IR 05000271/2012007

IR 05000271-12-007, 6/14/2012 - 6/21/2012, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection

ML12216A097
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	08/02/2012
From:	Doerflein L Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Wamser C Entergy Nuclear Operations
Larry Doerflein
References
IR-12-007
Download: ML12216A097 (22)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

SUBJECT:

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MOD I F I CATI ON S TEAM I N S PECTI O N RE PORT O5OOO27 1 I2O1 2OO7

Dear Mr. Wamser:

On June 21,2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) completed an inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 21,2012, with you, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, A

Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28

Enclosure:

I nspection Report 0500027 1 12012007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I==

50-271 DPR.28 05000271t2012007 Entergy Nuclear Operations, lnc.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Vernon, VT 05354-9766 June 4, 2012through June 21,2012 F. Arner, Senior Reactor lnspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS),

Team Leader J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Patel, Reactor Inspector, DRS Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500027112012007;61412012 - 612112012; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;

Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection.

This report covers a two week on-site inspection period of the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three region based engineering inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

No findings were identified.

1R17

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Gornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity Evaluations of Chanqes. Tests. or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (tP 71111.17)

Evaluations of Chanoes. Tests. or Experiments (20 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed one safety evaluation to determine whether the change to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. ln addition, the team evaluated whether Entergy had been required to obtain NRC approval prior to implementing the change. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications (TS), and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluation. The team compared the safety evaluation and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEl) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for lmplementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluation.

The team also reviewed a sample of nineteen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for which Entergy had concluded that no safety evaluation was required. These reviews were performed to assess whether Entergy's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, and procedure changes.

The team reviewed the safety evaluation that Entergy had performed and approved during the time period covered by this inspection (i.e., since the last modifications inspection) not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors. The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings were selected based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility.

In addition, the team compared Entergy's administrative procedures used to controlthe screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluations and screenings reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

.2 Permanent Plant Modifications

(11 samples)

Fuel Oil Storaqe Tank Liner Application Inspection Scope The team reviewed engineering change (EC) 24y'r04 that applied a spray-on protective liner to the bottom of fuel oil storage tank (FOST) TK'40-1A. The FOST provides diesel fuel makeup to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) day tanks via the fuel oil transfer pumps (FOTPS). The liner covered the inside bottom of the tank and extended 24 inches vertically on the inside wall of the tank. Entergy applied the liner to simplify future tank bottom inspections and to facilitate effective corrosion control in the FOST as recommended by the American Petroleum Institute (APl).

The team reviewed EC 24404 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the EDG fuel oil system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed calculations, industry operating experience (OE),nondestructive examination (NDE) and liner inspection results, and liner product specifications to verify that the applied liner would not adversely impact EDG fuel oil quality or delivery. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. The team reviewed the associated post-modification test (PMT) results, system health and walkdown reports, fuel oil sample results, and conective action condition reports (CRs)to verify proper fuel oil system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The team performed a walkdown of the FOST, FOTPs, fuel oil day tanks, and EDGs to independently assess Entergy's configuration control and the material condition of the EDG fuel oil system.

The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.2 Hiqh Pressure Coolant Iniection Turbine Auxiliarv Oil Pump Replacement

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed modification EC 26967 that replaced the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system turbine auxiliary oil pump (AOP). The AOP automatically starts on HPCI initiation, to provide hydraulic power to the turbine stop valve and turbine control valves (which open to start the turbine) and to provide lubrication during startup until the shaft driven oil pump reaches sufficient speed to supply this function. Entergy initiated this modification to upgrade the HPCI AOP based on mechanical seal leakage, potential pump re-build issues (availability of spare parts), and as a proactive measure in response to industry OE. Entergy determined that the replacement pump was nearly identical to the existing pump with a few differences (port size, shaft length, gasket a.

material, and mounting flange reinforcement). Entergy engineering evaluated these differences within EC 26967 and translated the required design changes to the EC i m plementing work order (51 07 07 40) instructions.

The team reviewed EC 26967 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the HPCI system had not been degraded by the modification.

The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. The team reviewed the associated PMT results, system health and walkdowns reports, HPCI surveillance test results, and corrective action CRs to verify proper HPCI system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. On June 5, 2012, the team observed portions of the quarterly HPCI in-service test to verify proper HPCI AOP performance. The team performed several walkdowns of the HPCI system, including control room instrumentation, to ensure that Entergy implemented the modification in accordance with design instructions and to independently assess HPCIAOP operability, Entergy's configuration control, and the material condition of the HPCI system. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.3 Service Water Svstem Supplv Header Inspection Port lnstallation

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed modification EC 30317 that installed inspection ports in the A and B service water (SW) supply headers. Entergy committed to inspect internal sections of the piping within the SW system prior to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's period of extended operation (March 21,2012). In order to facilitate visual examinations of the internal surfaces of SW system supply headers and evaluate their condition, Entergy installed inspection ports on the A and B SW supply headers in the intake structure. Entergy implemented the A and B SW supply header inspection port installation under associated ECs 30318 and 30319, respectively. Entergy used the associated ECs to track installation, testing, return to service, and update of configuration documents for each separate train because the return to service was completed at different times.

The team reviewed EC 30317 and EC 30318 for the A SW supply header to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the SW system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. The team reviewed the associated PMT results, system health and walkdowns reports, and corrective action CRs to verify proper SW system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the SW piping in the intake structure to ensure that Entergy implemented the modification in accordance with design instructions and to b.

independently verify that the modified SW system configuration did not adversely affect the structural integrity of the piping, pipe supports, and system pressure boundary. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Findinos No findings were identified.

Seismic Monitor Replacement lnspection Scope The team reviewed modificationEC 21268 that replaced the seismic monitor. The function of the seismic instrumentation system is to provide timely evaluation of a seismic event. In March 2010, Entergy identified reliability concerns with the communication between the installed seismic instrumentation and the control room workstation. Entergy determined that the installed seismic monitor was obsolete and spare parts were not available. Modification EC 21268 replaced the installed seismic monitor with an upgraded model, upgraded the associated modems used for communication between the monitor and the control room workstation, and upgraded the control room workstation with a new computer and printer.

The team reviewed EC 21268 to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the seismic instrumentation system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions and documentation to verify that Entergy implemented the modification as designed. The team interviewed operators and reviewed the associated PMT results, recent functional tests, associated operating and event response procedures, and corrective action CRs to verify proper seismic instrumentation system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the seismic instrumentation system, including the control room seismic monitor workstation, to independently assess seismic instrumentation system standby readiness, the seismic monitor's operating environment, and the material condition of the system. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Findinos No findings were identified.

Restoration of Fire Barrier for DG-1-1A Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 33731 that sealed several open electrical conduit floor penetrations in the A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) room floor fire barrier 21. The modification was performed because Entergy identified in condition report CR-WY-2011-05507 that EDG-1A electrical conduit penetrations were not sealed with a.

b.

.2.5 a.

the required fire rated material. The Vermont Yankee Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) and Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis (SSCA) require these floor openings to be sealed with 3-hour fire rated material to mitigate the hazard presented by an EDG room fire.

Penetrations through these barriers, including conduit and piping, need to be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the fire barrier itself.

The team assessed if the modification was consistent with requirements in the design and licensing bases. The team conducted interviews with the responsible engineer and performed a walkdown of the area and fire barriers affected by this modification. The team reviewed calculations and the associated technical evaluation to assess whether the modification was consistent with design assumptions. Additionally, the team reviewed the Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation to verify the material used to seal the open penetrations met the minimum required three hour fire rating. The team verified the requirement for de-rating cable ampacity for cables routed through fire barriers was evaluated in Entergy's analysis and cable ampacity was not adversely affected. The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

.2.6 RHR Shutdown Coolinq Inboard lsolation Valve Motor Maqnesium Rotor Replacement

a.

lnspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 23301 that replaced the motor for motor operated valve (MOV) V10-18, residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve. The seismically qualified and safety-related V10-18 motor is located in the containment structure and is credited to close the valve for primary containment and reactor vessel isolation actuation signals. The modification was initiated because Entergy had identified motor degradation during the RF028 refueling outage inspection and determined that motor replacement was required. During RFO29, the motor was replaced with an equivalent motor that was refurbished and certified by a qualified vendor that met the quality assurance program requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases of the RHR valve had not been degraded by the motor change. The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and reviewed the design modification package to ensure that the replacement motor had similar electrical characteristics of the previously installed motor. The team verified that the impact of the change was adequately evaluated for power consumption, cable protection, voltage drop, and overload condition protection and short circuit protection requirements. The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. Finally, the team reviewed post maintenance testing to determine if the motor and valve would operate as required and to verify that the replacement motor did not affect the minimum closing rate for the valve as specified in the W Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.7 Replacement of Large Power Cables

Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 13130 that replaced two large power cables, each cable consisting of three single conductors (350 MCM), feeding 4160V Bus 4 from the

'A' Diesel Generator, DG-1-1A. The diesel generators and auxiliary systems provide class 1E electrical power to the emergency buses in a loss-of-normal power (LNP)condition or a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with LNP/degraded grid voltage at the emergency buses. The modification was performed as a result of analysis of an identified damaged condensate pump motor cable (condition report CR-WY-2008-02929), which determined that it had reached end of life. Entergy determined that the diesel generator cables were installed approximately the same time as the damaged condensate pump motor cable. Although equipment run-time and environment conditions were not similar, Entergy conservatively decided to replace all4l(/ cables as equipment became available.

The team reviewed the modification to verify it was consistent with design and licensing bases requirements. The team reviewed the replacement cable properties, such as cable insulation ratings, cable current carrying capacity, cable resistance and reactance, and reviewed the associated short circuit calculation to ensure that changes were adequately incorporated into the design analysis and bounded by the current design.

The team verified that seismic loading of existing raceways was not affected by this modification. The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and performed a walkdown of the affected components. The team reviewed the implementing work order to ensure that it was consistent with the change package, and to ensure that proper post maintenance testing was performed and that the documented results were acceptable.

The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.8 RCIC MOV V1 3-30 Motor Replacement

Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC17858 that replaced the motorfor MOV V13-30, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system test return valve to the condensate storage a.

b.

a.

tank (CST). The modification was performed to resolve a 60VDC ground concern associated with the valve motor circuitry. Entergy identified within condition report, CR-WY-2009-02680, that an electricalground associated with the 250 VDC supply panel (DC-2) had been traced to the motor for the valve. The RCIC system performs a function to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel to maintain sufficient inventory.

This ensures that adequate core cooling is provided following a reactor vessel isolation event accompanied by a loss of feedwater, or following a loss of all auxiliary power. The RCIC test return valve is normally closed and if opened for system testing, automatically closes on a RCIC system initiation to allow full injection flowrate back to the vessel.

During the review of the EC to replace the motor, the team also reviewed the associated operability evaluation performed by Entergy to address the degraded ground condition.

This included review of the interim compensatory measures established by Entergy at the time to ensure the valve remained closed to ensure rated RCIC flow to the reactor upon an initiation signal.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases of the valve had not been degraded by the motor change. The team conducted interviews with the engineering staff and reviewed the design modification package to ensure that the replacement motor had similar electrical characteristics to the previously installed motor.

The team verified that the impact of the change was adequately addressed for power consumption, voltage drop, cable protection, and overload condition and short circuit protection requirements. The team also verified that affected plant design drawings and calculations were properly updated. Finally, the team reviewed post maintenance testing results to verify the motor and valve would operate as required. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.9 Replacement of the C RHRSW Pump Rotatins Assemblv. P-8-1C

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed modification EC 15733 which replaced the'C' residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) pump rotating assembly. The modification was performed to replace the carbon steel pump rotating assembly with microbiologically influenced corrosion (MlC) resistant materialto assist in improving pump performance and overall reliability. The RHRSW pump performance had previously shown some deterioration due to corrosion attack from MIC due to exposure to raw river water. Entergy had determined that the new RHRSW rotating assembly had an associated maximum horsepower which exceeded the previously installed coupled motor nameplate horsepower rating. The team reviewed the increase in horsepower rating to ensure Entergy had appropriately revised calculations associated with diesel generator loading and the increased heat load added to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)corner rooms. The team reviewed the calculations to ensure that design and licensing bases requirements associated with the equipment were maintained.

