IR 05000313/2012002: Difference between revisions

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[[Issue date::May 11, 2012]]
[[Issue date::May 11, 2012]]


Christopher J. Schwarz, Site Vice President Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Operations, Inc. 1448 SR 333 Russellville, AR 72802-0967
Christopher J. Schwarz, Site Vice President Arkansas Nuclear One  


SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000313/2012002 AND 05000368/2012002
Entergy Operations, In SR 333 Russellville, AR 72802
-0967


==Dear Mr. Schwarz:==
SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE
On March 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 12, 2012 with you and other members of your staff. The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. One NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection.
- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000313/2012002 AND 05000368/2012002 Dear Mr. Schwarz
 
:
This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, the NRC has determined that a traditional enforcement Severity Level IV violation occurred. This traditional enforcement violation was identified with an associated finding. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
On March 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 12, 2012 with you and other members of your staf The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission
's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licens The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personne One NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspectio This finding w as determined to involve a violation of NRC requirement Additionally, the NRC has determined that a traditional enforcement Severity Level IV violation occurre This traditional enforcement violati on was identified with a n associated findin The NRC is treating these violations as non
-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Polic If you contest these non
-cited violations , you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV
; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555
-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear On If you disagree with a cross
-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear On U N I T E D S T A T E S N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R Y C O M M I S S I O N R E G I O N I V1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD A R L I N G T O N , T E X A S 7 6 0 1 1-4511 C. Schwarz In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


Sincerely,/RA/
Sincerely,/RA/
Donald B. Allen, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000313, 05000368 License Nos.: DRP-51, NPF-6  
Donald B. Allen, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos
.: 050 0 0313, 0 50 00 368 License Nos
.: DRP-51, NPF-6  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000313/2012002 and 05000368/2012002 w/  
Inspection Report 05000313/2012002 and 05000368/2012002 w/  


===Attachment:===
===Attachment:===
Line 40: Line 51:


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000313/2012002; 05000368/2012002; 01/1/2012-03/31/2012; Arkansas Nuclear One, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation; Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation. The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced baseline inspections by region-based inspectors. Two non-cited violations of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process."  The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas."  Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
IR 05000313/2012002
 
; 05000368/2012002; 01/1/2012
-03/31/2012
; Arkansas Nuclear One, Integrated Resident and Regional Report
; Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation; Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
. The report covered a 3
-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced baseline inspection s by region-based inspector s. Two non-cited violations of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process."  The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas."  Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.


===A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings===
===A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings===
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===Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety===
===Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety===
: '''Green.'''
: '''Green.'''
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) because the licensee failed to calibrate Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly. The Unit 1 calibration procedures did not instruct the instruments and controls technician to correct the calibration source output for radioactive decay, nor did the procedures provide criteria for determining when the calibration was successful. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-0524, and reviewed the count rates of Unit 1 effluent and process monitors to determine the extent of the condition. The failure to calibrate the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, radiation monitor performance could deteriorate and go undetected by the current Unit 1 calibration process. The inspectors used IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," February 12, 2008, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I criterion or 10 CFR 20.1301(e). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, associated with the resources component, because complete, accurate, and up-to-date calibration procedures were not available for use on Unit 1 effluent and process monitors.  [H.2(c)]  (Section 2RS05)   Severity Level IV. Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records," because the licensee failed to update their Safety Analysis Report with adequate details and submittals that include the effects of changes made to the facility. Specifically, the licensee built numerous low level radwaste storage facilities on the owner controlled area for interim radwaste storage of dry and solidified radioactive waste and failed to update the Safety Analysis Report to adequately include these changes to equipment, processes, and facilities. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2012-00749. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency is more than minor, thus characterized as a finding, because it has a material impact on licensed activities in that solid radwaste equipment and processes, as well as stored radwaste materials with a significant radioactive source term, have not been adequately described and maintained in all licensee records and reports. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. This finding is characterized as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1 and was treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 2RS08).
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) because the licensee failed to calibrate Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly. The Unit 1 calibration procedures did not instruct the instruments and controls technician to correct the calibration source output for radioactive decay, nor did the procedures provide criteria for determining when the calibration was successful. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-ANO-1-2012-0524, and reviewed the count rates of Unit 1 effluent and process monitors to determine the extent of the condition.
 
The failure to calibrate the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, radiation monitor performance could deteriorate and go undetected by the current Unit 1 calibration process. The inspectors used IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," February 12, 2008, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I criterion or 10 CFR 20.1301(e). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, associated with the resources component, because complete, accurate, and up-to-date calibration procedures were not available for use on Unit 1 effluent and process monitors.  [H.2(c)]  (Section 2RS05)
Severity Level IV. Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records," because the licensee failed to update t heir Safety Analysis Report with adequate details and submittals that include the effects of change s made to the facility. Specifically, the licensee built numerous low level radwaste storage facilities on the owner controlled area for interim radwaste storage of dry and solidified radioactive waste and failed to update the Safety Analysis Report to adequately include these changes to equipment, processes, and facilities. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition R eport CR-ANO-C-2012-00749. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency is more than minor, thus characterized as a finding, because it has a material impact on licensed activities in that solid radwaste equipment and processes, as well as stored radwaste materials with a significant radioactive source term, have not been adequately described and maintained in all licensee records and reports. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. This finding is characterized as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1 and was treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 2RS08).


===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
None
None


=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
Summary of Plant Status   Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. On January 6, 2012, Unit 1 reduced power to 49 percent reactor power to support offsite Mabelvale 500 KV tower maintenance. Following completion of the Mabelvale 500 KV tower maintenance, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent reactor power on January 8, 2012. On March 2, 2012, Unit 1 reduced power to 86 percent reactor power to support repair of an electro-hydraulic control system leak on the solenoid valve for the number 4 main turbine governor valve. On March 2, 2012, after the hydraulic leak was repaired, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent reactor power and remained there for the remainder of the report period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power and remained there for the report period.
 
===Summary of Plant Status===
 
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. On January 6, 2012, Unit 1 reduced power to 49 percent reactor power to support offsite Mabelvale 500 KV tower maintenance. Following completion of the Mab e lvale 500 KV tower maintenance, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent reactor power on January 8, 2012. On March 2, 2012, Unit 1 reduced power to 86 percent reactor power to support repair of an electro
-hydraulic control system leak on the solenoid valve for the number 4 main turbine governor valve. On March 2, 2012 , after the hydraulic leak was repaired, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent reactor power and remained there for the remainder of the report period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power and remained there for the report period.


==REACTOR SAFETY==
==REACTOR SAFETY==
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{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01}}
===.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions===
===.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions===
a. Since thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for February 28-29, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the plant personnel's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On February 28-29, 2012, the inspectors walked down the service water intake structure and intake system, and the transformer yards because their safety-related functions could be affected, or required, as a result of high winds or tornado-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the plant staff's preparations against the site's procedures and determined that the staff's actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design features and the licensee's procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors also evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and performance requirements for the systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant-specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
 
a. Since thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for February 28
-29, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the plant personnel's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On February 28
-29, 2012, the inspectors walked down the service water intake structure and intake system , and the transformer yards because their safety
-related functions could be affected, or required, as a result of high winds or tornado
-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the plant staff's preparations against the site's procedures and determined that the staff's actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant
-specific design features and the licensee's procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors also evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and performance requirements for the systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant
-specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R04}}
{{a|1R04}}
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
==1R04 Equipment Alignment==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.04}}
===.1 Partial Walkdown===
===.1 Partial Walkdown===
a. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems: Inspection Scope  January 10, 2012, Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generators while the alternate AC diesel generator was out of service for maintenance    February 15, 2012, Unit 2 train A of emergency feedwater system while train B was out of service for maintenance March 1, 2012, Unit 1 high pressure injection pump, P-36A, (red train) while performing maintenance on the green train injection valves  The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, SAR, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.


b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk
-significant systems: Inspection Scope January 10, 2012, Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generators while the alternate AC diesel generator was out of service for maintenance February 15, 2012, Unit 2 train A of emergency feedwater system while train B was out of service for maintenance
 
March 1, 2012, Unit 1 high pressure injection pump , P-36A, (red train) while performing maintenance on the green train injection valves The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, SAR, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown sampl e s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R05}}
{{a|1R05}}
==1R05 Fire Protection==
==1R05 Fire Protection==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.05}}
===.1 Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours===
===.1 Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours===
a. The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas: Inspection Scope  January 12, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 1031, Unit 1 diesel fuel storage vault January 12, 2012, Unit 2, Fire Zone 2030, Unit 2 diesel fuel storage vault    March 20, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 104-S, Unit 1 south electrical equipment room  March 31, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 167B, control rod drive ac breaker room March 31, 2012, Unit 2, Fire Zone 2154-E, control element drive mechanism equipment room  The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of five quarterly fire-protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.


b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk
-significant plant areas:
Inspection Scope January 12, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 1031, Unit 1 diesel fuel storage vault
 
January 12, 2012, Unit 2, Fire Zone 2030, Unit 2 diesel fuel storage vault March 20, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 104-S, Unit 1 south electrical equipment room  March 31, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 167B, control rod drive ac breaker room
 
March 31, 2012, Unit 2, Fire Zone 2154
-E, control element drive mechanism equipment room The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of five quarterly fire
-protection inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R06}}
{{a|1R06}}
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06}}
a. The inspectors reviewed the SAR, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also inspected the areas listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. Inspection Scope  March 22, 2012, Unit 1, manhole number 4 which contains two trains of Unit 1 service water electrical power cables   These activities constitute completion of one manhole sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors reviewed the SAR, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also inspected the areas listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
Inspection Scope  March 22, 2012, Unit 1, manhole number 4 which contains two trains of Unit 1 service water electrical power cables These activities constitute completion of one manhole sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R11}}
{{a|1R11}}
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11}}
===.1 a. Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Program On March 15, 2012 the inspectors observed a crew of Unit 2 licensed operators in the plant's simulator during requalification training.===
===.1 a. Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Prog===
On March 16, 2012 the inspectors observed a crew of Unit 1 licensed operators in the plant's simulator during requalification testing. The inspectors assessed the following areas:  Inspection Scope  Licensed operator performance The ability of the licensee to administer the evaluations and the quality of the training provided  The modeling and performance of the control room simulator The quality of post-scenario critiques Follow-up actions taken by the licensee for identified discrepancies and for operators who failed an evaluation  These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified. Findings


===.2 Quarterly Observation of Licensed Operator Performance a. On March 2, 2012, the inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the Unit 1 control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk due to reducing reactor power to repair a leaking servo-control valve, SV-8519 and subsequent main turbine governor valve testing. Inspection Scope In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including OP-1015.001, "Conduct of Operations," Revision 90 and other operations department policies. These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed-operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified. Findings 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness===
r am On March 15 , 2012 the inspectors observed a crew of Unit 2 licensed operators in the plant's simulator during requalification training. On March 16, 2012 the inspectors observed a crew of Unit 1 licensed operators in the plant's simulator during requalification testing. The inspectors assessed the following areas:
Inspection Scope Licensed operator performance
 
The ability of the licensee to administer the evaluations and the quality of the training provided The modeling and performance of the control room simulator The quality of post
-scenario critiques
 
Follow-up actions taken by the licensee for identified discrepancies and for operators who failed an evaluation These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
 
===.2 Quarterly Observation of Licensed Operator Performance===
 
a. On March 2, 2012, the inspectors observed the performance of on
-shift licensed operators in the Unit 1 control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk due to reducing reactor power to repair a leaking servo
-control valve, SV-8519 and subsequent main turbine governor valve testing
. Inspection Scope In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including OP-1015.001, "Conduct of Operation s," Revision 90 and other operations department policies.
 
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed
-operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R12}}
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12}}
a. The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems: Inspection Scope  Maintenance Rule program (a)(3) assessment for period from January 2010 to June 2011.
a. The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems:
Inspection Scope  Maintenance Rule program (a)(3) assessment for period from January 2010 to June 2011.
 
Unit 1 service water system The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:
Implementing appropriate work practices
 
Identifying and addressing common cause failures
 
Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
 
Characterizing system reliability issues for performance
 
Charging unavailability for performance Trending key parameters for condition monitoring Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or
-(a)(2)  Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as descri bed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.


Unit 1 service water system  The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:  Implementing appropriate work practices Identifying and addressing common cause failures Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05. b. No findings were identified.
Characterizing system reliability issues for performance Charging unavailability for performance Trending key parameters for condition monitoring  Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or -(a)(2)  Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)  The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
 
Findings
{{a|1R13}}
{{a|1R13}}
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13}}
a. The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work: Inspection Scope January 11 and 19, 2012, Unit 1 while performing pressurizer sample via containment isolation valve SV-1818  February 14, 2012, Unit 2, maintenance on motor driven emergency feedwater pump room cooler, 2VUC-6B, which rendered the pump inoperable   February 15, 2012, Unit 1, loss of integrated control system automatic control of main feedwater low-load and startup valves   February 28-29, 2012, Unit 2, postponement of  train B service water pump outage while performing channel D of plant protection system and severe weather (tornado watch) in effect March 6, 2012, Unit 2, change in risk profile due to loss of two charging pumps, 2P-36B and 2P-36C  The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk
-significant and safety
-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
Inspection Scope January 11 and 19, 2012, Unit 1 while performing pressurizer sample via containment isolation valve SV
-1818  February 14, 2012, Unit 2, maintenance on motor driven emergency feedwater pump room cooler, 2VUC
-6B, which rendered the pump inoperable February 15, 2012, Unit 1, loss of integrated control system automatic control of main feedwater low
-load and startup valves February 28-29, 2012, Unit 2, postponement of  train B service water pump outage while performing channel D of plant protection system and severe weather (tornado watch) in effect March 6, 2012, Unit 2, change in risk profile due to loss of two charging pumps, 2P-36B and 2P
-36C  The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R15}}
{{a|1R15}}
==1R15 Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments==
==1R15 Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15}}
a. The inspectors reviewed the following assessments: Inspection Scope   January 20, 2012, Unit 1, SV-1818 pressurizer sample valve displaying dual position indication   February 29, 2012, Unit 2, weld flaw leak on service water loop II instrument line March 6, 2012, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator fuel transfer pump following spurious actuation of fire system deluge system   March 26, 2012, Unit 2, high pressure safety injection pump 2P-89C motor outboard bearing low oil level   March 27, 2012, Unit 2, control element assembly issues with delayed element movement given withdrawal and insert command   March 28, 2012, Unit 2, extension of service water pump, 2P-4B, operability evaluation due to degraded pump shaft sleeve The inspectors selected these operability and functionality assessments based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure technical specification operability was properly justified and to verify the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and SAR to the licensee's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of six operability evaluations inspection sample(s) as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors reviewed the following assessments:
Inspection Scope January 20, 2012, Unit 1, SV
-1818 pressurizer sample valve displaying dual position indication February 29, 2012, Unit 2, weld flaw leak on service water loop II instrument line March 6, 2012, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator fuel transfer pump following spurious actuation of fire system deluge system March 26, 2012, Unit 2, high pressure safety injection pump 2P
-89C motor outboard bearing low oil level March 27, 2012, Unit 2, control element assembly issues with delayed element movement given withdrawal and insert command March 28, 2012, Unit 2, extension of service water pump, 2P-4B, operability evaluation due to degraded pump shaft sleeve The inspectors selected these operability and functionality assessments based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure technical specification operability was properly justified and to verify the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and SAR to the licensee's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of si x operability evaluations inspection sample(s) as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|1R19}}
{{a|1R19}}
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19}}
a. The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability: Inspection Scope   January 12, 2012, Alternate AC diesel generator following planned maintenance January 18, 2012, CV-1219 and CV-1278, red train high pressure injection block valves following planned maintenance January 20, 2012, Unit 2, service water pump, 2P-4B, following electrical and mechanical maintenance   February 1, 2012, Unit 1, decay heat pump, P-34B, following planned maintenance   February 14, 2012, Unit 2, following emergency feedwater pump room cooler, 2VUC-6B, coupling replacement   February 15, 2012, Unit 1, following replacement of several transfer relay cards in the integrated control system for control of low-load, CV-2673 and start-up, CV-2623 feedwater control valves   February 24, 2012, Unit 1, service water pump, P-4C, following shaft sleeve replacement March 1, 2012, Unit 1, CV-1227, CV-1228, CV-1284, and CV-1285 green train high pressure injection block valves, following planned maintenance   March 9, 2012, Unit 2, charging water pump, 2P-36C, after shaft replacement The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):   The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed   Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the SAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of nine post-maintenance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors reviewed the following post
-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:
Inspection Scope January 12, 2012, Alternate AC diesel generator following planned maintenance
 
January 18, 2012, CV
-1219 and CV
-1278, red train high pressure injection block valves following planned maintenance January 20, 2012, Unit 2, service water pump, 2P-4B, following electrical and mechanical maintenance February 1, 2012, Unit 1, decay heat pump, P
-34B, following planned maintenance February 14, 2012, Unit 2, following emergency feedwater pump room cooler, 2VUC-6B, coupling replacement February 15, 2012, Unit 1, following replacement of several transfer relay cards in the integrated control system for control of low
-load, CV-2673 and star t-up, CV-2623 feedwater control valves February 24, 2012, Unit 1, service water pump , P-4C, following shaft sleeve replacement
 
March 1, 2012, Unit 1, CV
-1227, CV-1228, CV-1284, and CV
-1285 green train high pressure injection block valves
, following planned maintenance March 9, 2012, Unit 2, charging water pump, 2P-36C, after shaft replacement The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):
The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate
 
The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the SAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post
-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of nine post-maintenance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|R22}}
{{a|R22}}
==R22 Surveillance Testing==
==R22 Surveillance Testing==
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspectors reviewed the SAR, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:   Preconditioning Evaluation of testing impact on the plant   Acceptance criteria   Test equipment   Procedures Test data Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability Restoration of plant systems Reference setting data Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
The inspectors reviewed the SAR, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that t he significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:
Preconditioning
 
Evaluation of testing impact on the plant Acceptance criteria Test equipment Procedures
 
Test data Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability
 
Restoration of plant systems
 
Reference setting data
 
Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.


January 23, 2012, Unit 1, high pressure injection pump, P-36C, quarterly inservice test.
January 23, 2012, Unit 1, high pressure injection pump, P-36C, quarterly inservice test.


February 21, 2012, Unit 1, emergency feedwater initiation and control system channel B monthly surveillance test   February 27-28, 2012, Unit 2, D32 battery charger load test March 1, 2012, Unit 1, high pressure injection pump, P-36B, quarterly inservice test  March 2, 2012, Unit 1, main turbine control valve and stop valve surveillance testing March 20, 2012, Unit 2, low pressure safety injection pump, 2P-60B, quarterly inservice test and piping inservice inspection  March 26, 2012, Unit 2, control element assembly quarterly exercise test  Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of seven surveillance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
February 21, 2012, Unit 1, emergency feedwater initiation and control system channel B monthly surveillance test February 27
-28, 2012, Unit 2, D32 battery charger load test


b. No findings were identified. Findings  Cornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness
March 1, 2012, Unit 1, high pressure injection pump, P-36B, quarterly inservice test  March 2, 2012, Unit 1, main turbine control valve and stop valve surveillance testing March 20, 2012, Unit 2, low pressure safety injection pump, 2P-60B, quarterly inservice test and piping inservice inspection March 26, 2012, Unit 2, control element assembly quarterly exercise test Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of seven surveillance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings  Cornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness
{{a|1EP6}}
{{a|1EP6}}
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06}}
===.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation===
===.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation===
a. The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on February 27, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the control room simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment. Inspection Scope  These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.


b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on February 27, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the control room simulator, technical support center , and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.
 
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


===.2 Training Observations===
===.2 Training Observations===
a. The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 26, 2012, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.
a. The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 26, 2012, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post
-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.


Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


==RADIATION SAFETY==
==RADIATION SAFETY==
Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
Cornerstones:
Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
{{a|2RS0}}
{{a|2RS0}}
==2RS0 5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation==
==2RS0 5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation==
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
This area was inspected to verify the licensee was assuring the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments that are used to:  (1) monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment; and (2) detect and quantify radioactive process streams and effluent releases. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, the technical specifications, and the licensee's procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, performed walkdowns of various portions of the plant, and reviewed the following items:   Selected plant configurations and alignments of process, postaccident, and effluent monitors with descriptions in the Safety Analysis Report and the offsite dose calculation manual     Select instrumentation, including effluent monitoring instrument, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small article monitors to examine their configurations and source checks Calibration and testing of process and effluent monitors, laboratory instrumentation, whole body counters, postaccident monitoring instrumentation, portal monitors, personnel contamination monitors, small article monitors, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, electronic dosimetry, air samplers, continuous air monitors   Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiation monitoring instrumentation since the last inspection   Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.05-05.
This area was inspected to verify the licensee was assuring the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments that are used to:  (1) monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment; and (2) detect and quantify radioactive process streams and effluent releases. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, the technical specifications, and the licensee's procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, performed walkdowns of various portions of the plant, and reviewed the following items:
Selected plant configurations and alignments of process, postaccident, and effluent monitors with descriptions in the Safety Analysis Report and the offsite dose calculation manual Select instrumentation, including effluent monitoring instrument, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small article monitors to examine their configurations and source checks Calibration and testing of process and effluent monitors, laboratory instrumentation, whole body counters, postaccident monitoring instrumentation, portal monitors , personnel contamination monitors , small article monitors , portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, electronic dosimetry, air samplers, continuous air monitors Audits, self
-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiation monitoring instrumentation since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.05-05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Line 143: Line 312:


=====Description.=====
=====Description.=====
One part of a typical radiation instrument calibration involves a comparison of the instrument's indicated value with a known value. In this case, the indicated counts per minute provided by the instrument is compared with the known disintegration rate of a radioactive source. To have the correct disintegration rate of the radioactive source, the individual performing the calibration must take into account the half-life of the radionuclide and the activity of the radioactive source on a known date. However, when the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 effluent and process monitor calibration records, they observed the Unit 1 calibration procedures did not instruct the instruments and controls technician to correct the calibration source output for radioactive decay, nor did the procedures provide criteria for determining when the calibration was successful. Instead, the procedure instructed the technician to "compare the calibration source count rate with the last calibration reading" and inform Operations if a "significant" difference was observed.  "Significant" was not defined. Based on these technical omissions and an interview of two Unit 1 instruments and controls technicians, the inspectors concluded the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors were not calibrated properly. In contrast, the Unit 2 calibration procedures provided the original transfer calibration source count rate from the primary calibration for each effluent and process monitor, the date on which the count rate was taken, instructions on how to decay correct the calibration source count rate, and a statement that the final count rates were acceptable if between 80 to 120 percent of the calculated (decay corrected) value. After performing independent verification of the decay-corrected monitor count rates, the inspectors concluded the Unit 2 effluent and process monitors were calibrated properly. Based on a review of procedure revisions, the inspectors determined the Unit 1 procedures omitted the necessary technical guidance in 2003.
One part of a typical radiation instrument calibration involves a comparison of the instrument's indicated value with a known value. In this case, the indicated counts per minute provided by the instrument is compared with the known disintegration rate of a radioactive source. To have the correct disintegration rate of the radioactive source, the individual performing the calibration must take into account the half
-life of the radionuclide and the activity of the radioactive source on a known date. However, when the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 effluent and process monitor calibration records, they observed the Unit 1 calibration procedures did not instruct the instruments and controls technician to correct the calibration source output for radioactive decay, nor did the procedures provide criteria for determining when the calibration was successful. Instead, the procedure instructed the technician to "compare the calibration source count rate with the last calibration reading" and inform Operations if a "significant" difference was observed.  "Significant" was not defined. Based on these technical omissions and an interview of two Unit 1 instruments and controls technicians, the inspectors concluded the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors were not calibrated properly. In contrast, the Unit 2 calibration procedures provided the original transfer calibration source count rat e from the primary calibration for each effluent and process monitor, the date on which the count rate was taken, instructions on how to decay correct the calibration source count rate, and a statement that the final count rates were acceptable if between 80 to 120 percent of the calculated (decay corrected) value. After performing independent verification of the decay
-corrected monitor count rates, the inspectors concluded the Unit 2 effluent and process monitors were calibrated properly.


The licensee retrieved the original transfer calibration source count rate from the primary calibration for each Unit 1 effluent and process monitor, corrected the count rates for radioactive decay, and then compared the corrected count rates with the as-left count rates from the most recent calibrations. The licensee found the Unit 1 effluent and process monitor count rates were between 76 to 101 percent of the calculated values with all, except one, of the monitors reading below the calculated value. The count rate of one Unit 1 monitor was outside the +/- 20 percent allowable tolerance band used in Unit 2. RE-3814, a radiation monitor with an alarm function on the service water and intermediate cooling water systems, read 24 percent low, using the as-left count rate observed during the monitor's calibration on January 24, 2011.  
Based on a review of procedure revisions, the inspectors determined the Unit 1 procedures omitted the necessary technical guidance in 2003.
 
The licensee retrieved the original transfer calibration source count rate from the primary calibration for each Unit 1 effluent and process monitor, corrected the count rates for radioactive decay, and then compared the corrected count rates with the as
-left count rates from the most recent calibrations. The licensee found the Unit 1 effluent and process monitor count rates were between 76 to 101 percent of the calculated values with all, except one, of the monitors reading below the calculated value. The count rate of one Unit 1 monitor was outside the +/- 20 percent allowable tolerance band used in Unit 2. RE-3814, a radiation monitor with an alarm function on the service water and intermediate cooling water systems, read 24 percent low, using the as
-left count rate observed during the monitor's calibration on January 24, 2011.


=====Analysis.=====
=====Analysis.=====
The failure to calibrate the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that radiation monitor performance could deteriorate and go undetected by the current Unit 1 calibration process. The inspectors used IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," February 12, 2008, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however, it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I criterion or 10 CFR 20.1301(e). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area associated with the resources component because complete, accurate, and up-to-date calibration procedures were not available for use on Unit 1 effluent and process monitors.  [H.2(c)]  
The failure to calibrate the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that radiation monitor performance could deteriorate and go undetected by the current Unit 1 calibration process.
 
The inspectors used IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," February 12, 2008, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however, it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I criterion or 10 CFR 20.1301(e). The finding has a cross
-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area associated with the resources component because complete, accurate, and up
-to-date calibration procedures were not available for use on Unit 1 effluent and process monitors.  [H.2(c)]


=====Enforcement.=====
=====Enforcement.=====
10 CFR 20.1501(b) requires the licensee ensure that instruments and equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements are calibrated periodically for the radiation measured. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not calibrate some instruments used for quantitative radiation measurements periodically. Specifically, since 2003, the licensee did not use a process which calibrated the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors by comparing the observed count rate with a known or calculated count rate and the process did not ensure the instruments' performance was within an established acceptance band. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program and reviewed the count rates of Unit 1 effluent and process monitors to determine the extent of the condition. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-00524, it is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000313/2012002-01, "Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Effluent and Process Monitors Properly."
10 CFR 20.1501(b) requires the licensee ensure that instruments and equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements are calibrated periodically for the radiation measured. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not calibrate some instruments used for quantitative radiation measurements periodically. Specifically, since 2003, the licensee did not use a process which calibrated the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors by comparing the observed count rate with a known or calculated count rate and the process did not ensure the instruments' performance was within an established acceptance band. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program and reviewed the count rates of Unit 1 effluent and process monitors to determine the extent of the condition. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-00524, it is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000313/201 2002-01, "Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Effluent and Process Monitors Properly."
{{a|2RS0}}
{{a|2RS0}}
==2RS0 6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment==
==2RS0 6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment==
Line 157: Line 336:


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
This area was inspected to:  (1) ensure the gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems were maintained so radiological discharges were properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure; (2) ensure abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and conditions, when effluent radiation monitors are out-of-service, were controlled in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements and licensee procedures; (3) verify the licensee=s quality control program ensures the radioactive effluent sampling and analysis requirements were satisfied so discharges of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and evaluated; and (4) verify the adequacy of public dose projections resulting from radioactive effluent discharges. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and I; 40 CFR Part 190; the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, and licensee procedures required by the Technical Specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed and/or observed the following items:   Radiological effluent release reports since the previous inspection and reports related to the effluent program issued since the previous inspection, if any   Effluent program implementing procedures, including sampling, monitor setpoint determinations and dose calculations   Equipment configuration and flow paths of selected gaseous and liquid discharge system components, filtered ventilation system material condition, and significant changes to their effluent release points, if any, and associated 10 CFR 50.59 reviews  Selected portions of the routine processing and discharge of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents (including sample collection and analysis)   Controls used to ensure representative sampling and appropriate compensatory sampling    Results of the interlaboratory comparison program   Effluent stack flow rates   Surveillance test results of technical specification-required ventilation effluent discharge systems  since the previous inspection  Significant changes in reported dose values, if any  A selection of radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits   Part 61 analyses and methods used to determine which isotopes are included in the source term   Offsite dose calculation manual changes, if any   Meteorological dispersion and deposition factors   Latest land use census   Records of abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges, if any Groundwater monitoring results   Changes to the licensee's written program for indentifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to groundwater, if any   Identified leakage or spill events and entries made into 10 CFR 50.75 (g) records, if any, and associated evaluations of the extent of the contamination and the radiological source term   Offsite notifications and reports of events associated with spills, leaks, or groundwater monitoring results, if any  Audits, self-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment since the last inspection   Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of the one required sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.06-05.
This area was inspected to:  (1)ensure the gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems were maintained so radiological discharges were properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure; (2) ensure abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and conditions, when effluent radiation monitors are out
-of-service, were controlled in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements and licensee procedures; (3) verify the licensee
=s quality control program ensures the radioactive effluent sampling and analysis requirements were satisfied so discharges of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and evaluated; and (4) verify the adequacy of public dose projections resulting from radioactive effluent discharges. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and I; 40 CFR Part 190; the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, and licensee procedures required by the Technical Specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed and/or observed the following items:
Radiological effluent release reports since the previous inspection and reports related to the effluent program issued since the previous inspection, if any Effluent program implementing procedures, including sampling, monitor setpoint determinations and dose calculations Equipment configuration and flow paths of selected gaseous and liquid discharge system components, filtered ventilation system material condition, and significant changes to their effluent release points, if any, and associated 10 CFR 50.59 reviews  Selected portions of the routine processing and discharge of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent s (including sample collection and analysis)
Controls used to ensure representative sampling and appropriate compensatory sampling    Results of the interlaboratory comparison program Effluent stack flow rates Surveillance test results of technical specification
-required ventilation effluent discharge systems  since the previous inspection  Significant changes in reported dose values, if any  A selection of radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits Part 61 analyses and methods used to determine which isotopes are included in the source term Offsite dose calculation manual changes, if any Meteorological dispersion and deposition factors Latest land use censu s   Records of abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges, if any Groundwater monitoring results Changes to the licensee
's written program for indentifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to groundwater, if any Identified leakage or spill events and entries made into 10 CFR 50.75 (g) records, if any, and associated evaluations of the extent of the contamination and the radiological source term Offsite notifications and reports of events associated with spills, leaks, or groundwater monitoring results, if any  Audits, self
-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of the one required sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 7112 4.0 6-05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
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====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
This area was inspected to:  (1) ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program verified the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validated the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program; (2) verify that the radiological environmental monitoring program was implemented consistent with the licensee's technical specifications and/or offsite dose calculation manual and to validate that the radioactive effluent release program meets the design objective contained in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; and (3) ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program monitors non-effluent exposure pathways was based on sound principles and assumptions and validated that doses to members of the public were within the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 190, as applicable. The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following items:   Annual environmental monitoring reports and offsite dose calculation manual   Selected air sampling and thermoluminescence dosimeter monitoring stations Collection and preparation of environmental samples Operability, calibration, and maintenance of meteorological instruments   Selected events documented in the annual environmental monitoring report which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost thermoluminescence dosimeter, or anomalous measurement   Selected structures, systems, or components that may contain licensed material and has a credible mechanism for licensed material to reach ground water   Records required by 10 CFR 50.75(g)
This area was inspected to:  (1) ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program verified the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validated the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program; (2) verify that the radiological environmental monitoring program was implemented consistent with the licensee's technical specifications and/or offsite dose calculation manual and to validate that the radioactive effluent release program meets the design objective contained in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; and (3)ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program monitors non
Significant changes made by the licensee to the offsite dose calculation manual as the result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection   Calibration and maintenance records for selected air samplers, composite water samplers, and environmental sample radiation measurement instrumentation Interlaboratory comparison program results Audits, self-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to the radiological environmental monitoring program since the last inspection   Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.07-05.
-effluent exposure pathways was based on sound principles and assumptions and validated that doses to members of the public were within the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 190, as applicable. The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following items:
Annual environmental monitoring reports and offsite dose calculation manual Selected air sampling and thermoluminescence dosimeter monitoring stations
 
Collection and preparation of environmental samples Operability, calibration, and maintenance of meteorological instruments Selected event s documented in the annual environmental monitoring report which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost thermoluminescence dosimeter, or anomalous measurement Selected structures, systems, or components that may contain licensed material and has a credible mechanism for licensed material to reach ground water Records required by 10 CFR 50.75(g)  
 
Significant changes made by the licensee to the offsite dose calculation manual as the result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection Calibration and maintenance records for selected air samplers, composite water samplers, and environmental sample radiation measurement instrumentation
 
Interlaboratory comparison program results
 
Audits, self
-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to the radiological environmental monitoring program since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
 
These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.0 7-05.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified. 2RS08 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation (71124.08)
No findings were identified.
 
2RS08 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation (71124.08)


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
This area was inspected to verify the effectiveness of the licensee=s programs for processing, handling, storage, and transportation of radioactive material. The inspectors used the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180 for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following items:  The solid radioactive waste system description, process control program, and the scope of the licensee=s audit program Control of radioactive waste storage areas including container labeling/marking and monitoring containers for deformation or signs of waste decomposition   Changes to the liquid and solid waste processing system configuration including a review of waste processing equipment that is not operational or abandoned in place  Radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides    Processes for waste classification including use of scaling factors and 10 CFR Part 61 analysis   Shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking, driver instructing, and preparation of the disposal manifest   Audits, self-assessments, reports, corrective action reports radioactive solid waste processing, and radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation performed since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
This area was inspected to verify the effectiveness of the licensee
=s programs for processing, handling, storage, and transportation of radioactive material. The inspectors used the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180 for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following items:  The solid radioactive waste system description, process control program, and the scope of the licensee
=s audit program Control of radioactive waste storage areas including container labeling/marking and monitoring containers for deformation or signs of waste decomposition Changes to the liquid and solid waste processing system configuration including a review of waste processing equipment that is not operational or abandoned in place  Radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult
-to-measure radionuclides    Processes for waste classification including use of scaling factors and 10 CFR Part 61 analysis Shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking, driver instructing, and preparation of the disposal manifest Audits, sel f-assessments, reports, corrective action reports radioactive solid waste processing, and radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation performed since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.


These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.08-05.
These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.08-05.
Line 183: Line 388:


=====Description.=====
=====Description.=====
The inspector observed facilities in which the licensee stored solid radioactive waste on the owner controlled area. The licensee defined solid radioactive waste as spent demineralizer resins, filter elements, contaminated clothing, contaminated equipment, as well as paper, rags, and plastics used in decontamination and contamination control. The inspectors asked a licensing representative how long the buildings had been in place. The representative provided the following information: The low level radwaste storage building located northeast of Unit 2, adjacent to the switchyard, was built in late 1986 or early 1987. The old radwaste storage building located east of Unit 1 turbine building was in place since the start of plant operation.
The inspector observed facilities in which the licensee stored solid radioactive waste on the owner controlled area. The licensee defined solid radioactive waste as spent demineralizer resins, filter elements, contaminated clothing, contaminated equipment, as well as paper, rags, and plastics used in decontamination and contamination control. The inspectors asked a licensing representative how long the buildings had been in place. The representative provided the following information:
The low level radwaste storage building located northeast of Unit 2, adjacent to the switchyard, was built in late 1986 or early 1987. The old radwaste storage building located east of Unit 1 turbine building was in place since the start of plant operation.
 
Warehouse 2, located east of Unit 1 turbine building and adjacent to the old radwaste storage building, was also in place since the start of plant operation. The Unit 2 steam generator mausoleum, outside the protected area, was built in late 1999 or early 2000.
 
The Unit 1 steam generator and head mausoleum, outside the protected area, was built in 2005.
 
The SAR lacked details of these facilities regarding their volume and/or construction, principal sources of radioactivity stored, and estimated dose rate at the site boundary per curie of stored waste. Because of the special nuclear material, old steam generators, and old reactor vessel heads stored in these facilities, the inspectors concluded that there was a significant source of radioactivity not adequately described in the licensee's SAR. When this situation was identified by the NRC, the licensee was unable to provide the total amount of radioactivity (in curies) for these locations of stored waste materials nor could the licensee provide an estimate of dose rate at the site boundary per curie of stored waste.


Warehouse 2, located east of Unit 1 turbine building and adjacent to the old radwaste storage building, was also in place since the start of plant operation. The Unit 2 steam generator mausoleum, outside the protected area, was built in late 1999 or early 2000. The Unit 1 steam generator and head mausoleum, outside the protected area, was built in 2005.
Additionally, the Warehouse 2 storage facility was not discussed in any detail in the SAR reviewed.


The SAR lacked details of these facilities regarding their volume and/or construction, principal sources of radioactivity stored, and estimated dose rate at the site boundary per curie of stored waste. Because of the special nuclear material, old steam generators, and old reactor vessel heads stored in these facilities, the inspectors concluded that there was a significant source of radioactivity not adequately described in the licensee's SAR. When this situation was identified by the NRC, the licensee was unable to provide the total amount of radioactivity (in curies) for these locations of stored waste materials nor could the licensee provide an estimate of dose rate at the site boundary per curie of stored waste. Additionally, the Warehouse 2 storage facility was not discussed in any detail in the SAR reviewed. Analysis . The performance deficiency associated with this finding was failure of the licensee to update its SAR with adequate information and submittals relative to its solid radwaste equipment, processes, and facilities. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The finding is characterized as a Severity Level IV, non- violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there is no cross-cutting aspect.
Analysis . The performance deficiency associated with this finding was failure of the licensee to update its SAR with adequate information and submittals relative to its solid radwaste equipment, processes, and facilities. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The finding is characterized as a Severity Level IV, non- violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there is no cross
-cutting aspect.


=====Enforcement.=====
=====Enforcement.=====
Title 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records", requires, in part, that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall update periodically the final safety analysis report (FSAR). This submittal shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission by the licensee pursuant to Commission requirements since the submittal of the last update to the FSAR. The submittal shall include the effects of all changes made in the facility as described in the FSAR; all safety analyses and evaluations performed by the licensee in support of conclusions that changes did not require a license amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). Contrary to the above, since 1986, the licensee failed to include in a submittal the effects of all changes made in the facility as described in the SAR. Specifically, the licensee failed to update the solid radioactive waste program with adequate details and descriptions of equipment, facilities, and processes. This includes details of an additional solid radwaste storage area, principal radionuclides, and associated curie content or radioactivity of stored radioactive solid waste. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program. Because the finding was a Severity Level IV violation and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2012-00749, the finding is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000313/2012002-02; 05000368/2012002-02, "Failure to Update the SAR with Adequate Details relative to its Solid Radwaste Equipment, Processes, and Facilities."
Title 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records", requires, in part, that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall update periodically the final safety analysis report (FSAR). This submittal shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission by the licensee pursuant to Commission requirements since the submittal of the last update to the FSAR. The submittal shall include the effects of all changes made in the facility as described in the FSAR; all safety analyses and evaluations performed by the licensee in support of conclusions that changes did not require a license amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2).
 
Contrary to th e above, since 1986, the licensee failed to include in a submittal the effects of all changes made in the facility as described in the SAR. Specifically, the licensee failed to update the solid radioactive waste program with adequate details and descriptions of equipment, facilities, and processes.
 
This includes details of an additional solid radwaste storage area, principal radionuclides, and associated curie content or radioactivity of stored radioactive solid waste. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program. Because the finding was a Severity Level IV violation and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-ANO-C-2 012-00749, the finding is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy:
NCV 05000313/2012002
-02; 05000368/2012002
-02, "Failure to Update the SAR with Adequate Details relative to its Solid Radwaste Equipment, Processes, and Facilities
."


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
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{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}}
===.1 Data Submission Issue===
===.1 Data Submission Issue===
a. The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the fourth Quarter 2011 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, "Performance Indicator Program." Inspection Scope  This review was performed as part of the inspectors' normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.


b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the fourth Quarter 20 11 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, "Performance Indicator Program."
 
Inspection Scope This review was performed as part of the inspectors' normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


===.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)===
===.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)===
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1st quarter 2011 through the 4th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
 
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
 
Inspection Scope
 
These activities constitute completion of two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


===.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)===
===.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)===
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1st quarter 2011 through the 4th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, maintenance rule records, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
 
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, maintenance rule records, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
 
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


===.4 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)===
===.4 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)===
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for  ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1st quarter 2011 through the 4th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. Inspection Scope  These activities constitute completion of two unplanned scrams with complications samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.


b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for  ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals
. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.
 
Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two unplanned scrams with complications sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


===.5 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)===
===.5 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)===
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the safety system functional failures performance indicator for  ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1st quarter 2011 through the 4th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, and NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73."  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, operability assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance work orders, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two safety system functional failures samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified. Findings
 
a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the safety system functional failures performance indicator for  ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, and NUREG
-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73."  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, operability assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance work orders, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. Inspection Scope
 
These activities constitute completion of two safety system functional failures sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|4OA2}}
{{a|4OA2}}
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}}
===.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems===
===.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems===
a. As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program because of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed. Inspection Scope These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report. b. No findings were identified. Findings
 
a. As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program because of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed. Inspection Scope
 
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings


===.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews===
===.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews===
a. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the station's daily corrective action documents. Inspection Scope  The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.


b. No findings were identified. Findings
a. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow
-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the station's daily corrective action documents.
 
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
 
b. No findings were identified.
 
Findings
{{a|4OA3}}
{{a|4OA3}}
==4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion==
==4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion==
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71153}}
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71153}}
===.1 (Closed) LER 05000313/2010003 Manual Reactor Scram Conservatively Initiated After Multiple Abnormal Events Occurred During Plant Startup from a Refueling Outage===
===.1 (Closed) LER 05000313/2010003 Manual===
On April 18, 2010, Unit 1 was at 11 percent reactor power and preparing to connect the main generator to the electric grid to end refueling outage 1R22. At 1:46 p.m., the operations staff entered the abnormal operating procedure due to indications of a degradation of reactor coolant pump P-32C third stage seal. At 1:56 p.m., an operator at the main turbine reported smoke and small flames at turbine governor valve-3. At 1:57 p.m., control room operators immediately tripped the main turbine and initiated a manual reactor trip in response to the reactor coolant pump seal and the main turbine fire. The manual reactor trip was conservatively performed as neither issue directly required a reactor trip. The licensee determined that the reactor coolant pump seal failure was due to the failure to ensure adequate clearance between the pump coupling slinger ring and the stand pipe splash shield during pump replacement that occurred during the refueling outage. The fire was a result of an electro-hydraulic control fluid spill onto the calcium silicate piping insulation during maintenance. Under the proper conditions, the electro-hydraulic control fluid soaked insulation, heat from the steam lines, and ventilation combined to result in an unexpected exothermic reaction. The licensee implemented corrective actions to revise procedures for reactor coolant pump replacement and provide more supervisory oversight during these infrequent evolutions. The licensee also implemented procedural changes to monitor electro-hydraulic control fluid spills, require specific walkdowns of turbine generator areas following every outage to look for leaks and spills, and to install drip pans under turbine governor and throttle valves to prevent spills onto the insulation. These issues were placed into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-ANO-C-2010-0960, CR-ANO-1-2010-1895, and CR-ANO-1-2010-1896. A self-revealing finding for the reactor coolant pump seal was documented in inspection report 05000313/2010003. This licensee event report is closed.


===.2 (Closed) LER 05000368/2009005 Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power===
Reactor Scram Conservatively Initiated After Multiple Abnormal Events Occurred During Plant Startup from a Refueling Outage On April 18, 2010, Unit 1 was at 11 percent reactor power and preparing to connect the main generator to the electric grid to end refueling outage 1R22. At 1:46 p.m.
On December 08, 2009, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was operating near 100 percent reactor power when operators manually tripped main feedwater pump A in response to high thrust bearing temperature. Unit 2 operators entered the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure. A manual reactor trip was initiated when the steam generator A water level decreased to approximately 27 percent. The emergency feedwater system automatically actuated as designed to restore steam generator levels. Operator response was consistent with recent simulator training using the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure; however, the ANO Unit 2 simulator response had indicated that steam generator levels could be successfully recovered following the loss of a main feedwater pump without requiring both a reactor trip and emergency feedwater actuation.


The licensee determined that the cause of the event was due to (1) excessive thrust loading due to feedwater pump internal degradation, and (2) differences between the actual plant response and the ANO Unit 2 simulator program. Excessive thrust loading was caused by degradation of the main feedwater pump A internals due to contact between the main feedwater pump wear ring and the impeller, which was caused from  previous incorrect maintenance. Analysis of the plant transient data revealed differences between the actual plant response and the ANO Unit 2 simulator. The feedwater flow characteristics programmed into the ANO Unit 2 simulator were based on engineering analysis following the ANO Unit 2 power uprate in 2002. Feedwater modifications were implemented and mitigation strategies were changed to maximize available main feedwater flow. Analysis concluded that a slight increase in total feedwater flow would be achieved by those changes. During the event, steam generator levels decreased much faster during the plant transient than previously indicated by the simulator and actual plant main feedwater flows after the loss on a main feedwater pump were less than the original engineering estimates programmed into the simulator. The licensee took corrective actions to (1) replace the thrust bearing, (2) disassemble main feedwater pump, 2P-1A, to determine cause of degradation, (3) refurbish main feedwater pump, 2P-1A, with a more detailed maintenance procedure, (4) develop improved performance monitoring program to ensure early detection of thrust bearing degradation and pump performance, and (5) revise ANO Unit 2 simulator software program to incorporate actual plant data observed from the loss of a main feedwater pump at full power event. The thrust bearing failure issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-3744 and documented as a self revealing finding in Inspection Report 05000368/2010002. The inaccurate simulator response issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-3768 and documented as a licensee identified violation in the same inspection report. The review of this licensee event report is complete and no findings were identified and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. This licensee event report is closed.
, the operations staff entered the abnormal operating procedure due to indications of a degradation of reactor coolant pump P
-32 C third stage seal. At 1:56 p.m.
 
, an operator at the main turbine reported smoke and small flames at turbine governor valve
-3. At 1:57 p.m., control room operators immediately tripped the main turbine and initiated a manual reactor trip in response to the reactor coolant pump seal and the main turbine fire. The manual reactor trip was conservatively performed as neither issue directly required a reactor trip. The licensee determined that the reactor coolant pump seal failure was due to the failure to ensure adequate clearance between the pump coupling slinger ring and the stand pipe splash shield during pump replacement that occurred during the refueling outage. The fire was a result of an electro
-hydraulic control fluid spill onto the calcium silicate piping insulation during maintenance. Under the proper conditions, the elect r o-hydraulic control fluid soaked insulation, heat from the steam lines, and ventilation combined to result in an unexpected exothermic reaction. The licensee implemented corrective actions to revise procedures for reactor coolant pump replacement and provide more supervisory oversight during these infrequent evolutions. The licensee also implemented procedural changes to monitor electro
-hydraulic control fluid spills, require specific walkdowns of turbine generator areas following every outage to look for leaks and spills, and to install drip pans under turbine governor and throttle valves to prevent spills onto the insulation. These issues were placed into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR
-ANO-C-2010-0960, CR-ANO-1-2010-1895, and CR-ANO-1-2010-1896. A self-revealing finding for the reactor coolant pump seal was documented in inspection report 05000313/2010 0 03. This licensee event report is closed.
 
===.2 (Closed) LER 05000368===
 
/2009005 Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwate r Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power On December 08, 2009, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was operating near 100 percent reactor power when operators manually tripped main feedwater pump A in response to high thrust bearing temperature. Unit 2 operators entered the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure. A manual reactor trip was initiated when the steam generator A water level decreased to approximately 27 percent. The emergency feedwater system automatically actuated as designed to restore steam generator levels. Operator response was consistent with recent simulator training using the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure; however, the ANO Unit 2 simulator response had indicated that steam generator levels could be successfully recovered following the loss of a main feedwater pump without requiring both a reactor trip and emergency feedwater actuation.
 
The licensee determined that the cause of the event was due to (1) excessive thrust loading due to feedwater pump internal degradation, and (2) differences between the actual plant response and the ANO Unit 2 simulator program. Excessive thrust loading was caused by degradation of the main feedwater pump A internals due to contact between the main feedwater pump wear ring and the impeller, which was caused from  previous incorrect maintenance. Analysis of the plant transient data revealed differences between the actual plant response and the ANO Unit 2 simulator. The feedwater flow characteristics programmed into the ANO Unit 2 simulator were based on engineering analysis following the ANO Unit 2 power uprate in 2002. Feedwater modifications were implemented and mitigation strategies were changed to maximize available main feedwater flow. Analysis concluded that a slight increase in total feedwater flow would be achieved by those changes. During the event, steam generator levels decreased much faster during the plant transient than previously indicated by the simulator and actual plant main feedwater flows after the loss on a main feedwater pump were less than the original engineering estimates programmed into the simulator.
 
The licensee took corrective actions to (1) replace the thr ust bearing, (2) disassemble main feedwater pump
, 2P-1A, to determine cause of degradation, (3) refurbish main feedwater pump, 2P-1A , with a more detailed maintenance procedure, (4) develop improved performance monitoring program to ensure early detection of thrust bearing degradation and pump performance, and (5) revise ANO Unit 2 simulator software program to incorporate actual plant data observed from the loss of a main feedwater pump at full power event. The thrust bearing failure issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR
-ANO-2-2009-3744 and documented as a self revealing finding in Inspection Report 05000368/2010002. The inaccurate simulator response issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-3768 and documented as a licensee identified violation in the same inspection report. The review of this licensee event report is complete and no findings were identified and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. This licensee even t report is closed.
 
===.3 (Closed) LER 05000313/2010001 Multiple Main Steam Safety Valves not within Limits due to Seat Bonding and Transient===
 
-Induced Drift Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications On March 18
-19, 2010, four main steam safety valves on Unit 1, PSV
-2686, 2691, 2697 and 2698 were discovered out of tolerance with respect to technical specification surveillance requirement of
+ 3 percent pressure lift set point. Unit 1 plant operations were not affected as a result of the failed technical specification surveillance. The licensee determined that there were two issues: two safety valves lifting high out of tolerance and two safety valves lifting low out of tolerance. The licensee determined the cause for the safety valves lifting high out of tolerance was seat binding caused by oxide adhesion layer between metal parts. The licensee determined the cause for the safety valves lifting low out of tolerance was transient
-induced drift, which occurs when the spring is exercised due to valve actuations during reactor trips, which occurred during the operating cycle prior to the testing. The licensee has completed corrective action to exercise newly installed safety valves within four months of power operations. These issues were placed into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2010-0560. The review of this licensee event report is complete and no findings were identified and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. This licensee event report is closed.


===.3 (Closed) LER 05000313/2010001 Multiple Main Steam Safety Valves not within Limits due to Seat Bonding and Transient-Induced Drift Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications===
On March 18-19, 2010, four main steam safety valves on Unit 1, PSV-2686, 2691, 2697 and 2698 were discovered out of tolerance with respect to technical specification surveillance requirement of + 3 percent pressure lift set point. Unit 1 plant operations were not affected as a result of the failed technical specification surveillance. The licensee determined that there were two issues: two safety valves lifting high out of tolerance and two safety valves lifting low out of tolerance. The licensee determined the cause for the safety valves lifting high out of tolerance was seat binding caused by oxide adhesion layer between metal parts. The licensee determined the cause for the safety valves lifting low out of tolerance was transient-induced drift, which occurs when the spring is exercised due to valve actuations during reactor trips, which occurred during the operating cycle prior to the testing. The licensee has completed corrective action to exercise newly installed safety valves within four months of power operations. These issues were placed into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2010-0560. The review of this licensee event report is complete and no findings were identified and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. This licensee event report is closed.
{{a|4OA5}}
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities==
==4OA5 Other Activities==


===.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/185 "Follow-up on the Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative"===
===.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/185 "Follow===
 
-up on the Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative
"


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The ground water protection program was inspected March 19-22, 2012, to determine whether the licensee had implemented the program elements which were found to be incomplete when previously reviewed during NRC Inspection 05000313/2010004; 05000368/2010004. Inspectors interviewed cognizant licensee personnel and performed walk-downs. The following elements had been implemented since the previous review: Element 1.1.a - Perform hydrogeologic and geologic studies to determine predominant ground water flow characteristics and gradients.
The ground water protection program was inspected March 19
-22, 2012, to determine whether the licensee had implemented the program elements which were found to be incomplete when previously reviewed during NRC Inspection 05000313/2010004
; 05000368/2010004. Inspectors interviewed cognizant licensee personnel and performed walk
-downs. The following elements had been implemented since the previous review:
Element 1.1.a  
- Perform hydrogeologic and geologic studies to determine predominant ground water flow characteristics and gradients.


Element 1.1.c - Identify potential pathways for ground water migration from on-site locations to off-site locations through ground water.
Element 1.1.c  
- Identify potential pathways for ground water migration from on
-site locations to off
-site locations through ground water.


Element 1.2.a - Identify each structure, system, and component (SSC) and work practice that involves or could reasonably be expected to involve licensed material and for which there is a credible mechanism for the licensed material to reach ground water.
Element 1.2.a  
- Identify each structure, system, and component (SSC) and work practice that involves or could reasonably be expected to involve licensed material and for which there is a credible mechanism for the licensed material to reach ground water.


Element 1.2.b - Identify existing leak detection methods for each SSC and work practice that involves or could involve licensed material and for which there is a credible potential for inadvertent releases to ground water.
Element 1.2.b  
- Identify existing leak detection methods for each SSC and work practice that involves or could involve licensed material and for which there is a credible potential for inadvertent releases to ground water.


Element 1.2.c - Identify potential enhancements to leak detection systems or programs. These may include additional or increased frequency of rounds or walkdowns or inspections, or integrity testing.
Element 1.2.c  
- Identify potential enhancements to leak detection systems or programs. These may include additional or increased frequency of rounds or walkdowns or inspections, or integrity testing.


Element 1.3.a - Using the hydrology and geology studies developed under Objective 1.1, consider placement of ground water monitoring wells down gradient from the plant but within the boundary defined by the site license.
Element 1.3.a  
- Using the hydrology and geology studies developed under Objective 1.1, consider placement of ground water monitoring wells down gradient from the plant but within the boundary defined by the site license.


Element 1.3.b - Consider, as appropriate, placing sentinel wells closer to SSCs that have the highest potential for inadvertent releases that could reach ground water or SSCs where leak detection capability is limited.
Element 1.3.b  
- Consider, as appropriate, placing sentinel wells closer to SSCs that have the highest potential for inadvertent releases that could reach ground water or SSCs where leak detection capability is limited.


Element 2.2c - When communicating to the State/Local officials, be clear and precise in quantifying the actual release information as it applies to the appropriate regulatory criteria (i.e., put it in perspective) and provide specified information as part of the informal communication. The following element had not been implemented since the previous review and is documented in the corrective action document listed with the element: Element 1.2.d - Identify potential enhancements to prevent spills or leaks from reaching ground water. Licensee personnel acknowledged this element had not yet to be completed, and it was being tracked by Condition Report CR-HQN-2010-00207, Corrective Action 12.
Element 2.2c  
- When communicating to the State/Local officials, be clear and precise in quantifying the actual release information as it applies to the appropriate regulatory criteria (i.e.
 
, put it in perspective)and provide specified information as part of the informal communication.
 
The following element had not been implemented since the previous review and is documented in the corrective action document listed with the element:
Element 1.2.d  
- Identify potential enhancements to prevent spills or leaks from reaching ground water. Licensee personnel acknowledged this element had not yet to be completed, and it was being tracked by Condition Report CR-HQN-2010-00207, Corrective Action 12.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On March 22, 2012, the inspectors presented the results of the radiation safety inspections to Mr. M. Chisum, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.==
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.


