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{{#Wiki_filter:nuatar Croak ranarnfinn Atntinn AnnoyFwalnn Nnnlanrflumtnr (~mak (~gannr~tinn ~t~atinn Ann~v FvMnn hIIIt~I~2rTakhi r1('rZQ 29OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMSU761Initiating Condition:Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table M3 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table M3 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table M3 Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone System X X XNARS xHPN X XENS X XJ a ... .t i I I ---- !-LOtE~ OT !~LL O Tflfl TOIIOWInG OflEUT~ communication meTnoas:47ý(8ite SDOCifiC lict of communications methodSIo--s of ALL of th.e, folloA,;n- OR" commu r,) methods.(Site SWAGof 66 ist Of IMonth 20XXOCGS 3-76EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afar ('-rook (' Zonarnfin Afnfinn AnnovIPvalnn N, je-lonrflua*~r Crnok a~nor2tinn ~tn*inn Ann~v Fv.Inn NIumr~I~2r I ~*~* w. -- St ~ S~S ~*SS Sty --..~S S fft5 55 SSt ~st~ S ~* S U -~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS3. of AI- of the following NRC communictions methods:(sito specific. list of cormmuinications methods)Basis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, er--offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.-(6ee Deyeloper Notes)-.EAL #3 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU62. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-77EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOytrCee eeainaSainA exEenNuerTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCAI-21Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes orlonger.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Alei4-vent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 15 mFnnutes time has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.1. Loss of all offsite AC power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1 D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. Failure to restore power to at least one 4160V bus (1C or 1D) in < 15 minutesfrom the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.L--orss of ALL-' offeiote and ALL onsite AC Power to (site Specific emergency buses) for 1minuteS Or iengcr.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-relatedThis IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of allSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycore cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore anemergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decayheat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus,when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.Month 20XXOCGS 3-78EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexPylnn NJrlanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSFifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64- or RAS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-79EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) navtor (rnrok rantarntinn r~fnfinn Annax Exelnn NuclesarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU121Initiating Condition:Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual .' event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 4-5 ninutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D reduced to only one of thefollowing power sources for > 15 minutes.* Startup Transformer SA" Startup Transformer SB" EDG-1 Emergency Diesel Generator* EDG-2 Emergency Diesel GeneratorAND2. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS.-~ A k'~ ,,~r -i; I +, ;F1 ;t-, nnel it ne +rr~ ~ j 1 n~~r ~ .., -~;n-~ I-npoW9r SOU c for 15 minutes Or on ANDh Amu additional siRale neweF SGUFGe fAih wp W611 Fersult in loss ef all AG neweF toSAFF=Pý SYSTEMS.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources suchthat any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETYSYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or morethan one, train of safety-related equipment.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source toMonth 20XXOCGS 3-80EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
I::xAIon NuclAarflvster Creek (Anersatinn Stsation Annex Exeonn NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSservice. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and thelower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in thesemodes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AQ4e-ABNs and EOPs, and capable ofsupplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition arepresented below." A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).* A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.* A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a singletrain of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event toan Alert in accordance with IC CA12.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 CU22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-81EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) l=xAlon lvster Creek GAner~atinn Stt~ion Annexv Exelnn Nucler~ITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA26Initiating Condition:Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM nieed-required for the current operatingmode.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. a The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:" Seismic event (earthquake)" Internal or external flooding event" High winds or tornado strike* FIRE" EXPLOSION" (site ,pecifi, hazard.)* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by theShift ManagerAND2.b. EITHER of the following:a.4. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance inat least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed-required byTechnical Specifications for the current operating mode.ORb. 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure needed-required by TechnicalSpecifications for the current operating mode.ORc. A seismic event required a manual reactor scram per ABN-38,Station Seismic EventBasis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due tocombustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from highenergy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits,Month 20XXOCGS 3-82EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSgrounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Suchevents may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosionare present.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observablewithout measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage issufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affectedcomponent or structure.This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, Reeded-required for the currentoperating mode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications forthe current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss orpotential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electricalisolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitutedegraded performance and is classified under HU6.EAL--144-EAL #2.a addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required tobe operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is inseFv*Ge operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications ofdegraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding theoperability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.EAL--b1-EAL #2.b addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that isrequired to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, andis not in sePAIGe/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structurecontaining SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determinationbased on the totality of available event and damage report information. This is intendedto be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64 or RAS1.If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA62. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)4. FSAR Update Section 3.3.1 (High winds)5. ABN-31, High Winds6. ABN-32, Abnormal Intake Level7. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-83EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU34Initiating Condition:Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusua! Eventcvent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 15 minutes time has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.Voltage is < 115 VDC on required 125 VDC battery busses B and C for> 15 minutes.Indic-ated voltage is loss than (esite specifi bus voltage value) orequrdVtlDbu--s.e s fo r 15 mi4nu--te s or lon igerF.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitorand control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown orrefueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantlyreduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditionsincrease the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition isconsidered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, "required" means the Vital DC buses necessary to supportoperation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenancework and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train Bwould require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train Awould not warrant an emergency classification.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be viaIC CA64- or CA53, or an IC in Recognition Category RA.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU42. UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems3. OCNGS Drawing BR 3000Month 20XXOCGS 3-84EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS4. ABN-54, DC Bus B and Panel/MCC Failures5. ABN-55, DC Bus C and Panel/MCC FailuresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-85EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatina Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU45 IInitiating Condition:Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table C1 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table C1 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table Cl Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone System X X XNARS xHPN X XENS X XI I p j Af Al I I ^ +ký ~I .r, ~~~~ iE Uf*llevjrn ,r S JL 'Jy SSSLSS~.tI i SS %.* %'Atf.I nM K 9-ý at, " ft " F."t."FRUR era "FIR 1-mr-A " ft* ..... r-2) 1 or.~ of Al I I nf th faIy~nrss CORO nmmn, ,ininntinnise methadsl-(G sito s 11 A c l o ctionM e th Qds 6',ALIVE IV I I IVLI BVHV*32. Loassb of. ALL-' of the foll-owinga NR-C- commun.'-Aications mFethodrs:Month 20XXOCGS 3-86EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Que-for Cr~ank (rgangarninn tAtninn Annex~ Explon NuclezarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSlist Of Basis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site,-eF offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.(soo DoVolopor Notes).EAL #3 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU52. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-1 24-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-87EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Quafor Creek rannarnfing -Iqfnf inn AnnoyEXI~ynn Nnrilp~rflvfttAr CrnAk (~na~ratinn ~t2tinn Ann~av FvAInn M.iv~Ic~rTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA53Initiating Condition:Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Alej4-event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely beexceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212OF due to lossremoval for > Table C2 duration.of decay heatTable C2 RCS Heat-up Duration ThresholdsRCS Containment Closure Heat-upStatus Status DurationIntact Not Applicable 60 minutes*tEstablished 20 minutes*Not Established 20 minuteNot Established 0 minutes* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation withinthis time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced,then EAL #1 is not applicable.OR2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise > 10 psig as a result of temperature rise due toloss of decay heat removal.A I Illlltl A !* *= _ _ ?Jr"I.UNPL'ArNEL inGrcacc in 68. ieemperatue to greaieF than tsite specITNcfI B I m EI ecnnmcai z~cieGTica!ion Gcia SnUtaOWn tecm[orature limit) TOr Warter tnaA MfeAt or.,+in ennf lr% i k^ fnhln,.,mnný +r,Akl!Month 20XXOCGS 3-88EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) l=xalnn V lwaVr Creek vvnertinn Stvation Annewx Exevwn NuivloarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSTable: RCS Heat up Duration ThroeholdeRS-~~ ~Statue otmn lsur Heat up Duration!Rta~t(but Rt- atred-ced i'i'."entFry Not-appliGamle i n --i-te eNot intact (OFat ratoduIed dlteSinetF [0R)Not Established 0 MiUte*Iaf an ROS heat system is in operation withkn this time framea~n~d QRCs temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable2. UNPLANNED RCS peresure inrGease greater than (site specAifi pressurereading). (This E=AL= does not apply during water solid plant conditions.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or anaddition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Eithercondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses aR wGeaserise in RCStemperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact.T,,or RCS ..inentor; is red.u ed .(e.g., mid loop operation in 1216A .PRs). The 20-minutecriterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperaturer e rise.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses a4 iO, seaserise in RCStemperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is notMonth 20XXOCGS 3-89EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) flauo$r (rnmak (' Znaratinn Atn*inn AnnoyF~n ~~~ar- .~5 ~ .. ~~UU*fS* fI=Yalnn NienlanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONScrucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to afission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time toaddress the temperature e rise without a substantial degradation in plant safety.Finally, in the case where there is af hrFease rise in RCS temperature, the RCS is notintact or is at reduc..d in,..nt. y [PWR, , and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is notestablished, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0 minutes). This is because 1) theevaporated reactor coolant may be released directly into the Containment atmosphereand subsequently to the environment, and 2) there is reduced reactor coolant inventoryabove the top of irradiated fuel.EAL-#2-EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RASI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA32. Technical Specifications 1.73. OU-AA-103, Shutdown Safety Management ProgramMonth 20XXOCGS 3-90EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU53IInitiating Condition:UNPLANNED e rise in RCS temperatureOperating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual E'-ntcvent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 45-mfrutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212°F due to loss of decay heatremoval-.OR2. Loss of the following for >15 minutes.ALL RCS temperature indicationsAND* ALL RPV water level indications1. UNPLANNED incGrease in RCS temperature to greater than (site specificTechnical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit)-.2. Loss of ALL RCS temperature anid reactor vessel!RCS level indication for 15minute r, lOn Gger.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED uiwaeaserise in RCS temperature above theTechnical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-91EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatina Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSRCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not establishedduring this event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA53.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to theRCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolanttemperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specifiedin Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fueldamage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation ofpower operation.During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above thereactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactorvessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removalat reduced inventory may result in a rapid iOGeaserise in reactor coolant temperaturedepending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentationcapability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable tomonitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During thiscondition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heatload has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA64 based on an inventory loss or IC CA53 basedon exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU32. Technical Specifications 1.73. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline4. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray5. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-downMonth 20XXOCGS 3-92EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) flv-ntpr Crank Genaniratinn Station Annexv Evx&Inn Nucler~IT2 hhi 1_(~.9OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG64-Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Em-er-eny. vent promptlyupon determining that the applicable time 30-minutes-has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.1. a. RPV water level < 0 inches TAF for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:" Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.OR* Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-10, North Wall, reading >3 R/hr.ANDc. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)IMonth 20XXOCGS 3-93EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOy-ter. C .eek.Generaina S..ation.Annex..x...n.Nucle.rTnhla n (' Z- 1-9OCGS EAL Technical BasisI RECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSTable C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications* Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration > 6% and OxygenConcentration > 5%o UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established** Any Secondary Containment radiation monitor > EMG-3200.11 MaximumSafe (Table 12).* if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minutecore uncovery time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required.1. a. (Reactor ve66el!RCS level less than (cite specific level) for 30 m~inutes OrAMDb. ANY indicatfion fro~m the Cnimethlege Table (see belew).2.R Rewactr vessel!RCSR level ca;nnot ha monitored for 30 minuter, or lonaor.A &lifb. ~C n Crel uvr;m is .inicae by ANY of the following:= *p 11I ,o., I ..Jl I +J Ip 11 0 "^0f ay... ra -f.4*1L on fSfllf Jn r.=" anq.%fA -A.b *S1 s~f eFvau .f Itin Lt ..l~r ... nw.~' n s -----------s~a ,.-I 11SI-' ANNI-W]) 1"Aren'-q in 6sitp, 1qnRR1t4c 'iMn nnd4Ar UMUI~ 42.4eI'IR At- Q144IttR~tfnaanitude to hi n'Iieat' enre uneovefy-----I(o-1sther- site sfocciflo iadieatieios-1J V ANDMonth 20XXOCGS 3-94EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSG. ANY indication fom- the Containment Challenge Table (see below).Containment Challen.go TablCONTAINMENT CLOSURE not establishedl(Ex~plosive fFA*Pae) exists inside eontaimnentlUNPLANýNED incr-ease in eontaimnmnt pressure*if CONTAINMVENT CLOSURE ir, re established prior to eXceeding the 30 mninute tielim~it, tnen dAecar-afion o a Gencral Emegnc is not rcguirca.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above thetop of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual orIMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containmentintegrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective ActionGuidelines (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a directand unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENTCLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declarationof a General Emergency is not required.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containmentatmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at thelower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and couldresult in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. Ittherefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to acore uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installedMonth 20XXOCGS 3-95EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONShydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel claddingdamage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentrationreading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access.During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service,operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment ischallenged.l#-FAL-Threshod 2,b#1 Basis,-4The 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actuallyoccurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentationuncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminateleakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.The inability to monitor RPV-levetRPV water level may be caused by instrumentationand/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of availableinstrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that aninventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or taRk-Torus levels.Sump and/or ta4,k-Torus level changes must be evaluated against other potentialsources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CG12. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. Technical Specifications 5.2 Basis4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for SevereAccident5Guidelines5. EMG-3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control6. FSAR Update 6.2.1.1.37. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control8. EP-AEL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-96EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexD m Exelon NuclearOytr rekGneainaSainAnxex~nNdTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS64 IInitiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Site Area EmneFrencyvent promptlyupon determining that the applicable time 30 minutes -has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV water level < 56 inchesTAF.OR2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV water level < 0 inches TAF.OR3. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutesANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:" Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.OR" Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-10, North Wall, reading >3 R/hr.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.1. a. CONTAINMENT CLOSUREM t. n sotetablished.Month 20XX OCGS 3-97 EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovater Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster..Creek..Gener.t... Station.Annex......n.NuclearTabIA OC~S 3-2OC~S EAL Te~hnk3I R~siRRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSANDD. Iicl-(aTor Vpe8Ifl(A ."i'.tior-uv WVV#K4OF)2 IOW'Oi 10C es tflf (CiI Eske CITICtdfglevel)2.a COTANMN CLSR ocaliehod--ANDI* l'/nlllll I I I LI * !ID.~~~ K-eacTGF V96eV ei:~ Wi-E'w.-OF or * ,--' i'Vq-M WONe Iee ;man Weib db dfsp8G~fiG 'eVeq-FA- aN -A3CO V4~ V1n~x i.'-4i orT. -A -AVM WýItAfV1 -A& io-%rni Ecanno.1T..1 no-T Monirortor IMinuteG Or longer.C .....IAMD03. %=9F8 Uno.' It AInuated lay ANY r. 1 theo falowing-p(Site speeific radiatien monitor) reading gr-eater- than (site specific va -1,-"r rj- y y ln% Ahie0 44 I-r ^li VQ1If'1 ril-6Anii~rIl'1MI1i Iati fHL' ..ar 33-I rkTDT A XThXLThU:ýr Al- +--1, 1 1 V P-c.W .a.nr o rt anV I*t orm 10 z45.5 *Xta. r40 0LAS .4~S vL | |||
* Otfl1Jt rSS Cs U.n~,VR.3 *tL .3= Q2tJ ... i=Xaatd a~jJ%.,UflAA_1JA...... .. .... .... ... ... ..............i. .......Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.I I II fll~ it: annmR~c ~ FUflflmC~flT ~iflfl orotonrino I0~ 01 I-~I-"d inv~ntorv control anomakeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage" The lost inventory may be due toa RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactorcoolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protectionof the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfMonth 20XXOCGS 3-98EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifyingCONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory controlfunctions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs #1-.b and#2-b reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lowerprobability of a fission product release to the environment.k.-.AL--3,a-ln EAL #3.a the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable eventstart time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time tomonitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncoveryhas actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression andinstrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actionsto terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore levelmonitoring.The inability to monitor RPV-1eyeIRPV water level may be caused by instrumentationand/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of availableinstrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that aninventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or taRk-Torus levels.Sump and/or tak-Torus level changes must be evaluated against other potentialsources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG4-6 or ARG1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for EOPs5. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-99EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOytrCekGeeaigSatomneexeo ulaTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA64Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event Ale4t-promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 1-5 jinutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. a. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < 86 inches TAF.OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 15 minutes.ANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise*" Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.1. Loss of reactor veseeIRCS inve'ctor,' as indicated by level less than (site specificlevel)2. a. ,esel/Rl8 leel cannot be monitored for 15 minutes Or longerANDbh. increase in (site specific sump and/Or tank) le due to aSlo 11ss of reactor verssoURS inyentorII.Month 20XXOCGS 3-100EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExellon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.--This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability toadequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.FGr-EAL #11 Basis-aA lowering of water level below 86 inches Specific lovel) indicates that operatoractions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. Theheat-up rate of the coolant will e rise as the available water inventory is reduced.A continuing derease--drop in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not thepotential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of aResidual Heat Removal suction point). Aft iR, easerise in RCS temperature caused bya loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA53.F-Gr-EAL #2 Basis,-tThe inability to monitor RP-V-LeveIRPV water level may be caused by instrumentationand/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of availableinstrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that aninventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or taRk-Torus levels.Sump and/or taf k.-Torus level changes must be evaluated against other potentialsources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half ofthe EAL duration specified in IC CS61-If the RPV iwater level continues to lower, then escalation to Site AreaEmergency would be via IC CS61-.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. 2000-BAS-3200.02 EOP User's Guide4. 2000-GLN-3200.01 Plant Specific Technical Guideline5. 205.94.0 RPV Floodup Using Core Spray6. 205.95.0 Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down7. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-101EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) flvmter Creek (GAneratina Station Annex Exelnn NucilearTn hia C)r-r.-q 2-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU64Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual Eventevent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 1-5 ninutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore andmaintain RPV water level to above the procedurally established lower limit for> 15 minutes.OR2. a. RPV water level unknownANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise*" Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.A I-- I P I- --- 9.0IIl~f d" I ... I I --- ,I1-- -- Aw I'll, ZTýZ;ýJwm faý ý 'Zý Z'14 xt-. -%ýýreuirodi oIor limit fo'r 15 meinuts oFr IonGre.2. a- Reacto-r ves;AeliRGS !eye! cannot be monitored-.A ND13II | |||
* _l | |||
* I9. UNWt-ANNIMrLL Increacerse in keite speGITIG SUMP anaWOr lall~i levels.% iBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.Month 20XXOCGS 3-102EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) t'l aar t'_roaI (Zona.n*inn A*2inn Annov=yalinn Nnlan~~crTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSThis IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a requiredminimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RP-VIevelRPV water level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of theseconditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band establishedabove the procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedurallimit, but it is the procedurally established lower limit.Refueling evolutions that deleaselower RCS water inventory are carefully planned andcontrolled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below aprocedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to thereduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 BasisfRecognizes that the minimum required RP-V-IeyeIRPV water level can change severaltimes during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations andsystem lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for thecurrent plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimumlevel is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified inanother controlling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions torestore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transientconditions causing a brief lowering of water level.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses a condition where all means to determine RPV-IeveIRPV water level havebeen lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurringby observing changes in sump and/or tank-Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus tank levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergencyclassification level via either IC CA6-- or CA53.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 CUl2. Technical Specifications Section 3.3.D3. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray4. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down5. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-103EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
