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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ust 23, 2018
{{#Wiki_filter:August 23, 2018


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Line 28: Line 28:
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.


This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection  
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR ), Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.


and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC's Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR ), Part 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,
/RA/  


Sincerely,
Marc S. Ferdas, Chief Technical Support and Assessment Branch Division of Reactor Projects
/RA/ Marc S. Ferdas, Chief Technical Support and Assessment Branch  


Division of Reactor Projects Docket Number: 50-333 License Number: DPR-59  
Docket Number: 50-333 License Number: DPR-59  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Line 41: Line 41:


==Inspection Report==
==Inspection Report==
Docket Number:
50-333
License Number:
DPR-59
Report Number:
05000333/2018010


Docket Number: 50-333
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2018-010-0067


License Number: DPR-59
Licensee:  


Report Number: 05000333/2018010
Exelon Generation Company, LLC


Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0067
Facility:  


Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant


Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Location:  


Location: Scriba, NY  
Scriba, NY  


Inspection Dates: July 23 to 27, 2018  
Inspection Dates:  
 
July 23 to 27, 2018  
 
Inspectors:
 
D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer (Team Leader)
 
T. Dunn, Operations Inspector
 
G. Stock, James A. Fitzpatrick Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)


Inspectors: D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer (Team Leader) T. Dunn, Operations Inspector G. Stock, James A. Fitzpatrick Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)
B. Sienel, Nine Mile Point Resident Inspector  
B. Sienel, Nine Mile Point Resident Inspector  


Approved By: Marc S. Ferdas, Chief Technical Support and Assessment Branch Division of Reactor Projects
Approved By:  


2
Marc S. Ferdas, Chief
 
Technical Support and Assessment Branch
 
Division of Reactor Projects


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelon's performance at James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant by conducting Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191, "Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelons performance at  
 
Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. No findings or more-than-minor violations were identified.


3
James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant by conducting Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191,
Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. No findings or more-than-minor violations were identified.


=INSPECTION SCOPES=
=INSPECTION SCOPES=
Line 77: Line 101:


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
-TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans  
TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL  
 
TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans  


The inspectors verified plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events," (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation," (ADAMS Accession No.
The inspectors verified plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, (ADAMS Accession No.


ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS Accession No.


ML12053A340) and dose assessment info rmation provided per COMSECY-13-0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned," dated March 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
ML12053A340) and dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
: (1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML17342A006) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:  
: (1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML17342A006) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:  


a. Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; b. Integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures;  
a. Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events;  
 
b. Integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures;  
 
c. Protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards;
 
d. Developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability;
 
e. Trained its staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design basis events; and
 
f.
 
Developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
: (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:


c. Protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards; d. Developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability;  
a. Installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling, and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation;  


e. Trained its staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design basis events; and f. Developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
b. Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions, and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals;  
: (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
 
a. Installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling, and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation; b. Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions, and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals; c. Trained its staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and d. Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
c. Trained its staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and  
: (3) The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all alternating current (AC) power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
 
a. The licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) scenario; b. Emergency preparedness communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario; and c. The licensee implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from SFPs) using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
d. Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
: (3) The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all alternating current (AC) power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:  
 
a. The licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) scenario;  
 
b. Emergency preparedness communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario; and  
 
c. The licensee implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from SFPs)using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.


The inspectors verified that non-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
The inspectors verified that non-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
Line 107: Line 153:
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=


Issue Reports initiated in response to inspection 4157135 4158348 4158365 4158424
Issue Reports initiated in response to inspection
4158752 4158965 4159089 4159311
4157135
4159315 4159318 4159363 4159373
4158348
4159456 4159500  
4158365
 
4158424
Calculations JAF-CALC-16-00019, Rocking and Sliding Evaluation of Equipment Inside FLEX Equipment Storage Buildings, Revision 0  
4158752
 
4158965
Miscellaneous James  
4159089
: [[contact::A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant -Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA 12 049 and EA-12-051)]], dated December 18, 2017 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategi
4159311
es for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, JAFP-17-008 dated August 29, 2017 EC-9000052728, FUKUSHIMA - Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation EC 52736, Attachment 6.027, NSRC Pump Deployment Location
4159315
4159318
4159363
4159373
4159456
4159500
Calculations
JAF-CALC-16-00019, Rocking and Sliding Evaluation of Equipment Inside FLEX Equipment
Storage Buildings, Revision 0
Miscellaneous
James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant -Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of
Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
EA 12 049 and EA-12-051), dated December 18, 2017
Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,
JAFP-17-008 dated August 29, 2017
EC-9000052728, FUKUSHIMA - Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation
EC 52736, Attachment 6.027, NSRC Pump Deployment Location
JAF-RPT-15-00004, James A. FitzPatrick Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation Report
JAF-RPT-15-00004, James A. FitzPatrick Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation Report
JAF-RPT-17-00018, 2017 Focused Evaluation for External Flooding at James A. FitzPatrick
JAF-RPT-17-00018, 2017 Focused Evaluation for External Flooding at James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
Nuclear Power Plant
JAF-RPT-17-00033, JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FLEX Validation
JAF-RPT-17-00033, JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FLEX Validation
Report, dated 2017-06-29 JAF-RPT-17-00047, Seismic MSA Path 4 Seismic Evaluation Report for James A. FitzPatrick  
Report, dated 2017-06-29
 
JAF-RPT-17-00047, Seismic MSA Path 4 Seismic Evaluation Report for James A. FitzPatrick
Procedures FSG-ELAP, Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP), Revision 3 FSG-001, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Revision 3 FSG-002, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed and Management, Revision 2
Procedures
FSG-ELAP, Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP), Revision 3
FSG-001, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Revision 3
FSG-002, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed and Management, Revision 2
FSG-003, Alternate Reactor Vessel Cooling, Revision 5
FSG-003, Alternate Reactor Vessel Cooling, Revision 5
FSG-004, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 1
FSG-004, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 1
FSG-005, Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Makeup and Cooling, Revision 3
FSG-005, Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Makeup and Cooling, Revision 3
FSG-006, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power, Revision 1 FSG-007, Long Term Reactor Vessel Cooling, Revision 1 FSG-008, Transition from FLEX Equipment, Revision 0
FSG-006, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power, Revision 1
FSG-007, Long Term Reactor Vessel Cooling, Revision 1
FSG-008, Transition from FLEX Equipment, Revision 0
FSG-100, Emergency Response to an Extended Loss of AC Site Power (ELAP), Revision 2
FSG-100, Emergency Response to an Extended Loss of AC Site Power (ELAP), Revision 2
FSG-101, Beyond Design Basis External Events EP Communications, Revision 2
FSG-101, Beyond Design Basis External Events EP Communications, Revision 2
AOP-49, Station Blackout, Revision 23 CC-JF-118, Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX), Revision 3 CC-JF-118-101, Beyond Design Basis Administrative Controls, Revision 1
AOP-49, Station Blackout, Revision 23
CC-JF-118, Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX), Revision 3
CC-JF-118-101, Beyond Design Basis Administrative Controls, Revision 1
CC-JF-118-1001, SAFER Response Plan for James  
CC-JF-118-1001, SAFER Response Plan for James  
: [[contact::A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Station]], Revision 1
: [[contact::A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Station]], Revision 1

Latest revision as of 13:20, 5 January 2025

Temporary Instruction 2515/191 Inspection Report 05000333/2018010
ML18240A368
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/23/2018
From: Marc Ferdas
NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB7
To: Bryan Hanson
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
Ferdas M
References
IR 2018010
Download: ML18240A368 (7)


Text

August 23, 2018

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION 2515/191, INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/STAFFING/MULTI-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS REPORT 05000333/2018010

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On July 27, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant and the team discussed the preliminary results of this inspection with Mr. T. Peter, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. An exit meeting was conducted with Mr. A. Sterio, Engineering Director, via telephone on August 17, 2018, to discuss the final results of the inspection. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRCs Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR ), Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Marc S. Ferdas, Chief Technical Support and Assessment Branch Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Number: 50-333 License Number: DPR-59

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000333/2018010

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

50-333

License Number:

DPR-59

Report Number:

05000333/2018010

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2018-010-0067

Licensee:

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Location:

Scriba, NY

Inspection Dates:

July 23 to 27, 2018

Inspectors:

D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer (Team Leader)

T. Dunn, Operations Inspector

G. Stock, James A. Fitzpatrick Senior Resident Inspector (Acting)

B. Sienel, Nine Mile Point Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Marc S. Ferdas, Chief

Technical Support and Assessment Branch

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Exelons performance at

James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant by conducting Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191,

Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. No findings or more-than-minor violations were identified.

INSPECTION SCOPES

This inspection was conducted using the appropriate portions of the TI in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved TIs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Documents reviewed by inspectors are listed in the documents reviewed section of this report. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans

The inspectors verified plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS Accession No.

ML12053A340) and dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).

(1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML17342A006) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

a. Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events;

b. Integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures;

c. Protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards;

d. Developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability;

e. Trained its staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design basis events; and

f.

Developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.

(2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

a. Installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling, and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation;

b. Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions, and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals;

c. Trained its staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and

d. Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.

(3) The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all alternating current (AC) power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:

a. The licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extended loss of AC power (ELAP) scenario;

b. Emergency preparedness communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario; and

c. The licensee implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from SFPs)using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.

The inspectors verified that non-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.

This TI is considered closed.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On July 27, 2018, the team presented the preliminary FLEX inspection results to Mr. T. Peter, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. An exit meeting was conducted with Mr. A. Sterio, Engineering Director, via telephone on August 17, 2018, to discuss the final results of the inspection.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Issue Reports initiated in response to inspection

4157135

4158348

4158365

4158424

4158752

4158965

4159089

4159311

4159315

4159318

4159363

4159373

4159456

4159500

Calculations

JAF-CALC-16-00019, Rocking and Sliding Evaluation of Equipment Inside FLEX Equipment

Storage Buildings, Revision 0

Miscellaneous

James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant -Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of

Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders

EA 12 049 and EA-12-051), dated December 18, 2017

Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with

Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,

JAFP-17-008 dated August 29, 2017

EC-9000052728, FUKUSHIMA - Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation

EC 52736, Attachment 6.027, NSRC Pump Deployment Location

JAF-RPT-15-00004, James A. FitzPatrick Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation Report

JAF-RPT-17-00018, 2017 Focused Evaluation for External Flooding at James A. FitzPatrick

Nuclear Power Plant

JAF-RPT-17-00033, JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FLEX Validation

Report, dated 2017-06-29

JAF-RPT-17-00047, Seismic MSA Path 4 Seismic Evaluation Report for James A. FitzPatrick

Procedures

FSG-ELAP, Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP), Revision 3

FSG-001, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Revision 3

FSG-002, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed and Management, Revision 2

FSG-003, Alternate Reactor Vessel Cooling, Revision 5

FSG-004, Alternate Containment Cooling, Revision 1

FSG-005, Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Makeup and Cooling, Revision 3

FSG-006, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power, Revision 1

FSG-007, Long Term Reactor Vessel Cooling, Revision 1

FSG-008, Transition from FLEX Equipment, Revision 0

FSG-100, Emergency Response to an Extended Loss of AC Site Power (ELAP), Revision 2

FSG-101, Beyond Design Basis External Events EP Communications, Revision 2

AOP-49, Station Blackout, Revision 23

CC-JF-118, Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX), Revision 3

CC-JF-118-101, Beyond Design Basis Administrative Controls, Revision 1

CC-JF-118-1001, SAFER Response Plan for James

A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Station, Revision 1

ESP-99.001, FLEX Equipment Inventory and Inspection, Revision 0

CC-JF-118-1002, Congested Area Plan for James

A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Station, Revision 1

SAP-3, Emergency Communications Testing, Revision 93A

James

A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant TSGs, Revision 0