On April 12, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Schwarz, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
===Exit Meeting Summary===
 
On March 22, 2012, the inspectors presented the results of the radiation safety inspections to Mr. M. Chisum, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
 
On April 12, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Schwarz , Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
Line 273: Line 589:


===Licensee Personnel===
===Licensee Personnel===
: [[contact::S. Baxley]], Supervisor,Instrumentation and Controls  
: [[contact::S. Baxley ]], Supervisor ,Instrumentation and Controls
: [[contact::S. Bocksnick]], Radwaste Technician, Radiation Protection  
: [[contact::S. Bocksnick]], Radwaste Technician, Radiation Protection
: [[contact::B. Byford]], Manager, Training  
: [[contact::B. Byford]], Manager, Training
: [[contact::D. Calloway]], Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Specialist, Chemistry  
: [[contact::D. Calloway]], Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Specialist, Chemistry
: [[contact::S. Carey]], Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls  
: [[contact::S. Carey]], Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls
: [[contact::T. Chernivec]], Manager, Outages  
: [[contact::T. Chernivec]], Manager, Outages
: [[contact::M. Chisum]], Acting Site Vice President / General Manager, Plant Operations R  Clark, Licensing Specialist  
: [[contact::M. Chisum]], Acting Site Vice President / General Manager, Plant Operations
: [[contact::R. Crowe]], Acting  Manager, Security  
R  Clark , Licensing Specialist
: [[contact::B. Daiber]], Manager, Design Engineering  
: [[contact::R. Crowe]], Acting  Manager, Security
: [[contact::B. Doehring]], Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls  
: [[contact::B. Daiber]], Manager, Design Engineering
: [[contact::R. Fuller]], Manager, Quality Assurance  
: [[contact::B. Doehring]], Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls
: [[contact::W. Greeson]], Manager, Engineering Programs and Component  
: [[contact::R. Fuller]], Manager, Quality Assurance
: [[contact::T. Hatfield]], System Engineering  
: [[contact::W. Greeson]], Manager, Engineering Programs and Component
: [[contact::R. Holeyfield]], Manager, Emergency Preparedness  
: [[contact::T. Hatfield]], System Engineering
: [[contact::J. James]], Laboratory Technician, Chemistry  
: [[contact::R. Holeyfield]], Manager, Emergency Preparedness
: [[contact::K. Jones]], Manager, Operations  
: [[contact::J. James ]], Laboratory Technician , Chemistry  
: [[contact::D. Marvel]], Manager, Radiation Protection  
: [[contact::K. Jones]], Manager, Operations
: [[contact::J. McCoy]], Director, Engineering  
: [[contact::D. Marvel]], Manager, Radiation Protection
: [[contact::S. Morris]], Supervisor, Chemistry  
: [[contact::J. McCoy]], Director, Engineering
: [[contact::N. Mosher]], Licensing Specialist  
: [[contact::S. Morris]], Supervisor, Chemistry
: [[contact::D. Norman]], Radwaste Technician, Radiation Protection  
: [[contact::N. Mosher]], Licensing Specialist
: [[contact::B. Pace]], Manager, Planning Scheduling, and Outage  
: [[contact::D. Norman]], Radwaste Technician, Radiation Protection
: [[contact::D. Perkins]], Manager, Maintenance  
: [[contact::B. Pace]], Manager, Planning Scheduling, and Outage
: [[contact::S. Pyle]], Manager, Licensing  
: [[contact::D. Perkins]], Manager, Maintenance
: [[contact::T. Rolniak]], Specialist, Radiation Protection  
: [[contact::S. Pyle]], Manager, Licensing
: [[contact::C. Schwarz]], Site Vice President  
: [[contact::T. Rolniak]], Specialist, Radiation Protection
: [[contact::R. Sebring]], Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
: [[contact::C. Schwarz]], Site Vice President
: [[contact::T. Sherrill]], Manager, Chemistry  
: [[contact::R. Sebring]], Supervisor, Radiation Protection
: [[contact::R. Starkey]], Radwaste Supervisor, Radiation Protection  
: [[contact::T. Sherrill]], Manager, Chemistry
: [[contact::P. Williams]], Manager, System Engineering
: [[contact::R. Starkey]], Radwaste Supervisor, Radiation Protection
: [[contact::P. Williams]], Manager, System Engineering
 
===NRC Personnel===
===NRC Personnel===
: [[contact::A. Sanchez]], Senior Resident Inspector
: [[contact::A. Sanchez]], Senior Resident Inspector  
: [[contact::J. Rotton]], Resident Inspector
: [[contact::J. Rotton]], Resident Inspector  
: [[contact::W. Schaup]], Resident Inspector
: [[contact::W. Schaup]], Resident Inspector
Attachment  
 
Attachment
 
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED==


===Opened===
Opened N one      
None      
===Opened and Closed===
===Opened and Closed===
: 05000313/2012002-01 NCV Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Effluent and Process Monitors Properly (Section 2RS05)  
: 05000313/201200
: 05000313/2012002-02  
2-01 NCV Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Effluent and Process Monitors Properly (Section 2RS05)
: 05000368 /2012002-02 NCV Failure to Update the Safety Analysis Report with Adequate Details Relative to its Solid Radwaste Equipment, Processes, and Facilities (Section 2RS08)
: 05000313/201200
2-02  
: 05000368 /201200 2-02 NCV Failure to Update the Safety Analysis Report with Adequate Details R elative to its Solid Radwaste Equipment, Processes, and Facilities (Section 2RS08)
 
===Closed===
===Closed===
: [[Closes LER::05000313/LER-2010-003]] LER Manual Reactor Scram Conservatively Initiated After Multiple Abnormal Events Occurred During Plant Startup from a Refueling Outage
: 05000313/2010003
: [[Closes LER::05000368/LER-2009-005]] LER Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power
: LER Manual Reactor Scram Conservatively Initiated After Multiple Abnormal Events Occurred During Plant Startup from a Refueling Outage
: [[Closes LER::05000313/LER-2010-001]] LER Multiple Main Steam Safety Valves not within Limits due to Seat Bonding and Transient-Induced Drift Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Temporary Instruction 2515/185 TI  "Follow-up on the Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative"  
: [[Closes LER::05000368/LER-2009-005]] LER Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater
===Discussed===
: Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power
None
: [[Closes LER::05000313/LER-2010-001]] LER Multiple Main Steam Safety Valves not within Limits due to Seat Bonding and Transient
Attachment
-Induced Drift Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
: Temporary Instruction 2515/185 TI  "Follow-up on the Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative"
: Discussed N one     
: Attachment
 
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection==
Section 1R
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: 01:
: OP-1203.025 Unit 1 Natural Emergencies 35
: Adverse Weather Protection
: OP-2203.008 Unit 2 Natural Emergencies 22
: PROCEDURES
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: OP-1203.025 Unit 1 Natural Emergencies
: OP-2203.008 Unit 2 Natural Emergencies
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-C-2011-2952
: CR-ANO-C-2011-2952
: CR-ANO-C-2012-0530 CR-ANO-C-2012-0699
: CR-ANO-C-2012-0530
 
: CR-ANO-C-2012-0699
==Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment==
: Section 1R
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: 04:
: OP-2106.006 Emergency Feedwater System Operations 80
: Equipment Alignment
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 74
: PROCEDURES
: DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION M-230, Sheet 1 Reactor Coolant System 118 M-231, Sheet 1 Makeup and Purification System 113 M-231, Sheet 3 Makeup and Purification System 10
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: OP-2106.006 Emergency Feedwater System Operations
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
: DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION M-230, Sheet 1
: Reactor Coolant System
: 118 M-231, Sheet 1
: Makeup and Purification System
: 113 M-231, Sheet 3
: Makeup and Purification System


==Section 1R05: Fire Protection==
==Section 1R05: Fire Protection==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION FHA ANO Fire Hazard Analysis 13
: PROCEDURES
: PFP-U1 ANO Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 15
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION FHA ANO Fire Hazard Analysis
: PFP-U2 ANO Pre-Fire Plan Unit 2 11 
: PFP-U1 ANO Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1
: Attachment DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PFP-U2 ANO Pre-Fire Plan Unit 2
: FZ-1031 Unit 1 Fire Zone Detail - Diesel Fuel Storage Vaults 2
: Attachment
: FZ-2030 Unit 2 Fire Zone Detail - Diesel Fuel Storage Vaults 2
: DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: FZ-1044 Unit 1 Fire Zone Detail - Electrical Equipment Room and Lower South Electrical Penetration Room 2
: FZ-1031 Unit 1 Fire Zone Detail  
: FZ-1054 Fire Zone Detail - Computer Room and Computer Transformer 2
- Diesel Fuel Storage Vaults
: FZ-2004 Fire Zone Detail - CEDM Equipment Room and Computer Room 2
: FZ-2030 Unit 2 Fire Zone Detail  
- Diesel Fuel Storage Vaults
: FZ-1044 Unit 1 Fire Zone Detail  
- Electrical Equipment Room and Lower South Electrical Penetration Room
: FZ-1054 Fire Zone Detail - Computer Room and Computer Transformer
: FZ-2004 Fire Zone Detail  
- CEDM Equipment Room and Computer Room 2


==Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures==
==Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures==
: PRCOEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PRCOEDURES
: EN-DC-346 Cable Reliability Program 2
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-DC-346 Cable Reliability Program


==Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program==
==Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: COPD-030 ANO Reactivity Management Program 2
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: OP-1106.009 Turbine Startup (Warmup and Roll) 45
: COPD-030 ANO Reactivity Management Program
: OP-1102.004 Power Operation 52
: OP-1106.009 Turbine Startup (Warmup and Roll)
: OP-1102.004 Power Operation
: OP-1102.016 Power Reduction
: OP-1102.016 Power Reduction
: WORK ORDERS
: WORK ORDERS
Line 363: Line 708:


==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness==
==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: EN-DC-203 Maintenance Rule Program 1
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-DC-204 Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis 2 
: EN-DC-203 Maintenance Rule Program
: EN-DC-204 Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis
: Attachment
: Attachment


==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness==
==Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring 3
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process 1
: EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring
: EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process
: OP-1412.187
: OP-1412.187
: HPL-C Transfer Switch Inspection and Lubrication 3
: HPL-C Transfer Switch Inspection and Lubrication
: WORK ORDERS
: WORK ORDERS
: 52318766
: 2318766
: 00298672
: 00298672
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
Line 382: Line 729:
==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls==
==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls==
: PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: OP-1203.025 Natural Emergencies 35
: OP-1203.025 Natural Emergencies
: COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines 39
: COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-1-2012-098
: CR-ANO-1-2012-098
Line 390: Line 737:


==Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations==
==Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: EN-OP-104 Operability Evaluations 5
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: OP-2104.039 HPSI Operations 68
: EN-OP-104 Operability Evaluations
: OP-2104.039 HPSI Operations
: MISCELLANEOUS
: MISCELLANEOUS
: ER-ANO-2004-0930
: ER-ANO-2004-0930
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-1-2012-0098
: CR-ANO-1-2012-0 098
: CR-ANO-2-2012-0412
: CR-ANO-2-2012-0 412
: CR-ANO-1-2012-0405  
: CR-ANO-1-2012-0 405  
: Attachment CONDITION REPORTS
: Attachment
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-2-2012-0588
: CR-ANO-2-2012-0588
: CR-ANO-2-2012-0151
: CR-ANO-2-2012-0151
Line 406: Line 755:


==Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing==
==Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing 3
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing
: EN-WM-105 Planning 9
: EN-WM-105 Planning 9
: EN-MA-101 Fundamentals of Maintenance 9
: EN-MA-101 Fundamentals of Maintenance
: EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities 9
: EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
: EN-WM-102 Work Implementation and Closeout 6
: EN-WM-102 Work Implementation and Closeout
: OP-2104.029 Service Water System Operation 82
: OP-2104.029 Service Water System Operation
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 73
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 74
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
: OP-1104.029 Service Water System Operation 94
: OP-1104.029 Service Water System Operation
: OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure 96
: OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure
: OP-2104.037 Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations 22
: OP-2104.037 Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations
: WORK ORDERS
: WORK O RDER S
: 52315639
: 52315639 00
: 00305315
: 305315
: 52279859
: 52279859
: 00305852
: 00305852
Line 435: Line 785:


==Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing==
==Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: OP-2403.097 Class 1E Battery Charger Load Test for 2D32B 5
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: OP-1304.206 EFIC channel B monthly Test 27
: OP-2403.097 Class 1E Battery Charger Load Test for 2D32B
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 73
: OP-1304.206 EFIC channel B monthly Test
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation 74
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
: OP-2104.04 LPSI System Operations 59
: OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
: OP-2105.009 CEDM Control System Operation 29
: OP-2104.04 LPSI System Operations
: OP-2105.009 CEDM Control System Operation
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-1-2012-0126
: CR-ANO-1-2012-0126
Line 448: Line 799:


==Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation==
==Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: OP-1903.011 Emergency Response/ Notifications 42
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: SE-1-EN-3 Shift Engineer (STA) PI Drill Evaluation Session 1
: OP-1903.011 Emergency Response/ Notifications
: EN-EP-311 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Activation via the Virtual Private Network (VPN) 0
: SE-1-EN-3 Shift Engineer (STA) PI Drill Evaluation Session
: EN-EP-310 Emergency Response Organization Notification System 1
: EN-EP-311 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Activation via the Virtual Private Network (VPN)
: EN-EP-310 Emergency Response Organization Notification System
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-C-2012-0570
: CR-ANO-C-2012-0570
Line 460: Line 812:
: PROCEDURES
: PROCEDURES
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-RP-302 Operation of Radiation Protection Instrumentation 1
: EN-RP-302 Operation of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
: EN-RP-303 Source Checking of Radiation Protection Instrumentation 3 
: EN-RP-303 Source Checking of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
: Attachment Section 2RS05:
: Attachment Section 2RS05:
: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
: PROCEDURES
: PROCEDURES
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-RP-304 Operation of Counting Equipment 2 1304.027 Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation Monitor Calibration 20 1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration 0 1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration 2 1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration 3
: EN-RP-304 Operation of Counting Equipment
: AUDITS,
: 1304.027 Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
: SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: 1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
: 1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
: 1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
: AUDITS, SELF
-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: LO-ALO-2010-00048 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment
: LO-ALO-2010-00048 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 10, 2011
: January 10, 2011
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
Line 487: Line 842:
: CALIBRATION RECORDS
: CALIBRATION RECORDS
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: Canberra Fastscan Whole Body Counting System September 20, 2011
: Canberra Fastscan Whole Body Counting System September 20, 2011  
: WO52225615
: WO52225615
: RE-4642/4830 July 6, 2011
: RE-4642/4830 July 6, 2011
Line 493: Line 848:
: RE-4642/4830 December 21, 2009
: RE-4642/4830 December 21, 2009
: WO52222948
: WO52222948
: RE-2236/2237/3618/3809/3810/3814/3815 January 24, 2011
: RE-2236/2237/3618/3809/3810/3814/3815
: WO52284396 2RE2330 August 12, 2011
: January 24, 2011
: Attachment MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: WO52284396
: 2RE2330 August 12, 2011
: Attachment
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: 17
: WAP-890120-061 Calibration/Traceability Information for RMS Liquid Monitors (Source # 959)
: WAP-890120-061 Calibration/Traceability Information for RMS Liquid Monitors (Source # 959) January 20, 1989
: January 20, 1989
: Source 655 - Calibration Certificate August 31, 1983
: Source 655  
- Calibration Certificate August 31, 1983
: Section 2RS06:
: Section 2RS06:
: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
: PROCEDURES
: PROCEDURES
: NUMBER TITLE CHANGE NO.
: NUMBER TITLE CHANGE NO.
: 1052.003 Nuclear Chemistry Quality Control Program 029 1052.022 Radiological Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Program 002-05-0 1604.001 Gross Alpha Measurement 016 1604.003 Tritium Sample Penetration 012 1604.014 Reactor Building Purge Analysis 022 1604.015 Analysis of Unit Vents 019 1604.017 Analysis of Liquid Waste 024 1604.022 Gamma Spectroscopy 028 1604.051 Eberline Radiation Monitoring System 022 1607.008 Sampling the Filtered Waste Monitor Tank (T-21 A/B) 006-05-0 1607.009 Sampling the Treated Waste Monitor Tanks (T-16 A/B) 013 1607.010 Sampling of the ANO Unit 1 Vents 022 1607.014 Reactor Building Air Sampling 010 1607.018 Sampling the Unit 1 Waste Gas Decay Tanks and Surge Tank 008 1607.028 Sampling the Unit 1 Turbine Building Sump
: 1052.003 Nuclear Chemistry Quality Control Program
: 004-01-0 1618.011 Sampling the Unit 1 Neutralizing Tank (T-50) 005-02-0 2607.009 Sampling the Waste Condensate Tanks (2T-21A and 2T-21B) 009-03-0 2607.010 Sampling the Unit 2 Vents 019 2607.028 Sampling the Unit Two Turbine Building Sump 004 2618.028 Sampling the Regenerative Waste Tanks (2T-92 A, B, or C) 004-03-0 5120.415 In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Control Room Filtration System 011 5120.417 In-Place Testing of the Penetration Room Filtration System 008 5120.425 In-Place Testing of the Unit 2 Control Room Filtration System 012 5120.427 In-Place Testing of the Unit 2 Penetration Room Filtration System 005   
: 29 1052.022 Radiological Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Program
: Attachment AUDITS,
: 2-05-0 1604.001 Gross Alpha Measurement
: SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: 016 1604.003 Tritium Sample Penetration
: 2 1604.014 Reactor Building Purge Analysis
: 2 1604.015 Analysis of Unit Vents
: 019 1604.017 Analysis of Liquid Waste
: 24 1604.022 Gamma Spectroscopy
: 28 1604.051 Eberline Radiation Monitoring System
: 2 1607.008 Sampling the Filtered Waste Monitor Tank (T
-21 A/B) 006-05-0 1607.009 Sampling the Treated Waste Monitor Tanks (T
-16 A/B) 013 1607.010 Sampling of the ANO Unit 1 Vents
: 2 1607.014 Reactor Building Air Sampling
: 010 1607.018 Sampling the Unit 1 Waste Gas Decay Tanks and Surge Tank
: 008 1607.028 Sampling the Unit 1 Turbine Building Sump
: 004-01-0 1618.011 Sampling the Unit 1 Neutralizing Tank (T
-50) 005-02-0 2607.009 Sampling the Waste Condensate Tanks (2T
-21A and 2T
-21B) 009-03-0 2607.010 Sampling the Unit 2 Vents
: 019 2607.028 Sampling the Unit Two Turbine Building Sump
: 004 2618.028 Sampling the Regenerative Waste Tanks (2T
-92 A, B, or C)
: 004-03-0 5120.415 In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Control Room Filtration System
: 011 5120.417 In-Place Testing of the Penetration Room Filtration System
: 008 5120.425 In-Place Testing of the Unit 2 Control Room Filtration System
: 2 5120.427 In-Place Testing of the Unit 2 Penetration Room Filtration System
: 005   
: Attachment
: AUDITS, SELF
-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
Line 546: Line 931:
: UNIT SYSTEM
: UNIT SYSTEM
: TEST DATE
: TEST DATE
: 1 Penetration Room Ventilation 18 Month Test October 19, 2010 2 2
: 1 Penetration Room Ventilation Month Test October 19, 2010
: 2
: VSF-9 18 Month Test October 5, 2011
: VSF-9 18 Month Test October 5, 2011
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2010 April 29, 2011
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2010
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2009 February 25, 2010
: April 29, 2011
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2009
: February 25, 2010
: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: 017
: 017
: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 SAR Chapter 11 023
: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 SAR Chapter 11
: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 SAR Chapter 11 023
: 23
: Section 2RS07: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION 1304.062 Meteorological Monitoring Calibration 14 
: Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 SAR Chapter 11
: Attachment 1608.005 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 37 1608.008 Land Use Census 3 1012.018 Administration of Radiological Surveys 12
: 23
: EN-CY-108 Monitoring of Nonradioactive Systems 4
: Section 2RS07: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
: EN-CY-109 Sampling and Analysis of Groundwater Monitoring Wells 2
: PROCEDURES
: EN-CY-111 Radiological Ground Water Protection Program 2
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION 1304.062 Meteorological Monitoring Calibration
: EN-RP-113 Response to Contaminated Spills/Leaks. 5
: Attachment
: EN-RP- 210 Area Monitoring Program 0
: 1608.005 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
: AUDITS,
: 1608.008 Land Use Census
: SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES NUMBER TITLE DATE
: 1012.018 Administration of Radiological Surveys
: EN-CY-108 Monitoring of Nonradioactive Systems
: EN-CY-109 Sampling and Analysis of Groundwater Monitoring Wells
: EN-CY-111 Radiological Ground Water Protection Program
: EN-RP-113 Response to Contaminated Spills/Leaks.
: EN-RP- 210 Area Monitoring Program
: AUDITS, SELF
-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: QA-2/6-2011-ANO-1 Quality Assurance Audit Report; Combined Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring October 11, 2011
: QA-2/6-2011-ANO-1 Quality Assurance Audit Report; Combined Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring October 11, 2011
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012 QA O2Cs Chemistry  and REMP Report July 19, 2010
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
: QA O2Cs Chemistry  and REMP Report July 19, 2010
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-2-2009-1635
: CR-ANO-2-2009-1635
Line 579: Line 976:
: CR-ANO-C-2010-1987
: CR-ANO-C-2010-1987
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: NUMBER TITLE DATE WO 52258408
: WO 52258408-01 Perform the Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration June 7, 2011
-01 Perform the Semi
: WO 52220528-01 Perform the Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration November 15, 2011
-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration June 7, 2011
: WO 52037947-01 Perform the Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration June 22, 2010
: WO 52220528
: WO 51694738-01 Perform the Semi-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration January 6, 2010
-01 Perform the Semi
: Attachment
-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration November 15, 2011
: Annual Radiological Environment Operating Report for 2009 May 11, 2010
: WO 52037947
-01 Perform the Semi
-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration June 22, 2010
: WO 51694738
-01 Perform the Semi
-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration January 6, 2010
: Attachment Annual Radiological Environment Operating Report for 2009 May 11, 2010
: Annual Radiological Environment Operating Report for 2010 April 20, 2011
: Annual Radiological Environment Operating Report for 2010 April 20, 2011
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2009 February 25, 2010
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2009
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2010 April 29, 2011
: February 25, 2010
: EP-2012-0002 Meteorological Tower Annual Report 2011 January 6, 2012
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2010
: EP-2011-0004 Meteorological Tower Annual Report 2010 December 2, 2010
: April 29, 2011
: EP-2012-0002 Meteorological Tower Annual Report 2011
: January 6, 2012
: EP-2011-0004 Meteorological Tower Annual Report 2010
: December 2, 2010
: Section 2RS08:
: Section 2RS08:
: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
: Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
: PROCEDURES
: PROCEDURES
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-RW-101 Radioactive Waste Management 3
: EN-RW-101 Radioactive Waste Management
: EN-RW-102 Radioactive Shipping Procedure 9
: EN-RW-102 Radioactive Shipping Procedure
: EN-RW-103 Radioactive Waste Tracking Procedure 3
: EN-RW-103 Radioactive Waste Tracking Procedure
: EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors 8
: EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors
: EN-RW-105 Process Control Program 2
: EN-RW-105 Process Control Program
: EN-RW-106 Integrated Transportation Security Plan 2 1106.024 Condensate Demineralizer System Operation and Regeneration 43 1601.505 Processing of Spent Radioactive Resin 12 1601.506 Radioactive Waste Management Program Surveillances 2
: EN-RW-106 Integrated Transportation Security Plan
: AUDITS,
: 1106.024 Condensate Demineralizer System Operation and Regeneration
: SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: 1601.505 Processing of Spent Radioactive Resin 12 1601.506 Radioactive Waste Management Program Surveillances
: AUDITS, SELF
-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: 02C-ANO-2010-0370 Oversight Observation Checklist: Radwaste Packaging, Handling, and Shipping June 28, 2010 02C-ANO-2011-0102 Oversight Observation Checklist: Radiation Protection Control of Radioactive Material March 4, 2011
: 02C-ANO-2010-0370 Oversight Observation Checklist: Radwaste Packaging, Handling, and Shipping June 28, 2010
: 2C-ANO-2011-0102 Oversight Observation Checklist: Radiation Protection Control of Radioactive Material March 4, 2011
: ANO-1108-0107 Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Building August 1, 2011
: ANO-1108-0107 Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Building August 1, 2011
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
: LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
Line 610: Line 1,020:
: ANO-1202-0138 Mausoleum February 13, 2012
: ANO-1202-0138 Mausoleum February 13, 2012
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CONDITION REPORTS
: CR-ANO-C-2011-000402
: CR-ANO-C-20 11-0 0 04 0 2
: CR-ANO-C-2011-00424
: CR-ANO-C-201 1-0 04 24
: CR-ANO-C-2011-00476
: CR-ANO-C-201 1-004 7 6
: CR-ANO-C-2010-00510
: CR-ANO-C-2010-00510
: CR-ANO-C-2011-00988
: CR-ANO-C-201
: CR-ANO-C-2011-02280
: 1-00988
: CR-ANO-C-2011-0 2280
: CR-ANO-C-2011-02317
: CR-ANO-C-2011-02317
: CR-ANO-C-2011-02349
: CR-ANO-C-2011-02349
: CR-ANO-C-2012-02388
: CR-ANO-C-201
: CR-ANO-C-2011-00709     
: 2-02388
: Attachment RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
: CR-ANO-C-201
: 1-00709     
: Attachment
: RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
: NUMBER TYPE TITLE DATE
: NUMBER TYPE TITLE DATE
: RSR 10-109 LQ 8 Containers of Unit 1 Secondary Resin September 30, 2010
: RSR 10-109 LQ 8 Containers of Unit 1 Secondary Resin September 30, 2010
Line 631: Line 1,045:
: RSR 11-122 LQ 3 Boxes of RCP Motor Equipment December 5, 2011
: RSR 11-122 LQ 3 Boxes of RCP Motor Equipment December 5, 2011
: RSR 12-025 Type A Part 61 Primary Resin Samples February 23, 2012
: RSR 12-025 Type A Part 61 Primary Resin Samples February 23, 2012
: RSR 12-028 Type B Unit 2 Primary Resin #PO
: RSR 12-028 Type B Unit 2 Primary Resin #PO 007477
: 007477-12 March 8, 2012
-12 March 8, 2012
: RSR 12-030 Type B Unit 2 Primary Resin #PO 007940-3 March 15, 2012
: RSR 12-030 Type B Unit 2 Primary Resin #PO 007940
: RSR 12-036 LQ Unit 2 Charcoal Sample 2VEF8 March 21, 2012
-3 March 15, 2012
: RSR 12-036 LQ Unit 2 Charcoal Sample 2VEF8
: March 21, 2012
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE
: ANO Unit 1 and 2 Safety Analysis Reports - Chapters 11&12 23 22873 NUPIC Audit of GEL Laboratories, LLC November 18, 2011
: ANO Unit 1 and 2 Safety Analysis Reports  
: 268460001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for 2F-4 Filter January 10, 2011
- Chapters 11&12
: 22873 NUPIC Audit of GEL Laboratories, LLC
: November 18, 2011
: 268460001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for 2F
-4 Filter January 10, 2011
: 274957001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 RCS Filters May 9, 2011
: 274957001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 RCS Filters May 9, 2011
: 278919003 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 Primary Resin January 24, 2012
: 278919003 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 Primary Resin January 24, 2012
Line 646: Line 1,066:


==Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification==
==Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification==
: PROCEDURES NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: PROCEDURES
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION
: EN-LI-114 Performance Indicator Process 4
: EN-LI-114 Performance Indicator Process 4
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS NUMBER TITLE DATE
: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non- MSPI PI data report - 1st
: NUMBER TITLE DATE
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non
- MSPI PI data report  
- 1 st
: QTR 2011 April 4, 2011
: QTR 2011 April 4, 2011
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non- MSPI PI data report - 2nd
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non
: QTR 2011 July 7, 2011
- MSPI PI data report  
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non- MSPI PI data report - 3rd
- 2nd QTR 2011
: QTR 2011 October 13, 2011
: July 7, 2011
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non- MSPI PI data report - 4th
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non
: QTR 2011 January 3, 2012  
- MSPI PI data report  
: Attachment PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
- 3rd QTR 2011
: This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150-0011.
: October 13, 2011
: The following items are requested for the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety Inspection At Arkansas Nuclear One (3/19/2012 - 3/23/2012)
: Unit 1  and Unit 2 Non
: Integrated Report
- MSPI PI data report  
: 2012002
- 4th QTR 2011
: The items listed below are needed to support the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety inspection to be conducted by Larry Ricketson (817-200-1165), Louis Carson (817-200-1221), Casey Alldredge (817-200-1547), and Natasha Greene (817-200-1154).  .
: January 3, 2012
: Attachment
: PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT  
: This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150
-0011.
: The following items are requested for the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety Inspection At Arkansas Nuclear One
  (3/19/2012  
- 3/23/2012)
: Integrated Report 2012002
: The items listed below are needed to support the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety inspection to be conducted by Larry Ricketson (817
-200-1165), Louis Carson (817
-200-1221), Casey Alldredge (817
-200-1547), and Natasha Greene (817
-200-1154).  .
: NOTE: The information requested may be provided in either electronic or paper media or a combination of these.
: NOTE: The information requested may be provided in either electronic or paper media or a combination of these.
: Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of
: Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of IMS
: IMS-CERTREC, e-mail attachments or CD.
-CERTREC, e
: The agency's text editing software is MS Word; however, we have document viewing capability for Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text files.
-mail attachments or CD.
: The agency's text editing software is MS Word; however, we have document viewing capability for Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text file
s.
: Please ensure the requested information is submitted for the NRC inspectors' review by March 5, 2012.
: Please ensure the requested information is submitted for the NRC inspectors' review by March 5, 2012.
: Attachment 1.
: Attachment
: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)
: 1.
: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)  
: NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
: NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 1- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 1- B, etc.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 1- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 1
: A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas: 1 Effluent monitor calibration 2
- B, etc.
: Radiation protection instrument calibration 3 Installed instrument calibrations 4 Count room and Laboratory instrument calibrations
: A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
: B. Applicable organization charts
: Effluent monitor calibration Radiation protection instrument calibration Installed instrument calibrations Count room and Laboratory instrument calibrations
: C. Copies of audits, self-assessments, surveillances, vendor or NUPIC audits for contractor support and LERs, written since August 1, 2011, related to:
: B. Applicable organization charts
: 1 Area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, or whole body counters
: C. Copies of audits, self
: 2 Installed radiation monitors
-assessments, surveillances, vendor or NUPIC audits for contractor support and LERs, written since August 1, 2011
: D. Procedure index for: 1 Calibration, use and operation of continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, temporary area radiation monitors, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, and whole body counters. 2 Calibration of installed radiation monitors
, related to:  
: Area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, or whole body counters Installed radiation monitors
: D. Procedure index for:
: Calibration, use and operation of continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, temporary area radiation monitors, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, and whole body counters. 2 Calibration of installed radiation monitors
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: 1 Calibration of portable radiation detection instruments (for portable ion chambers) 2 Whole body counter calibration 3
: 1 Calibration of portable radiation detection instruments (for portable ion chambers)
: Laboratory instrumentation quality control
: Whole body counter calibration Laboratory instrumentation quality control
: F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since August 1, 2011, related to the following programs: 1 Area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, whole body counters,
: F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since August 1, 2011
, related to the following programs:
: Area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, whole body counters,
: 2 Installed radiation monitors,
: 2 Installed radiation monitors,
: 3 Effluent radiation monitors 4 Count room radiation instruments Attachment NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: 3 Effluent radiation monito rs 4 Count room radiation instruments
: Attachment
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: G. Most recent calibration data for the whole body counters
: G. Most recent calibration data for the whole body counters
: H.
: H.
: A list of the point of discharge effluent monitors with the two most recent calibration dates and the work order numbers associated with the calibrations
: A list of the point of discharge effluent monitors with the two most recent calibration dates and the work order numbers associated with the calibrations Although it is not necessary to submit the following information, the inspector will also review:
: Although it is not necessary to submit the following information, the inspector will also review:
: I. Response check documentation for criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, temporary area radiation monitors, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, and whole body counters since August 1, 2011
: I. Response check documentation for criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, temporary area radiation monitors, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, and whole body counters since August 1, 2011
: J. Selected portable radiation protection instrument calibration records since August 1, 2011
: J. Selected portable radiation protection instrument calibration records since August 1, 2011
: K. Selected personnel contamination monitors and tool monitors calibration records since August 1, 2011
: K. Selected personnel contamination monitors and tool monitors calibration records since August 1, 2011
: L. Calibration records for selected installed area radiation monitors, and post accident monitors since August 1, 2011
: L. Calibration records for selected installed area radiation monitors, and post accident monitors since August 1, 2011
: M. Documentation for the point of discharge effluent monitors that shows the current calibration methodology is traceable to the primary calibration Attachment 2. Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06)
: M. Documentation for the point of discharge effluent monitors that shows the current calibration methodology is traceable to the primary calibration  
: Attachment
: 2. Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06)  
: NOTE: Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.
: NOTE: Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 2- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 2- B, etc.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 2
: A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas: 1 Radiological effluent control 2 Engineered safety feature air cleaning systems
- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 2
: B. Applicable organization charts
- B, etc.
: C. Audits, self assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since July 19, 2010, related to: 1 Radioactive effluents 2
: A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
: Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
: Radiological effluent control Engineered safety feature air cleaning systems
: D. Procedure indexes for the following areas 1
: B. Applicable organization charts
: Radioactive effluents 2
: C. Audits, self assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since July 19, 2010
: Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
, related to:
: Radioactive effluents Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
: D. Procedure indexes for the following areas Radioactive effluents Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: 1
: 1
: Sampling of radioactive effluents 2
: Sampling of radioactive effluents Sample analysis Generating radioactive effluent release permits Laboratory instrumentation quality control In-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers New or applicable procedures for effluent programs (e.g., including ground water monitoring programs),   
: Sample analysis 3
: F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010
: Generating radioactive effluent release permits 4
, associated with:
: Laboratory instrumentation quality control 5
: Radioactive effluents Effluent radiation monitors Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
: In-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers 6
: New or applicable procedures for effluent programs (e.g., including ground water monitoring programs),   
: F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010, associated with: 1
: Radioactive effluents 2
: Effluent radiation monitors 3
: Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: G. 2009 and 2010 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
: G. 2009 and 2010
: Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
: H. Current Copy of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: H. Current Copy of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: I. Copy of the 2009 and 2010 interlaboratory comparison results for laboratory quality control performance of effluent sample analysis Attachment J. Effluent sampling schedule for the week of the inspection
: I. Copy of the 2009 and 2010
interlaboratory comparison results for laboratory quality control performance of effluent sample analysis
: Attachment
: J. Effluent sampling schedule for the week of the inspection
: K. New entries into 10
: K. New entries into 10
: CFR 50.75(g) files since July 19, 2010
: CFR 50.75(g) files since July 19, 2010
: L. Operations Dept (or other responsible dept) log records for effluent monitors removed from service or out of service since July 19, 2010
: L. Operations Dept (or other responsible dept) log records for effluent monitors removed from service or out of service since July 19, 2010
: M. Listing or log of liquid and gaseous release permits since July 19, 2010
: M. Listing or log of liquid and gaseous release permits since July 19, 2010
: N.
: N.
: For technical specification-required air cleaning systems, the most recent surveillance test results of in-place filter testing (of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers) and laboratory testing (of charcoal efficiency)  
: For technical specification
: Attachment 3.
-required air cleaning systems, the most recent surveillance test results of in
: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07)
-place filter testing (of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers) and laboratory testing (of charcoal efficiency)
: Attachment
: 3.
: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07)  
: NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
: NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 3- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 3- B, etc.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 3- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 3
: List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas: 1 Radiological environmental monitoring 2 Meteorological monitoring
- B, etc.
: B. Applicable organization charts
: List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
: C. Audits, self assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since July 19, 2010, related to: 1 Radiological environmental monitoring program (including contractor environmental laboratory audits, if used to perform environmental program functions) 2 Environmental TLD processing facility 3 Meteorological monitoring program
: Radiological environmental monitoring Meteorological monitoring
: D. Procedure index for the following areas: 1 Radiological environmental monitoring program 2 Meteorological monitoring program
: B. Applicable organization charts
: C. Audits, self assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since July 19, 2010
, related to:
: Radiological environmental monitoring program (including contractor environmental laboratory audits, if used to perform environmental program functions)
: Environmental TLD processing facility Meteorological monitoring program
: D. Procedure index for the following areas:
: Radiological environmental monitoring program Meteorological monitoring program
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: 1 Environmental Program Description 2 Sampling, collection and preparation of environmental samples 3 Sample analysis (if applicable)
: 1 Environmental Program Description Sampling, collection and preparation of environmental samples Sample analysis (if applicable)  
: 4 Laboratory instrumentation quality control 5 Procedures associated with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 6 Appropriate QA Audit and Surveillance program procedures, and/or sections of the station's QA manual (which pertain to the REMP)
: Laboratory instrumentation quality control  
: F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010, related to the following programs: 1 Radiological environmental monitoring 2 Meteorological monitoring
===Procedures===
associated with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Appropriate QA Audit and Surveillance program procedures, and/or sections of the station's QA manual (which pertain to the REMP)
: F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010
, related to the following programs:
: Radiological environmental monitoring Meteorological monitoring
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: G. Wind Rose data and evaluations used for establishing environmental sampling locations
: G. Wind Rose data and evaluations used for establishing environmental sampling locations
: H. Copies of the 2 most recent calibration packages for the meteorological tower instruments Attachment
: H. Copies of the 2 most recent calibration packages for the meteorological tower instruments  
: I. Copy of the 2009 and 2010 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Land Use Census, and current revision of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: Attachment
: I. Copy of the 2009 and 2010
: Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Land Use Census, and current revision of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
: J. Scheduled time to observe environmental sampling activities in the field and visit selected environmental sample locations
: J. Scheduled time to observe environmental sampling activities in the field and visit selected environmental sample locations
: K. Scheduled time to meet with the meteorological tower system engineer and/or meteorologist to visit/observe the meteorological tower and associated equipment
: K. Scheduled time to meet with the meteorological tower system engineer and/or meteorologist to visit/observe the meteorological tower and associated equipment
: L. Copy of the environmental laboratory's interlaboratory comparison program results for 2009 and 2010, if not included in the annual radiological environmental operating report
: L. Copy of the environmental laboratory's interlaboratory comparison program results for 2009 and 2010, if not included in the annual radiological environmental operating report
: M. Data from the environmental laboratory documenting the analytical detection sensitivities for the various environmental sample media (i.e., air, water, soil, vegetation, and milk)
: M. Data from the environmental laboratory documenting the analytical detection sensitivities for the various environmental sample media (i.e., air, water, soil, vegetation, and milk)
: N. Quality Assurance audits (e.g., NUPIC) for contracted services
: N. Quality Assurance audits (e.g., NUPIC) for contracted services  
: O. Current NEI Groundwater Initiative Plan and status
: O. Current NEI Groundwater Initiative Plan and status
: Attachment 4. Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation (71124.08)  
: Attachment
: 4. Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation (71124.08)  
: NOTE:
: NOTE:
: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 4- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 4- B, etc.
: For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 4
: A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas: 1 Solid Radioactive waste processing 2 Transportation of radioactive material/waste
- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 4
: B. Applicable organization charts (and list of personnel involved in solid radwaste processing, transferring, and transportation of radioactive waste/materials)
- B, etc.
: C. Copies of audits, department self-assessments, and LERs written since July 19, 2010, related to: 1 Solid radioactive waste management 2 Radioactive material/waste transportation program
: A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
: D. Procedure index for the following areas: 1 Solid radioactive waste management 2 Radioactive material/waste transportation
: Solid Radioactive waste processing Transportation of radioactive material/waste
: B. Applicable organization charts (and list of personnel involved in solid radwaste processing, transferring, and transportation of radioactive waste/materials)
: C. Copies of audits, department se lf-assessments, and LERs written since July 19, 2010, related to:
: Solid radioactive waste management Radioactive material/waste transportation program
: D. Procedure index for the following areas:
: Solid radioactive waste management Radioactive material/waste transportation  
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
: 1 Process control program 2 Solid and liquid radioactive waste processing
: 1 Process control program Solid and liquid radioactive waste processing Radioactive material/waste shipping Methodology used for waste concentration averaging, if applicable Waste stream sampling and analysis
: 3 Radioactive material/waste shipping
: F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010 related to:
: 4 Methodology used for waste concentration averaging, if applicable 5 Waste stream sampling and analysis
: Solid radioactive waste Transportation of radioactive material/waste
: F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010 related to: 1 Solid radioactive waste 2 Transportation of radioactive material/waste
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
: G. Copies of training lesson plans for 49
: G. Copies of training lesson plans for 49
: CFR 172 subpart H, for radwaste processing, packaging, and shipping.
: CFR 172 subpart H, for radwaste processing, packaging, and shipping.
: Attachment H. A summary of radioactive material and radioactive waste shipments made from July 19, 2010 to present
: Attachment
: H. A summary of radioactive material and radioactive waste shipments made from July 19, 2010 to present
: I. Waste stream sample analyses results and resulting scaling factors for 2009 and 2010
: I. Waste stream sample analyses results and resulting scaling factors for 2009 and 2010
: J. Waste classification reports if performed by vendors (such as for irradiated hardware)
: J. Waste classification reports if performed by vendors (such as for irradiated hardware)
: Although it is not necessary to compile the following information, the inspector will also review:
: Although it is not necessary to compile the following information, the inspector will also review:
: K. Training and qualifications records of personnel responsible for the conduct of radioactive waste processing, package preparation, and shipping Attachment 5. Temporary Instruction 2515/185, Revision 1,
: K. Training and qualifications records of personnel responsible for the conduct of radioactive waste processing, package preparation, and shipping
: Attachment
: 5. Temporary Instruction 2515/185, Revision 1,
: Follow-Up On The Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative As documented in the integrated Inspection Report
: Follow-Up On The Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative As documented in the integrated Inspection Report
: 2010004, you had not fully implemented some of the objectives of Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, at the time of the inspection.
: 2010004, you had not fully implemented some of the objectives of Nuclear Energy Institute
: 07-07, at the time of the inspection.
: Please provide the status of each of these objectives.
: Please provide the status of each of these objectives.
: If the objective has not been fully implemented, please provide a copy of the corrective action document and specific corrective action assignment that ensures implementation of the objective.
: If the objective has not been fully implemented, please provide a copy of the corrective action document and specific corrective action assignment that ensures implementation of the objective.
}}
}}

