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| issue date = 05/07/2015
| issue date = 05/07/2015
| title = IR 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001, 01/01/2015 - 04/04, 2015, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2. Integrated Report
| title = IR 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001, 01/01/2015 - 04/04, 2015, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2. Integrated Report
| author name = Rosebrook A A
| author name = Rosebrook A
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
| addressee name = Koehl D
| addressee name = Koehl D
Line 9: Line 9:
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| docket = 05000498, 05000499
| license number = NPF-076, NPF-080
| license number = NPF-076, NPF-080
| contact person = Rosebrook A A
| contact person = Rosebrook A
| case reference number = EA-12-227
| case reference number = EA-12-227
| document report number = IR 2015001
| document report number = IR 2015001
Line 19: Line 19:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:May 7, 2015
[[Issue date::May 7, 2015]]


EA-12-227
==SUBJECT:==
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2015001 AND 05000499/2015001


Mr. Dennis Koehl President and Chief Executive Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company P.O. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483
==Dear Mr. Koehl:==
On April 4, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. On April 9, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.


SUBJECT: SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2015001 AND 05000499/2015001
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.


==Dear Mr. Koehl:==
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
On April 4, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. On April 9, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
 
Sincerely,
/RA/


In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Andrew Rosebrook, Acting Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects


Sincerely,/RA/
Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 and NPF-80  
Andrew Rosebrook, Acting Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 and NPF-80  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 w/  
Inspection Report 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
 
REGION IV==
Docket:
05000498, 05000499 License:
NPF-76, NPF-80 Report:
05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates:
January 1 through April 4, 2015 Inspectors: A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector Approved By:
Andrew Rosebrook Acting Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects


===Attachment:===
- 2 -
Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
IR 05000498/2015001, 05000499/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 04/04/2015; South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.
IR 05000498/2015001, 05000499/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 04/04/2015; South Texas Project  
 
Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.
 
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and April 4, 2015, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and an inspector from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
 
No findings were identified.


The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and April 4, 2015, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and an inspector from the NRC's Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process."  Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas."  Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process." No findings were identified.
=PLANT STATUS=


==PLANT STATUS==
Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent power and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent power and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.


Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and entered Mode 3 on March 29, 2015, to begin Refueling Outage 2RE17. The unit remained shut down for the remainder of the period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and entered Mode 3 on March 29, 2015, to begin Refueling Outage 2RE17. The unit remained shut down for the remainder of the period.


=REPORT DETAILS=
REPORT DETAILS


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity {{a|1R01}}
{{a|1R01}}
 
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection==
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
Line 62: Line 80:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 17, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's adverse weather procedures for hurricane season and evaluated the licensee's implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to hurricane season; the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous hurricane season. These activities constituted one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
On March 17, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather procedures for hurricane season and evaluated the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to hurricane season; the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous hurricane season.
 
These activities constituted one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R04}}
{{a|1R04}}
 
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
Line 75: Line 95:
* January 26, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump during normal operations
* January 26, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump during normal operations
* January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump during normal operations
* January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump during normal operations
* March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water while train A was out of service. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
* March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water while train A was out of service.
 
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.


These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R05}}
{{a|1R05}}
 
==1R05 Fire Protection==
==1R05 Fire Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
Line 87: Line 109:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on six plant areas important to safety:
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on six plant areas important to safety:
* January 27, 2015, Unit 1, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
* January 27, 2015, Unit 1, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
* January 27, 2015, Unit 2, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
* January 27, 2015, Unit 2, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
Line 93: Line 115:
* March 10, 2015, Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator, Fire Area 37 and Fire Zone Z501
* March 10, 2015, Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator, Fire Area 37 and Fire Zone Z501
* March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water, Fire Area 58 and Fire Zone Z605
* March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water, Fire Area 58 and Fire Zone Z605
* March 24, 2015, common to both units, diesel fire pump 2, Fire Zone Z800   For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
* March 24, 2015, common to both units, diesel fire pump 2, Fire Zone Z800  
 
For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.


These activities constituted six quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
These activities constituted six quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R06}}
{{a|1R06}}
 
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}
Line 108: Line 132:
* Unit 1, Class 1E, train A electrical manhole A0XYABKEM52
* Unit 1, Class 1E, train A electrical manhole A0XYABKEM52
* Unit 2, Class 1E, train C electrical manhole C0XYABKEM56
* Unit 2, Class 1E, train C electrical manhole C0XYABKEM56
* Unit 1, Class 1E, train B electrical manhole B0XYABKEM53 The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the bunkers and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.
* Unit 1, Class 1E, train B electrical manhole B0XYABKEM53  
 
The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the bunkers and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.


These activities constitute completion of one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
These activities constitute completion of one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R11}}
{{a|1R11}}
 
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
===.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification===
===.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification===
====a. Inspection Scope====
On March 11, 2015, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew.


====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.
On March 11, 2015, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.


On March 23, 2015, the inspectors observed just-in-time simulator training for an operating crew. The training included a brief from reactor engineering on the reactivity plan for the shutdown, and a simulator scenario where the crew could practice shutdown procedures and work on communications and responsibilities. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.
On March 23, 2015, the inspectors observed just-in-time simulator training for an operating crew. The training included a brief from reactor engineering on the reactivity plan for the shutdown, and a simulator scenario where the crew could practice shutdown procedures and work on communications and responsibilities. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.
Line 130: Line 158:


===.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance===
===.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
On January 22, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to beginning train A emergency diesel generator surveillance testing, along with replacing makeup water totalizer in the chemical and volume control system.
On January 22, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to beginning train A emergency diesel generator surveillance testing, along with replacing makeup water totalizer in the chemical and volume control system.
Line 136: Line 163:
On March 28 and 29, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to shutting down the Unit 2 reactor for Refueling Outage 2RE17.
On March 28 and 29, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to shutting down the Unit 2 reactor for Refueling Outage 2RE17.


In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies. These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
 
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R12}}
{{a|1R12}}
 
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
Line 148: Line 177:
* January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following cleaning and lubrication
* January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following cleaning and lubrication
* February 2, 2015, Unit 2, failure of resistance temperature detector RTD-420Y during response time testing
* February 2, 2015, Unit 2, failure of resistance temperature detector RTD-420Y during response time testing
* February 11, 2015, Unit 2, control room makeup and cleanup system, flow control valve, FCV-984, failed to modulate following planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
* February 11, 2015, Unit 2, control room makeup and cleanup system, flow control valve, FCV-984, failed to modulate following planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.


These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R13}}
{{a|1R13}}
 
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}
Line 162: Line 191:
* January 8, 2015, Unit 2, phase C bushing replacement of breaker Y550 Dow-Velasco 27, 345kV line to south bus
* January 8, 2015, Unit 2, phase C bushing replacement of breaker Y550 Dow-Velasco 27, 345kV line to south bus
* January 28, 2015, Unit 2, phase B shaft seal repair on breaker Y580 Elm Creek 27, 345kV line to south bus
* January 28, 2015, Unit 2, phase B shaft seal repair on breaker Y580 Elm Creek 27, 345kV line to south bus
* March 17, 2015, Unit 2, phase rotation checks on 13.8kV switchgear bus 2F The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
* March 17, 2015, Unit 2, phase rotation checks on 13.8kV switchgear bus 2F  
 
The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.


The inspectors also observed portions of five emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event, to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems, or to impact barrier integrity:
The inspectors also observed portions of five emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event, to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems, or to impact barrier integrity:
Line 169: Line 200:
* February 25, 2015, Unit 1, emergent train A emergency diesel generator maintenance to replace shutdown air pressure control valve PCV-5436
* February 25, 2015, Unit 1, emergent train A emergency diesel generator maintenance to replace shutdown air pressure control valve PCV-5436
* March 5, 2015, Unit 1, unplanned trip of train C essential chiller while train A essential chiller was out of service for planned maintenance
* March 5, 2015, Unit 1, unplanned trip of train C essential chiller while train A essential chiller was out of service for planned maintenance
* March 16, 2015, Unit 1, emergent maintenance on the reactor containment building personnel airlock inner door seal The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
* March 16, 2015, Unit 1, emergent maintenance on the reactor containment building personnel airlock inner door seal  


The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's actions for implementing the Configuration Risk Management Program for determining and implementing the risk-informed allowed outage time for the following emergent issues listed above: 1) Technical Specification 3.7.14.a for Unit 2, train A essential chilled water extended maintenance; and 2) Technical Specification 3.7.14.b for unexpected Unit 1, train C essential chiller trip.
The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
 
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees actions for implementing the Configuration Risk Management Program for determining and implementing the risk-informed allowed outage time for the following emergent issues listed above: 1) Technical Specification 3.7.14.a for Unit 2, train A essential chilled water extended maintenance; and 2) Technical Specification 3.7.14.b for unexpected Unit 1, train C essential chiller trip.


These activities constitute completion of eight maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
These activities constitute completion of eight maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R15}}
{{a|1R15}}
 
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
Line 189: Line 222:
* March 6, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1 reactor containment building personnel airlock due to failure of the inner door seal
* March 6, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1 reactor containment building personnel airlock due to failure of the inner door seal
* March 19, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump due to degraded governor performance
* March 19, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump due to degraded governor performance
* March 23, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2 qualified display processing system due to a comparative communication issue between two redundant data processing units The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC.
* March 23, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2 qualified display processing system due to a comparative communication issue between two redundant data processing units  
 
The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC.


These activities constitute completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
These activities constitute completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R18}}
{{a|1R18}}
 
==1R18 Plant Modifications==
==1R18 Plant Modifications==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18}}
Line 202: Line 237:
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that affected risk-significant SSCs:
The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that affected risk-significant SSCs:
* April 2, 2015, Unit 1, temporary modification to the qualified display processing system, which removed the communication link between database processing units A and C to reduce the number of alarms in the control room The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed this temporary modification in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that this modification did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs.
* April 2, 2015, Unit 1, temporary modification to the qualified display processing system, which removed the communication link between database processing units A and C to reduce the number of alarms in the control room  
 
The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed this temporary modification in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that this modification did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs.


The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modification to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.
The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modification to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.
Line 209: Line 246:


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R19}}
{{a|1R19}}
 
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}
Line 221: Line 258:
* February 13, 2015, Unit 2, train A control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning makeup and cleanup following repair of flow control valve FCV-9584
* February 13, 2015, Unit 2, train A control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning makeup and cleanup following repair of flow control valve FCV-9584
* March 14, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following governor replacement
* March 14, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following governor replacement
* March 16, 2015, Unit 1, personnel airlock inner door following seal replacement The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs. These activities constitute completion of six post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
* March 16, 2015, Unit 1, personnel airlock inner door following seal replacement  
 
The inspectors reviewed licensing-and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
 
These activities constitute completion of six post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R20}}
{{a|1R20}}
 
==1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities==
==1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.20}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.20}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
During the station's refueling outage that began March 28, 2015, and was still in progress as of April 4, 2015 (end of this inspection quarter), the inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:
During the stations refueling outage that began March 28, 2015, and was still in progress as of April 4, 2015 (end of this inspection quarter), the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:
* Review of the licensee's outage plan prior to the outage
* Review of the licensees outage plan prior to the outage
* Review and verification of the licensee's fatigue management activities
* Review and verification of the licensees fatigue management activities
* Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities
* Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities
* Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
* Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
* Observation and review of lowered-inventory activities These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.
* Observation and review of lowered-inventory activities  
 
These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|1R22}}
{{a|1R22}}
 
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==
==1R22 Surveillance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22}}


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed eight risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions: In-service tests:
The inspectors observed eight risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:  
 
In-service tests:
* January 16, 2015, Unit 1, train B component cooling water pump in-service surveillance test
* January 16, 2015, Unit 1, train B component cooling water pump in-service surveillance test
* January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump periodic surveillance testing
* January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump periodic surveillance testing
* February 3, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump periodic surveillance testing Containment isolation penetration tests:
* February 3, 2015, Unit 2, train D auxiliary feedwater pump periodic surveillance testing Containment isolation penetration tests:
* March 16, 2015, Unit 1, local leak-rate test penetration M-90 personnel airlock door seals Other surveillance tests:
* March 16, 2015, Unit 1, local leak-rate test penetration M-90 personnel airlock door seals  
 
Other surveillance tests:
* January 12, 2015, Unit 1, engineered safety features power availability surveillance
* January 12, 2015, Unit 1, engineered safety features power availability surveillance
* January 20, 2015, Unit 1, control room envelope makeup heating, ventilation, and air conditioning periodic surveillance test
* January 20, 2015, Unit 1, control room envelope makeup heating, ventilation, and air conditioning periodic surveillance test
Line 259: Line 306:
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


===Cornerstone:===
===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness===
Emergency Preparedness
{{a|1EP6}}
{{a|1EP6}}
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
Line 267: Line 314:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on February 11, 2015, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensee's assessment of drill performance. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the simulator, technical support center, and the emergency response center; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensee's emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on February 11, 2015, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance.
 
The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the simulator, technical support center, and the emergency response center; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.


These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06
These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06
Line 275: Line 324:


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
{{a|4OA1}}
{{a|4OA1}}
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification==
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}}
===.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)===
===.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these licensee event reports to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these licensee event reports to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.


These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
Line 290: Line 340:


===.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)===
===.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)===
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.


====a. Inspection Scope====
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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===.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)===
===.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 2014 and January 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 2014 and January 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.


These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified. {{a|4OA2}}
{{a|4OA2}}
 
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}}
Line 312: Line 362:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.  
No findings were identified.
{{a|4OA5}}
 
{{a|4OA5}}
 
==4OA5 Other Activities==
==4OA5 Other Activities==
  (Closed) Violation 05000498/2012007-01; 05000499/2012007-01: "Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection (EA-12-227)"
(Closed) Violation 05000498/2012007-01; 05000499/2012007-01: Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection (EA-12-227)  
During the 2012 problem identification and resolution inspection, the team issued a violation (05000498; 05000499/2012007-01) for the failure to implement timely corrective actions for a previous fire protection violation. The licensee's corrective actions included a revised submittal of a license amendment request on July 23, 2013. The licensee supplemented this license amendment request with letters dated May 12 (two letters), May 19, and December 17, 2014.
 
During the 2012 problem identification and resolution inspection, the team issued a violation (05000498; 05000499/2012007-01) for the failure to implement timely corrective actions for a previous fire protection violation. The licensees corrective actions included a revised submittal of a license amendment request on July 23, 2013.
 
The licensee supplemented this license amendment request with letters dated May 12 (two letters), May 19, and December 17, 2014.


During the 2014 triennial fire protection inspection, the team reviewed the license amendment request and the compensatory measures the licensee implemented during the review process for the license amendment request. The team performed a timed walk-down of the alternative shutdown procedure and verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits, assuming the license amendment request was approved.
During the 2014 triennial fire protection inspection, the team reviewed the license amendment request and the compensatory measures the licensee implemented during the review process for the license amendment request. The team performed a timed walk-down of the alternative shutdown procedure and verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits, assuming the license amendment request was approved.


On February 13, 2015, the NRC approved the license amendment request. The amendment approved crediting one automatic action and seven operator actions in the main control room prior to evacuation during an alternative shutdown, in addition to manually tripping the reactor previously credited in the fire protection program. The inspectors performed an in-office review from March 23 to March 31, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions, the approved license amendment, and the alternative shutdown procedure. The inspectors noted that the alternative shutdown procedure contained the approved steps for operators to perform the credited actions in the main control room prior to abandoning the control room due to a fire. This violation is closed.  
On February 13, 2015, the NRC approved the license amendment request. The amendment approved crediting one automatic action and seven operator actions in the main control room prior to evacuation during an alternative shutdown, in addition to manually tripping the reactor previously credited in the fire protection program.
 
The inspectors performed an in-office review from March 23 to March 31, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions, the approved license amendment, and the alternative shutdown procedure. The inspectors noted that the alternative shutdown procedure contained the approved steps for operators to perform the credited actions in the main control room prior to abandoning the control room due to a fire. This violation is closed.
 
{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On April 9, 2015, the inspectors presented the resident inspector inspection results to Mr. D. Koehl, and other members of the licensee staff.==
The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.


