IR 05000335/2019010

NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team) Report Nos. 05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010

ML19112A164
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/22/2019
From:	Jonathan Montgomery NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1
To:	Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co
References
IR 2019010
Download: ML19112A164 (20)

Text

April 22, 2019

SUBJECT:

SAINT LUCIE UNITS 1, 2 - NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM) REPORT NUMBER 05000335/2019010 AND 05000389/2019010

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On March 8, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Saint Lucie Units 1 and2, and discussed the onsite inspection results with Mr. Dan DeBoer and other members of your staff. On April 4, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with Mr. Dan DeBoer and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.

If you contest the violation or significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at Saint Lucie.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 05000335 and 05000389 License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010

Inspection Report

Docket Number(s):

05000335 and 05000389

License Number(s):

DPR-67 and NPF-16

Report Number(s):

05000335/2019010 and 05000389/2019010

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2019-010-0023

Licensee:

Florida Power & Light Co.

Facility:

Saint Lucie, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Jensen Beach, FL 34957

Inspection Dates:

February 11, 2019 to March 08, 2019

Inspectors:

N. Morgan, Reactor Inspector

G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector

M. Riley, Reactor Inspector

M. Schwieg, Reactor Inspector

C. Baron, Mechanical Contractor

S. Kobylarz, Electrical Contractor

A. Mink, Mechanical Engineer (observer)

Approved By:

Jonathan M. Montgomery, Acting Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Team) at Saint Lucie Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Consider Valve Stability During Modification to Pressurizer Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV (05000335,05000389/2019010-01)

Closed None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to include appropriate limitations on their pressurizer safety valve (PSV) ring settings in their design and procurement specifications. Specifically, modification PCM 96139M changed the PSV blowdown to a ring setting that could challenge the PSVs performance, as identified in original testing, without performing additional testing or analysis to justify the new setting. The modification resulted in an equipment configuration contrary to the pre-modification description of the PSV ring setting adjustments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

INSPECTION SCOPE

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===

2-HCV-3615, Unit 2 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) for Low Pressure Safety Injection to Loop 2A2

• MOV torque/thrust analysis

• MOV weak link analysis

• Basis for MOV maximum pressure and pressure differential

• Basis for minimum MOV motor voltage

• Walkdown of MOV and associated equipment

• Basis for inservice test (IST) acceptance criteria

• Results of recent IST

• Limits on frequency of jogging MOV

• Basis for MOV limit stop settings for flow distribution

• Basis for MOV limit stop settings for pump runout protection

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (3 Samples)

(1) V1200, V1201, V1202, Unit 2 Pressurizer Safety Valves

• Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Design Criteria, and other design basis and licensing basis document accuracy

• Maintenance effectiveness

• Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history

• Component modifications

• Surveillance and IST results

• Procurement and Design Specifications (2)2B Emergency Diesel Generator (Generator and Protective Relaying)

• Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during walkdown)

• Maintenance effectiveness

• Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history

• Diesel loading and voltage calculations

• Protective device selection and settings

• Surveillance testing and recent test results

• Modifications performed

(3)2B3-4KV SWGR, Unit 2 4.16KV Switchgear 2B3 (SB)

• Material condition and configuration (e.g., visual inspection during a walkdown)

• Consistency between station documentation (e.g. procedures) and vendor specifications

• Operating procedure

• Maintenance effectiveness

• Component health reports, corrective maintenance records, and corrective action history

• Operator actions for degraded breaker conditions

• Surveillance and calibration testing and recent test results

• Bus short circuit calculations

• Breaker short circuit capacity

• Overcurrent protection and coordination

• Protective device selection and settings

• Minimum breaker control voltage

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)

(1) EC 284321, Replacement of Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors

(2) EC 283579, Replace 125 VDC Reversing Starter for Unit 1 MV-08-3

(3) EC 286079, Revise Charging Pump 2A Control Circuity Associated with SIAS

(4) EC 290387, Convert Manual Pratt Butterfly Valve to AOV

(5) EC 284271, Unit 1 AFW MOV Torque Switch Bypass Change from 25% to 95% on MV-08-3, MV-09-10, MV-09-11, MV-09-12, MV-09-9

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

Information Notice 2016-09, Recent Issues Identified When Using Reverse Engineering Techniques in the Procurement of Safety-Related Components

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Consider Valve Stability During Modification to Pressurizer Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events

Green NCV (05000335,05000389/2019010-01)

Open None 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to include appropriate limitations on their pressurizer safety valve (PSV) ring settings in their design and procurement specifications. Specifically, modification PCM 96139M changed the PSV blowdown to a ring setting that could challenge the PSVs performance, as identified in original testing, without performing additional testing or analysis to justify the new setting. The modification resulted in an equipment configuration contrary to the pre-modification description of the PSV ring setting adjustments in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Description:

The PSVs at St. Lucie function by lifting to prevent over-pressurization of the reactor coolant system, and by successfully closing without excessive leakage in order to meet the assumptions of the event and accident analyses described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR. Following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. Licensee's responses to Item II.D.1 of the NUREG were used to re-confirm the General Design Criteria 14, 15, and 30, of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 were met.

Item II.D.1 of NUREG-0737 required licensees to conduct testing to qualify the reactor coolant system relief and safety valves under expected operating conditions for design-basis transients and accidents. To satisfy this, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)performed testing relevant to St. Lucie. The results of this testing were documented in report CEN-227, Summary Report on the Operability of Pressurizer Safety Valves in CE Designed Plants. Report CEN-227 identified three qualified combinations of ring settings (-45, -14), (-

55, -14), and (-95, -14) which corresponded to blowdown settings of between approximately 8 and 15 percent. Blowdown is a term used to describe the closing pressure of PSVs, and was defined in CEN-227 as the difference between the actual opening (pop) pressure and the actual re-seating pressure, expressed as a percentage of the actual opening (pop)pressure. Test results documented in CEN-227 revealed that blowdowns around 5 percent could cause valve flutter and/or chatter (unstable valve behavior) that was inappropriate for St. Lucie, and was a disqualifying characteristic as described in the report. In its resolution to NUREG-0737 item II.D.1, the licensee stated to the NRC that a qualified ring setting of (-55, -

14) would be used; this ring setting corresponded to 10% blowdown.

In 1996, the licensees modification PCM 96139M changed, in part, the ring setting and blowdown percentage from 10 percent to approximately 4 percent. The ring setting change applied to both units at St. Lucie. Prior to the change, the St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR, section 5.4.13.4, "Tests and Inspections" reflected why the ring setting was chosen:

"On the basis of the results of the EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program, which included full scale testing of a St. Lucie 2 model pressurizer safety valve, valve ring adjustments for St. Lucie 2 were selected to assure stable operation. The resulting valve blowdown is approximately 10 percent (2250 psia blowdown pressure)."

Following the modification implementation, the UFSAR was updated to include the following:

"Note: 10% represents the blowdown of the originally installed safety valves. PC/M 96139M installed new valves with an actual blowdown of 4%."

Inspectors review of the modification package and associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation revealed that the licensee did not review or consider the basis or results of the EPRI PSV testing when they developed the modification; rather, it focused on the valves' ability to meet the maximum allowed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers construction code of record, which allowed no more than 5 percent blowdown. The inspectors noted that the specifications used in the modification design and procurement, 13172-PE-701, 00000-PE-701, and JPN-PSL-SEMS-95-026, did not include limitations that would ensure the PSVs would remain stable (not flutter or chatter) during their operation. Specifying stable valve characteristics was necessary to ensure that the design basis assumption of successful closure of the PSVs was met.

The inspectors noted that justification of the appropriateness of this change by analysis or additional test data was not provided. The modification, and its 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, did not address the potential failure mechanisms associated with this modification. Also, the inspectors noted that the UFSAR description change that occurred along with the modification inaccurately reflected the licensing basis once it was incorporated into the UFSAR.

Corrective Action(s): The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and determined that the valves were operable, but nonconforming with the current licensing basis commitment that satisfied their closure of NUREG-0737 item II.D.1. The licensee initiated plans to return the valves to the original, qualified blowdown parameters.

Corrective Action Reference(s): ARs 02303872 and 02304431

Significance:

The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The inspectors evaluated the finding for Initiating Events, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012. Inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding could not, after a reasonable assessment of the degradation, result in exceeding the Reactor Coolant System leak rate for a small break loss-of-coolant accident, and it did not affect other systems used to mitigate a loss-of-coolant accident.

Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, required, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above, since the modification of pressurizer safety valves per PCM 96139M in 1996, the licensee failed to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were translated into specifications. Specifically, the specifications for design and procurement (Specifications 13172-PE-701; 00000-PE-701; JPN-PSL-SEMS-95-026) of the pressurizer safety valves did not include limitations for allowable setup for the blowdown parameter of the pressurizer safety valves, as described in CEN-227.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On April 4, 2019, the inspector presented the final design bases assurance inspection results to Mr. Dan DeBoer, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On March 8, 2019, the inspector presented the design bases assurance inspection onsite results to Mr. Dan DeBoer, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.21M

Calculations

99624-C-001

Weak Link Analysis of MOVs for Hot Shorts

Rev. 1

CN-SEE-II-08-17

St. Lucie Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Fathom Model

Rev. 2

CN-SEE-II-09-12

St. Lucie Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) and

Low-Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Pump Delivery and

Pump Surveillance Requirements

Rev. 0

LTR-SEE-II-09-

Evaluation of St. Lucie Unit 2 Pressurizer Quench Tank,

Sparger, Rupture Disc and RCS Backpressure at

Maximum PSV Flow

Rev. 1

PSL-2-FJE-90-

20

St. Lucie U2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2A and 2B

Electrical Loads

Rev. 11

PSL-2-J-E-90-

003

GL 89-10 MOV Cable Voltage Drop

Rev. 10

PSL-2FJM-91-

046

St. Lucie Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 Design Basis

Differential Pressures for Motor Operated Valves

Rev. 14

PSL-2FJM-91-

048

St. Lucie Unit 2 Generic Letter 89-10 Gate and Globe

Valve Required Stem Thrust and Actuator Torque Switch

Setting Evaluation

Rev. 30

PSL-2FSE-02-

2

MCC Control Circuit Voltage Drop Calculation

Rev. 0

PSL-2FSE-03-

010

U2 Electrical Computer Model (ETAP) Documentation

Rev. 3

PSL-2FSE-03-

011

Unit 2 Short Circuit, Voltage Drop, and PSB-1 Analysis

Rev. 2

PSL-2FSE-08-

001

Unit 2 Electrical Coordination Study; Reg. Guide 1.75 and

Appendix R Validation

Rev. 1

PSL-BFSM-01-

014

Acceptable Corrosion Allowance on the Units 1 and 2

CCW Surge Tank for a 50 PSI Design Pressure

Rev. 0

71111.21M Corrective Action

Documents

00443765

2023558

2042282

2054295

2119272

201793

201795

201800

203330

205200

207758

285892

22188

22191

28877

2076185

2145693

2184476

2198226

200106

203854

268112

299399

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-97-0753

AR 02301677

DBAI 2019 - Scaffold Program Inconsistency

AR 02301831

2019 DBAI Vendor Tech Manual 2998-4244 Needs Update

AR 02301844

DBAI 2019 - Scaffolding Exceeded 90 Day Walkdown

Requirement

AR 02302033

DBAI 2019-Ladder Secured with Chain to Safety-Related

Cond

AR 02302130

2019 DBAI-Motor Operated Valves Duty Time

AR 02302141

2109 DBAI-Mud Creek Temperature Bases

AR 02302187

DBAI 2019-Document Typo

71111.21M Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

AR 02302193

NRC 2019 DBAI-Electrical Drawing Discrepancies

AR 02302231

NRC 2019 DBAI-U2 Battery Service Testing Acceptance

Criter

AR 02302233

2019 NRC DBAI-Ultimate Heat Sink

AR 02303872

2019 DBAI-Lic/Des Bases Not Updated for Pzr RV

Replacement

AR 02304431

2019 DBAI Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Change in

Blowdown

AR 02304771

Unit 1 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Maintenance

Rule DBAI 2019

AR 02305144

NRC 2019 DBAI-Typo Rating Error in Calc PSL-2FSE-03-

011

AR 02305580

NRC 2019 DBAI-4KV BKR PM Proc 0-PME-52.06

Procedure Weakness

Drawings

AR 02308334

2019 DBAI URI-U2 LPSI PP Motor Loading at Runout

140050, Sht. 1

Schematic Diagram for 4.16KV, 1200A, Magnum SF6

Breaker

Rev. 5

2998-1219

U2 HCV-3615 Drawing

Rev. 10

2998-19690

Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement-Forged Body

Design Sheet 1 of 2

5/28/1997

2998-19691

Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement-Forged Body

Design Sheet 2 of 2

5/28/1997

2998-22561

U2 HCV-3615 Drawing

Rev. A

2998-3420

IN Piston Operated Tag No. I-TCV-14-4A & 4B

Rev. 7

2998-3424

IN XSECTN & MATL T. NO I-TCV-14-4A & 4B

Rev. 8

2998-B-326, Sht.

177

Schematic Diagram Charging Pump 2A

Rev. 15

2998-B-326, Sht.

177

EC286079 Charging Pump 2A

Rev. 1

2998-B-326, Sht.

937

Schematic Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 from Bus 2B2

Rev. 3

2998-B-326, Sht.

967

Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Start Ckts Sht. 1

Rev. 6

71111.21M Drawings

2998-B-327, Sht.

177

Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump 2A

Rev. 24

2998-B-327, Sht.

177

EC286079 Charging Pump 2A

Rev. 1

2998-B-327, Sht.

196

EC286079 Sht. 2

Rev. 1

2998-B-327, Sht.

196

Control Wiring Diagram Charging Pump 2A Bypass Valve

V2555

Rev. 11

2998-B-327, Sht.

257

CWD-HCV-3615

Rev. 16

2998-B-327, Sht.

25

Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 Diff Relay

Rev. 3

2998-B-327, Sht.

937

Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Swgr 2B3 (2-20411)

Incoming Fdr From Bus 2B2

Rev. 16

2998-B-327, Sht.

948

Control Wiring Diagram 4160V Sta Serv Trans 2B2/2B5

4160V Fdr Bkr

Rev. 12

2998-B-327, Sht.

963

Control Wiring Diagram Diesel Generator 2B Bkr (2-20401)

Rev. 20

2998-G-078, Sht.

130A

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

Rev. 24

2998-G-078, Sht.

130B

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

Rev. 37

2998-G-078, Sht.

131

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

Rev. 24

2998-G-078, Sht.

2

Flow Diagram - Safety Injection System

Rev. 11

2998-G-272

Main One Line Diagram

Rev. 29

2998-G-275

4.16KV Switchgear No. 2A3 and 2B3 One Line Diagrams

Rev. 7

Engineering

Changes

8770-B-326 Sht.

631

Aux Feedwater Pump 1C Turbine and Steam Valve MV-

08-3

Rev. 14

EC 221134

Replace HCV-3615

Rev. 0

EC 284271

Unit 1 AW MOV Torque Switch Bypass Change from 25%

to 95%

Rev. 1

EC 284321

Replacement of Unit 1 main steam line radiation monitors

Rev. 12

71111.21M Engineering

Changes

EC 286079

Revise Charging Pump 2A Control Circuity Associated with

SIAS

Rev. 0

EC 290267

U2 TCV-14-4A Valve Stem Clamp Installation/Removal

Engineering

Evaluations

PC/M 96139M

Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Replacement - Forged

Body Design

Rev. 0

475454

Circuit Board Battery Charger Hi/Lo Voltage Alarm

Reverse Engineering

3/18/2017

Miscellaneous

89859

Power Supply 125 DC Converter Reverse Engineering

8/20/2018

03-Safety

Injection

System Health Report

1/31/2019

13172-PE-701

Project Specification for Safety and Power Operated Relief

Valves for Florida Power and Light Company St. Lucie Unit

No. 2

Rev. 5

13172-PE-705

MOV Specification

Rev. 6

2576C

MOV Periodic Verification Classification

Rev. 0

2998-4244

Manual for Motor Operated Globe Valves

Rev. 10

2998-A-451-1000

Environmental Qualification Report and Guidebook

Rev. 12

464761

Item Equivalency Review for Torque Switch

Rev. 2

AR 02308334

Evaluation

Review of Motor Protective Relay Device Trips for Unit 1

LPSI Pump Motor Operation at Design Runout at EOG

High Tech Spec (60.6 HZ)

Rev. 0

CEN-227

Summary Report on the Operability of Pressurizer Safety

Valves in C-E Designed Plants

December

1982

DBD-4160-VAC-

4160 VAC Distribution System

Rev. 5

DBD-CCW-2

Component Cooling Water System

Rev. 8

DBD-ICW-2

Intake Cooling Water System

Rev. 6

DBD-PZR-2

Pressurizer System

Rev. 9

DBD-SDC-2

Low Pressure Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling

System

Rev. 9

EACE 02042282

MV 09-9 Did not Stroke Fully Open

Rev. 0

EPRI NP-2770-

LD, Volume 5

EPRI/C-E PWR Safety Valve Test Report Volume 5: Test

Results for Crosby Safety Valve

March 1983

ER-AA-204-

2004-F05

Motor-Operated Valve Fleet Standard PM Template

Rev. 2

71111.21M Miscellaneous

Health Report

Unit 2 System 52 Health Report System IQ, Q1-2019

I-1105-2

Pressurizer Safety Relief Valves

8/21/1997

IN 2016-09

RECENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED WHEN USING REVERSE

ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES IN THE PROCUREMENT

OF SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS

July 15,

2016

JPN-PSL-SEMP-

NRC Generic Letter 89-10 Summary Report

Rev. 2

JPN-PSL-SEMS-

95-026

PSL 1&2 Pressurizer Safety Valves Forged Body Design

Requirements, Additional Specification Requirements and

Clarifications to Spec 13172-PE-701, Rev. 05

Rev. 05

L-2001-258

Application for Renewed Operating Licenses

11/29/01

L-2011-21

LAR for Extended Power Uprate

2/25/11

LTAM PSL-15-

0137

Unit 2 Charging Pump Control Deficiencies

Rev. 0

Manual No. IM-

14050-01

Yaskawa Instruction Manual, Troubleshooting

Rev. 5

ML14188B101

EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program Guide

for Application of Valve Test Program Results to Plant-

Specific Evaluations, Interim Report, July 1982

Rev. 2

ML17216A456

L-86-114, Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements

3/18/88

ML17222A798

NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief

and Safety Valves-St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC

Nos. 44617 and 51605)

