IR 05000280/2023003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2023003 and 05000281/2023003

ML23296A031
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/25/2023
From:	Matthew Fannon Division Reactor Projects II
To:	Carr E Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2023003
Download: ML23296A031 (1)

Text

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2023003 AND 05000281/2023003

Dear Eric S. Carr:

On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Surry Power Station. On October 16, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with David Wilson, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

October 25, 2023

Sincerely, Matthew S. Fannon, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000280 and 05000281

License Numbers:

DPR-32 and DPR-37

Report Numbers:

05000280/2023003 and 05000281/2023003

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2023-003-0031

Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Facility:

Surry Power Station

Location:

Surry, VA

Inspection Dates:

July 01, 2023 to September 30, 2023

Inspectors:

P. Gresh, Operations Engineer

D. Jung, Resident Inspector

S. Kennedy, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Tornow, Physical Security Inspector

B. Towne, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Walker, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector

A. Wilson, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By:

Matthew S. Fannon, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 4

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Transient Combustibles Stored in Restricted Areas Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000280,05000281/2023003-01 Open/Closed

[P.3] -

Resolution 71152A The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, associated with the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which resulted in storage of transient combustibles within restricted or combustion free zones in various areas of Unit 1 and Unit 2.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Diverse and flexible coping strategies beyond design basis equipment in the equipment dome on August 7, 2023 (2)

1. 1 emergency diesel generator following routine surveillance on September 12, 2023

(3) Control room ventilation following failure of 1-VS-MOD-103C, control room supply isolation motor operated damper, on September 25, 2023

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Security central alarm station, elevation 27 feet, on July 20, 2023

(2) Unit 1 safeguards building valve room and low head safety injection pump cubes, elevations 27 feet, 19 feet, and 12 feet, on August 10, 2023

(3) Fire pump house, elevation 27 feet, on August 13, 2023

(4) Unit 1 cable vault penetration area, elevation 15 feet, on August 24, 2023

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Fire brigade drill performance observation for unannounced simulated fire in Unit 2 turbine building basement from the B instrument air compressor, on August 15, 2023

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training involving a scenario which included a loss of all instrument and station air requiring a manual reactor trip and emergency boration on September 13, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 switchgear rooms backflow preventer valves

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergent risk assessment due to 'A' emergency service water pump emergent fuel oil line repair on July 31, 2023

(2) High risk plan assessment for replacement of electronic module in Unit 1 turbine control system on August 3, 2023

(3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 elevated risk due to #2 emergency diesel generator and canal level probe testing on September 18, 2023

(4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 elevated risk due to the alternate AC diesel maintenance on September 26, 2023

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Condition Report (CR) 1232411, Unit 1 boric acid transfer pump failure of 1-CH-FI-1180, boric acid filter outlet flow indicator, on July 3, 2023

(2) CR1234395, 1-VS-AC-2, Unit 1 control room air handling unit, high current readings on July 31, 2023

(3) CR1234933, Unit 2 C charging pump discharge sample valve, 2-SS-HCV-203C, failed to close during performance of 2-NPT-CH-003, In-service Inspection of 2-CH-P-1C, on August 7, 2023

(4) CR1235475, Seismic support spring can to trunnion misalignment on A and B auxiliary feedwater injection headers near containment penetrations, on August 14, 2023

(5) CR1236002, Rising Unit 2 pressurizer power operated relief valve tailpipe temperatures after draining pressurizer relief tank on August 22, 2023

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Design Equivalent Change Package SU-23-00112, Temporary Chiller for 1-VS-AC-3 Mechanical Equipment Room-2 AC Unit, on August 16, 2023

(2) Design Equivalent Change Package SU-23-00117, Isolation of Flux Thimble 2-RC-TW-R8, on September 26, 2023

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1)0-MOP-SW-001, Removal from Service and Return to Service of Emergency Service Water Pumps, following repair of leak on 'A' emergency service water pump fuel oil line on August 2, 2023 (2)1-OPT-SI-005, Low Head Safety Injection Pump Test, following drain and refill of the seal head tank on August 9, 2023

(3) PMT-BKR-OP-01, Breaker Operability Test, following 10-year planned refurbishment of 01-IP-BKR-15H10-CKTBRK, component cooling pump 1A circuit breaker, August 24, 2023 (4)2-IPT-CC-CW-L-202, Intake Canal Level Probe Time Response and Calibration, following cleaning of channel 3 canal level probe on September 1, 2023 (5)2-OPT-RC-11.1, 10-Year Inservice Inspection System Pressure Test of Class 1 Components Associated with the Reactor Coolant System, following installation of plug for flux thimble 2-RC-TW-R8 on September 22, 2023

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

(1)2-NPT-FW-001, Inservice Inspection System Pressure Test of the Suction Flow Path from the Fire Protection System to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, on August 2, 2023 (2)2-OSP-ZZ-001, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Functional Surveillance, on August 3, 2023 (3)2-OPT-ZZ-002, Engineered Safety Features Actuation with Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage - 2J Bus, on August 4, 2023 (4)2-OPT-CS-006, Containment Spray System Motor Operated Valve Stroke Test, on August 28, 2023 (5)0-OSP-AAC-003, 18 Month Frequency: Automatic Start Test of AAC Diesel Generator, on August 29, 2023

71114.01 - Exercise Evaluation

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.11) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the biennial emergency plan exercise during the week of July 17, 2023. The simulated scenario began with a loose parts alarm in the lower reactor vessel, followed by a high radiation alarm from the reactor coolant system letdown radiation monitor. This met the conditions for declaring a Notice of Unusual Event. Subsequently, a steam generator tube rupture occurred resulting in the loss of reactor coolant system boundary, meeting the conditions for declaring an Alert. As the scenario progressed, a main steam safety valve on the effected steam generator failed open, meeting the conditions for a Site Area Emergency. When off-site field team readings exceeded threshold criteria, conditions for a General Emergency were met, and the Offsite Response Organizations were able to demonstrate their ability to implement emergency actions.

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated submitted Emergency Action Level, Emergency Plan, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure changes during the week of July 17, 2023. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of an emergency preparedness drill on Unit 1 involving a steam generator tube rupture and a stuck open main steam safety valve resulting in a General Emergency declaration on July 18, 2023.

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated in-office, the proposed scenario for the biennial emergency plan exercise prior to the day of the exercise.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

(1) Unit 1 (July 2022 through June 2023)

(2) Unit 2 (July 2022 through June 2023)

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 2022 through December 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 2022 through December 2022)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 2022 through December 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 2022 through December 2022)

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 2022 through December 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 2022 through December 2022)

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 2022 through December 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 2022 through December 2022)

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 2022 through December 2022)

(2) Unit 2 (January 2022 through December 2022)

EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023 EP03: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Potential adverse trend in work hour violations (Corrective Action 11435365)

(2) Adverse trend in the control of transient combustible material (Corrective Action 11441583)

INSPECTION RESULTS

Transient Combustibles Stored in Restricted Areas Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000280,05000281/2023003-01 Open/Closed

[P.3] -

Resolution 71152A The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, associated with the licensee's failure to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which resulted in storage of transient combustibles within restricted or combustion free zones in various areas of Unit 1 and Unit 2.

Description:

Following the NRC issuance of NCV 05000280/2022004-01, Transient Combustible Stored in a Restricted Area, and NCV 05000280,05000281/2023001-01, Transient Combustibles Stored in Restricted Areas, the licensee initiated corrective action assignment (CA) 11894278 regarding an adverse trend of transient combustibles being stored in restricted areas contrary to the requirements of the licensees fire protection program as stated in CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials.

The inspectors reviewed CA11894278, CM-AA-FPA-101, and ETE-SU-2011-0109, Evaluation of Permanently Stored Combustible Material at Surry, and performed a walkdown of plant areas with the site fire marshal to assess whether the corrective actions to address this issue have been effective. In CA11894278, the licensee determined that the most probable cause was that workers and first line supervisors in multiple departments demonstrated a lack of engagement and adherence to the transient fire loading permit requirements to the extent that they did not recognize deviating conditions in the field. The licensee implemented interim corrective actions such as performing a stand down with all site personnel and twice per week walkdowns by site leadership and supervision focusing on transient fire loading permits and general housekeeping. Final corrective actions included designating an independent supervisor to review the work area, upon initial setup, for compliance with program requirements as described in CM-AA-FPA-101; discussing each permit with a member of Site Safety prior to approval to ensure all restrictions are understood; and more frequent reviews of work areas with active transient fire loading permits.

On August 31, 2023, the inspectors conducted a walkdown of plant areas with the site Fire Marshal. During the walkdown, the inspectors identified the following non-compliances with CM-AA-FPA-101, which were determined to be violations of the licensees fire protection program:

• Fire Zone 4A - Transient combustibles located in the overhead cable tray in the northwest corner of Unit 2 relay room. CM-AA-FPA-101 stated no transient permitted except that required to repair/replace equipment.

• Fire Zone 4C - Transient combustibles located in Unit 2 Train 2J emergency switchgear room within 3 feet of the Unit 2 containment cable vault Cardox control panel.

• Fire Zone 45 - Transient combustibles located in mechanical equipment room (MER)-

3 within 10 feet of the south wall.

• Fire Zone 54 - Transient combustibles located in MER-4. CM-AA-FPA-101, stated that no transient combustibles are allowed in this room.

In addition, on August 10, 2023, during a plant status walkdown of the Unit 1 safeguards/main steam valve house, Fire Zone 19, the inspectors identified transient combustibles behind the safeguards building basement ladder. CM-AA-FPA-101 stated no transients within 10 feet of penetration wall with containment.

The inspectors concluded that the licensees corrective actions to address previous NRC-identified non-cited violations associated with the control of transient combustibles have not been effective.

Corrective Actions: On August 10, 2023, and August 31, 2023, the licensee removed the transient combustibles from the identified restricted areas and initiated condition reports to evaluate corrective actions to address this issue.

Corrective Action References: CR1235281 and CR1236765

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors found that the licensees failure to implement the fire protection program in accordance with licensee procedure CM-AA-FPA-101, which resulted in the storage of transient combustibles within restricted or combustion free zones, was a performance deficiency within the licensees ability to foresee and prevent.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the transient combustible was stored within a restricted or combustion free zone, which affected the zones function to prevent the spread of fire. The inspectors used IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated January 1, 2021, to inform answers to the more than minor screening questions and found this condition consistent with more than minor Example 4.j.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire finding would not increase the likelihood of a fire, delay detection of a fire, or result in a more significant fire than previously analyzed such that the credited safe shutdown strategy could be adversely impacted.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the inspectors found that the licensee did not take effective corrective actions related to two NRC identified findings involving transient combustible stored in restricted areas, which led to an additional finding.

Enforcement:

Violation: License Condition 3.I, Fire Protection, states in part, The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report UFSAR Section 9.10.1, Design Bases, states in part, Compliance with these criteria is contained in the following documents Fire Protection Program documents and the associated Administrative Procedures describe the administrative and technical controls. Licensee procedure CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, which includes restrictions for the following areas and states, in part:

• Fire Zone 4A - Unit 2 relay room: No transient permitted except that required to repair/replace equipment.

• Fire Zone 4C - Unit 2 train 2J emergency switchgear room: No transient within 3 feet of 1-FP-PNL-HAZ06 and 1-FP-PNL-HAZ08.

• Fire Zone 19 - Unit 1 safeguards/main steam valve house: No transient within 10 feet of penetration wall with containment.

• Fire Zone 45 - MER-3: No transient permitted within 10 feet of the south wall (MER#4) or west wall (U2ESGR/battery room).

• Fire Zone 54 - MER-4: No transient permitted.

Contrary to the above, prior to August 10, 2023 (Fire Zone 19), and prior to August 31, 2023 (Fire Zones 4A, 4C, 45, and 54), the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect, the provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the UFSAR, resulting in noncompliance with the fire protection combustible control program as documented CM-AA-FPA-101. Specifically, the licensee stored transient combustibles within restricted or combustion free zones noted above.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 16, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to David Wilson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On July 20, 2023, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise inspection results to David Wilson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR1179951

