ML031910312

Joint Appendix: Volume 3 of 3

ML031910312
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	05/15/2003
From:	Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, Entergy Nuclear Operations, NRC/OGC, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, Riverkeeper, ShawPittman, LLP
To:	US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit
References
-RFPFR, 03-4313, FOIA/PA-2004-0042
Download: ML031910312 (66)

Text

03-43 13 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the SECOND CIRCUIT i

Riverkeeper, Inc.,

Petitioner,

- against -

SAMUEL J. COLLINS, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; DR. WILLIAM TRAVERS, Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear REGULATORY COMMISSION; the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 2 LLC; ENTERGY NUCLEAR INDIAN POINT 3, LLC; and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

Respondents.

'3.

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Joint Appendix: Volume 3 of 3 Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, Inc.

78 North Broadway White Plains, New York 10603 914-422-4343 Attorneyfor Plaintiff-Appellant David A. Cummings Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 301-415-1520 Attorney for Federal Respondents Of Counsel:

Karl S. Coplan Legal Interns:

Nicolette Witcher Joseph Vinciguerra Jay E. Silberg, Esq.

David J. Cynamon, Esq.

Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Esq.

Shaw Pittman, L.L.P.

2300 N Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20037 Attorney for Entergy Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume 1 Certified Index of the Record............................................................

1 Letter From Samuel J. Collins to Alex Matthiessen Enclosing Director's Decision...... 12 Letter Secy to Matthiessen Informing Commission Declined Any Review; Decision Became Final Agency Action............................................................

50 Section 2.206 Request for Emergency Shutdown of Indian Point Units 2 and 3........... 52 Exhibit 1 :U.S. Conference of Mayors, "If U.S. City/County Metro Economies Were Nations"............................................................

80 Exhibit 2: Daniel Rubin, "Nuclear Terrorism Threat Growing," (Knight Ridder Foreign Service).......................................................

81 Exhibit 3: CNN, "Threat at Three Mile Island Closes Airports,"....................... 84 Exhibit 4: International Atomic Energy Agency, "Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat"......................................................

85 Exhibit 5: Eric Pianin and Dan Eggen, "Preparations Stepped Up for Possible New Attacks"......................................................

90 Exhibit 6: Lara Mansnerus and Judith Miller, "Terrorist Details His Training in Afghanistan)......................................................

94 Exhibit 7: Nicholas Rufford, David Leppard and Paul Eddy, "Nuclear Mystery:

Crashed Plane's Target May Have Been Reactor..................................... 98 Exhibit 8: CNN: "FAA Restricts Flights Near World Series, Nuclear Plants"......................................................

102 Exhibit 9: William Branigin, "In Afghan Jail, a Terrorist Who Won't Surrender"......................................................

106 Exhibit 10: NRC, Press Release No.01-112, "NRC Reacts to Terrorist Attacks"......................................................

112 Exhibit 11: NRC Report, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk At Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants".............................................. 115 i

V.L. Sailer Et Al. "Severe Accident In Spent Fuel Pools In Support of Generic Safety Issues 82" NUREG/CR-4982...........................................................

203 Exhibit 12: Roger Witherspoon, "Indian Point Chief: Plant Safe From Possible Attack".....................................................

360 Exhibit 13: Vibeke Laroi, "Nuclear Plant Scare Adds to U.S. Security Jitters".....................................................

362 Exhibit 14: Douglas Pasternak, "A Nuclear Nightmare".............................. 365 Exhibit 15: Paul. L. Leventhal, Commencement Address to the Class of 2001 at Franklin & Marshall College.....................................................

369 Exhibit 16: Shawn Cohen, "NRC Flags ConEd With Red Tag for Indian Point"......................................................

376 Sandia Labs, NRC, "Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences" (1982) (CRAC-2 Report)...........................................................

380 Exhibit 17: "At Indian Point, A History of Nuclear Power, Problems and Controversy"...........................................................

392 Declaration of 20 December 2001 By Gordon Thompson in Support of a Petition by Riverkeeper, Inc...........................................................

398 Letter From Samuel Collins (NRC) to Alex Matthiessen (Riverkeeper) Acknowledging Receipt of Riverkeeper's 2.206 Petition and Denying Immediate Closure of Indian Point 2 and 3...........................................................

435 Licensee's Response to Riverkeeper, INC.'s Section 2.206 Request for Emergency Shutdown of Indian Point Units 2 and 3.442 Volume II NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000247/2001-002, Indian Point Unit 2...........................................................

486 AEC Regulatory Guide 1.78...........................................................

603 NRC Inspection Manual, Inspection Procedure 81110, Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation...........................................................

613 Letter from NRC Chainnan Richard Meserve to Senator James Jeffords.................. 624 ii

Letter from G. Scott Barber (NRC) to J. Barret (Entergy) (Enclosing NRC Inspection Report 50/286/01-09)...........................................................

638 NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Directive 8.11, "Review Process for 10 C.F.R. 2.206 Petitions"...........................................................

664 "Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" 59 Fed. Reg. 38889..............704 "Final Rule: Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" 63 Fed. Reg. 26955...........................................................

724 NURGE-0800, Section3.5.1.6, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants"...........................................................

741 NURGE-0654/FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants...........................................................

749 NRC Inspection Report 95000286/2000-10...........................................................

902 "Evaluation of Aircraft-Crash-Hazards Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-2859...........................................................

912 Proposed Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206............................................. 926 Riverkeeper's Comments on May 16, 2002 Proposed Director's Decision on Riverkeeper's November 8th Petition 2.206 Request for Emergency Shutdown of Indian Point Units 2 and3.951 Volume Il[

Exhibit A: National Research Council, "Making the Nation Safer" The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism"........................................ 976 Exhibit B: Associated Press, "Planes Often Enter Prohibited Air".................. 1004 Exhibit C: ABC News, "Subways, Scuba Divers and Landmarks".................... 1008 Exhibit D: CBS News, "Dozens of Airport Workers Arrested"................... 1012 Exhibit E: CBS News, "Airport Security Gets an 'F"'......................................... 1014 Nuclear Control Institute, "The Impact of Nuclear Plant Shutdown on Severe Accident Consequences"...........................................................

1016 i..

Rep. Edward Markey, Security GAP: "A Hard Look at the Soft Spots in our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security".......................................................

1019 NRC, Regulatory Issues Summary (RIS) 2001-16, "Update of Evacuation Time Estimates".......................................................

1036 iv

190A&

T I I I ON.

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM Committee on Science anc' Technology for Countering Terrorism NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF D-a f*TM; L ACADEME5 THE NATIOlJNAL ACADEAIES PRESS Washington, D.C.

www.ncp.ecu 000976

NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Coveming Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering. and the Institute of tvMedicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.

Support for this project was provided with institutional funds.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Making the nation safer: the role of science and technology in countering terrorism I Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Tewrorism. National Research Council.

p. cm.

ISBN 0-309-084814 (perfect)

1. Terrorism-Prevention-Technological innovations. 2. Terrorism-United States-Prevention. 1. National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism.

HV643 I M354 2002 363.3 2'0973--dc2 200201 1495.

Copies available from:

Naval Studies Board National Research Council

101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20418 National Academy Press 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W.

Box 25 Washington, DC 20055 800-624-6242 202-33-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan urea)

Copyright ^002 by the National Academy of Sciences. All tights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America 0009W

2 Nuclear and Radiological Threats THE NLCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREAT MATRIX For the purposes of the following discussion, the threats to homeland secu-rity from nuclear and radiological terrorism are grouped into the following three categories:

1. Stolen state-owned nuclear weapons or weapons components, modified as necessary to permit terrorist use.

2. improvised nuclear devices (DTDs) fabricated from stolen or diverted special nuclear material (SNNM) 1-plutonium and, especially, highly enriched uranium (HEU).z

3. Attacks on nuclear reactors or spent nucdear fuel or attacks involving radiological devices.

The threat matrix is surnmarized in Table 2. I and is discussed in more detail below.

State-Owned Nuclear Weapons or Weapons Components Several countries possess nuclear weapons that could potentially be turned to te.-orist use: Britain. China. France, India. Israel. Pakistan, Russia, and the United States. Other countries have had weapons development programs in the past. and Spec-ai nucicar enaze.

includes tissie istopes such as umuum-:^_. umn'um-'^.

and oiutonium-

';° that cn se used to max.- nucicr veavons.

IEU contains kZO percent by weighz., uranium-n 5.

39 000978

40)

MAKING THE NATION SAFER one of these (South Africa's) led to the development of nuclear weapons. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are believed to have active weapons development pro-grams at present, and these countries probably have the technical capabilities to develop nuclear weapons but may not have sufficient quantities of SNM (pluto-nium or HEU).

The weapons arsenals of Britain, China, France, Israel, and the United States are probably well protected. Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons are also thought to be adequately protected at present, but the near-term (I-to 5-year) security of Pakistani weapons may be problematical.

Theft or diversion of Russian nuclear weapons for terrorist use may represent a significant near-term threat to the United States, especially the theft or diversion of smaller, man-portable weapons. Table 2.1 and the classified annex provide additional details on these threats.3 Improvised Nuclear Devices Improvised nuclear devices are nuclear weapons fabricated by terrorists, with or without state assistance, using stolen or diverted SNM. The basic techni-cal information needed to construct a workable nuclear device is readily available in the open literature. The primary impediment that prevents countries or tech-nically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear weapons is the avail-ability of SNM, especially HEU.

HEU could potentially be obtained by terrorists from several sources. There are large stockpiles of excess HEU and weapons-gorade plutonium in both the United States and Russia. and other countries with nuclear weapons may have smaller stockpiles of these materials. HIEU also exists in nuclear fuel from naval reactors, and large stocks of reactor-grade plutonium are contained in commeT-cial spent fuel. Spent-fuel reprocessing programs and separated stocks of reactor-grade plutonium also exist in several countries, and these stocks are routinely transported across national borders.

Reactor-grade plutonium can be used to fabricate workable nuclear devices.

Theft or diversion of excess Russian HIEU for terrorist use represents a significant near-term threat to the United States. There are estimated to be about 150 metric tons of separated plutonium and 1,200 metric tons of HEU in Russia.

The United States has been working with Russia over the past 7 years to secure this material and has made major progress. These safeguards are effective against casual thefts but mav not be effective against higher-level threats, especially sophisticated insider threats. Moreover, a complete inventory of Russian materi-als is not available, so it is impossible to confirm that diversions of materials have 3In iadition to the unc'ass;fned discussion of nuclear and radiological tezrorism provided in this

.'uoler. :a c!;ssified annex zonauning runier treatment of these topics has been produced by the StUGY.

000979

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 41 not already occurred. Additionally, there have been more than a dozen seizures of SNM from Russia and surrounding countries since the early 1990s. Most of the seized materials are thought to have been smuggled from Russian civilian nuclear sites.

Stocks of SNM also could be produced clandestinely, either through enrich-ment of uranium or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to recover plutonium.

Uranium enrichment is equipment intensive and time consuming, and detection is increasingly likely as the scale of operations is increased. A small-scale program could potentially be hidden through careful facility design, however, and could, in principle, produce sufficient material for a weapon if operated for several years.

Reprocessing to recover plutonium also can be carried out in small, difficult-to-detect facilities but requires access to irradiated reactor fuel. Any country with a research reactor has potential access to such fuel, and there are, in addition,.large stocks of spent fuel in power reactors in countries of the former Soviet Union and also in foreign research reactors, some of which still operate with HEU. Clandestine production of SNM by states or terrorist groups for use against the United States represents a significant near-term threat to homeland security.

Nuclear Reactors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, or Radiological Dispersion Devices The threats considered here include attacks on nuclear power plants (both commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) and research reactors), their spent fuel storage facilities, and spent fuel transportation casks; detonation of conventional explosive devices packed with radioactive materials, so-called "dirty bombs:"

and the surreptitious placement of radiation sources in places frequented by large numbers of the public. Attacks on DOE-owned nuclear facilities were not con-sidered because these are generally considered to be hardened and well protected.

Nuclear Power Plants The United States has 103 operating civilian nuclear power reactors at 65 sites that generate about 20 percent of the U.S. electrical supply (USNRC, 2002; EIA, 2002). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulates NPPs and has had a long-standing concern about security and safeguards. The agency's security and safeguards regulations are extensive and actively enforced.

The USNRC requires that NPPs be protected against a "design basis threat."

defined at present to involve a ground attack by a group consisting of several armed lerrorists aided by an inside collaborator.> NPPs are required to train their

.AdditionaLly. same NPPs iocated near airports have been jesigned to withstand certain types of low-sneea taueoff and landine accidents involving aircait in cmrnmon use wnen the plants were

'icerzd in the !9M0s.

000980

42 MAKING THE NATION SAFER TABLE 2.1 The Nuclear and Radiological Threat Matrix TABLE 2.1A State-Owned Nuclear Weapons Potential Probabi.

Threat Category Threat Description Threat Level Consequences of Occu State-owned Theft and United States: Low-PotentialIv Moderm nuclear weapons diversion of state-weapons are well protected catastrophic-5 years.

owned nuclear and tactical weapons have massive loss of life potentia weapons for use.

integrated permissive and severe political with or without action links to prevent and economic modification, unauthorized use destruction possible against U.S.

targets or assets Britain, China, France, Israel: Low-weapons are few in number relative to U.S.-Russian arsenals and are well protected Pakistan, India: Medium-weapons are under secure control of the military, but political situation is unstable Russia: Medium-large numbers of weapons with poor inventory controls security personnel against this threat and are periodically tested by the TJSNRC to ensure readiness to meet this threat.

The current design basis threat for NPPs does not include high-speed attacks with fully loaded civilian airliners or, alternatively, smaller general aviation air-craft loaded with high explosives (HE) or attacks from the ground using HE projectiles. Potential targets for aircraft or ground attacks against an NPP are described in the classified annex.

The CSNRC is supporting work at the Sandia National Laboratories, and the nuclear industry's trade association, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), is direct-ing work at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to assess some of these threats. These studies, which involve modeling aircraft i mpacts against steel-reinforced concrete structures and investigating the potential effects of aircraft-fuel fires. are proceeding independently of each other and will not be compiemed until after this report is published.

The detaiis of rhese studies are classified and/or sensitive, and the results are 000981

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 43 Probability Technical and Approaches

es of Occurrence Policy Challenges to Mitigation Moderate over the next Theft or diversion may not Improve indications and 5 years. with a high require state assistance and may warnings capabilities 5s of life potential for surprise go undetected if theft occurs political in Russia Improve security of Russian liC and Pakistani nuclear weapons possible Stolen or diverted weapons at storage sites and borders could be converted for terrorist use Accelerate deployment of sensor arrays at critical HEU-based weapons smuggled US. entry points and targets into the United States could be difficult to detect and recover Develop and announce policies to deter use of First responders may be killed weapons by terrorist states or incapacitated by attack Improve attribution capabilities preliminary. But taken together, these studies suggest that a terrorist attack on an NPP could have potentially severe consequences if the attack were large enough.

The severity is highly dependent on the specific design configuration of the NPP, including details such as the location of specific safety equipment Additional details are provided in the classified annex.

The potential vulnerabilities of NPPs to terrorist attack seem to have captured the imagination of the public and the media, perhaps because of a perception that a successful attack could harm large populations and have severe economic and environmental consequences. There are, however, many other types of large industrial facilities that are potentially vulnerable to attack, for example, petro-leum refineries, chemical plants, and oil and liquefied natural gas supertankers.

These Facilities do not have the robust construction and security features charac-teristic of NPP-s, and many are located near higzhl populated urban areas. The Committee has not petformed a derailed examination of the vulnerabiIities of these other types of :ndustrial facilities and does not know how they compare to 000982

44 MAKING THE NATION SAFER TABLE 2.1B Improvised Nuclear Devices Potential Probabo Threat Category Threat Description Threat Level Consequences of Occi Improvised Theft or diversion United States: Low-SNIM Potentially Modem nuclear devices of SNM for is well protected catastrophic-5 years fabrication of massive loss of life potentii nuclear devices Britain. China. France.

and severe political for use against India, Israel, Pakistan:

and economic U.S.targets or Low-small amounts of destruction possible assets materials are well protected Russia: High-large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls,and indigenous threats have increased the vulnerabilities of NPPs. It is not clear whether the vulnerabilities of NPPs constitute a higher risk to society than the vulnerabilities of other industrial facilities.

Research Reactors Research reactors are used primarily to produce neutrons and gamma rays for research and development, and they provide a testbed for education on reactor physics and operations. As of April 2002 there were 36 operating research reactors in 23 states, an additional 12 reactors were being decommissioned, and 7 had licenses only to possess radioactive material. 5 Most research reactors are 5Much or tire factual Wiaornation used in this section is taien from the USNRC Web site. See.

panicuiarly. <http;,O/wwwi

.govireacins.-m/doc-collections/,at.-she eresearc5t-reactors.html>, last accessed May -0. ZOO-.

000983

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 45 Probability Technical and Approaches es of Occurrence Policy Challenges to Mitigation Moderate over the next Theft or diversion may not Improve indications and 5 years. with a high require state assistance and warnings capabilities as of life potential for surprise may go undetected political Consolidate SNM at Russian li Crude HEU weapons could be sizes, improve inventory possible fabricated without state controls, and improve security assistance at sites and borders HEU-based INDs smuggled Accelerate blend-down of into the United States could be Russian HEU difficult to detect and recover Accelerate the development First responders may be killed and deployment of SNM or incapacitated by attack sensor arrays at critical U.S.

entry points and targets Improve capabilities for remote detecticn of HLIEU Develop and announce policies to deter use of INDs by terrorist-states Improve attribution capabilities located at universities or government laboratories,6 and many university research reactors operate on a restricted basis and therefore do not generate much radioac-tive material.

With thermal outputs ranging from about 0.1 to 20 megawatts. U.S. research reactors produce much less radiation, heat, and waste (e.g., spent fuel) than do power reactors, whose thermal output is commonly 2,000-3,000 megawatts. Re-search reactors also generally have fail-safe shutdown systems, and most do not generate sufficient heat to be vulnerable to core accidents, even in the event of a coolant loss. The potential consequences of terrorist attacks therefore appear to be small relative to power reactors.

!In addition. the Department of Energy and she U.S. Anmy operate research and test reactors at seve-ai of their sites. The thermal output of these reactors ranges from to 4Wr megawatts. These aca::rs ure not licensed by tre USNRC and ar: not considered in this discussion.

00098

46 MAKING THE NATION SAFER TABLE 2.1C Radiological Attacks Potential Probabil Threat Category Threat Description Threat Level Consequences of Occut Nuclear power Ground or air High-Over 100 potential Yariable, ranging Potentia plants (NPPs) assaults on targets exist in the from reactor attacks i civilian NPPs United States shutdowns to core' near terr meltdowns with very large releases of radioactivity Research reactors Ground or air High-there are 36 Little or no release of Unclear assaults operating reactors radioactivity likely Spent nuclear Ground or air High-Potential targets Little or no release of Potential fuel in wet or assaults on spent exist at all commercial radioactivity likely attacks is dry storage fuel pools or dry NPP sites next S ye storage casks would be locate or damage Radiological Attacks with Very high-radiation Few deaths likely, High-m.

sources dirty bombs or sources are numerous and but potential for means are placement of highly dispersed worldwide economic disruption available, radioactive sources and panic is high few preve in public places in place Radioactive Same as for Very high-radioactive Trivial-most types Hivh-mu waste radiological waste is abundant of radioactive waste means are sources worldwide and nor potentially available available.

well protected to terrorists have few preve low specific activity in place Spent Nuclear Fuel in Wet or Dry Storage All civilian NPPs contain storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and, with few exceptions, all of the spent fuel produced by those reactors is being stored at the sites where it was produced. Approximately 42,000 metric tons of spent fuel are currently stored under water in large spent fuel storage pools for cooling and shielding purposes. These pools are constructed of steel-reinforced concrete and are typically located adjacent co reactor containment buildings.

At some NPP sites spent nuclear fuel also is being stored outside the power-plant buildings in dr-y casks on concrete pads. At present. about 3,000 metic tons of spent fuel are being stored in this fashion. The casks are constructed of one or more layers of stainless steel and steel-reinforced concrete. The spent fuel is stored in the casks in an inert atmosphere at low pressure.

A consortium ci 00098'-

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 47 Probability Technical and Approaches eS of Occurrence Policy Challenges to Mitigation nging Potential for 9/11-type Stopping airplane attacks that Perform vulnerability analysis r

attacks is high in the deliver large amounts of energy of NPPs

.0 core near term directlv on target with very Harden vulnerable NPPs and

.s of improve redundancies of critical safety systems release of Unclear in the near term Providing security against all Minimize the amount of fuel likely types of attacks stored onsite release of Potential for 9/1 I-type Stopping airplane attacks that Perform vulnerability analysis likely attacks is high over the deliver large amounts of energy of spent nuclear fuel storage next 5 years. but targets directly on target sites would be difficult to locate or severely Move vulnerable spent fuel in damage wet storage to dry cask storage

ikely, High-materials and Training first responders to Improve first responder for means are readily deal with these types of attacks capabilities ruption available, and there are nigh few preventive measures Improve public education in place t types High-materials and Training first responders to Improve first responder waste means are readilv deal with these types of attacks capabilities ailable available, and there are ave few preventive measures Improve public education activity in place nuclear utility companies has applied to the USNRC for a license to construct a centralized dry-cask storage facilicy (the Private Fuel Storage Facility) in Utah west of Salt Lake Citv. This facility, if licensed and constructed, could house up to 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel contained in up to 4,000 above-ground storage casks on thick reinforced-concrete pads (Private Fuel Storage, 2002).

The threat of terrorist attacks on spent fuel storage facilities, like reactors. is highly dependent on design characteristics. Moreover, spent fuel generates orders of magnitude less heat than an operating reactor, so that emergency cooling of the fuel in the case of attack could probably be accomplished using low-tech mea-sures that could be impiemented without significant exposure of workers co radia-tion. Dry cask storage svsterns are Very robust and would probably stand up to aircraft actacks as well.

000986

48 4MAKING THE NATION SAFER Like dry storage casks, spent fuel transport containers are very robust and appear to offer similar protection against terrorist attack. Studies on the vulner-ability of spent fuel transport containers to sabotage suggest that relatively little or no radioactivity would be released in the event of a terrorist attack, and the USNRC is now undertaking a package performance study that will examine fuel performance and source terms under a variety of impact situations. That agency is conducting a top-to-bottom review of potential vulnerabilities, including trans-port vulnerabilities, in the wake of September I1. In the meantime, it has issued advisories to its licensees to take additional precautions until these reviews are completed.

Radiation Sources and Radioactive Waste A wide varietv of radiation sources are used in the civilian economy for, among other things, industrial radiography, radiation therapy, university research, and natural resource exploration. The approximately 2 million sources licensed by the USNRC range in activity from millicuries to tens of kilocuries and typi-cally contain penetrating gamnma emitters like cesium-137, cobalt-60, and iri-dium-192; alpha emitters like radium-226 and americium-241; and beta emitters like strontium-90. Devices in which such sources are dispersed by explosives or other means are called radiological dispersion devices (RDDs).

In the United States, most radioactive sources are regulated by the USNRC or by states under agreement with that agency, and a materials license is required to possess such sources. Licensees are responsible for safeguarding these sources and returning them to the manufacturer or properly disposing of them when the sources are no longer needed.

This system is not foolproof, however. For example, according to USNRC records, several hundred U.S. sources are unac-counted for and presumed lost.

Radioactive sources are also used widely in other countries, not all of which have the regulatory controls that exist in the United States. Control of sources may be a particular concern in some central and eastern European countries, which lack strong regulatory or accounting standards. 7 The United States also produces quantities of radioactive waste that could potentially be used in an RDD. This waste includes high-level spent nuclear fuel and high-level defense waste stored at government or commercial sites; transu-ranic waste stored at government sites: and low-level industrial, research, and medical waste stored at commercial sites, universities, and hospitals. Low-level waste may be a particularly attractive terrorist target: It is produced by many companies. universities, and hospitals. it is not always stored or shipped under tieht secur.ri, and it is routinely shipped across the country. Although labeled Ze Gonzuez 19991 for u recent review of Iost ;nd itolen radioactive sources.

000987

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 49 "low-level," some of this waste has high levels of radioactivity and could poten-tially be used to make an effective terrorism device.

RDD attacks could be carried out in several ways.. Nonexplosive sources could be hidden in facilities frequented by large numbers of the public (e.g.,

sports stadiums, subway systems) or dispersed in building ventilation systems.

Additionally, a radiation source could be combined with an explosive to disperse radioactive contamination over areas on the orderof hundreds of square meters to a few square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions. A radioactive waste shipment also could be attacked while in transit. Although such an attack probably would not disperse large quantities of radioactivity, it could cause public panic, especially if the attack took place in a highly populated urban area.

Detailed studies of RDDs suggest that few if any human deaths would be expected from dispersed radiation, although the explosion itself could cause casualties. The presence of dispersed radioactivity in the attacked areascould, however, confound rescue efforts. The most severe effects on human health are produced if the material can be efficiently dispersed in respirable form. For optimum particulate sizes, inhaled material can remain lodged in the lungs, lead-ing to either acute or chronic effects, depending on the amount and type of material respired. Although there are methods to construct an RDD to obtain good dispersion of inhalable particles, they require expert knowledge and access to university-level laboratory facilities.

HOMELAND SECURITY CHALLENGES The threat matrix presented in Table 2.1 and discussed in previous sections suggests that the United States faces several near-term (1-5 year) vulnerabilities to terrorist acts using nuclear and radiological dispersal weapons. Several poten-tial vulnerabilities are described in this section.

State-Owned Nuclear Weapons and Improvised Nuclear Devices At present the United States has no evidence that a terrorist organization or nonnuclear state possesses stolen nuclear weapons or MDs. However, this situ-ation could change rapidly over the near term if steps are not taken to better secure nuclear weapons and SNM, especially in Russia. In the future, efforts to develop MDs may involve virtual collaborations among groups of countries and terrorist organizations. These efforts will be harder to detect and interdict because the different materials, facilities, activities, and expertise will be spread across large and unconnected geeoravhical areas. As noted above, the primary impedi-mert to the success of AND development efforts is the availability of SIMN.

especially HEU. The first challenge. then, far the fruited States and its allies is to improve securiEt for weapons and special nuclear material wherever they exist.

but especiaily in Russia.

000988

so MAKING THE NATION SAFER Once a terrorist state or organization is able to procure a state-owned nuclear weapon or SNM, especially HEU, it will be able to fabricate an IND if it has the appropriate technical expertise. In addition to the potential for obtaining SNM from existing stocks in countries like Russia, the technologies for making SNM are ubiquitous, and past experiences, which are discussed in the classified annex, illustrate the difficulty of detecting well-concealed clandestine efforts to produce these materials. Therefore, the second challenge for the United States and its allies is to improve the gathering of indications-and-warnings intelligence on efforts by states or groups to obtain a nuclear capability so that resources can be focused on countering the most significant threats. The third challenge is to improve capabilities for detecting and interdicting stolen nuclear weapons and INDs once they are obtained by a terrorist group or state.

The consequences.of terrorist use of a stolen weapon or MD are horrible to contemplate. A successful detonation of a stolen weapon or IND could produce massive casualties and cause substantial damage to the nation's political and economic infrastructure. Although recovery would eventually occur, it would be both expensive and lengthy. While recovery plans should be put into place to deal with such attacks, the main focus of the nation's efforts must be on preven-tion of attacks by whatever means possible.

Nuclear Reactors, Spent Nuclear Fuel, and Radiological Dispersion Devices Nuclear power plants may present a tempting high-visibility target for terror-ist attack, and the potential for a September 1 I-type surprise attack in the near tenn using U.S. assets such as airplanes appears to be high. Such attacks could potentially have severe consequences if the attack were large enough and, were such an attack successfully carried out, could do great harm to the nation's near-term energy security and civilian nuclear power as a long-term energy option.

Complete denial of the means to attack NPPs from the air or ground using U.S. assets such as aircraft is probably not feasible. If important vulnerabilities are identified, however, design and operational fixes exist, some of which are easily identifiable, that could substantially harden the facilities. Some of these possible fixes are discussed in the classified annex.

The private ownership and operation of NPPs present some additional chal-lenges. One involves cost. and another information sharing. Private companies may be hesitant to commit significant resources to reducing vulnerabilities unless they receive clear guidance and leadership from the USNRC. Further, operators may be unable to pass such costs on to consumers in a highly competitive elec-uicin. market. This has important ramifications for nuclear energy as a long-term contributor to the U.S. energv supply. Information sharing between Government agencies and plant owners and operators on potential vulnerabilities and opera-ticnai fixes is essential for improving securitv at the nation's NPPs. Such inior-00098'

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 51 mation sharing is currently problematical, however, because much of the infor-mation to be shared is classified.

Of course, the development of remedies for reducing potential NPP vulner-abilities to terrorist attack must consider both costs and achieved risk reductions, especially in view of the potential vulnerabilities of other types of industrial facilities, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. The nation's resources to address these vulnerabilities are limited and thus have to be expended in a way that achieves the greatest risk reduction at the lowest overall cost to society.

Given the wide use of radiation sources in the United States and other coun-tries, a determined terrorist would probably have little trouble obtaining material for use in an RDD. Fortunately, many radiation sources are strong gamma emitters and, unless heavily shielded, can be readily detected with existing sensor technologies. If an RDD attack were to occur, the casualty rate would likely be low, and. contamination could be detected and removed from the environment, although such cleanup would probably be expensive and time consuming.

It is clear that the aim of an RDD attack would be to spread fear and panic and to cause as much disruption to society as possible. Given the public fear of anything "nuclear" or "radioactive," even a minor terrorist attack could have greatly magnified psychological and economic consequences. The ease of recov-ery from an RDD attack would depend to a great extent on how the attack was handled by first responders, political leaders, and the news media, all of which would help to shape public opinion and reactions.

REDUCLNG VULNERABILITIES Several steps can be taken over the near term to reduce the nation's vulner-ability to acts of nuclear and radiological terror. Science and technology have an important role to play in this effort but clearly are insufficient in themselves to meet the future challenges. Policy and procedural changes may also be required, as described in the following discussion.

Stolen Nuclear Weapons and Improvised Nuclear Devices There are no obvious technological silver bullets to reduce the nation's vul-nerability to terrorist use of stolen nuclear weapons or INDs. Nevertheless, science and technology can play a central role in an enduring, multilavered homeland-defense systam that provides for the following capabilities:

• Indications and warnings of terrorist group membership, structure, inten-tions. and transformational activities;

• Accounting of and security for weapons and SN-M inventories at their sources; 000990

52 MAKING THE NATION SAFER

• Detection and interdiction, using technology and intelligence, of weapons and SNM moved across national borders, especially Russian and U.S. borders;

• Detection of weapon or IND movements inside the United States;

• Effective responses to nuclear and radiological attacks if they do occur; and

• Attribution to identify weapons and/or SNM characteristics and sources of origin.

Such a system must be structured to overcome the political inertia that inevi-tably develops over time and that can lead to a slackening of effort. A good example of such inertia is the federal government's reduced willingness to pro-vide funding during the last decade to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for air marshals to guard commercial flights against hijackers. It appears that the FAA's effectiveness in reducing airline hijackings through the 1980s led to a perception that the risk of hijacking no longer existed.

Protection. Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Weapons and Special Nuclear Material Nuclear weapons and SNOI can be most effectively protected, controlled, and accounted for at their sources, which are relatively few in number compared with the many potential points of transit across national borders and are protected by state-run security infrastructures. Therefore, the first line of homeland defense against nuclear and radiological terrorism is a robust system for protecting, con-trolling, and accounting for nuclear weapons and SNTW at their sources.

Technology for weapons and SNM protection, control, and accounting already exists and has been deployed in many nuclear countries. The impediments to more widespread deployment of these technologies in nuclear weapons and SNMI states include cultural differences over what constitutes workable and acceptable technologies; funding for procurement. training, and security screening of the necessary personnel; and the willingness of states to accept and deploy such systems.

Of particular concern is the deployment of these systems in Russia, which possesses large stockpiles of weapons and SNM, and Pakistan, whose weapons are controlled in a fashion that may be unpredictable, especially given the poten-tially unstable governmental situation. The United States can-and should-engage nuclear weapons states, states possessing SNM, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (LAEA) in bilateral and multilateral discussions aimed at improving the protection control of, and accounting for weapons and SNMI. To this end. the following four actions should be taken:

Recommendation.1: The U.S. government. working through the Depart-ment of Energy, Department of Defense. and Department of State, should 00099:>

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 53 increase the urgency and pace of discussions with states possessing nuclear weapons and special nuclear material with the goal of identifying and imple-menting more effective safeguards through the wider deployment of protec-tion, control, and accounting technologies.

Although the United States has technically sophisticated capabilities to offer to other nations, other nations have also identified good technical solutions to many of these challenges. Technology sharing is essential for preventing the unauthorized procurement and use of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 2.2: Concurrently, the U.S. government, working through the Department of Energy and Department of Defense, should reexamine the security of its own nuclear weapons, both within its borders and else-where.

Stolen U.S. nuclear weapons represent a very small threat in the universe of threats described in this chapter; nevertheless, protecting these weapons is solely the responsibility of the U.S. government, and a reexamination to determine their security would set a positive example for other nuclear powers to emulate. In particular, the risks and benefits of retaining forward-based nuclear weapons in N.ATO countries should be reassessed, especially in light of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which emphasizes that the addition of non-nuclear strike forces to the U.S. deterrent capability will reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear forces.$

Although the presence of forward-based nuclear weapons in INATO countries does not pose an immediate danger given current levels of security and protection measures, the potential for rapid, regional changes in the geopolitical security environment is cause for concern.

Recommendation 2.3: The U.S. government, working through the Depart-ment of Energy and Department of Defense, should undertake an internal evaluation of its bilateral Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (PC&A) program in Russia and consider ways to accelerate progress in safeguarding nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials, especially to counter potential insider threats. A principal goal of this evaluation should be to identify ways to accelerate deployments of means to safeguard (1) atomic demolition munitions and other small nuclear warheads and (2) special nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium.

This program is moving at an irregular and sometimes interrupted rate for a variet of reasons, but there are several actions the United States could take to sTransrnict letter of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to Congress, signed by Donald H.

Rumscid. -le ctassiried review was comnoeted in December '001.

There are other technical and dioiomatic issues relevant to tne nuciear posture that would have to be considered in this reassess-ment. incudinv binoing agreeenems with NATO countis.

000994

54 MAKING THE NATION SAFER improve its reach and effectiveness. These include (1) encouraging more of the work under this program to take place through direct scientist-to-scientist con-tacts; this may help to promote a better understanding of workable approaches for both countries and (2) reconceptualizing the program as a fully joint program of technology research, development, and deployment 9 that can serve to improve Russian security and raise worldwide safeguard norms.

The first essential step in a robust MPC&A program is an accurate estimate of SNM inventories, which appears to be lacking in Russia. To address this problem, the United States should work with the Russian government to obtain an accurate inventory of its weapons-usable materials to match the U.S. declaration (DOE, 1994, 1996, 1998) in a way that addresses Russian national security concerns.10 Recommendation 2.4: The U.S. government, working through the Depart-ment of Energy, should increase the priority and pace of cooperative efforts with Russia to safeguard its highly enriched uranium by blending down this material as soon as possible.

One way to accomplish this objective is to encourage Russia to down-blend HEU in two stages: the first to just less than 20 weight percent to eliminate the proliferation threat, and the second to those levels (typically 4 to 5 percent) required for sale as feed for reactor fuel. This two-stage approach would not require any more time or effort than the one-stage process used at present,' I and the first stage probably could be accomplished in about 2 years if adequate funding were made available.

Recommendation 2.5: The U.S. government, working through the Depart-ment of State, Department of Energy, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, should provide encouragement as well as technical and financial assis-tance to the International Atomic Energy Agency to raise the levels of 9This effort could involve scientists and engineers fron both countries, and one of its explicit goals could be to improve protection, control, and accounting technologies and practices and to share these improvements with other countries and organizations, especially the Irnemutional Atomnic Energy Agency.

. l0For example. the Russian government could make a secret declaration. cenify to the United States that such a declaration had been made. and provide the declared inventories to the U.S.

government in encrypted form as evidence of this certification. The Russian government would hold the encryption key and mignt. t some time in the future. make that key public so that the inventory could be verified.

it The same uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas flow would blend four times as much urunium-2 5 to 20 weight percent as to 4.4 percent. and the down-blending fac:lity in Russia could handle at least twice tbe current gas flow. Furtmernore. tccelerating the pace of down-bWending would not disrupt worid uranium markets. because the availability of - 4 percent uranium-35 for nuclear fuel is limited by its rate of sale by Russia to world markes ana not by the rAte ot down-blending. Acceierating the pace of down-olending :may require intenational cooperation beyond that of the United States.

000993

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 55 international norms for protecting civilian special nuclear materials, specifi-cally highly enriched uranium from research reactors and civilian pluto-nium from intact and reprocessed spent nuclear fuel.

The assistance could include technical support and funding for safeguards-technology development and deployment activities. The United States also should encourage other nuclear states to provide support for this effort.

Detection and Interdiction of Illicit Weapons and Special Nuclear Material An important line of defense in a layered system of homeland protection is the detection and interdiction of illicit nuclear weapons and SNIM as well as the detection and disruption of illicit weapons development programs. Science and technology can contribute to this defense effort in at least two ways: (1) by providing technical means for detecting the movement of SNM, especially HEU, either in weapons or as contraband, through border transit points and around critical U.S. assets such as ports, cities, and other high-value facilities; and (2) by providing sophisticated data-mining tools for analysis of intelligence on nuclear smuggling and on illicit weapons development programs.

The presence of certain types of penetrating radiation is a signature of most (but not all) SNM. Passive detection of gamma rays and/or neutrons can be an effective screening technique in some circumstances for revealing the presence of illicit SNM or TDs. In other cases, active. interrogation methods may be required. While shielding can reduce these signals, they can serve as a useful first indicator of SNM, as well as other radioactive materials that could pose threats.

The nuclear materials of primary interest in weapons and flDs are pluto-nium, primarily plutonium-239 and plutonium-240, and HEU. Plutonium can be detected through passive gamma-ray and neutron monitoring, but HEU is diffi-cult to detect passively owing to its low specific activity, low spontaneous fission rate, and low-energy gamma-ray emissions. Passive monitoring of these materi-als requires Large-area detectors and relatively long exposure durations for ac-ceptable sensitivity. HEU can be detected by active monitoring using, for ex-ample, neutron detectors and pulsed neutron sources. Additionally, both HEU and plutonium can be detected indirectly by gamma radiography, which is sensi-tive to high-atomic-number materials. Active systems are more complex and costly than passive detectors. however, and they emit radiation. Consequently, there may be radiological safety issues associated with their use in populated areas.

The full deplovment of a national detection network would be an expensive proposition given the large numbers of international transit points, entry points into the United States, and critical U.S. cities and facilities. Although sensor technologies now exist for such deployments, it will be a daunting technical challenge to integrate these technologies into effective and reliable detection systems-in particular, to sort through the thousands of hits that would be re-000994

56 MAKING THE NATION SAFER ceived each hour from legitimate transport of commercial radioisotopes (includ-ing isotopes implanted or injected into people for medical tests and treatments),

identify and track suspicious targets while the threats they pose are being evalu-ated, and dispatch responders to interdict the target if the threat proves credible, all in real time. A poorly designed system would likely be turned off or ignored by frustrated operators and responders once the false alarms reached even moder-ate levels. The state of the art for such detection systems has not yet advanced to the levels needed to make a national deployment feasible.

A careful analysis of likely SNM transport routes, however, would likely reveal a smaller number of choke points where well-designed detection systems could be effectively deployed. Such choke points might include the following:

• Critical border transit points in countries like Russia;

• Major global cargo-container ports, especially at cargo entry and transfer portals;

• Major U.S. airports with large numbers of international arrivals;

• Major choke points in the U.S. interstate highway system-for example, through the Rocky Mountains; and

• Major roadways, bridges, and tunnels into critical U.S. cities.

The deployment of sensor systems even at a large number of such choke points would not guarantee the detection of SINM in transit-determined terror-ists probably could find ways to overcome such systems by using secondary entry points and roads or by using heavv shielding. But the deployment of a well-tested, national integrated detection network would be a powerful component of the lavered homeland defense svstem.

A national detection network could consist of several types of sensors: large numbers of simple counters that indicate the presence of radiation, backed up by smaller numbers of spectroscopic instruments to identify specific isotopic signa-tures. The technical challenge for the deployment of both types of sensors is the differentiation of signals of interest from the background of naturally occurring radioactivity and medical and industrial radioisotopes. There is a surprising lack of comprehensive data on the normal variations in background and radioactivity in general commerce.

Small hand-held ("pager') radiation detectors are becoming available to cus-toms officials, police, and first responders. These instruments could form the first laver of detection defense for illicit radioisotopes (especially strong gamma emitters) and could also be used by emergency personnel when responding to suspected radiological incidents. At present. most of these instruments have no spectroscopic discrimination capabilities: additional R&D would be needed to develop low-cost instruments of zhis Pype with spectroscopic capability and to improve their sensitivity and seiectivity. Fixed instruments at airports or other 000995

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 57 choke points can provide very useful sensitivity for materials in luggage or car-ried in truck cargo. R&D to support the innovative design and production of cost-effective detectors to meet these needs could be an important path to progress.

The following actions should be taken to improve the nation's capabilities to detect the illicit movement of weapons and SNMI:

Recommendation 2.6: A focused and coordinated near-term effort should be made by the Department of Energy, through its National Nuclear Secu-rity Administration, and by the Department of Defense, through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to evaluate and improve the efficacy of special nuclear material detection systems that could be deployed at strategic choke points for homeland defense.

The.objectives of these evaluations should be to provide (I) technical feed-back to system developers that can be used to improve system design and perfor-mance; (2) improved definition of background signals at potential monitoring sites and radioisotopes in general commerce that can be used to improve system capabilities to detect illicit materials in transport; and (3) experience in detecting materials in transport that can be used to develop protocols for identifying false positives and evaluating and responding to actual threats.

Recommendation 2.7: Research and development support should be pro-vided by the Department of Energy and Department of Defense for improv-ing the technological capabilities of special nuclear material detection sys-tems, especially for detecting highly enriched uranium.

In the near term. R&D is needed to improve neutron interrogation sources (i.e.. neutron generators) and detector systems for HBU. Additionally, some priority should be given to the development of inexpensive portable detectors with spectroscopic discrimination capabilities so that such detector systems could be more widely deployed.

As mentioned above in this chapter, future efforts to develop INDs may be harder to detect and disrupt because such efforts are likely to involve multiple organizations spread across the globe. Detection of such efforts will require the ability to assemble intelligence data from many disparate sources and to find patterns and connectivity among large amounts of seemingly unrelated data.

This will require the development of new databases, for example, databases that can be used to track and attribute smuggling efforts; enhancements to the connec-tivity of various kinds of databases (e.g., intelligence, immigration. law enforce-ment. signals intelligence. and imagery) to enable searching for relevant data: and the development of sophisticated data-mining tools and techniques that can iden-tiry transnational patterns and connections in the acquisition of know-how, zech-nology, and materials for fabricating illic t weapons.

00099G

58 MAKUNG THE NATION AER Effective Responses to Nuclear and Radiological Attacks Responses to nuclear and radiological attacks fall into two distinct categories that could require very different types of governmental actions:

(1) attacks involving the detonation of a nuclear weapon or IND and (2) attacks involving RDDs. The first type of attack would likely involve massive property destruction and loss of life. making it difficult to mount an effective emergency response, at least over the short tenn. An emergency response action lasting months to years might be required in the wake of such an attack. The second type of attack would likely involve localized loss of life and no immediate danger to surrounding populations or property, but the potential for misinformation and public panic would be high. An emergency response action lasting weeks to months might be required, although longer-termn cleanup might be needed for large RDD attacks.

The worst scenarios. involving nuclear power plants fall somewhere between these two categories, but, as noted in the classified annex, studies have not yet determined how credible these scenarios are.

Responses to nuclear and radiological attacks are governed by the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan,'2 which establishes authorities and procedures for responding to "peacetime" radiological emergencies such as acci-dents at nuclear power plants. This plan devotes only three paragraphs to radiologi-cal sabotage and terrorism, giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation the lead for investigating such acts and calling on other agencies, especialy the designated lead federal agency, to assist the bureau in its investigative mission. The plan concludes that acts of sabotage and terrorism should not be treated as separate types of emergencies but are simply a "complicating dimension" of the other types of emergencies.

The correctness of this conclusion seems questionable given the attacks that might be envisaged in light of September 11. A terrorist attack could be much larger in magnitude than other events anticipated under this emergency plan.

Such an attack could require large numbers of rescuers and medical personnel trained to deal with radiological emergencies; the ability to manage large popula-tions in contaminated urban areas for long periods of time, potentially years; the ability to predict in real time the spread of radioactive contamination in debris clouds and provide this information to potentially affected populations in real time so that appropriate actions can be taken; and timely and effective cleanup capabilities. The current plan does not appear to provide the guidance needed to ensure mris type of response in the case of nuclear terrorist attack.

• .Federai Radiological Erneenc? Re:ponswe ?!anperaup'onal Plan. published by the Fcderl Ernergency:

Management Agency in the Federal RegEi';e an yuy 1. 1996. with a correction pub-Ushed on June 5. !996. The Vlan is available online at chztpiV/www.au.aftmil/aurlwwc/awcgate/frerpI

rewp.hcn.

Aczessed on Aprl '. :aO 000997

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 59 Recommendation 2.8: Immediate steps should be taken by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to update the Federal Radiological Emer-gency Response Plan, or to develop a separate plan, to respond to nuclear and radiological terrorist attacks, especially an attack with a nuclear weapon on a U.S. city. This plan should, at a minimum, address the following needs:

(1) rapid mobilization of nationwide medical resources to cope with burns, physical trauma, and poorly characterized outcomes of exposure to radia-tion; (2) rapid airlift of field hospitals to the affected area; (3) means to provide the affected public with basic information on protection against radiation and fallout; (4) technical procedures for decontaminating people, land, and buildings; and (5) protection of citizens and foreign nationals from vigilante attacks. This plan should be mock exercised and, if required, incident site monitoring capabilities should be enhanced. Steps also should be taken to ensure that federal decision makers are familiar with this plan.

Should a nuclear or radiological attack occur, response effectiveness could be enhanced through public education efforts carried out well in advance of a nuclear or radiological attack. These efforts could include the stocking of potas-sium iodide pills by individuals to reduce the potential for thyroid cancers from releases of radioactive iodine. Such efforts may increase the public's willingness to accept market-based recovery approaches for land use and permitted activities in regions that are contaminated at levels just a few times above background radiation levels.

Attribution to Identify Characteristics of Weapons and Special Nuclear Material and Their Sources of Origin As the history of the Cold War has shown, the most effective defense against attacks with nuclear weapons is a policy of nuclear retaliation. This past success suggests that the United States may be able to deter some future state-supported or state-sponsored nuclear and radiological terrorist acts by announcing in ad-vance that it will retaliate by whatever means deemed appropriate, including the use of nuclear weapons, against states and terrorist groups responsible for nuclear or radiological attacks against U.S. citizens or assets. 13 To be a useful deterrent, however, this doctrine would have to be formulated and announced in advance, and its credibility would depend in large part on the ability of the United States to demonstrate to the rest of the world that it has the technical means to attribute such attacks to states or terrorist groups.

!!The analogy between :he Cold War and post-Sectember !I worlds is imperfect in that terorist activitv is aispersed geogrnphically and nay not be politically motivated. A doctrine of assured retaliation orobablv wouid not teter fanafical :errorist grouDs. but it may discourage states from provioins sucn ^,oups with aid ano comfor.

00099['

60 MAKING THE NATION SAFER Attribution is a difficult technical challenge-ideally, one would want to know both the characteristics of the weapon used in the attack and its country of origin. The former can be determined through careful analysis of blast debris; the latter might be determined by linking this information with intelligence on thefts; smuggling, and weapons development efforts by states and terrorist groups devel-oped through the data-mining techniques discussed above.

Efforts are under way by national laboratories to develop an attribution capability under the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The goal is to develop the capability to perform a postdetonation debris analysis and to draw conclusions on the design and performance after an attack. The technology for developing this capability exists but needs to be assembled, an effort that is expected to take several years.

Recommendation 2.9: Given the potential importance of attribution to de-terring nuclear attacks, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's efforts to develop a capability for identifying perpetrators of an attack should con-tinue to declared operability as quickly as practical.

Reactors The events of September I1 suggest that physical and operational changes at some NPPs may be needed to mitigate vulnerabilities to attacks from the air using a large commercial airliner or a smaller aircraft loaded with high explosives and, possibly, attacks from the ground using HE projectiles. The technical analyses that are now being carried out by the USNRC-and EPRI to understand the effects of such attacks on reactor containment buildings and essential auxiliary facilities are critical to understanding the full magnitude of this threat to the nation's NPPs.

Recommendation 2.10: The ongoing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Electric Power Research Institute assessments of nuclear power plant vulnerabilities to airliner attacks should be completed as soon as possible, and follow-on work to identify vulnerabilities on a plant-by-plant basis, including vulnerabilities to air attacks by small craft loaded with high explo-sives or to ground attacks by high-explosive projectiles, should be under-taken as soon as these initial studies are completed. This "completion" should not stand in the way of early actions to address significant plant vulnerabilities that are identified in the course of the ongoing Sandia National Laboratories and EPRI assessments. If these assessments continue to show that important vulnerabilities exist, then steps should be taken to reduce such vulnerabilities as soon as possible.

If the USNRC discovers significant vulnerabilities at its licensees' reactors as z resuit of these analyses, it could mandate a number of physical and opera-000999

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 61 tional changes to reduce vulnerabilities to and the consequences of attacks. Some possible changes are listed in the classified annex. This list is by no means exhaustive, and an effective remedy can be applied at a particular reactor only after a careful analysis of risks and benefits, taking into account the comparative risk reduction that could be achieved by devoting resources to hardening nuclear plants versus other large industrial facilities.

Radiological Dispersion Devices Although the damage potential of RDDs is far less than that of stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear explosives, or successful attacks on reactors, the terror/panic potential of RDDs warrants increased attention to the control and use of radiological sources by regulatory agencies and materials licensees.

Recommendation 2.11: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the states with agreements with that agency should tighten regulations for obtaining and possessing radiological sources that could be used in terrorist attacks (i.e. large sources containing long-lived isotopes), including require-ments for securing and tracking these sources. Additionally, licensees pos-sessing large sources should be encouraged to substitute nonradioactive sources (compact accelerators, electron beams, and x-ray generators) when economically feasible.

Other important counters to RDDs are public education, emergency responder training, and preparation of leaders to deal quickly and effectively with terrorist acts. As noted above, the likeiy aim of an RDD attack would be to spread fear and panic and cause disruption. Recovery would therefore depend on how such an attack is handled by first responders, political leaders, the media, and general members of the public.

In general, public fear of radiation and radioactive materials appears to be disproportionate to the actual hazards. Although hazardous at high doses, ioniz-ing radiation is a weak carcinogen, and its effects on biological systems are better known than those of most, if not all, toxic chemicals. Federal standards. that limit human exposure to environmental ionizing radiation, which are based on the line:r, nonthreshold dose-response relationship,14 are conservative and protec-14Tba is, mutagenic (cell mutation) and carcinognic (concert effects are assumed to increase inearly with radiation dose, with no threshold at low doses below which there is zero effect. A recent report by the National Council on Radiation Protection and MKeusuremens concluded that tnere is no conclusive evidence on which to rie.e: the assumption of a linear-nonthreshold dose-resoonse relationship for many of the risks attributable to low-level ionizing radiatton

.' (NCRP.

COWpP..).

0 0 100

62 MAKING THE NATION SAFER five, and the government continues to fund R&D' 5 to improve scientific under-standing of radiation effects on biological materials.

Education and training can serve as an effective counter to future RDD attacks. To this end, the committee recommends that the following actions be implemented:

Recommendation 2.12: Training should be provided to emergency respond-ers (police, fire, and other emergency service personnel) on how to assess on-the-ground hazards from radiological attacks. As part of this training, responders should be provided with simple but effective radiation-monitoring devices, trained in their use, and told whom to contact for expert assistance, if needed. The Office of Homeland Security should take the lead for this effort in cooperation with the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Recommendation 2.13: Prepackaged kits of written materials on basic ra-diation science and effects should be developed for the media and national, state, and local leaders to help them respond appropriately to radiological attacks. The Office of Homeland Security should take the lead for this effort and should work with independent credible organizations to develop these kits.

Recommendation 2.14: A technically credible spokesperson at the national level who is perceived as being outside the political arena-for example, the President's Science Advisor, the Surgeon General, or their designated spokespersons-should be prepared to provide accurate and usable infor-mation to the media and public concerning public health and safety risks and appropriate response actions in the aftermath of a nuclear or radiologi-cal attack.

Such a response needs to be prepared and rehearsed in advance to avoid the kind of national leadership confusion that followed the anthrax attacks on Wash-ington, D.C., in 2001.

15The Departnent of Energy soonsors research on low-dose radiation effects within the Office of Science and also supports the Radiation Effects Research Foundation. which is conducting a long-twrn longitudinal study of Japanese atornic bomb survivors. Additionally, the federal government provides funding come >Nautional Research Council's Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIRi Committees for periodic reassessmnents of low-dose health efects. The BEIR-VI1 study is currently in progress. and its objective is to determine the mathenmticai relationship oetween health risks and adiation cose for low levels of ionizing radiation.

OOG1O0

NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS 63 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION Many of the recommendations offered in this chapter call for an organized.

focused, and adequately funded R&D effort to counter nuclear and radiological terrorism, as well as additional scientific, technical, and policy actions to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorist attacks, sometimes in cooperation with other national governments. To be effective, these efforts must bring to bear the best scientific and technical resources available to the federal government and must be well coordinated with other federal R&D and counterterrorism activities.

Important progress is already being made by the R&D and policy communi-ties to reduce the nation's vulnerability to nuclear and radiological terrorism.

There is not much evidence, however, that the R&D activities are being coordi-nated, that thought is being given to prioritizing these activities against other national counterterrorism needs, or that effective mechanisms are in place to transfer the results of these activities into application. Presumably the newly established Office of Homeland Securitv will take a lead role in the national counterterrorism effort, but that office does not have the expertise or budget to oversee a broad R&D effort.

The effectiveness of the nation's counterterrorism efforts could be improved if one agency were given the lead responsibility for coordinating and prioritizing,

.-in consultation with other interested agencies, nuclear and radiological. counter-terrorism R&D. Several federal agencies have R&D responsibilities and could potentially take the lead: DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) already has a large R&D effort on many of the issues addressed in this chapter and is carrying out that work at the three national laboratories under its control.16 The DOD's DTRA is carrvinL out R&D work to reduce threats from chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. This work is being carried out primarily by DOD contractors, including NNSA national labo-ratories. The USINRC also sponsors R&D on NPP safety and vulnerabilities, and some of this work is canied out at NNSA national laboratories.

Given its large budget and broad scope of current work, it appears that DOE-NNSA is best positioned to take a lead role for R&D on nuclear and radiological terrorism. The committee, however, has not had an opportunity to study this issue in detail, especially to examine the current R&D portfolios of NNSA and DTRA or their strategic planning documents. The President's science advisor, working with DOE, DOD, USNRC, and other agencies with a stake in this decision, may be in the best position to develop a recommendation to the Presi-dent regarding which agency should rake a lead role in this important R&D effort.

The desinadion of a lead agency also will require approval from the U.S. Congress.

16Lawrence Live.rnore Nadionai Laboratorv. LOs ALaMOS Naional Laboraory, and Sandia National L -boracotnes.

001002

64 MAKING THE NATION SAFER Recommendation 2.15: A single federal agency, possibly the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, should be designated as the nation's lead research and development agency for nuclear and radio-logical counterterrorism. This agency should develop a focused and adequately funded research and development program to fulfill this mission and should work with other federal agencies, the President's science advisor, and the director of the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate this work and ensure that effective mechanisms are in place for the timely transfer of results to the homeland defense effort.

The centralization of lead R&D responsibilities into a single federal agency is no guarantee of success absent commitments to certain operating principles.

Among these are commitments to appoint a technically capable staff to manage the R&D work; to provide sufficient and sustained funding to carry out an ad-equate program; and to reach across agency boundaries and outside government to obtain the expertise needed to execute the work and to ensure that results are moved expeditiously into application. While the events of September 11 appear to have produced a renewed sense of cooperation among federal agencies, the challenge for whichever agency is selected to lead this important R&D effort will be to nurture and sustain this spirit.

REFERENCES Department of Energy. 1994. Openness Press Conference Fact Sheerts, Office of the Press Secre-tary. Washington. D.C.

Department of Energy. 1996. Plutonium: 77te First 50 Years, Washington. D.C.. 82 pp.

Department of Energy. 1998. Commercial Nuclear Fuel from US. and Russian Surplus Defense Inventories: Materials, Policies, and Market Effecrs, DOE/EIA-0619, Energy Information Administrazion, Washington. D.C.. 115 pp.

Energy Information Administration. 2002. US. Nuclear Generation of Electricity. Available online at ehtnp:/jwww.eia.doe.govlcneaf/nuckar/pageInuc-generaion lgensumiml>.

Gonzalez. AJ. 1999. 'Strengthening the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radio-active Materials: Timely Action," LIEA Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 3. pp. 2-15.

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 2001.

Evaluation of the Linear-Novnhresnold Dose-Response Model for lonfring Radiation. Report No. 136. Bethesda. Md..

257 pp.

Private Fuel Storage. 2002. The PFS Facility Specificarionr. Available online at <htcp://

privatefuelstorage.comlproject/facility.hinl>.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2002. List of Power Reactor Units. Available online at

<hrtp::lwww.nrc.gov/reactaorsoperatingilist-power-reacwr-units.btml>.

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in eacn case a piicG v.-rcr:3iv fiew into one of the county's six orohi.bited f ignt zories, where no planes are allowed. cr inmo one of many restricted zones where air traffic is limited because of sensitive military or nuclear operations or special events.

The post-Sept. i1 incidents include four commercial jetliners and one medical helicopter that flew into the forbidden airspace protecting the White House. Capitol and vice presidential mansion in the nation's capital, officials said. The most recent incursion occurred this week.

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• :rgo Atri tes I-MM "Practically speakirg, by the time a violation is discovered. it is too late to do anything to prevent 2 crash into the White House.' former FAA security chief Bil!ie H. Vincent said.

FAA Deput4 Aaministrator Monte R. Belger said Thursday tne agercy recognizes there's little time to react once planes penetrate the safety zcne and so the governmer.t has imposed numerous other precautions to ensure planes with ill Intent Cfr't et close.

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• Commercial Transpo.-t

• Glcbal Feet/Capacity Post-Show Wrap-Jp defense," Beiger said-. The additional on-the-ground security procedures and in-flight protocols put in place give us a much higher level of confidence.'

Borders have beer, tightened; pilots, flight crews and passengers are screened to weed out possible terrorists, and planes approaching Washington or other prohibited zones must complete authentication procedures, including providing passwords.

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Mecanics Sue Ta SioCk Norttnwestit'"s Bacikground Checks SAS Re ecls Sweder's Proposal To increase Irrmigration Checks Cosmetic 'Knife' Shuts Down Del:a Hub at Cincinnat FAA enforcement records obtained by The Assoc;.ted Press shov! rpot pilots wsao have

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aor e tear f wvarn.ng etir o the I1 pilotc cn XA ¶ohn9ts tnat fiefs irnn Washington's no-fl'. zone since 1992, just one was fined, for S1.000. and nine had their licenses suscencied for between seven to 120 days, the records show. At least 90 *were settled with ad,-,instraive action - neary al Of them warnrno ietters the analysis sr;owe.

Just a month before tne Septernber hijackings. -

Mesa Airlines fight strayec into prohibited airspace over Washingtcr.. By Ncvember, the matter was clcsed with a warning letter to the pilot

- common for most cases.

_etweer Sec!. 1 I 2nd Marsch 5. the FAA recordecd 567 airspace violations across the country, ranging from prohibited airspace to special use zones where only certain planes may fly.

Of that number, 65 involved incursions into major prohibited or restricted sites. Nineteen of those cases alreacy have been resolved with no punishment or administrative letters, officials said.

Former Transportation Department Inspector General Mary Schiavo, who highlighted airline safety problems in the 1990s and now works as a lawyer representing airline accident victims, said the small number of severe punishments amounts

o laissez-faire enforcement.

"It is fairiy typical. The.AA really doesn't like to do enforcement act:ons, particularly any carrier

.nrri.gemrenr'. said Scniavo. a frequent FAA critic.

FA.4 officia.s said they had no plans to stiffen the Venailies, nless the number of incursions keeos growirnc. They said in most cases pilots mistakenly ntrded4 'tie airsace or w.e-Le blowvn `tz it by nic'n 001005 hE0o:. au w.av iation.-ow.comnvavnow news, channel corrmnjsp ?view=story&id=news/cscrty0...

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"They.generally aren't deliberate. They generally don't reflect poor skills or poor training,' Belger said. "if we do see a situation that is egregious or reflects a lack of training... we take appropriate action.'

Planes that violate Washington's prohibited zone are quickly warned by air traffic controllers to correct course, and the Secret Service is alerted.

Nearly all pilots comply immediately, officials said.

Military planes that patrol the capital skies are permitted to force such planes to land or. as a last resort. shoot them down if Dilots don't respond.

.ijone of the five planes tnat flew into the capiiai's orc~ecte';1 space since Sept. 11 have required SLICh acticn. officials said.

Washington's Reagan National airport was closed for more than a month after the attacks. and has been gradually reopened to traffic since despite reservations by the Secret Service.

One pilot died whren he crashed his small plane into the White House in September 1994-no one else was harmed. In 1999, a pilot drifted so close to the White House that agents fired a warning flare. That pilot ended up with a warning letter.

FAA records show.

The five most recent airspace violations are still being investigated. including a Frontier Airlines 737 jet that flew over the White House and vice presidential residence on Monday before correcting its path. That pilot has been grounded with pay pending the outcome of the investigation.

FAA records show violators of Washington's airspace over the past decade indude about three dozen pilots for major commercial airlines, one Air Force pilot, a NASA pilot, a handful of private or foreign pilots and several air transport companies.

One pilot caught in Washington's prohibited airspace blamed air traffic controllers, saying they are so busy they sometimes order flight maneuvers that send pilots into the prohibited zone.

"The D.C. controllers are absolutely horrible.

Washington National is absolutely the worst place to fly into. period," said Happy Wells, a 30-year veteran pilot from Oklahoma who was cited in July 1997 for flying his charter plane through Oa100C Washington's prohibited zone.

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4/1 0/021

I ar-t UI -t after.he filed a report with the FAA.

Outside Washington, there are five other prohibited zones: President Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas; the Bush family compound in Kennebunkport, Maine; the presidential retreat at Camp David in Thurmont, Md.; the Pantex nuclear assembly plant in Amarillo, Texas; and the area around George Washington's home at Mount Vernon, Va.

Elsewhere, there are numerous permanent and temporary restricted zones across the country.

They cover military and nuclear sites. special evemnu: iike the Winter Olyimpics in Utah and the Suoer rowi in.New Oreans, or places like News York a d Boston where threats have prompted emporary zones Since many restricted areas are temporary. FAA notifies pilots through a monthly publication. Over the past month, for example, the agency has warned pilots to stay out of certain areas such as a zone surrounding an auto race in Talladega, Aia., areas hosting aerial demonstrations by the Navy Blue Knights and Air Force Thunderbirds:

and Parts of AJaska where the officials are setting off pre-emptive avalanches.

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us INTERNATIONAL MONEYScope WEATHER LOCAL NEWS ENTERTAINMENT ESPN SPORTS SCI I TECH POLITICS HEALTH TRAVEL FEATURED SERVICES SHOPPING DOWNLOADS WIRELESS Subways, Scuba Divers, and Landmarks' Also: House Approves $29 Billion Anti-Terror Bill; Terrorist Chiefs Interrogation Leads to More Threat Warnings

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Now, Two Boys Face A Bigger Struggle MORE ON THIS STORY Terrorists May Use Scuba Divers, Planes W A S H I N G T 0 N, May 24-Terrorists may use scuba divers or small planes to attack targets in the United States, the FBI said today in the latest in a series of unconfirmed warnings.

'Recent information has determined that various terrorist elements have sought to develop an offensive scuba diver capability," the FBI said In an information bulletin issued by its National Infrastructure Protection Center.

"While there is no evidence of operational planning to utilize scuba divers to carry out attacks within the United States, there Is a body of information showing the desire to obtain such capability," the FBI said.

Citing 'uncorroborated Information," the FBI also discussed possible terrorists using small planes.

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• FBI Answers Critics With Anti.Tprr Toom "The Interest Is reportedly in the use of small aircraft, as opposed to large, commercial aircraft, due to post-September 11, 2001 enhancements in aviation security throughout the United States," the FBI and the Transportation Security Administration said in an alert to law enforcement.

The warnings are the latest in a string Issued this week.

Federal transportation officials said in an alert made public Thursday that they have gotten an unconfirmed warning that terrorists are planning attacks on subways in the United States.

The possible attack would involve simultaneous strikes against multiple trains, perhaps using time bombs, said an alert issued by the Department of Transportation's Office of Intelligence and Security and obtained by ABCNEWS.

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r"uhvUoIl uIuwvcuus...1g awaja1,mu cwu, o yUUwo, it emv5001.1 all logo and transit security officials to review their safety procedures and implement additional security measures commensurate with the current threat environment."

It emphasized that the threat was not confirmed, but advised the industry to remain on a heightened state of alert.

The subway warning is particularly unsettling to New Yorkers, where millions of people ride the city's subways every day. Residents there were told this week that the Brooklyn Bridge or the Statue of Uberty could be targeted by terrorists.

And around the country, federal officials warned building managers to be on the lookout for terrorists trying to rent apartments for the purpose of planting explosives.

Apartment building management companies sent copies of the warning to residents of some buildings in New York and Los Angeles earlier this week.

-ABCNEWS.com House Approves $29 Billion Anti-Terror Bill W A S H I N G T 0 N, May 24-The House approved $29 billion early today for the fight against terrorism overseas and at home as the two parties grappled in a bitter election-year spat over war and the growing national debt.

Democrats and Republicans alike strongly backed the money the package would provide. Billions would be showered on the military, on Afghanistan and other U.S.

allies, on rebuilding New York, and on the Coast Guard, explosive detection devices for airports, and other anti-terror initiatives.

Even so, the measure's 280-138 passage came only after bleary-eyed lawmakers had battled until nearly 3 a.m. ET over issues that could resound in this fall's campaigns for congressional control. The overnight session highlighted a GOP resolve to not start lawmakers' Memorial Day recess without passage of a counterterrorism bill they could tell voters about.

Over three days of unusually acerbic debate, Democrats accused Republicans of sneaking a borrowing Increase Into the bill while the GOP said Democrats were hindering money sorely needed by American troops abroad.

"They retreated from our responsibility to put politics aside when the time comes to strengthen our country," taunted House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, R-Texas.

That prompted Democrats to accuse Republicans of smearing them by questioning their patriotism, as all pretenses that the war against terror should not become a political issue seemed to fade away.

"We don't want those soldiers used for your agenda," said Rep. Patrick Kennedy, D-R.l.

The Senate's anti-terror legislation was facing its own contentious path. The appropriations committee passed a $31 billion version of the bill on Wednesday. But Republicans, eager to trim It closer to the $27.1 billion President Bush proposed in March, blocked debate until Congress returns next month.

More than half the House's Democrats ended up voting against the bill. Their chief objection was that majority Republicans had forced language into it that would pave the way for raising the current $5.95 trillion cap on federal borrowing.

The Bush administration wants a $750 billion boost in that limit enacted by late June, saying an unprecedented federal default otherwise awaits. It will be the first since 1997, when annual deficits turned to surpluses under President Clinton.

Democrats concede a borrowing increase is inevitable, but say it was forced by last 0 01009 vear's GOP-written tax cut Thev sav that means Social Securitv suroluses will have to http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/homefront0020524.htmI

//20 8/9/2002

be diverted to pay for other programs -

which while true will not affect the program's benefits-or solvency, but gives them a political issue to raise.

The money is for the remaining months of fiscal 2002, which ends Oct. 1. It Is the second installment of anti-terrorism spending since the Sept 11 attacks, following $40 billion lawmakers approved late last year.

The military would get the lion's share of the money: $14 billion in the Bush and Senate proposals, $15.8 billion under the Senate bill. Those funds would go for everything from bomb guidance systems to the Reserves and National Guard.

New York would get $5.5 billion under all three plans to rebuild from the Sept 11 attacks on lower Manhattan. Most of the rest is for domestic security programs like staffing the new Transportation Security Administration, modernizing FBI computers and buttressing security at Energy Department nuclear weapons facilities.

The House bill would temporarily freeze the $10 billion loan guarantee program that Congress created late last year to help airlines whose business was eroded by the terrorist strikes.

US Airways officials have lobbied unsuccessfully so far to remove the provision, which lawmakers supporting them said could mean the airline will go out of business this summer. GOP leaders say the carrier should be able to get loans to carry It over until the fall, when the federal loans will be available again.

The Senate bill trims the loan program to $429 million this fiscal year and to $4 billion permanently.

-The Associated Press Terrorist Chief's Interrogation Leads to More Threat Warnings W A S H I N G T 0 N, May 24-The words of Abu Zubaydah have set counterterrorism officials into motion again, even as they wonder if the captured al Qaeda field commander Is lying just to create panic.

Law enforcement and other U.S. officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Thursday that Abu Zubaydah's claims led to this week's warnings of potential terrorist attacks on the Brooklyn Bridge and the Statue of Uberty.

He did not provide a date or method of attack, and officials called his statements uncorroborated. But they canceled a 119th birthday celebration for the bridge anyway.

The level of the U.S. response to the warnings is a testament to Abu Zubaydah's seniority within al Qaeda, officials say. He is the highest-ranking terrorist leader to come into U.S. custody since the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Officials have been able to verify at least some of his statements to CIA and FBI interrogators.

"He has told us things we didn't know before that we subsequently were able to confirm," said one senior official. 'Not everything he says is bogus."

On the other hand, officials say some of his statements are certainly lies or boasting, intended to promote al Qaeda's ends by confusing investigators and scaring Americans. Abu Zubaydah speaks English.

Other threats from Abu Zubaydah have reached the public's ears: He was the key source for last month's threat to banks in the northeastern United States, and he also claimed al Qaeda was building a radiological weapon, a so-called dirty bomb that spreads harmful radioactive substances but does not ignite a nuclear detonation.

Officials have said threats linked to Abu Zubaydah are only publicized when they match other information.

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//20 8/9/2002

He also recently told his interrogators that United Airlines Flight 93, the hijacked plane that crashed in Pennsylvania on Sept. 11 after its passengers fought back, was aimed at the White House. Officials had, previously assumed the White House was its likely destination but said the U.S. Capitol and CIA headquarters were other potential targets.

Intelligence officials say al Qaeda typically keeps going after the same target until it conducts a successful strike, noting the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center as well as the January 2000 attempt to bomb a U.S. destroyer in Yemen -

months before the successful bombing of the USS Cole.

Officials describe Abu Zubaydah, a Saudi-born Palestinian, as a link between bin Laden and many of al Qaeda's operational cells. Abu Zubaydah ran the Khalden camp in Afghanistan, where U.S. investigators believe many of the Sept 11 hijackers trained.

He also had telephone contacts with at least one student at U.S. flight schools, according to a July 10, 2001, memo from a Phoenix FBI agent.

Earlier, he is believed to have masterminded the failed millennium bombing plots in Los Angeles and Jordan, and he has been linked to failed plots on the U.S. embassies in Paris and Sarajevo.

U.S. and Pakistani authorities captured and wounded Abu Zubaydah In a raid in Faisalabad, Pakistan, In late March.

They also found his notebook, which officials say may contain a more accurate account of his plans.

His location remains undisclosed but he is thought to be away from U.S. soil.

He shbuldn't know the furor his statements are causing, If his interrogators are using standard techniques that would keep him uninformed. This would allow them to tell him only what they want about events In the outside world.

The Associated Press 8

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Homel U.S.l World) Politicsk SciTechh HealthWatchl Entertainments Opinionl In-Depthll News Summaryi April 23. 200215:56:05 sfE The Early Show CBS Evening News 48 Hours 60 Minutes 60 Minutes All Bro Ug

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E E-mail This Story Jg Printable Version Dozens Of Airport Workers Arrested WASHINGTON, April 23, 2002 Eye On Air Safety (CBS) Federal authorities Tuesday rounded up 94 wkorkers at Washington-area airports on a variety of charges from illegal immigration to lying about a criminal background, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced.

The arrests at Dulles and Reagan National airports were part of a continuing post-

,Sept. 11 crackdown by U.S. law enforcement and transportation authorities ion airport security lapses.

Ashcroft said the workers allegedly gained access to secure areas of the airports 'by lying on security applications," using false Social Security numbers or committing various immigration frauds."

See how turbulence affects an airplane, test your flight survival knowledge and see how black boxes help crash investigators piece together what happened.

America On Guard (CBS)

"There will be zero tolerance of security breaches at our nation's airports."

Attorney General John Ashcroft The terror attacks in the U.S. and air strikes on Afghanistan have forced the nation to toughen its national security. Find out what actions are being taken to protect our nation in the air, water and on land.

"There will be zero tolerance of security breaches at our nation's airports,"

Aschroft said.

CBS News Correspondent Stephanie Lambidakis reports most of those arrested are Hispanic and none are being charged with terrorism-related offenses.

Tuesday's operation was a joint effort that included the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, federal prosecutors and the Transportation Department's inspector general.

Similar arrests have occurred in recent weeks in Phoenix, Las Vegas, Salt Lake City and San Francisco. In all, about 400 workers have been arrested since Sept. 11, including those on Tuesday, officials said.

The investigation, called Operation Tarmac, had spread to 10 airports before Tuesday's arrests.

Many of those arrested Tuesday were illegal aliens and could be deported; others face prison terms or fines of up to $250,000, officials said.

Most of the workers arrested had security badges allowing them to get onto planes, ramps, runways and cargo areas, law enforcement officials said. They were employed by private companies, such as those that clean the airplanes or operate airport restaurants.

While law enforcement officials said none of those arrested have been linked to terrorism, some aviation experts said the workers were in a position to help smuggle bombs or weapons aboard aircraft.

U.S. authorities believe that the Sept. 11 hijackers carried knives and box Story Closing Airport Security Holes 4a) Story Airport Security Vs. Efficiency Story Back To School For Airport Security Story DC Airspace Violations Not Unusual Story

$29 Price Tag For Airport Security Story Airport Security Gets An 'P Story Air Security vs. Commerce 001012 http://www.cbsnews.conlstories/2002/04/2'.3/national/main5O7008.shtmI

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cutters past security checkpoints and there was no evidence that the weapons were put on board by rogue employees, a law enforcement official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

C MMII, CBS Worldwide Inc. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast. rewritten, or redistributed. The Associated Press and Reuters Limited contributed to this report.

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Page I of 2 SciTechk HealthWatchk Entertainment Opinioni In-Depthk News SummarYk March 25, 2002 18:59:14 s

The Early Show CBS Evening News 48 Hours 60 Minutes 60 Minutes All Br WAR ON TERROR "._- Section Front Search:

M E-mail This Story a Printable Version I

xa Or Airport Security Gets An 'F' March 25. 2002 America On Guard (CBSIAP)

(CBS) The Transgortation Department insector general found airport security screeners on several dozen occasions failed to catch guns and simulated explosives, even after the September terrorist attacks, a person familiar with the report said Monday.

Inspector General Kenneth Mead's report found screeners missed knives 70 perCeg ot te time, guns__

30preto e time and simulated explos 0percent th time, said the source speaking on condition of anony CBS News Correspondent Jim Axelrod reports these findings support what a CBS News investigation first revealed last month. In that investigation, lead-lined film bags, which block x-ray exams, passed screenings unchecked 70% of the time.

'The FAA and the TSA have worked closely with the inspector general's office to address security issues and have taken immediate action any time we've been notified about problems."

FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown The terror attacks in the U.S. and air strikes on Afghanistan have forced the nation to toughen its national security. Find out what actions are being taken to protect our nation in the air, water and on land.

) Story Counterfeit Crackdown 0 Story Phony IDs, Real Danger

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Story Airport Security Fails Test

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Story Nuke Plant Security Concerns

) Story Air Security vs. Commerce is Story Security Switch At O'Hare C

Story New Airport Security Devices Debut Tests of the security system were conducted at 32 airports while the screening checkpoints were still primarily under the supervision of the airline industry, with some oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration. The new Transportation Security Administration took over responsibility for airline security Feb. 17.

Security administration spokesman Paul Turk said the White House requested the investigation. The idea was to get a realistic assessment of potential needs,' he said.

Some of the same companies doing the work during the audit period are still stationed at security checkpoints under contracts that will run until a new federal work force of screeners is phased in between May and mid-November.

Transportation Department officials would not comment on the audit details, saying its results were too sensitive to reveal publicly.

Aviation regulators defended actions to tighten security at airports in the months after Sept. 11.

"The FM and the TSA have worked closely with the inspector general's office to address security issues and have taken immediate action any time we've been notified about problems," said FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown.

The security agency is hiring 30,000 federal employees to take over passenger screening. On Monday, it began training the first 300 of 1,200 senior supervisors, who will run the airport checkpoints. The other 900 will be 0 01014 http:ii/w'ww.cbsnews.conivstories/2-002/03~/25/attack/main504553.shtmI

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Z.c 0 u1 L trained over the next three weeks. The supervisors all have law enforcement, security or military backgrounds, Turk said.

Following several well-publicized post-Sept 11 incidents, Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta in October ordered government officials to close airport concourses and re-screen passengers.

Security breaches caused the government to evacuate 59 airport concourses or terminals between Oct. 30 and March 7, forcing 2,456 flights to be delayed or canceled, the FAA says. Passengers on another 734 flights had to leave their seats and go through security a second time, the FAA said.

Former FAA security chief Billie Vincent said the report was not surprising, considering the checkpoints were staffed by the same low-paid, poorly trained screeners who were there before Sept. 11.

In addition, Vincent said, current equipment cannot detect explosives, nor can it detect many varieties of cutting tools.

'The technology at the screening points is not there," Vincent said. "The current metal detectors won't do the job. If you turn it high enough to detect that much metal, you will have an alarm on every person going through."

©*4MVII CBS Wor ti;de Inc. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be publisheu broadcast. rewvritten, or redistributed The Associated Press and Reuters Liniteod contributed ic Ihis report.

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NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR PLANT SHUTDOWN ON SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES Edwin S. Lyman, PhD Scientific Director DRAFT: February 12,2002 OVERVIEW In the core of an operating nuclear reactor, many different fission product isotopes are produced. Some have relatively long half-lives, such as cesium-137 (30 years).

Others have relatively short half-lives. After the reactor is shut down, many of the short-lived fission products decay away rapidly, leading to a reduction in the "source term" --

e.g. the quantity of radionuclides that are available to be released in an accident This memorandum presents the results of a calculation of the approximate reduction in consequences (both latent cancer fatalities and early fatalities from acute radiation syndrome) of a severe core melt accident following reactor shutdown.

LIMITATIONS This calculation does not attempt to calculate any change in the Drobability of a core melt accident that may result from reactor shutdown. Numerous studies have indicated that the probability of core damage at nuclear plants during outages is comparable to the probability at full power. This result, however, may depend on the fact that much safety equipment is unavailable during outages for maintenance. The risk of containment failure from overpressure is likely to be lower at shutdown plants.

The calculation also assumes that the "release fractions" -- the fractions of core radionuclides that would be released to the environment in a severe accident -

are the same for both full-power and shutdown modes. This simplifying assumption is commonly made but does not take into account changes to the release fraction that may result from the different thermal and chemical conditions that the core would encounter during an accident in shutdown mode.

O0loif;

METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS A generic pressurized-water reactor (PWR) with a capacity of approximately 1000 MWe was analyzed. Core inventories were obtained using the Oak Ridge National Laboratory SCALE 4.3 code for an end-of-cycle (EOC) core at full-power and for a core at twenty days after shutdown. Code parameters were based on a typical U.S. PWR core management scenario. Additional details may be found in a recent publication.'

Severe accident consequences were calculated using the Sandia National Laboratories MACCS2 code. The calculations assumed uniform population densities of 354 persons/sq. km and 962 persons/sq. km for the regions within 10 miles of the plant and between 10 and 50 miles of the plant, respectively. These values correspond approximately to a total of nineteen million individuals within 50 miles, with 288,000 individuals within 10 miles -- the values for the Indian Point plant. A single set of weather conditions was chosen for simplicity. Finally, latent cancer fatalities calculated below do include chronic radiation exposures due to long-term contamination, but numerous generic assumptions were made for this estimate. None of these assumptions would be appropriate for an accurate, site-specific calculation of the absolute number of latent cancer fatalities in a particular region, since the results would depend strongly on the actual population distribution and weather conditions. However, they are adequate for the purposes of this calculation, which seeks to calculate the relative consequences of accidents during full-power and shutdown modes.

Appropriate release fractions for a severe accident with early containment failure were developed from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reports. Further details are available in Reference 1.

The calculations assume that 85% of individuals located within 10 miles of the reactor are evacuated. However, the relative consequence ratios obtained below are insensitive to this assumption.

RESULTS Table 1 presents the results of the calculation.

Full-power 20 days after Ratio of SD to FP shutdown Latent cancer 53,960 26,870 0.50 fatalities within 50 miles I

I Acute fatalities 867 166 0.19 within 10 miles I

I 2 Edwin S. Lyman, "Public Health Risks of Substituting Mixed-Oxide for Uranium Fuel in Pressurized-Water Reactors," Science and Global Secunrty 9 (1) 33.

001017

CONCLUSIONS At twenty days after shutdown, a severe accident with containment failure will result in approximately 50% fewer latent cancer fatalities within 50 miles of the plant, and approximately 81% fewer acute fatalities within 10 miles of the plant, for the generic model considered.

001018

SECURITY GAP:

A Hard Look At the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security Staff Summary of Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Correspondence from

-Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

Member, Energy and Commerce Committee U.S. House of Representatives March 25,2002 EMBARGOED UNTIL MONDAY MARCH 25, 2002 12:01 AM 001019

Page 2 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 Contents Heading Page Introduction 3

I) The NRC is Not Adequately Overseeing Security at Nuclear Reactors 4

A) The NRC does not know how many foreign nationals are employed 4

at nuclear reactors, and does not require adequate background checks of nuclear reactor employees that would determine whether an employee was a member of a terrorist organization B) The NRC does not know what its licensees spend on security or 5

how many security guards are employed at each reactor

11) Nuclear Reactors and Impact by Aircraft 5

A) Twenty-one nuclear reactors are located within 5 miles of an airport 5

B) 96 percent of U.S. nuclear reactors were designed without regard to 6

the potential for impact from even a small aircraft C) Aircraft impact to the containment structure of a nuclear reactor is 7

not the only way an aircraft could cause a full-scale core meltdown D) The NRC has rejected placing anti-aircraft capabilities at nuclear 8

facilities, even though other countries have chosen to do so and even though many reactors are located very close to airports lii) Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel is Inadequate 8

A) Spent nuclear fuel in significant quantities exists at reactors all 8

across the U.S. and is stored in buildings that are not hardened structures B) Security of spent nuclear fuel at decommissioned reactors is lower 9

than that at operating reactors in part because licensees obtained exemptions to the security regulations. The NRC assumed that spent fuel fires would only occur as a result of an accident, and failed to consider fires that occurred as a result of a terrorist attack C) The NRC has not experimentally determined how long a fire spent 10 fuel casks can withstand, and has not provided information on worst-case consequences of a breach of a spent fuel cask IV) Security at Nuclear Reactors Continues to be Inadequate Even After 10 September 1I1t A) It took the NRC almost 6 months after September 1 1" to require 10 enhanced security at nuclear reactors B) The NRC has historically failed to adjust the security regulations to 11 meet the evolving threat, and has yet to begin a permanent revision of security regulations following the events of September 11 C) Security exercises at nuclear reactor sites are inadequate, and sites 12 continue to fail the exercises about 50% of the time Appendix A 14 Appendix B 17 001020

Page 3 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 Introduction Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Rep. Markey initiated a series of letters to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding our nation's preparedness for similar attacks on civilian nuclear targets. The possibility of a terrorist attack on a civilian nuclear power plant is not new. In fact it is anticipated in requirements, referred to as the

'Design Basis Threat," that all plant operators must meet when they build a civilian nuclear power-plant in the United States. Unfortunately, prior to 9-11, the NRC was in the process of systematically backing away from rigorous enforcement of those requirements, and post 9-11, it has failed to upgrade the Design Basis Threat to take into account the new reality of terrorists acting in large groups carrying a sophisticated understanding of the technical aspects of their target and a commitment to suicide as the price to be paid for accomplishing their goal. The threat is no longer theoretical.

President Bush has remarked on the discovery of Al Qaeda documents showing the plans of civilian nuclear targets, and Al Qaeda operatives have given testimony asserting their interest in targeting nuclear materials and civilian nuclear power-plants'.

Although Rep. Markey's concerns regarding the terrorist threat to civilian nuclear power-plants have been expressed in correspondence with the NRC over many years,2 the basis of the current analysis can be found in the letters sent by Rep. Markey to the NRC following 9-11 (November 15, November 19 and November 27, 2001) and the NRC's responses forward to Rep. Markey on March 4, 2002 (hereafter referred to as the NRC Response). (The NRC has yet to respond to Rep. Markey's December 4, 2001 letter NRC regarding the security of radioactive materials.)

The NRC requested that some responses to these questions be kept confidential for security reasons. We have done so while compiling this analysis. The full correspondence (other than the documents NRC has requested we not make publicly available) on which this analysis is based can be found at htto:/Awwm.house.Qov/markev/iss terrorsm.htm.

5 See, for example: mBin Laden Sought Uranium, Jury Told,* Washington Post, February 8, 2001; 2 Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say, Washington Post, December 12,2001; President Bush State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002; ONuclear Plants Targeted,* Washinaton Times.

January 31, 2002; 2 See httD:I/wwwhouse.aovlmarkevirss terrodsm.htm for copies of Rep. Markey's January 15, 1991, February 28, 1991 and January 27, 1992 letters to the NRC supporting a petition to require an upgrade to NRC's security rules for truck bombs and other threats, the May 8, 1997 letter to the NRC on combustibility of nuclear reactor materials, the November 8, 1998 letters to the National Security Counsel and the NRC on terrorism at nuclear reactors, the February 23, 1999 letter to the NRC on nuclear reactor terrorism, the July 8, 1999 letter to the NRC on the suspension of force-on-force security exercises, the February 4, 2000 letter to the NRC on radiological sabotage at domestic nuclear reactors, the September 20, 2001 letter to the NRC on nuclear reactor terrorism in light of the events of September 111, the November 15, 2001 letter to the NRC on nuclear reactor terrorism in light of the events of September 11",

the November 19, 2001 letter to the NRC on security at spent nuclear fuel facilities, the November 27, 2001 letter on aircraft threats to nuclear reactors, the December 4, 2001 letter to the NRC on the security of nuclear materials and the January 16, 2002 letters to the NRC, U.S. Customs, Fedex and UPS on security associated with the shipment of radioactive materials.

0 0 I 1

Page 4 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 The NRC Is Not Adequately Overseeing Security at Nuclear Reactors Rep. Markey's letter requested information regarding the numbers and screening procedures for reactor employees who are foreign nationals, as well as information related to the security forces at each reactor. The responses indicate that the NRC is in the dark about what nuclear reactor licensees are doing to ensure the reactors are safe from attack.

A) The NRC does not know how many foreign nationals are employed at nuclear reactors, and does not require adequate background checks of nuclear reactor employees that would determine whether an employee was a member of a terrorist organization3 According to the NRC Response, NRC Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants requires that a criminal background check be performed on prospective employees seeking to obtain unescorted access to protected and vital areas of a nuclear power plant. However, the NRC Response states that Wthe search is limited to the United States" and that "Licensees determine access to the facility regarding foreign applicants on a "best effort" basis and the applicants are screened and processed as any other individual according to federal requirements." It is unacceptable that the NRC neither-has a policy on screening of foreign nationals, nor does it know what its licensees' policies are. Terrorists may now be employed at nuclear reactors in the U.S. just as terrorists enrolled at flight schools in the U.S.

According to the NRC Response, crimes committed overseas by foreign job applicants are not even looked for. Moreover, although Rep. Markey requested whether security background checks would be conducted in order to determine whether an individual is a member of a domestic or foreign group that seeks to do harm to the U.S.

