IR 05000334/2014002

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000334/2014002 and 05000412/2014002 (Jan 1 - Mar 31, 2014)

ML14135A317
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/15/2014
From:	Kevin Mangan Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Emily Larson FirstEnergy Nuclear Generation
Mangan, KA
References
IR-14-002
Download: ML14135A317 (40)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:May 15, 2014

SUBJECT:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2014002 AND 05000412/2014002

Dear Mr. Larson:

On March 31, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 3, 2014, with Mr. R. Bologna, Director of Site Operations, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one violation of an NRC requirement and one finding, both of which were of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the non-cited violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding, or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Kevin A. Mangan, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000334/2014002 and 05000412/2014002 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos.: DPR-66, NPF-73 Report No.: 05000334/2014002 and 05000412/2014002 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA 15077 Dates: January 1 to March 31, 2014 Inspectors: J. Nadel, Acting Senior Resident Inspector E. Carfang, Resident Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector N. Floyd, Reactor Inspector D. Orr, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector R. Rolph, Health Physicist Inspector Approved By: Kevin Mangan, Chief (Acting) Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000334/2014002, 05000412/2014002; 01/01/2014 - 03/31/2014; Beaver Valley Power

Station, Units 1 and 2; Post Maintenance Testing; Plant Events.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified two findings of very low safety significance (Green), of which one was a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 19, 2013. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing, Green finding was identified because FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) did not evaluate technical information provided in a vendor report as required by FENOC procedures: 1/2-ADM-2017, Control of Vendor Technical Information and NOP-CC-1003, Vendor Manuals and Vendor Technical Information.

Specifically, FENOC did not take action to address the recommendation in the ABB Inc.

Life Assessment Report, dated September 2, 2008, to prevent the running of all the main transformer oil pumps when the oil temperature is below 50°C. As a result on January 6, 2014 the Beaver Valley main transformer failed resulting in a reactor trip. Following the trip FENOC conducted an apparent cause evaluation and determined the transformer failure resulted from static electrification caused by improper cooling system operation. FENOC subsequently performed corrective actions included a review of engineering training and updating the operating procedures for the main transformer at both units. The inspectors determined the actions to be reasonable.

The inspectors determined the performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the main transformer faulted due to improper guidance on transformer cooling bank operation which resulted in a plant trip. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigating equipment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Design Margin, in that FENOC did not ensure that equipment margin was carefully guarded and changed through a systematic and rigorous process. Specifically, FENOC did not ensure that the vendor technical review process implemented main transformer operating margin guidance that resulted in the failure of the transformer (H.6). (Section 4OA3)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

A self-revealing, Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because FENOC did not establish appropriate post maintenance test procedures for the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW)pump following trip/throttle valve maintenance that required the removal and reinstallation of the governor. Specifically, FENOC identified in their apparent cause evaluation that vendor technical information regarding the verification of stable governor operating temperature following governor compensating needle valve adjustment was not incorporated into surveillance and post maintenance testing procedures. Because of this omission FENOC did not identify an incorrect governor compensating needle valve adjustment during post maintenance testing on November 1, 2103 and declared the TDAFW pump operable when it was not able to perform its safety function. As a result, the TDAFW pump tripped on overspeed following a reactor trip on January 6, 2014. Following the event, FENOC entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR-2014-0177), performed an apparent cause evaluation, and took corrective actions to update TDAFW pump surveillance and maintenance procedures to ensure the establishment of a stable governor temperature during post maintenance testing runs. The inspectors determined the actions to be reasonable.

The inspectors determined the performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the inadequate post maintenance testing procedure resulted in the inoperability of the TDAFW pump. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required because the finding represented an actual loss of function of a single train of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. The detailed risk evaluation determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most recent opportunity for FENOC to include the appropriate vendor information in the post maintenance testing procedure was in 2009 and is not indicative of current performance.

   (Section 1R19)

Other Findings

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by FENOC was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by FENOC have been entered into FENOCs corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On January 6, 2014, the unit tripped due to a main transformer fault. Following the replacement of the main transformer, operators returned the unit to 100 percent power on January 30, 2014. On January 31, 2014, operators down powered the unit to approximately 15 percent power to remove the main transformer from service due to an open current transformer. The unit returned to 100 percent power on February 1, 2014. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed FENOCs preparations for the onset of cold weather the week of January 6, 2014. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during this adverse weather condition to determine if the impending adverse weather could challenge safety systems and to ensure that FENOC personnel had adequately prepared for potential challenges. The inspectors walked down the emergency diesel generators and auxiliary feedwater system to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in FENOCs adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and FENOC personnel availability for adverse weather response with the operations and work control departments to ensure that they were available and capable of responding to potential adverse weather challenges.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: 47 service water strainer during 48 service water strainer outage for corrective maintenance on February 13, 2014 2A recirculation spray pump while 2B recirculation spray pump was out of service for preventative maintenance on MOV-1RS-156B and 1RS-159 on February 14, 2014 1A quench spray pump during planned maintenance on the 1B quench spray pump on March 10, 2014 2-1 Emergency diesel generator (EDG) during corrective maintenance on the 2-2 EDG cooler on March 17, 2014 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether FENOCs staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection