ML20140D519
| ML20140D519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 12/12/1984 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140D488 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-84-09, 50-266-84-9, 50-301-84-07, 50-301-84-7, NUDOCS 8412180557 | |
| Download: ML20140D519 (31) | |
See also: IR 05000266/1984009
Text
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SALP 4
SALP BOARD REPORT
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CON 4ISSION
REGION III
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
50-266/84-09; 50-301/84-07
Inspection Report No.
Wisconsin Electric Power
Name of Licensee
Point Beach Units 1 and 2
Name of Facility
April 1,1983 through September 30, 1984
Assessment Period
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INTRODUCTION
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The Systematic Assessn.9nt of Licensee Performance (SALP) program is
an integrated NRC staff effort to collect available observations and
data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based
upon this information.
SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory
processes used to ensure compliance to NRC rules and regulations.
SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational
basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide. meaningful guidance
to the licensee's management to promote quality and safety of plant
construction and operation.
A NRC SALP Board, composed of staff members listed below, met on
November 16, 1984, to review the collection of performance observations
and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance with the
guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee
Performance." A summary of the guidance and evaluation criteria is
provided in Section II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety
performance at Point Beach for the period April 1,1983 through
September 30, 1984.
SALP Board for Point Beach:
J. A. Hind, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
R. L. Spessard, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
C. J. Paperiello, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
I. N. Jackiw, Chief, Projects Section 2B
R. L. Hague, Senior Resident Inspector
R. J. Leemon, Resident Inspector
Bruce L. Burgess, Project Inspector / Manager
Tim Colburn, Project Manager, ORB-3/DL/NRR
Frank Rowsome, AD/ Tech./ DST /NRR
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II.
CRITERIA-
The licensee performance is assessed in selected functional-areas
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depending whether the facility is in a' construction, pre-operational
or operating phase.
Each functional area normally represents areas
.significant to nuclear safety and the environment, and are normal
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programmatic _ areas.
Some functional areas may not be assessed because
of little or no licensee activities or lack of meaningful' observations.
Special areas may.be added to highlight significant observations.
One or more of the following evaluation' criteria were used to assess
each functional area.
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1.
Management involvement .in assurinC quality.
2.
Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
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3.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
4.
Enforcement history.
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5.
Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
6.
Staffing (including management).
7.
Training effectiveness and qualification.
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However, the SALP Board is not limited to these criteria and others may
have been used where appropriate.
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Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional area evaluated
is classified into one of three performance categories. .The definition
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of these performance categories is:
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Category 1:
Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Licensee man-
agement attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward
nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used so
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that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety or
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construction is being achieved.
Category 2:
NRC attention shoulo be maintained at normal levels.
Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are
concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and
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are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with
respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 3:
Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and
considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee
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resources appear to be strained or not effectively used so that
minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational
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safety or construction is'being achieved,
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Trend: The performance gradient over the course of the SALP assessment
period.
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'III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Overall, the licensee's performance has improved from the last SALP
period.
Ratings. increased from a Category 2 to Category 1 in two -
functional areas, the areas of Plant Operations and Surveillance remained
a Category 1, and five areas remained a Category 2.
The only decline
was the Maintenance area where the performance ' level was reduced from a
~ Category 1 to a Category 2 primarily due to the increase in number and '
significance of noncompliances. The increase in major construction and
plant modification activities by the licensee and the increased NRC
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inspection effort have contributed to the noncompliance numbers in this
area.
Rating Last
P.ating This
Functional' Area
Period
Period
Trend
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A.
Plant Operations
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Same
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B.
Radiological Controls
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2
Same
C.
Maintenance
1
2
Same
D.
Surveillance
1
1
Same
E.
Fire Protection
2
2
Same
F.
2
2
Same
G.
Security
2
1
Improved
H.
Refueling
2
2
Same
I.
Quality Programs and
Not
Administrative Controls
Rated
2
Improved
J.
Licensing Activities
2
1
Mixed
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pgIV.
PERFORMANCE' ANALYSIS
[A.
Pl' ant' Operations'
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. Analysis
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Evaluation of this functional: area is based on the results of
routine inspections conducted by the resident inspectors. The
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inspections included direct observation of activities,- review
of logs and: records, verification of selected equipment lineup:
and operability, follow up of significant operating events, and'
verification that-facility operations were-in conformance with
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the Technical Specifications, administrative procedures, and
commitments.
Two items of-noncompliance were identified as'
follows:
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a.
Severity Level V - Failure to follow procedures for
logging a bomb threat (266/83-15; 301/83-15).
b.
Severity Level V. -- Failure to follow procedures for
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removing source range instrument fuses (301/84-15).
Noncompliance a. resulted when the shif t superintendent
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failed to log a bomb threat in his station log. The~ threat:
was received and logged by security personnel. .The shift
superintendent felt that this documentation was adequate,
and did not recognize an administrative requirement to log
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bomb threats in the station log. .This item of concompliance
was representative of other log keeping deficiencies which
had been identified by the resident inspectors.
Noncom-
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pliance b. resulted from an operator's misconception that-
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deenergizing the malfunctioning source range detector would
prevent further equipment damage and this action was taken
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without consulting the appropriate procedure which was-
available in the control room.
The number and significance
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of noncompliances for this area remains about the same as
the previous assessment period.
During the evaluation period, there were six reactor trips,.
two on Unit 1 and four on Unit 2.
Of the six trips, two
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were from full power and were caused by equipment failures,
one was during startup and was caused by low steam generator
level while shifting feedwater control from manual to auto-
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matic. The remaining three occurred with reactor power in
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the source range.
Two of these three were caused either
directly or indirectly by malfunctioning source ~ range detectors
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and the third resulted, during a maintenance procedure, from
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inadequately addressing maintenance prerequisites.
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Three LER's were assigned to this area, (301/84-02) withdrawn
position of control rods in violation of Technical Specifi-
cations, (301/84-03) inadvertent actuation of emergency
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safeguards, and (301/84-04) reactor trip caused by improperly
deenergizing source range instrumentation.
All of these events
were of minor safety significance and do not represent any
deterioration in the level of performance of the operations
staff from the last assessment period.
During the assessment period one reactor operator (RO) and four
senior reactor operator (SRO) examinations were administered.
The R0 and three of the four SRO candidates passed the initial
examination. The remaining SRO candidate subsequently passed
a reexamination.
A concern relative to sufficient difficulty and scope in
licensee written requalification examinations was identified
during the SALP period.
This concern was communicated to
the licensee and as a result, NRC licensing examiner partici-
pation was scheduled for a subsequent examination.
Review of
the subsequent written examinations indicated that the above
weaknesses had been corrected.
NRC licensing examiners will
continue to monitor the licensee requalification program.
The advantages of a six shift operations crew rotation
which was initiated near the end of the last SALP period
was evidenced in the increased training time allotted for
the crews.
This SALP period each crew received over twice
the classroom time than was previously possible with a five
shift rotation.
Shift superintendents were utilized as
instructors and provided inputs for examinations to help
make them more operations oriented.
Consultants have been
hired to provide systems descriptions which will be utilized
in future training programs.
Overall, operations training
and retraining programs have continued to be upgraded during
the SALP period.
Point Beach Units 1 and 2 continun to maintain an excellent
reliability record.
As of the end of the assessment period
Unit l's availability factor was 79.2% with a capacity factor
of 69.4% and Unit 2's availability factor was 87.7% with a
capacity factor of 80.3%.
This assessment period included a
six month outage on Unit 1 to replace steam generators.
Two
forced outages oc:urred during the period.
Both outages were
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on Unit 2 and lasted a total of 36.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, one to replace a
valve in the RTD bypass manifold and the other caused by a
capacitor failure in inverter 20Y01.
Site and corporate management involvement in plant operations
continues to be maintained at a high level.
A corporate
reorganization during the SALP period now provides for the Vice
President - Nuclear Power to report directly to the President
and Chief Operating Officer.
Management's response to NRC
concerns has been timely and effective.
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Conclusion-
LTheLlicensee continues.to beirated Category 1 inithis area.
The performance trend during this period remained thelsame.
3.
. Board Recommendations
- This area'should be considered for reduced inspection
- frequency.
8.
Radiological Controls
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'Analys i s -
Six inspections were performed during the assessment period
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by. regional specialists.
The inspections included outage:
radiation protection, operational radiation protection, steam
generator replacement, spent fuel shipments, confirmatory
measurements, and environmental protection.
The resident
inspectors also inspected in this area. .Seven. violations
and one deviation from a commitment were identified as
follows:
a.
Severity Level IV - Fail'ure to take suitable air
samples during reactor vessel head removal and
cavity flooding (50-266/83-08; 50-301/83-08).
b.
Severity Level IV -' Failure to adhere to an NRC Order
confirming a licensee commitment for installation and
operations of steam line monitors per NUREG-0737
(50-266/83-08; 50-301/83-08).
c.
Severity Level IV - Failure to conduct a timely
contamination survey of a spent fuel cask before
shipment (266/83-17; 301/83-16).
d.
Severity Level V - Failure, for two exclusive
shipments, to provide written exclusive use
instructions to the carrier (266/83-11; 301/83-19).
e.
Severity Level IV - Failure to notify the control
room of a high airborne concentration per procedures
(301/83-19).
f.
Severity Level V - Failure to maintain in situ
calibration records for the containment high range
radiation monitor (266/84-02; 301/84-01).
g.
Severity Level IV - Failure to adhere to an NRC order
confirming a licensee commitment for installation of
control room and C-59 panel shielding per NUREG-0737
(266/84-02; 301/84-01).
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h.
Deviation - Special operating instructions for the
steam generator replacement project were not reviewed
by licensee personnel as stated in a letter to NRR
from the licensee dated February 22, 1983 (266/83-11;
301/83-19).
Although these multiple minor violations, some repetitive and
some indicative of a minor programmatic breakdown, represent
a significant increase from the last SALP assessment period,
they do not appear indicative of a significantly weakened
radiation protection program.
Increased work activity
(e.g., steam generator replacement and spent fuel shipping)
and increased NRC inspections contributed to the increased
number of violations.
The number of violations do, however, indicate a need for
improved management involvement, including increased plant and
corporate quality assurance audits, which were notably lacking
during this assessment period.
Self-audits by the plant health
physics staff were generally of good quality.
The licensee has
an acceptable analytical laboratory quality control program;
however, licensee audits of analytical laboratory activities
should be improved.
Corporate involvement in the steam
generator replacement project appears to have contributed to
the success of the project.
Overall, management involvement
and control are adequate; however, improvements should be made
in the audit program.
Staffing in this functional area was adequate.
Key positions
within the radiation protection and chemistry groups were
identified, authorities and responsibilities were defined,
and positions were usually filled in a reasonable time.
The
radiation protection program has been strengthened during the
assessment period by addition of two health physics supervisors
who meet Regulatory Guide 1.8 Radiation Protection Manager
selection criteria and provisions for health physics technician
coverage on a second shift.
However, the Chemistry and Health
Physics Superintendent's position has been vacant since
February 9, 1984.
The current Radiation Control Operators (RCOs) training program
was marginal.
A more comprehensive training curriculum is
needed, especially given the relative inexperience of the staff.
An improved training program for the RCOs was developed and is
scheduled for implementation during the next SALP assessment
period.
The new program appears adequate and should upgrade
the technical level of the RCOs and other members of the staff.
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A chemistry training program, involving formal lectures,
on-the-job supervisory training, and demonstration of labor-
atory proficiency was being developed for new RCOs.
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.A conservative approach to: radiological safety and controls was.
' generally exhibited.
Overall radiological controls associated-
with the steam generator replacements and sleeving were very
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good.~
Personnel, radiation exposures during 1983 were about 15
percent ~above the average for U.S.Lpressurized water reactors;
and about 150 percent:above the licensee's average annual
exposures over the preceding five years. 'The' increase was due
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primarily to_special projects during,this assessment period,
-includingLthel Unit:1 steam generator- replacement project, the
. Unit 2 steam generator sleeving project, and phase 2 6f the Unit
1' steam generator tube specimen removal task. These projects
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were all completed at relatively low personal radiation doses
due primarily to good pre planning, work practices, worker.
' attitudes, and exposure and management controls.
Total dose for
the Unit 1 steam generator replacement ~ project was'about 300
person-rems per steam generator which represents'a significant
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reduction from the doses for previous steam generator replace-
ment projects. These low doces are apparently attributable
to effective oversight of the project-by licensee personnel,
combined with good project management by Westinghouse.
During this assessment period, liquid effluent releases and
solid waste production were about average for U.S. pressurized
water. reactors and gaseous effluent releases remained lower than
average.
No unplanned liquid or gaseous releases were reported.
One
hundred and ninety-three spent fuel shipments from two storage
facilities were received by the licensee.
Frequent departure
and arrival inspections of the shipments performed by NRC
inspectors identified two violations concerning an inadequate
cask survey and inadequate shipping documentation.
The licensee-continued to demonstrate good performance in his
capability to accurately measure radioactivity in effluents.
The licensee achieved all (26) agreements in comparison with
results from the Region III mobile laboratory. Two additional
agreements were obtained for beta analysis of a liquid sample
collected in a previous inspection.
A hood air flow discrepancy
identified during an inspection was corrected in a timely mannt.r.
Radiological environmental monitoring, sample collection by
plant personnel and analyses performed by the contractor
(Teledyne Isotopes, Inc.), appear satisfactory.
This
radiological environmental monitoring program contractor also
performed an adequate internal QC and EPA interlaboratory
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cross-check program.
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2.
Conclusion
The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area.
This is the
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same rating as the last SALP period.
No significant change
in performance was evident.
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Board Recommendation
.None.
C.
Maintenance.
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Analysis
Safety-related-maintenance performed during'the period-included
sleeving of Unit ~2 steam generator tubes,~. modification of
. Unit-1 and 2 containment air particulate'and gaseous monitors,
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seal:and shaft key replacement.on safety injection pumpf2P15A,
annual inspection and governor replacement on 30 diesel
generator, annual ~ inspection on 4D diesel generator, changeout
of_N8FD relays, reinforcement _of pressurizer safety valve
discharge: header piping,-replacement of source' range detection.
channel 32, modification of auxiliary feed system to provide
automatic initiation and back-up cooling from the fire main,.
installation of the auxiliary safety instrumentation panels in
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the control room and replacement-of Unit 1 steam generators.
Evaluation of this area is based on the results of routine
inspections by the resident inspectors and three inspections
by Regional Office Inspectors. The inspections included such
activities as the observation of maintenance; compliance with
procedures, and plant technical specifications; the use of
properly certified parts and materials; and adherence to radio-
logical and fire protection controls.
Six items of noncompliance
were identified as follows:
a.
Severity Level V - Use of incorrect procedure
revision for steam generator closeout inspection
(301/83-13-02).
b.
Severity Level IV - Failure to perform adequate
10 CFR 50.59 review for snubber removal (301/84-03-01).
c.
Severity Level IV - Failure to comply with ANSI
N45.2.1 1973Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI</br></br>N45.2.1 1973" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., resulting in a significant amount of
debris in the reactor coolant system (266/84-06-01).
d.
Severity Level IV - Failure to maintain operable
radiation monitors which initiate containment
isolation during' fuel motion (301/83-11).
e.
Severity Level V - Failure to accomplish activities
in accordance with procedures and drawings (266/83-20).
f.
Severity Level V - Failure to establish an adequate
hydrostatic test program (266/84-01).
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Noncompliance.a. was of minor: safety significance and did
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not affact-the' operation of the plant.
Noncompliance b.
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- was of minor' safety significance but-was. repetitive in nature.
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Noncompliance c. could have caused a safety. concern if the-
licensee had not identified the debris. problem during the
normal rod latching procedure and removed the. debris prior
to startup. -This event resulted in a fifteen day delay in
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. recovering from the steam generator replacement outage.
Noncompliance d. involved an LCO violation of minimal safety
significance.
However, -among the many causal factors which
lead to this noncompliance was a possible-inadequacy in the
licensee's 10 CFR:50.59. review process.
Noncompliances'e.
and f. were identified during the; steam' generator replacement
outage and do not appear to have generic or programmatic-
implications.
Management invol'vement in maintenance ac'tivities was extensive
during this SALP period.
Although management resources were
somewhat strained during the steam generator replacement, the
overall handling of this activity was commendable.
All major
critical path evolutions were competed on or ahead of schedule -
until.the. debris problem was identified at the end of the
outage.
During the previous SALP, quality assurance activities were a
part of this functional area.
In this SALP period, they are
treated as a separately assessed area.
A major team inspection
of the quality assurance area at both the site and corporate
levels was held during this evaluation period.
The licensee
has corrected or is in the process of correcting the findings.
from that inspection, many of which impact the maintenance area.
Examples of significant changes were the licensee's revised
10 CFR 50.59 review process and development of more comprehen-
sive maintenance procedures.
Training has been upgraded by the addition of classroom
instruction on basic plant systems and their operation along
with the normal specific discipline training.
This will help
maintenance personnel to get an overall picture of what effect
their actions can have on the operation of the plant.
Five LER's were assigned to this area:
(266/84-04), reactor
trip caused by placing turbine first stage pressure in test-
while at 700 PSIG primary system pressure, the cause of the
reactor protection actuation was an inadequately prepared
maintenance request; (266/83-03) critical control power
failure, caused by contractors pulling wires in the control
boards; (266/83-10) loss of fire detection in auxiliary
feedpump room, vital switchgear room, and cable spreading
room,' caused by a contractor wiring error during a modification;
(301/83-08) loss of R-11 and R-12 during fuel movement, caused
by inadequate system turnover during modification; and
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(301/84-01) removal of a safety-related snubber contrary
to technical specifications during modification, caused by
an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 review.
These last two LER's are
also' carried as noncompliances b. and d. above.
During the previous SALP period no items of noncompliance and
one LER were assigned to this area.
The Board recommended
-that increased NRC inspection should be implemented during
the steam generator. replacement outage.
The increase in major
construction and plant modification activities by the licensee
and the increased NRC inspection effort in this area have
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contributed to the LER and noncompliance numbers identified
in this SALP period. Although the numbers of noncompliances
and LER's have increased significantly over the previous SALP
period, there does not appear to be a major breakdown in
management control or maintenance personnel performance as
evidenced by the continued lack of significant plant problems
identified as related to maintenance and the continued
reliability of safety-related equipment.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area.
The licensee
was rated a Category 1 during the last assessment period.
The
performance trend during this SALP period remained the same.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
D.
Surveillance
1.
Analysis
Evaluation of this functional area is t ssed on results of
routine inspections conducted by the Resident Inspectors
and five inspections by regional personnel.
The resident
inspections included such activities as the observation of
testing; verification that testing was performed in accordance
with adequate procedures; that limiting conditions for
operation were met; that test results conformed with technical
specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by
personnal other than the individual directing the test; and
that ary deficiencies identified during the testing were
properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel.
Four of the regional based inspections were in
the area of inservice inspections.
These included inspections
of (1) inservice examination of piping systems, (2) the results
of inspections and documentation review for crack indications
and failure of control rod guide tube split pins, (3) a review
of the results of ultrasonic testing that identified indications
in the reactor pressure vessel outlet nozzle to shell weld,
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and_(4) followup on valve. shaft inspections required to be
performed on main steam line isolation swing check and swing
stop' valves.
The fifth regional inspection covered the
integrated leak rate test on the Unit 1 containment.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified. One
LER attributed to rarsonnel error was submitted during the
assessment period, (266/83-06) boric acid storage tank and
refueling water storage tank sampling frequency exceeded.
The
cause of this event was the failure of a chemistry technician
to note a scheduling change for the required samples. The
samples were taken as soon as the error was recognized and
the results were within specifications.
Licensee surveillance testing continues to be performed by
well qualified personnel using comprehensive procedures and,
with the one noted exception, in a timely manner.
Management
involvement remains evident.
Procedure revisions are developed
with inputs from operations and testing personnel and are'given
timely reviews. On-the-job training for technicians includes
explanations of what effect each step in a procedure has on the
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system being tested. Operations personnel are constantly kept
informed as to the status of testing and what effects they'
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should expect to see on instrumentation or annunciators.
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licensee continues to maintain the performance level and
attributes described in the previous 5 ALP.
2.
Conclusions
The licensee continues to be rated Category 1 and performance
in this area has remained the same.
3.
Board Recommendations
This area should be considered for reduced inspection
frequency.
E.
Fire Protection and Housekeeping
1.
Analysis
Throughout the assessment period, while performing the resident
inspection program, observations were made of the control of
combustible materials, control of fire barriers, inclementation
of ignition control permit requirements and housekeeping require-
ments.
One inspection was performed by regional inspectors to
followup on previously identified findings.
Two items of
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noncompliance were identified as follows:
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a.
Severity Level IV - Failure to follow procedures:
Acetylene bottle and wood stored in containment
during steam generator replacement outage (266/83-26).
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b.:
Severity Level.V - Failure to! follow procedures:
Transient combustibles not controlled in diesel
generator room (266/84-06; 301/84-04).
Noncompliance a. resulted in a small fire in containment when
acetylene and the acetylene hose were ignited by grinding sparks.
~ The fire was quickly extinguished and unnecessary' combustibles
removed from containment. . Noncompliance b. resulted from a
misinterpretation of the transient combustibles procedure.
All
necessary personnel were retrained on the proper use of the
procedure.
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Licensee performance in the area of fire protection has shown
marked improvement since the last SALP assessment based on the
following:
a.
During the current SALP period only two items of
noncompliance were identified, one Severity Level IV
and one Severity Level V.
items resulted from a self-disclosing event.
During
the previous evaluation period, three Severity Level IV
items of noncompliance were identified along with six
unresolved items, indicating basic programmatic
weaknesses.
b.
All of the items identified as weaknesses during the
previous SALP period were reinspected and determined
to be adequately resolved.
c.
The licensee has established a full time Fire
Protection Engineer position, removing these duties
from operations personnel and giving them to a fully
qualified individual.
d.
The licensee has actively involved their corporate
Fire Protection Engineer in site fire protection /
j
prevention activities.
During this evaluation period the licensee has satisfactorily
completed an operational test of the new Halon suppression
l
system which serves the cable spreading room, the auxiliary
l
feedpump room, and the vital switchgear room.
Housekeeping
continues to be well above average with a recent renewed
effort at auxiliary building cleanliness.
'
2.
Conclusion
The licensee continues to be rated Category 2 in this area.
The performance trend remained the same.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
14
L._.
~
,
'
l
.(
'
F.-
1.
Analysis-
~
LDuring the assessment period,:four inspections were conducted,
~
two emergency preparedness exercises were observed, a Safety
Evaluation Report was' written and a management meeting was held
-
to~ evaluate compliance with 10.CFR Part'50,' Technical Specifi-
cations and procedures.--Three items of noncompliance and one
deviation from a commitment were identified during this
assessment period in contrast to the previous assessment period
.during which only one noncompliance was identified.
Of the
three items of noncompliance and the deviation discussed below,
only a. was of greater significance to the emergency program
than the previous period's noncompliance.
a.
Severity Level'IV - Shift Supervisors, initially
the Emergency Support Manager, were incapable of
determining when and what type'of protective measures
should be considered outside the site boundary to
protect public health and safety (266/84-13; 301/84-11).
b.
Severity Level IV - An evaluation for the adequacy
of interfaces with the State and local governments
was not included in the 1984 annual audit (266/84-13;
301/84-11).
c.
Severity Level V - Emergency action levels for the
Point Beach Nuclear Plant had not been reviewed by
the State of Wisconsin on an annual basis (266/84-13;
301/84-11).
d.
Deviation - Failure te .pdate or obtain letters of
agreement with offsite organizations (266/83-75;
301/83-23(DRSS)).
Each of the items of noncompliance and the deviation from a
commitment appeared to be the result of a failure to adequately
maintain portions of the emergency preparedness program. The
licensee had shown that it was responsive to NRC' concerns as
demonstrated by the fact that a total of 50 outstanding items
were closed out during the assessment period.
However, it was
~
also evident that not all NRC concerns were being addressed.
First, the July 1983, routine inspection identified problems
with Shift Supervisors being able to make a protective action
recommendation due to inadequacies in the procedures and training.
Walkthroughs with the Shift Supervisors a year later, during
the July 1984 routine inspection, showed that their ability to
make a protective action recommendation had deteriorated, which
resulted in the issuance of noncompliance a.
Second, a
management meeting in September 1983 addressed NRC concerns-
pertaining to letters of agreement with offsite organizations.
15
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/-
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,
.
+
Four months later.these concerns ha'd-still not'been addressed
'
which resulted in~ issuing a deviation from commitment.
Based on
the above and the fact that noncompliances b. and c. were-the
result of's failure to carry out annually scheduled tasks, it
appeared that not enough manpower was allocated to resolving
emergency preparedness issues, and still continue'to maintain
the program on an ongoing basis.
The licensee's performance during their 1984 annual exercise
'
was an improvement over their 1983 annual exercise.
However,
.a major ' weakness was identified in the ability to determine
appropriate protective actions. ' Weaknesses identified in the
area of command and control during the 1983 exercise were
corrected during the 1984 exercise.
The licensee had adequately responded to the previous SALP
Board recommendation that increased management attention is
i
needed to address NRC concerns in a more timely and responsive
manner. With the exception of the two-items discussed above
'
that resulted in noncompliance a. and the deviation from a
,
commitment, the licensee responded to all other NRC concerns
in'a timely and thorough manner.
!
1
l
The licensee continued to carry out their training program
!
for site and corporate personnel involved in the emergency
!
!
preparedness program which included drills as well as class-
room training.
Improvements in the training program were
!
evident in that improved performance by the licensee was noted
l
in each successive annual emergency preparedness exercise over
the last three years.
However, additional emphasis was
,
necessary in the area of protective action recommendations
j
based on the 1984 exercise and shift. supervisor walkthroughs
e
as previously discussed.
!
2.
Conclusion
2
The licensee is rated Category 2 in this area.
This is the.
1
same rating as the last SALP period.
Licensee performance in
<
j
this area remained the same overall.
)
3.
Board Recommendations
i
None.
G.
Security
1.
Analysis
'
Three physical security inspections and one material control
and accountability inspection were conducted during this
assessment period.
During' August and September 1983,'inspec-
tions'of security protection for shipments of irradiated fuel
,
I
16
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--
- - .
. -
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s
assemblies were also conducted.
Additionally, the resident
- inspectors conducted periodic observations of security
activities.
The scope of the security inspections included
normal security operations, transportation security measures,
,
and security measures for a major outage.
Two violations were
noted during the. inspection effort.
a.
Adequate searches of hand-carried
packages were not conducted (266/83-22; 301/83-21).
b.
Severity Level IV - A security computer capability,
required by the security plan, could be circumvented
(266/84-08; 301/84-06).
Violations a. and b. represent a significant decrease in number
and nature of violations identified in the previous SALP period.
The SALP 3 report identified seven violations and noted'that
the violations pertained primarily to equipment problems. .This
trend has been reversed by the licensee's management.
A concern pertaining to the contract security organization's
written guidance for reporting possible violations to the NRC
was noted in Inspection Report K,.
50-265/84-08; 50-301/84-06.
The guidance required, rather than encouraged, security
contractor personnel to contact both the security contractor
management and licensee management before contacting the NRC
about possible violations.
The guidance was published in
February 1984 and the licensee was required to respond to
the concern since it appeared to conflict with the intent of
The guidance was superseded in July 1984 and
the conflict was clearly eliminated.
The previous SALP report noted that corrective actions lacked
depth.
During this assessment period, security issues were
consistently resolved at the Security Supervisor level and
concerns appeared to receive the same level of management
attention as violations.
Corrective actions for violations
and concerns have been timely and effective in resolving the
issues and preventing recurrence.
The licensee is ennsistently
responsive to NRC concerns.
Several actions to improve the existing security program have
i
been initiated during this assessment period. These actions
include upgrading of the security computer system, installation
i
'
of several new closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, improve-
ments in the licensee's firearms range, acquisition of equipment
for maintenance support for high elevation security equipment
(lighting and CCTV cameras), and development of the Security
,
i
Force Training and Qualification Program in concert with an area
i
certified educational institution.
Proposals to improve portable
!
radio equipment, lighting, and modification of the cer. tral alarm
17
.
c
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._
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.
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r
.
o
station console based upon human factor analysis have also been
~
recommended. Senior management has been supportive of efforts to
improve security effectiveness.
Corporate level support for the security program appears
aggressive and supportive of site activities. -Communications
between the site Security Supervisor and corporate System
Security Officer was effective.
Corporate audits of the
security program were in-depth and included all major segments
of the program.
Inspection findings are closely monitored by
,
the corporate security office.
Frequent meetings are held with
the principal law enforcement agency and drills have included
participation of the local sheriff's department.
A significant revision to the security program was necessary
during the major outage for the steam generator, replacement.
Some existing facilities had to be modified, additional
personnel had to be hired and trained, and a separate appendix
to the security plan had to be prepared and submitted for NRC
approval. -All of these major tasks were completed in a timely
and professional manner.
Aggressive management of security operations is provided by the
two licensee security supervisors.
Both have demonstrated a
high level of management and technical competence.
Effective
liaison with the contract security force manager was also
evident.
Staffing of the contract security force appears
adequate and strong supervision of day-to-day operations was
noted during security inspections.
Personnel appeared well
trained and motivated.
Procedural guidance is adequate to assure that provisions of the
security plan are fulfilled.
Required security plan submittals
are completed in a timely manner and are technically correct.
Physical security event reports required by 10 CFR 73.71(c) are
submitted in a timely manner and contain adequate details.
The major task facing the licensee is complete implementation
of the Security Force Training and Qualification Plan (SFT&Q).
Implementation progress was determined to be adequate during
the June 1984 inspection.
The SFT&Q Plan becomes effective on
November 12, 1984.
Security equipment observed during inspections was functional
and well maintained.
Contingency equipment was also serviceable.
Maintenance support for security equipment and systems appeared
adequate and was monitored by the Security Supervisor on a weekly
basis.
.
18
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r
7
(.
4
. 2.
Conclusion
'
- The licensee is rated Category 1 in this area. 'This.is an
e
,
- improvement from the previous rating of Category ?
--d
is-
~
based primarily on the' improved enforcement histor , erfec-
s
tiveness and depth;of corrective actions to resolve security
- issues and the licensee'sl actions to upgrade the existing
,
security program. . Licensee performance over the course of
this-SALP period has' improved.
Deficiencies noted in the
SALP 3 evaluation have been addressed and corrected by the
-
licensee.
3.
Board Recommendations
This area'should be considered for reduced inspection
frequency.
.H.
Refuelina Activities
'
1.
Analysis
Evaluation of this functional area is based on the results
of inspections conducted by the resident inspectors.
The
inspection activities included observation of fuel movements;
verification that surveillance for refueling activities had
been performed; that refueling containment integrity
requirements were met; and observation of outage controls
,
and activities.
One item of noncompliance was identified:
Severity Level IV - Failure to follow procedure:,
during core loading activities (301/83-13-01).
The above noncompliance resulted from a personnel error that
involved a failure to verify manipulator crane mast elevation
prior to releasing an irradiated fuel assembly in the reactor
i
and resulted in the fuel assembly. leaning over approximately
,
30 degrees.
This assembly was subsequently removed from the
core and not used in the reiaad.
This noncompliance had
potential safety imp 1tcations since the fuel.rodlets could
have ruptured.
Three LER's were assigned to this area:
(266/84-01) split pin
cracks and missing fasteners, (301/83-02) steam generator tubes
requiring plugging, and (301/83-07) abnormal degradation in
,
i
The noncompliance above occurred during the Spring of 1983,
'
Unit 2 refueling.
The last Unit I refueling displayed evidence
of management involvement in that prior planning and' assignment
of priorities were completed for utilization of the spent fuel
l
pool.
Coordination had to be maintained between spent fuel
shipments arriving at the site and the core offload and reload.
1
I
1
y
19
,
..
-.- .
-
.
.
-
.
On-the-job training on the manipulator and spent fuel bridge
is preceded by classroom training for those operators handling
fuel.
Staffing was adequate and responsibilities were defined.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee continues to be rated Category 2 in this area.
The performance trend remained the same.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
I.
Quality Programs and Administrative Controls
1.
Analysis
This functional area was examined by regional inspection
specialists in three inspections conducted during the SALP
period.
The first inspection included a review of the
licensee's programs and their implementation for non-licensed
.
i
personnel training and licensed personnel requalification
training.
The second inspection was a special inspection of
the licensee's quality assurance program activities and
included a review of QA Program administration; maintenance
program and implementation; design change and modification
l
program and implementation; procurement; Offsite Review
l
Committee; document control; calibration and control of
l
measuring the test equipment; surveillance and inservice
!
testing; cleanliness control; audit program and implementa-
l
tion; and the steam generator replacement program.
The third
l
inspection which occurred at the end of the SALP period,
'
was conducted to determine the status and adequacy of the
licensee's corrective action in response to the findings
of the special QA inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during
,
I
the first and third inspections.
However, during the second
inspection nine items of noncompliance with a total of 22
separate examples were identified as follows (266/83-21;
310/83-20):
a.
Severity Level IV - Five examples of failure to
control documents.
b.
Severity Level IV - Six examples of failure to
!
have or follow appropriate procedures.
i
l
c.
Severity Level IV - Failure to prepare the written
safety evaluations required to 10 CFR 50.59 for
'
changes to the facility as described in the FSAR.
20
.
- -
-
-
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R
.
V
.
,
.
I
d.
Severity Level IV - Failure to provide training to
personnel performing inspections.
'
e.
Severity Level V - Two examples of the failure to
perform audits under the cognizance of the Offsite
,
Review Committee as required by the Technical
Specifications.
,
f.
Severity Level V - Four examples of failure to
conduct audits in accordance with the ANSI standards
as committed in the FSAR.
-
g.
Severity Level'V - Failure to provide a program to
prevent the use of material from " Ready Stores" that
had exceeded its shelf life,
h.
Severity Level V - Failure to properly store quality
records.
i.
Severity Level V - Failure to maintain suitable
cleanliness in areas where activities affecting
quality were performed.
In addition to the noncompliances listed above, seven other
examples of noncompliance were identified which were not cited,
but were classified as unresolved items in accordance with the
l
enforcement policy (self-identification by the licensee and
'
i
formulation of corrective actions).
Eleven open items
addressing other inspector concerns were also identified.
"
Noncompliance a. had potential safety significance due to the
possible use of outdated procedures or drawings for safety-
related activities. Noncompliance b. represented a failure to
use approved procedures in the repair of a safety injection
pump and the failure to independently verify system configuration.
Noncompliance c. resulted from a misunderstanding on the part of
the licensee of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 relative to a
change of non-safety related equipment which modified the plant
!
description in the FSAR.
Noncompliance d. had safety signi-
[
ficance, in that, personnel performing QC inspections were not
I
trained in the significance of these activities and their
attendant responsibilities.
Noncompliances e. - 1. were of
minor safety significance and represent primarily programmatic
problems. While the findings of the special quality assurance
inspection indicated fairly extensive program deficiencies, they
had not yet manifested themselves in identifiable equipment or
operational problems.
These findings and the licensee's planned corrective actions
were reviewed during a management meeting in the Region III
Office and during a subsequent inspection as previously
discussed.
The licensee implemented an extensive and
21
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%
v
aggressive corrective action program. =Of the 22 examples of
noncompliance, 15 were closed.
Three of the seven unresolved
items and five of the eleven open items were also closed.
Corrective actions were in progress for the remaining items.
The licensee was making major changes in the maintenance and
modifications programs and revising the structure of its QA
-
Program.
The magnitude of these changes delayed the
L
implementation of final corrective action on many of the
'
noncompliances and unresolved items.
However, temporary
corrective actions were taken where appropriate.
During SALP 3, the Board recommended that the licensee pursue
improvements in the formalization and documentation of the
Quality Assurance Program. :The licensee had initiated actions
on the Board's recommendation; however, the special QA
inspection identified numerous areas where improvements would
be required to bring the licensee's program up to present
l_ndustry standards. As noted above, the licensee has imple-
emented an extensive corrective action program in response
to the identified deficiencies.
There was evidence of prior planning and assignment of
priorities in licensee activities.
Corporate management was
usually involved in site activities.
Audits were generally
complete, timely and thorough.
Committees were usually
properly staffed and functioning.
Records were generally
complete, well maintained, and available.
Corrective action
systems generally recognized and address nonreportable
concerns. There were occasional instances of procedural
breakdowns of minor significance in design control, drawing
control, maintenance and auditing.
Response to NRC initiatives
were generally timely, viable, sound and thorough.
Acceptable
resolutions were proposed initially in most cases.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee is rated a Category 2 in this area.
Licensee
performance in this area at the beginning of the SALP period
was minimally acceptable with evident weaknesses.
However, the
extensive corrective action program implemented during this
period to correct these weaknesses has significantly improved
performance in this area.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
l
J.
Licensina Activities
1.
Analysis
During the present rating period, the licensee's management
demonstrated active participation in licensing activities and
22
1
1
e
i
t
e-
i
.
f
i
kept abreast of current and anticipated licensing actions.
The
licensee's management actively participated in an effort to
work closely with the NRC staff to establish realistic
integrated schedules for all modifications of the Point Beach
facility.
The licensee's management consistently exercised
good control over its internal activities and its contractors,
and maintained effective communication with the NRC staff.
This was specially evident during the steam generator
replacement and tube sleeving activities which occurred during
the reporting period.