A-1 Attachment
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
===Exit Meeting Summary===
On April 9, 2015, the inspectors presented the resident inspector inspection results to Mr. D. Koehl, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
===Licensee Personnel===
===Licensee Personnel===
: [[contact::R. Aguilera]], Manager, Health Physics  
: [[contact::R. Aguilera]], Manager, Health Physics  
Line 364: Line 421:


==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
===Closed===
===Closed===
: 05000498/2012007-01  
: 05000498/2012007-01  
: 05000499/2012007-01 VIO Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection [EA-12-227] (Section 4OA5)  
: 05000499/2012007-01 VIO Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection  
[EA-12-227] (Section 4OA5)  


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZV-0002 Hurricane Plan 7
==Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0POP02-AF-0001 Auxiliary Feedwater 38
: 0POP02-EW-0001 Essential Cooling Water Operations 68
==Section 1R05: Fire Protection==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0SBX99-FP-0750 Fire Preplan for the Standby Transformer 1 0DGB37-FP-0501 Fire Preplan for Diesel Generator Building, Train B 3 2ECW58-FP-0605 Fire Preplan for Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure Pump Room Train A 3 0EAB02-FP-0037 Fire Preplan for Electrical Auxiliary Building, Halon Storage Room 2
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 13-4310 15-3360
==Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures==
: Number Title
: EM-0-14000409 Preventive Maintenance Work Order
: EM-0-13000258 Preventive Maintenance Work Order: Manhole C0XYABKEM56
: EM-0-13000254 Preventive Maintenance Work Order: Manhole B0XYABKEM53
: EM-0-14000402 Preventive Maintenance Work Order: Manhole A0XYABKEM52
==Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0POP02-AE-0002 Transformer Normal Breaker and Switch Lineup 56
: 0POP02-CD-0001 Condensate System 45
: 0POP04-CR-0001 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 22
: RST215.01 Extended Loss of AC Power 1 RST215.02 Post SGTR Subcooling Control 0
===Drawings===
: Number Title Revision 29F00021#2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Condensate 44
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 3295
==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision
: SEG-0009 Maintenance Rule Basis Document Guideline 2
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 07-2529 07-11327 06-8564 15-541
===Miscellaneous===
: Number Title Revision 9028 ISEG REPORT 0 1319 Maintenance Office Memo 0
==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZA-0091 Configuration Risk Management Program 13
: 0PGP03-ZG-RTMS Risk-Managed Technical Specifications Program 2
: 0PGP03-ZO-0055 Protected Components 8
: 0PGP03-ZA-0090 Work Process Program 39
: WCG-0001 Work Screening and Processing 24
: MM-1-9-91000098 Work Order RCP Personnel Airlock 7 0PSP03-EA-0002 ESF Power Availability 34
: 0POP06-PE-00P0 Load Center 1P (2P) Bus Outage 14
: 0POP01-ZO-0006 Risk Management Actions (RMAs) 23
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 15-3477 15-719 15-1178 15-4505 
: PRA Risk Sequence Number
: 2402 2421 2405 2409 2403 2418
: Work Activity Risk (WAR)
: 2567 2569 2572 2573 2576
==Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZO-9900 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Program 4 0PGP03-ZO-9900A Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Implementation 4 0PEP02-ZM-0002 New Fuel Receipt, Inspection, and Storage 24
===Drawings===
: Number Title Revision 3D229C35000 Concrete Diesel Generator Building Removable Panel Details Unit NO. 1&2 0 9M182S01026 Flex Diesel Generators Enclosure Plan Unit 2 0 3M01-9-C-4064 Concrete Mechanical and Electrical Aux. Bldg. Sections and Details Unit 1 & 2 12
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 15-5477 15-5132 15-5133 15-2452 14-20431 15-5030 15-5487 15-541 15-4754 12-11658
===Calculations===
: CC-5038
: CC-5225 CC-6202
==Section 1R18: Plant Modifications==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZO-0003 Temporary Modifications 27
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 15-5100
: Temporary Modifications (T-MOD)
: T2-15-5100-12
==Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PSP03-AF-0007 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14(24) Inservice Test 45 0PMP08-CV-0111 Boric Acid Makeup System Total Makeup Water Flow Calibration 11 0PSP03-HE-0001 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 15 0PSP05-RC-0465L Pressurizer Level Loop Calibration 15
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PSP11-XC-0009 Personnel Airlock Pneumatic Seal System Pressure Drop Test 18
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 15-719 15-1174 15-4505 15-3145 14-18847
: Work Authorization Number (WAN)
: 509171
: 504131
===Miscellaneous===
: Number Title STP
: Memorandum
: MAINT-90-1319
: STP 7159A Review Performance Criteria/Goals and Actual SSC Performance
: Work Authorization Number (WAN)
: 507406
==Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0POP03-ZG-0006 Plant Shutdown From 100% to Hot Standby 60
: 0PGP03-ZA-0101 Shutdown Risk Assessment 28
: 0POP03-ZG-0007 Plant Cooldown 74
: 0PGP03-ZO-0052 Containment Management 9 0PMP04-ZG-0012 Equipment Hatch Removal and Installation 26 0PSP03-XC-0001 Refueling Containment Penetration Status 26
: 0PGP03-ZA-0114 Fatigue Rule Program 7
===Drawings===
: Number Revision 5R179F05005#2 29
===Drawings===
: Number Revision 5R179F05006#2 19
==Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PSP03-EA-0002 ESF Power Availability 33 0PSP03-AF-0007 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14(24) Inservice Test 45 0PSP11XC-0008 LLRT Penetration M-90 Airlock Door Seals 21
: 0PEP07-TM-0001 Main Turbine Overspeed Test 5
: 0PSP11-ZH-0009 EAB and FHB HVAC In-Place Absorber Leak Test 23
: 0PSP03-NI-0001 Power Range NI Channel Calibration 28 0PSP10-NI-0002 Excore QPTR Determination 16 0PSP05-NI-0044A NIS Axial Flux Difference Calibration (N-0044A) 37
: 0PSP03-CC-0002 Component Cooling Water Pump 1B Inservice Test 16
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 15-4505 15-5133 15-1352
==Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0ERP01-ZV-IN01 Emergency Classification 9
: 0ERP01-ZV-IN02 Notification to Offsite Agencies 30
===Miscellaneous===
: Title Date Combined Functional Drill Package February 11, 2015
==Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution==
===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0PGP03-ZA-0104 Switchyard Access and Control of Vehicles Near Electrical Power Components 12
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 15-3282 15-3291
==Section 4OA5: Other Activities==


===Procedures===
: Number Title Revision 0POP04-ZO-0001 Control Room Evacuation 37
===Condition Reports===
(CRs)
: 05-8507 08-1057 11-10905 12-27648
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 12:56, 10 January 2025

IR 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001, 01/01/2015 - 04/04, 2015, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2. Integrated Report
ML15113B384
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/2015
From: Andrew Rosebrook
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To: Koehl D
South Texas
Rosebrook A
References
EA-12-227 IR 2015001
Download: ML15113B384 (26)
v • d • e


Text

May 7, 2015

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2015001 AND 05000499/2015001

Dear Mr. Koehl:

On April 4, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, facility. On April 9, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Andrew Rosebrook, Acting Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 License Nos.: NPF-76 and NPF-80

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION IV==

Docket:

05000498, 05000499 License:

NPF-76, NPF-80 Report:

05000498/2015001 and 05000499/2015001 Licensee:

STP Nuclear Operating Company Facility:

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas 77483 Dates:

January 1 through April 4, 2015 Inspectors: A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Resident Inspector S. Alferink, Reactor Inspector Approved By:

Andrew Rosebrook Acting Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects

- 2 -

SUMMARY

IR 05000498/2015001, 05000499/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 04/04/2015; South Texas Project

Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between January 1 and April 4, 2015, by the resident inspectors at the South Texas Project and an inspector from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.

No findings were identified.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent power and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and entered Mode 3 on March 29, 2015, to begin Refueling Outage 2RE17. The unit remained shut down for the remainder of the period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Main article: IP 71111.01

Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On March 17, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather procedures for hurricane season and evaluated the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to hurricane season; the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous hurricane season.

These activities constituted one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Main article: IP 71111.04

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:

  • March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water while train A was out of service.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Main article: IP 71111.05

Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on six plant areas important to safety:

  • January 27, 2015, Unit 1, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
  • January 27, 2015, Unit 2, standby transformer, Fire Area 99 and Fire Zone 0750
  • February 12, 2015, Unit 1, electrical auxiliary building, Fire Area 02 and Fire Zone Z037
  • March 18, 2015, Unit 2, train B essential cooling water, Fire Area 58 and Fire Zone Z605
  • March 24, 2015, common to both units, diesel fire pump 2, Fire Zone Z800

For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constituted six quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Main article: IP 71111.06

a. Inspection Scope

On February 26 through March 25, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of underground bunkers susceptible to flooding. The inspectors selected four underground bunkers that contained risk-significant cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment:

  • Unit 2, Class 1E, train C electrical manhole C0XYAKKEM54
  • Unit 1, Class 1E, train A electrical manhole A0XYABKEM52
  • Unit 2, Class 1E, train C electrical manhole C0XYABKEM56
  • Unit 1, Class 1E, train B electrical manhole B0XYABKEM53

The inspectors observed the material condition of the cables and splices contained in the bunkers and looked for evidence of cable degradation due to water intrusion. The inspectors verified that the cables and vaults met design requirements.