(such as Al Qaeda), the NRC did not indicate that such checks have been performed in the past or would be done in the future. The NRC Response also stated that the NRC has no idea how many foreign nationals are employed at nuclear power plants, though individual licensees would have such records. lt states that the screening requirements do not require the [foreign] applicants to declare any affiliation with terrorist organizations, although the background investigation, including criminal history, may uncover information that may lead to discovery of such affiliation.'

In short, i appears that Al Qaeda operatives such as Mohamed Atta or Marwan al-Shehhi could pass the narrow nature of the criminal screening still in use at U.S.

nuclear power-plants and gain unescorted access to the controlled area of a plant, just as they obtained student visas to attend flight school. As long as they have no criminal record in this country, Al Qaeda operatives are not required to pass any security check intended to find and expose terrorist links prior to their employment 3 See Page 9-12 of the NRC Response 001 I) ? 9

Page 5 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 B) The NRC Does Not Know What Its Licensees Spend on Security or How Many Security Guards are Employed at Each Reactor According to the NRC Response:

The NRC has approved the use of new technologies that replaced security guards at some reactors. The NRC Response states that 'the NRC does not require licensees to submit information concerning security expenditures. The NRC also does not have information on the number of security personnel at each facility over the last ten years."4 The NRC Response states that "the number of security employees varies in accordance with a number of factors, including site design, geography, and response strategies.05 It is appalling that the NRC does not require licensees to submit information regarding the licensee's security resources, expenditures and capabilities. While new technologies may be a supplement to security guard forces, only security guard forces would be able to combat an armed attack on a nuclear reactor. The NRC must ensure that there are sufficient security guard forces to repel attacks by a large group of technologically sophisticated and suicidal attackers who may be assisted by insiders working at the reactors who disarm whatever new technologies have been installed.

11)

Nuclear Reactors and Impact by Aircraft A) Twenty-one nuclear reactors are located within 6 miles of an airport Although an NRC Task Force recommended in NUREG-0625 that nuclear reactors not be sited within 5 miles of a major or commercial airport, the NRC acknowledged that 21 reactors are located within 5 miles of an airport6:

Name of reactor Nearest Proximity to airport cityltown Three Mile Island Harrisburg, PA 3 miles from Harrisburg International Airport Maine Yankee Wiscasset, ME I mile from Wiscasset Municipal Airport H. B. Robinson Columbia, SC 2.2 miles from Hartsville Regional Airport Limerick 1,2 Philadelphia, PA 2.2 miles away from Pottsdown-Limerick airport and 5 miles away from Pottsdown Municipal Airport Seabrook Portsmouth, NH 4.6 miles away from Hampton Airfield airport, 6.5 miles away from Cole Farm 4 See Page 13 of the NRC Response

' See Page 14 of the NRC Response See Pages 83-84 of the NRC Response for airport information, and htp:/Awww.nrc.oov/reactors/ooeratincilist-oower-reactor-units.html for locations of reactors 001023

Page 6 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 airport and 7.1 miles away from Plum Island airport Wolf Creek Burlington, KS 4.5 miles away from Coffey County airport Clinton Power Station Clinton, IL located 4.5 and 4.75 miles away from 2 private airports Catawba 1,2 Rock Hills, SC 4.2 miles away from Rock Hill airport Dresden 2, 3 Morris, IL Within 5 miles of 2 private airports Brunswick 1,2 Southport, NC 4 miles away from Brunswick County airport Palisades South Haven, Ml located 3.6 miles away from South Haven Area Regional airport Kewaunee Greenbay, WI 3.7 miles from Ranch Side airport Duane Arnold Cedar Rapids, IA 4.6 and 5.3 miles away from 2 private airports Braidwood 1,2 Joilet, IL within 5 miles of 2 private airports LaSalle 1,2 Ottawa, IL located 2.5 and 4.3 miles away from 2 private airports B) 96 percent (all but 4 of the I103) of U.S. nuclear reactors were designed without regard to the potential for Impact from even a small aircraft The planes that struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were Boeing 757s and 767s which have a maximum-takeoff weight of 272,500 - 450,000 pounds at takeoff. 7What would happen if they had struck a U.S. nuclear reactor instead?

There are 103 active cvilian nuclear reactors in the U.S. According to the NRC, the licensees of 43 of those reactors on 28 sites did not even consider the probability of an accidental aircraft impact when the reactors were designed, built and licensed. In an additional 56 reactors on 37 sites, the licensees concluded that the probability of an accidental aircraft impact was so low that it did not have to be incorporated into the designs for the reactors.

In no case has anv U.S. licensee considered the Dossibilitv of a deliberate aircraft impact such as the one that occurred on September 11. 2001.8 According to the NRC Response, only 4 U.S. reactors include any design features calculated to withstand the impact of an airplane. The Limerick (Philadelphia, PA) and Seabrook (Portsmouth, NH) reactor designs were evaluated to consider impacts from aircraft weighing up to 12,500 pounds - less than 3-5 percent of the weight of the Boeing 757s1767s aimed at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.9 Only the Three Mile Island units I and 2 near Harrisburg, PA, were designed with the impact of a large airliner in mind. According to the NRC Response, Unit 1 was

' See htto:llwww.boeina.comncommerciaV/767familvftechnical.html and httv://www.boeinp.con/commerciaV757-300/oroduct.html

'See Pages 74-76 of the NRC Response See Page 73, 75 of the NRC Response 001024

Page 7 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 designed with 'reinforcement of outer walls, thickening of concrete sections, and unique internal features. In addition, special fire protection and ventilation features were provided to cope with aircraft crashes. Similar features were incorporated in Three Mile Island Unit 2." The design features were made so that the reactors could withstand the impact of planes weighing up to 200,000 pounds.' 0 Nuclear reactors licensed by Switzerland are designed to withstand the impact of a 44,092 pound airplane traveling at 481 miles per hour, the reactor buildings have I meter-thick reinforced concrete walls, and spatial separation of redundant or diverse safety devices is required. According to the NRC Response, 'Germany and possibly other European countries also require nuclear containment structures to withstand the crash of certain types of military and commercial aircraft."

The NRC Response states that the U.S. chose not to require additional protection against the impact of an aircraft because "The likelihood of an airplane accidentally crashing onto a reactor site in the U.S. is typically much lower than in Europe."'

C) Aircraft Impact To The Containment Structure Of A Nuclear Reactor Is Not The Only Way An Aircraft Could Cause A Full-Scale Core Meltdown The NRC Response acknowledges that there are buildings other than the core of the reactor (which is a hardened structure) that could lead to a core meltdown if destroyed by the impact of a commercial aircraft:

"The NRC recognizes that aircraft crashes may result in multiple-failure initiating events, and that non-safety system malfunctions could contribute to such events. 2 If all electrical power to a reactor was cut off (by a deliberate crash of an aircraft into the power generating systems, for example), the time it would take for damage to the reactor core to begin is estimated by the NRC to be about two hours'3.

Support systems for the reactor, such as the cooling system, are not located within buildings that are hardened (such as the reactor core) and "are not designed to withstand the direct impact of a large commercial aircraft." The destruction of some of these buildings could lead to core damage.1" These acknowledgments by the NRC are highly significant, because they indicate that claims by the nuclear industry that existing plants would be able to withstand a terrorist aircraft or other attack due to the strength of containment structures are 10See Pages 71-72, 76-79, 83 of the NRC Response

" See Pages 32-33 of the NRC Response 12 See Page 82 of the NRC Response 13See Pages 94-95, 97-99 of the NRC Response 4See Page 96 of the NRC Response 001025

Page 8 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 irrelevant to the very real risk that terrorists might target critical support infrastructure whose destruction could result in a catastrophic nuclear accident.

D) The NRC Has Rejected Placing Anti-Aircraft Capabilities At Nuclear Facilities, Even Though Other Countries Have Chosen To Do So And Even Though Many Reactors Are Located Very Close To Airports The NRC Response states that it 'believes that the proper way to deal with the potential hijacking of large commercial aircraft by suicidal terrorists is through the measures on airline security now well underway. 05 Temporary no-fly-zones above nuclear reactors were imposed on November 2, 2001 but were removed less than a week later. While it is our hope that airline security measures now well underway will prevent future hijackings, the absence of no-fly-zones and the proximity of many nuclear reactors to airports lead many experts to believe that anti-aircraft systems on the ground at or near reactor locations is necessary to assure security.

France has deployed anti-aircraft weaponry at its reprocessing facility in La Hague, and similar measures have reportedly been taken at nuclear facilities in Hungary.

Nevertheless, the NRC has concluded that it "sees no need to deploy anti-aircraft weaponry at any commercial nuclear facilities in the United States. After consultation with the Department of Defense, the Office of Homeland Security, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Commission believes that there would be enormous command and control problems and a large potential for unintended consequences and collateral damages if such weaponry were deployed. The Commission believes that the proper way to deal with the potential hijacking of large commercial aircraft by suicidal terrorists is through the measures on airline security now well underway.."3 The no-fly-zones around nuclear reactors were lifted after less than a week. The NRC has acknowledged that nuclear reactors were not designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft, and that 21 of the reactors in the U.S. are located within 5 miles of an airport. Rep. Markey strongly believes that equipping the reactor sites with anti-aircraft weaponry would enhance security greatly.

111) Security Of Spent Nuclear Fuel Is Inadequate A) Spent Nuclear Fuel In Significant Quantities Exists At Reactors All Across The U.S. and Is Stored In Buildings That Are Not Hardened Structures.

Pages 38-41 of the NRC Response contain a 1998 table of how much spent nuclear fuel is stored in the spent fuel pool (i.e. outside the better-protected reactor core building) in each operating reactor in the country. The closest cityltown to each reactor 15 See Page 30 of the NRC Response 16 See Page 30 of the NRC Response 001026

Page 9 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 was added by Rep. Markey's staff using information obtained from NRC's website.17 The table is included as Appendix A of this report. At any reactor that has continued operating since the 1998 list was compiled, the amounts of spent nuclear fuel would, of course, have continued to accumulate and be higher today. Information on decommissioned reactors was not complete and does not seem to be available on the NRC website.

B) Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel at Decommissioned Reactors is Lower than that at Operating Reactors In Part Because Licensees Obtained Exemptions to the Security Regulations. The NRC Assumed That Spent Fuel Fires Would Only Occur As The Result Of An Accident, And Failed To Consider Fires That Occurred As A Result Of A Terrorist Attack.18 The NRC Response conceded that uNRC regulations do not require dry cask storage areas to be protected by armed guards or vehicle barriers" and that uA watchman is required with the ability to contact and have the local law enforcement agencies respond immediately to an event." The NRC also allowed licensees of these sites to reduce the amount of insurance coverage they must obtain. Force-on-force exercises have never been conducted at a decommissioned reactor in order to determine whether the exemptions to security requested and received by licensees were appropriate from a security perspective.

Prior to September I1th, the security requirements for non-operating reactors (i.e.

those that contain stores of spent nuclear fuel but do not produce electricity any longer) were non-uniform because some licensees had obtained exemptions to the security regulations. Since September 11t, the NRC has issued a security advisory to require vehicle barriers and armed responders at these sites. However, as is noted on page 3 of the NRC Response, an advisory is a 'guidance document that is not, in itself, legally binding.'

The reason why licensees of these facilities requested and received exemptions from the security requirements is because the NRC assumed that the greatest safety risk at a decommissioned reactor, a zirconium fire, would only occur accidentally, and that the risk of such an accident was very low. NRC did not evaluate the risk that a terrorist attack could intentionally cause a zirconium fire, it did not attempt to update estimates for the costs associated with a zirconium fire, and failed to respond to Rep.

Markey's questions related to whether it had performed worst-case analyses of the consequences of such a fire.

The NRC Response stated that 'There is a possibility that, with enough explosives, both a spent nuclear fuel pool or spent fuel dry cask can be penetrated." However, in its consideration of whether licensees should be able to reduce safety and insurance coverage at these sites, the NRC assumed that a zirconium fire would be accidental and would therefore require more than 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to ignite as a result of accidental 17 See http:l/www.nrc.govlreactors/operatinglist-power-reactor-units.html 1t See Pages 42-64 of the NRC Response for references for this section 00102~

Page 10 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 drainage of the spent nuclear fuel pool. The NRC has not considered an 'external heat source," such as an explosion caused by a terrorist attack, in arriving at the 20-hour estimate.

Rep. Markey strongly believes that all security exemptions received by licensees of these sites should be immediately revoked.Security at spent fuel sites needs to be dramatically and immediately upgraded and no lessening of this higher standard should

• be contemplated unless and until an economic, safety and health analysis of the worst-case consequences associated with a successful terrorist attack at these sites has been completed and has justified a reduction.

C) The NRC Has Not Experimentally Determined How Long A Fire Spent Fuel Casks Can Withstand, And Has Not Provided Information On Worst-Case Consequences Of A Breach Of A Spent Fuel Cask.

In prior correspondence, the NRC dismissed the possibility that a fire caused by an aircraft at a spent nuclear fuel facility-would last for more than "a matter of minutes,'

because NRC assumed that only 200 gallons of jet fuel would be available to feed the fire. However, a typical large commercial aircraft contains more than 20,000 gallons of jet fuel.

The NRC Response states that 'the staff performed an analysis of a seven-hour fire duration. The results from the analysis did not lead to fuel failure or cask failure.' 9 The NRC does not cite a real-world expenmentthat demonstrated this seven-hour fire duration tolerance level for a spent-fuel cask, nor does it state the theoretical or experimental limit of how long a spent fuel cask can withstand a fire fed by jet fuel.

IV)

Security at Nuclear Reactors Continues To Be Inadequate Even After September I 1 th A) It Took The NRC Almost 6 Months After September 11 To Require Enhanced Security At Nuclear Reactors On September 11"', the NRC issued a 'Threat Advisory' that recommended security enhancements to its licensees. According to the NRC Response, a "Threat Advisory" is a "guidance document that is not, in itself, legally binding.20" The NRC issued an Order requiring security enhancements to its licensees on February 26, 2002, almost 6 months after September 1Ith. According to the NRC Response, "An order imposes legally binding requirements upon a licensee... If a licensee does not comply with the requirements of an order, civil penalties or additional sanctions for such noncompliance may be imposed by further order. Willful noncompliance with an order may result in criminal sanctions, pursuant to Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.21" 1' See Page 35 of the NRC Response D See Page 3 of the NRC Response 21 See Page 3 of the NRC Response 00102(5

Page 1 1 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 It is unclear why, given the seriousness of the events of September 1 1t and the subsequent discovery of information about U.S. nuclear reactors in captured Al Qaeda locations that suggested they were potential terrorist targets, the NRC failed to impose legally binding security requirements on its licensees until February 26, 2002.

B) The NRC Has Historically Failed To Adjust The Security Regulations To Meet The Evolving Threat, And Has Yet To Begin A Permanent Revision Of Security Regulations Following The Events Of September 11h 22 The Design Basis Threat (DBT) is the set of regulations that define the security threat against which all licensees must be protected. The DBT was first created in the late 1970s, and according to the NRC Response, was amended in minor ways in 1987 and 1994.23 The DBT now in force, therefore, is based on assumptions of threat levels that date to the 1970s. These assumptions do not account for the realistic threat levels we now know to exist; the DBT assumes that only a small group of attackers would be involved, it assumes that a vehicle used for a truck bomb could only be as large as an SW, It assumes only passive insider assistance from one insider at the reactor, and it fails to assume the degree of technical sophistication and modem weaponry that we know Al Qaeda members have access to.