() afar roak rýanarafin Atnfinn AnnowI::ralnn N.PrlanrAw1r(rJ lnrLn *a~n n~ v1n i rI~Table OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG1Initiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring orhas occurred within the PROTECTED AREA.AND2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be controlled or maintained.ORb. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENTTable H1 Safety Functions" Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)" RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)* RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)4 A W _qrTII r- I ; ,or.r-,. ,. k ...-.,,ry,4 ar.;ukar okb DDm -hTE('TEIA MIA ba~-,4r +kft f,;+am pt;g gegoa ir;+ti e-k~fif ga rtm.... ......r"y 11 r,b. EITHER of the haG occurred:-J A L BIB f alf a f ao d I1 'INY 01 TflR 1flhIfl""flfl R~TAT'! TIIflCTIflflft ('TlflflAT nfl r5flnTrflhIAcl orI g" Reactivity control" Coe e-eeliflg" RCS heat r-emoval0 R-iv .... vvu vgwz amnaqe to spont ruel has occu rred or is IMMIrJIPJ I.Month 20XXOCGS 3-104EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)I Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexI::alnn N, :PllanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYBasis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control ofthe facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessaryto maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to aloss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls,etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot bemaintained.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].Emer-gencay plans and implementing proedraesFe arc public documents; therefore, E=ALsshould not incorporate Security sensitive inomto.This includer, infomation thatmay be advantageous to a potential adversar,', such as the particulars cocrnnGswccific threat Or thro-at lcto.SecUrity rsensoitive information should beMonth 20XXOCGS 3-105EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexI~vghlrnn kl"rAaarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYcontainod in non public- derou-monts suc-h as the ScRbqwity Plan.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG15. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-106EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHSIInitiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the PROTECTED AREA.1. A HOST!LE ACTION is occurring Or has ....rro.d withn the PROTECTEDAREA aS reported by the (site specific. secr.ity shift superwision).Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTEDAREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility fordamage to plant equipment.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Month 20XXOCGS 3-107EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) afar i'trook (' Zinnarnfin Afnfinn AnnovPyalnn Niid-lanrAue+~r (~rnnk (~cnor~tinn ~t~*inn Anncv Fv~Inn Mmua~I~~r-V -t~U W* ~~Wt ~ *~* ~*** S., ~ t*~SU *~~* ** U~flTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYSecurity plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize OROresources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actionsin the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions.This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTEDAREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should beassessed using IC HAl. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events,acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by aHOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters,physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events isadequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR§ 50.72.~e~Ai~mnraene'.' nrnn~ ~ino imninmnn~inn nrooeaum~ 3m DUDIIO aocumenrn: mereGhoul-d noVLt in o Security onritioinformaAtio-n. ThiS inu s WARthl.~~~~~~~~~~~~U8 1 r ntnil 0nr"rih 6tn cIrm~enabnin thLeIspecific thro9tFor threat lnocatio. Security ....n.iti,,, inform.ation' should be con d inon public docu monts sucwh a theScrt Plan.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HG1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS13. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-108EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHAIInitiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threatwithin 30 minutes.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat < 30 minutes fromthe site.i.A HOST-ILE ~ACTION is occurring or- has occurred v.'thin the OWNEROR2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA.A validated n,-tifr,-ation frorm NRIC of an aircraft attack within 30 mRn.Uteothe seBasis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station andowned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for officialbusiness.Month 20XXOCGS 3-109EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station Annex..... V .... Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYPROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will requirerapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to thePROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraftimpact.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness ofOffsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it benecessary to consider further actions.This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience,or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE.Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputesbetween employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressedby other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72.EAL #1 BasisAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipatedarrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-relatednotifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in aheightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information hasbeen validated in accordance with ABN-41, Security Event.EAL #2 Basis4is-aApplicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in theOWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI thatis located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.Month 20XXOCGS 3-110EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYE.AL #2 addresses the throat fro~m the im.p~act of an -aircraft. on the plant, and theantidpated arr."al time it Within 30 mi"nt. "The i t of h;. tRAh I ;ris tAo ensue thatthre-at r-l-ato-d notfif~ic-ations are Made In Rta timely manner se that plant personnel andOROs are in a heightened statte of re-ad-inees. This EA~L is Met w"hen the threat relatodiAfnorm..ation has boon validated in accordance9 with (sate specifi procedure).The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee ifthe threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided byNORAD through the NRC.In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected,although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site wouldclarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD,FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs,should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency.Emergencly plans and implementiRg procedures are public documents; therefore, EALsshould not incorFporate Security sensitive informnation. This inclu~des information thatmay be advantageous to a peteItIal adversar,1 , such as the palticulars 'aspe -.A .1 hlnpseific thrcat Or threat lctin Security sensitive nomto should be conaind ~non public. documents suc ams the Secr.