ML081370218

Feb-Mar 05000259/2008301 Exam Draft RO Written Exam (Part 2 of 4)

ML081370218
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	04/08/2008
From:	NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-259/08-301 50-259/08-301
Download: ML081370218 (86)

See also: IR 05000259/2008301

Text

(7)CASx(CASAorCASB)

accident signal(after5seconddelayviaBBRXrelay)OPL171.036

Revision 11Page24of58-122"RxVLOR2.45DWPAND

<450#RPV I.4kV ShutdownBoards(NormalPowerSeeking)1.Powersources

a.4kV suppliestoeach U1/2 Shutdown Board:areasfollows:BoardNORMALSupplyAShutdownBus1BShutdownBus1CShutdownBus2DShutdownBus2Thefirstalternateisfromthe

other ShutdownBus.Thesecond

alternateisfromthediesel

generator.Thethird alternateisfromtheU3

diesel generatorsviaaU3 Shutdown Board.b.Therearetwopossible4kV

suppliestoeach U3 Shutdown Board:BoardNORMALSupply3EAUnitBoard3A3EBUnitBoard3A3ECUnitBoard3B3EDUnitBoard3B(1)Thefirstalternateisfromthediesel

generators.

The U1/2 diesel generators

cannot supply powertotheU3ShutdownBoardsalone.

Theymay,however,be

paralleledwiththeU3diesel generatorsforbackfeed

operation.Thetie breakerofftheunit3

ShutdownBoardis interlocked

as follows:Refertoprints15E-500seriesKeyDiagramof STDBYAux.PowerSystem

Obj.V.B.6.cObj.V.C.1.c

Obj.V.D.6.c SBO 3%viabustie board%%viaotherSOBus

7.ShutdownBoardTransferSchemea.Theonlyautomatic

transferofpoweronashutdownboardisadelayed(slow)transfer.Inorderforthetransfertotakeplace,thebus

transfercontrolswitch(43Sx)mustbein

AUTOMATIC.OPL171.036

Revision 11 Page 31of58Obj.V.B.8.cObj.V.C.2.cObj.V.D.8.c

ProceduralAdherencewhen

transferring

boards (**b(1)Undervoltageissensedonthelinesideofthenormal

feeder breaker.(2)Voltageisavailableonthelinesideofthealternatefeederbreaker.(3)Thenormalfeeder

breaker thenreceivesatripsignal.(4)A52bcontactonthenormalsupplybreakershutsintheclosecircuitofthealternatefeederbreaker,indicatingthatthenormal

breaker is open.(5)Aresidualvoltagerelayshutsintheclosecircuitofthealternatesupplybreaker,indicatingthat

ooar a voltagebasdecayedtolessthan30percentofnormal.(6)Thealternatesupply

breaker then closes.Theshutdownboard

transferschemeisNORMALseeking.Ifpowerisrestoredtothelinesideofthenormal

feederbreaker,andifthe43SxswitchisstillinAUTOMATIC,thena"slow" transferbacktothenormalsupplywilloccur.Thiswillcause

momentarypowerlosstoloadsonthebusandESFactuationsarepossible.ManualHighSpeed(Fast

Transfer)Tofast transferashutdownboardperformthe

following:Obj.V.B.8.cObj.V.C.2.cReviewINPOSOER83-06

OPL171.036Revision11Page32of58

((1)Ensure voltage is availablefromtheProceduralalternatesource.

Adherence(2)Place43SxswitchtoMANUAL.

(3)Place alternate breakerSYNCswitch

Self ChecktoON.(4)Place alternate supply breaker switchinCLOSE.(5)Placenormal

supply breakerswitchin TRIP.(6)Alternate breakercloseswhen52b

Alternatesupplyis contactfromnormal

breakercloses,notaqualifiedOff-indicatingthat

breakerhasopened.Ifsitesupply

the Alternate SupplyfromSOBusisclosedtoaUnit1/2SIDBoard,an AccidentSignalwilltripitopen.(7)Turn offSYNCswitch.

(8)DONOTplace

43Sxswitchbackto

AUTOMATIC (Transferbackto normal supplywouldoccur).

Note:IftheSYNC SWwasnotONforSelfCheck the alternatebreaker,a delayed transfer would occurwhenthe normal breaker opensandtheboardresidual

voltage relay detectslessthan30%voltage, assuming the alternate breaker'scontrolswitchisheldintheCLOSEposition.

c.Conditions

which automaticallytriptheboard

transfercontrolswitch(43Sx)to

MANUAL: (1)Normal Feeder Lockout Relay (86-xxx)(2)Alternate Feeder LockoutRelay(86-,xxx)(3)Normal Feeder Control Transfer Switch in EMERGENCY (4)Alternate Feeder Control Transfer-122"RxVLSwitchin EMERGENCY OR ((5)CASx accident signal2.45DWPAND

<450#RPV

(.-----20.RO 262002 Al.02 OO l/C/Am/GI/UNIT PREFFERRED/C/A 2.5/2.9/262002AA l.02/B F0530I/RO/SRO/lO/27/2007

G iventhefollowingplantconditions:*Un it3is inanormallineup

.*Thefollowingalarmisreceived

-UNITPFD SUPPLY ABNORMAL*Itis determinedthatthealarm

isduetotheUnit-3Unit

Preferred AC Generator Overvoltage

condition Wh ichONEofthefollowing

describes the correctresultofthis

condition?

Assume NO Operator actions.A.Unit3bkr1001tripsopen;Unit2bkr1003interlockedopen

theMMGset automaticallyshutsdown.B.Unit3bkr1001

interlocked

open;Unit2bkr1003tripsopen;theMMGset

automaticallyshutsdown.Unit3bkr1001tripsopen

Unit2bkr1003interlockedopen

theMMGset continuestorunwithout

excitat ion.D.Unit3bkr1001

interlocked

open;Un it2bkr1003tripsopen;theMMGsetcont

inuestorunwithout

excitation

.KIA Statement:262002UPS(AC/DC)

KIA:A1.02Abilityto

predict and/or monitorchangesin parameters

associatedwithoperatingthe

UNINTERRUPTABLE

POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.)controlsincluding:

Motor generator outputs.KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequir ing the candidatetocorrectlyapplyaspecificoperatingconditionoftheUPSMMGSettothecorrect

responseofthe systemtothatcondition.

References:

OPL171.102, Rev.6,pg20&21, 3-ARP-9-8B

, Rev.9,tile35 Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirementtoassemble

, sort ,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontosolveaproblem

.This requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningtoresolvetheproblem

.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis: (Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:

1.The1001and1003

breakersfromanMMGsetwilltripon

overvoltage

or underfrequencyattheoutputoftheMMG.2.Unit2MMG

Breakers are interlockedtopreventalternate

powertounit1and3atthesametime.

3.Whenan overvoltage

conditionexistsatthe

GeneratorOutput,the1001

breakerfromtheMMGSet

trips.4.ExcitationislostandtheMMGSet

continuestorun.5.TheHoldto buildupvoltageswitchmustbe

depressedtorestore voltage.AlsoAis incorrect.TheMMGsetdoesnot

automaticallyshutdown.Thisisplausiblebecausethebreakerlineupiscorrect.Bis incorrect.TheMMGsetdoesnot

automaticallyshutdown.Thisisplausiblealthoughthebreakerlineupisbackwards.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.

The breakerlineupis backwards.ThisisplausiblebecausetheMMGSetwillcontinuetorunwithoutexcitation.

(

(BFN Unit 1 Panel 1-9-8 1-XA-55-8B

Senso rlTrip Poin t: 1-ARP-9-8BRev.0009 Page 42 of 42UNITPFD SUPPLY ABNORMAL (Page 1 of 1)RelaySE-loss ofnormalDC power source.RelayTS-DCXferswitch

transfers to Emergency DC Power Source.Regulating

Transforme

rCommonAlarm.

1-INV-252-001

,INVT-1SystemCommonAlarm

.Sensor Location: Probable Cause:EL593'250VDCBatteryBoard2A.LossofnormalDC

power source B.DC power transfer.C.Relayfailure

D.INVT-1 SystemCommonAlarms

1.FanFailure

Rectifier 2.Over temperature

Rectifier 3.AC PowerFailuretoRectifier

4.LowDC Voltage5.HighDC Voltage6.LowDC Disconnect

7.FanFailure

Inverter 8.Alternate Source Failure 9.:LowAC Output Voltage 10.H igh Output Voltage 11.InverterFuseBlown 12.StaticSwitchFuseBlown

13.Over Temperature

InverterE.PFD RegulatingXFMRCommonAlarms

1.Transformer

Over temperature

2.Fan Failure 3.CB1 Breaker Tr ip 4.CB2 Breaker Trip Auto transfertoDC Power SourceonRect ifier failure.Auto transfer to AlternateACsupply (Regulated

Transformer)onInverterfailure.

Automatic A.Action: B.Operator A.Act ion: B.IF 120VACUn itPreferredislost

, THENREFERTO 1-AOI-57-4, Loss ofUnitPreferred

.REFER TO appropriateportionof 0-OI-57C , 208V/120V AC Electrical

System.o o References:

0-45E641-2

10-100467 1-45E620-11

0-20-100756

1-3300D15A4585-1

20-110437

(b.(d)AnotherUnit'sMMGsetThesecond alternateisfromanotherunit'sMMGsetoutput.Unit2MMGisthesecondalternatefor

eitherUnit1orUnit3;Unit3isthesecondalternateforUnit2

.Transferstothissourceare

done manuallyatBatteryBoard2panel11.MMGSets(Unit2&3)(1)TheMMGisnormallydrivenBytheACmotor,poweredfrom

480VShutdownBoardA.Shouldthissupplyfail,theAC

motor is automatically

disconnectedandtheDCmotorstarts,poweredfrom250VBatteryBoard.TheDCmotorhasanalternate

powersupplyfrom

another 250V Battery Board.Transfertothe alternateDCsourceismanual.

Underfrequencyonthe generatoroutputwilltriptheDCmotor.TransferoftheMMGsetbacktotheACmotorismanual.(2)The1001and1003breakersfromanMMGsetwilltripon

overvoltage

or underfrequencyatthe output oftheMMG.AlsoUnit2MMGBreakersareinterlockedtopreventalternatepowertounit1and3atthesametime

.OPL171.102Revision6Page20of69Obj.V.B.2.b TP-11 Obj'v.D.2.c Obj.V.D.2.d/jObjV.E.2.c

Obj'v.E.2.d/iObjV.B.2.h Obj'v.C.3.e

Obj'v.D.2.j

Obj'v.E.2.i

(3)WhenanunderfrequencyorovervoltageconditionexistsattheGeneratorOutputthefollowing

occurs(a)BBpanel10breakersfromtheMMGSettrip.OPL171.102Revision6Page21of 69Obj.V.B.2.hObj.V.C.3.e

Obj.V.D.2.jObj.V.E.2.i U2 U31001(U2)

1001(U3)1003(U1&3)1003(U2)(b)ExcitationislostandtheMMGSetcontinuestorun.(TheHoldtobuildupvoltageswitchmustbedepressedtorestore

voltage.)

((21.RO 263000KI.02 00 I/MEMlT2G I1250VDC/3/26

3000KI.02//RO/SROI

Wh ichONEofthefollowing

statements

describestheoperat ionof250VDCBattery

Charger 2B?A.Thenormal power supplytoBattery Charger 2B i s 480V CommonBoard1.8.Battery Charger2Bcansupply

.directlyfromunit2BatteryBoardroom,anyofthesixUnit

&Plant 250VDC battery boards.C.Battery Charger2Bis capable of supplyingtwoBatteryBoards

simultaneously.

0.01Loadsheddingofthe

battery chargercanbe bypassedbyplacingthe

Emergency ON select switch inthe EmergencyONPosition.KIA Statement:263000DCElectrical

Distribution

K1.02-Knowledgeofthe

physical connections

and/or cause-effect relationships

between D.C.ELECTRICAL

DISTRIBUTIONandthe following: Battery chargerandbattery

KIA Justification:

Th is quest ion satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequ iring the candidatetousespecific

knowledgeofbattery charger operation.References

OPL171.037Levelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedasMEMduetotherequ

irementtorecallorrecognized

iscretebitsof information

.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inorderto answer this quest ion cor rectlythecand idate must determine the follow ing: 1.Normaland Alternate power to Battery Charger 2B.2.Loadscapableofbeing

suppliedbyBattery Charger 2B.3.LoadShedd

ing log icandbypass capabil ity.Aisincorrect.Thisis plausible because 480V CommonBoard1 isthe Alternate supplytoBattery Charger 2B.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausible because Battery Charger 2B i s capable of supply ing any ofthes ix 250VBatteryBoards

, but NOT directlyfromUnit2BatteryBoardRoom

.Cis incorrect.

Thisisplaus ible because Battery Charger2Bis sufficiently large enough to support the loads , but mechanical

interlocks preventclosingmorethanone

output feeder breaker.D iscorrect.

((2)The Plant/Station

Batteries(4,5,and6)are

ClassNon-1Eandareutilized

primarilyforU-2,U-1,andU-3

respectively

--fornormalloadsOPL171.037 Revision 10Page11of70ObjV.B.1Obj.V.C.1Obj.V.D.1 (3)Battery(4)RoomislocatedonUnit3inthe

TurbineBuildingonElev.586

(4)Battery(5&6)Roomsare

locatedonthe TurbineFloor,Elev.617(5)The boards and chargersfortheUnit

Batteries are locatedinBatteryBoard

Rooms adjacenttothe batteriestheyserve,withthe

spare chargerbeingintheUnit2

Battery Board room.(BatteryBoards5&6and

their associated

chargersarelocated

adjacent to the batteries,butareintheopen

spaceofthe turbine floor.)c.250V Plant DC components

(1)Battery charger(a)The battery chargers are ofthesolid state rectifiertype.They normally supply loadsonthe 250VPlantDC DistributionSystem.Uponlossof

powertothecharger,the

battery suppliestheloads.(b)Themainbank

chargers only provide float and equalize charge whentiedto theirloads.The chargersarenot placedonfast charge (high voltage equalize)withanyloads

attached.(c)They can rechargeafully discharged

batteryin12hourswhile

supplying normal loads.(d)Battery charger power suppliesareFollow Procedure manual transfer only.(250V Battery Normal Source Alternate Source Charaer (Charger Service bus)1 480VSDBd1A 480V CommonBd1Comp6D Comp 3A 2A 480VSDBd2A 480V CommonBd1 Comp6DComp3A 2B 480VSDBd2B 480V CommonBd1 Comp6D Comp 3A 3 480VSDBd3A 480V CommonBd1Comp6D Comp3AObj.V.B.2 Obj.V.C.2 Obj V.D.2

(4 5 480VSOBd3B Com 60 480VComBd1Com5C 480V CommonBd1Com3A (no alternate)OPL171.037Revision10Page12of70

63(no alternate)2Bspare charger DC outputcanbedirectedtoanyoffourfeeders.ThreeDC

outputscanbe connected to batteryboard1,2,or3.Thefourth

output is connectedtoanew output transferswitch(locatedin

batteryboardroom4)which

charges batteries4,5,or6plantbatteries.Amec

lianical interloc Kpermitsclosing

onl y: one output feeaeratatime.(Aslidebarisutilizedin

batteryboardroom2andaKirkkey

interlockisusedin battery boardroom4 TP-2&TP-7 AttentiontoDetail

(XI.Summary We have discussed in detailtheDC Power SystemsatBFN.The electrical

design and operation which makes these systems so reliable has been explained.

The various systems have been described with reference to function, components, locations, and electrical

loads.Power sources have been identified, and instrumentation

has been noted.Significant

control and alarm aspects have also been pointed out.OPL171.037Revision10Page31 of 70 250V Battery Charger Normal Source Alternate Source (Charger Service bus)1 480VSOBd1A,Comp

60 480V CommonBd1,Comp3A

2A 480VSOBd 2A Comp 60 480V CommonBd1,Comp 3A 2B 480VSOBd2B, Comp 60 480V CommonBd1,Comp3A

3 480VSOBd3A,Comp

60 480V CommonBd1,Comp3A

4 480VSOBd3B,Comp

60 480V CommonBd1,Comp 3A 5 480VComBd1Comp5C (no alternate)

6 480VComBd3Comp3D (no alternate)

The 2B spare charger DC outputcanbe directed to any of four feeders.Three DC outputscanbe connected to battery board1,2,or3.The fourth DC output is connected to output transfer switch (BBR4)to batteries4,5, or 6.Mechanical

interlock permits closing only one output feederatatime.(A

slide bar is utilized in battery boardroom2 and a Kirk key interlock is used in battery board room 4.)250V DC battery chargers 1, 2Aand2B will load shed upon receipt of a Unit1or Unit 2 accident signal and any Unit 1/2 shutdown board being suppliedbyits respective

diesel generator or cross tiedtoa Unit 3 shutdown boardanda unit three Diesel Generator.

250 VDC Battery Charger 3 will load shedona unit 3 load shed signal.eoad shedding feature can be

by.placing the"Emergency" swi tCii on thecharger.to

tfie"EMERG" P.Qsition.Station Battery charger 4 does not have load shed logic;however, battery charger4will deenergize

when 3B 480 SID Board deenergizes

and will return when the 480V SID Board voltage returns.They also supply alternate control power for Units1and2 4kV Shutdown Boards;however, on Unit3,theA,C,and

0 4kV Shutdown Boards receive both normal and alternate control power from the 250V DC Unit Systems.(3EB receives alternate control power only.)The 250V DC RMOV Boards are supplied from the Unit Battery Board as follows: BB-1 supplies 250V RMOV Boards1A,2C,3B.BB-2 supplies 250V RMOVBds2A,1C,3C.

OPL171.037Revision10Page47 of70 (-=:=:=..=.---480vSOBO1A NOR............

BATTERY CHARGER No.1 ALT............

480v SO B02A............

BATTERY CHARGER No.2A ALT.............480vSOBO2B

NOR............

BATTERYCHARGER en No.2B 0: w u..ALT en z 1************

-I-480v SO B03A0..I-NOR;:),.-------.---i

0 I aJ: BATTERY: N CHARGER*0*I-: No.3**ALT:............

480vSOBO3B

NOR BATTERY CHARGER t--------+-----+--+----i--+---;--i----+---+-

____NO.4 1-----'ALT BATTBO1 BATT B02 BATT B03 BATT B04 480v COMMONBO1..............._....................TP-2250VDCPowerDistribution

((22.RO 264000K5.06

00 l/C/A/T2Gl/82

-DG/9/264000K5

.06//RO/SRO

/Giventhefollowingplantconditions:*Unit2isoperatingatFullPower.*No EquipmentisOutofService.*Alargeleak

occursinthedrywellandthefollowing

conditions

exist:-DrywellPressurepeakedat28psigandiscurrentlyat20psig

.-Reactor Pressureisat110psig

.-Reactor WaterLevelisat-120inches-Offsite powerisavailable

.WhichONEofthefollowing

describestheproperloading

sequence and associated

equipment?

A.II28RHRand 28CoreSpraypumpsstartat7secondsafterthe

accidentsignalisreceived

.B.RHRSWpumpslinedupfor

EECWstartat14secondsafterthe

accidentsignalisreceived

.c.CoreSpraypumps(2A

, 28 ,2C,2D)start

immediatelywhenvoltageis

availableontherespectiveshutdownboard

.D.2CRHRand2CCoreSpraypumpsstartat7

secondsafterthe accidentsignalisreceived

.KIA Statement:264000EDGs

K5.06-Knowledgeofthe

operational

implicationsofthefollowing

conceptsastheyapplyto

EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEUJET):

Load sequenc ing KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsandtimesto

correctly determine the effectof.load sequencingonplant equipmentsuppliedbythe

Emergency Generators

.References:

Level of Knowledge Justification:

Th isquestionisratedas

CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble, sort ,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictan

outcome.This requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis: (Inordertoanswerthisquestioncorrectlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing

1.LoadSequencingisNVA(NormalVoltageAvailable)andNOTDGVA (DIGVoltageAvailable).

2.BasedonItem1above, theproperloadsequencingwithaCommon

AccidentSignal(CAS)onUnit-2aloneandNOTinadditiontoaCASonUnit1.Ais correct.Bis incorrect.Thisisplus

iblebecauseRHRSWpumpsallstartat14

secondsifloadsequencingis

DGVA.Cis incorrect.ThisisplausiblebasedonLoadSequencinglogicpriortoamodificationforUnit1restart

activities.Dis incorrect.Thisisplausiblebecause2-01-74P&L3.2.Bdefinesthestarttimeas7second"intervals".(

(b.(2)Opensdieseloutputbreakersifshut.Ifnormalvoltageisavailable,loadwillsequenceonasfollows:(NVA)

OPL171.038Revision16Page38 of63 INSTRUCTOR

NOTES ou.v.s.s ou.v.c.e Obj.v.D.15 oejv.s.15 Time After Accident SID Board SID Board SID Board SID Board A C B D , 0-RHR/GS-A_l 7RHR/CSB 14RHR/CSC 21RHR/CSD 28 RHRSW RHRSW RHRSW*RHRSW*RHRSWpumpsassigned

for.EECWautomaticstart

c.If ormal voltage is NeT-available: (DGVA)(1)After5-secondtimedelay, all4kVShutdownBoardloadsexcept

4160/480Vtransformerbreakersareautomaticallytripped.(2)Dieselgeneratoroutputbreakercloseswhendieselisatspeed.

ouv.e.s ouv.c.e c.(3)Loadssequenceasindicatedbelow

Time After Accident SID Board SID Board SID Board SID Board A B C D 0RHRARHRCRHRBRHRD 7 CSACSCCSBCSD 14 RHRSW*RHRSW*RHRSW*RHRSW**RHRSWpumpsassignedforEECWautomaticstartd.Certain480Vloadsareshedwheneveranaccidentsignalisreceivedinconjunctionwiththedieselgeneratortiedtotheboard.(seeOPL171.072)

((BFN Residual Heat Removal System 2-01-74 Unit 2Rev.0133Page17 of 3673.2LPCI (continued)

B.Uponan automaticLPCIinitiationwithnormal

power available, RFiR P-umpstartsimme

aiately.and2B,2C,2D

sequentially

startat7 second intervals.

Otherwise,allRHRpumps

start immediately

once diesel powerisavailable(andnormal

power unavailable).

C.Manually stoppinganRHRpumpafterLPCI

initiation

disables automatic restartofthatpumpuntilthe

initiationsignalisreset.The

affectedRHRpumpcanstillbestarted manually.3.3 Shutdown CoolingA.Priorto initiating

ShutdownCooling,RHRshouldbe

flushed to Radwaste until conductivityislessthan2.0

micromho/cmwithlessthan0.1ppmchlorides (unless directed otherwise by 2-AOI-74-1, Loss of Shutdown Cooling).IfCS&Shasbeen alignedasthekeepfillsourcefortwo

daysormorea chemistry sampleshouldbe requestedandresults

analyzed to determineifflushingis

required.B.Whenin Shutdown Cooling, reactor temperature

should be maintained

greater than 72°Fandonlybe controlledbythrottling

RHRSWflow.Thisistoassure

adequatemixingof reactor water.1.[NER/C]Reactor vessel water temperatures

below 68°Fexceedthe temperature

reactivity

assumedinthe criticality

analysis.[INPOSER90-017]

2.[NER/C]Maintaining

water temperature

below 100°F minimizesthereleaseof

soluble activity.[GESIL541]

C.Shutdown Cooling operation at saturated conditions

(212°F)with2RHRpumps

operatingator near combinedmaximumflow

(20,000gpm)couldcauseJet

Pump Cavitation.

IndicationsofJetPump Cavitationareasfollows:1.RiseinRHR

System flow without a correspondingrisein JetPumpflow.2.FluctuationofJetPumpflow.

3.Louder"Rumbling"noiseheardwhenvesselheadisoff.

Correctiveactionforanyofthese

symptoms wouldbetoreduceRHRflowuntil

the symptom is corrected.

(23.RO 300000K2.02 001/MEM/T2Gl/CAI1300000K2.02/

2.8/2.8/RO/SR0/1l/16/07

RMSWhichONEofthefollow

ing describesthepowersuppliestotheControlandServiceAir

Compressor

motors?A."A"and"8"arefedfromthe480VCommon8d.#1"C"and"0" from 480VSID8d.18&28 , respectively"G"from4KV

SID 8d.8and480SO8d

.2A"E"fromthe

480VCommon8d.#1 B."A"and"0" from 480V Common 8d.1"8"and"C"from

480VSID8d.18&28,respectively"G"from 4KV SID 8d.8and 480VRMOV8d.2A"F"from 480V Common8d.#3 C."A"from 480V SID 8d.18"8"and"F"from 480VCommon8d.#3"C"from 480V SID 8d.1A"0" from 480V SID 8d.2A"G"from4KV

Common 8d.#2 0.01"A"from 480V SID 8d.18"8"and"C"from

480V Common 8d.#1"0" from 480V SID 8d.2A"G"from 4KV SID8d.8and 480V RMOV 8d.2A"E"from 480V Common8d.#3 KJA Statement:

300000 Instrument

Air.K2.02-Knowledgeof

electrical

powersuppliestothefollowing

Emergency a ir compressor

KJA Justification

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificknowledgeofthe

powersuppliesofALLair

compressors.

References

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognized

iscrete b its of informat ion.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis: (In order to answer this question correctly the candidate must determine the following:

1.Power suppliestosix air compressors

.NOTE: Regarding plausibility,allthe power supplieslistedinthe

distractors

are capable of supplying power to each air compressor

.Aisincorrect.

B ,G&Eare correct.A,C&Dare incorrect.Bis incorrect.

F&G are correct.A,B,C,&Dare incorrect.Cis incorrect.

A, D&Fare correct.B,C&Gare incorrectDiscorrect.

((X.LessonBodyA.ControlAir

System1.**The purposeoftheControlAirSystemisto

process and distribute

oil-freecontrolair,driedtoalow

dew pointandfree of foreign materials.

This high-qualityairis required throughouttheplantandyardto

ensure the proper functioning

of pneumatically

operated instruments, valves ,andfinal operators.2.Basic DescriptionofFlowPatha.The station controlairsystemhas5air

compressors, each designed for continuous

operation.

b.Common header(fedbyair compressors

A-DandG)(1)The control air system is normally alignedwiththeGair compressorrunningandloaded.The

existing A-D air compressors

are alignedwithone in second lead ,oneinthirdlead,andat

least one compressor

in standby.(2)3 control air receivers(3)4dual dryersOneforeachunit's

control air header(units1,2&3

through their 4-inch headers)andOne standby dryer supplies the standby ,3-inchcommoncontrolair

header for all three units (4)Outletfromlarge service air receiver is connectedtothe control air receiversthrougha pressure control valve 0-FCV-33-1,whichwill automaticallyopento supply serviceairtothe control air header if control air pressurefallsto85psig

.c.4-inch control air header(1perunit)is

supplied fromeachunit dryerandbackedupbyacommon,3-inch

standby header.3.ControlAir

System Component Description

a.Four Reciprocating

Air Compressors

A-D (2-stage, double acting, V-type)arelocatedEI565,U-1

Turbine Building.(1)Supplyairtothecontrolair

receiversat610scfmeachata normal operating pressureof90-101 psig.(2)480V,60Hz, 3-phase, drive motors (3)Power suppliesAfrom 480V Shutdown Board1BOPL171.054Revision12Page9of72**SOER 88-1 Obj.V.E.1 TP-1 Obj.V.E.3Obj.V.D.1TheGair compressorwillbe discussedlaterinthissectionofthelesson

plan.normallyalignedtoall

three units TP-1

(o from 480V ShutdownBoard2ABfrom 480V CommonBoard1Cfrom 480V CommonBoard1 (a)Control air compressorswhichare poweredfromthe480VAC

shutdown boards are tripped automaticallydueto: i.under voltageonthe shutdown board.ii.loadshedlogicduringan

accident signal concurrentwithaloss of offsite power.NOTE: The compressors

must be restarted manually after power is restoredtotheboard.(b)Units powered from common boardsalsotripdueto under voltage.(4)Lubrication

provided from attached oil system via gear-typeoilpump (a)Compressortripsonlubeoil pressure<10psig orlubeoil temperature

>180 of (b)Compressor

cylinderisanon lubricated

type (5)Cooling waterisfromtheRaw

Cooling Water system with backup from EECW (a)Compressoroilcooler, compressorcooler, after cooler and cylinder water jackets (b)Compressor

inter-cooler

and after cooler moisture traps drain moisture to theUnit1 station sump.NOTE: Cooling waterflowstothe

compressors

are regulated such that the RCW outlet temperature

is maintained

between70°Fand100°F.

Outlet temperatures

should be adjustedlowintheband(high

flow rates)during warm seasons (river temps.70°F).Outlet temperatures

should be adjustedhighintheband

during the cooler seasons (river temps70°F)to reduce condensationinthe cylinders.(c)Compressorautotripsif

discharge temperature

of air>310°F.b.Unloaders OPL171.054Revision12Page10of72

Obj.V.B.1.Obj.V.C.1.Obj.V.B.2.Obj.V.C.2.Obj.V.E.12 Obj.V.D.10Obj.V.B.2.Obj.V.C.2.Obj.V.E.12Obj.V.D.10

((b)Shouldboththe primaryandthe backup controllersfail,all four compressors

will comeonlineatfullloaduntil

these pressure switches cause the compressors

to unload at112psig.(c)When air pressure drops belowthehigh pressure cutoff setpoint (110.8psig),the compressorswillagain comeonlineatfullloaduntilthehigh

pressure cutoff switches cause the compressors

to unload.d.Relief valvesonthe compressors

discharge set at120psig protects the compressor

and piping.e.G Air Compressor

-centrifugaltype,two stage (1)Located 565'EL Turbine Bldg.,Unit1end.Control Air Compressor

Gisthe primary control air compressor

and provides most of the control air needed for normal plant operation.(2)Ratedat

1440 SCFM@105psig.(3)Power Supply (a)4 kV Shutdown Board B supplies power to the compressor

motor.(b)480 V RMOV Bd.2A Supplies the following:*Prelubepump*Oil reservoir heater*Cooling water pumps*Panel(s)control power*Auto Restart circuit (c)Except for short power interruptionsonthe 480v RMOV Bd, Loss of either of these two power supplies will resultina shutdown of the G air compressor.(4)A complete descriptionoftheG Air compressor

controls and indicationscanbe found in 0-01-32.(TheGandtheFair

compressor

indicat ions and Microcontrollers

are similar).(a)UNLOAD MODULATE AUTO DUAL handswitchisusedto select the mode of operation for the compressor

OPL 171.054Revision12Page14of72

Cutout switch setpointsaresetat112psigto

prevent spurious operat ionwhenGair compressor

running Cover 01 illustrations

TP-8

3.Component Description

a.CompressorsEandF(EL565,U-3

Turbine Building)are designatedforserviceair.b.TheFair compressorisratedfor

approximately

630 SCFM@105psig,centrifugaltype,2stagesc.The powersupplyforboth

compressors

is 480VAC Common Board 3.d.FIG air compressor

comparison

(1)ControlsaresimilartothatoftheGair

compressor.Thereisno4KV

breakercontrolontheFair compressorcontrolpanel.(2)Controlsystemmodulates

discharge air pressureinthesame mannerasisdoneontheGair

compressor

.(3)Airsystemis similartotheGair compressor.