Revision as of 18:56, 28 July 2018

IR 05000313-12-002; 05000368-12-002; 01/1/2012-03/31/2012; Arkansas Nuclear One, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation; Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage..
ML12132A371
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/2012
From: Allen D B
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E
To: Schwarz C J
Entergy Operations
References
IR-12-002
Download: ML12132A371 (55)
v • d • e


Text

May 11, 2012

Christopher J. Schwarz, Site Vice President Arkansas Nuclear One

Entergy Operations, In SR 333 Russellville, AR 72802

-0967

SUBJECT: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE

- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000313/2012002 AND 05000368/2012002 Dear Mr. Schwarz

On March 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 12, 2012 with you and other members of your staf The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission

's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licens The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personne One NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspectio This finding w as determined to involve a violation of NRC requirement Additionally, the NRC has determined that a traditional enforcement Severity Level IV violation occurre This traditional enforcement violati on was identified with a n associated findin The NRC is treating these violations as non

-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Polic If you contest these non

-cited violations , you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555

-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV

the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear On If you disagree with a cross

-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear On U N I T E D S T A T E S N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R Y C O M M I S S I O N R E G I O N I V1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD A R L I N G T O N , T E X A S 7 6 0 1 1-4511 C. Schwarz In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Donald B. Allen, Chief, Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos

.: 050 0 0313, 0 50 00 368 License Nos

.: DRP-51, NPF-6

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000313/2012002 and 05000368/2012002 w/

Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000313/2012002

05000368/2012002; 01/1/2012

-03/31/2012

Arkansas Nuclear One, Integrated Resident and Regional Report
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation; Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation

. The report covered a 3

-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced baseline inspection s by region-based inspector s. Two non-cited violations of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) because the licensee failed to calibrate Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly. The Unit 1 calibration procedures did not instruct the instruments and controls technician to correct the calibration source output for radioactive decay, nor did the procedures provide criteria for determining when the calibration was successful. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program as Condition Report CR

-ANO-1-2012-0524, and reviewed the count rates of Unit 1 effluent and process monitors to determine the extent of the condition.

The failure to calibrate the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that, radiation monitor performance could deteriorate and go undetected by the current Unit 1 calibration process. The inspectors used IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," February 12, 2008, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I criterion or 10 CFR 20.1301(e). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, associated with the resources component, because complete, accurate, and up-to-date calibration procedures were not available for use on Unit 1 effluent and process monitors. H.2(c) (Section 2RS05)

Severity Level IV. Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records," because the licensee failed to update t heir Safety Analysis Report with adequate details and submittals that include the effects of change s made to the facility. Specifically, the licensee built numerous low level radwaste storage facilities on the owner controlled area for interim radwaste storage of dry and solidified radioactive waste and failed to update the Safety Analysis Report to adequately include these changes to equipment, processes, and facilities. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition R eport CR-ANO-C-2012-00749. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency is more than minor, thus characterized as a finding, because it has a material impact on licensed activities in that solid radwaste equipment and processes, as well as stored radwaste materials with a significant radioactive source term, have not been adequately described and maintained in all licensee records and reports. There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. This finding is characterized as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1 and was treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 2RS08).

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power. On January 6, 2012, Unit 1 reduced power to 49 percent reactor power to support offsite Mabelvale 500 KV tower maintenance. Following completion of the Mab e lvale 500 KV tower maintenance, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent reactor power on January 8, 2012. On March 2, 2012, Unit 1 reduced power to 86 percent reactor power to support repair of an electro

-hydraulic control system leak on the solenoid valve for the number 4 main turbine governor valve. On March 2, 2012 , after the hydraulic leak was repaired, Unit 1 returned to 100 percent reactor power and remained there for the remainder of the report period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent reactor power and remained there for the report period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Main article: IP 71111.01

.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Since thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for February 28

-29, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the plant personnel's overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On February 28

-29, 2012, the inspectors walked down the service water intake structure and intake system , and the transformer yards because their safety

-related functions could be affected, or required, as a result of high winds or tornado

-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The inspectors evaluated the plant staff's preparations against the site's procedures and determined that the staff's actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant

-specific design features and the licensee's procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors also evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and performance requirements for the systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant

-specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Main article: IP 71111.04

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk

-significant systems: Inspection Scope January 10, 2012, Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generators while the alternate AC diesel generator was out of service for maintenance February 15, 2012, Unit 2 train A of emergency feedwater system while train B was out of service for maintenance

March 1, 2012, Unit 1 high pressure injection pump , P-36A, (red train) while performing maintenance on the green train injection valves The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, SAR, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown sampl e s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R05 Fire Protection

Main article: IP 71111.05

.1 Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours

a. The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk

-significant plant areas:

Inspection Scope January 12, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 1031, Unit 1 diesel fuel storage vault

January 12, 2012, Unit 2, Fire Zone 2030, Unit 2 diesel fuel storage vault March 20, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 104-S, Unit 1 south electrical equipment room March 31, 2012, Unit 1, Fire Zone 167B, control rod drive ac breaker room

March 31, 2012, Unit 2, Fire Zone 2154

-E, control element drive mechanism equipment room The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of five quarterly fire

-protection inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Main article: IP 71111.06

a. The inspectors reviewed the SAR, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also inspected the areas listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

Inspection Scope March 22, 2012, Unit 1, manhole number 4 which contains two trains of Unit 1 service water electrical power cables These activities constitute completion of one manhole sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Main article: IP 71111.11

.1 a. Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Prog

r am On March 15 , 2012 the inspectors observed a crew of Unit 2 licensed operators in the plant's simulator during requalification training. On March 16, 2012 the inspectors observed a crew of Unit 1 licensed operators in the plant's simulator during requalification testing. The inspectors assessed the following areas:

Inspection Scope Licensed operator performance

The ability of the licensee to administer the evaluations and the quality of the training provided The modeling and performance of the control room simulator The quality of post

-scenario critiques

Follow-up actions taken by the licensee for identified discrepancies and for operators who failed an evaluation These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.2 Quarterly Observation of Licensed Operator Performance

a. On March 2, 2012, the inspectors observed the performance of on

-shift licensed operators in the Unit 1 control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened risk due to reducing reactor power to repair a leaking servo

-control valve, SV-8519 and subsequent main turbine governor valve testing

. Inspection Scope In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including OP-1015.001, "Conduct of Operation s," Revision 90 and other operations department policies.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed

-operator performance sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

Main article: IP 71111.12

a. The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk significant systems:

Inspection Scope Maintenance Rule program (a)(3) assessment for period from January 2010 to June 2011.

Unit 1 service water system The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:

Implementing appropriate work practices

Identifying and addressing common cause failures

Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)

Characterizing system reliability issues for performance

Charging unavailability for performance Trending key parameters for condition monitoring Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or

-(a)(2) Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as descri bed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Main article: IP 71111.13

a. The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk

-significant and safety

-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:

Inspection Scope January 11 and 19, 2012, Unit 1 while performing pressurizer sample via containment isolation valve SV

-1818 February 14, 2012, Unit 2, maintenance on motor driven emergency feedwater pump room cooler, 2VUC

-6B, which rendered the pump inoperable February 15, 2012, Unit 1, loss of integrated control system automatic control of main feedwater low

-load and startup valves February 28-29, 2012, Unit 2, postponement of train B service water pump outage while performing channel D of plant protection system and severe weather (tornado watch) in effect March 6, 2012, Unit 2, change in risk profile due to loss of two charging pumps, 2P-36B and 2P

-36C The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R15 Operability Evaluations and Functionality Assessments

Main article: IP 71111.15

a. The inspectors reviewed the following assessments:

Inspection Scope January 20, 2012, Unit 1, SV

-1818 pressurizer sample valve displaying dual position indication February 29, 2012, Unit 2, weld flaw leak on service water loop II instrument line March 6, 2012, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator fuel transfer pump following spurious actuation of fire system deluge system March 26, 2012, Unit 2, high pressure safety injection pump 2P

-89C motor outboard bearing low oil level March 27, 2012, Unit 2, control element assembly issues with delayed element movement given withdrawal and insert command March 28, 2012, Unit 2, extension of service water pump, 2P-4B, operability evaluation due to degraded pump shaft sleeve The inspectors selected these operability and functionality assessments based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure technical specification operability was properly justified and to verify the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and SAR to the licensee's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of si x operability evaluations inspection sample(s) as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.19

a. The inspectors reviewed the following post

-maintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:

Inspection Scope January 12, 2012, Alternate AC diesel generator following planned maintenance

January 18, 2012, CV

-1219 and CV

-1278, red train high pressure injection block valves following planned maintenance January 20, 2012, Unit 2, service water pump, 2P-4B, following electrical and mechanical maintenance February 1, 2012, Unit 1, decay heat pump, P

-34B, following planned maintenance February 14, 2012, Unit 2, following emergency feedwater pump room cooler, 2VUC-6B, coupling replacement February 15, 2012, Unit 1, following replacement of several transfer relay cards in the integrated control system for control of low

-load, CV-2673 and star t-up, CV-2623 feedwater control valves February 24, 2012, Unit 1, service water pump , P-4C, following shaft sleeve replacement

March 1, 2012, Unit 1, CV

-1227, CV-1228, CV-1284, and CV

-1285 green train high pressure injection block valves

, following planned maintenance March 9, 2012, Unit 2, charging water pump, 2P-36C, after shaft replacement The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):

The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate

The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the SAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with post

-maintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of nine post-maintenance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

R22 Surveillance Testing

Main article: IP 71111.22

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the SAR, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that t he significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:

Preconditioning

Evaluation of testing impact on the plant Acceptance criteria Test equipment Procedures

Test data Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability

Restoration of plant systems

Reference setting data

Annunciators and alarms setpoints The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.

January 23, 2012, Unit 1, high pressure injection pump, P-36C, quarterly inservice test.

February 21, 2012, Unit 1, emergency feedwater initiation and control system channel B monthly surveillance test February 27

-28, 2012, Unit 2, D32 battery charger load test

March 1, 2012, Unit 1, high pressure injection pump, P-36B, quarterly inservice test March 2, 2012, Unit 1, main turbine control valve and stop valve surveillance testing March 20, 2012, Unit 2, low pressure safety injection pump, 2P-60B, quarterly inservice test and piping inservice inspection March 26, 2012, Unit 2, control element assembly quarterly exercise test Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of seven surveillance testing inspection sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

Main article: IP 71114.06

.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on February 27, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the control room simulator, technical support center , and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weakness with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.

Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.2 Training Observations

a. The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on January 26, 2012, which required emergency plan implementation by a licensee operations crew. This evolution was planned to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post

-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that the licensee evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the scenario package and other documents listed in the attachment.

Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones:

Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS0 5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Main article: IP 71124.05

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to verify the licensee was assuring the accuracy and operability of radiation monitoring instruments that are used to: (1) monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment; and (2) detect and quantify radioactive process streams and effluent releases. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, the technical specifications, and the licensee's procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, performed walkdowns of various portions of the plant, and reviewed the following items:

Selected plant configurations and alignments of process, postaccident, and effluent monitors with descriptions in the Safety Analysis Report and the offsite dose calculation manual Select instrumentation, including effluent monitoring instrument, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small article monitors to examine their configurations and source checks Calibration and testing of process and effluent monitors, laboratory instrumentation, whole body counters, postaccident monitoring instrumentation, portal monitors , personnel contamination monitors , small article monitors , portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, electronic dosimetry, air samplers, continuous air monitors Audits, self

-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiation monitoring instrumentation since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.05-05.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(b) because the licensee failed to calibrate Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly.

Description.

One part of a typical radiation instrument calibration involves a comparison of the instrument's indicated value with a known value. In this case, the indicated counts per minute provided by the instrument is compared with the known disintegration rate of a radioactive source. To have the correct disintegration rate of the radioactive source, the individual performing the calibration must take into account the half

-life of the radionuclide and the activity of the radioactive source on a known date. However, when the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 effluent and process monitor calibration records, they observed the Unit 1 calibration procedures did not instruct the instruments and controls technician to correct the calibration source output for radioactive decay, nor did the procedures provide criteria for determining when the calibration was successful. Instead, the procedure instructed the technician to "compare the calibration source count rate with the last calibration reading" and inform Operations if a "significant" difference was observed. "Significant" was not defined. Based on these technical omissions and an interview of two Unit 1 instruments and controls technicians, the inspectors concluded the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors were not calibrated properly. In contrast, the Unit 2 calibration procedures provided the original transfer calibration source count rat e from the primary calibration for each effluent and process monitor, the date on which the count rate was taken, instructions on how to decay correct the calibration source count rate, and a statement that the final count rates were acceptable if between 80 to 120 percent of the calculated (decay corrected) value. After performing independent verification of the decay

-corrected monitor count rates, the inspectors concluded the Unit 2 effluent and process monitors were calibrated properly.

Based on a review of procedure revisions, the inspectors determined the Unit 1 procedures omitted the necessary technical guidance in 2003.

The licensee retrieved the original transfer calibration source count rate from the primary calibration for each Unit 1 effluent and process monitor, corrected the count rates for radioactive decay, and then compared the corrected count rates with the as

-left count rates from the most recent calibrations. The licensee found the Unit 1 effluent and process monitor count rates were between 76 to 101 percent of the calculated values with all, except one, of the monitors reading below the calculated value. The count rate of one Unit 1 monitor was outside the +/- 20 percent allowable tolerance band used in Unit 2. RE-3814, a radiation monitor with an alarm function on the service water and intermediate cooling water systems, read 24 percent low, using the as

-left count rate observed during the monitor's calibration on January 24, 2011.

Analysis.

The failure to calibrate the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors properly is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, in that radiation monitor performance could deteriorate and go undetected by the current Unit 1 calibration process.

The inspectors used IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process," February 12, 2008, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however, it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I criterion or 10 CFR 20.1301(e). The finding has a cross

-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area associated with the resources component because complete, accurate, and up

-to-date calibration procedures were not available for use on Unit 1 effluent and process monitors. H.2(c)

Enforcement.

10 CFR 20.1501(b) requires the licensee ensure that instruments and equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements are calibrated periodically for the radiation measured. Contrary to the above, the licensee did not calibrate some instruments used for quantitative radiation measurements periodically. Specifically, since 2003, the licensee did not use a process which calibrated the Unit 1 effluent and process monitors by comparing the observed count rate with a known or calculated count rate and the process did not ensure the instruments' performance was within an established acceptance band. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program and reviewed the count rates of Unit 1 effluent and process monitors to determine the extent of the condition. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was documented in Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-00524, it is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000313/201 2002-01, "Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Effluent and Process Monitors Properly."