One notable difficulty encountered by
the licensee was the inability to keep NUREG-0737 and other
items on schedule.
This resulted in a fair'y large number of
requests by the licensee for schedule slips, Order modifi-
,
cations, schedular exemptions, equipment qualification deadline
extensions, etc. While management appeared to play an active
role in trying to minimize and recoup time lost during various
delays, they were unsuccessful in preventing these delays.
This
may have been due to a combination of factors including an
originally overoptimistic or unrealistic schedule, timing
imposed by various NRC regulations and an integrated schedule
approach to installation.
In the latter case, it has been seen
that a delay in one system may not immediately demonstrate its
impact on related systems.
Management's active participation in issues of high potential
safety impact is clearly demonstrated.
Examples are the manage ,
ment involvement with shift staffing, CRDM support pin cracking,
equipment qualification and steam generator replacement and
tube sleeving licensing actions.
l
The licensee's management and its staff have demonstrated sound
technical understanding of issues involving licensing actions.
Its approach to resolution of technical issues has demonstrated
extensive technical expertise in almost all technical areas
l
involving licensing actions.
The decisions related to
l
licensing issues have routinely exhibited conservatism in
relation to significant safety matters.
The licensee's
frequent visits to NRC and sound communications during the
rating period assured sound technical discussions regarding
resolution of safety issues.
During the reporting period, the
licensee effectively resolved complex technical issues
concerning steam generator replacement and tube sleeving, CRDM
support pin cracking, and environmental qualification of safety
related electrical equipment.
On occasions when the licensee deviated from the staff guidance,
the licensee has consistently provided good technical justifi-
cation for such deviations.
Examples of this are shown in the
,
licensee's inservice inspection program relief requests, CRDM
support pin cracking issues and control of heavy loads over
spent fuel pool reviews.
The licensee has consistently
monitored itself to assure that the safety systems function
23
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.
,
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s
.
,
-as designed.and the plant's Technical Specifications are well
- maintained. .Recent examples _of;self-monitoring includei ;
'
.
frequent administrative technical specification change
requests to improve the clarity and consistency of the
technical specifications .and i_dentification and resolution
of conflicting requirements and/or commitments, such as, fuel
pool poison surveillance technical specification change requests.
..
The licensee has;always come well prepared to meetings with the
0
staff involving resolution of safety issues.
Included as
topics for these meetings were steam generator replacement,.
equipment qualification, CRDM support pin cracking, . shift
staffing and fire protection.
As a result, these meetings have
')
progressed efficiently and effectively and resulted in prompt
'
-resolution of all safety concerns.
.
The licensee has been consistent 1, responsive to NRC
l
'
initiatives.
However, some weaknesses were noted.
Mainly,
items involving schedular relief were not always submitted with
.
adequate lead time for staff review.
This included, notably,
'
requests for equipment qualification deadline extensions,
,
NUREG-0737 Order modifications, component cooling water heat
,
exchanger technical specification change requests and shift
staffing exemption requests.
Further, several requests for
4
licensing actions did not contain complete packages (i.e., all
'
supporting technical justification).
This was true of both
initial submittals, such as, Optimized Fuel Assembly technical
.
j
specifications and some responses to requests for additional
j
information. However, in both cases, improvement has been seen
since the previous reporting period.
.}
One item of concern was the licensee's schedule of reactor
j
vessel internal components inspections during the steam
t
generator replacement outage.
Earlier scheduling of inspec-
i
tions which were critical path, such as, reactor vessel nozzle
j
welds and CRDM support pins would have provided a greater time
'
period for resolution of safety concerns resulting from these
.
j
inspections. While these problem areas could not have been
i
predicted or anticipated with absolute confidence, there was
adequate prior evidence of their potential existence.
As a
,
result, hurried, intense efforts were required by both the
'
'
staff'and licensee to resolve the safety issues which ultimately
-
resulted in a delayed startup.
f
l
The licensee experienced mixed trends in performance during
1
this reporting period. While their overall performance of
j
routine licensing actions has improved, several non-routine
'
licensing action areas have showed declining performance or
<
have otherwise shown that additional effort is still needed.
Notably, in the area of 10 CFR 50.59 reviews, the licensee has
had difficulty in performing'the reviews in a correct and
i
timely fashion including completion and documentation of the
_
24
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,
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..&r~..
4
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. . - -
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, , - - - . - - - - . - _ . , ~ ~ , , , - _ , ,
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,#.,,,,w..e
.
,
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.
F
required safety reviews.
For example, if safety reviews are
completed during the preparation stage of an outage, any needed
technical resolution could be reached prior to the outage
rather than as a last minute item just prior to startup. The
licensee has had difficulty in meeting scheduled dates for
several_ licensing actions. This has resulted in a large number
,
'
of schedular reliefs, extensions, exemptions, etc., which have
required resolution on a short turn around time basis and have
created significant burden for the NRC licensing staff.
Often,
once relief was granted, additional stepped-up tracking efforts
were either perceived as not needed and therefore not enacted
by the licensee or were ineffective, which resulted in several
repeat relief requests for the same licensing actions.
The end
result is an inefficient use of both licensee and NRC staff
licensing resources.
Overall, with the exception of the items noted above, the
licensee has been very responsive to staff requests for
information.
This is particularly true of voluntary requests,
such as, the staff's site visit request related to USI A-45
" Decay Heat Removal Capability".
2.
Conclusion
The licensee is rated a Category 1 in this area.
Licensee
performance has been mixed during the evaluation period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
I
25
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E..
)
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.
.
~ V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUDMARIES
A.
Licensee Activities
During the evaluation period, Point Beach Unit 1 operated for a
total of 357.1 out of 549 days. Of the 191.9 days Unit I was not in
operation, .9 days were attributable to unanticipated equipment
' problems with the loose parts monitoring system and the remaining
191 days were attributable to the. scheduled refueling and steam
generator replacement outage. This outage would have been 15 days
shorter if it would not have been necessary to remove several
hundred pieces of debris from the reactor vessel upper internals
package control rod guide tubes.
Unit 1 generator was taken off line on October 1,1983 and placed
back on line April 9,1984, at the completion of the steam generator
replacement outage. _0th9r activities during the outage included:
installation of a loose parts monitoring system; inspection of the '
reactor vessel outlet nozzle to shell welds; an ultrasonic examination
of the guide tube split pins, which revealed crack indications in
the shank to collar region of 67 of the 74 pins; replacement of
the NBFD relays in the reactor protection and safeguards relay
racks; replacement of the R-11/R-12 monitors; and a containment
During the evaluation period, Point Beach Unit 2 operated for a
total of 444.8 out of 549 days.
