IR 05000336/2015002: Difference between revisions
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No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R04}} | {{a|1R04}} | ||
==1R04 Equipment Alignment | ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 3 samples) | ||
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 3 samples) | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
== | |||
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: | The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: | ||
Unit 2 Facility 2 of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) during facility 1 surveillance testing on June 30 Unit 3 B quench spray system (QSS) during A QSS Quarterly Surveillance on May 7 C component cooling pump train following restoration of B component cooling pump train following B pump motor replacement on May 8 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Review (UFSAR), technical specifications (TS), work orders, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. | Unit 2 Facility 2 of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) during facility 1 surveillance testing on June 30 Unit 3 B quench spray system (QSS) during A QSS Quarterly Surveillance on May 7 C component cooling pump train following restoration of B component cooling pump train following B pump motor replacement on May 8 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Review (UFSAR), technical specifications (TS), work orders, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. | ||
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No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R05}} | {{a|1R05}} | ||
==1R05 Fire Protection | ==1R05 Fire Protection | ||
===.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns=== | ===.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns=== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05Q|count=4}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05Q|count== | ||
=4}} | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
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{{a|2R22}} | {{a|2R22}} | ||
==2R22 startup, Cycle 23, and 2R23 and the resultant impact to the plant. | ==2R22 startup, Cycle 23, and 2R23 and the resultant impact to the plant. | ||
== | |||
Dominion is tracking work order 53102730091 to repair the leaking PORV in 2R23 (October 2015), but this work order is a contingency work order from 2R22, and still has open holds before it is ready to be worked. Additionally, there is a request for engineering assistance to change the design of the PORVs in 2R24 (2017) that is still in the early planning stages. Without a completed causal analysis to explain the 2R22 leakage, it is unsure if the design change is necessary or sufficient to solve the problem. | Dominion is tracking work order 53102730091 to repair the leaking PORV in 2R23 (October 2015), but this work order is a contingency work order from 2R22, and still has open holds before it is ready to be worked. Additionally, there is a request for engineering assistance to change the design of the PORVs in 2R24 (2017) that is still in the early planning stages. Without a completed causal analysis to explain the 2R22 leakage, it is unsure if the design change is necessary or sufficient to solve the problem. | ||
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{{a|3R17}} | {{a|3R17}} | ||
==3R17 in 2016 and A for 3R18 in 2017. | ==3R17 in 2016 and A for 3R18 in 2017. | ||
== | |||
The inspectors identified a performance deficiency against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI associated with Dominions failure to correct conditions adverse to quality associated with the Unit 3 RHS heat exchangers in a timely manner. However, this performance deficiency is not considered more than minor as if left uncorrected, the condition does not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern provided it is monitored and restored in accordance with Dominion analyses, programs, and work control plans. | The inspectors identified a performance deficiency against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI associated with Dominions failure to correct conditions adverse to quality associated with the Unit 3 RHS heat exchangers in a timely manner. However, this performance deficiency is not considered more than minor as if left uncorrected, the condition does not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern provided it is monitored and restored in accordance with Dominion analyses, programs, and work control plans. | ||
Revision as of 22:51, 16 November 2019
| ML15222A834 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/2015 |
| From: | Raymond Mckinley NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Heacock D Dominion Resources |
| McKinley R | |
| References | |
| IR 2015002 | |
| Download: ML15222A834 (44) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 August 10, 2015 Mr. David Heacock President and Chief Nuclear Officer Dominion Resources 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711 SUBJECT: MILLSTONE POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2015002 AND 05000423/2015002 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200047/2015001
Dear Mr. Heacock:
On June 30, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 27, 2015, with Mr. John Daugherty, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/ Raymond R. McKinley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423 License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000336/2015002 and 05000423/2015002 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I== Docket Nos. 50-336 and 50-423 License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49 Report Nos. 05000336/2015002 and 05000423/2015002 Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Dominion) Facility: Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2015 Inspectors: J. Ambrosini, Sr. Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Haagensen, Resident Inspector, DRP L. McKown, Resident Inspector, DRP J. Richmond, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) H. Anagnostopoulos, Health Physicist, DRS D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS O. Masnyk Bailey, Health Physicist, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety (DNMS) B. Bollinger, Health Physicist (training status), DNMS Approved By: Raymond R. McKinley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000336/2015002, 05000423/2015002; 04/01/2015 - 06/30/2015; Millstone
Power Station (Millstone), Units 2 and 3; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December, 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Millstone Unit 2 and 3 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On April 1, Unit 2 reduced power to approximately 70 percent power and Unit 3 reduced power to approximately 85 percent power in advance of planned maintenance on the 371 offsite power line. Both units returned to 100 percent power on April 4. On April 21, Unit 3 reduced power to approximately 67 percent in advance of planned maintenance on the 371 offsite power line.
Unit 3 returned to 100 percent power on April 29. Both units remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate Alternating Current (AC) Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of plant features and procedures for the operation and continued availability of the offsite and alternate AC power system to evaluate readiness of the systems prior to seasonal high grid loading. The inspectors reviewed Dominions procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and Dominion. This review focused on changes to the established program and material condition of the offsite and alternate AC power equipment. The inspectors assessed whether Dominion established and implemented appropriate procedures and protocols to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite alternate AC power system. The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the associated equipment by interviewing the responsible system manager, reviewing condition reports (CRs) and open work orders, and walking down portions of the offsite and AC power systems.
Documents reviewed for each section of the inspection report are listed in the .
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 2 Facility 2 of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) during facility 1 surveillance testing on June 30 Unit 3 B quench spray system (QSS) during A QSS Quarterly Surveillance on May 7 C component cooling pump train following restoration of B component cooling pump train following B pump motor replacement on May 8 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Review (UFSAR), technical specifications (TS), work orders, CRs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.
The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Dominion staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection