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{{#Wiki_filter:Risk-Informed Technical Specification Initiative 4b: Risk | {{#Wiki_filter:Risk-Informed Technical Specification Initiative 4b: Risk-Informed Completion Times Brandon Hartle, Reliability and Risk Analyst Jonathan Evans, Reliability and Risk Analyst PRA Licensing Branch A, Division of Risk Assessment, NRR NEI Lessons-Learned Workshop, January 30 - 31, 2019 | ||
-Informed Completion | |||
-Learned Workshop, January 30 | Executive Summary | ||
-31, 2019 Executive Summary | * TSTF-505 and 4b LARs require the highest quality submittals | ||
*TSTF-505 and 4b LARs require the highest quality submittals | * TSTF-505 Rev. 1 suspended November 2016 | ||
*TSTF-505 Rev. 1 suspended November 2016 *3 plant-specific 4b LARs in house; 3 SEs issued | * 3 plant-specific 4b LARs in house; 3 SEs issued | ||
*NRC SE for TSTF | * NRC SE for TSTF-505 Rev. 2 issued November 2018 | ||
-505 Rev. 2 issued November 2018-Revision resolves issues, except Loss of Function Conditions | - Revision resolves issues, except Loss of Function Conditions | ||
*3 LARs in house for TSTF | * 3 LARs in house for TSTF-505 Rev. 2 2 | ||
-505 Rev. 2 2 | |||
Initiative 4b Overview | Initiative 4b Overview | ||
*Risk-Informed process to extend TS CTs based on plant configuration | * Risk-Informed process to extend TS CTs based on plant configuration | ||
*Risk evaluation using current configuration to calculate a specific CT called Risk | * Risk evaluation using current configuration to calculate a specific CT called Risk-informed Completion Time (RICT) | ||
-informed Completion Time (RICT) | * Frontstop = existing TS CT | ||
*Frontstop= existing TS CT | * Backstop = 30 day maximum | ||
*Backstop = 30 day maximum | * Applies to planned and emergent conditions 3 | ||
*Applies to planned and emergent conditions 3 | |||
Initiative 4b Overview | Initiative 4b Overview | ||
*NEI 06-09 Rev. 0 | * NEI 06-09 Rev. 0 | ||
-Introduced term | - Introduced term PRA Functional as an alternative to Operable and allowed a RICT for all PRA Functional configurations | ||
-This replaces design basis analysis requirements with PRA success criteria in the TSs*NRC SE on NEI 06 Restricted definition of | - This replaces design basis analysis requirements with PRA success criteria in the TSs | ||
Attributes of a RICT Program*Integrates Plant Risk | * NRC SE on NEI 06-09 | ||
-Manage multiple SSC outages | - Restricted definition of PRA Functional as capable of meeting design basis analysis requirements or appropriate disposition or programmatic restriction will be provided | ||
-Manage broader scope of SSCs (TS and non | - A RICT can only apply to (restorative) TS Required Actions that are not Mode changes or unit shutdown 4 | ||
-TS)*Flexible Configuration Management | |||
-Decisions include real | Attributes of a RICT Program | ||
-time risk insights | * Integrates Plant Risk | ||
-Focus on repair, not necessarily shutdown | - Manage multiple SSC outages | ||
-Emergent problems | - Manage broader scope of SSCs (TS and non-TS) | ||
*Ongoing/continuous risk awareness 5 | * Flexible Configuration Management | ||
Description of TSTF | - Decisions include real-time risk insights | ||
-505 Rev. 1 | - Focus on repair, not necessarily shutdown | ||
*Defined Conditions, Required Actions, and CTs within scope*Added new Conditions, Required Actions, and CTs to replace TS 3.0.3 and mode change conditions | - Emergent problems | ||
*Added a new program in TS Chapter 5, "Administrative Controls," entitled the "Risk | * Ongoing/continuous risk awareness 5 | ||
-Informed Completion Time Program." *Provided additional clarity for RICT entry using PRA Functional to extend CT for loss of function (LOF) mode change conditions (e.g., 3.0.3 conditions) 6 Early Challenges for TSTF-505 Rev. 1* | |||
-going in 2016 | Description of TSTF-505 Rev. 1 | ||
*5 other TSTF | * Defined Conditions, Required Actions, and CTs within scope | ||
-505 reviews submitted before pilot completed*Discrepancies between NEI 06 | * Added new Conditions, Required Actions, and CTs to replace TS 3.0.3 and mode change conditions | ||
-09 and TSTF | * Added a new program in TS Chapter 5, "Administrative Controls," entitled the "Risk-Informed Completion Time Program." | ||
