05000219/FIN-2011002-04: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of technical specification 6.8.1.a for Exelon's failure to have written procedures for activities listed in Regulatory Guide 1.33, which includes procedures for abnormal, off-normal, or alarm conditions and procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events. Specifically, Exelon did not have a procedure to cope with a loss of main control room annunciators. Exelon entered this issue into the CAP as lR 1205823. This finding is not similar to any of the IMC 0612 Appendix E minor examples, but is more than minor because it affects the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors used lnspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, because other significance determination process guidance was not suited to provide reasonable estimates of the significance of this inspection finding. With the assistance of NRC management, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because there was no actual loss of safety system function during the time period the annunciator panels were inoperable. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources (H.2(c)), where complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. [H.2(c)] | | description = The inspectors identified a Green NCV of technical specification 6.8.1.a for Exelon\'s failure to have written procedures for activities listed in Regulatory Guide 1.33, which includes procedures for abnormal, off-normal, or alarm conditions and procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events. Specifically, Exelon did not have a procedure to cope with a loss of main control room annunciators. Exelon entered this issue into the CAP as lR 1205823. This finding is not similar to any of the IMC 0612 Appendix E minor examples, but is more than minor because it affects the procedure quality attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors used lnspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, because other significance determination process guidance was not suited to provide reasonable estimates of the significance of this inspection finding. With the assistance of NRC management, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because there was no actual loss of safety system function during the time period the annunciator panels were inoperable. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources (H.2(c)), where complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. [H.2(c)] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000219/2011002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Kulp R Nimitz J Tomlinson R Bellamy J Ambrosini T Hedigan E Keighley |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |