IR 05000443/1987008

Insp Rept 50-443/87-08 on 870219-20.Violations Noted:Failure to Follow Requirements of Emergency Procedure Er 1.0, Classification & Notification of Emergencies at Zero Power

ML20205G442
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	03/10/1987
From:	Lazarus W, Schumacher J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205G376	List: IR 05000443/1987008 ML20205G370 ML20205G395
References
50-443-87-08, 50-443-87-8, NUDOCS 8703310457
Download: ML20205G442 (6)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No.

50-443/87-08 Docket No.

50-443 License No.

NPF-56 Permit No.

CPPR-135 Priority --

Category B/C t

Licensee:

Public Service Company of New Hampshire

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1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Facility Name:

Seabrook Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:

Seabrook, New Hampshire i

Inspection Conducted: F bruary 19-20, 1987 Inspectors:

C L5 8 ['7 W. IdCL(rus, @II)ergency Preparedness Date

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i Section Chief EP &RPB, DRSS

= = -k Y/ohl I

chumacher, Senior Emergency bat (

repa dness Specialist Approved by:

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W J(_.Le(zarCChief. Emergency Date Preparedness Section, EP and Radiological Protection Branch, DRSS

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on February 19-20.1986 (Report No.

50-443/87-08)

Areas Inspected: Special unannounced inspection by two region-based inspectors of conditions surrounding the classification and reporting of an Unusual Event which was identified on February 11, 1986.

Results:

One apparent violation was identified. The licensee failed to follow the requirements of emergency procedure ER 1.0, " Classification and Notification of Emergencies at Zero Power", which requires notification of both Massachusetts and New Hampshire within 15 minutes of classifying any emergency condition (as defined in procedure ER 1.1).

8703310457 870323 PDR ADOCK 0500

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Persons Contacted J. Connolly, Test Engineer

'T. Harpster, Director, Emergency Preparedness

• D. Moody, Station Manager R. Strickland, Shift Superintendent

• G. Thomas, Vice President, Nuclear Production R. Thompson, Shift Superintendent T. Waechter, Shift Test Director

'L. Walsh, Operations Manager

• Indicates those present at the exit interview.

2.

Background This special inspection was conducted to determine the facts behind an Unusual Event which was declared by the licensee on February 11, 1987, and to determine if the event was correctly classified and reported in accordance with NRC regulations and conditions of the zero-power license under which Seabrook is operating.

In performing this inspection, those persons directly involved were interviewed, and appropriate supporting documentation was reviewed in order to determine the sequence of events which occurred on February 10 and 11,1987. The times noted in Detail 3 below, are reconstructed from the best available information from all these sources.

3.

Seauence of Events DATE TIME EVENT 2/10 1600 The containment emergency personnel access air lock was closed for the last time after a series of entries.

2/11 1345 The Test Engineer arrived at the emergency personnel access hatch to perform the Technical Specification (T.S.) required surveillance test of the air lock door

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seals (required within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the last of a series of entries). Hearing a sound of air hissing, he investigated and located the source of the leakage as the one inch pressure equalizing line on the door.

1400 Pursuing the reason for the leak, he opened the outer personnel door, removed a cover plate over the interior section of the outer door and found the equalizing valve linkage disconnected from the door operating linkage (The equalizing valves are designed to be operated automatically by actuation of the door linkage). While inside the air lock he heard air leaking from the vicinity of the inner door and found air leaking from the identically designed equalizing line of the inner door. The investigation indicated that the linkage was

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also disconnected from the equalizing valves on the Inner door, and that the equalizing valves on both doors

were at least partially open. The engineer called the Shift Test Director to report the problem.

1410 The Shift Test Director arrived at the door.

Recognizing the potential significance of the loss of containment integrity by the observed leakage through

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the equalizing lines of both doors, the Shift Test

Director went to the control room to explain the.

situation to the Shift Superintendent, instructing the

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test engineer to continue with his planned test of the

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door seals.

1410-1440 The test engineer proceeded with the routine test of the "O"-ring seals of the inner and outer doors. In the Control Room, the Shift Superintendent on watch

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recognized that if air lock integrity was not established

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on at least one of the two air lock doors within one

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hour (from 1410), a cool-down would have to be started in order to comply with Technical Specifications (T.S.

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3.0.3 requires that if unable to comply with the most limiting condition of a technical specification, a shutdown to cold shutdown conditions must be started

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i within one hour). The Shift Superintendent sent the

Shift Test Director back to the door to attempt to

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expedite restoration of containment integrity and air

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lock operability.

1440 The Shift Test Director arrived back at the door and instructed the test engineer to begin work to get the equalizing ball valves shut on the inner and outer air

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lock doors.

i 1445 The linkage was reconnected on the inner door, however j

a test performed by connecting compressed air to a

fitting between the inner and outer valves on the inner

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door indicated that at least the inner valve was still leaking. Work on the inner door was suspended to try

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l to restore the equalizing valves on the outer door to

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normal.

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1455 The linkage on the outer door equalizing valves was

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reconnected and the door shut. A test of the valves i

indicated that the outer valve was leaking. The door was re-opened and an assistant was stationed inside the

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air lock to ensure that the valve linkage was staying in place while the door was shut again. The linkage I

appeared to operate normally, however the outer valve still leaked.

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1510 As the one hour time lYrait hadAeen reached, and emergency equipment door air lock Integrity had not been restored, t. cool-down was sta!ted to comply with T.S. 3.0.3.

The oncom'.ng S.ift Superintendent (who relieved the w$ch at hbout 1500) realized that initiating

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a shutdown to cold shetdown conditions because of inability no mtti. T.S. requirements, may be classified as an "Unusel Event." by the Emergency Plsn, and began checkin;I the appropriate refersnces in the Plan and the implementing procedures. He slso called the Operations Manager to discust, tpe situation. By coincidence the

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Operations Manager was also asMgned as Duty Station Emergency Director (a posit.lon wnich is assigned on a

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weekly rotation basis to einier staff membe s).

The Operations Manager disagt'e9d with the classification df the forced cool-do'in as an " Unusual Event"'and the

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two continued their review of the procedure.

1515 The test er gineer was\\ able to close the outer equalizing valve on the outer door a few more degrees with a wrench. A test rig was connected to determine if the'

valve had sealed.

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1f90 The leak test was satisfactofy and the Control Room was notified that the integrity of one of the two air lock doors had been restored.

1525 The cool-dme was hal':3d, as the condittens requiring 'it had been corrected.

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1525:1530 Thi discussion continued between t2:e Shift Suterintendent ard the Operations Manager, which now foused on wlut 4ction was nec9stary to report an

" r.nual Event" or other emergcacy action level that is over before< lt is repoater.

1530 The Shift SuperinterAtt alassified the l'orced cort-dowa as an "Unusud EV?it", and immediately declassified it, t,mev the condition no longer er!ttt f The Shift SuperWendtml began to make notifications in accordance with procedure ER 1.0, 'vhich required

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notification of botl. New Hampshire End Massachusetts within 15 minut3s. The Opvar< ions Manager instructed the Shift Superintendent tn go' ahead with the call to New flampshire, but to wbl until he verified that i

Massach.usetts should ba i ta led before calling them.

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e 1539 The Shift Superintenden'., ' notified the state of New

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Hampshire via the state " hot-line". This r.ecessitated

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dialing the number for Naw llampshire Mone, as the normal procedure requires dialing one number which

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connects to both Massachusetts and New Hampshire

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state police.1 1548 Reported the declaration of the " Unusual Event" to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer via the Emergency Notification System.

1549 The Operations Manager returned to the Control Room

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and informed the Shift Superintendent to also call Massachusetts.

1550 Shift Superintendent attempted to call Massachusetts via the' state " hot-line", however an incoming call from New Hampshire requesting additional information on the hot-

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line prevented him from making the call to Massachusetts, c

1600 After providing additional information to New Hampshire,' and making another failed attempt to call

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Massachusetts on the state " hot-line", the notification to the Massachusetts State Police was made via back-up commercial telephone, in accordance with the reporting procedure.

4.

Findings Although in this particular instance, no real threat to the health and safety of the public existed, several generic weaknesses in the licensee's procedures and training, particularly in the areas of classification and notification were identified. These areas will require review and corrective action by the licensee:

a.

Failure to report the declaration of an " Unusual Event" to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts within 15 minutes is contrary to the requirements of Emergency Plan implementing procedure ER 1.0,

" Classification and Notification of Events at Zero Power". This is an apparent violation (see Appendix A)(50-443/87-08-01).

b.

The discussion between the Operations Manager and the Shift Superintendent unnecessarily delayed the classification and reporting of the event. If the Shift Superintendent.had not: delayed the -

classification by consulting with the Operations Manager / Duty Station Emergency Director, apparently both New Hampshire and Massachusetts would have been notified within the allowed 15

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minutes. The relationship between the Shift Superintendent and the Operations Manager (or other Duty Station Emergency Director)

during emergency classification and notification, needs to be clarified and stressed in' training. This item is unresolved (50-

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443/87-08-02).

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Based on the noted disagreement between the Shift Superintendent and the Operations Manager, additional training may be necessary to

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clarify what events are classified as Unusual Events. This item is unresolved (50-443/87-08-03).

d.

The procedure for reporting of events which have been classified under the Emergency Plan, but have cleared before reporting is possible, needs to be further evaluated to determine if present guidance for operators is sufficient. This item is unresolved (50-443/87-08-04),

The acceptability of using the state notification " hot line" by the e.

states for calling in for additional information needs to be evaluated.

This item is unresolved (50-443/87-08-05).

f.

The lack of sensitivity of the test engineering staff, in falling to promptly inform the operations crew of the loss of containment

. integrity, needs to be evaluated and corrected. This item is unresolved (50-443/87-08-06).

g.

The generic implications of the common-mode failure of the equalizing valve linkage on both the inner and outer emergency personnel air lock doors needs to be evaluated, and necessary reports completed if appropriate. This item is unresolved (50-443/87-08-07).

4.

Exit Meeting The inspectors met with representatives of the licensee at the conclusion of the inspection (see detail 1 for attendees) to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection as detailed in this report. At no time during this inspection was any written material provided to the licensee.

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