ML20140D519

SALP Repts 50-266/84-09 & 50-301/84-07 for Apr 1983 - Sept 1984

ML20140D519
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	12/12/1984
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140D488	List: ML20140D485 ML20140D519
References
50-266-84-09, 50-266-84-9, 50-301-84-07, 50-301-84-7, NUDOCS 8412180557
Download: ML20140D519 (31)

See also: IR 05000266/1984009

Text

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SALP 4

SALP BOARD REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CON 4ISSION

REGION III

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

50-266/84-09; 50-301/84-07

Inspection Report No.

Wisconsin Electric Power

Name of Licensee

Point Beach Units 1 and 2

Name of Facility

April 1,1983 through September 30, 1984

Assessment Period

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INTRODUCTION

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The Systematic Assessn.9nt of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is

an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and

data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based

upon this information.

SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory

processes used to ensure compliance to NRC rules and regulations.

SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational

basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide. meaningful guidance

to the licensee's management to promote quality and safety of plant

construction and operation.

A NRC SALP Board, composed of staff members listed below, met on

November 16, 1984, to review the collection of performance observations

and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance with the

guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee

Performance." A summary of the guidance and evaluation criteria is

provided in Section II of this report.

This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety

performance at Point Beach for the period April 1,1983 through

September 30, 1984.

SALP Board for Point Beach:

J. A. Hind, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

R. L. Spessard, Director, Division of Reactor Safety

C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects

I. N. Jackiw, Chief, Projects Section 2B

R. L. Hague, Senior Resident Inspector

R. J. Leemon, Resident Inspector

Bruce L. Burgess, Project Inspector / Manager

Tim Colburn, Project Manager, ORB-3/DL/NRR

Frank Rowsome, AD/ Tech./ DST /NRR

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II.

CRITERIA-

The licensee performance is assessed in selected functional-areas

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depending whether the facility is in a' construction, pre-operational

or operating phase.

Each functional area normally represents areas

.significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal

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programmatic _ areas.

Some functional areas may not be assessed because

of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful' observations.

Special areas may.be added to highlight significant observations.

One or more of the following evaluation' criteria were used to assess

each functional area.

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1.

Management involvement .in assurinC quality.

2.

Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.

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3.

Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.

4.

Enforcement history.

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5.

Reporting and analysis of reportable events.

6.

Staffing (including management).

7.

Training effectiveness and qualification.

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However, the SALP Board is not limited to these criteria and others may

have been used where appropriate.

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Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional area evaluated

is classified into one of three performance categories. .The definition

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of these performance categories is:

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Category 1:

Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.

Licensee man-

agement attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward

nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used so

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that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or

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construction is being achieved.

Category 2:

NRC attention shoulo be maintained at normal levels.

Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are

concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and

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are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with

respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.

Category 3:

Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.

Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and

considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee

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resources appear to be strained or not effectively used so that

minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational

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safety or construction is'being achieved,

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Trend: The performance gradient over the course of the SALP assessment

period.

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'III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Overall, the licensee's performance has improved from the last SALP

period.

Ratings. increased from a Category 2 to Category 1 in two -

functional areas, the areas of Plant Operations and Surveillance remained

a Category 1, and five areas remained a Category 2.

The only decline

was the Maintenance area where the performance ' level was reduced from a

~ Category 1 to a Category 2 primarily due to the increase in number and '

significance of noncompliances. The increase in major construction and

plant modification activities by the licensee and the increased NRC

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inspection effort have contributed to the noncompliance numbers in this

area.

Rating Last

P.ating This

Functional' Area

Period

Period

Trend

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A.

Plant Operations

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Same

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B.

Radiological Controls

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2

Same

C.

Maintenance

1

2

Same

D.

Surveillance

1

1

Same

E.

Fire Protection

2

2

Same

F.

Emergency Preparedness

2

2

Same

G.

Security

2

1

Improved

H.

Refueling

2

2

Same

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Quality Programs and

Not

Administrative Controls

Rated

2

Improved

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Licensing Activities

2

1

Mixed

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pgIV.

PERFORMANCE' ANALYSIS

[A.

Pl' ant' Operations'

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. Analysis

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Evaluation of this functional: area is based on the results of

routine inspections conducted by the resident inspectors. The

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inspections included direct observation of activities,- review

of logs and: records, verification of selected equipment lineup:

and operability, follow up of significant operating events, and'

verification that-facility operations were-in conformance with

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the Technical Specifications, administrative procedures, and

commitments.

Two items of-noncompliance were identified as'

follows:

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a.

Severity Level V - Failure to follow procedures for

logging a bomb threat (266/83-15; 301/83-15).

b.

Severity Level V. -- Failure to follow procedures for

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removing source range instrument fuses (301/84-15).

Noncompliance a. resulted when the shif t superintendent

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failed to log a bomb threat in his station log. The~ threat:

was received and logged by security personnel. .The shift

superintendent felt that this documentation was adequate,

and did not recognize an administrative requirement to log

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bomb threats in the station log. .This item of concompliance

was representative of other log keeping deficiencies which

had been identified by the resident inspectors.

Noncom-

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pliance b. resulted from an operator's misconception that-

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deenergizing the malfunctioning source range detector would

prevent further equipment damage and this action was taken

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without consulting the appropriate procedure which was-

available in the control room.

The number and significance

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of noncompliances for this area remains about the same as

the previous assessment period.

During the evaluation period, there were six reactor trips,.

two on Unit 1 and four on Unit 2.

Of the six trips, two

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were from full power and were caused by equipment failures,

one was during startup and was caused by low steam generator

level while shifting feedwater control from manual to auto-

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matic. The remaining three occurred with reactor power in

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the source range.

Two of these three were caused either

directly or indirectly by malfunctioning source ~ range detectors

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and the third resulted, during a maintenance procedure, from

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inadequately addressing maintenance prerequisites.

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Three LER's were assigned to this area, (301/84-02) withdrawn

position of control rods in violation of Technical Specifi-

cations, (301/84-03) inadvertent actuation of emergency

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safeguards, and (301/84-04) reactor trip caused by improperly

deenergizing source range instrumentation.

All of these events

were of minor safety significance and do not represent any

deterioration in the level of performance of the operations

staff from the last assessment period.

During the assessment period one reactor operator (RO) and four

senior reactor operator (SRO) examinations were administered.

The R0 and three of the four SRO candidates passed the initial

examination. The remaining SRO candidate subsequently passed

a reexamination.

A concern relative to sufficient difficulty and scope in

licensee written requalification examinations was identified

during the SALP period.

This concern was communicated to

the licensee and as a result, NRC licensing examiner partici-

pation was scheduled for a subsequent examination.

Review of

the subsequent written examinations indicated that the above

weaknesses had been corrected.

NRC licensing examiners will

continue to monitor the licensee requalification program.

The advantages of a six shift operations crew rotation

which was initiated near the end of the last SALP period

was evidenced in the increased training time allotted for

the crews.

This SALP period each crew received over twice

the classroom time than was previously possible with a five

shift rotation.

Shift superintendents were utilized as

instructors and provided inputs for examinations to help

make them more operations oriented.

Consultants have been

hired to provide systems descriptions which will be utilized

in future training programs.

Overall, operations training

and retraining programs have continued to be upgraded during

the SALP period.

Point Beach Units 1 and 2 continun to maintain an excellent

reliability record.

As of the end of the assessment period

Unit l's availability factor was 79.2% with a capacity factor

of 69.4% and Unit 2's availability factor was 87.7% with a

capacity factor of 80.3%.

This assessment period included a

six month outage on Unit 1 to replace steam generators.

Two

forced outages oc:urred during the period.

Both outages were

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on Unit 2 and lasted a total of 36.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, one to replace a

valve in the RTD bypass manifold and the other caused by a

capacitor failure in inverter 20Y01.

Site and corporate management involvement in plant operations

continues to be maintained at a high level.

A corporate

reorganization during the SALP period now provides for the Vice

President - Nuclear Power to report directly to the President

and Chief Operating Officer.

Management's response to NRC

concerns has been timely and effective.

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Conclusion-

LTheLlicensee continues.to beirated Category 1 inithis area.

The performance trend during this period remained thelsame.

3.

. Board Recommendations

- This area'should be considered for reduced inspection

- frequency.

8.

Radiological Controls

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'Analys i s -

Six inspections were performed during the assessment period

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by. regional specialists.

The inspections included outage:

radiation protection, operational radiation protection, steam

generator replacement, spent fuel shipments, confirmatory

measurements, and environmental protection.

The resident

inspectors also inspected in this area. .Seven. violations

and one deviation from a commitment were identified as

follows:

a.

Severity Level IV - Fail'ure to take suitable air

samples during reactor vessel head removal and

cavity flooding (50-266/83-08; 50-301/83-08).

b.

Severity Level IV -' Failure to adhere to an NRC Order

confirming a licensee commitment for installation and

operations of steam line monitors per NUREG-0737

(50-266/83-08; 50-301/83-08).

c.

Severity Level IV - Failure to conduct a timely

contamination survey of a spent fuel cask before

shipment (266/83-17; 301/83-16).

d.

Severity Level V - Failure, for two exclusive

shipments, to provide written exclusive use

instructions to the carrier (266/83-11; 301/83-19).

e.

Severity Level IV - Failure to notify the control

room of a high airborne concentration per procedures

(301/83-19).

f.

Severity Level V - Failure to maintain in situ

calibration records for the containment high range

radiation monitor (266/84-02; 301/84-01).

g.

Severity Level IV - Failure to adhere to an NRC order

confirming a licensee commitment for installation of

control room and C-59 panel shielding per NUREG-0737

(266/84-02; 301/84-01).

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h.

Deviation - Special operating instructions for the

steam generator replacement project were not reviewed

by licensee personnel as stated in a letter to NRR

from the licensee dated February 22, 1983 (266/83-11;

301/83-19).

Although these multiple minor violations, some repetitive and

some indicative of a minor programmatic breakdown, represent

a significant increase from the last SALP assessment period,

they do not appear indicative of a significantly weakened

radiation protection program.

Increased work activity

(e.g., steam generator replacement and spent fuel shipping)

and increased NRC inspections contributed to the increased

number of violations.

The number of violations do, however, indicate a need for

improved management involvement, including increased plant and

corporate quality assurance audits, which were notably lacking

during this assessment period.

Self-audits by the plant health

physics staff were generally of good quality.

The licensee has

an acceptable analytical laboratory quality control program;

however, licensee audits of analytical laboratory activities

should be improved.

Corporate involvement in the steam

generator replacement project appears to have contributed to

the success of the project.

Overall, management involvement

and control are adequate; however, improvements should be made

in the audit program.

Staffing in this functional area was adequate.

Key positions

within the radiation protection and chemistry groups were

identified, authorities and responsibilities were defined,

and positions were usually filled in a reasonable time.

The

radiation protection program has been strengthened during the

assessment period by addition of two health physics supervisors

who meet Regulatory Guide 1.8 Radiation Protection Manager

selection criteria and provisions for health physics technician

coverage on a second shift.

However, the Chemistry and Health

Physics Superintendent's position has been vacant since

February 9, 1984.

The current Radiation Control Operators (RCOs) training program

was marginal.

A more comprehensive training curriculum is

needed, especially given the relative inexperience of the staff.

An improved training program for the RCOs was developed and is

scheduled for implementation during the next SALP assessment

period.

The new program appears adequate and should upgrade

the technical level of the RCOs and other members of the staff.

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A chemistry training program, involving formal lectures,

on-the-job supervisory training, and demonstration of labor-

atory proficiency was being developed for new RCOs.

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.A conservative approach to: radiological safety and controls was.

' generally exhibited.

Overall radiological controls associated-

with the steam generator replacements and sleeving were very

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good.~

Personnel, radiation exposures during 1983 were about 15

percent ~above the average for U.S.Lpressurized water reactors;

and about 150 percent:above the licensee's average annual

exposures over the preceding five years. 'The' increase was due

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primarily to_special projects during,this assessment period,

-includingLthel Unit:1 steam generator- replacement project, the

. Unit 2 steam generator sleeving project, and phase 2 6f the Unit

1' steam generator tube specimen removal task. These projects

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were all completed at relatively low personal radiation doses

due primarily to good pre planning, work practices, worker.

' attitudes, and exposure and management controls.

Total dose for

the Unit 1 steam generator replacement ~ project was'about 300

person-rems per steam generator which represents'a significant

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reduction from the doses for previous steam generator replace-

ment projects. These low doces are apparently attributable

to effective oversight of the project-by licensee personnel,

combined with good project management by Westinghouse.

During this assessment period, liquid effluent releases and

solid waste production were about average for U.S. pressurized

water. reactors and gaseous effluent releases remained lower than

average.

No unplanned liquid or gaseous releases were reported.

One

hundred and ninety-three spent fuel shipments from two storage

facilities were received by the licensee.

Frequent departure

and arrival inspections of the shipments performed by NRC

inspectors identified two violations concerning an inadequate

cask survey and inadequate shipping documentation.

The licensee-continued to demonstrate good performance in his

capability to accurately measure radioactivity in effluents.

The licensee achieved all (26) agreements in comparison with

results from the Region III mobile laboratory. Two additional

agreements were obtained for beta analysis of a liquid sample

collected in a previous inspection.

A hood air flow discrepancy

identified during an inspection was corrected in a timely mannt.r.

Radiological environmental monitoring, sample collection by

plant personnel and analyses performed by the contractor

(Teledyne Isotopes, Inc.), appear satisfactory.

This

radiological environmental monitoring program contractor also

performed an adequate internal QC and EPA interlaboratory

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cross-check program.

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2.

Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area.

This is the

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same rating as the last SALP period.

No significant change

in performance was evident.

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Board Recommendation

.None.

C.

Maintenance.

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Analysis

Safety-related-maintenance performed during'the period-included

sleeving of Unit ~2 steam generator tubes,~. modification of

. Unit-1 and 2 containment air particulate'and gaseous monitors,

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seal:and shaft key replacement.on safety injection pumpf2P15A,

annual inspection and governor replacement on 30 diesel

generator, annual ~ inspection on 4D diesel generator, changeout

of_N8FD relays, reinforcement _of pressurizer safety valve

discharge: header piping,-replacement of source' range detection.

channel 32, modification of auxiliary feed system to provide

automatic initiation and back-up cooling from the fire main,.

installation of the auxiliary safety instrumentation panels in

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the control room and replacement-of Unit 1 steam generators.

Evaluation of this area is based on the results of routine

inspections by the resident inspectors and three inspections

by Regional Office Inspectors. The inspections included such

activities as the observation of maintenance; compliance with

procedures, and plant technical specifications; the use of

properly certified parts and materials; and adherence to radio-

logical and fire protection controls.

Six items of noncompliance

were identified as follows:

a.

Severity Level V - Use of incorrect procedure

revision for steam generator closeout inspection

(301/83-13-02).

b.

Severity Level IV - Failure to perform adequate

10 CFR 50.59 review for snubber removal (301/84-03-01).

c.

Severity Level IV - Failure to comply with ANSI

N45.2.1 1973Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI</br></br>N45.2.1 1973" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., resulting in a significant amount of

debris in the reactor coolant system (266/84-06-01).

d.

Severity Level IV - Failure to maintain operable

radiation monitors which initiate containment

isolation during' fuel motion (301/83-11).

e.

Severity Level V - Failure to accomplish activities

in accordance with procedures and drawings (266/83-20).

f.

Severity Level V - Failure to establish an adequate

hydrostatic test program (266/84-01).

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Noncompliance.a. was of minor: safety significance and did

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not affact-the' operation of the plant.

Noncompliance b.

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- was of minor' safety significance but-was. repetitive in nature.

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Noncompliance c. could have caused a safety. concern if the-

licensee had not identified the debris. problem during the

normal rod latching procedure and removed the. debris prior

to startup. -This event resulted in a fifteen day delay in

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. recovering from the steam generator replacement outage.

Noncompliance d. involved an LCO violation of minimal safety

significance.

However, -among the many causal factors which

lead to this noncompliance was a possible-inadequacy in the

licensee's 10 CFR:50.59. review process.

Noncompliances'e.

and f. were identified during the; steam' generator replacement

outage and do not appear to have generic or programmatic-

implications.

Management invol'vement in maintenance ac'tivities was extensive

during this SALP period.

Although management resources were

somewhat strained during the steam generator replacement, the

overall handling of this activity was commendable.

All major

critical path evolutions were competed on or ahead of schedule -

until.the. debris problem was identified at the end of the

outage.

During the previous SALP, quality assurance activities were a

part of this functional area.

In this SALP period, they are

treated as a separately assessed area.

A major team inspection

of the quality assurance area at both the site and corporate

levels was held during this evaluation period.

The licensee

has corrected or is in the process of correcting the findings.

from that inspection, many of which impact the maintenance area.

Examples of significant changes were the licensee's revised

10 CFR 50.59 review process and development of more comprehen-

sive maintenance procedures.

Training has been upgraded by the addition of classroom

instruction on basic plant systems and their operation along

with the normal specific discipline training.

This will help

maintenance personnel to get an overall picture of what effect

their actions can have on the operation of the plant.

Five LER's were assigned to this area:

(266/84-04), reactor

trip caused by placing turbine first stage pressure in test-

while at 700 PSIG primary system pressure, the cause of the

reactor protection actuation was an inadequately prepared

maintenance request; (266/83-03) critical control power

failure, caused by contractors pulling wires in the control

boards; (266/83-10) loss of fire detection in auxiliary

feedpump room, vital switchgear room, and cable spreading

room,' caused by a contractor wiring error during a modification;

(301/83-08) loss of R-11 and R-12 during fuel movement, caused

by inadequate system turnover during modification; and

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(301/84-01) removal of a safety-related snubber contrary

to technical specifications during modification, caused by

an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 review.

These last two LER's are

also' carried as noncompliances b. and d. above.

During the previous SALP period no items of noncompliance and

one LER were assigned to this area.

The Board recommended

-that increased NRC inspection should be implemented during

the steam generator. replacement outage.

The increase in major

construction and plant modification activities by the licensee

and the increased NRC inspection effort in this area have

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contributed to the LER and noncompliance numbers identified

in this SALP period. Although the numbers of noncompliances

and LER's have increased significantly over the previous SALP

period, there does not appear to be a major breakdown in

management control or maintenance personnel performance as

evidenced by the continued lack of significant plant problems

identified as related to maintenance and the continued

reliability of safety-related equipment.

2.

Conclusion

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area.

The licensee

was rated a Category 1 during the last assessment period.

The

performance trend during this SALP period remained the same.

3.

Board Recommendations

None.

D.

Surveillance

1.

Analysis

Evaluation of this functional area is t ssed on results of

routine inspections conducted by the Resident Inspectors

and five inspections by regional personnel.

The resident

inspections included such activities as the observation of

testing; verification that testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures; that limiting conditions for

operation were met; that test results conformed with technical

specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by

personnal other than the individual directing the test; and

that ary deficiencies identified during the testing were

properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management

personnel.

Four of the regional based inspections were in

the area of inservice inspections.

These included inspections

of (1) inservice examination of piping systems, (2) the results

of inspections and documentation review for crack indications

and failure of control rod guide tube split pins, (3) a review

of the results of ultrasonic testing that identified indications

in the reactor pressure vessel outlet nozzle to shell weld,

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and_(4) followup on valve. shaft inspections required to be

performed on main steam line isolation swing check and swing

stop' valves.

The fifth regional inspection covered the

integrated leak rate test on the Unit 1 containment.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. One

LER attributed to rarsonnel error was submitted during the

assessment period, (266/83-06) boric acid storage tank and

refueling water storage tank sampling frequency exceeded.

The

cause of this event was the failure of a chemistry technician

to note a scheduling change for the required samples. The

samples were taken as soon as the error was recognized and

the results were within specifications.

Licensee surveillance testing continues to be performed by

well qualified personnel using comprehensive procedures and,

with the one noted exception, in a timely manner.

Management

involvement remains evident.

Procedure revisions are developed

with inputs from operations and testing personnel and are'given

timely reviews. On-the-job training for technicians includes

explanations of what effect each step in a procedure has on the

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system being tested. Operations personnel are constantly kept

informed as to the status of testing and what effects they'

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should expect to see on instrumentation or annunciators.

The

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licensee continues to maintain the performance level and

attributes described in the previous 5 ALP.

2.

Conclusions

The licensee continues to be rated Category 1 and performance

in this area has remained the same.

3.

Board Recommendations

This area should be considered for reduced inspection

frequency.

E.

Fire Protection and Housekeeping

1.

Analysis

Throughout the assessment period, while performing the resident

inspection program, observations were made of the control of

combustible materials, control of fire barriers, inclementation

of ignition control permit requirements and housekeeping require-

ments.

One inspection was performed by regional inspectors to

followup on previously identified findings.

Two items of

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noncompliance were identified as follows:

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a.

Severity Level IV - Failure to follow procedures:

Acetylene bottle and wood stored in containment

during steam generator replacement outage (266/83-26).

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b.:

Severity Level.V - Failure to! follow procedures:

Transient combustibles not controlled in diesel

generator room (266/84-06; 301/84-04).

Noncompliance a. resulted in a small fire in containment when

acetylene and the acetylene hose were ignited by grinding sparks.

~ The fire was quickly extinguished and unnecessary' combustibles

removed from containment. . Noncompliance b. resulted from a

misinterpretation of the transient combustibles procedure.

All

necessary personnel were retrained on the proper use of the

procedure.

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Licensee performance in the area of fire protection has shown

marked improvement since the last SALP assessment based on the

following:

a.

During the current SALP period only two items of

noncompliance were identified, one Severity Level IV

and one Severity Level V.

The Severity Level IV

items resulted from a self-disclosing event.

During

the previous evaluation period, three Severity Level IV

items of noncompliance were identified along with six

unresolved items, indicating basic programmatic

weaknesses.

b.

All of the items identified as weaknesses during the

previous SALP period were reinspected and determined

to be adequately resolved.

c.

The licensee has established a full time Fire

Protection Engineer position, removing these duties

from operations personnel and giving them to a fully

qualified individual.

d.

The licensee has actively involved their corporate

Fire Protection Engineer in site fire protection /

j

prevention activities.

During this evaluation period the licensee has satisfactorily

completed an operational test of the new Halon suppression

l

system which serves the cable spreading room, the auxiliary

l

feedpump room, and the vital switchgear room.

Housekeeping

continues to be well above average with a recent renewed

effort at auxiliary building cleanliness.

'

2.

Conclusion

The licensee continues to be rated Category 2 in this area.

The performance trend remained the same.

3.

Board Recommendations

None.

14

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F.-

Emergency Preparedness

1.

Analysis-

~

LDuring the assessment period,:four inspections were conducted,

~

two emergency preparedness exercises were observed, a Safety

Evaluation Report was' written and a management meeting was held

-

to~ evaluate compliance with 10.CFR Part'50,' Technical Specifi-

cations and procedures.--Three items of noncompliance and one

deviation from a commitment were identified during this

assessment period in contrast to the previous assessment period

.during which only one noncompliance was identified.

Of the

three items of noncompliance and the deviation discussed below,

only a. was of greater significance to the emergency program

than the previous period's noncompliance.

a.

Severity Level'IV - Shift Supervisors, initially

the Emergency Support Manager, were incapable of

determining when and what type'of protective measures

should be considered outside the site boundary to

protect public health and safety (266/84-13; 301/84-11).

b.

Severity Level IV - An evaluation for the adequacy

of interfaces with the State and local governments

was not included in the 1984 annual audit (266/84-13;

301/84-11).

c.

Severity Level V - Emergency action levels for the

Point Beach Nuclear Plant had not been reviewed by

the State of Wisconsin on an annual basis (266/84-13;

301/84-11).

d.

Deviation - Failure te .pdate or obtain letters of

agreement with offsite organizations (266/83-75;

301/83-23(DRSS)).

Each of the items of noncompliance and the deviation from a

commitment appeared to be the result of a failure to adequately

maintain portions of the emergency preparedness program. The

licensee had shown that it was responsive to NRC' concerns as

demonstrated by the fact that a total of 50 outstanding items

were closed out during the assessment period.

However, it was

~

also evident that not all NRC concerns were being addressed.

First, the July 1983, routine inspection identified problems

with Shift Supervisors being able to make a protective action

recommendation due to inadequacies in the procedures and training.

Walkthroughs with the Shift Supervisors a year later, during

the July 1984 routine inspection, showed that their ability to

make a protective action recommendation had deteriorated, which

resulted in the issuance of noncompliance a.

Second, a

management meeting in September 1983 addressed NRC concerns-

pertaining to letters of agreement with offsite organizations.

15

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Four months later.these concerns ha'd-still not'been addressed

'

which resulted in~ issuing a deviation from commitment.

Based on

the above and the fact that noncompliances b. and c. were-the

result of's failure to carry out annually scheduled tasks, it

appeared that not enough manpower was allocated to resolving

emergency preparedness issues, and still continue'to maintain

the program on an ongoing basis.

The licensee's performance during their 1984 annual exercise

'

was an improvement over their 1983 annual exercise.

However,

.a major ' weakness was identified in the ability to determine

appropriate protective actions. ' Weaknesses identified in the

area of command and control during the 1983 exercise were

corrected during the 1984 exercise.

The licensee had adequately responded to the previous SALP

Board recommendation that increased management attention is

i

needed to address NRC concerns in a more timely and responsive

manner. With the exception of the two-items discussed above

'

that resulted in noncompliance a. and the deviation from a

,

commitment, the licensee responded to all other NRC concerns

in'a timely and thorough manner.

!

1

l

The licensee continued to carry out their training program

!

for site and corporate personnel involved in the emergency

!

!

preparedness program which included drills as well as class-

room training.

Improvements in the training program were

!

evident in that improved performance by the licensee was noted

l

in each successive annual emergency preparedness exercise over

the last three years.

However, additional emphasis was

,

necessary in the area of protective action recommendations

j

based on the 1984 exercise and shift. supervisor walkthroughs

e

as previously discussed.

!

2.

Conclusion

2

The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area.

This is the.

1

same rating as the last SALP period.

Licensee performance in

<

j

this area remained the same overall.

)

3.

Board Recommendations

i

None.

G.

Security

1.

Analysis

'

Three physical security inspections and one material control

and accountability inspection were conducted during this

assessment period.

During' August and September 1983,'inspec-

tions'of security protection for shipments of irradiated fuel

,

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assemblies were also conducted.

Additionally, the resident

- inspectors conducted periodic observations of security

activities.

The scope of the security inspections included

normal security operations, transportation security measures,

,

and security measures for a major outage.

Two violations were

noted during the. inspection effort.

a.

Severity Level IV

Adequate searches of hand-carried

packages were not conducted (266/83-22; 301/83-21).

b.

Severity Level IV - A security computer capability,

required by the security plan, could be circumvented

(266/84-08; 301/84-06).

Violations a. and b. represent a significant decrease in number

and nature of violations identified in the previous SALP period.

The SALP 3 report identified seven violations and noted'that

the violations pertained primarily to equipment problems. .This

trend has been reversed by the licensee's management.

A concern pertaining to the contract security organization's

written guidance for reporting possible violations to the NRC

was noted in Inspection Report K,.

50-265/84-08; 50-301/84-06.

The guidance required, rather than encouraged, security

contractor personnel to contact both the security contractor

management and licensee management before contacting the NRC

about possible violations.

The guidance was published in

February 1984 and the licensee was required to respond to

the concern since it appeared to conflict with the intent of

10 CFR 19.15.

The guidance was superseded in July 1984 and

the conflict was clearly eliminated.

The previous SALP report noted that corrective actions lacked

depth.

During this assessment period, security issues were

consistently resolved at the Security Supervisor level and

concerns appeared to receive the same level of management

attention as violations.

Corrective actions for violations

and concerns have been timely and effective in resolving the

issues and preventing recurrence.

The licensee is ennsistently

responsive to NRC concerns.

Several actions to improve the existing security program have

i

been initiated during this assessment period. These actions

include upgrading of the security computer system, installation

i

'

of several new closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, improve-

ments in the licensee's firearms range, acquisition of equipment

for maintenance support for high elevation security equipment

(lighting and CCTV cameras), and development of the Security

,

i

Force Training and Qualification Program in concert with an area

i

certified educational institution.

Proposals to improve portable

!

radio equipment, lighting, and modification of the cer. tral alarm

17

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o

station console based upon human factor analysis have also been

~

recommended. Senior management has been supportive of efforts to

improve security effectiveness.

Corporate level support for the security program appears

aggressive and supportive of site activities. -Communications

between the site Security Supervisor and corporate System

Security Officer was effective.

Corporate audits of the

security program were in-depth and included all major segments

of the program.

Inspection findings are closely monitored by

,

the corporate security office.

Frequent meetings are held with

the principal law enforcement agency and drills have included

participation of the local sheriff's department.

A significant revision to the security program was necessary

during the major outage for the steam generator, replacement.

Some existing facilities had to be modified, additional

personnel had to be hired and trained, and a separate appendix

to the security plan had to be prepared and submitted for NRC

approval. -All of these major tasks were completed in a timely

and professional manner.

Aggressive management of security operations is provided by the

two licensee security supervisors.

Both have demonstrated a

high level of management and technical competence.

Effective

liaison with the contract security force manager was also

evident.

Staffing of the contract security force appears

adequate and strong supervision of day-to-day operations was

noted during security inspections.

Personnel appeared well

trained and motivated.

Procedural guidance is adequate to assure that provisions of the

security plan are fulfilled.

Required security plan submittals

are completed in a timely manner and are technically correct.

Physical security event reports required by 10 CFR 73.71(c) are

submitted in a timely manner and contain adequate details.

The major task facing the licensee is complete implementation

of the Security Force Training and Qualification Plan (SFT&Q).

Implementation progress was determined to be adequate during

the June 1984 inspection.

The SFT&Q Plan becomes effective on

November 12, 1984.

Security equipment observed during inspections was functional

and well maintained.

Contingency equipment was also serviceable.

Maintenance support for security equipment and systems appeared

adequate and was monitored by the Security Supervisor on a weekly

basis.

.

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. 2.

Conclusion

'

The licensee is rated Category 1 in this area. 'This.is an

e

,

improvement from the previous rating of Category ?

--d

is-

~

based primarily on the' improved enforcement histor , erfec-

s

tiveness and depth;of corrective actions to resolve security

issues and the licensee'sl actions to upgrade the existing

,

security program. . Licensee performance over the course of

this-SALP period has' improved.

Deficiencies noted in the

SALP 3 evaluation have been addressed and corrected by the

-

licensee.

3.

Board Recommendations

This area'should be considered for reduced inspection

frequency.

.H.

Refuelina Activities

'

1.

Analysis

Evaluation of this functional area is based on the results

of inspections conducted by the resident inspectors.

The

inspection activities included observation of fuel movements;

verification that surveillance for refueling activities had

been performed; that refueling containment integrity

requirements were met; and observation of outage controls

,

and activities.

One item of noncompliance was identified:

Severity Level IV - Failure to follow procedure:,

during core loading activities (301/83-13-01).

The above noncompliance resulted from a personnel error that

involved a failure to verify manipulator crane mast elevation

prior to releasing an irradiated fuel assembly in the reactor

i

and resulted in the fuel assembly. leaning over approximately

,

30 degrees.