-505 Rev. 1 were discovered during these integrated reviews | * Provided additional clarity for RICT entry using PRA Functional to extend CT for loss of function (LOF) mode change conditions (e.g., 3.0.3 conditions) 6 | ||
*Implementation of the TSTF in these LARs would have resulted in indeterminate and potentially substantive reduction in safety margin | |||
-505 Rev. 1 | Early Challenges for TSTF-505 Rev. 1 | ||
* Vogtle pilot 4b review on-going in 2016 | |||
-505 SE) justification for adequate defense | * 5 other TSTF-505 reviews submitted before pilot completed | ||
-in-depth and safety margin which relied on assuming | * Discrepancies between NEI 06-09 and TSTF-505 Rev. 1 were discovered during these integrated reviews | ||
* Implementation of the TSTF in these LARs would have resulted in indeterminate and potentially substantive reduction in safety margin 7 | |||
-505, Rev.1, explaining concerns identified during review of plant | |||
-specific LARs:-Definition of PRA Functional | Issues With TSTF-505 Rev. 1 Included changes to the Technical Specifications beyond scope of NRC SE on NEI 06-09 Included PRA Functional to extend CT for configurations with loss of capability to achieve design basis success criteria Added new TS 3.0.3 Conditions and Required Actions to replace default TS 3.0.3 entry and included PRA Functional to extend CTs in the new TS Included (in model TSTF-505 SE) justification for adequate defense-in-depth and safety margin which relied on assuming NRCs restricted definition of PRA Functional, without additional disposition or programmatic restrictions for TS 3.0.3 and mode change CTs 8 | ||
*SE on NEI 06 | |||
-09 limited use of PRA Functionality by requiring | TSTF-505 Rev. 1 Suspension NRC staff suspended approval of TSTF -505, Rev.1, explaining concerns identified during review of plant-specific LARs: | ||
-TS Conditions Involving Mode Changes or Unit Shutdowns | - Definition of PRA Functional | ||
*SE on NEI 06 | * SE on NEI 06-09 limited use of PRA Functionality by requiring remaining performance capability to meet design basis analysis requirements (e.g., maintain functional capability to perform at level of one operation train) | ||
-09 | - TS Conditions Involving Mode Changes or Unit Shutdowns | ||
* SE on NEI 06-09 a RICT can only apply to (restorative) TS Required Actions that are not Mode changes or unit shutdown 9 | |||
-09 1 0 TSTF-505 Rev. 2 1 1 TSTF-505 Rev. 2 Changes*Removed Loss of Function Conditions | |||
-Staff concerned with maintaining adequate defense in depth and safety margins | TSTF-505 Rev. 1 Condition B does not meet design basis analysis requirements, therefore, would not meet intent of SE for NEI 06-09 1 | ||
-The conditions in Table 1 require additional justification that those are not Loss of Function*Newly Developed PRA Method Administrative Control Constraint | 0 | ||
*Conditions not modeled in the PRA are in scope | |||
-Can be plant specific, PRA model dependent | TSTF-505 Rev. 2 1 | ||
-Table 1 in Model application requires additional justification 1 2 TSTF-505 Rev. 2 Changes*Common Cause Failures (CCF) | 1 | ||
-Included in the TS Admin Section to address emergent failures-CCF PRA Modeling to be handled on a plant specific basis | |||
*All hazards require technically adequate dispositions | TSTF-505 Rev. 2 Changes | ||
-External hazards need to be systematically considered | * Removed Loss of Function Conditions | ||
-Addressing only the impact on baseline risk is insufficient | - Staff concerned with maintaining adequate defense in depth and safety margins | ||
-Impact on configuration specific change in risk should be addressed 1 3 Initiative 4b Loss of Function Considerations | - The conditions in Table 1 require additional justification that those are not Loss of Function | ||
* Newly Developed PRA Method Administrative Control Constraint | |||
-But available equipment can provide design basis success parameters upon demand OR-Define and justify adequate defense in depth and safety margins when available equipment can only provide PRA success parameters | * Conditions not modeled in the PRA are in scope | ||
- Can be plant specific, PRA model dependent | |||
-426 which allows a maximum of 24 hours when all trains are Inoperable 1 4 | - Table 1 in Model application requires additional justification 1 | ||
*Using design basis success criteria for PRA Functional for loss of all trains alleviates need for justifying PRA success criteria, i.e.,-Use only SSCs relied on in the original TS specified safety function-Ensure design basis success criteria for parameters are met for all design basis initiators | 2 | ||
*May deviate by requesting TS changes for Inoperability of all trains using PRA Functional with supporting information | |||
-This review may be complex and resource intensive | TSTF-505 Rev. 2 Changes | ||
-Suggest only using on a limited basis 1 5 Initiative 4b Loss of Function Considerations TSTF-505 and 4b LAR Content 1 | * Common Cause Failures (CCF) | ||
- Included in the TS Admin Section to address emergent failures | |||
- CCF PRA Modeling to be handled on a plant specific basis | |||
-Requires confidence in plant specific PRA models | * All hazards require technically adequate dispositions | ||
- External hazards need to be systematically considered | |||
- Addressing only the impact on baseline risk is insufficient | |||
-Familiarizes staff with | - Impact on configuration specific change in risk should be addressed 1 | ||
-Allows for clarifications to reduce acceptance review pitfalls | 3 | ||
-Helps licensee anticipate and address common RAIs | |||
-Minimizes deviations from acceptable approaches/templates | Initiative 4b Loss of Function Considerations 4b allows the use of PRA Functional and calculation of RICT when all trains are Inoperable | ||
- But available equipment can provide design basis success parameters upon demand OR | |||
- Define and justify adequate defense in depth and safety margins when available equipment can only provide PRA success parameters Change in Backstop for CT upon Inoperability of all trains from 30 days to 24 hours | |||
-Clarifies information in the LAR to reduce RAIs 1 8 Conclusions | - Consistent with approved and used TSTF-426 which allows a maximum of 24 hours when all trains are Inoperable 1 | ||
4 | |||
-505 Rev. 2 issued November 21, 2018 | * Using design basis success criteria for PRA Functional for loss of all trains alleviates need for justifying PRA success criteria, i.e., | ||
- Use only SSCs relied on in the original TS specified safety function | |||
- Ensure design basis success criteria for parameters are met for all design basis initiators | |||
* May deviate by requesting TS changes for Inoperability of all trains using PRA Functional with supporting information | |||
-505 Rev. 2 | - This review may be complex and resource intensive | ||
- Suggest only using on a limited basis 1 | |||
5 Initiative 4b Loss of Function Considerations | |||
TSTF-505 and 4b LAR Content 1 | |||
-505 Rev. 2, we expect a large number of submittals in 2019 | 6 Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection 50.69 SSC Categorization 5b, Risk-Informed Surveillance Frequencies NFPA-805, Risk-Informed Fire Protection 4b, Risk-Informed Completion Times Required scope, level of | ||
: detail, technical robustness, and plant representation | |||
* Greater reliance on PRA | |||
* More flexibility for licensee | |||
* More complex staff review | |||
TSTF-505 and 4b LAR Content Scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy of PRA are to be commensurate with application Compare total CDF and LERF against RG 1.174 acceptance guidelines | |||
- Requires confidence in plant specific PRA models Up-to-date full-scope PRA peer reviews | |||
- Supporting Requirements assessed to Capability Category II for all PRA hazards Facts and Observations (F&Os) resolved or dispositioned prior to LAR submittal Deviations from NRC accepted guidance and pilot applications add to review time and resources 1 | |||
7 | |||
4b Application Review Best Practices Pre-submittal meetings | |||
- Familiarizes staff with licensees strategy and goals | |||
- Allows for clarifications to reduce acceptance review pitfalls Reviewing recent submittals | |||
- Helps licensee anticipate and address common RAIs | |||
- Minimizes deviations from acceptable approaches/templates F&O Closure Observations Audits | |||
- Assists with NRC review of complex 4b applications | |||
- Clarifies information in the LAR to reduce RAIs 1 | |||
8 | |||