A differenceisthatthe2stagesof

compression

aredrivenbyoneshaftfortheFair

compressor.

OntheGaircompressor,thereisa

separate drives;oneforeachof3

compression

stages.(4)Oilsystem

similartothatontheGair

compressor

with exceptionoflocationof

components

andcapacity.E

compressorhasan electricoilpumpthatruns whenevercontrolpowerison.(5)CoolingsystemissimilartothatontheGair

compressorwithexceptionofflowrate,location, and capacityofcomponents.(6)Lossof powerwillresultinFair

compressor

trip ,lossoftheprelubepump,andthecooling

water pumps.(7)Restartofthe compressorcanbe accomplishedoncethe compressorhascometoafullstopandanytrip conditionsclearedandreset.

e.AlarmslTrips(1)The AlertandShutdown

setpointsforthe Fair compressorarelistedin0-01-33.OPL171.054Revision12Page30of72

Obj.V.E.6 Obj.V.DA TP-16 ouv.s.rObj.V.D.5Settocontrolatapprox.95psig-ReliefValveissettoliftat

.115psig.TP-17 TP-18 TP-19Seeforlatestsetpoints

(24.RO 300000K3.0100

lIel A/T2G lISGT/B 1 OB/300000K3.0 113.2/3A/RO/SRO/ll/l6/07

RMSALOCAhas occurredonUnit1andthedrywellisbeingventedtoSBGT,whenalossoftheControlAirsystemoccurs

.WhichONEof

thefo llowing descr ibestheoperatio

nofventva lves 1-FCV-64-29

, DRYWELLVENTINBDISOLVALVEand

1-FCV-84-19,PATHB VENT FLOW CONT?A.Bothventvalves1-FCV-64-29

&1-FCV-84-19willfailcloseandcannotbeoperated

.8.Bothventvalves

1-FCV-64-29

&1-FCV-84-19willautoswaptocontrolfromtheCADsupplylinewithno operatoractionrequ

ired.C.oIBothventvalves

1-FCV-64-29

&1-FCV-84-19willautoswaptocontrolfromtheCADsupplyl

ine , howeverCADsupplymustbe

manuallyalignedfromthecontrolroom

.D.TheCAD systemmustbe manuallyinitiatedandthenventvalves

1-FCV-64-29

&1-FCV-84-19

mayberealignedtotheCADsupply

.KIA Statement:

300000 Instrument

Air K3.01-Knowledgeofthe

effectthatalossor

malfunct ionofthe (INSTRUMENT

AIR SYSTEM)willhaveonthefollow

ing: Conta inment air system KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequir ing the candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine the effectontheconta

inment a irsystemduetoalossofControlAir.

References:

1-EOI Appendic ies8Gand12, 1-AOI-32-2

Level of Knowledge Justification:Thisquestionisratedas

CIAduetotherequ

irementtoassemble

,sort,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome

.This requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningtopredictthe

correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthis

quest ion correctly the candidate must determinethefollowing

1.Whetherthevent valves automaticallyswaptobesuppliedbyCADormustbemanuall

y aligned.2.WhetherCADsupplytoDW

Control A ir automaticallyswapsormustbe

manually aligned.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheventvalvesDOfailclosed, however ,theycanbeoperated

w ith manual alignmentoftheCAD Tanks.Bis incorrect.

Thisisp lausible becausetheventvalveswillautoswaptocontrolfromtheCADsupply

line , howeve rtheCAD tanksmustbe

manually aligned.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisisplausible

becasetheCADsystemmustbe

manually initiated, howeveroncethisi s accomplished

, no further alignment i s necessary.

(BFN1*EOIAPPENDIX*12UNIT1PRIMARYCONTAINMENTVENTINGRev.0Page4 ofaf.VERIFY1-FIC-84-20,PATHAVENTF

LOWCONT , i s indicating approximately100scfm.g.CONTINUEinth isprocedureatstep12.

10.VENTtheDrywellusing1-FIC-84-19

,PATHBVENTFLOWCONT

, as follows:a.VERIFYCLOSED

1-FCV-64-141

,DRYWELLDPCOMPBYPASSVALVE(Panel1-9-3).

b.PLACEkeylockswitch1-HS-84-36,SUPPRCHBR/DWVENTISOLBYPSELECT,toDRYWELLposition(Panel1-9-54)

.c.VERIFYOPEN1-FCV-64-29

,DRYWELLVENTINBDISOLVALVE(Panel1-9-54)

.d.PLACE1-FIC-84-19,PATHBVENTFLOWCONT,inAUTOwithsetpointat100scfm(Panel1-9-55).e.PLACEkeylockswitch1-HS

-84-19, 1-FCV-84-19 CONTROL , inOPEN(Panel1-9-55)

.f.VERIFY1-FIC-84

-19,PATHBVENTFLOWCONT,isindicatingapproximately100scfm

.g.CONTINUEinthisprocedureatstep12.11.VENTtheDrywellus

ing 1-FIC-84-20

,PATHAVENTFLOWCONT,as

follows:a.VERIFYCLOSED1-FCV-64-141,DRYWELLDPCOMPBYPASSVALVE(Panel1-9-3)

.b.PLACEkeylockswitch1-HS-84

-35,SUPPRCHBR I DWVENTISOLBYPSELECT

,toDRYWELLposition(Panel1-9-54).c.VERIFYOPEN

1-FCV-64-31

,DRYWELLINBDISOLVALVE(Panel1-9-54)

.d.VERIFY1-FIC-84-20

,PATHAVENTFLOWCONT

,inAUTOwithsetpointat100scfm(Panel1-9-55).

e.PLACEkeylockswitch1-HS-84-20, 1-FCV-84-20

ISOLATION BYPASS ,inBYPASS(Panel1

-9-55).f.VERIFY1-FIC-84-20

,PATHAVENTFLOWCONT

,isindicatingapproximately100scfm

.

(1-EOI APPENDIX-12

Rev.0 BFN PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

VENTINGPage7of8UNIT1 A IT ACHMENT 1...J...Jo 3: 0 w s en 2" It: I-W o&, 64-34>en.....0 0I-c>>A-N N:E....0'?W eo-e.....eo en>--en I.....z I w>'---'" 0 0'"'?0....-e eo eo 9£-\79en we:: ClWiQ.u....Jo o...JZ o w<0 gz...J en>-z alO al z e::<e::i=1-e::<Ou.Ou. 1-1-Itl en tll-<i5 Z J: wx<;e::>w ox I-W

(BFNCROSSTIECADTO1-EOIAPPENDIX-8GUNIT1 DRYWELLCONTROLAIRRev.0Page1 of 2 LOCATION:Unit1ControlRoomATTACHMENTS:None1.OPENthefollowingvalves

• 0-FCV-84-5,CADATANKN2OUTLETVALVE(Unit1,Panel1-9-54)*0-FCV-84-16,CADBTANKN2OUTLETVALVE(Unit1,Panel1-9-55).2.VERIFY0-PI-84-6,VAPORAOUTLETPRESS,and0-PI-84-17

,VAPORBOUTLETPRESS,indicateapproximately100psigPanel1-9-54andPanel1-9-55).

3.PLACEkeylockswitch1-HS-84-48,CADACROSSTIETODWCONTROLAIR,inOPEN(Panel1-9-54).4.CHECKOPEN1-FSV-84-48,CADACROSSTIETODWCONTROLAIR,(Panel1-9-54).5.PLACEkeylockswitch1-HS-84-49,CADBCROSSTIETODWCONTROLAIR,inOPEN(Panel1-9-55).6.CHECKOPEN1-FSV-84-49,CADBCROSSTIETODWCONTROLAIR(Panel1-9-55).7.CHECKMAINSTEAMRELIEFVLVAIRACCUMPRESSLOW,1-PA-32-31,alarmcleared(1-XA-55-3D,Window18).8.IFMAINSTEAMRELIEFVLVAIRACCUMPRESSLOW,1-PA-32-31,annunciatorisorremainsinalarm(1-XA-55-3D,Window18),THENDETERMINEwhichDrywellControlAirheaderisdepressurizedasfollows:

a.DISPATCHpersonneltoUnit1,RB,EI565ft,toMONITORthefollowingindicationsforlowpressure:*1-PI-084-0051,DWCONTAIRN2SUPPLYPRESSindicator,forCADA(RB, EI.565,byDrywellAccess

Door),*1-PI-084-0050,DWCONTAIRN2SUPPLYPRESSindicator,forCADB(RB,EI.565,leftsideof480VRBVentBoard1B)

.

(BFN Loss Of Control Air 1-AOI-32-2

Unit 1 Rev.0001Page5 of 272.0SYMPTOMS (continued)

• REACTOR CHANNELA(B)AUTOSCRAM

annunciator, (1-XA-55-5B

, Window1(2))inalarm

.*MAIN STEAM RELIEF VLV AIR ACCUM PRESS LOW annunciator, (1-XA-55-3D, Window18)inalarm

.3.0AUTOMATICACTIONSA.U-1TOU-2

CONT AIR CROSSTIE , 1-PCV-032-3901, will CLOSE to separateUnits1&2whencontrolAir

HeaderControlAir

Header pressure reaches65psig loweringatthevalve.

B.UNIT2TOUNIT3 CONTROL AIR CROSSTIE, 2-PCV-032-3901,willCLOSE to separateUnits2and3whenControlAir

Header pressurereaches65psig

loweringatthevalve.C.CAD SUPPLY PRESS REGULATOR, 1-PCV-084-0706, will select nitrogen from CAD TankAat s75psigControlAir

pressure to supplythefollowing:

1.SUPPR CHBRVACRELIEF VALVE , 1-FSV-064-0020

2.SUPPR CHBRVACRELIEFVALVE, 1-FSV-064-0021

D.INSTGAS SELECTOR VALVE , 1-PCV-084-0033, will select nitrogenfromCAD TankAto supply the following:

1.DRYWELL OR SUPPRESS CHMBR EXHAUSTTOSGTS, 1-FSV-084-0019

2.DRYWELL VENTINBDISOL VALVE , 1-FSV-064-0029

3.SUPPR CHMBR VENTINBDISOL VALVE, 1-FSV-064-0032E.INSTGAS SELECTOR VALVE, 1-PCV-084-0034, will select nitrogenfromCAD TankBto supply the following:

1.DRYWELL OR SUPPRESS CHMBR EXHAUSTTOSGTS, 1-FSV-084-0020

2.DRYWELL INBD ISOLATION VLV, 1-FSV-064-0031

3.SUPPR CHBR INBD ISOLATION VLV, 1-FSV-064-0034

.

(BFN Loss Of Control Air 1-AOI-32-2

Unit 1Rev.0001Page7 of 27 4.2 Subsequent

Actions (continued)

NOTECNDSBSTRPMPSDISCHBYPASSTOCOND1C

,1-FCV-002-0029AandCNDSBSTRPMPSDISCHBYPASSTOCOND1B,1-FCV-002-0029BbothfailCLOSEDonalossofcontrolair.[3]IFthereisNOTaflowpathforCondensatesystem,THENSTOPtheCondensatePumpsandCondensateBooster

Pumps.REFERTO1-01-2.[4]IFanyOutboardMSIVcloses,THENPLACEtheassociatedhandsw

itchonPanel1-9-3intheCLOSEposition.

NOTERSWSTRGTNKISOLATION

,0-FCV-25-32,failsCLOSEDonlossofcontrola

ir.o o[5]STARTaHighPressureFirePump.REFERTO0-01-26.

0[6]OPENCADSYSTEMAN2SHUTOFFVALVE,0-FCV-84-5,atPanel1-9-54.

0[7]OPENCADSYSTEMBN2SHUTOFFVALVE

, 0-FCV-84-16,atPanel1-9-55

.0[8]CHECKRCWpumpmotorampsandPERFORMSteps

4.2[8.1]through4.2[8.5]toreduceRCWflow:

(25.RO 400000A2.02

OO l/C/A/T2G I/RBCCW//400000A2

.02/3.8/4.I/RO/SRO/ll/l6/07 RMSWithUn it2operat ingatpower,thefollowingchangesare

observed:-RBCCW Temperature

lowerthannormal.-Annunc iator 2-XA-55-4C-6 RBCCWSurgeTankH

igh Level isinalarm.Wh ichONEofthefollowing

descr ibesacausefortheseind

icationsandthe corrective

act ion required?A.Reactor RecirculationPumpsealcoolerleakintoRBCCW.TripandisolatetheRecirculationPump

.B.oIRCWleak inthe RBCCW heat exchanger(s).

Remove RBCCW from service follow ing unit shutdown.C.RWCUleakinto

RBCCW v ia non-regenerative

heat exchanger.IsolateRWCU.

D.Drywell equipmentdrainsumpheat

exchangerleakintoRBCCW.

Isolate DW Equipment Dra inSumpheat exchanger.KIA Statement:

400000 Component Cooling Water A2.02-Abilityto(a)

predict the impactsofthefollow

ingontheCCWSand(b)basedonthose

predictions

, use procedurestocorrect,control,ormitigate the consequencesofthoseabnormal

operation:High/lowsurgetanklevel

KIA Justification:

Th is question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine the effectofaleakintothe

RBCCW system and determinewhichprocedureaddressesthiscondition

.References:

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirementtoassemb le , sort ,andinteg ratethepartsofthe

quest iontopred ict an outcome.Th is requires mentally us ing thisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerth

is question correctly the candidate must determ inethefollow ing: 1.Whichleakpathwould

providetheindications given inthe quest ion stem.2.Whatactionswouldberequiredtomitigatetheproblem

.NOTE:Alldistractorsareplaus ibleleakpaths into RBCCWbutwould indicate higher temperatures

.Ais incorrect.

A Reactor Rec irculat ionPumpseal coolerleakwouldcause

RBCCW temperaturetorise.Bis Correct.Cis incorrect.ARWCUleak would cause RBCCW temperaturetor ise.Dis incorrect.ADWEqu ipmentDrainSumpHXleakwouldcause

RBCCW temperaturetorise.

(BFN Unit 1 RBCCW SURGE TANK LEVEL HIGH 1-LA-70-2A(Page1of2)

Panel 9-4 1-XA-55-4C

SensorlTrip

Point: 1-LS-070-0002A

1-ARP-9-4C

Rev.0015 Page 12 of 434Inches Above CenterLineofTank

c.Sensor Location: Probable Cause: Automatic Action: Operator Action: RBCCW surge tankonthefourthfloorintheM-Gsetroom

.A.Makeup valve 1-FCV-70-1 open.B.By pass valve 1-2-1369 leaking.<'S.Leakintothesystem.

None A.VERIFY make-upvalve1-FCV-70-1closed,using

RBCCW SYS SURGE TANKFILLVALVE,1-HS-70-1

,onPanel 1-9-4.B.CHECK RBCCW PUMP SUCTIONHDRTEMP,1-TIS-70-3, indicates water temperature

is 100°Forless ,onPanel1-9-4.

C.DISPATCH personneltoverifyhighlevel

, ensure bypass valve, 1-2-1369 ,isclosedand

observesightglasslevel.

D.OPENsurge tankdrainvalve

, 1-70-609 , then CLOSE valve when desiredlevelis obtained.E.REQUEST Chemistrytopulland analyze a samplefortotal gamma activity and attempt to qualifysourceofleak

.F.CHECK activityreadingon RM-90-131D.

ContinuedonNextPage

o o o

o o o

(BFN Unit 1 Panel 9-4 1-XA-55-4C

1-ARP-9-4CRev.0015 Page13of43 RBCCW SURGE TANK LEVEL HIGH 1-LA-70-2A, Window 6(Page2of2)

Operator Action: (Continued)

NOTE[NERlC]ReactorRecirculationPumpsealcoolerleakagemaybeindicatedbyarisein1-RM-90-131(Panel1-9-10)activity

(1-RR-90-131/132Panel1-9-2)or

1-TE-68-54or67 temperature(Panel1-9-21)orloweringofanyRecircpumpsealpressure.

G.IFitissuspectedthattheReactorRecirculationPumpsealcooleris

leaking, THEN PERFORMthefollowing:

• DETERMINEwhichReactorRecirculationloopisleakingandat

the discretionoftheUnitSupervisor, ISOLATE.REFER TO1-01-68Section7

.1or8.2asapplicable.

COOLDOWN isrequiredtopreventhangerorshock

suppressorsfromexceeding

their maximumtravelrange.

0*WHENprimarysystempressureisbelow125psigandatthe

discretionoftheUnitSupervisor, THEN ISOLATE the RBCCWSystemtopreclude

damagetothe RBCCW PIPING.[IEN

89-054 , GE SIL-459)0 H.START selectivevalvingtodetermine

in-leakagesource,ifpresent.0

(References:

1-45E620-41-47E610-70-1FSARSection10

.6.4and13.6.2

26.RO 400000G2.4.31

00 lICf A/T2G 1 IRBCCWff4000002.4.3Of/ROfSRO/NOUnit3isat100%rated

powerwiththefollowingindications

• RECIRCPUMPMTRBTEMPHIGH

(3-ARP-9-4BW13)inalarm.

• RBCCW EFFLUENT RADIATION HIGH (3-ARP-9-3AW17)inalarm

.*RBCCW SURGE TANKLEVELHIGH (3-ARP-9-4CW6)inalarm

.*RXBLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH (3-ARP-9-3AW22)inalarm.*RECIRCPMPMTR3B

WINDINGANDBRGTEMP

recorder 3-TR-68-84isreading170

of and rising.*RBCCW PUMP SUCTIONHDRTEMP 3-TIS-70-3isreading140

ofandrising.*RWCU NON-REGENERATIVEHXDISCHTEMPHIGHinalarm

.*AREA RADIATION MONITORRE-90-13andRE-90-14are

inalarmread

ing 55 mrlhrandrising.WhichONEofthe

following describestheaction(s)thatshouldbetaken?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.01Enter3-EOI-3, Secondary ContainmentControl.Tripandisolate3BRecircPump

.Commence a normal shutdown and cooldown in accordancewith3-GOI-100-12A,UnitShutdown

.B.Enter3-EOI-3, Secondary ContainmentControl.Tripandisolate3BRecircPump.Enter3-EOI-1

,RPVControlatStepRC-1

.C.TripRWCU pumpsandisolateRWCUsystem.Close

RBCCW SectionalizingValve3-FCV-70-48toisolate non-essentialloadsand maximizecoolingto3BRecirc

.Pump.EOIentryisnotrequired

.D.Enter3-EOI-3, Secondary ContainmentControl.TripRWCU

pumps and isolateRWCUsystem

.Commenceanormal shutdown in accordance

with 3-GOI-100-12A,UnitShutdown

.KIAStatement:

400000 Component Cooling Water2.4.31-Emergency Procedures

IPlanKnowledgeof

annunciatorsalarmsandindications,anduseofthe

response instructions

.KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsto

determine the correctiveactionsrequiredduetoan

emergency involving RBCCWbasedon annunciators

and indications

.References:

3-EOI-3 flowchart,3-ARP9-3and

3-ARP-9-4Levelof Knowledge Justification:Thisquestionisratedas

CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble

, sort ,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome.This

requiresmentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.(0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: 3-EOI-3 flowchart Plausibility

Analysis: (Inorderto answerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:1.EOIEntryisrequiredsolelybasedonARMalarms.2.Locationoftheleakisfromthe3BRecicPump

.3.RWCU temperature

indicationsaredueto insufficientcoolingbyRBCCW,notaRWCUleak.

4.Appropriate

actions per 3-EOI-3aretoisolatetheleakand

monitorradiationlevels.

5.JustificationforUnit Shudwon and CooldownareduetotheRecircLoopbeingisolatedatrated

temperature

and pressure (pipe hanger and supportissue),andNOTDirectedby3-EOI-3.Aiscorrect.Bisincorrect.Entering3-EOI-1toinitiateascramisNOTrequireduntilradiationlevelsapproach1000mr/hrinanyarea.Thisis

plausiblebecuasethelocationoftheleakandrequiredisolationarecorrect.Cis incorrect.Thisis plausibleifthe candidate incorrectly

determinesthatRWCUiscausingthe

temperatureissueswith3BRecircPumpandnotviceversa

.IfRWCUwastheleaklocation,the

RBCCW temperaturewouldnotbehighenoughtoprovidethegiven

indications

.Theleakwouldhavetohaveoccurredinthe

NRHXwhichisbelowtheindicated

RBCCW temperature.Disincorrect.Thisis plausibleifthe candidate incorrectly

determinesthatRWCUiscausingthe

temperatureissueswith3BRecircPumpandnotviceversa

.Inadditiontothe

justification

above, commencing

a shutdown in accordancewith3-EOI-3isnot

appropriateuntilARMsindicate

greater than1000mr/hr.(

(OPL171.047

Revis ion 12 Appendix CPage35of41

DEMIN WATER MAKEUP DRW..................................RCW t-_........U2 TCV'S RCW TCV'S RCW*, II1II""**"" TCV'S RCW 626 623 0-70-607 601 U2-11.....-1 RBCCW RETURN",--====-__J HEADER CHEMICAL FEED 633 RBCCW SUPPLY HEADER 70 69 638 U3 67 68'--........U3 U2 TP-1: RBCCW SYSTEM FLOW DIAGRAM

(8FN Unit 3 Panel 9-4 3-XA-55-48

3-ARP-9-48Rev.0036 Page 17 of 45 RECIRCPUMPMTRB TEMP HIGH 3-TA-68-84(Page1of1)

SensorlTripPoint:Alarmisfrom

3-TR-68-84

,Panel3-9-2

3-TE-68-73ARECIRCPMPMTR3B-THRBRG

UPPERFACE(190°F)

3-TE-68-73CRECIRCPMPMTR3B-THRBRG

LOWERFACE(190°F)

3-TE-68-73ERECIRCPMPMTR

3B-UPPER GUIDEBRG(190°F)

3-TE-68-73NRECIRCPMPMTR

3B-LOWERGUIDEBRG(190°F)

3-TE-68-73GRECIRCPMPMTR

3B-MOTOR WINDINGA(216°F)3-TE-68-73JRECIRCPMPMTR

3B-MOTOR WINDINGB(216°F)3-TE-68-73LRECIRCPMPMTR

3B-MOTOR WINDINGC(216°F)3-TE-68-73TRECIRCPMPMTR

3B-SEAL NO.2 CAVITY(180°F)

3-TE-68-73URECIRCPMPMTR

3B-SEAL NO.1 CAVITY(180°F)

3-TE-68-67RECIRCPMPMTR3B-CLGWTRFROMSEALCLG(140°F)

3-TE-68-70

RECIRC PMPMTR3B-CLGWTRFROMBRG(140°F)

Sensor Location: Probable Cause: Automatic Action: Temperatureelementsarelocatedonrecirculationpumpmotor,Elevation563

.12,Unit3drywell.A.Possiblebearingfailure.B.Possiblemotoroverload.

C.Insufficientcoolingwater.D.Possiblesealfailure.E.Highdrywelltemperature.

None Operator Action: A..CHECKfollowingonPanel3-9-4:

• RBCCWPUMPSUCTIONHDRTEMP

temperature

indicatingswitch,3-TIS-70-3normal (summer 70-95°F, winter 60-80°F).*RBCCWPRICTMTOUTLEThandswitch, 3-HS-70-47A

(3-FCV-70-47)

OPEN.o o o B.CHECK the temperatureofthecooling

waterleavingthesealandbearingcoolers

<140°FonRECIRCPMPMTR3BWINDINGANDBRGTEMP temperaturerecorder,3-TR-68-84onPanel3-9-21

.0 C.LOWERrecirepumpspeeduntilBearing

and/or Winding temperaturesarebelowthealarmsetpoint.

0 D.CONTACTSiteEngineeringtoPERFORMa

complete assessment

and monitoringofallseal conditionsparticularlysealleakage, temperature,andpressureofallstagesforRecircPumpseal

temperaturesinexcessof180°F

.0 References:

3-45E620-5GE731E320RE3-47E610-68-1

3-SIMI-68BTechSpec3.4.1FSARSection13.6.2

(BFN Unit3 RBCCW EFFLUENT RADIATION HIGH3-RA-90-131A

Panel 9-3 3-XA-55-3A

SensorlTrip

Point: RE-90-131D

ill(NOTE2)3-ARP-9-3A

Rev.0036 Page 25 of 51 HI-HI(NOTE2)(Page 1 of 2)Hialarmfrom

recorderHi-Hialarmfrom

drawer (2)Chemlabshouldbe contacted for current setpointsper0-TI-45.

Sensor Location: Probable Cause: Automatic Action: RE-90-131A

RBCCWHXRxBldg, EI593,R-20S-L1NEHXtubeleakinto

RBCCW system.None Operator Action: A.DETERMINEcauseofalarmby

observing following:

1.RBCCWand RCW EFFLUENT RADIATION recorder, 3-RR-90-131/132RedpenonPanel3-9-2.

2.RBCCW EFFLUENT OFFLINERADMON, 3-RM-90-131D

onPanel3-9-10.

o o B.NOTIFY Chemistrytosample RBCCWfortotal gamma activity to verify condition.

0 C.START an immediate investigation

to determineifsourceofleakis

RWCU Non-regenerative,FuelPool Cooling, Reactor Water SampleorRWCU RecircPump3Aor3BSeal

Water heat exchanger(s).

0 D.(NERlC]CHECK Followingforindicationof

Reactor RecirculationPumpSealHeat

Exchanger leak: 1.LOWERING in reactor Recirculation

pump 3A(3B)NO.1or2 SEAL, 3-PI-68-64A

or 3-PI-68-63A

(3-PI-68-76A

or 3-PI-68-75A)onPanel3-9-4.

0 2.TemperatureriseonCLGWTRFROM

SEAL CLG TE-68-54, on RECIRCPMPMTR3A WINDINGANDBRG TEMP temperature

recorder, 3-TR-68-58

,onPanel3-9-21.

0 3.TemperatureriseonCLGWTRFROM

SEAL CLG TE-68-67, on RECIRCPMPMTR3B WINDINGANDBRGTEMP

temperature

recorder, 3-TR-68-84,onPanel3-9-21.

0 Continued on Next Page

(BFN Unit 3 Panel 9-3 3-XA-55-3A 3-ARP-9-3ARev.0036Page26 of 51 RBCCW EFFLUENT RADIATION HIGH 3-RA-90-131A, Window 17 (Page 2 of 2)Operator Action: (Continued)

E.IF itisdeterm inedthesource ofleakageisfrom

Reactor RecircPumpA(B), THEN 1.ISOLATE Reactor RecirculationLoopA(B)per3-01-68,as

applicable.

0 NOTECooldownisrequiredto

prevent hangersorshock suppressors

from exceeding theirmaximumtravel

range.2.WHEN primarysystempressureislessthan125psig, THEN ISOLATE RBCCW Systemtopreclude

damage to RBCCW piping.[lEN 89-054 ,GESIL-459)0 References:

3-45E620-3

3-47E610-90-3

GE 3-729E814-3

BFN Unit3RXBLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH 3-RA-90-1D(Page1 of 2)Panel 9-3 3-XA-55-3A

SensorlTrip

Point: RI-90-4A RI-90-8A RI-90-9A RI-90-13A

RI-90-14A

RI-90-20A RI-90-21A RI-90-22A RI-90-23A

RI-90-24A RI-90-25A RI-90-26A RI-90-27A RI-90-28A RI-90-29A 3-ARP-9-3A

Rev.0036 Page 32 of 51 For setpointsREFERTO 3-SIMI-90B.

Sensor RE-90-4MGsetareaRxBldgEI.639R-17

Q-L1NE Location: RE-90-8 Main ControlRoomRxBldgEI.617

R-16 R-L1NE RE-90-9 Clean-upSystemRxBldgEI.621

R-16 T-L1NE RE-90-13 North Clean-upSys.RxBldgEI.593R-16

P-L1NE RE-90-14 South Clean-up Sys.RxBldg EI.593R-16 S-L1NE RE-90-20 CRD-HCU WestRxBldgEI.565

R-16 R-L1NE RE-90-21 CRD-HCU EastRxBldg EI.565 R-20 R-L1NE RE-90-22TipRoomRxBldgEI.565R-19

P-L1NE RE-90-23TipDriveRxBldgEI.565R-19

P-L1NE RE-90-24HPCIRoom*RxBldgEI.519

R-21 U-L1NE RE-90-25RHRWestRxBldgEI.519

R-16 U-L1NE RE-90-26 Core Spray-RCICRxBldgEI.519R-16

N-L1NE RE-90-27CoreSprayRxBldg EI.519R-20 N-L1NE RE-90-28RHREastRxBldg EI.519R-20 U-L1NE RE-90-29 Suppression

Pool.RxBldgEI.519R-19

U-L1NE*Duetothe locationoftheRad Monitorinrelationtothe

TestlineintheHPCIQuad,theHPCIRoomRadAlarmmaybe

receivedwhentheHPCIFlowtestisin progress.Probable Cause: Automatic Action: Radiation levelshaverisenabovealarmsetpoint.HPCIFlowRate

Surveillance

in Progress.None ContinuedonNextPage

(BFN Unit3 Panel 9-3 3-XA-55-3A

3-ARP-9-3ARev.0036*Page33 of 51 Operator Action: RX BLDG AREA RADIATION HIGH 3-RA-90-1D, Window 22(Page2 of 2)A.DETERMINEareawithhighradiationlevelonPanel3-9-11.(AlarmonPanel3-9-11will

automaticallyresetifradiationlevellowersbelowsetpoint.)B.IFthealarmisfromtheHPCIRoomwhileFlowtestingisbeingperformed,THEN

REQUESTpersonnelattheHPCIQuadto

validate conditions

.C.NOTIFY RADCON.D.IFtheTSCisNOTmannedanda"VALID"radiologicalcondition

exists., THENUSEpublicaddresssystemto

evacuateareawherehighairborne

conditions

existE.IFtheTSCismannedanda"VALID"radiologicalconditionexists, THEN REQUESTtheTSCtoevacuate

non-essentialpersonnelfromaffectedareas.

F.MONITORotherparametersprovidinginputtothis

annunciator

frequentlyastheseparameterswillbemaskedfromalarmingwhilethisalarmissealedin

.G.IFaCREVinitiationisreceived,THEN

1.VERIFYCREVA(B)Flowis2700CFM,and3300CFMas indicated on 0-FI-031-7214(7213)within5hoursoftheCREVinitiation.[BFPER03-017922]2.IFCREVA(B)FlowisNOT2700CFM,and

s3300CFMas indicated on 0-FI-031-7214(7213)

THEN PERFORMthefollowing

(Otherwise

N/A)[BFPER 03-017922]a.STOPtheoperatingCREVper0-01-31

.b.STARTthestandbyCREVper0-01-31

.H.IFalarmisduetomalfunction,THENREFERTO0-01-55

.I.ENTER3-EOI-3Flowchart.

J.REFERTO3-AOI-79-1or3-A01-79-2ifapplicable.

o o o o o o o o o o o o References:

3-45E620-33-45E610-90-1GE730E356-1

(BFN Unit 3 RBCCW SURGE TANKLEVELHIGH 3-LA-70-2A(Page1of2)

Panel 9-4 3-XA-55-4C

SensorlTrip

Point: 3-LS-070-0002A

3-ARP-9-4CRev.0028 Page 12 of 444inchesabove

centerlineoftank

Sensor Location: Probable Cause: Automatic Action: Operator Action: RBCCWsurgetankintheMGsetroomEI639'.

A.Makeupvalve,3-FCV-70-1,open.B.Bypassvalve

3-BYV-002-1369

leaking.C.Leakintothesystem.

None A.CHECKmake-upvalve3-FCV-70-1,3-HS-70-1, CLOSED onPanel3-9-4.

B.CHECK RBCCWsystemwaterleavingthe

RBCCWsystemheat

exchangersis100°Forlesson3-TI-70-3,Panel3-9-4.

C.DISPATCHpersonneltoverifyhighlevelandto

ensure 3-BYV-002-1369,FCV-70-1BYPASSVALVEisCLOSED.

OBSERVEsightglasslevel.

D.OPENsurgetankdrainvalve, 3-DRV-070-0609.

CLOSE valvewhendesiredlevelisobtained.

E.REQUEST Chemistrytopullandanalyzeasamplefortotalgamma

activityandattempttoqualifysourceofleak.

F.CHECKactivityreadingon3-RM-90-131

Band3-RM-90-131D.

ContinuedonNextPage

o n o o o o

(BFN Unit 3 Panel 9-4 3-XA-55-4C

3-ARP-9-4CRev.0028 Page 13 of 44 RBCCW SURGETANKLEVELHIGH

3-LA-70-2A

, Window 6(Page2"of2)Operator Action: (Continued)

NOTE[NER/C)ReactorRecirculationPumpsealcoolerleakagemaybeindicatedbyarise

in3-RM-90-131(Panel3-9-10)

activity(3-RR-90-131/132,Panel3-9-2or3-

TE-68-54or67temperature,Panel3-9-21)oraloweringinanyRecircpumpsealpressure

.G.IFitissuspectedthattheReactorRecirculationPumpsealcooleris

leaking, THEN PERFORMthefollow ing:*DETERMINEwhichReactorReci

rculation loop isleakingand

ISOLATE.REFERTO3-01-68Section7

.1or8.2asapplicable.

Cooldownisrequiredtopreventhangersorshock

suppressors

from exceedingtheirmaximumtravelrange

.0*WHENprimarysystempressureisbelow125psig, THEN ISOLATE the RBCCWSystemtopreclude

damagetothe RBCCW piping.[IEN89-054 ,GESIL-459)

0 H.START select ive valv ingtodeterminein-leakagesource,ifpresen t.References:

3-45N620-43-47E610-70-1

FSAR Sections 10.6.4and13.6.2 3-47E822-1

(EOI-3OPL171.034Revision11

Append ix CPage30of30

TABLE 4 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

AREA RADIATION APPLICABLE

MAX NORMAL MAX SAFE POTENTIAL AREA RADIATION VALUE VALUE ISOLATION INDICATORS

MRIHR MR/HR SOURCESRHRSYSI PUMPS90-25A A LARMED 1000 FCV-74-47,48RHRSYSII PUMPS 90-2BA ALARMED 1000 FCV-74-47,48 HPC I ROOM 90-24A ALARMED 1000 FCV-73-2, 3 , 81 FCV-73-44CSSYS I PUMPS90-26A ALARMED 1000 RCIC ROOM FCV-71-2,3 , 3 9CSSYSII PUMPS90-27A ALARMED 1000 NO'lE TORUS FCV-73-2, 3 , 81 90-29A ALARMED 1000 FCV-74-47 , 48 GENERAL AREA FCV-71-2 , 3RBE L565W 90-20A ALARMED 1000 FC V-69-1 , 2 , 1 2 SD V VENTS&DRAI NSRBEL565E 90-2 1A ALARMED 1000 SDV VENTS&DRAINSRBE L565NE 90-23A ALARMED 1000 NO'l E TIPROOM 90-22A ALAR MED 100 ,000 TIPBALL VALVERBEL593 90-13A,14A ALARMED 1000 FCV-74-47 ,48RBEL6 21 90-9A ALARMED 1000 FCV-43-13 , 14 REC IRCMGSETS 90-4A ALARMED 1000 NO'lEREFUELFLOOR

90-1A ,2A,3A ALARMED 1000 NO'l ETP-7EOI-3TABLE4

E MINATION REFERENCE.PROVIDED TO CANDIDATE

(-o au C")*-o wil ,H-t1UIIrrrn

I S l H" tt rr-r<lI I I I1!l1!!!!I-!I*i ,I:.iii I III!iii!II 1 II I or II I iI iii I 1111 I I r It..I I I!!I I I'"III!I'IIi I I I I I C")*-o w

(27.RO 201003K3.03OOl/MEM/TIG

2/85-3/Bl1/201003K3.03

/3.6/3.7/RO/SR0/1 1/l6/07 RMSGiventhefollowingplant

condit ions:*AOI85-3, CRD System Failure , d irectsamanualscrambasedonlow

reactor pressure.WhichONEofthe following PROCEDURAL

reactor pressurelimitsshouldbe

adheredtointhiscaseand

WHY?A.980psig reactor pressure, becausethiswouldbethe

lowest pressure a scramcanbeensuredduetothelossof

accumulators

.B.oI900psig reactor pressure, becausethiswouldbethe

lowest pressure a scramcanbeensuredduetothelossof

accumulators.

C.445psig reactor pressure, becausethiswouldbethe

lowest pressure requiredtoliftacontrolrod

blade.D.800psig reactor pressure, becausethisisthe Technical Specification

pressure for scrammingcontrolrodsfor

scramtimetesting

.KIAStatement:201003Con trolRodandDr ive MechanismK3.03-Knowledgeofthe

effectthatalossor

malfunctionofthe CONTROLRODANDDRIVE

MECHANISMwillhaveonfollowing

Shutdown margin KIA Justification:

Th is quest ion sat isfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificknowledgeofCRD

mechanism limitationsandthebas isforthat limitationrelatedtotheab

ility to effectandmain tain shutdown margin.References:

1/2/3-AOI-85-3

,OPL171.005, OPL 171.006Levelof Knowledge Justification:

This quest ion is ratedasMEMduetotherequ

i rementtorecallorrecognized

iscretebitsof information.

06 10NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis: (Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:1.The minimum pressureallowedby1/2/3-AOI85-3

,CRDSystemFailure.2.Thebasisforthat

minimum pressure.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible because980psigisthe

setpointfortheLow Accumulator

Pressure alarm.Bis correct.Cis incorrect.Thisisplausible

becausetheentire statement is accurate,butisnotthepressurespecifiedby1/2/3-AOI85-3,CRDSystemFailure

.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausiblebecausetheentire

statement is accurate,butisnotthepressurespecifiedby1/2/3-AOI85-3,CRD

System Failure.

OPL171.006Revision9Page17of60

C(a)A specificpatternofcontrolrod

withdrawal

or insertion(b)Written

step-by-steppathusedby

the operator in establishing

theexpectedrodpatternandfluxshapeatrated

power(c)Deviationfromthe

establishedpathcouldresultin

potentiallyhighcontrolrod

worths (9)Shutdown margin OBJ.V.B.15.c (a)Technical specificationsoftheplantrequireknowing

whether theplantcanbe

shutdowntoasafe level (b)Withouttheinsertion

capability

of Obj.V.B.20.gallcontrolrods, shutdown marginwillnotbeasgreat,thus

closer to an inadvertent

criticality(10)ControlRodWorth

variables (a)Moderator temperature

OBJ.V.8.20.ei.As temperaturerises,SER3-05slowingdownlengthand

thermal diffusion length increase ii.Rodworth increases with as moderator temperature

increases(b)Voideffectsonrodworth

i.Asvoidsincrease, averageneutronflux

energy increases ii.U238andPu240will

(capturemore

epithermal

neutrons through resonance

(BFN CRD System Failure 1-AOI-85-3

Unit 1Rev.0003 Page 7 of 11 4.1 Immediate Actions (continued)

[2]IFoperatingCRDPUMPhastr

ippedANDbackupCRDPUMPisNOT available ,THEN(OtherwiseN/A)

PERFORMthefollowingatPanel1-9-5:

[2.1]PLACECRDSYSTEMFLOW

CONTROL , 1-FIC-85-11

, inMANatminimumsetting

.D[2.2]ATTEMPT TO RESTARTtrippedCRDPumpusingoneofthefollowing:*CRDPUMP1B ,using1-HS-85-2A*CRDPump1A,using

1-HS-85-1A

D[2.3]ADJUSTCRDSYSTEMFLOW

CONTROL, 1-FIC-85-11,toestablishthefo

llowing cond itions:*CRDCLGWTRHDRDP

, 1-PDI-85-18A, approx imately20psid.D*CRDSYSTEMFLOW

CONTROL , 1-FIC-85-11,between40and65gpm

.D[2.4]BALANCECRDSYSTEMFLOW

CONTROL, 1-FIC-85-11

, and PLACEinAUTOor BALANCE.D[3]IF ReactorPressureislessthan900ps

ig AND e itherofthe following conditions

exists:*In-serviceCRDPumptr ipped and neitherCRDPumpcanbestarted , OR*Charging WaterPressurecanNOTberestoredand

maintainedabove940psig

, THEN PERFORMthefollowing: (Otherw ise N/A)[3.1][3.2]MANUALLY SCRAMReactorand

IMMEDIATELY

PLACEtheReactorModeSwitchinthe

SHUTDOWN position.REFERTO1-AOI-100-1.[Item

020]D D

OPL 171.006 Revision 9Page30of60

((6)The withdraw motion is terminated

prior to reaching the desired positionandtherodissettledas

discussed earlier.d.Cooling water is continuously

suppliedviathe P-underportand insert header.(1)Flowfromplug

type orifice in flange follows passage between outer tube and thermal sleeve to outer screen.(2)Cooling water is required to protect theOBJ.V.B.18 graphitarsealsfromhigh

reactor temperatures.(3)Long exposuresathigh temperatures

will resultinbrittle, fast-wearing seals.(4)Drive temperature

should be maintained

at<350°Fandthe cause should be investigatedifit exceeds this value.(5)Concern is thatthehigh temperaturemaybe causedbya leaking scram discharge valve.(6)This problemshouldbe corrected assoonas possible to prevent damage tothevalve.e.Scram function(1)Therearetwo sources of water thatcanOBJ.V.B/E.11,beusedtoscramadrive:

reactor water V.D.10 and accumulator

water.(2)Reactor water scram feature (a)Reactorwater,ifathigh

enough pressure, is capable of scrammingMoreonrequired

the drive without any accumulator

amount of assistance.

pressuretolift drive and control(b)The over-pistonareais openedtorodlaterinLP

.thescram discharge header.

((2)Theprimaryeffectisreduced

10oftheinnertubejustbelowthebottomofthecolletpiston.(a)Inseriousoverpressuresituations,thissqueezestheinnertubeagainstthecircumferenceoftheindextube.(b)Theindextubeisthenheldintheinsertovertravelpositionandoftencannotbewithdrawn.

OPL171.006Revision9 Page 35of60(3)Bulgingoftheindextubeasdescribedabovealsooccurs

.b.Extensiveproceduralcontrolsarespecifiedtopreventimpropervalvingofthehydraulic

module.c.Particularcautionshouldbeobservedduringthestartuptestprogram.3.ScramCapabilitya.Pistonareas(1)Under-pistonareaequals4.0in

2.(2)Over-pistonareaequals2.8in

2.b.Normalscramforces(1)Duringanormalscramcondition,theover-pistonareaisopenedtothescramdischargevolumewhichisinitiallyatatmosphericpressure.

(2)Accumulatorand/orreactorpressureissimultaneouslyappliedtothepistonarea.Thenetinitialforceappliedtothedrive(takingnocreditfortheaccumulator)canbecalculatedas

follows.Fnet=(ForcesUp)-(ForcesDown)

(Fnet=(RxPressurexUnder-PistonArea)(RxPressurexAreaofIndexTube

+WeightofBlade

+Friction)Fnet=(1000psigx4.0in

2)-[1000psigx(4.0 in 2-1.2 in 2)]-255Ibs-500IbsFnet=4000-2800-255-500OPL171.006Revision9Page36of60

Note:4in 2upwardforce1.2in 2downwardforce

=2.8 in 2 Fnet=445Ibs (Upward)c.Singlefailureproof-Thereisno

single-modefailuretothehydraulicsystemwhichwould

preventthedrivefromscramming

.d.Accumulatorversusreactorvesselpressure

scrams (1)TP-9representsaplotof90percentscramtimesversusreactorpressure

.(a)Reactorpressureonly (b)Accumulatorpressureonly(c)Combinedreactorand

accumulator

pressure TP-9(2)Scramtimesaremeasuredforonlythefirst90%oftherodinsertionsincethebufferholesatthetopendofthestrokeslowthedrive

.(3)Reactor-pressure-only

scram(a)AscanbeseenfromTP-9,thedrivecannotbescrammedwithreactorpressure400psig.(b)Thenetinitialupwardforceavailabletoscramthedrivecanbecalculatedasfollows.

OPL 171.006Revision9Page38of60

(e.Average scram times (normal drive)TP-9(1)Technical Specifications

state that scram timesaretobe obtained without relianceontheCRD pumps.(2)Consequently, the charging water must be valved outonthe drivetobe tested.(3)Maximum scram time for a typical drive occursat800psig reactor pressure.(4)Thisis why Technical Specifications

specify that scram timesaretobe takenat800psigor

greater reactor pressure.f.Abnormal scram conditions(1)Scram outlet valve failure to open(2)Drivewill

slowly scramonseal leakageaslongas accumulator

charging water pressure stays greater than reactor pressure.(3)Ifthe accumulatorisnot available, the drivewillnot scram(thisisa double failure).g.Control Rods failure to Insert After ScramObj.V.D.11(1)This conditioncouldbe due to hydraulic lock.(2)Procedure has operator close theSee2-01-85

&2-Withdraw Riser Isolation valve.ConnectEOIApp-1E for drain hose to Withdraw Riser Vent Test detailed Connectiononthe affected HCU.Slowly operations

open Withdraw Riser Vent.When inward motion has stopped, close Withdraw Self Check Riser Vent.Peer Check

((28.RO201006K4

.09 OOl/MEM/T2G2/RWM//201006K4.09/3.2/3.2/RO/SR0/11/l6/07

RMSTheRodWorth

Minimizermustbe INITIALIZEDtoproperlydeterminerodpositionandsequence

.WhichONEofthefollowing

describeshowRWMSystem

INITIALIZATION

is accomplished?

A.INITIALIZATION

occurs automaticallywhentheRWMis

unbypassed

.B.INITIALIZATION

occurs automaticallyevery5secondswhileinthetransitionzone

.C.oI INITIALIZATIONmustbe performedmanuallyusingthe

INITIALIZATION

push-buttonwhentheRWMis unbypassed

.D.INITIALIZATIONmustbe performedmanuallyusingthe

INITIALIZATION

push-buttonwhenpowerdropsbelowtheLPSP.

KIA Statement:201006RWM K4.09-KnowledgeofROD

WORTH MINIMIZERSYSTEM(RWM)(PLANT SPECIFIC)designfeature(s)and/orinterlockswhichprovideforthefollowing

Systeminitialization

P-Spec(Not-BWR6)

KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificofwhichplantconditionwould

INITIALIZEtheRWM.References:1/2/3-01-85,OPL171.024

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthis

question correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing

1.WhenRWM INITIALIZATIONisrequired

.2.HowRWM INITIALIZATION

is accomplished

.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseinitializationisrequiredwhentheRWMis

unbypassed,butthismustbedonemanually.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheRWM automaticallyinitiatesa"scanllatch"todeterminethecorrectlatchedrodgroup,butthisisnotthesameas

INITIALIZATION.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheRWMmustbe

manually INITIALIZED

,buttheRWMdoesnotrequireinitialization

becausetheLPSPisreached

.THeRWMwill

automaticallyperforma"scanllatch"atthatpoint.