ANS Evaluation Report

10/22/2022

CR1182798

NRC ENS line is non-functional

10/15/2021

CR1209676

Offsite Notifications

10/06/2022

CR1223366

RP below ERO minimum shift manning requirements

4/5/23

CR1224246

State and Local Comm selected 'Emergency' vs. 'Drill' on

ENF

4/12/2023

CR1228173

TSC UPS failed to transfer to its normal source

5/12/23

Corrective Action

Documents

CR1231023

Unexpected response in MIDAS during drill

6/15/23

Surry Emergency Plan

Rev. 72

0-AP-37.00

Seismic Event

0-LSP-J-W-001

Early Warning System Polling Functional Test

1/11/2022

EPIP 3.03

ACTIVATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER

Rev. 27

EPIP-1.01

Emergency Manager Controller Procedure

EPIP-1.01

Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure

Rev. 63

EPIP-1.02

Response to Notification of Unusual Event

EPIP-1.03

Response to Alert

EPIP-1.04

Response to Site Area Emergency

EPIP-1.05

Response to General Emergency

EPIP-1.06

Protective Action Recommendations

EPIP-1.06

Protective Action Recommendations

EPIP-2.01

Notifications and Communications

EPIP-2.02

Notification of NRC

EPIP-3.02

Activation of the TSC

EPIP-3.06

Corporate Emergency Response Center Activation

Rev. 2

EPIP-3.10

CERC Technical Support Controlling Procedure

EPIP-4.01

Radiological Assessment Director Controlling Procedure

EPIP-4.02

Radiation Protection Supervisor Controlling Procedure

EPIP-4.03

Dose Assessment Team Controlling Procedure

EPIP-4.04

Emergency Personnel Radiation Exposure

EPIP-4.07

Protective Measures

71114.01

Procedures

EPIP-4.09

Source Term Assessment

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

EPIP-4.15

Onsite Monitoring

EPIP-4.34

Field Team Radio Operator Rev 10

EPIP-5.01

Transportation of Contaminated Injured Personnel

EPIP-5.03

Personnel Accountability

Rev. 26

EPIP-5.09

Attacks Against Station, Security Threat or Security

Condition

SU-22-01-0

50.54(q) Change Package for SPS EAL Matrix and EAL

Technical Basis Document

SU-22-02-0

50.54(q) Change Package for Surry LBCDR 463

1/18/22

SU-22-03-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP 3.02 Activation of the

TSC

SU-22-05-0

50.54(q) Change Package for SPS EAL Matrix and EAL

Technical Basis Document

SU-22-06-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.34 Field Team Radio

Operator Rev 10

SU-22-07-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-3.10 CERC Technical

Support Controlling Procedure

SU-22-08

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-1.06 Protective Action

Recommendations

SU-22-09-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-3.03 Activation of the

OSC

SU-22-11-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.07 Protective

Measures

SU-23-01-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-5.01 Transportation of

Contaminated Injured Personnel

SU-23-02-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-1.01 Emergency

Manager Controller Procedure

SU-23-03-0

Update to EPIP-4.03, Dose Assessment Team Controlling

Procedure - EPIP-4.03, Rev. 24

2/08/2023

SU-23-04-0

EPIP-5.09 Attacks Against Station, Security Threat or

Security Condition

SU-23-05-0

50.54(q) Change Package for 0-AP-37.00 Seismic Event

71114.04

Miscellaneous

SU-23-06-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.01 Radiological

Assessment Director Controlling Procedure

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

SU-23-07-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.02 Radiation

Protection Supervisor Controlling Procedure

SU-23-08-02

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.04 Emergency

Personnel Radiation Exposure

SU-23-09-01

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.09 Source Term

Assessment

SU-23-10-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.15 Onsite Monitoring

SU-23-11-1

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.16 Offsite Monitoring

SU-23-12-0

50.54(q) Change Package for EPIP-4.34 Field Team Radio

Operator Rev 10

SU-23-13-0

50.54(q) Change Package for 0-LSP-CO-005 Rev 2

6/26/23

EAL

Surry Power Station Emergency Action Level Matrix

Rev. 6

Procedures

EAL

Surry Power Station Emergency Action Level Matrix

Rev. 7

Corrective Action

Documents

CR1225406

Unsuccessful DEP opportunity from 4/4/2023 drill (CERC)

4/21/2023

Miscellaneous

2nd quarter 2022 through 1st quarter 2023 PI data.

71151

Procedures

EP-AA-103

Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators

Rev. 11