-Informed Extended Completion Times | |||
-RITSTF Initiative 4b, | Conclusions NRC SE for TSTF-505 Rev. 2 issued November 21, 2018 Revision resolves issues, except for loss of function conditions 3 Initiative 4b LARS in house; 3 SEs issued 3 LARs in house for TSTF-505 Rev. 2 TSTF-505 and 4b LARs require the highest quality submittals Complex reviews that rely on the technical adequacy of the PRA High quality submittals needed to support efficient review by the NRC Progress/Path forward With issuance of the SE for TSTF-505 Rev. 2, we expect a large number of submittals in 2019 Reviewing previous submittals and using best practices will facilitate efficient NRC review 1 | ||
). | 9 | ||
-505, Revision 2, | |||
-RITSTF Initiative 4b, | List of Acronyms CC - Capability Category CCF - Common Cause Failure CDF - Core Damage Frequency CT - Completion Time F&O - Facts and Observations LAR - License Amendment Request LERF - Large Early Release Frequency NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment RAI - Request for Additional Information RICT - Risk Informed Completion Time SE - Safety Evaluation SR - Supporting Requirement SSC - Systems, Structures, and Components TS - Technical Specification TSTF - Technical Specifications Task Force 2 | ||
0 | |||
-505, Revision 1, | |||
-Informed Extended Completion Times | References TSTF-505, Revision 1, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times | ||
-RITSTF Initiative 4B, | - RITSTF Initiative 4b, June 14, 2011, and Model Application dated January 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120330410). | ||
). | Draft Revised Model Safety Evaluation of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, May 1, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17290A005). | ||
-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk | Letter from Timothy J. McGinty, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Technical Specifications Task Force, Issues With Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 1, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B, dated November 15, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16281A021). | ||
-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, | Final Safety Evaluation For Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06 09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, May 17, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071200238). | ||
).2 1 References | 2 1 | ||
-09, Revision 0 | References Topical Report NEI 06-09, Revision 0-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4B, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, October 2012 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML122860402). | ||
-A, | Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 3, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, January 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17317A256). | ||
-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, | |||
). | |||
-Informed Decisions on Plant | |||
-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, | |||
2 2}} | 2 2}} | ||
Latest revision as of 04:29, 5 January 2025
| ML19064B075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/30/2019 |
| From: | Jonathan Evans, Hartle B NRC/NRR/DRA |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML19064B075 (22) | |
Text
Risk-Informed Technical Specification Initiative 4b: Risk-Informed Completion Times Brandon Hartle, Reliability and Risk Analyst Jonathan Evans, Reliability and Risk Analyst PRA Licensing Branch A, Division of Risk Assessment, NRR NEI Lessons-Learned Workshop, January 30 - 31, 2019
Executive Summary
- TSTF-505 Rev. 1 suspended November 2016
- Revision resolves issues, except Loss of Function Conditions
Initiative 4b Overview
- Risk-Informed process to extend TS CTs based on plant configuration
- Risk evaluation using current configuration to calculate a specific CT called Risk-informed Completion Time (RICT)
- Frontstop = existing TS CT
- Backstop = 30 day maximum
- Applies to planned and emergent conditions 3
Initiative 4b Overview
- NEI 06-09 Rev. 0
- Introduced term PRA Functional as an alternative to Operable and allowed a RICT for all PRA Functional configurations
- This replaces design basis analysis requirements with PRA success criteria in the TSs
- Restricted definition of PRA Functional as capable of meeting design basis analysis requirements or appropriate disposition or programmatic restriction will be provided
- A RICT can only apply to (restorative) TS Required Actions that are not Mode changes or unit shutdown 4
Attributes of a RICT Program
- Integrates Plant Risk
- Manage multiple SSC outages
- Manage broader scope of SSCs (TS and non-TS)
- Flexible Configuration Management
- Decisions include real-time risk insights
- Focus on repair, not necessarily shutdown
- Emergent problems
- Ongoing/continuous risk awareness 5
Description of TSTF-505 Rev. 1
- Defined Conditions, Required Actions, and CTs within scope
- Added a new program in TS Chapter 5, "Administrative Controls," entitled the "Risk-Informed Completion Time Program."
- Provided additional clarity for RICT entry using PRA Functional to extend CT for loss of function (LOF) mode change conditions (e.g., 3.0.3 conditions) 6
Early Challenges for TSTF-505 Rev. 1
- Vogtle pilot 4b review on-going in 2016
- 5 other TSTF-505 reviews submitted before pilot completed
- Implementation of the TSTF in these LARs would have resulted in indeterminate and potentially substantive reduction in safety margin 7
Issues With TSTF-505 Rev. 1 Included changes to the Technical Specifications beyond scope of NRC SE on NEI 06-09 Included PRA Functional to extend CT for configurations with loss of capability to achieve design basis success criteria Added new TS 3.0.3 Conditions and Required Actions to replace default TS 3.0.3 entry and included PRA Functional to extend CTs in the new TS Included (in model TSTF-505 SE) justification for adequate defense-in-depth and safety margin which relied on assuming NRCs restricted definition of PRA Functional, without additional disposition or programmatic restrictions for TS 3.0.3 and mode change CTs 8
TSTF-505 Rev. 1 Suspension NRC staff suspended approval of TSTF -505, Rev.1, explaining concerns identified during review of plant-specific LARs:
- Definition of PRA Functional
- SE on NEI 06-09 limited use of PRA Functionality by requiring remaining performance capability to meet design basis analysis requirements (e.g., maintain functional capability to perform at level of one operation train)
- TS Conditions Involving Mode Changes or Unit Shutdowns
- SE on NEI 06-09 a RICT can only apply to (restorative) TS Required Actions that are not Mode changes or unit shutdown 9
TSTF-505 Rev. 1 Condition B does not meet design basis analysis requirements, therefore, would not meet intent of SE for NEI 06-09 1
0
TSTF-505 Rev. 2 1
1
TSTF-505 Rev. 2 Changes
- Removed Loss of Function Conditions
- Staff concerned with maintaining adequate defense in depth and safety margins
- The conditions in Table 1 require additional justification that those are not Loss of Function
- Newly Developed PRA Method Administrative Control Constraint
- Conditions not modeled in the PRA are in scope
- Can be plant specific, PRA model dependent
- Table 1 in Model application requires additional justification 1
2
TSTF-505 Rev. 2 Changes
- Common Cause Failures (CCF)
- Included in the TS Admin Section to address emergent failures
- CCF PRA Modeling to be handled on a plant specific basis
- All hazards require technically adequate dispositions
- External hazards need to be systematically considered
- Addressing only the impact on baseline risk is insufficient
- Impact on configuration specific change in risk should be addressed 1
3
Initiative 4b Loss of Function Considerations 4b allows the use of PRA Functional and calculation of RICT when all trains are Inoperable
- But available equipment can provide design basis success parameters upon demand OR
- Define and justify adequate defense in depth and safety margins when available equipment can only provide PRA success parameters Change in Backstop for CT upon Inoperability of all trains from 30 days to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
- Consistent with approved and used TSTF-426 which allows a maximum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when all trains are Inoperable 1
4
- Using design basis success criteria for PRA Functional for loss of all trains alleviates need for justifying PRA success criteria, i.e.,