OPL171.024Revision13Page19of53

(INSTRUCTOR

NOTES(2)The MANUAL indicatorlightwillthenbeObj.V.B.6litandallerrorandalarm

indicationsthatwereonpriorto

bypasswillbeblankedoutontheRWMsystem

displays.(3)AmanualbypasswillalsolighttheRWMandPROGR

indicatoronthe RWM-COMP-PROGR-BUFF

pushbutton.

f.SYSTEM INITIALIZE

pushbutton

switch/indicator(1)TheSYSTEM INITIALIZEswitchis depressed to initializetheRWM system.(2)Initializationmustbe performed whenevertheRWMhasbeentaken

offline,asoccurs

whenevertheRWMprogramisabortedor

manually bypassed.(3)Therefore, following any program abortorbypass,the

SYSTEM INITIALIZEswitchmustbe

depressed before theprogramcanberunagain.(4)TheSYSTEM

INITIALIZE

windowlightswhitewhiletheswitchisheld

down.g.SYSTEM DIAGNOSTIC

switch/indicator(1)Thisswitchcanbepressedatanytime

afterthesystemhasbeen

initialized

to requestthatthe system diagnosticroutinebe performed.

(2)TheRWMprogramwill

thereupon beinitiatedandwillperformtheroutine,whichconsistsof

applyingandthenremovingin

sequence the insert and withdraw blocks (nominal10second frequency).

(3)The operatorcanverifythe

operabilityNOTE:Rodinsertoftherodblockcircuitsby

observingandwithdrawal

(thatthe INSERT BLOCK andpermitlightswillgo

WITHDRAW BLOCKalarmlightscome

offwhenblockisonandthengo

offastheblocksareapplied.

((BFN ControlRodDriveSystem

1-01-85Unit1Rev.0005 Paue136of179 8.18 ReinitializationoftheRodWorth

Minimizer[1]VERIFYthefollowinginitialconditionsaresatisfied:

• TheRodWorth

Minimizer isavailabletobeplacedin

operation D*Integrated

ComputerSystem(ICS)is

available D*The Shift Manager/Reactor

Engineer has directed reinitializationoftheRodWorth

Minimizer D[2]REVIEW all Precautions

and LimitationsinSection3.3.

D[3]VERIFYRWMSWITCHPANEL, 1-XS-85-9025

in NORMAL.D[4]CHECK the Manual/AutoBypasslightsare

extinguished.

D[5]DEPRESSANDHOLD INOP/RESET

pushbutton.

D[6]CHECKallfourlights (RWM/COMP/PROG/BUFF)

are illuminated.

D[7]RELEASE INOP/RESETpushbuttonand

CHECKallfour lights extinguished.

D[8]SIMUL TANEOUSLYDEPRESSOUTOF SEQUENCE/SYSTEM

INITIALIZE

pushbutton

and INOP/RESET

pushbuttontoplacetheRodWorth

Minimizer in service.D[9]IF Rod Worth Minim izer will NOT in itialize, THEN DETERMINE alarmsonRWMDisplayScreenand

CORRECT problems.D[10]IFunableto correct problems and initialize

RWM, THEN NOTIFY Reactor Engineer.D

(BFNControlRodDriveSystem

1-01-85Unit1Rev.0005Page19of179

3.3RodWorth Minimizer (RWM)(continued)N.Forgrouplimitsonly,RWMrecognizestheNominalLimitsonly

.TheNominalLimitistheinsertorwithdrawlimitforthegroupassignedbyRWM.TheAlternateLimitisnolongerrecognizedbytheRWMasanAcceptableGroupLimit.

O.DuringRWMlatching

,thelatchedgroupwillbethehighestnumberedgroupwith2orlessinserterrorsandhavingatleast1rodwithdrawnpastitsinsertlimits

.1.WithSequenceControlON,latchingoccursasfollows:(Normally,startupswillbeperformedwithSequenceControlON)

a.RWMwilllatchdownwhenallrodsinthepresentlylatchedgrouphavebeeninsertedtothegroupinsertlimitandarodinthenextlowergroupisselected.b.RWMwilllatchupwhenarodwithinthenexthighergroupisselected,providedthatnomorethantwoinserterrorsresult.2.WithSequenceControlOFF,latchingoccursasfollows

a.Fornon-repeatinggroups,latchingoccursasdescribedabove,ORb.Forrepeatinggroups,latchingoccurstothenextsetuporsetdownbasedonrodmovementasopposedtorodselection.P.Latchingoccursatthefollowingtimes:1.Systeminitialization

.2.Followinga"SystemDiagnostic"request.

3.When operatordemandsentryorterminationof"RodTest."4.WhenpowerdropsbelowLPAP.5.WhenpowerdropsbelowLPSP.

6.Everyfivesecondsinthetransitionzone.7.FollowinganyfullcontrolrodscanwhenpowerisbelowLPAP.8.UpondemandbytheOperator(Scan/LatchRequestfunction).

9.Followingcorrectionofinsertorwithdrawerrors.

(29.RO 202001K6.09

OOl/C/A/T2G2/68-RECIRC/24/202001 K6.09//RO/SROIGiventhefollowingp

lant conditions:*Unit3isoperatingat55%

powerwithReactorFeedPump(RFP)"A"&"C"runningandRFP"B" idling.*Both RecirculationPumpspeedsare53%

.*The"A"RFPtrips,resultinginthefollowingconditions:

Reactor Water level Abnormalalarmsealedin

Reactor Vessel WtrLevelLowHalfScramalarmsealedin*Indicated

Reactor WaterLeveldropsto

_10"beforeRFP"B"is

broughtonlinetoreversetheleveltrendandlevelisstabilizedat33".WhichONEofthefollowing

describesthesteadystateconditionofboth

Recirculation

Pumps?A.Runningat53%speed

B.Runningat45%speed

c.Y'Runningat28%speed

D.Trippedon ATWS/RPT signal.KIA Statement:202001Recirculation

K6.09-Knowledgeofthe

effectthatalossor

malfunct ionofthefollow

ingwillhaveonthe

RECIRCULATION

SYSTEM: Reactor water level KIA Justification:

Th is question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsandtimesto

determine the effectofa change in reactor waterlevelontheRecirculation

System.References:

3-01-68 ,OPL171.007,OPL171.012 Level of Knowledge Justification:

Th is quest ionisratedas CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble

, sort , and integratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome.Th

is requires menta llyusingth isknowledgeanditsmeaningto

predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

(l REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:

1.Didplant conditionsexceedtheRecirc

Runback setpoint.2.WhichRunbackis

appropriateforthegivenconditions.Ais incorrect.

Total Feedflowwoulddropbelow19%withonlyoneRFPrunningat55%ratedpower,thusinitiatingaRecirc

Runbackto28%.Thisisplausiblebasedontheinitial

powerlevelbeingcloseenoughtocreate

doubtontotal feedflowresultingfromthetripofoneRFP

.Bis incorrect.

This i s plausiblebecauseaRecircRunbackDIDoccur,butthe45%speedgiveninthe

distractoristhetypicalspeedtheRecircPumpsrunatduringstartup

,notfollowingaRFPtrip

.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.

Th is is plausible because ATWS/RPTsignalsare

associatedwithlowRPVlevel,howeverthesetpointis-45inchesandlevelonlyloweredto-10

inches.

(BFN Reactor Recirculation

System 3-01-68 Unit 3Rev.0066Page13 of 1793.0PRECAUTIONSANDLIMITATIONS (continued)10.TheoutofservicepumpmayNOTbestartedunlessthe

temperatureofthecoolantbetweentheoperatingandidleRecircloopsarewithin50°Fofeachother.This50°FdeltaTlimitisbasedonstressanalysisforreactornozzles,stressanalysisforreactorrecirculation

componentsandpiping,andfuelthermallimits

.[GE Sll517Supplement1]11.TheoutofservicepumpmayNOTbestartedunlessthereactorisverifiedoutsideofregions1,2and3oftheUnit3PowertoFlowMap(ICSorStationReactorEngineering,0-TI-248).12.The temperatureofthecoolantbetweenthedomeandtheidleRecircloopshouldbemaintainedwithin75°Fofeachother.Ifthislimitcannotbe

maintainedaplantcooldownshouldbeinitiated

.FailuretomaintainthislimitandNOTcooldowncouldresultinhangers

and/orshocksuppressers

exceedingtheirmaximumtravelrange.

[GE SIl251,430and517]M.RecircPump

controllerlimitsareasfollows:1.WhenanyindividualRFPflowislessthan19%andreactor

waterlevelisbelow27inches,speedlimitissetto

75%(-1130RPMspeed)andifspeed

is greater than 75%(-1130RPMspeed),Recircspeedwillrunbackto

75%(-1130RPMspeed).2.Whentotalfeed

waterflowislessthan19%(15secTD)orRecircPump

dischargevalveislessthan90%open,speedlimitissetto28%

(-480RPMspeed)andifspeedis

greater than 28%(-480RPMspeed),Recircspeedwillrunbackto

28%(-480RPMspeed).

(BFN Reactor Recirculation

System 3-01-68 Unit 3 Rev.0066Page15 of 179 3.0PRECAUTIONSANDLIMITATIONS (continued)

R.ThepowersuppliestotheMMRandDFRrelaysarelistedbelow

.VFD3AI&CBUSA(BKR215)ICSPNL532(BKR30)UNITPFD(BKR615)

VFD3BI&CBUSB(BKR315)

ICSPNL532(BKR26)UNITPFD(BKR616)

3-RLY-068-MMR3/A

&DFR3/A 3-RL Y-068-MMR2/A

&DFR2/A 3-RL Y-068-MMR1/A

&DFR1/A 3-RLY-068-MMR3/B&DFR3/B 3-RL Y-068-MMR2/B&DFR2/B 3-RLY-068-MMR1/B&DFR1/B (S.AcompletelistofRecircSystemtripfunctionsisprovidedinIllustration4.The

RPT breakersbetweentherecircdrivesandpumpmotorswillopenonanyofthefollowing:1.ReactordomePressure1148psig (ATWS/RPT).(Bothpressure

switchesinLogicAorbothpressure

switchesinLogicBwillcauseRPT

breakerstotripbothpumps

.)(2outof2takenoncelogic)

2.Reactor WaterLevels-45"(ATWS/RPT)

.(BothlevelswitchesinLogicAorbothlevel

switchesinLevelBwillcauseRPTbreakerstotripbothpumps.)(2outof2takenoncelogic)

3.Turbinetriporloadrejectcondition,when30%powerbyturbinefirst

stage pressure (EOC/RPT).1.TheA TWS/RPTA(B)logictotriptheRPT

breakersisdefeatedifthe

ATWS/RPT/ARIA(B)manuallogicisarmedusingthearmingcollaronPanel3-9-5

.B(A)logicwouldstillbefunctionalandtriptheRPTbreakersifthesetpointsarereached.Ifbothmanual

push-buttonson3-9-5arearmed, A TWS/RPT automaticlogicistotallydefeated(noRPT

breakertripwilloccuriftheA TWS/RPTtripsetpointsarereached)

.EOC/RPTlogicandATWS/ARIlogicwillfunction

withoutregardtothepositionofthearmingcollars.ATWS/RPT/ARIlogiccanbereset30secondsafter

setpointsarereset.

((30.RO 215001Al.Ol

OOlIMEMlTIG2/TIPI121500IAl.Ol//RO/SROIWhichONEofthefollowing

describestheprocedural

requirements

in accordancewith2-01-94

,TraversingIn-CoreProbeSystemwhilerunningTIPtraces?

A.TheTIP detectorshallbe withdrawntotheIn-ShieldpositionandtheballvalveclosedfollowingeachTIPtrace

.8.RunningaTIPtracewhile

personnelareworkinginsidetheDrywellisprohibited

.C."TheRadiationProtectionShift

SupervisorisrequiredtobenotifiedpriortoTIPSystemoperation.

D.TheTIP Machine will automatically

withdrawtothein-shieldposition,thentheballvalvewill

automaticallyclosefollowingaPCISGroup6isolation

.KIA Statement:

215001 Traversing

In-core ProbeA1.01-Abilityto

predict and/or monitorchangesin parameters

associatedwithoperatingthe

TRAVERSING

IN-CORE PROBE controls including:Radiationlevels

(Not-BWR1)

KIA Justification:Thisquestion

satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidate to determine theoperatinglimitationsoftheTIP

systemwithrespecttohighradiation

.References:

2-01-94 Precautions

&Limitations

Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inorderto answerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing

1.LimitationsforrunningTIP

traceswithpersonnelintheDrywell.2.Notification

requirements

priortorunningTIPs

.3.WhichPCISGroupwill

causeaTIPretractionandisolation

.4.Requirementsforrunning

multiple simultaneous

TIP traces.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible becausethatlimitationisplacedonTIPoperation,butonlywhenTIPoperationisno

longerrequired.TheTIP

detectorcanbestoredinthe

Indexerin-betweentracesusingthesameTIP

Machine for ALARA concerns.8is incorrect.Thisis plausible because specific permission

and controlsarerequiredtoallowthiscondition,butitisallowable.Cis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausible becausetheTIPresponsetoaPCISisolationiscorrect,butitisnotaGroup6isolation

.

(BFN Traversing

Incore Probe System 2-01-94 Unit2 Rev.0029 Page 7 of 26 3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS

A.[NER/C]Verificationofadigitin

CORELIMITand DETECTOR POSITION windows priortoorduringTIPinsertion

ensures TIPsretaintheabilityto

determine its properposition.Thiswill

prevent malfunctionswhichcould

damagetheTIP detector.[GESIL-166]

B.To prevent accidental

exposuretopersonnel

, immediately

evacuatetheareaiftheTIPdrivearearadiation

monitor alarms.C.[NER/C]Always observe READY light illuminated

prior to inserting detector.[GE SIL-166]D.(NERlC]DONOTmove CHANNEL SELECTswitchwith

detectorinsertedpast

Indexer position(0001).Thecommonchannel

interlockcanbe defeatedinthis manner resulting in detector and equipment damage.[GESIL-092]E.(NERlC]Should detectorfailto shifttoslowspeed

when it entersthecore,the

LOWswitchshouldbeturnedon, switched to manualmode,andthe

detector withdrawn.[GESIL-166]

F.[NER/C]Length of time detectorisleftincoreshouldbe

minimizedtolimit act ivation of detectorandcable.[GESIL-166]

G.(NERlC]WhenTIP System operationisnotdesired, detectorsshouldberetractedandstoredin

chambershieldwithballvalvesclosed

.[GESIL-166]

Storage of detector in Indexer(0001)isallowedonlyfor

ALARA concernsandto prevent unnecessary

masking of multipleinputsto annunciatorRXBLDG AREA RADIATIONHIGH2-RA-90-1D

(2-XA-55-3A, Window 22)..H.[NER/C]Upon receiptofaPCISsignal(low

reactor waterlevelorhighdrywellpressure),any

detector insertedbeyonditsshield

chambershouldbeverifiedto

automatically

shift to reversemodeandbegin

withdrawal.Onceinshield,ballandpurge valves close.[GESIL-166]Ballvalve cannot be reopeneduntilPCISisresetonPanel2-9-4andmanualresetofTIP

ISOLATION RESET pushbutton

2-HS-94-7D/S2

locatedonPanel2-9-13.I.A detector should not be abruptly stopped from fastspeedtooff

without first switching to slow speed.J.[NER/C]Drive ControlUnits(DCU)shouldbe

monitored during withdrawal

to prevent any chamber shield withdrawallimitfrombeing

overrun.Detectorsshouldbe stopped manuallyatshieldlimitifautostoplimitswitchshouldfailandverifyballvalvecloses.[GESIL-166]K.OnlyoneTIPatatime

should be operated when maintenanceisbeing performedinTIPdrivearea.