These activities constitute completion of one bunker/manhole sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Main article: IP 71111.11

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On March 11, 2015, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew.

The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.

On March 23, 2015, the inspectors observed just-in-time simulator training for an operating crew. The training included a brief from reactor engineering on the reactivity plan for the shutdown, and a simulator scenario where the crew could practice shutdown procedures and work on communications and responsibilities. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

On January 22, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to beginning train A emergency diesel generator surveillance testing, along with replacing makeup water totalizer in the chemical and volume control system.

On March 28 and 29, 2015, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 2 main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity due to shutting down the Unit 2 reactor for Refueling Outage 2RE17.

In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):

  • February 2, 2015, Unit 2, failure of resistance temperature detector RTD-420Y during response time testing
  • February 11, 2015, Unit 2, control room makeup and cleanup system, flow control valve, FCV-984, failed to modulate following planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:

  • January 8, 2015, Unit 2, phase C bushing replacement of breaker Y550 Dow-Velasco 27, 345kV line to south bus
  • January 28, 2015, Unit 2, phase B shaft seal repair on breaker Y580 Elm Creek 27, 345kV line to south bus
  • March 17, 2015, Unit 2, phase rotation checks on 13.8kV switchgear bus 2F

The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.

The inspectors also observed portions of five emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event, to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems, or to impact barrier integrity:

  • January 18, 2015, Unit 2, unplanned extended outage of train A essential chilled water due to a faulty check valve
  • February 3, 2015, Unit 1, unplanned extended outage of emergency 13.8kV transformer due to 13.8kV breaker fit-up issues
  • February 25, 2015, Unit 1, emergent train A emergency diesel generator maintenance to replace shutdown air pressure control valve PCV-5436
  • March 5, 2015, Unit 1, unplanned trip of train C essential chiller while train A essential chiller was out of service for planned maintenance
  • March 16, 2015, Unit 1, emergent maintenance on the reactor containment building personnel airlock inner door seal

The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensees actions for implementing the Configuration Risk Management Program for determining and implementing the risk-informed allowed outage time for the following emergent issues listed above: 1) Technical Specification 3.7.14.a for Unit 2, train A essential chilled water extended maintenance; and 2) Technical Specification 3.7.14.b for unexpected Unit 1, train C essential chiller trip.

These activities constitute completion of eight maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Main article: IP 71111.15

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six operability determinations and one functionality assessment that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:

  • February 10, 2015, functionality assessment of new fuel received with foreign material found in shipping containers during receipt inspection
  • March 2, 2015, operability determination of the Unit 2 mechanical auxiliary building roof following lifting FLEX (Fukashima) diesel generators greater than 20 feet above the roof
  • March 6, 2015, operability determination of Unit 1 reactor containment building personnel airlock due to failure of the inner door seal
  • March 23, 2015, operability determination of Unit 2 qualified display processing system due to a comparative communication issue between two redundant data processing units

The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded SSC.

These activities constitute completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Main article: IP 71111.18

Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that affected risk-significant SSCs:

  • April 2, 2015, Unit 1, temporary modification to the qualified display processing system, which removed the communication link between database processing units A and C to reduce the number of alarms in the control room

The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed this temporary modification in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that this modification did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs.

The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modification to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.

These activities constitute completion of one sample of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:

  • January 18, 2015, Unit 1, pressurizer level channel 467 following NLP5 circuit card replacement
  • January 29, 2015, Unit 1, train D auxiliary feedwater pump following inspection, cleaning, and lubrication
  • February 13, 2015, Unit 2, train A control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning makeup and cleanup following repair of flow control valve FCV-9584
  • March 16, 2015, Unit 1, personnel airlock inner door following seal replacement

The inspectors reviewed licensing-and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constitute completion of six post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Main article: IP 71111.20

a. Inspection Scope

During the stations refueling outage that began March 28, 2015, and was still in progress as of April 4, 2015 (end of this inspection quarter), the inspectors evaluated the licensees outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:

  • Review of the licensees outage plan prior to the outage
  • Review and verification of the licensees fatigue management activities
  • Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities
  • Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities
  • Observation and review of lowered-inventory activities

These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.22

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed eight risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

  • January 16, 2015, Unit 1, train B component cooling water pump in-service surveillance test
  • March 16, 2015, Unit 1, local leak-rate test penetration M-90 personnel airlock door seals

Other surveillance tests:

  • January 12, 2015, Unit 1, engineered safety features power availability surveillance
  • January 20, 2015, Unit 1, control room envelope makeup heating, ventilation, and air conditioning periodic surveillance test
  • January 21, 2015, Unit 2, power range nuclear instrumentation channel calibration, axial flux difference calibration, and quadrant power tilt ration determination
  • March 28, 2015, Unit 2, main turbine mechanical overspeed test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constitute completion of eight surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Main article: IP 71114.06

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on February 11, 2015, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance.

The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario; observed the drill from the simulator, technical support center, and the emergency response center; and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Main article: IP 71151

.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these licensee event reports to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operating logs, corrective action program records, and monthly operating reports for the period of January 2014 through January 2015 to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between January 2014 and January 2015. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.

These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Main article: IP 71152

Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

(Closed) Violation 05000498/2012007-01; 05000499/2012007-01: Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection (EA-12-227)

During the 2012 problem identification and resolution inspection, the team issued a violation (05000498;05000499/2012007-01) for the failure to implement timely corrective actions for a previous fire protection violation. The licensees corrective actions included a revised submittal of a license amendment request on July 23, 2013.

The licensee supplemented this license amendment request with letters dated May 12 (two letters), May 19, and December 17, 2014.

During the 2014 triennial fire protection inspection, the team reviewed the license amendment request and the compensatory measures the licensee implemented during the review process for the license amendment request. The team performed a timed walk-down of the alternative shutdown procedure and verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits, assuming the license amendment request was approved.

On February 13, 2015, the NRC approved the license amendment request. The amendment approved crediting one automatic action and seven operator actions in the main control room prior to evacuation during an alternative shutdown, in addition to manually tripping the reactor previously credited in the fire protection program.

The inspectors performed an in-office review from March 23 to March 31, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions, the approved license amendment, and the alternative shutdown procedure. The inspectors noted that the alternative shutdown procedure contained the approved steps for operators to perform the credited actions in the main control room prior to abandoning the control room due to a fire. This violation is closed.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 9, 2015, the inspectors presented the resident inspector inspection results to Mr. D. Koehl, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Aguilera, Manager, Health Physics
J. Atkins, Manager, Systems Engineering
M. Berg, Manager, Design Engineering/Testing and Programs
C. Bowman, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
J. Connolly, General Manager, Engineering
R. Dunn Jr., Manager, Nuclear Fuel and Analysis
T. Frawley, Manager, Plant Protection/Emergency Response
R. Gibbs, Manager, Operations, Production Support
R. Gonzales, Senior Licensing Engineer
J. Hartley, Manager, Mechanical Maintenance
G. Hildebrandt, Manager, Operations
G. Janak, Operations Training Manager
D. Koehl, President and CEO
J. Lovejoy, Manager, I&C Maintenance
R. McNeil, Manager, Maintenance Engineering
J. Milliff, Manager, Security
M. Murray, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
L. Peter, General Manager, Projects
J. Pierce, Manager, Unit 1 Operations
G. Powell, Site Vice President
M. Ruvalcaba, Manager, Strategic Projects
R. Savage, Engineer, Licensing Staff Specialist
R. Scarborough, Manager, Quality Assurance
M. Schaefer, Plant General Manager
R. Stastny, Maintenance Manager
L. Sterling, Supervisor, Licensing
D. Zink, Supervising Engineering Specialist

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000498/2012007-01
05000499/2012007-01 VIO Failure to Timely Correct Conditions Adverse to Fire Protection

[EA-12-227] (Section 4OA5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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