- Use only SSCs relied on in the original TS specified safety function
- Ensure design basis success criteria for parameters are met for all design basis initiators
- May deviate by requesting TS changes for Inoperability of all trains using PRA Functional with supporting information
- This review may be complex and resource intensive
- Suggest only using on a limited basis 1
5 Initiative 4b Loss of Function Considerations
6 Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection 50.69 SSC Categorization 5b, Risk-Informed Surveillance Frequencies NFPA-805, Risk-Informed Fire Protection 4b, Risk-Informed Completion Times Required scope, level of
- detail, technical robustness, and plant representation
- Greater reliance on PRA
- More flexibility for licensee
- More complex staff review
TSTF-505 and 4b LAR Content Scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy of PRA are to be commensurate with application Compare total CDF and LERF against RG 1.174 acceptance guidelines
- Requires confidence in plant specific PRA models Up-to-date full-scope PRA peer reviews
- Supporting Requirements assessed to Capability Category II for all PRA hazards Facts and Observations (F&Os) resolved or dispositioned prior to LAR submittal Deviations from NRC accepted guidance and pilot applications add to review time and resources 1
7
4b Application Review Best Practices Pre-submittal meetings
- Familiarizes staff with licensees strategy and goals
- Allows for clarifications to reduce acceptance review pitfalls Reviewing recent submittals
- Helps licensee anticipate and address common RAIs
- Minimizes deviations from acceptable approaches/templates F&O Closure Observations Audits
- Assists with NRC review of complex 4b applications
- Clarifies information in the LAR to reduce RAIs 1
8
Conclusions NRC SE for TSTF-505 Rev. 2 issued November 21, 2018 Revision resolves issues, except for loss of function conditions 3 Initiative 4b LARS in house; 3 SEs issued 3 LARs in house for TSTF-505 Rev. 2 TSTF-505 and 4b LARs require the highest quality submittals Complex reviews that rely on the technical adequacy of the PRA High quality submittals needed to support efficient review by the NRC Progress/Path forward With issuance of the SE for TSTF-505 Rev. 2, we expect a large number of submittals in 2019 Reviewing previous submittals and using best practices will facilitate efficient NRC review 1
9
List of Acronyms CC - Capability Category CCF - Common Cause Failure CDF - Core Damage Frequency CT - Completion Time F&O - Facts and Observations LAR - License Amendment Request LERF - Large Early Release Frequency NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment RAI - Request for Additional Information RICT - Risk Informed Completion Time SE - Safety Evaluation SR - Supporting Requirement SSC - Systems, Structures, and Components TS - Technical Specification TSTF - Technical Specifications Task Force 2
0
References TSTF-505, Revision 1, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times
- RITSTF Initiative 4b, June 14, 2011, and Model Application dated January 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120330410).
Draft Revised Model Safety Evaluation of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, May 1, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17290A005).
Letter from Timothy J. McGinty, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Technical Specifications Task Force, Issues With Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 1, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B, dated November 15, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16281A021).
Final Safety Evaluation For Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06 09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, May 17, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071200238).
2 1
References Topical Report NEI 06-09, Revision 0-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4B, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, October 2012 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML122860402).
Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 3, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, January 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17317A256).
2 2