This assembly was subsequently removed from the

core and not used in the reiaad.

This noncompliance had

potential safety imp 1tcations since the fuel.rodlets could

have ruptured.

Three LER's were assigned to this area:

(266/84-01) split pin

cracks and missing fasteners, (301/83-02) steam generator tubes

requiring plugging, and (301/83-07) abnormal degradation in

fuel cladding,

,

i

The noncompliance above occurred during the Spring of 1983,

'

Unit 2 refueling.

The last Unit I refueling displayed evidence

of management involvement in that prior planning and' assignment

of priorities were completed for utilization of the spent fuel

l

pool.

Coordination had to be maintained between spent fuel

shipments arriving at the site and the core offload and reload.

1

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On-the-job training on the manipulator and spent fuel bridge

is preceded by classroom training for those operators handling

fuel.

Staffing was adequate and responsibilities were defined.

2.

Conclusion

The licensee continues to be rated Category 2 in this area.

The performance trend remained the same.

3.

Board Recommendations

None.

I.

Quality Programs and Administrative Controls

1.

Analysis

This functional area was examined by regional inspection

specialists in three inspections conducted during the SALP

period.

The first inspection included a review of the

licensee's programs and their implementation for non-licensed

.

i

personnel training and licensed personnel requalification

training.

The second inspection was a special inspection of

the licensee's quality assurance program activities and

included a review of QA Program administration; maintenance

program and implementation; design change and modification

l

program and implementation; procurement; Offsite Review

l

Committee; document control; calibration and control of

l

measuring the test equipment; surveillance and inservice

!

testing; cleanliness control; audit program and implementa-

l

tion; and the steam generator replacement program.

The third

l

inspection which occurred at the end of the SALP period,

'

was conducted to determine the status and adequacy of the

licensee's corrective action in response to the findings

of the special QA inspection.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during

,

I

the first and third inspections.

However, during the second

inspection nine items of noncompliance with a total of 22

separate examples were identified as follows (266/83-21;

310/83-20):

a.

Severity Level IV - Five examples of failure to

control documents.

b.

Severity Level IV - Six examples of failure to

!

have or follow appropriate procedures.

i

l

c.

Severity Level IV - Failure to prepare the written

safety evaluations required to 10 CFR 50.59 for

'

changes to the facility as described in the FSAR.

20

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I

d.

Severity Level IV - Failure to provide training to

personnel performing inspections.

'

e.

Severity Level V - Two examples of the failure to

perform audits under the cognizance of the Offsite

,

Review Committee as required by the Technical

Specifications.

,

f.

Severity Level V - Four examples of failure to

conduct audits in accordance with the ANSI standards

as committed in the FSAR.

-

g.

Severity Level'V - Failure to provide a program to

prevent the use of material from " Ready Stores" that

had exceeded its shelf life,

h.

Severity Level V - Failure to properly store quality

records.

i.

Severity Level V - Failure to maintain suitable

cleanliness in areas where activities affecting

quality were performed.

In addition to the noncompliances listed above, seven other

examples of noncompliance were identified which were not cited,

but were classified as unresolved items in accordance with the

l

enforcement policy (self-identification by the licensee and

'

i

formulation of corrective actions).

Eleven open items

addressing other inspector concerns were also identified.

"

Noncompliance a. had potential safety significance due to the

possible use of outdated procedures or drawings for safety-

related activities. Noncompliance b. represented a failure to

use approved procedures in the repair of a safety injection

pump and the failure to independently verify system configuration.

Noncompliance c. resulted from a misunderstanding on the part of

the licensee of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 relative to a

change of non-safety related equipment which modified the plant

!

description in the FSAR.

Noncompliance d. had safety signi-

[

ficance, in that, personnel performing QC inspections were not

I

trained in the significance of these activities and their

attendant responsibilities.

Noncompliances e. - 1. were of

minor safety significance and represent primarily programmatic

problems. While the findings of the special quality assurance

inspection indicated fairly extensive program deficiencies, they

had not yet manifested themselves in identifiable equipment or

operational problems.

These findings and the licensee's planned corrective actions

were reviewed during a management meeting in the Region III

Office and during a subsequent inspection as previously

discussed.

The licensee implemented an extensive and

21

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aggressive corrective action program. =Of the 22 examples of

noncompliance, 15 were closed.

Three of the seven unresolved

items and five of the eleven open items were also closed.

Corrective actions were in progress for the remaining items.

The licensee was making major changes in the maintenance and

modifications programs and revising the structure of its QA

-

Program.

The magnitude of these changes delayed the

L

implementation of final corrective action on many of the

'

noncompliances and unresolved items.

However, temporary

corrective actions were taken where appropriate.

During SALP 3, the Board recommended that the licensee pursue

improvements in the formalization and documentation of the

Quality Assurance Program. :The licensee had initiated actions

on the Board's recommendation; however, the special QA

inspection identified numerous areas where improvements would

be required to bring the licensee's program up to present

l_ndustry standards. As noted above, the licensee has imple-

emented an extensive corrective action program in response

to the identified deficiencies.

There was evidence of prior planning and assignment of

priorities in licensee activities.

Corporate management was

usually involved in site activities.

Audits were generally

complete, timely and thorough.

Committees were usually

properly staffed and functioning.

Records were generally

complete, well maintained, and available.

Corrective action

systems generally recognized and address nonreportable

concerns. There were occasional instances of procedural

breakdowns of minor significance in design control, drawing

control, maintenance and auditing.

Response to NRC initiatives

were generally timely, viable, sound and thorough.

Acceptable

resolutions were proposed initially in most cases.

2.

Conclusion

The licensee is rated a Category 2 in this area.

Licensee

performance in this area at the beginning of the SALP period

was minimally acceptable with evident weaknesses.

However, the

extensive corrective action program implemented during this

period to correct these weaknesses has significantly improved

performance in this area.

3.

Board Recommendations

None.

l

J.

Licensina Activities

1.

Analysis

During the present rating period, the licensee's management

demonstrated active participation in licensing activities and

22

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e

i

t

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i

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f

i

kept abreast of current and anticipated licensing actions.

The

licensee's management actively participated in an effort to

work closely with the NRC staff to establish realistic

integrated schedules for all modifications of the Point Beach

facility.

The licensee's management consistently exercised

good control over its internal activities and its contractors,

and maintained effective communication with the NRC staff.

This was specially evident during the steam generator

replacement and tube sleeving activities which occurred during

the reporting period.

One notable difficulty encountered by

the licensee was the inability to keep NUREG-0737 and other

items on schedule.

This resulted in a fair'y large number of

requests by the licensee for schedule slips, Order modifi-

,

cations, schedular exemptions, equipment qualification deadline

extensions, etc. While management appeared to play an active

role in trying to minimize and recoup time lost during various

delays, they were unsuccessful in preventing these delays.

This

may have been due to a combination of factors including an

originally overoptimistic or unrealistic schedule, timing

imposed by various NRC regulations and an integrated schedule

approach to installation.

In the latter case, it has been seen

that a delay in one system may not immediately demonstrate its

impact on related systems.

Management's active participation in issues of high potential

safety impact is clearly demonstrated.

Examples are the manage ,

ment involvement with shift staffing, CRDM support pin cracking,

equipment qualification and steam generator replacement and

tube sleeving licensing actions.

l

The licensee's management and its staff have demonstrated sound

technical understanding of issues involving licensing actions.

Its approach to resolution of technical issues has demonstrated

extensive technical expertise in almost all technical areas

l

involving licensing actions.

The decisions related to

l

licensing issues have routinely exhibited conservatism in

relation to significant safety matters.

The licensee's

frequent visits to NRC and sound communications during the

rating period assured sound technical discussions regarding

resolution of safety issues.

During the reporting period, the

licensee effectively resolved complex technical issues

concerning steam generator replacement and tube sleeving, CRDM

support pin cracking, and environmental qualification of safety

related electrical equipment.

On occasions when the licensee deviated from the staff guidance,

the licensee has consistently provided good technical justifi-

cation for such deviations.

Examples of this are shown in the

,

licensee's inservice inspection program relief requests, CRDM

support pin cracking issues and control of heavy loads over

spent fuel pool reviews.

The licensee has consistently

monitored itself to assure that the safety systems function

23

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-as designed.and the plant's Technical Specifications are well

maintained. .Recent examples _of;self-monitoring includei ;

'

.

frequent administrative technical specification change

requests to improve the clarity and consistency of the

technical specifications .and i_dentification and resolution

of conflicting requirements and/or commitments, such as, fuel

pool poison surveillance technical specification change requests.

..

The licensee has;always come well prepared to meetings with the

0

staff involving resolution of safety issues.

Included as

topics for these meetings were steam generator replacement,.

equipment qualification, CRDM support pin cracking, . shift

staffing and fire protection.

As a result, these meetings have

')

progressed efficiently and effectively and resulted in prompt

'

-resolution of all safety concerns.

.

The licensee has been consistent 1, responsive to NRC

l

'

initiatives.

However, some weaknesses were noted.

Mainly,

items involving schedular relief were not always submitted with

.

adequate lead time for staff review.

This included, notably,

'

requests for equipment qualification deadline extensions,

,

NUREG-0737 Order modifications, component cooling water heat

,

exchanger technical specification change requests and shift

staffing exemption requests.

Further, several requests for

4

licensing actions did not contain complete packages (i.e., all

'

supporting technical justification).

This was true of both

initial submittals, such as, Optimized Fuel Assembly technical

.

j

specifications and some responses to requests for additional

j

information. However, in both cases, improvement has been seen

since the previous reporting period.

.}

One item of concern was the licensee's schedule of reactor

j

vessel internal components inspections during the steam

t

generator replacement outage.

Earlier scheduling of inspec-

i

tions which were critical path, such as, reactor vessel nozzle

j

welds and CRDM support pins would have provided a greater time

'

period for resolution of safety concerns resulting from these

.

j

inspections. While these problem areas could not have been

i

predicted or anticipated with absolute confidence, there was

adequate prior evidence of their potential existence.

As a

,

result, hurried, intense efforts were required by both the

'

'

staff'and licensee to resolve the safety issues which ultimately

-

resulted in a delayed startup.

f

l

The licensee experienced mixed trends in performance during

1

this reporting period. While their overall performance of

j

routine licensing actions has improved, several non-routine

'

licensing action areas have showed declining performance or

<

have otherwise shown that additional effort is still needed.

Notably, in the area of 10 CFR 50.59 reviews, the licensee has

had difficulty in performing'the reviews in a correct and

i

timely fashion including completion and documentation of the

_

24

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required safety reviews.

For example, if safety reviews are

completed during the preparation stage of an outage, any needed

technical resolution could be reached prior to the outage

rather than as a last minute item just prior to startup. The

licensee has had difficulty in meeting scheduled dates for

several_ licensing actions. This has resulted in a large number

,

'

of schedular reliefs, extensions, exemptions, etc., which have

required resolution on a short turn around time basis and have

created significant burden for the NRC licensing staff.

Often,

once relief was granted, additional stepped-up tracking efforts

were either perceived as not needed and therefore not enacted

by the licensee or were ineffective, which resulted in several

repeat relief requests for the same licensing actions.

The end

result is an inefficient use of both licensee and NRC staff

licensing resources.

Overall, with the exception of the items noted above, the

licensee has been very responsive to staff requests for

information.

This is particularly true of voluntary requests,

such as, the staff's site visit request related to USI A-45

" Decay Heat Removal Capability".

2.

Conclusion

The licensee is rated a Category 1 in this area.

Licensee

performance has been mixed during the evaluation period.

3.

Board Recommendations

None.

I

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~ V.

SUPPORTING DATA AND SUDMARIES

A.

Licensee Activities

During the evaluation period, Point Beach Unit 1 operated for a

total of 357.1 out of 549 days. Of the 191.9 days Unit I was not in

operation, .9 days were attributable to unanticipated equipment

' problems with the loose parts monitoring system and the remaining

191 days were attributable to the. scheduled refueling and steam

generator replacement outage. This outage would have been 15 days

shorter if it would not have been necessary to remove several

hundred pieces of debris from the reactor vessel upper internals

package control rod guide tubes.

Unit 1 generator was taken off line on October 1,1983 and placed

back on line April 9,1984, at the completion of the steam generator

replacement outage. _0th9r activities during the outage included:

installation of a loose parts monitoring system; inspection of the '

reactor vessel outlet nozzle to shell welds; an ultrasonic examination

of the guide tube split pins, which revealed crack indications in

the shank to collar region of 67 of the 74 pins; replacement of

the NBFD relays in the reactor protection and safeguards relay

racks; replacement of the R-11/R-12 monitors; and a containment

integrated leak rate test.

During the evaluation period, Point Beach Unit 2 operated for a

total of 444.8 out of 549 days.

On the 104.2 days Unit 2 was not in

operation, 1.5 days were attributable to two forced outages caused

by equipment failure, 3.7 days were attributable to a scheduled

inspection and repair of the moisture separator reheaters, and the

remaining 99 days were attributable to scheduled refueling outages.

Unit 2 was shut down at the beginning of the evaluation period for a

scheduled refueling and steam generator sleeving outage.

The unit

was returned to service on July 6, 1983.

During this outage, the

licensee:

sleeved 1501 tubes in the "A" steam generator and 1500

tubes in the "B" steam generator; replaced NBFD reactor protection

system r ' vs; replaced R-11/R-12 monitors; and inspected fuel

assemblies, during which one of four optimized fuel assemblies was

found to have through-wall defects in at least 9 rodlets.

Unit 2 was shut down at the end of the evaluation period going off

line September 28, 1984.

Scheduled work for this outage include

SPEC 200 system startup and calibrations, reactor coolant loose

parts monitoring system installations, replacement of 36 incore flux

monitoring thimbles, and steam generator eddy current examinations.

)

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B.

Inspection Activities

-The inspection program at Point Beach during the evaluation period

consisted of routine resident and region-based inspections.

One

special Quality Assurance team inspection was conducted during this

SALP period.

Noncompliance Data

Facility Name:

Point Beach, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-266,

50-301

Inspection Reports No. 83-07 through 83-28

'

No. 84-01 through 84-17

Inspection Activity and Enforcement

1

FUNCTIONAL-

NO.-0F VIOLATIONS IN EACH SEVERITY LEVEL

'

AREA

I

II

III

IV

V

DEV.

Plant Operations

2

Radiological Controls

5

2

1

!

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Maintenance

3

3

Surveillance

l

' Fire Protection

1

1

i

'

Emergency Preparedness

2

1

1

Security

2

l

Refueling

1

l

l.

Quality Programs and

'

Administrative

Controls

4

5

Licensing Activities

Totals

18

14

2

I Noncompliances' reflect total noncompliances for site rather than

noncompliances associated with each unit as was reflected in SALP 3.

C.

Investinations and Allegations Review

None

27'

.

,-

.

D.

Escalated Enforcement Actions

None

E.

Management Conferences Held During Appraisal Period

1.

On August 22, 1983, a management meeting was held at the Point

Beach site to discuss NRC concerns over the casual factors

which lead to a limiting condition for operation being

exceeded for the R-11/R-12 radiation monitors.

2.

On September 28, 1983, a management meeting was held at the

licensee's corporate offices in Milwaukee to discuss NRC

concerns pertaining to the inspection findings of the

July 18-22, 1983, emergency preparedness inspection 266/83-14;

301/83-14(DRSS).

3.

On January 4,1984, a management conference was held at the

licensee's request in the Region III Office to discuss the

findings of the special QA inspection 266/83-21;

301/83-20(DRS).

F.

Review of Licensee Event Report and 10 CFR 21 Reports

1.

Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

On August 29, 1983, the NRC published an amendment clarifying

its regulations regarding Licensee Event Reports required by

10 CFR 50.73.

Details of the new reporting system were pub-

l

lished as NUREG-1022 " Licensee Event Report System".

The

l

effective date of this amendment was January 1, 1984.

The

new rule deleted reporting requirements for several types of

l

licensee events which had been found, through experience,

to be of little value to the Commission.

i

.

28

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Unit'2

~ PROXIMATE CAUSE**

SALP III*

SALP IV*

'SALP III*-

SALP IV*

Personne1' Error

3(.25)***

4(.22)

'1(.08)

5(.28)

,

Design Mfg.

Const/ Install

-5(.42)

2(.11)

3(.25)

-1(.06)

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External

0(.00)

0(.00)

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0(.00)

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3(.25)

0(.00)

1(.08)

0(.00)

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11(.92)

4(.22)'

4(.33)

6(.33)

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2(.17)

4(.22)

2(.17).

1(.06)

TOTALS

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14(.78)

11(.92)

13(.72)

,

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SALP 3 (12 months), SALP 4 (18 months)

Proximate Cause is the cause assigned by the licensee according to

i

NUREG-0161, " Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee

j

Event Report (LER) File", or NUREG-1022, " Licensee Event Report System"

• • • Numbers in parentheses indicate LER's/ Month

i

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1

4

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1

3

4

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26_LERS were reviewed for clarity and adequacy of the provided des-

criptions during the assessment period and were found reasonably

detailed to permit understanding of the events. An increase was

noted in the numbers of LERs attributed to personnel errors; however,

reductions of licensee events were noted in Design Manufacturing,

. Construction / Installation and Component Failure categories.

G.

Licensing Actions

1.

NRR/ Licensee Meetinas

June 23, 1983

Steam Generator Replacement

,

July 22, 1983

Appendix R Fire Protection Exemptions

October 13, 1983

Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related

Electrical Equipment

January 10, 1984

Shift Staffing Rule Exemption Request

March 28. 1984

Control Rod Guide Tube Support Pin Cracking

2.

NRR Site Visits

August 22, 1983

Steam Generator Replacement Outage Schedule

October 31, 1983

Inservice Inspection Program Evaluation

July 16, 1984

USE A-45 Decay Heat Removal Evaluation

3.

Commission Briefings

None.

4.

Schedular Extensions Granted

10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Deadline Extension

7/22/83

,

10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Deadline Extension

1/3/84

NUREG-0737 Order Modification

7/12/83

10 CFR 50.54 Shift Staffing Extension

3/26/84

5.

Reliefs Granted

10 CFR 50.49a Additional Inservice Inspection Relief 6/1/83

10 CFR 50.55a 2nd Ten Year Interval ISI Relief

3/29/84

6.

Exemptions Granted

10 CFR 50.44 Reactor Coolant System Vents Schedular Exemption

5/9/83

.

10 CFR 50.44 Reactor Coolant System Vents Schedular Exemption

'

12/30/83

7.

Emeroency Technical Specification Issued

None.

30

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8.

Orders Issued

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Units 1 and 2 - Order confirming Licensee commitments on

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Emergency Response Capability.as. required by Supplement 1

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to NUREG-0737, July 3, 1984

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