The team reviewed affected procedures such as alarm response sheets which were impacted due to the potentialfor higher operating RHRSW pump motor cunents to ensure they were adequately revised. The team reviewed the post modification pump test results to ensure that pump performance remained above the minimum required flowrate and pressure established in design calculations. Additionally the team reviewed the associated in-service testing results to ensure the pump performed within established acceptance criteria. The team reviewed the replacement pump rotating assembly minimum flow requirements to ensure that operational procedures ensured this minimum flow requirement would be maintained during RHRSW pump operation.

The team reviewed post modification testing to ensure that the assumed increase in motor electrical loading had been conservative. The team reviewed the implementing work order for the modification to ensure that the replacement pump assembly had been installed consistent with the engineering change assumptions. The team performed a walkdown of the pump to ensure the installed configuration was consistent with the EC requirements. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17

.1 of this report. The

documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified

.2.10 Vent Valve Installation in 'A' RHR Torus Suction Line

lnspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 13969 that installed an air vent valve in the 'A' RHR torus suction line. This modification was performed to allow for venting air that can be entrained in the inverted U piping configuration between the torus and the pump suction isolation valve. A single isolation, locked closed and capped vent valve was installed as part of the 'A' RHR to torus suction piping pressure boundary.

The team reviewed Entergy's method used to installthe vent assembly to ensure the welding procedures and pressure testing were in accordance with code requirements.

The team reviewed the process requirements contained within the design package to ensure installation of the valve using the hot tap procedure was consistent with engineering requirements. The team reviewed the structural calculation associated with the change to ensure the new branch line and valve were adequately evaluated for loading conditions and pipe stresses remained within code requirements. The team reviewed affected procedures and drawings to ensure they were adequately revised to reflect the modification. The team performed a walkdown to ensure the installed valve configuration was consistent with the engineering change package. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

a.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

Replace Service Water Return Valve for Steam Tunnel Air to Water Cooler Inspection Scope The team reviewed modification EC 13467 that replaced service water gate valve V70-207, an isolation valve in the service water return piping from the steam tunnel air to water cooler. The modification was installed to resolve erosion issues and ensure that the valve disc does not separate from the stem and block the cooling water flowpath out of the cooler. The previously installed gate valves had been found to have internal erosion on the gates and in some cases were difficult to operate.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design basis, licensing basis and performance capability of the main steam tunnel cooling water system had not been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the associated piping analysis performed to ensure that pipe stresses were not adversely impacted by the modification.

The team reviewed the work order instructions and documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed, and welding and repair instructions were performed to code requirements. The team reviewed the work package to ensure appropriate post modification test instructions had been developed to ensure in-service leak testing was performed. The team reviewed corrective action CRs to verify proper SW system operation and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was also reviewed as described in section 1R17

.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Findinos No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)

Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of CRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether the planned and/or completed conective actions were appropriate. In addition, the team reviewed CRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the conective action system.

The CRs reviewed are listed in the ailachment.

b.

.2.11 a.

b.

4. a.

b.

Findinss No findings were identified.

40A6 Meetinss, includino Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Wamser, Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy's staff, at an exit meeting on June 21,2012. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Enterqv Personnel

M. Anderson, Fire Protection Engineer

M. Ball, Senior System Engineer

G. Brede, Senior Mechanical Design Engineer

J. Devincentis, Senior Licensing Engineer

G. Gibbs, System Engineer

J. Mully, System Engineer

B. Naeck, Senior System Engineer

A. Robertshaw, Senior Mechanical Design Engineer

J. Rogers, Design Engineering Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

None

LIST OF DOCUIUIENTS REVIEWED

CFR 50.59 Evaluations

2010-01, Safety Evaluation to Change Containment lsolation Valve Designation for V10-394/8,

Rev.0

CFR 50.59 Screened-out Evaluations

AP 0894, Staffing Limits Revision 14 Process Applicability Determination, dated 10128110

EC 11794, Fault Tolerant Turbine Trip Logic for Stator Water lnitiating Event, Rev. 0

EC 13467, Replace Valve V70-207, Rev. 0

EC 13969, InstallVent Valve RHR Torus Line, Rev. 0

EC 15733, RHRSW Pump C Replacement, Rev. 0

EC 18907, HPCI Lube Oil Pump Flexible Hose & Fittings Replacement Equivalent Change

Evaluation, Rev. 0

EC 23206, Add Fuses Relay Circuits in Recirc MG Panels, Rev. 0

EC 31133, Remove Internal Component Check Valve for Fuel Pool Cooling, Rev. 0

ON 3156, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Rev. 13

ON 3171, Loss of Bus 3, Rev. 8

OP 2120, HPCI System Revision 60 Process Applicability Determination, dated 10117111

OP 2126, Diesel Generators Revision 59 Process Applicability Determination, dated 2129112

OP 4142, Vernon Tie and Delay Access Power Source Backfeed Surveillance, Rev. 16

OPOP-4KV-2142,4KV Electrical System, Rev. 2

OPST-ADS-4126-01A, Daily A EDG Readiness Check Revision 0 Process Applicability

Determination, dated 41221 1 1

OPST-EDG4122-01, Auto Blowdown System Surveillance from the Control Room Revision 1

Process Applicability Determination, dated 10128111

OPST-FO-4195-04, Portable Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Equipment Surveillance, Rev. 1

OPST-RCIC4121, Reactor Core lsolation Cooling System Surveillance, Rev. 2

Revision to EOP-1 to Incorporate New Table 3.2.2Main Steam Line, RCIC and HPCI Area High

Temperature Setpoints to Reflect Tech Spec Amendment#236 Process Applicability

Determination, dated 1 11 110

Modification Packaoes

EC 13130, Replacement of Critical Large Power Cable, Rev. 0

EC 13467, Replace Valve V70-207, Rev. 0

EC 13969, InstallVent Valve RHR Torus Line, Rev. 0

EC 15733, RHRSW Pump C Replacement, Rev. 0

EC 17858, RCIC MOV V13-30 has a +60V DC Ground, Rev. 0

EC 21268, Seismic Monitor Replacement, Rev. 0

EC 23301, Magnesium Rotor Replacement, Rev. 0

EC 24404, Liner Repair Fuel Oil Storage Tank Bottom, Rev. 0

EC 26967, Replacement of HPCI Aux Oil Pump (P-85-14), Rev. 0

EC 30317, SW System Supply Headers A & B lnspection Ports (Base EC), Rev. 0

EC 33731, Restoration of Fire Banierfor DG-1-1A Room, Rev. 0

Calculations. Analvsis. and Evaluations

FPEE 40, Installation of Silicone Based Fire Penetration Seal Details in Barriers Less than

inches thick, Rev. 0

TE 2003-047, MOV Design Input for Stroke Time, FLA and LRA

VYC-611, SW Discharge, Rev. 0

VYC-0685G, Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level Monitoring Uncertainty, Rev. 2

VYC-0830, Voltage Drop Calculation for W Distribution Panels DC-1 and DC-z, Rev. 2

VYC-836, DG Loading, Rev. 15

VYC-1053, MOV Voltage Analysis, Rev. 9

VYC-1087, 4160VAC and 480VAC Relay and Breaker Coordination, Rev. 2

VYC-1088, 41601480 Volt Short CircuiWoltage Study, Rev. 4

VYC-1171, Electrical Design Bases Review of Safety Related MOVs for GL 89'10, Rev. 9

VYC-1183, Thermal Overload Heater Sizing for SR MOVs, Rev. 5

VYC-1296, Circuit Breaker Sizing and Settings for Safety Related MOVs, Rev. 4

l/YC-132] ECCS Corner Room Heatup and Sensitivity, Rev. 1

VYC-1404, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Usage and Storage Capacity, Rev. 2

VYC-1854, Determination of Ampacity for Safety Related Power Cables for the AC Auxiliary