5/11/89

ML17223A132

EGG-NTA-8332, Technical Evaluation Report TMI Action -

- NUREG-0737 (II.D.1) Relief and Safety Valve Testing,

St. Lucie Unit 2 Docket No. 50-389

December

1988

ML17223A221

NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1, Performance Testing of Relief

and Safety Valves-St. Lucie Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC

Nos. 44617 and 51605)

5/11/89

PSL-ENG-SENS-

97-038

CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Pressurizer Code Safety

Valve Modification

Rev. 0

Qualification

Report QR-

140050-1

Square D Magnum SF6 Circuit Breaker, Florida Power &

Light - St. Lucie

Rev. 4

71111.21M Miscellaneous

Section 5.2A

Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

Rev. 23

VTM 2998-2072

Metal Clad Switchgear

Rev. 22

VTM 2998-21826

Square D/NLI Magnum SF6 4.16KV, 1200A, 350MVA

Circuit Breakers

Rev. 0

Procedures

VTM 2998-4508

NY 422537 Henry Pratt Butterfly Valves

Rev. 17

0-GME-80.21

Diagnostic Testing of Motor Operated Valves Using the

Votes Infinity Valve Diagnostic System

Rev. 4

0-NOP-99.02

Watchstation General Inspection Guidelines

Rev. 27

0-NOP-99.05

Valve, Breaker, Motor and Instrument Instructions

Rev. 12

0-PME-52.06

Periodic Maintenance of SF6 Switchgear Breakers

Rev. 12

0-SME-50.08

Safety Battery Service Test

Rev. 9

1-AOP-26.02

AREA RADIATION MONITORS

Rev. 4

1-EOP-01

STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS SPTA

Rev. 35

1-EOP-99

Appendix R

Steam Generator Isolation

Rev. 65

2-AOP-03.02

Shutdown Cooling Abnormal Operations

Rev. 14

2-AOP-14.01

Component Cooling Water Abnormal Operations

Rev. 15

2-ARP-01-A00

Control Room Panel A RTGB-201

Rev. 27

2-EOP-03

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

Rev. 39

2-EOP-04

Steam Generator Tube Rupture SGTR

Rev. 33

2-ONP-01.03

Plant Condition 3 Shutdown Cooling in Operation - No

Reduced Inventory

Rev. 42

2-OSP-03.02A

2A LPSI Flow Test

Rev. 9

2-OSP-100.13

Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations Week

Rev. 76,

performed

09/28/18

2-OSP-100.13

Schedule of Periodic Tests, Checks and Calibrations Week

Rev. 76,

performed

2/25/18

2-OSP-69.13B

ESF - Staggered 36 Month Surveillance for

SIAS/CIS/CSAS - Train B

Rev. 27,

performed

03/21/17

2-OSP-99.08A

A Train Quarterly Non Check Valve Cycle Test

Rev. 23

ADM-09.25

Surveillance Frequency Control Program

Rev. 19

71111.21M Procedures

ADM-29.01A

Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps and Valves

Rev. 24

CY-SL-168-0003

Alternate Sampling Methods for Effluent and Processing

Rad Monitors

Rev. 4

ER-AA-116

Motor Operated Valve Program

Rev. 2

IP-ENG-001

Design Equivalent Change Package

Rev. C

MA-AA-100-1014

Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Testing and Actuator

Inspections

Rev. 6

MA-AA-100-1014

Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Testing and Actuator

Inspections

Rev. 6

Work Orders

NSC-PP-022

Corporate Procurement Engineering and Dedication

Process for Reverse Engineering Activities

Rev. 0

33008835-07

40177137-01

40177137-02

40192600-01

40301055-01

40301984-01

40302524-01

4033306804

40417654-05

40456003-01

40456003-02

40456003-06

40507440-01

40518025-02

40520832-01

40522122-01

40525157-01

40525157-01

40533596-01

40533596-01

40571871

40571871-10

71111.21M

Work Orders

40595531-01

40599605

40615767-01

40617480-01

40619748-01

40621444-01