2RS0 6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment

Main article: IP 71124.06

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to: (1)ensure the gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems were maintained so radiological discharges were properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated with respect to public exposure; (2) ensure abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and conditions, when effluent radiation monitors are out

-of-service, were controlled in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements and licensee procedures; (3) verify the licensee

=s quality control program ensures the radioactive effluent sampling and analysis requirements were satisfied so discharges of radioactive materials were adequately quantified and evaluated; and (4) verify the adequacy of public dose projections resulting from radioactive effluent discharges. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendices A and I; 40 CFR Part 190; the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, and licensee procedures required by the Technical Specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed and/or observed the following items:

Radiological effluent release reports since the previous inspection and reports related to the effluent program issued since the previous inspection, if any Effluent program implementing procedures, including sampling, monitor setpoint determinations and dose calculations Equipment configuration and flow paths of selected gaseous and liquid discharge system components, filtered ventilation system material condition, and significant changes to their effluent release points, if any, and associated 10 CFR 50.59 reviews Selected portions of the routine processing and discharge of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent s (including sample collection and analysis)

Controls used to ensure representative sampling and appropriate compensatory sampling Results of the interlaboratory comparison program Effluent stack flow rates Surveillance test results of technical specification

-required ventilation effluent discharge systems since the previous inspection Significant changes in reported dose values, if any A selection of radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits Part 61 analyses and methods used to determine which isotopes are included in the source term Offsite dose calculation manual changes, if any Meteorological dispersion and deposition factors Latest land use censu s Records of abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges, if any Groundwater monitoring results Changes to the licensee

's written program for indentifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to groundwater, if any Identified leakage or spill events and entries made into 10 CFR 50.75 (g) records, if any, and associated evaluations of the extent of the contamination and the radiological source term Offsite notifications and reports of events associated with spills, leaks, or groundwater monitoring results, if any Audits, self

-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of the one required sample , as defined in Inspection Procedure 7112 4.0 6-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS0 7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Main article: IP 71124.07

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to: (1) ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program verified the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validated the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program; (2) verify that the radiological environmental monitoring program was implemented consistent with the licensee's technical specifications and/or offsite dose calculation manual and to validate that the radioactive effluent release program meets the design objective contained in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50; and (3)ensure that the radiological environmental monitoring program monitors non

-effluent exposure pathways was based on sound principles and assumptions and validated that doses to members of the public were within the dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 190, as applicable. The inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following items:

Annual environmental monitoring reports and offsite dose calculation manual Selected air sampling and thermoluminescence dosimeter monitoring stations

Collection and preparation of environmental samples Operability, calibration, and maintenance of meteorological instruments Selected event s documented in the annual environmental monitoring report which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost thermoluminescence dosimeter, or anomalous measurement Selected structures, systems, or components that may contain licensed material and has a credible mechanism for licensed material to reach ground water Records required by 10 CFR 50.75(g)

Significant changes made by the licensee to the offsite dose calculation manual as the result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection Calibration and maintenance records for selected air samplers, composite water samplers, and environmental sample radiation measurement instrumentation

Interlaboratory comparison program results

Audits, self

-assessments, reports, and corrective action documents related to the radiological environmental monitoring program since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.0 7-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS08 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation (71124.08)

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to verify the effectiveness of the licensee

=s programs for processing, handling, storage, and transportation of radioactive material. The inspectors used the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180 for determining compliance. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following items: The solid radioactive waste system description, process control program, and the scope of the licensee

=s audit program Control of radioactive waste storage areas including container labeling/marking and monitoring containers for deformation or signs of waste decomposition Changes to the liquid and solid waste processing system configuration including a review of waste processing equipment that is not operational or abandoned in place Radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult

-to-measure radionuclides Processes for waste classification including use of scaling factors and 10 CFR Part 61 analysis Shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking, driver instructing, and preparation of the disposal manifest Audits, sel f-assessments, reports, corrective action reports radioactive solid waste processing, and radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation performed since the last inspection Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of the one required sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.08-05.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50.71, "Maintenance of Records," because the licensee failed to update its Safety Analysis Report (SAR) with adequate information relative to its solid radwaste equipment, processes, and facilities.

Description.

The inspector observed facilities in which the licensee stored solid radioactive waste on the owner controlled area. The licensee defined solid radioactive waste as spent demineralizer resins, filter elements, contaminated clothing, contaminated equipment, as well as paper, rags, and plastics used in decontamination and contamination control. The inspectors asked a licensing representative how long the buildings had been in place. The representative provided the following information:

The low level radwaste storage building located northeast of Unit 2, adjacent to the switchyard, was built in late 1986 or early 1987. The old radwaste storage building located east of Unit 1 turbine building was in place since the start of plant operation.

Warehouse 2, located east of Unit 1 turbine building and adjacent to the old radwaste storage building, was also in place since the start of plant operation. The Unit 2 steam generator mausoleum, outside the protected area, was built in late 1999 or early 2000.

The Unit 1 steam generator and head mausoleum, outside the protected area, was built in 2005.

The SAR lacked details of these facilities regarding their volume and/or construction, principal sources of radioactivity stored, and estimated dose rate at the site boundary per curie of stored waste. Because of the special nuclear material, old steam generators, and old reactor vessel heads stored in these facilities, the inspectors concluded that there was a significant source of radioactivity not adequately described in the licensee's SAR. When this situation was identified by the NRC, the licensee was unable to provide the total amount of radioactivity (in curies) for these locations of stored waste materials nor could the licensee provide an estimate of dose rate at the site boundary per curie of stored waste.

Additionally, the Warehouse 2 storage facility was not discussed in any detail in the SAR reviewed.

Analysis . The performance deficiency associated with this finding was failure of the licensee to update its SAR with adequate information and submittals relative to its solid radwaste equipment, processes, and facilities. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The finding is characterized as a Severity Level IV, non- violation in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there is no cross

-cutting aspect.

Enforcement.

Title 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records", requires, in part, that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall update periodically the final safety analysis report (FSAR). This submittal shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the Commission by the licensee pursuant to Commission requirements since the submittal of the last update to the FSAR. The submittal shall include the effects of all changes made in the facility as described in the FSAR; all safety analyses and evaluations performed by the licensee in support of conclusions that changes did not require a license amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2).

Contrary to th e above, since 1986, the licensee failed to include in a submittal the effects of all changes made in the facility as described in the SAR. Specifically, the licensee failed to update the solid radioactive waste program with adequate details and descriptions of equipment, facilities, and processes.

This includes details of an additional solid radwaste storage area, principal radionuclides, and associated curie content or radioactivity of stored radioactive solid waste. As immediate corrective action, the licensee documented the violation in the corrective action program. Because the finding was a Severity Level IV violation and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR

-ANO-C-2 012-00749, the finding is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000313/2012002

-02; 05000368/2012002

-02, "Failure to Update the SAR with Adequate Details relative to its Solid Radwaste Equipment, Processes, and Facilities

."

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Main article: IP 71151

.1 Data Submission Issue

a. The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for the fourth Quarter 20 11 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, "Performance Indicator Program."

Inspection Scope This review was performed as part of the inspectors' normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

Inspection Scope

These activities constitute completion of two unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, maintenance rule records, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two unplanned transients per 7000 critical hours sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.4 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)

a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals

. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

Inspection Scope These activities constitute completion of two unplanned scrams with complications sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.5 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)

a. The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the safety system functional failures performance indicator for ANO Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the period from the 1 st quarter 2011 through the 4 th quarter 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99

-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, and NUREG

-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73." The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, operability assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance work orders, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of January 2011 through December 2011 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. Inspection Scope

These activities constitute completion of two safety system functional failures sample s as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.

Findings

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Main article: IP 71152

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program because of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed. Inspection Scope

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews

a. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow

-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the station's daily corrective action documents.

Inspection Scope The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. No findings were identified.

Findings

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Main article: IP 71153

.1 (Closed) LER 05000313/2010003 Manual

Reactor Scram Conservatively Initiated After Multiple Abnormal Events Occurred During Plant Startup from a Refueling Outage On April 18, 2010, Unit 1 was at 11 percent reactor power and preparing to connect the main generator to the electric grid to end refueling outage 1R22. At 1:46 p.m.

, the operations staff entered the abnormal operating procedure due to indications of a degradation of reactor coolant pump P

-32 C third stage seal. At 1:56 p.m.

, an operator at the main turbine reported smoke and small flames at turbine governor valve

-3. At 1:57 p.m., control room operators immediately tripped the main turbine and initiated a manual reactor trip in response to the reactor coolant pump seal and the main turbine fire. The manual reactor trip was conservatively performed as neither issue directly required a reactor trip. The licensee determined that the reactor coolant pump seal failure was due to the failure to ensure adequate clearance between the pump coupling slinger ring and the stand pipe splash shield during pump replacement that occurred during the refueling outage. The fire was a result of an electro

-hydraulic control fluid spill onto the calcium silicate piping insulation during maintenance. Under the proper conditions, the elect r o-hydraulic control fluid soaked insulation, heat from the steam lines, and ventilation combined to result in an unexpected exothermic reaction. The licensee implemented corrective actions to revise procedures for reactor coolant pump replacement and provide more supervisory oversight during these infrequent evolutions. The licensee also implemented procedural changes to monitor electro

-hydraulic control fluid spills, require specific walkdowns of turbine generator areas following every outage to look for leaks and spills, and to install drip pans under turbine governor and throttle valves to prevent spills onto the insulation. These issues were placed into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Reports CR

-ANO-C-2010-0960, CR-ANO-1-2010-1895, and CR-ANO-1-2010-1896. A self-revealing finding for the reactor coolant pump seal was documented in inspection report 05000313/2010 0 03. This licensee event report is closed.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000368

/2009005 Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwate r Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power On December 08, 2009, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 was operating near 100 percent reactor power when operators manually tripped main feedwater pump A in response to high thrust bearing temperature. Unit 2 operators entered the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure. A manual reactor trip was initiated when the steam generator A water level decreased to approximately 27 percent. The emergency feedwater system automatically actuated as designed to restore steam generator levels. Operator response was consistent with recent simulator training using the loss of main feedwater pump abnormal operating procedure; however, the ANO Unit 2 simulator response had indicated that steam generator levels could be successfully recovered following the loss of a main feedwater pump without requiring both a reactor trip and emergency feedwater actuation.

The licensee determined that the cause of the event was due to (1) excessive thrust loading due to feedwater pump internal degradation, and (2) differences between the actual plant response and the ANO Unit 2 simulator program. Excessive thrust loading was caused by degradation of the main feedwater pump A internals due to contact between the main feedwater pump wear ring and the impeller, which was caused from previous incorrect maintenance. Analysis of the plant transient data revealed differences between the actual plant response and the ANO Unit 2 simulator. The feedwater flow characteristics programmed into the ANO Unit 2 simulator were based on engineering analysis following the ANO Unit 2 power uprate in 2002. Feedwater modifications were implemented and mitigation strategies were changed to maximize available main feedwater flow. Analysis concluded that a slight increase in total feedwater flow would be achieved by those changes. During the event, steam generator levels decreased much faster during the plant transient than previously indicated by the simulator and actual plant main feedwater flows after the loss on a main feedwater pump were less than the original engineering estimates programmed into the simulator.

The licensee took corrective actions to (1) replace the thr ust bearing, (2) disassemble main feedwater pump

, 2P-1A, to determine cause of degradation, (3) refurbish main feedwater pump, 2P-1A , with a more detailed maintenance procedure, (4) develop improved performance monitoring program to ensure early detection of thrust bearing degradation and pump performance, and (5) revise ANO Unit 2 simulator software program to incorporate actual plant data observed from the loss of a main feedwater pump at full power event. The thrust bearing failure issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR

-ANO-2-2009-3744 and documented as a self revealing finding in Inspection Report 05000368/2010002. The inaccurate simulator response issue was placed into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-3768 and documented as a licensee identified violation in the same inspection report. The review of this licensee event report is complete and no findings were identified and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. This licensee even t report is closed.

.3 (Closed) LER 05000313/2010001 Multiple Main Steam Safety Valves not within Limits due to Seat Bonding and Transient

-Induced Drift Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications On March 18

-19, 2010, four main steam safety valves on Unit 1, PSV

-2686, 2691, 2697 and 2698 were discovered out of tolerance with respect to technical specification surveillance requirement of

+ 3 percent pressure lift set point. Unit 1 plant operations were not affected as a result of the failed technical specification surveillance. The licensee determined that there were two issues: two safety valves lifting high out of tolerance and two safety valves lifting low out of tolerance. The licensee determined the cause for the safety valves lifting high out of tolerance was seat binding caused by oxide adhesion layer between metal parts. The licensee determined the cause for the safety valves lifting low out of tolerance was transient

-induced drift, which occurs when the spring is exercised due to valve actuations during reactor trips, which occurred during the operating cycle prior to the testing. The licensee has completed corrective action to exercise newly installed safety valves within four months of power operations. These issues were placed into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2010-0560. The review of this licensee event report is complete and no findings were identified and no violations of NRC requirements occurred. This licensee event report is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Closed) Temporary Instruction 2515/185 "Follow

-up on the Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative

"

a. Inspection Scope

The ground water protection program was inspected March 19

-22, 2012, to determine whether the licensee had implemented the program elements which were found to be incomplete when previously reviewed during NRC Inspection 05000313/2010004

05000368/2010004. Inspectors interviewed cognizant licensee personnel and performed walk

-downs. The following elements had been implemented since the previous review:

Element 1.1.a

- Perform hydrogeologic and geologic studies to determine predominant ground water flow characteristics and gradients.

Element 1.1.c

- Identify potential pathways for ground water migration from on

-site locations to off

-site locations through ground water.

Element 1.2.a

- Identify each structure, system, and component (SSC) and work practice that involves or could reasonably be expected to involve licensed material and for which there is a credible mechanism for the licensed material to reach ground water.

Element 1.2.b

- Identify existing leak detection methods for each SSC and work practice that involves or could involve licensed material and for which there is a credible potential for inadvertent releases to ground water.

Element 1.2.c

- Identify potential enhancements to leak detection systems or programs. These may include additional or increased frequency of rounds or walkdowns or inspections, or integrity testing.

Element 1.3.a

- Using the hydrology and geology studies developed under Objective 1.1, consider placement of ground water monitoring wells down gradient from the plant but within the boundary defined by the site license.

Element 1.3.b

- Consider, as appropriate, placing sentinel wells closer to SSCs that have the highest potential for inadvertent releases that could reach ground water or SSCs where leak detection capability is limited.

Element 2.2c

- When communicating to the State/Local officials, be clear and precise in quantifying the actual release information as it applies to the appropriate regulatory criteria (i.e.

, put it in perspective)and provide specified information as part of the informal communication.

The following element had not been implemented since the previous review and is documented in the corrective action document listed with the element:

Element 1.2.d

- Identify potential enhancements to prevent spills or leaks from reaching ground water. Licensee personnel acknowledged this element had not yet to be completed, and it was being tracked by Condition Report CR-HQN-2010-00207, Corrective Action 12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On March 22, 2012, the inspectors presented the results of the radiation safety inspections to Mr. M. Chisum, Acting Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On April 12, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Schwarz , Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Baxley, Supervisor ,Instrumentation and Controls
S. Bocksnick, Radwaste Technician, Radiation Protection
B. Byford, Manager, Training
D. Calloway, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Specialist, Chemistry
S. Carey, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls
T. Chernivec, Manager, Outages
M. Chisum, Acting Site Vice President / General Manager, Plant Operations

R Clark , Licensing Specialist

R. Crowe, Acting Manager, Security
B. Daiber, Manager, Design Engineering
B. Doehring, Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls
R. Fuller, Manager, Quality Assurance
W. Greeson, Manager, Engineering Programs and Component
T. Hatfield, System Engineering
R. Holeyfield, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
J. James, Laboratory Technician , Chemistry
K. Jones, Manager, Operations
D. Marvel, Manager, Radiation Protection
J. McCoy, Director, Engineering
S. Morris, Supervisor, Chemistry
N. Mosher, Licensing Specialist
D. Norman, Radwaste Technician, Radiation Protection
B. Pace, Manager, Planning Scheduling, and Outage
D. Perkins, Manager, Maintenance
S. Pyle, Manager, Licensing
T. Rolniak, Specialist, Radiation Protection
C. Schwarz, Site Vice President
R. Sebring, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
T. Sherrill, Manager, Chemistry
R. Starkey, Radwaste Supervisor, Radiation Protection
P. Williams, Manager, System Engineering

NRC Personnel

A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Rotton, Resident Inspector
W. Schaup, Resident Inspector

Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened N one

Opened and Closed

05000313/201200

2-01 NCV Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Effluent and Process Monitors Properly (Section 2RS05)

05000313/201200

2-02

05000368 /201200 2-02 NCV Failure to Update the Safety Analysis Report with Adequate Details R elative to its Solid Radwaste Equipment, Processes, and Facilities (Section 2RS08)

Closed

05000313/2010003
LER Manual Reactor Scram Conservatively Initiated After Multiple Abnormal Events Occurred During Plant Startup from a Refueling Outage
05000368/LER-2009-005 LER Manual Reactor Scram and Emergency Feedwater
Automatic Actuation due to an Unexpected Plant Response Following the Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump at Full Power
05000313/LER-2010-001 LER Multiple Main Steam Safety Valves not within Limits due to Seat Bonding and Transient

-Induced Drift Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

Temporary Instruction 2515/185 TI "Follow-up on the Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative"
Discussed N one
Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R

01:
Adverse Weather Protection
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
OP-1203.025 Unit 1 Natural Emergencies
OP-2203.008 Unit 2 Natural Emergencies
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-C-2011-2952
CR-ANO-C-2012-0530
CR-ANO-C-2012-0699
Section 1R
04:
Equipment Alignment
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
OP-2106.006 Emergency Feedwater System Operations
OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION M-230, Sheet 1
Reactor Coolant System
118 M-231, Sheet 1
Makeup and Purification System
113 M-231, Sheet 3
Makeup and Purification System

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION FHA ANO Fire Hazard Analysis
PFP-U1 ANO Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1
PFP-U2 ANO Pre-Fire Plan Unit 2
Attachment
DRAWINGS NUMBER TITLE REVISION
FZ-1031 Unit 1 Fire Zone Detail

- Diesel Fuel Storage Vaults

FZ-2030 Unit 2 Fire Zone Detail

- Diesel Fuel Storage Vaults

FZ-1044 Unit 1 Fire Zone Detail

- Electrical Equipment Room and Lower South Electrical Penetration Room

FZ-1054 Fire Zone Detail - Computer Room and Computer Transformer
FZ-2004 Fire Zone Detail

- CEDM Equipment Room and Computer Room 2

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

PRCOEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-DC-346 Cable Reliability Program

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
COPD-030 ANO Reactivity Management Program
OP-1106.009 Turbine Startup (Warmup and Roll)
OP-1102.004 Power Operation
OP-1102.016 Power Reduction
WORK ORDERS
00306856

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-DC-203 Maintenance Rule Program
EN-DC-204 Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis
Attachment

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring
EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process
OP-1412.187
HPL-C Transfer Switch Inspection and Lubrication
WORK ORDERS
2318766
00298672
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2011-3070 CR-ANO-1-2012-0350

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls

PROCEDURE NUMBER TITLE REVISION
OP-1203.025 Natural Emergencies
COPD-024 Risk Assessment Guidelines
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2012-098
CR-ANO-2-2012-459
CR-ANO-2-2012-453 CR-ANO-2-2012-550