The NRC has yet to even begin to permanently revise the DBT regulations to require licensees to protect against the realistic terrorist threat we know now exists, including but not limited to consideration of: attacks by more than 'several' simultaneous attackers; attacks that involve the participation of more than one insider, attacks that involve the participation of an active insider(s) (i.e. one or more individuals who assist the attackers by opening locked doors or operating equipment during the attack); attacks using sophisticated weaponry such as vehicle-mounted weapons; and attacks by individuals possessing sophisticated knowledge of the operation of nuclear reactors such as the attackers who participated in the September 1 1t hijackings.

22-See Page 6 of the NRC Response 23 The first such change, in 1987, was to require licensees to consider that attackers might use a vehicle for use in transporting personnel and equipment during an attempted theft of strategic special nuclear material. It is unclear why the use of a vehicle was not anticipated as a possibility prior to 1987, since it seems obvious that anyone seeking to steal strategic special nuclear material would probably approach and leave the site in a car, truck, boat, or plane. The second such change, in 1994, was to a) require licensees to consider that attackers might use a vehicle for use in transporting personnel and equipment during an attempted act of radiological sabotage, and b) require licensees to consider that attackers might use a vehicle bomb as a means of attack. It is unclear why the use of a vehicle to transport personnel and equipment for use in sabotage was not considered In 1987, since it seems rather remarkable for the NRC to have concluded that attackers would use such a vehicle to steal strategic special nuclear material but not to commit an act of radiological sabotage. It must also be noted that the vehicle bomb regulation only requires licensees to protect against bombs contained in 4 wheel drive vehicles, even though much larger truck bombs have been detonated against U.S. targets both in the U.S. and abroad.

001029

Page 12 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 C) Security Exercises At Nuclear Reactor Sites Are Inadequate, And Sites Continue To Fail The Exercises About 50% Of The Time The NRC has historically conducted force-on-force exercises, known as Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSRE), to assess the adequacy of security at nuclear reactors In 1998, the NRC and the industry attempted to de-fund OSRE. After opposition from Rep. Markey and the public forced them to restore funding to the program, the NRC instead decided to replace the OSRE program with one that would be designed and run by the nuclear industry, called the Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA). Rep. Markey believes that the proposed SPA program would undermine the rigor of current testing and has been proposed by the NRC and industry because they are simply embarrassed by the failure rate under OSRE and the accompanying revelation that security measures that look good on paper are not succeeding in the field.

Prior to September 11, the NRC intended to reduce the number of OSREs from eight to six each year, in order to undertake the SPA pilot program. The NRC Response to Rep. Markey's questions on security exercises at nuclear reactor sites indicates that:

e In 37 of 81 OSREs (46 percent of the security tests) conducted between August 1991 and August 2001, the NRC identified weaknesses that allowed the attacking force to "reach a target set and simulate destruction of that equipment.'. The licensee's performance is judged unsuccessful for the scenario if the response force is not able to prevent the adversary from disabling and/or destroying all pieces of equipmentlactions in a target set.... Cases in which a licensee was unable to satisfy one or more of these criteria would indicate that the adversary could cause an act of sabotage resulting in a loss of a complete target set (i.e., the equipment necessary to be protected to prevent core damage).' 24 The NRC Response states that for the 15 OSREs conducted between April 2000 and August 2001, weaknesses were identified in 9 of 59 exercises or 15 percent of the time.25" Compared to the 1991-2001 time frame, this appears at first to be a significant improvement. However, upon further examination of information contained in the non-public section of the NRC's response and discussion with the NRC staff, which agreed to the public disclosure of the statistical representation of this data, the NRC has conceded that if judged using the same method of analysis used for the August 1991-2001 time, the NRC Identified serious weaknesses at 7 of 15 OSRE sites, and required corrective action to be taken at 9 of 15 sites.

In short, between August 1991 and August 2001, weaknesses were identified at 46% of the sites tested. Between April 2000 and August 2001, serious weaknesses were Identified at 47% of the sites tested and corrective action was required at 60% of them.

24 See Pages 27-29 of the NRC Response 2 See Page 27 of the NRC Response 001030

Page 13 An Analysis of Security at Civilian Nuclear Reactors March 25, 2002 No force-an-force security exercises have been conducted since September 11 because "the current elevated threat environment would pose significant safety hazards to the licensees' employees and negatively impact security effectiveness." 26 Although licensees have advance notice of the date of the exercises, and the Department of Energy has resumed its force-on-force exercises at nuclear weapons facilities, the NRC has chosen to indefinitely postpone future OSREs. This means that the NRC has no way of knowing whether the enhanced security measures it ordered on February 26 actually succeed in enhancing security..

The NRC intends to continue to move forward with the pilot program of the

.industry-designed and implemented SPA security program, instead of enhancing its own OSRE program. This will result in the reduced ability by NRC to participate in and oversee exercises designed to test security at nuclear reactors.2' The NRC Response states that it "does not agreed that the testing of a licensee's security force needs to be the sole function of a federal entity, even in light df the September 11 events."28

` See Page 17 of the NRC Response 27 See Pages 19-23 of the NRC Response 2 See Page 24 of the NRC Response 001031

CL



APPENDIX A SPENT FUEL POOLFULL CORE OFFLOAD CAPABILITY - As of November 1998 (Number of fuel assemblies)

(Attachment to Answer 3.b)

C4-0 S eI~

3o\\LT!

PLANT NAME FUEL AVAILABLE FUEL IN SPENT REMAINING IN SPENT FUEL FUEL POOL SPENT FUEL CORE POOL CAPACITY POOL

-__-4__.__.-__

CAPACITY Arkansas 1 177 968 818 150 Arkansas 2 177 gS8 701 287 r

Beaver Valley 1 157 1627 756 871 BeaverVafley 2 157 1088 392 696 Braldwood 1 t93 2870 1054 1816 Brakdwood 2 193 Browns Ferry 1 764 3471 1864 1607 TOCJLIE GEUrmt Kmo

-P Lt X CAS~J1 K~bIN 7M1 C.bj-IP rog"e'.0, Browns Ferrv 2 764 3471 2116 1355 K

Browns Feny3 764 3471 1588 1879 1P )

r Brunswick 1 660 1767 984 783 Brunswuck 2 560 1767 1020 747 Fos b Byron 1 193 2781 1278 1503 Byron2 193 N),

Callawav 193 1340 829 sl1 Cahert Caffs t 217 1830 1362 468 Calvert Cts 2 217 tts LLSy Catawba 1 193 1418 705 622 Catawba 2 193 1418 686 6a5 Conton 624 2515 1124 1381 ZrCsrE Comanche Peak 1 193 55S 7BS Comanche Peak 2 193 735 M

139 C.Copoer 548 2366 1340 1026 av ee Cystl River 3 177 1357 Sa0 677

>,0 Davis-Besse 177 718 601 117 D$~eao O.C. Cook t8193 3613 2015 1598 L.xf D.C. Cook 2 193 Diablo Canyon 1 193 1324 640 684 Diablo Canyon 2 193 1317 660 657 Dresden 2 724 3537 2562 975 Dresden 3 724 3536 2380 1158 Duene Ariold 368 2411 1648 763 Farley t 157 1407 662 527 Farlev 2 157 1407 593 641 Enclosure 1 001032

TctOD) O)*

ORA vl, ta R ciozm~, V-v%~1S Q9Cv,;

ts 01T1*5 4

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MS PLANT NAME FUEL AVAILABLE FUEL IFJ SPENT REMAINING IN SPENT FUEL FUEL POOL SPENT FUEL CORE POOL CAPACITY POOL CAPACITY Fermi 2 764 2383 1296 1087 FltzPatrick 560 2797 2080 717 Fort Calboun 133 1083 706 377 Ginna 121 1879 879 435 Grand Gult 1 800 4348 2488 1660 Hatch 1 560 5946 4884 1062 Hatch 2 560 Hope Creek 764 4006 1708 2298 hdian Pont 2 193 1374 917 457 Indan Point 3 193 1345 672 655 Kewaunee 121 990 780 210 LaSalle 1 764 7932 3076 4852 LaSalle 2 764 Limerick 1 764 2832 1701 t 111 rrzz -

-9 I

9 Umrrick 2 764 3921 1893 2028

.9 I

I UcauIre 1 193

_ 1351 871 480

&I

.9 I

4 UcGulra 2 193 1425 1039

.9

.9 I

4 MIUIslonn 2 217 13X I m M euIo L',. r~oi os"EO, Not 0 0I-GAesb I LS

'T~ONl.S iztLuz.N SOUTH RK&Ye)

SDUI1 HhiIBN)1 pie f l y, ;VL

\\-fist,4v Tv eV1L~o 4t A

5.

4 -

4 1

4 LfnLhtrkna A 193 756 4t6 Monticello 484 2209 1094 115_

Nine Mne Point t 532 2778 2200 576 Nine WIIe Point 2 764 4049 1400 2649 North Anna 1 157 1737 10sm 169 Norm Anna 2 157 0

Oconee t 177 1312 1094 218 Oconee 2 177 1312 1094 218 Oconee 3 177 825 552 273 Oyster Creek 560 2645 2420 t80 Palsades 204 771 657 101 Palo Verde 1 241 1205 6S 557 PalD Verde 2 241 1205 644 5W1 Palo Verde 3 241 1205 664 541 Peach Bottom 2 784 3819 2720 1099 Peach Bottom 3 764 3819 2777 1042 Perry 748 4020 iS4 2516 Enclosure 1 001033

PLANT NAME FUEL AVAILABLE FUEL IN SPENT REMAINING IN SPENT FUEL FUEL POOL SPENT FUEL CORE POOL CAPACITY POOL CAPACrIY fpg>

1J -K r r Pilrim 580 3859 1974 1885 C.e4rc r

PointBeach 1 121 1502 1347 155 Point Beach 2 121 Pralrle Ilsand t 121 1386 1237 125 Pralre Island 2 121 Ouad Citiesi 724 3657 1933 1724 Ouad Cities 2 724 3897 2943 954

'rou eCVIE

,'L\\ River Bern 624 2680 t400 1280 R Vse

-"J Sc Robinson 157 544 302 242 t-z L44ijo

>4 ra~

Salem I 193 1632 772 850 Cble 9

Salem 2 193 1632 584 1038 S

t]

C" M

San Onofre 2 217 1542 870 672 San Onotre 3 217 1542 9g8 624 eot 11SJt)

^

Seabrook 193 1238 376 860 C*§oR~n~bA v > Sequoveh 1 193 2091 1295 796 Sequovah 2 193 Shearon Harris I 157 4184 720 PWR and 336 PWR and

'X*5Is~A &tI J NC.

(accepts spent fuel

.1841 BWR 557 BWR from oher units) 9e-- v South Texas 1 193 1969 428 1529 Pc SSouth Texas 2 193 1969 400 1556 n

. p~l~t£ 2 St Lude 1 217 1706 1128 6T8 L

L SLude2 217 1076 692 384 Summer 167 1276 637 567 C

tt KE(42 Stuuv1 17 1044 854 1SO S urv 2 157 Ea.

ELb4" CwC.

Susquehanms 1 764 2840 2655 None Susquehanna 2 764 28W 1762 823 Three Wle Island 177 1338 755 583 Turkev Po" it3 157 1395 808 687 FL Turkyv Point 4 157 1389 770 619 BP/MLIC 6

°jO '

Vermont Yankee 368 2863 2331 532 Au2 &xTSb v

'Vogtle 193 1475 1081 2392 cm

-Vogtle 2 193 1998 Lae WNP 2 764 2654 1703 951 t4EL.W O1LA I4~L Watarford3 217 2398 700 1698 SP? RNfts C.,

CX, ;

waUsear, 193 1612 80 1530 Bk3L I YK S WOM Creek 193 1327 664 663 Single values given for mutilple units using cornmmon fuel storage facility.

oo)0 0 Enclosure 1

IF Index I Sie May I F.

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Nuclear Reactors Nuclear MaterialsI Radioactive Waste H Public InvolvementI Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Generic Communications > Regulatorv Issue Summaries > 200 Update of Evacuation Time Estimates Update of Evacuation Time Estimates August 1, 2001 0

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Addresses Intent Background Information Summary of Issue Backfit Discussion Federal Register Notification

• Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Addresses All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power plants.

a TOP Intent The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) to alert addre-possible need to update emergency planning evacuation time estimates as the results of the year 2000 census published. This RIS does not transmit any new requirements or staff positions. No specific action or written res required.

in ToP Background Information Addressees are required to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in Section 50A47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E. The requirements concerning emergency plan cl found in Section 10 CFR 50.54(q). This regulation allows a licensee to change its emergency plan without Coin approval provided that the change does not decrease the effectiveness of the plan and the plan, as changed, c meet the planning standards of Section 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E.

evacuation time estimates would not be considered a decrease in the effectiveness of the emergency plan und CFR 50.54(q) and licensees may update the estimates without prior Commission approval.

Additionally,Section IV.G of Appendix E requires licensees to have provisions in these emergency plans to ens emergency plan and its implementing procedures are kept up to date and that emergency equipment and supi properly maintained. Since the emergency plan is contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report In accordance i 50 Appendix E Section III, the updating requirements of 10 CFR 50.,71(e) apply.

Guidance on evacuation time estimates is in Section J.8, 101, 1Om, and Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654, "Criteria f Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness In Support of Nuclear Plants." This guidance was endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.101, Rev 2. Additional information can be fou NUREG/CR-4831, wThe State of the Art in Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants", March:

0010I http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2001 /riO 101 6.html 6/9/20C.

A TOP Summary of Issue Recently published results of the year 2000 census show increases or decreases in population within the plum(

pathway emergency planning zone around certain nuclear power facilities. Consequently, the estimated times evacuation of the public could increase or decrease. Longer or shorter evacuation times In turn affect decisions evacuating the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, decision makers may need updated how long It would take to evacuate the public.

i TOP Backfit Discussion This RIS does not require any action or written response nor does It require any modification to plant structure components or design of facilities; therefore, the staff did not perform a backfit analysis.

i TOP Federal Register Notification A notice of opportunity for public comment was not published In the Federal Register because this RIS Is inforr pertains to a staff position that does not represent a departure from current regulatory requirements and pract

&,Top Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This RIS does not request any Information collection.

If you have any question about this matter, please contact the person listed below or the appropriate Office of Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

i TOP IRA Frank P. Gillespie Acting for/

David B. Matthews, Director Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Edwin F. Fox, Jr., NRR contact:

301-415-2908 E-mail: eff@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Regulatory Issue Summaries (ADAMS Accession Number ML012070310) 00103 n http://www.nrc.gov/reading-nm/doc-collections/gen-comxn/reg-issues/2001/riO 101 6.html 6/9/2003