On the 104.2 days Unit 2 was not in
operation, 1.5 days were attributable to two forced outages caused
by equipment failure, 3.7 days were attributable to a scheduled
inspection and repair of the moisture separator reheaters, and the
remaining 99 days were attributable to scheduled refueling outages.
Unit 2 was shut down at the beginning of the evaluation period for a
scheduled refueling and steam generator sleeving outage.
The unit
was returned to service on July 6, 1983.
During this outage, the
licensee:
sleeved 1501 tubes in the "A" steam generator and 1500
tubes in the "B" steam generator; replaced NBFD reactor protection
system r ' vs; replaced R-11/R-12 monitors; and inspected fuel
assemblies, during which one of four optimized fuel assemblies was
found to have through-wall defects in at least 9 rodlets.
Unit 2 was shut down at the end of the evaluation period going off
line September 28, 1984.
Scheduled work for this outage include
SPEC 200 system startup and calibrations, reactor coolant loose
parts monitoring system installations, replacement of 36 incore flux
monitoring thimbles, and steam generator eddy current examinations.
)
!
26
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B.
Inspection Activities
-The inspection program at Point Beach during the evaluation period
consisted of routine resident and region-based inspections.
One
special Quality Assurance team inspection was conducted during this
SALP period.
Noncompliance Data
Facility Name:
Point Beach, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-266,
50-301
Inspection Reports No. 83-07 through 83-28
'
No. 84-01 through 84-17
Inspection Activity and Enforcement
1
FUNCTIONAL-
NO.-0F VIOLATIONS IN EACH SEVERITY LEVEL
'
AREA
I
II
III
IV
V
DEV.
Plant Operations
2
Radiological Controls
5
2
1
!
'
Maintenance
3
3
Surveillance
l
' Fire Protection
1
1
i
'
2
1
1
Security
2
l
Refueling
1
l
l.
Quality Programs and
'
Administrative
Controls
4
5
Licensing Activities
Totals
18
14
2
I Noncompliances' reflect total noncompliances for site rather than
noncompliances associated with each unit as was reflected in SALP 3.
C.
Investinations and Allegations Review
None
27'
.
,-
.
D.
Escalated Enforcement Actions
None
E.
Management Conferences Held During Appraisal Period
1.
On August 22, 1983, a management meeting was held at the Point
Beach site to discuss NRC concerns over the casual factors
which lead to a limiting condition for operation being
exceeded for the R-11/R-12 radiation monitors.
2.
On September 28, 1983, a management meeting was held at the
licensee's corporate offices in Milwaukee to discuss NRC
concerns pertaining to the inspection findings of the
July 18-22, 1983, emergency preparedness inspection 266/83-14;
301/83-14(DRSS).
3.
On January 4,1984, a management conference was held at the
licensee's request in the Region III Office to discuss the
findings of the special QA inspection 266/83-21;
301/83-20(DRS).
F.
Review of Licensee Event Report and 10 CFR 21 Reports
1.
Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
On August 29, 1983, the NRC published an amendment clarifying
its regulations regarding Licensee Event Reports required by
Details of the new reporting system were pub-
l
lished as NUREG-1022 " Licensee Event Report System".
The
l
effective date of this amendment was January 1, 1984.
The
new rule deleted reporting requirements for several types of
l
licensee events which had been found, through experience,
to be of little value to the Commission.
i
.
28
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Unit 1
Unit'2
~ PROXIMATE CAUSE**
SALP III*
SALP IV*
'SALP III*-
SALP IV*
Personne1' Error
3(.25)***
4(.22)
'1(.08)
5(.28)
,
Design Mfg.
Const/ Install
-5(.42)
2(.11)
3(.25)
-1(.06)
7
External
0(.00)
0(.00)
O(.00)
0(.00)
Defective Procedure
3(.25)
0(.00)
1(.08)
0(.00)
'1
Component Failure
11(.92)
4(.22)'
4(.33)
6(.33)
Other
2(.17)
4(.22)
2(.17).
1(.06)
TOTALS
24(2.00)
14(.78)
11(.92)
13(.72)
,
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SALP 3 (12 months), SALP 4 (18 months)
Proximate Cause is the cause assigned by the licensee according to
i
NUREG-0161, " Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee
j
Event Report (LER) File", or NUREG-1022, " Licensee Event Report System"
- Numbers in parentheses indicate LER's/ Month
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1
4
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1
3
4
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26_LERS were reviewed for clarity and adequacy of the provided des-
criptions during the assessment period and were found reasonably
detailed to permit understanding of the events. An increase was
noted in the numbers of LERs attributed to personnel errors; however,
reductions of licensee events were noted in Design Manufacturing,
. Construction / Installation and Component Failure categories.
G.
Licensing Actions
1.
NRR/ Licensee Meetinas
June 23, 1983
Steam Generator Replacement
,
July 22, 1983
Appendix R Fire Protection Exemptions
October 13, 1983
Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related
Electrical Equipment
January 10, 1984
Shift Staffing Rule Exemption Request
March 28. 1984
Control Rod Guide Tube Support Pin Cracking
2.
NRR Site Visits
August 22, 1983
Steam Generator Replacement Outage Schedule
October 31, 1983
Inservice Inspection Program Evaluation
July 16, 1984
USE A-45 Decay Heat Removal Evaluation
3.
Commission Briefings
None.
4.
Schedular Extensions Granted
10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Deadline Extension
7/22/83
,
10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Deadline Extension
1/3/84
NUREG-0737 Order Modification
7/12/83
10 CFR 50.54 Shift Staffing Extension
3/26/84
5.
Reliefs Granted
10 CFR 50.49a Additional Inservice Inspection Relief 6/1/83
10 CFR 50.55a 2nd Ten Year Interval ISI Relief
3/29/84
6.
Exemptions Granted
10 CFR 50.44 Reactor Coolant System Vents Schedular Exemption
5/9/83
.
10 CFR 50.44 Reactor Coolant System Vents Schedular Exemption
'
12/30/83
7.
Emeroency Technical Specification Issued
None.
30
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8.
Orders Issued
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Units 1 and 2 - Order confirming Licensee commitments on
,
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Emergency Response Capability.as. required by Supplement 1
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to NUREG-0737, July 3, 1984
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