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-OP-104 Operability Evaluations
OP-2104.039 HPSI Operations
MISCELLANEOUS
ER-ANO-2004-0930
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2012-0 098
CR-ANO-2-2012-0 412
CR-ANO-1-2012-0 405
Attachment
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-2-2012-0588
CR-ANO-2-2012-0151
CR-ANO-2-2012-0350
CR-ANO-2-2007-1436 CR-ANO-2-2005-2273

Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-WM-107 Post Maintenance Testing
EN-WM-105 Planning 9
EN-MA-101 Fundamentals of Maintenance
EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities
EN-WM-102 Work Implementation and Closeout
OP-2104.029 Service Water System Operation
OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
OP-1104.029 Service Water System Operation
OP-1104.004 Decay Heat Removal Operating Procedure
OP-2104.037 Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations
WORK O RDER S
52315639 00
305315
52279859
00305852
00285146
52319293
52318838
52271625
52319321
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2012-0126
CR-ANO-2-2011-2677
CR-ANO-2-2012-0310
Attachment

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
OP-2403.097 Class 1E Battery Charger Load Test for 2D32B
OP-1304.206 EFIC channel B monthly Test
OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
OP-1104.002 Makeup and Purification System Operation
OP-2104.04 LPSI System Operations
OP-2105.009 CEDM Control System Operation
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2012-0126
CR-ANO-2-2011-3367
CR-ANO-1-2011-1265 CR-ANO-2-2012-0596

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
OP-1903.011 Emergency Response/ Notifications
SE-1-EN-3 Shift Engineer (STA) PI Drill Evaluation Session
EN-EP-311 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Activation via the Virtual Private Network (VPN)
EN-EP-310 Emergency Response Organization Notification System
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-C-2012-0570
CR-ANO-C-2012-515
Section 2RS05:
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-RP-302 Operation of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
EN-RP-303 Source Checking of Radiation Protection Instrumentation
Attachment Section 2RS05:
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-RP-304 Operation of Counting Equipment
1304.027 Unit 1 Effluent Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
1413.441 Unit 1 Process Radiation Monitor Calibration
AUDITS, SELF

-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE
LO-ALO-2010-00048 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 10, 2011
LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2011-01491
CR-ANO-1-2011-01415
CR-ANO-1-2011-00173
CR-ANO-1-2011-01164
CR-ANO-2-2011-00029
CR-ANO-C-2004-01077
CR-ANO-1-2004-01629
CR-ANO-2-2012-00187
CR-ANO-C-2011-02233
CR-ANO-C-2011-02345
CR-ANO-1-2012-00524
CALIBRATION RECORDS
NUMBER TITLE DATE
Canberra Fastscan Whole Body Counting System September 20, 2011
WO52225615
RE-4642/4830 July 6, 2011
WO51671566
RE-4642/4830 December 21, 2009
WO52222948
RE-2236/2237/3618/3809/3810/3814/3815
January 24, 2011
WO52284396
2RE2330 August 12, 2011
Attachment
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
WAP-890120-061 Calibration/Traceability Information for RMS Liquid Monitors (Source # 959)
January 20, 1989
Source 655

- Calibration Certificate August 31, 1983

Section 2RS06:
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE CHANGE NO.
1052.003 Nuclear Chemistry Quality Control Program
29 1052.022 Radiological Effluents and Environmental Monitoring Program
2-05-0 1604.001 Gross Alpha Measurement
016 1604.003 Tritium Sample Penetration
2 1604.014 Reactor Building Purge Analysis
2 1604.015 Analysis of Unit Vents
019 1604.017 Analysis of Liquid Waste
24 1604.022 Gamma Spectroscopy
28 1604.051 Eberline Radiation Monitoring System
2 1607.008 Sampling the Filtered Waste Monitor Tank (T

-21 A/B) 006-05-0 1607.009 Sampling the Treated Waste Monitor Tanks (T

-16 A/B) 013 1607.010 Sampling of the ANO Unit 1 Vents

2 1607.014 Reactor Building Air Sampling
010 1607.018 Sampling the Unit 1 Waste Gas Decay Tanks and Surge Tank
008 1607.028 Sampling the Unit 1 Turbine Building Sump
004-01-0 1618.011 Sampling the Unit 1 Neutralizing Tank (T

-50) 005-02-0 2607.009 Sampling the Waste Condensate Tanks (2T

-21A and 2T

-21B) 009-03-0 2607.010 Sampling the Unit 2 Vents

019 2607.028 Sampling the Unit Two Turbine Building Sump
004 2618.028 Sampling the Regenerative Waste Tanks (2T

-92 A, B, or C)

004-03-0 5120.415 In-Place Testing of the Unit 1 Control Room Filtration System
011 5120.417 In-Place Testing of the Penetration Room Filtration System
008 5120.425 In-Place Testing of the Unit 2 Control Room Filtration System
2 5120.427 In-Place Testing of the Unit 2 Penetration Room Filtration System
005
Attachment
AUDITS, SELF

-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE
LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-1-2011-00739
CR-ANO-C-2011-01152
CR-ANO-C-2011-02295
CR-ANO-C-2011-02345
CR-ANO-C-2011-03015
CR-ANO-C-2011-02293
CR-ANO-C-2011-02122
CR-ANO-C-2011-02237
CR-ANO-C-2011-01742
CR-ANO-C-2011-01962
CR-ANO-C-2011-02027
CR-ANO-C-2011-00320
CR-ANO-C-2010-02476
CR-ANO-C-2010-02744
CR-ANO-C-2010-02429
CR-ANO-2-2011-00028
CR-ANO-C-2010-01373
CR-ANO-2-2010-02356
CR-ANO-2-2010-02512
CR-ANO-1-2011-00602
CR-ANO-2-2009-01635
CR-ANO-1-2010-03232
CR-ANO-1-2011-00173
CR-ANO-1-2011-00601
CR-ANO-1-2010-02942
CR-ANO-2-2009-02149
CR-ANO-C-2008-1583
CR-ANO-1-2011-00739
CR-ANO-C-2011-01152
RELEASE PERMITS
1GR2011-0095 2GR2011-0079 1GR2010-0095 2GR2010-0059 1LR2011-0058 2LR2011-0025 1LR2010-0029
IN-PLACE FILTER TESTING RECORDS
UNIT SYSTEM
TEST DATE
1 Penetration Room Ventilation Month Test October 19, 2010
2
VSF-9 18 Month Test October 5, 2011
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE REVISION / DATE
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2010
April 29, 2011
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2009
February 25, 2010
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
017
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 SAR Chapter 11
23
Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 SAR Chapter 11
23
Section 2RS07: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION 1304.062 Meteorological Monitoring Calibration
Attachment
1608.005 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
1608.008 Land Use Census
1012.018 Administration of Radiological Surveys
EN-CY-108 Monitoring of Nonradioactive Systems
EN-CY-109 Sampling and Analysis of Groundwater Monitoring Wells
EN-CY-111 Radiological Ground Water Protection Program
EN-RP-113 Response to Contaminated Spills/Leaks.
EN-RP- 210 Area Monitoring Program
AUDITS, SELF

-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE
QA-2/6-2011-ANO-1 Quality Assurance Audit Report; Combined Chemistry, Effluents and Environmental Monitoring October 11, 2011
LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
QA O2Cs Chemistry and REMP Report July 19, 2010
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-2-2009-1635
CR-ANO-C-2010-0543
CR-ANO-C-2010-2102
CR-ANO-C-2010-2288
CR-ANO-C-2010-3016
CR-ANO-C-2011-0424
CR-ANO-C-2011-0954
CR-ANO-C-2011-2122
CR-ANO-C-2011-3218
CR-ANO-C-2010-1987
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE DATE WO 52258408

-01 Perform the Semi

-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration June 7, 2011

WO 52220528

-01 Perform the Semi

-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration November 15, 2011

WO 52037947

-01 Perform the Semi

-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration June 22, 2010

WO 51694738

-01 Perform the Semi

-Annual Meteorological Monitoring Calibration January 6, 2010

Attachment Annual Radiological Environment Operating Report for 2009 May 11, 2010
Annual Radiological Environment Operating Report for 2010 April 20, 2011
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2009
February 25, 2010
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2010
April 29, 2011
EP-2012-0002 Meteorological Tower Annual Report 2011
January 6, 2012
EP-2011-0004 Meteorological Tower Annual Report 2010
December 2, 2010
Section 2RS08:
Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation
PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-RW-101 Radioactive Waste Management
EN-RW-102 Radioactive Shipping Procedure
EN-RW-103 Radioactive Waste Tracking Procedure
EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors
EN-RW-105 Process Control Program
EN-RW-106 Integrated Transportation Security Plan
1106.024 Condensate Demineralizer System Operation and Regeneration
1601.505 Processing of Spent Radioactive Resin 12 1601.506 Radioactive Waste Management Program Surveillances
AUDITS, SELF

-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE
02C-ANO-2010-0370 Oversight Observation Checklist: Radwaste Packaging, Handling, and Shipping June 28, 2010
2C-ANO-2011-0102 Oversight Observation Checklist: Radiation Protection Control of Radioactive Material March 4, 2011
ANO-1108-0107 Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Building August 1, 2011
LO-ALO-2011-00055 Pre-NRC Inspection Assessment January 23, 2012
ANO-1201-0196 Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage Building January 23, 2012
ANO-1202-0138 Mausoleum February 13, 2012
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-ANO-C-20 11-0 0 04 0 2
CR-ANO-C-201 1-0 04 24
CR-ANO-C-201 1-004 7 6
CR-ANO-C-2010-00510
CR-ANO-C-201
1-00988
CR-ANO-C-2011-0 2280
CR-ANO-C-2011-02317
CR-ANO-C-2011-02349
CR-ANO-C-201
2-02388
CR-ANO-C-201
1-00709
Attachment
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
NUMBER TYPE TITLE DATE
RSR 10-109 LQ 8 Containers of Unit 1 Secondary Resin September 30, 2010
RSR 10-136
LSA-II Dry Active Waste in Shielded Sealand Container December 9, 2010
RSR 11-012
SCO-II One B-25 box of Diving Equipment January 13, 2011
RSR 11-062
LSA-I Dry Active Waste and Metal Trash June 8, 2011
RSR 11-122 LQ 3 Boxes of RCP Motor Equipment December 5, 2011
RSR 12-025 Type A Part 61 Primary Resin Samples February 23, 2012
RSR 12-028 Type B Unit 2 Primary Resin #PO 007477

-12 March 8, 2012

RSR 12-030 Type B Unit 2 Primary Resin #PO 007940

-3 March 15, 2012

RSR 12-036 LQ Unit 2 Charcoal Sample 2VEF8
March 21, 2012
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE REVISION/DATE
ANO Unit 1 and 2 Safety Analysis Reports

- Chapters 11&12

22873 NUPIC Audit of GEL Laboratories, LLC
November 18, 2011
268460001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for 2F

-4 Filter January 10, 2011

274957001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 RCS Filters May 9, 2011
278919003 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 Primary Resin January 24, 2012
295060001 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Dry Active Waste February 28, 2012
295060002 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Filters February 28, 2012
296569003 10 CFR Part 61 Analysis for Unit 2 Primary Resin March 5, 2012

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

PROCEDURES
NUMBER TITLE REVISION
EN-LI-114 Performance Indicator Process 4
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
NUMBER TITLE DATE
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Non

- MSPI PI data report

- 1 st

QTR 2011 April 4, 2011
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Non

- MSPI PI data report

- 2nd QTR 2011

July 7, 2011
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Non

- MSPI PI data report

- 3rd QTR 2011

October 13, 2011
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Non

- MSPI PI data report

- 4th QTR 2011

January 3, 2012
Attachment
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150

-0011.

The following items are requested for the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety Inspection At Arkansas Nuclear One

(3/19/2012

- 3/23/2012)

Integrated Report 2012002
The items listed below are needed to support the Occupational and Public Radiation Safety inspection to be conducted by Larry Ricketson (817

-200-1165), Louis Carson (817

-200-1221), Casey Alldredge (817

-200-1547), and Natasha Greene (817

-200-1154). .

NOTE: The information requested may be provided in either electronic or paper media or a combination of these.
Information provided in electronic media may be in the form of IMS

-CERTREC, e

-mail attachments or CD.

The agency's text editing software is MS Word; however, we have document viewing capability for Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) text file

s.

Please ensure the requested information is submitted for the NRC inspectors' review by March 5, 2012.
Attachment
1.
Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)
NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 1- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 1

- B, etc.

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
Effluent monitor calibration Radiation protection instrument calibration Installed instrument calibrations Count room and Laboratory instrument calibrations
B. Applicable organization charts
C. Copies of audits, self

-assessments, surveillances, vendor or NUPIC audits for contractor support and LERs, written since August 1, 2011

, related to:

Area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, or whole body counters Installed radiation monitors
D. Procedure index for:
Calibration, use and operation of continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, temporary area radiation monitors, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, and whole body counters. 2 Calibration of installed radiation monitors
E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
1 Calibration of portable radiation detection instruments (for portable ion chambers)
Whole body counter calibration Laboratory instrumentation quality control
F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since August 1, 2011

, related to the following programs:

Area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, whole body counters,
2 Installed radiation monitors,
3 Effluent radiation monito rs 4 Count room radiation instruments
Attachment
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
G. Most recent calibration data for the whole body counters
H.
A list of the point of discharge effluent monitors with the two most recent calibration dates and the work order numbers associated with the calibrations Although it is not necessary to submit the following information, the inspector will also review:
I. Response check documentation for criticality monitors, portable survey instruments, temporary area radiation monitors, electronic dosimeters, teledosimetry, personnel contamination monitors, and whole body counters since August 1, 2011
J. Selected portable radiation protection instrument calibration records since August 1, 2011
K. Selected personnel contamination monitors and tool monitors calibration records since August 1, 2011
L. Calibration records for selected installed area radiation monitors, and post accident monitors since August 1, 2011
M. Documentation for the point of discharge effluent monitors that shows the current calibration methodology is traceable to the primary calibration
Attachment
2. Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (71124.06)
NOTE: Please submit this information using the same lettering system as below.
For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 2

- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 2

- B, etc.

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
Radiological effluent control Engineered safety feature air cleaning systems
B. Applicable organization charts
C. Audits, self assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since July 19, 2010

, related to:

Radioactive effluents Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
D. Procedure indexes for the following areas Radioactive effluents Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
1
Sampling of radioactive effluents Sample analysis Generating radioactive effluent release permits Laboratory instrumentation quality control In-place testing of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers New or applicable procedures for effluent programs (e.g., including ground water monitoring programs),
F. List of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010

, associated with:

Radioactive effluents Effluent radiation monitors Engineered Safety Feature Air cleaning systems
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
G. 2009 and 2010
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
H. Current Copy of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
I. Copy of the 2009 and 2010

interlaboratory comparison results for laboratory quality control performance of effluent sample analysis

Attachment
J. Effluent sampling schedule for the week of the inspection
K. New entries into 10
CFR 50.75(g) files since July 19, 2010
L. Operations Dept (or other responsible dept) log records for effluent monitors removed from service or out of service since July 19, 2010
M. Listing or log of liquid and gaseous release permits since July 19, 2010
N.
For technical specification

-required air cleaning systems, the most recent surveillance test results of in

-place filter testing (of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers) and laboratory testing (of charcoal efficiency)

Attachment
3.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07)
NOTE: In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 3- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 3

- B, etc.

List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
Radiological environmental monitoring Meteorological monitoring
B. Applicable organization charts
C. Audits, self assessments, vendor or NUPIC audits of contractor support, and LERs written since July 19, 2010

, related to:

Radiological environmental monitoring program (including contractor environmental laboratory audits, if used to perform environmental program functions)
Environmental TLD processing facility Meteorological monitoring program
D. Procedure index for the following areas:
Radiological environmental monitoring program Meteorological monitoring program
E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
1 Environmental Program Description Sampling, collection and preparation of environmental samples Sample analysis (if applicable)
Laboratory instrumentation quality control

Procedures

associated with the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Appropriate QA Audit and Surveillance program procedures, and/or sections of the station's QA manual (which pertain to the REMP)

F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010

, related to the following programs:

Radiological environmental monitoring Meteorological monitoring
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
G. Wind Rose data and evaluations used for establishing environmental sampling locations
H. Copies of the 2 most recent calibration packages for the meteorological tower instruments
Attachment
I. Copy of the 2009 and 2010
Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Land Use Census, and current revision of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
J. Scheduled time to observe environmental sampling activities in the field and visit selected environmental sample locations
K. Scheduled time to meet with the meteorological tower system engineer and/or meteorologist to visit/observe the meteorological tower and associated equipment
L. Copy of the environmental laboratory's interlaboratory comparison program results for 2009 and 2010, if not included in the annual radiological environmental operating report
M. Data from the environmental laboratory documenting the analytical detection sensitivities for the various environmental sample media (i.e., air, water, soil, vegetation, and milk)
N. Quality Assurance audits (e.g., NUPIC) for contracted services
O. Current NEI Groundwater Initiative Plan and status
Attachment
4. Radioactive Solid Waste Processing, and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation (71124.08)
NOTE:
In an effort to keep the requested information organized, please submit this information to us using the same lettering system below.
For example, all contacts and phone numbers for the above inspector should be in a file/folder titled 4

- A, Applicable organization charts in file/folder 4

- B, etc.

A. List of contacts and telephone numbers for the following areas:
Solid Radioactive waste processing Transportation of radioactive material/waste
B. Applicable organization charts (and list of personnel involved in solid radwaste processing, transferring, and transportation of radioactive waste/materials)
C. Copies of audits, department se lf-assessments, and LERs written since July 19, 2010, related to:
Solid radioactive waste management Radioactive material/waste transportation program
D. Procedure index for the following areas:
Solid radioactive waste management Radioactive material/waste transportation
E. Please provide specific procedures related to the following areas.
Additional specific procedures will be requested by number after the inspector reviews the procedure indexes.
1 Process control program Solid and liquid radioactive waste processing Radioactive material/waste shipping Methodology used for waste concentration averaging, if applicable Waste stream sampling and analysis
F. A summary list of corrective action documents (including corporate and subtiered systems) written since July 19, 2010 related to:
Solid radioactive waste Transportation of radioactive material/waste
NOTE: The lists should indicate the significance level of each issue and the search criteria used.
G. Copies of training lesson plans for 49
CFR 172 subpart H, for radwaste processing, packaging, and shipping.
Attachment
H. A summary of radioactive material and radioactive waste shipments made from July 19, 2010 to present
I. Waste stream sample analyses results and resulting scaling factors for 2009 and 2010
J. Waste classification reports if performed by vendors (such as for irradiated hardware)
Although it is not necessary to compile the following information, the inspector will also review:
K. Training and qualifications records of personnel responsible for the conduct of radioactive waste processing, package preparation, and shipping
Attachment
5. Temporary Instruction 2515/185, Revision 1,
Follow-Up On The Industry's Ground Water Protection Initiative As documented in the integrated Inspection Report
2010004, you had not fully implemented some of the objectives of Nuclear Energy Institute
07-07, at the time of the inspection.
Please provide the status of each of these objectives.
If the objective has not been fully implemented, please provide a copy of the corrective action document and specific corrective action assignment that ensures implementation of the objective.
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