(l BFN Traversing

Incore Probe System 2-01-94 Unit2Rev.0029 Page 8 of 26 3.0 PRECAUTIONS

AND LIMITATIONS (continued)

L.[NRC/CJDONOToperateTIPswithpersonnelinsideTIPRoomorinvicinityofTIPtubingandIndexersinDrywell

.RequirementmaybewaivedwithapprovalofShift ManagerandsiteRADCON

manager or designee.Inthisinstance,RADCONisrequiredtoestablishsuchcontrolsasare

necessarytopreventaccesstoTIPtubingandIndexerareastopreclude

unnecessaryexposuretopersonnelworkinginDrywell.RADCONField

Operations

Shift Supervisor

isrequiredtobenotifiedpriortooperationofTIPSystem.[NRCInformationNotice88-063, Supplement

2J M.Nochannelshouldbeindexedtocommonchannel10unlessallotherchannelsarenotindexedtochannel10andalltheirREADYlightsareilluminated

.N.[NERlC]DONOTturnMODEswitchtoOFFonDriveControlUnit

ifdetectorisoutsideshield

chamberunlesspersonnelsafetyrequiresit.

[GE SIL-166J This removes powerpreventingautomatic

withdrawalonPCISsignalandcausingballvalvestocloseoncableordetector.TipBallValves

CANNOTfullyclose

and shearvalvesmayhavetobeactuated

.O.CHANNEL SELECTswitchesonDriveControlUnitsshouldalwaysberotated

in clockwisedirectionwhenselectingchannels.

P.Connectoronshearvalve

indicatorcircuitshouldnotberemovedwhiletestingshearvalveexplosivechargesorperforming

shear valve maintenance

with detectorinserted.Thiswillcausean

automatic detector withdrawal.

Q.Continuous

voice communicationshouldbe maintainedbetweenTIPoperator

or maintenancepersonnelincontrolroomanddrive

mechanismareawhile maintenanceisbeingperformedandTIP

detectordrivingis necessary.R.Each applicableballvalveshouldbeopenedpriortooperatingthatTIP

machine.S.TIPDrive

MechanismsandIndexersshouldhave

continuouspurgesupplyunlessrequiredtoberemovedfromservicefor

maintenance.T.Duringoutageswhen

containmentisdeinertedfor

personnelaccess,TIP

Indexerpurgesupplyshouldbetransferredfrom

nitrogentoControlAirforpersonnelsafety.

U.Detector damageispossibleifTIPballvalveisleftopen

,orisopenedduring

DRYWELL PRESSURETEST.(GESIL-166)

((31.RO 216000K l.l O 00l/MEM/T2G2/PR.INSTRJ9/216000Kl.lO

//RO/SRO/Wh ichONEofthefollowingindicateshowraisingrecirculation

flow affects the EmergencySystemRange

indica tors(3-58A-58B)andNa

rrowRangeIndicators(e.g., L1-3-53)onPanel9-5?

A.Noeffecton

Emergency SystemRange;NarrowRangewillindicate

higher.B.Emergency SystemRangewillindicatehigher;NarrowRangewillnotbe

affected.C.Both EmergencySystemRangeandNarrowRangewill

indicate lower.D.oIEmergencySystemRangewillindicatelowerandNarrowRangewillnotbeaffected.

KIA Statement:216000Nuclear

Boiler Inst K1.10-Knowledgeofthephysical

connectionsand/orcause-

effect relationshipsbetweenNUCLEAR

BOILER INSTRUMENTATIONandthefollowing

Recirculationflowcontrol

system KIA Justification:

This quest ionsatisfiestheKIA

statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecific

know ledgeofthe effect of changesinRecirculationflowon

reactor water level instrumentation.

References:OPL171.003 Level of Knowledge Justificat

ion:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetotherequ

irementtorecallorrecogn ize d iscretebitsof information.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inordertoanswerthis

question correctly the candidate must determine the effectofraising Rec ircflowonNormalRangeand

Emergency SystemsRangelevel

instrumentation.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseNarrowRange

instrumentsmayreadslightlyh

igheratcolderconditions,butthisdoesNOTapplytoRecircflowchanges.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseNarrowRange

instrumentsarenoteffectedbyRec

irc Flow changes , but Emergency Sys tem Range isntrumentswillreadlower.Cis incorrect.

Th isisplaus ible because EmergencySystemRange

instruments

w illreadlower,buttheNarrowRange

instrumentswillnot.Dis correct.

(d.Fourrangesoflevel

indicationOPL171.003Revision17Page20of54

INSTRUCTOR

NOTES Normal Control Range (Narrow Range)(1)(a)oto+60 inchrange cover ing the normal operat ing range (analog)with+60"upto+70"digitaland0"downto-10"digital

readings.Obj.V.B.5Obj.V.B.6TP-3showsonlyanalogscale (b)Referenced

to instrument

zero (c)Four of these instruments

areusedby Feedwater Level Control System (FWLCS).Thelevel s ignal utilizedbythe FWLCS isnotd irected throughtheAnalog Trip System.i.Temperature

compensatedbya pressure signal Obj.V.B.11.Obj.V.B.13.(ii.Most accurate level indication

availabletothe operator iii.Calibrated

for normal operating pressure and temperature (d)These indicatorsanda recorder point (averageofthefour)are

locatedonPanel9-5

.NOTE:Anair bubbleorleakin the referencelegcan cause inaccurate

readingsinaconservative

direction resulting in a mismatch between level indicators

.This problem is particularly

prevalent after extended outages when startingupfromcold

shutdown conditionsandatlow reactor pressures.LER85-006-02(SeeLPFolder)(Section X.C.1.j.provides more detail)

((e)Fourother

narrow range instrumentsarelocatedinthecontrolroom,twoabovetheFWLCSlevel

indicatorsonpanel9-5(3-208A&D), one above HPCI (3-208B)and

one above RCIC (3-208C)onpanel9-3.OPL171.003Revision17Page21of54

INSTRUCTOR

NOTES Associated

with RFPT/Main TurbineandHPCIIRCICtrip

instruments

(2)Emergency SystemsRange(WideRange)2Analog

metersand2Digitalmeters

.(a)-155to+60 inches rangecoveringnormal

operating rangeanddowntothe

lower instrumentnozzlereturn (b)Referenced

to instrument

zero (c)FourMCR indicatorsonPanel9-5 monitorthisrangeoflevel

indication.(d)Calibratedfornormal operating pressure and temperature(e)ThelevelsignalutilizedbytheWideRange instruments

havesafetyrelated

functionsandare directedthroughthe

Analog Trip System.(f)Level indicationforthisrangeis

Obj.V.B.12.alsoprovidedonthe

BackupControlPanel

(25-32).(3)Shutdown Vessel Flood Range (Flood-up Range)(a)oto+400 inches range covering upperportionof reactor vessel (b)Referenced

to instrument

zero Calibratedforcold conditions

<<212°F,0psig)(c)Provides level indication

duringvesselfloodingorcooldown.

(Transient flashing effectscancauseindicatedlevelto

oscillateorbe erratic.Asthe referencelegrefills,theindicatedlevel

approaches

a more accurate waterlevelindication

.TheRVLlSmod

decreasesthetime necessaryforthisrefillto

occur j.NormalControlRange (NarrowRange)and EmergencySystemsRange(WideRange)Level

Discrepancies(1)NarrowRangelevel

instrumentation

iscalibratedtobemost

accurateatrated temperature

and pressure (particularly

the instrumentsforFWLCS ,sincethey are temperature

compensated)

.Atcold conditions

the non-FWLCS instrumentsreadhigh(not

temperature

compensated)

.(2)WideRange

instrumentsarealsocalibratedforrated

temperature

and pressure OPL171.003Revision17Page32of54

INSTRUCTOR

NOTES(a)TheindicatedlevelontheWideRange(9-5)isalsoaffectedby

changesinthe subcooling

of recirculation

waterandtheamountofflowatthelower(variableleg)tap

.Obj.V.B.15(b)Atrated

conditions

with minimum recirculationflowtheWideRange instruments

areaccurate.As

recirculationflowis increasedpastthe lowertapithasa significantvelocityheadandsomefrictionlosswhichreducesthe

pressureonthevariablelegtothe

differential

pressureinstrument,resultinginanindicatedlevellowerthanactual.Thiscouldbeasmuch

as10-15inches

errorwhenatratedflowandpower.(c)Duetocalibrationforrated

conditionsandnodensity

compensationatcold conditions

these instrumentsreadhigh.

(32.RO219000K2

.02 00l/C/A/T2G2/0I-74//219000K2.02//RO/SRO/NEW

10/16/07Giventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Unit-2isat100%ratedpowerw

ithRHRLoopII i n SuppressionPoolCoolingmodetosupportaHPC IFullFlowtest

surveillance.

• Unit-1 experiencesaLOCAwhichresultsinaCASsignalinitiationonUnit-1

.WhichONEofthefollowing

describes the currentstatusofUnit-2RHR

system and whatactionsmustbetakentorestore

SuppressionPoolCoolingonUn

it-2?A.2Aand2CRHRPumpsaretripped

.28and2Dpumpsareunaffected

.Noadditionalactionis

required.B.28and2DRHRPumpsaretripped.2Aand2Cpumpsareunaffected.PlaceRHRLoopIin

SuppressionPoolCooling

immediately.

c.AllfourRHR

pumpsreceiveatripsignal.PlaceRHRLoopIIin

Suppression

Poo l Cooling immediately

.AllfourRHR

pumps receiveatripsignal.PlaceRHRLoopIIin

SuppressionPoolCoolingaftera60secondtimedelay

.KIA Statement:219000RHR/LPCI:

Torus/PoolCoolingMode

K2.02-Knowledgeof

electrical

powersuppliestothefollowing

Pumps KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificplantconditionsandtimesto

determinewhichRHRpumpscanbeusedfor

SuppressionPoolCooling.

References:

2-01-74,OPL171.044 Level of Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedasCIAduetothe

requirementtoassemble

,sort,andintegratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome

.This requires mentallyusingthisknowledgeandits

meaning to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis: (Inordertoanswerthisquestioncorrectlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:

1.ResponseofUnit-2RHRpumpsduetoaUnit1CASinitition

.2.Recognizethe

differencebetweenaSingleUnitCASand

SimultaneousUnitCAS.3.RecognizethatPreferredandNon-preferredECCSpumpsdoNOTapplywiththegivenconditions.Ais incorrect.ThisisplausiblebasedonRHRLoopIIbeingthePreferredpumpsforUnit-2

.Bis incorrect.Thisisplausibleiftakenfromthe

perspectiveofUnit1operation,notUnit2operation

.Cis incorrect.ThisisplausiblebecauseallfourRHRpumpsonUnit2willtrip,buttheyarelockedoutfrommanualstartfor60

secondsbasedonD/Gand/orShutdownBoardloadingconcerns.Dis correct.(

(BFN Residual Heat Removal System 2-01-74 Unit2Rev.0133Page331 of 367 Appendix A(Page2 of 7)Unit 1&2Core Spray/RHR Logic Discussion2.2ECCS Preferred Pump Logic Concurrent

AccidentSignalsOnUnit1andUnit2Withnormal

poweravailable,thestartingandrunningofRHRpumpsona4KV

ShutdownBoardalreadyloadedbytheoppositeunit'sCoreSpray,RHRpumps,and

RHRSWpumpscouldoverloadtheaffected4KV

ShutdownBoardsandtripthe

normal feederbreaker.Thiswouldresultina

temporarylossofpowertothe

affected 4KVShutdownBoardswhiletheboardsarebeingtransferredtotheir

diesels.To prevent this undesirabletransient,Unit2RHRPumps2Aand2CareloadshedonaUnit1

accidentsignalandUnit1Pumps1

Band 10willbeloadshedonaUnit2 accidentsignal.Unit2CoreSprayPumps2Aand2CareloadshedonaUnit1 accidentsignalandUnit1CoreSprayPumps1

Band 10willbeloadshedonaUnit2 accidentsignal.ThismakesthePreferredECCSpumpsUnit1DivisionICoreSprayandRHRPumpsandUnit2Division2CoreSprayandRHRPumps.

Conversely

, the Non-preferredECCSpumpsareUnit1Division2CoreSprayandRHRPumpsandUnit2Division1CoreSprayandRHRPumps.Thepreferredand

non-preferredECCSpumpsareasfollows:UNIT1&2 PREFERREDECCSPumps CS1A,CS1C,RHR1A,RHR1CCS2B,CS 20,RHR2B,RHR 20 NON-PREFERREDECCSPumpsCS1B,CS 10,RHR1B,RHR 10

UNIT3Unit3doesnothaveECCS

Preferred/Non-PreferredPumpLog ic.AccidentSignalOnOneUnitWithan accidentononeunit,ECCSPreferredpumplogictripsallrunningRHRandCoreSpraypumpsonthe

non-accident

unit.

(OPL171.044Revision15Page50 of 159 INSTRUCTOR

NOTES Note: PresentlyUnit1 AccidentsignalwillnotaffectUnit2duetoDCN

H2735Athatliftedwiresfromrelays.Unit2willstillaffectUnit1.However,thefollowingrepresentsmodificationstotheinter-tielogicasitwillbeuponUnit1recovery.

(f.(1)Unit1PreferredRHRpumpsare

1A and 1C(2)Unit2PreferredRHRpumpsare

28 and 2D(3)Unit2initiationlogicisas

follows:Div1RHRlogicinitiatesDiv1pumps(AandC),andDiv2logicinitiatesDiv2pumps(BandD)

Accident Signal(1)LOCAsignalsaredividedintotwo

separatesignals,onereferredtoasaPre

AccidentSignal(PAS)andtheotherreferredtoasa

Common AccidentSignal(CAS)

.*PAS-122"Rx waterlevel(Level1)

OR2.45psigDW

pressure*CAS-122"Rxwaterlevel(Level1)

OR2.45psigDW

pressure AND<450psigRxpressure(2)Ifaunitreceivesan

accidentsignal,thenall

its respectiveRHRandCoreSpraypumps

will sequenceonbasedupon

powersourcetotheSDBoards.(3)AllRHRandCoreSpraypumpsontheaffectedunitwilltrip(ifrunning)andwillbeblockedfrom

manualstartingfor60seconds.Obj.V.B.13.Obj.V.C.3Obj.V.C.7 Obj.V.D.6Obj.V.E.II

Obj.V.B.13.Obj.V.C.3 Obj.V.C.7 Obj.V.D.6 Obj.V.E.II Note:Itshouldbeclearthattheonly

differencebetweenthetwosignalsistheinclusionofRxpressureintheCASsignal.ThePASsignalisananticipatorysignalthatallowstheDG'stostartonrisingOWpressureandbereadyshouldaCASbereceived.

OPL171.044Revision15Page51of159

(INSTRUCTOR

NOTES (4)After 60 secondsallRHR pumps on the non-Operator diligence affected unit may be manually started.required to (5)The non-preferred

pumps on the non-prevent overloading

SO affected unit are also prevented from boards/DG's

automatically

starting until the affected unit's accident signalisclear.(6)Thepreferredpumps

on the non-affected

unit are locked out from automatically

starting until the affected unit accident signal is clear OR the non-affected

unit receives an accident signal.g.4KV Shutdown Board Load ShedObj.V.C.B.(1)A stripping of motor loads on the 4KV boards occurs when the board experiences

an undervoltage

condition.