Power Distribution System, Rev. 5

VYC-3033, Service Water Pump Discharge Pipe Valve Replacement, Rev. 1

Condition Reports

1998-1916

2010-4098

2007-3054

2010-5491

2008-0979

2011-1402

2008-2195

2011-2553

2010-0890

2011-3797

2010-1738

2011-3823

Design

Design

Design

Topical

2011-4489

2011-4530

2012-2315

2012-2545*

2012-2588*

2012-2666*

2012-2715*

2012-2716*

2012-2717*

2012-2757*

2012-2759*

2012-2842*

2012-2853*

2012-2878*

2012-281 3*

2012-2640*

2012-2752*

2012-2761*

(* denotes NRC identified during this inspection)

Design & Licensinq Bases

Amendment No. 236 to License No. DPR-28, lnstrumentation Technical Specifications (TAC

No. MD8111), dated 6112109

Basis Document for Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliary Systems, Rev. 23

Basis Document for High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 34

Basis Document for Service Water, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, Alternate

Cooling System, Rev.31

Design Basis Document for External Events Earthquakes (Seismic), Tornadoes,

External Flooding, Low Water, Rev. 2

Drawinqs

20-3914, Fuel Oil Storage Tank, EC 24404 Mark-up to Rev. 1

20-9284, lsometric Dwg for RHR Part 5, Rev. 4

20-11255, Seismic Monitor Workstation, EC 21268 Mark'up to Rev. 0

20-11256, Seismic Monitor Enclosure, EC 21268 Mark-up to Rev. 0

B-191300, Sht. 25A, 480V MCC-88 Power Distribution and Motor Data, Rev. 54

8-191300, Sht. 68, 125V MCC 28 Power Distribution and Motor Data, Rev. 20

B-191301, Sht. 1309, ControlWiring Diagram RHR Reactor Shutdown Cooling lsolation Valve

V10-18 (inboard), Rev. 14

B-191301, Sht.331, Cable and Conduit List, Rev.8

B-191500, Sht. 240, Fire Barrier Seal Drawing, Rev. 1

G-191159, Service Water System Flow Diagram, Rev. 82

G-191172, Flow Diagram RHR System, Rev. 66

G-191233, lntake Structure Piping Plans & Sections, Rev. 18

G-191300, Sht. 2,480VAuxiliary One Line Diagram MCC-88, 8E, 89B, Rev. 34

G-191301, Sht.2,480VAuxiliary One Line Diagram MCC-98, 9D,89A, Rev. 33

SK-5920-M-85, Fuel Oil Storage Tank TK-40-1A, Rev. 2

VY1-SW-Part 3 Sh. 1, Service Water Intake Structure Piping lsometric, Rev. 2

Functional. Surveillance and Modification Acceptance Testing

lCRP-4396, Seismic Monitoring System FunctionalTest, performed9l22ll1 &513112

OPST-EDG-4126-02A, Monthly A EDG Slow Start Operability Test, performed 5114112

OPST-EDG4126-028, Monthly B EDG Slow Start Operability Test, performed 5121112

OPST-FO-4195-02A, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1A) and Discharge Check Valve (FO-28A)

Operabi I ity Test (Quarterly), perfo rmed 419 I 1 2

OPST-FO-4195-028, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1B) and Discharge Check Valve (FO-288)

Operabil ity Test (Quarterly), perfo rmed 41 1 61 12

OPST-FO-4195-038, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P92-1B) and Discharge Check Valve (FO-28B)

Operability Test (CYC), performed 1116112

OPST-HPCI-4120-02, HPCI Pump Operability Test (Quarterly), performed 1113111 &2115112

OPST-HPCI-4120-04, HPCI Valve Operability Test (Quarterly), performed 1113111 &2115112

Miscellaneous

268, Seismic Monitor Replacement Return to Service Form, dated 9126111

24404, Liner Repair Fuel Oil Storage Tank Bottom Return to Service Form, dated 10129111

26967, Replacement of HPCI Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A) Return to Service Form, dated 5127111

30318, Service Water System Supply Header A lnspection Port (Child EC) Return to Service

Form, dated 9110111

API Standard 652, Lining of Above Ground Petroleum Storage Tank Bottoms, December 1997

API Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, December 1999

A SW fnspection Port (WO 256119-13) Foreign Material Exclusion Component Close-Out Data

Sheet, performed 9110111

ASTM D975 Table 1, Detailed Requirements for Diesel Fuel Oils, Revs. 2,9, & 10

Aux Oil Pump Pipes WO 51070740) Foreign Material Exclusion Component Close-Out Data

Sheet, performed 5124111

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.12, Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes, Rev. 2

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.54, Service Level l, ll, and lll Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear

Power Plants, Rev. 2

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.114, Guidance to Operators at the Controls and to Senior Operators in

the Control Room of a Nuclear Power Unit, Rev. 3

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and lmmediate Nuclear Power Plant

Operator Post-Earthquake Actions, Rev. 0

UESI QA Records Package for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant FOST Interior Re-Lining

Project, dated 1119111

Non-Destructive Exam inations and I nspection Reports

EGVN-FOST-10056, FuelTank Maintenance (FTM) Abrasive Blasting, Tank Lining and

lnspection, dated 10128111

Evaluation of the Service Water Piping Condition, Based on Internal Visual lnspections During

RFO-29 (Autumn 201'l), dated 1130112

lTl f nspection Summary FOST Tank TK40-1A, dated 11t1n1

NUC201 1116-N-CAIR-001, UESI Coating Application Inspection Record (CAIR) Page 1

Vermont Yankee FOST Relining, performed 10125111

NUC2011116-N-DCIR-001-007, UESI Daily Coating Inspection Record (DCIR) Vermont Yankee

FOST Relining, dated 10124111 - 10127111

NUC2011116-N-DFTR-001-002, UESI Dry Film Thickness Record (DFTR) Vermont Yankee

FOST Relining, performed 101261 1')

NUC2011116-N-SPR-001, Surface Preparation Record (SPR) Vermont Yankee FOST Relining,

performed 10124111

NUC2011-N-CAIR-2-002, UESI Coating Application Inspection Record (CAIR) Page2 Vermont

Yankee FOST Relining, performed 10127111

NUC2011-N-CATR-1, UESI Coating Adhesion Test Record (CATR) Vermont Yankee FOST

Relining, performed 10127 111

Structures Monitoring RFO28 Inspection Summary Report, dated 6/30/10

VY BOP-11-MT-01 1,24' SW-1A (3" SW Welds 3 & 4) Magnetic Particle Examination,

performed 917111

VY BOP-11-PT-007, 24' SW-1A (3' SW Latrolet Weld 1) Liquid Penetrant Examination,

performed 919111

VY BOP-11-PT-008, 24' SW-1A (3' SW Latrolet Weld 2) Liquid Penetrant Examination,

performed 911Ol11

VY BOP-11-VT-001, 24" SW-1A (Piping, Valve lnstalled per EC 30317) Visual Examination

System Leakage (W-2), performed 9l1ol11

VYNEF 8064.05, Vermont Yankee Non-Code Leak-Check Examination Report (P-85-1A Pump

and Replaced Pipe), performed 5124111

Normal and Special (Abnormal) Operations Procedures

ARS 21003, SLC Squib Valve Continuity Loss CRP 5-A-1 Alarm Response Sheet, Rev. 12

ARS 21005, Seismic Monitoring CRP 9-7 Alarm Response Sheet, Rev. 21

EOP-1, RPV Control, Rev. 4

OP 2120, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Rev. 60

OP 2126, Diesel Generators, Rev. 59

OPOP-PHEN-3127, Natural Phenomena, Rev. 8

OPST-ADS4126-01A, Daily A EDG Readiness Check, Rev. 0

OPST-EDG4122-01, Auto Blowdown System Surveillance from the Control Room, Rev. 1

Procedures

AP 0894, Staffing Limits, Rev. 14

AP 3125, Emergency Plan Classification and Action Level Scheme, Rev. 22

ARS 21001, CRP 9-3 Alarm Response Sheets, Rev. 21

CHOP-DIES-4613-01, Sampling and Testing of Diesel Fuel Oil, Rev. 2

EN-DC-115, Engineering Change Process, Rev. 12

EN-DC-117, Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions, Rev. 5

EN-DC-126, Engineering Calculation Process, Rev. 4

EN-DC-132, Control of Engineering Documents, Rev. 5

EN-DC-152, Preparation, Revision, Review, and Approval of Design Basis Documents, Rev. 7

EN-Ll-1 00, Process Applicability Determination, Rev. 1 1

EN-Ll-101, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Program, Rev. 9

EN-OP-115-02, Control Room Conduct and Access Control, Rev. 0

ENN-SEP-APJ-009, Table 2 Penetrations, Rev. 7

ICRP-4396, Seismic Monitoring System FunctionalTest, Rev. 2

UESI Procedure QCP-10-2-Vry-NUC2011116, Coating Inspection of FOST Lining, Rev. 0

OP 0046, lnstallation and Repair of Fire Barriers, Penetration seals, Fire Breaks and Flood

Seals, Rev. 14

OP 4019, Surveillance of Plant Fire Baniers and Fire Rated Assemblies, Rev. 31

OP 5219, Diagnostic Testing of Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 17

OP 5220, Limitorque operator PM, Rev. 32

OPOP-RHR-2124, RHR System, Rev.6

OPST-RHR-4124-12C, RHRSW PumpA/alve Operability and Full Flow Test, Rev. 1

VYS-040, Guidelines for Protection and Coordination of Electrical System, Rev. 4

Svstem Health Reports. Walkdown Reports. & Trendino

Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A) Amperage Trend Data, dated 511109 - 2115112

Aux Oil Pump (P-85-1A) Pressure Trend Data, dated 2120108 - 2115112

CHOP-DIES-4613-01 Attachment 1, Diesel Fuel Oil Analyses Results per ASTM D975-09,

dated 1112111 - 5115112

Fuel Oil System Health Report, Q1-2012

Fuel Oil System Walkdown Report, performed 413112 & 5115112

Fuel OilTransfer Pump A & B IST Data (Flow - Pressure - Vibes), dated 7124106 - 119112

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Health Report, Q4-2011 & Q1-2012

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Walkdown Report, performed 4123112 & 5121112

Main Computer/ERFIS System Health Report, Q2-2012 (updated 614112)

Service Water System Health Report, Q1-2012

Service Water Walkdown Report, performed 4118112 & 5124112

Vendor Technical Manuals and Specifications

301803, Condor System Software Manual User's Guide, February 2007

301877, Seismic Monitoring System Model Condor Calibration Record, January 201 1

2208, QuickTalk & QuickLook Communications Software for Altus Recorder Systems,

August 1997

20-58, Ebasco Specification - Miscellaneous Tanks, Rev. 3

Performance Data for UC Series Pump Model 5C, dated 11130100

SM 22, Tuthill Installation and Service Instructions C2 Series Pumps, dated 4l1l0g

VYEM No. 0120, HPCI Turbine Operation and Maintenance - Instruction Manual, Rev. 12

Work Orders

001 84551

205629

237 1 96

237 1 96

242475

242475

246319

299490

2561 19

2189034

299488

50043629

LIST OF ACRONYMS

070740

ADAMS

AOP

API

CFR

CR

CST

DC

DRS

EC

EDG

Entergy

EPRI

FHA

FOST

FOTP

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

Auxiliary Oil Pump

American Petroleum Institute

Code of Federal Regulations

Condition Report

Condensate Storage Tank

Direct Current

Division of Reactor Safety

Engineering Change

Emergency Diesel Generator

Entergy Nuclear Northeast

Electric Power Research Institute

Fire Hazard Analysis

Fuel Oil Storage Tank

Fuel Oil Transfer Pump

HPCI

LNP

LOCA

MOV

NDE

NEI

NRC

OE

PARS

PMT

RCrC

SSCA

SW

TS

UESI

UFSAR

High Pressure Coolant Injection

Loss of Normal Power

Loss of Coolant Accident

Motor-Operated Valve

Nondestructive Exam i nation

Nuclear Energy Institute

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Operating Experience

Publicly Available Records

Post-Mod ification Test

Reactor Core lsolation Cooling

Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis

Service Water

Techn ical Specifications

Underwater Engineering Services, Inc.

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

Attachment