This is referredtoasa 4KV Load Shed.This shed prepares the board for the DG ensuringtheDGwilltieonto

the bus unloaded and without faults.(2)The Load Shed occurs when an undervoltage

is experienced

on the boardi.e.orif the Diesel weretiedtothe board (only source)and one of the units experienced

an accident signal which trips the Diesel output breaker.(3)Then, when the Diesel output breaker interlocks

are satisfied, the DG output breaker would closeand,ifan initiation

signal is present (CAS)theRHR,CS,and

RHRSW pumps would sequence on (4)Following an initiation

of a Common Accident Signal (which trips the diesel breaker),ifa subsequent

accident signal is received from anotherunit,a second diesel breakertripona"unit priority" basis is provided to ensure that the Shutdown boards are stripped prior to startingtheRHR pumps and other ECCS loads (5)When an accident signal trip of the diesel Occurs due to breakers is initiated from one unit (CASA or actuation of the (CASB), subsequent

CAS trips of all eight diesel breaker diesel breakers are blocked.TSCRN relay

(33.RO 226001A4.I2

OOlIMEM/T2G2/PC/P//226001A4.12/3.8/3.9/RO/SRO/Giventhefollowingplantconditions:*Apipebreakinside

containmentresultsinthebelow

parameters:-Drywell pressureis20psig-Drywell temperatureis210°F-Suppression

chamber pressureis18psig.-Suppression

chamber temperatureis155°F.-Suppressionpoollevelis+2inches-Reactor waterlevelis+30inchesWhichONElistof

parametersbelowmust ALWAYS be addressed to determinewhenitisappropriatetospraythedrywell?

A.-Suppression

Chamber temperature-Drywellpressure-Drywell temperature

B.-Suppression

Chamber pressure-Drywell temperature-SuppressionPoollevel C."-Drywellpressure-Drywell temperature-Reactor water level D.-Reactor water level-Suppression

Chamber temperature-Drywellpressure

KIA Statement:226001RHR/LPCI:

CTMTSprayModeA4.12-Abilityto

manually operate and/or monitorinthecontrolroom:

ContainmenUdrywell

pressure KIA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecificknowledgeofwhich

containment

parametersareusedto determinewhenContain

meritSprayscanbe

used.References:

1/2/3-EOI-2

Flowchart Level of Knowledge Justification:ThisquestionisratedasMEMduetothe

requirementtorecallorrecognizediscretebitsof

information.0610NRCExam

(REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analysis:Inorderto answerthisquestion

correctlythecandidatemust

determinethefollowing:

1.Orywell temperature

and pressurearealwaysrequiredtoensureCurve5limitsarenotexceeded.

2.RPVlevelisalwaysrequiredtoverifyadequatecorecoolingis

assuredpriortodivertingRHRflow

for Orywell sprays.3.SuppressionPoollevelisalwaysrequiredtoverify

Suppression

ChambertoOrywellvacuumbreakersareuncovered.

4.Suppression

Chamber pressure is ONLYrequiredwheninitiatingOrywellSpraysfromflowpathPC/P

o 5.Suppression

Chamber temperature

isNOTrequiredto

initiateOrywellSprays.Ais incorrect.Thisisplaus

iblebecauseOWtempandpressarerequired

,butSCtempisnot.Bis incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseOWtempandSPlevelarerequired

,butSCpressisONLYrequiredwheninitiatingOWSpraysusingPC/P

oCis correct.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseRPVlevelandOW

pressarerequired,butSCtempisnot.

WHEN SUPPR CH MBR PRESS EX CEEDS 12 PSIG, THEN CONnNUEINTHISPR OCEDURE L-_..._....----_.....__.__.._---------_....,.."PClP-7 L SHUT DOWN RECI RC PUfA'PS AND OW BL OWERS#2 PUMP NPS H AND VO RTEX m"TS INITlAm r:JN SPRAYS USING W:lL:!PUMP SWIREQUJRED

ro ASSUR EAIEQUATEOORECOOLIN

GBYCON11NUOUS

INJ (APPX 17 8)L L L

L!:!" ,p'0"..

L S HUT DOWN RS CIRC i'IIllWS RJO r:1" BLO'/IB'tS L L L

(34.RO 234000G2.4.50

OO l/C/NTIG2///234000G2.4.50/IRO/SRO/Giventhefollowingplant

conditions

• Fuelmo vementisinp rogressforchannelchangeou

t activitiesintheFuelPrepMach

ine.*Gas bubblesarevisiblecomingfromthede-channeled

bundle.*AnAreaRadiation

Monitor adjacenttotheSFSPbeginsalarm

ing.Wh ichONEofthe following describestheaction(s)totake?

Immed iatelySTOPfuelhandling,then_

A.notifyRADCONto

monitor&evaluateradiation

levels.B." evacuate non-essential

personnelfromtheRFF

.C.evacuate ALL personnelfromtheRFF

.D.obtain Reactor Engineering

Supervisor's

recommendation

for movementandsipp ingofthedamagedfuel

assembly.KIAStatement:234000FuelHandling

Equipment 2.4.50-Emergency Procedures/PlanAbilitytoverify

system alarm setpointsandoperatecontrolsidentifiedinthealarm

response manual KIA Justification:

This question sat isfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespecific

plant conditions

to determine the corrective

act ionsinvolvingFuelHandl

ing equipmentunderemergency

cond itions.References:

1/2/3-AOI-79-1&79-2 , 1/2/3-ARP-9-3A (W1)Levelof Knowledge Justification:Thisquestionisratedas

CIAduetothe requirementtoassemble

,sort,and integratethepartsofthequestiontopredictanoutcome.Th

isrequiresmentallyusingthisknowledgeanditsmean

ingtopred ict the correct outcome.0610NRCExam

(REFERENCE PROVIDED: None Plausibility

Analvsis:Inordertoanswerthisquestion

correctly the candidate must determinethefollowing

1.Whether indications

are consistentwithfueldamageor

inadvertant

criticality.

2.Basedonthe

answertoItem1above,enterthe

appropriate

AOI.3.Immediate Operator Actionsfortheselectedprocedure,AOI-70-1.Ais incorrect.Thisis plausible becauseRADCONnotificationisa

subsequentactioninAOI-70-1, however non-essential

personnel evacuationisan IMMEDIATE action.Bis correct.C is incorrect.Thisis plausible because evacuat ionofALLpersonnelisan

IMMEDIATEactionin AOI-70-2 , however non-essential

personnel evacuation

isan IMMEDIATE action inthe appropr iate AOI.D is incorrect.

Thisi s plausible because RE recommendationsarea subsequentactioninAOI-70-1

, howe ver non-essential

personnel evacuationisan IMMEDIATE act ion.

BFN Panel 9-3 2-ARP-9-3A

(Unit2 2-XA-55-3A Rev.0036 Page 4 of 50FUELPOOL SensorlTrip

Point: FLOOR AREARADIATIONHIGHRI-90-1B RI-90-2BForsetpo ints 2-RA-90-1A

RI-90-3BREFERTO 2-SIMI-90B

.11(Page1of1)

Sensor RE-90-1 B EI664'R-11 P-L1NE Location: RE-90-2B E1664'R-10U-L1NE

RE-90-3BE1639'R-10Q-L1NE

Probable Cause: Automatic Action: Operator Action: References:

A.Change in general rad iation levels.B.Refueling accident.C.Sensor malfunct ion.None A.CHECK 2-RI-90-1A , 2-RI-90-2A and 2-RI-90-3AonPanel2-9-11.

B.NOTIFYrefuelfloorpersonnel.C.IFDryCaskload

ing/unloading

activitiesareinprogress,THEN

NOTIFY Cask Supervisor.D.IF airbornelevelsriseby100DACAND

RADCONconfirms,THENREFERTOEPIP-1.E.REFERTO2-AOI-79-1or

2-AOI-79-2

as applicable.

F.IFthisalarm

isnotvalid,THENREFERTO0-01

-55.G.IFthisalarmisvalid

, THEN MONITOR the other parametersthatinputtoit

frequently.

These other parameterswillbemaskedfrom

alarmingwhilethisalarmissealedin.H.ENTER 2-EOI-3 Flowchart.0-47E600-132-47E610-90-1

2-45E620-3

GE 730E356 Series,TVACalc NDQ00902005001/EDC63693

o o o o o o o o

(BFNFuelDamage

During Refueling 2-AOI-79-1

Unit 2Rev.0017Page3 of71.0PURPOSEThisinstructionprovidesthesymptoms,automaticactionsand

operatoractionsforafueldamageaccident.2.0SYMPTOMS

A.Possible annunciatorsinalarm: 1.FUELPOOLFLOORAREARADIATIONHIGH(2-XA-55-3A,window1)

.2.AIR PARTICULATEMONITORRADIATIONHIGH(2-XA-55-3A,window2).3.RXBLDG,TURBBLDG,RFZONEEXHRADIATIONHIGH(2-XA

-55-3A,window4).4.REACTORZONEEXHAUSTRADIATIONHIGH

(2-XA-55-3A

,window21).5.RXBLDGAREARADIATIONHIGH(2-XA-55-3A,window22).6.REFUELINGZONEEXHAUSTRADIATIONHIGH(2-XA-55-3A,window34).

B.Gasbubblesvisible,intheSpentFuelStoragePooland/orReactorCavity,attributedtophysicalfueldamage.C.Knowndroppedorphysicallydamagedfuelbundle.D.PortableCAMinalarm.

E.RadiationlevelontheRefuelFloorisgreaterthan25mr/hrandcauseis

unknown.

BFNFuelDamageDuringRefueling

2-AOI-79-1

Unit2Rev.0017Page5of74.0OPERATORACTIONS4.1ImmediateActions

[1]STOPallfuelhandling.

[2]EVACUATEallnon-essentialpersonnelfromRefuelFloor.

4.2 Subsequent

Actions CAUTION o oThereleaseofiodineisofmajorconcern.Ifgasbubblesareidentifiedatanytime,IodinereleaseshouldbeassumeduntilRADCONdeterminesotherwise.

[1]VERIFY secondarycontainmentisintact.(REFERTOTechSpec3.6.4.1)

[2]IFanyEOIentryconditionismet, THEN ENTER the appropriate

EOI(s).[3]VERIFY automatic actions.[4]NOTIFYRADCONtoperformthefollowing:

n o o*EVALUATEtheradiationlevels.

0*MAKE recommendationforpersonnelaccess.

0*MONITORaroundtheReactorBuilding

Equipment Hatch,atlevelsbelowtheRefuelFloor,forpossiblespreadofthe

release.0[5]REFERTOEPIP-1forpropernotification.

o

((BFN Fuel Damage During Refueling 2-AOI-79-1

Unit 2Rev.0017 Page 6 of 7 4.2 Subsequent

Actions (continued)

[6]MONITOR radiationlevels,fortheaffectedareas,usingthe

following radiation recorders and indicators:A.2-RR-90-1 (points1and2), 2-MON-90-50 (Address 11), 2-RR-90-142

and 2-RR-90-140(Panel2-9-2)

.0 B.2-RM-90-142, 2-RM-90-140, 2-RM-90-143

and 2-RM-90-141

DetectorsAandB(Panel2-9-10).

0 C.2-RI-90-1A

and 2-RI-90-2A(Panel2-9-11).

0 D.0-CONS-90-362A (Address09,10,08)forUnit1,2, 3-RM-90-250, respectively(Panel1-9-44).

0[7]IF possible, MONITOR portable CAMs&ARMs.[8]REQUEST Chemistrytoperform 0-SI-4.8.8.2-1 to determine if iodine concentrationhasrisen.0[9]NOTIFY Reactor Engineering

Supervisor,orhis designee , and OBTAIN recommendation

for movement and sippingofthe damaged fuel assembly.0[10]OBTAIN Plant Managers approvalpriorto resuminganyfuel transfer operations.

0[11]WHEN conditionhasclearedANDifrequired, THEN RETURN ventilation

systems, includingSGTS,tonormal.

REFERTO2-01-30A,2-01-30B,0-01-30F,0-01-31,and0-01-65.

0

(BFN Inadvertent

CriticalityDuringIncore

2-AOI-79-2Unit2 Fuel MovementsRev.0013Page5of8 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Immediate Actions[1]IF unexpectedcriticalityisobservedfollowingcontrolrod

withdrawal, THEN REINSERTthecontrolrod.

0[2]IFallcontrolrods

CANNOTbefullyinserted, THEN MANUALL Y SCRAMthereactor.

0[3]IF unexpectedcriticalityisobservedfollowingthe

insertionofa fuel assembly , THEN PERFORMthefollowing:

0[3.1]VERIFYfuelgrapplelatchedontothefuel

assemblyhandleAND immediately

REMOVEthefuel assemblyfromthereactorcore.

0[3.2]IFthereactorcanbedeterminedtobe

subcritical

ANDnoradiologicalhazardisapparent, THEN PLACEthefuelassemblyinaspentfuelstoragepoollocationwiththeleastpossiblenumberof

surroundingfuelassemblies,leavingthefuelgrapplelatchedtothe

fuel assembly handle.0[3.3]IF the reactor CANNOTbedeterminedtobe

subcritical

OR adverseradiologicalconditionsexist, THEN TRAVERSEtherefuelingbridgeandfuel

assemblyawayfromthereactorcore,preferablytotheareaofthecattlechute,AND

CONTINUEatStep4.1[4].0[4]IF the reactor CANNOTbedeterminedtobe

subcritical

OR adverse radiological

conditions

exist, THEN EVACUATEtherefuelfloor

.0

(35.RO 245000K6.04 OOI/C/A/TIG 2/0I-35//245000K6.04

/fRO/SRO/Il/28/07

RMSGiventhefollowingplant

conditions:*Unit2 i s operatingat100%power.*Main Generatorisat1150MWe.*The Chattanooga

Load Coordinator

requ iresa0.95 lagging power factor.*Generator hydrogen pressureis65psig.Wh ichONEofthe following describestherequiredact

ion and reason if Generator hydrogen pressuredropsto45psig?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A.Reduce excitationtoobtaina power factorofunitytomaintain

current generatorload.Poleslippagewillnot occuratthis power factor.Reduce generatorloadbelow800MWe.

Sufficient

cooling capability

still existsatthishydrogen

pressure.C.Reduce generatorloadbelow800MWe

.Poleslippagewillnot

occuratthis generator load.D.Reduceexci

tationtoobta in a power factorofun itytomain tain current generator load.Suffic ientcoolingcapability st illexistsatthishydrogen

pressure.KJA Statement:245000MainTurb

ine Gen./Aux.K6.04-Knowledgeofthe

effectthatalossor

malfunct ionofthe follow ingwillhaveontheMAIN

TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS:Hydrogencooling

KJA Justification:

This question satisfiestheKIA statementbyrequiringthe

candidatetousespec ificplantcond itions to determine the effectofalossofhydrogen

coolingonMa in Generator operation.Reference Provided: Generator Capability

Curve withoutaxislabeledLevelof Knowledge Justification:

This questionisratedas CIAduetotherequ

irement to assemble , sort , and integratethepartsofthe

questiontopredictan

outcome.Thisrequi res mentally us ing th is know ledge and its meaning to predict the correct outcome.0610NRCE xam

REFERENCE PROVIDED: Generator Capability

Curvewithouttheaxislabeled.

Plausibility

Analysis:Inorderto answer this question correctly the candidate must determine the following:

1.Current operat ing po intonthe Generator CapabilityCurvebasedongiven

condiions.2.Recognizethatpole slippageisonlyaconcernwhenoperatingw

ith a significant

leading power factor.3.Recognizethatpolesl

ippageisaresultof

underexcitation,not

excessive generator load.4.Recognizethat

generator hydrogen pressure is directlyrelatedtocooling

capability.Aisincorrect.Thisis plausible because reducing excitationDOESreduceheat

generationwithinthe generator ,butnot sufficientenoughto prevent generator damage.However,pole

slippageisnotaconcernataunity

power factor.Biscorrect.Cis incorrect.Thisis plausible because generatorloadisproperlyreduced,butthebasisforthe

reduction isnotrelatedtoslippingpoles

.Dis incorrect.Thisis plausible because reducing excitationDOESreduceheat

generation

w ithin thegenerator,butnot

sufficientenoughto prevent generatordamage.Inaddition, insufficient

hydrogen pressureexistsatthe

current generatorloadevenwiha

power factorofunity.