-ity Plan.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HAl2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security EventMonth 20XXOCGS 3-111EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU1Initiating Condition:Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined perSY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities.1 .A SECUJT-Y CONDITION thAt does not involve a HO0ST-ILE ACTION1 as r-epoied bythe (site speeffie security shift supervision).OR2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.2. Notificationt of a credible securfity threat dir-eeted at the site.OR3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does notinvolve a HOSTILE ACTION.3. A validated from the NRC p.O..iding Of An aircrAft th.eat.Basis:SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved securitycontingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to sitepersonnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITYCONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTIONSAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.Month 20XXOCGS 3-112EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEMequipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety.Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by therequirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed asHOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plantpersonnel and OROs.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].EAL #1 BasisAddresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat isassessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132. rofeFcenS (site Specific .ecurity shiftsupevisin) becsause these aro the individu als trained to confirm that A Recurwity event ioccurriAng r hn~asoccrred. Traing on ecr.ity eVent conmfirmation and classification icon~trolled du to the naturoe of Safeguards-and 10 CFýR -§ 2'."30 ,Finformna-tio-n.-EAL #2 BasisaAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRCHeadquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threatinvolves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORADthrough the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with ABN-41,Security Event. (Site Specific proccdurc. addrFesses the receipt of a_ credible Securitythreat. The Nredibilidanty of the threat is assessed in acordaRne with (site specPFGeedu~e)-.EAL #3 BasisfReferences Security sp...ecific security shift super+ision) -because these arethe individuals trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred.Training on security event confirmation and classification is controlled due to the natureof Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39 information.addresses the threat from the impact ofan aircraft on the plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) willcommunicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of theplane may also be provided by NORAD through the NRC. Validation of the threat isperformed in accordance with (site-specific procedure).Month 20XXOCGS 3-113EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYEmer9genY plans and imleeninrocedures are public. docau-men~ts; therefore, E=ALsrhoud nt incorPorate Security sensitive information. This inclludes informaton thatmay be advantageous to a potential aad-versar,a-" -GucGh-as" the particulars concerninaSpecii theto hetlcto.Scrty sniienfrtonshould be contain~ed inno public, documents6 suc-h as the Security Plan.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HAl.Basis Reference(s):1 .NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HUI2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security Event4. SY-AA-1 01 -1 32, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual ActivitiesMonth 20XXOCGS 3-114EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) tl fgsr Priagile f-'gngirinfin Qfnfinn Anng&vI:=v,-Ien Mi~rl--orZ2~, *2 2~~ ~fa~ml1~~unAn~ o~ ~ *u sa .w. -.. an .*Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS26Initiating Condition:Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):--Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Site Ara Emergency.ventpromptly upon determining that (site specific .. ,=,,,'- the applicable timeefminutes) has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.AND2. Control of ANY Table H1 safety function is not reestablished in < 15 minutes.Table H1 Safety Functions* Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)* RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)* RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)1. a. An ent h6ereulted in pat control being transferred panel6 andloclcontrol stations). from the Room to (site Ipecifc remote shuitAdonANDb. Coentrol oef.ANY of the following key safo* functions is not r~eostablishedwithin (6ite specific number of minutes).*Ro~actiVit' controlT Corescoolionrol PRi RPVlwater lesel [B iteBasis:The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either:Month 20XXOCGS 3-115EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearO-- e Cre Genera.. ........ Stai on.. Annex.....e... n.. Nu..le..rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYa. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control RoomORb. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room.This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot bereestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety functionfollowing a transfer of plan control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge toone orOmornany fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time.The determination of whether or not "control" is established at the remote safeshutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The EmergencyDirector is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within (the site spe...,.tmi-F,. ,anefo#, 15 minutes whether or not the operating staff has control of key safetyfunctions from the remote safe shutdown location(s).Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG64.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-116EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) nafor rookk (' Zonarnfin _qfafinn AnnovF:Yalnn Nn AnPlrAu tr(rJ L ~ ~ in~~~n An~ v~nMuI~r.- UW * *S S wt**5 E3s~.Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA26Initiating Condition:Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.An event has, roSulted in plant control being transferre9d from the COntro Rooem to the(site spec-ific- re-mote shut-down panels and local control Stations)-.Basis:This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to controlthe plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradationin the level of plant safety.Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternateshutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the ControlRoom, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the ControlRoom, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel.Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding tothese challenges.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS26.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-117EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) n afar rank rZonarafin Afafinn AnnovPyninn Nnela2rAu@*~r (~roaI flanar2tmnn ~*~tinn Ann~v Fv~Inn MuIr~I~2r -V Ia t* .*~ * ** .*.. ... -.. *** ..-.. .. Ian -~Table OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU34Initiating Condition:FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual Eventevent promptlyupon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. A FIRE in any Table H2 area is no.t extinguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of thefollowing FIRE detection indications:00Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indicationsField verification of a single fire alarmTable H2 Vital Areas* Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt)* 4160V Switchgear Rooms (1C and 1D)* Control Room Complex (MOB, Upper and Lower CableSpreading Rooms)* Main Transformer/Condensate Transfer Pad* Intake Structure* #1 EDG Vault* #2 EDG Vaulto EDG Fuel Oil Storage TankOR2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in any Table H2 area (i.e., no other indicationsof a FIRE).ANDb. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt.ORMonth 20XXOCGS 3-118EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) afar 1'rook flonjarnfin -Qfnfifn AnnovF:valnn N,,ldlaarZ*rt ..IV I .I lA 1 SM St5e S /- *e l n, I e lUTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY3 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in < 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication.OR4 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA that requires firefightingsupport by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish./4 A CID ;. Ki 4T ; kA ,;4k;, 4 r -.. f A IV f 4k-* -I;- ~ ~ ~ ..... .. ---- ; I ..9 Roport from the fgeld (i.e., visual observation)a P''~rzaet 'f militinla imana~ thnnr 1'1 4.fiF9 nlrm r, cir dr t ..vA~ ~~.ni, .it enr:4~.ne.% * :~ I n~r ..e .% Inri.ANMTh r R i Io ca l ithin AN Y of t he e f allowin l a r o omsr ar W ans-:(.(sites seificlistof plantr omsonr, Or eas)(2% iI()a Re cGipt of as single firel armfn(i .e.,noG other indicationsof aF IIRE).AAND-1-mcq FIRR irs 1nn;atAd wamn A NY of the ;eiiewlRa elaR F FaF..... .... JE I....... \61le SmeGINGlist. of. WaRT MOMS eF aFea\ ..... iv ............ IV ............ iAND__ "lr'L .... ." __z =Gy. 4-RAexisteRoe ef- a F-1 In is not YeFified WKRIA 6W minutes of-Warm F-k-_AA1ER-.-rtdi A FIRE- Ava-hin the Want or-154=S-f imr-plants wifn an ;54=.3f eumide theplantIý;+kw A tA not emlngul6nea wanin ou Fninutes ofinitial FepeFt, alaFm eFindiGatien.141 A F! RF %Ar;+k*n thý !pn+ ^r 14Z Q1 rl;r-%r lqqfc% iA/;#h jqp 15ýr=S:j qjiffo;r1m fj"ftc "%"V040WGFett Ar-eal r-mw-+r=- ra-60 A r= that FeQUIFeS iffelmhunq supoet-t koy aneffbitefiFeFespense ageney to e)dlngu*shMonth 20XXOCGS 3-119EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) afar ('-raakI rlonarn*inn -Qfnirn AnnoyFon %~I~ f W S *tE* t*U~.* fI:valnn Ml"iAlnrZ nTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYBasis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of apotential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisThe intent of the 15-minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate againstsmall FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). Inaddition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure,automatic activation of a suppression system, etc.Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial firealarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declarationclock starts at the time that the initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and notthe time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire durationclock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is notverified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt,operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EALassessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm wasreceived, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed.A single fire alarm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipmentfailure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional timeis allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonableamount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, andabsent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress.If an actual FIRE is verified by a report from the field, then EAL #1 is immediatelyapplicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to anMonth 20XXOCGS 3-120EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rl a+gsr imak ('Zonarnfin _Q+--ifinn AnnovF:valnn N"Aalnrfluatar (~ rn~Ie t~n~r~*i nn n A n n~v Fvc Inn Muui~2r -Vt* S S~ *~ uflS WS5* rt. * .fl ....... * -**Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYequipment failure or a spurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutesof the receipt of the alarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergencydeclaration is warranted.EAL #3 BasisIn addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plantPROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degradethe level of plant safety. This basis extends to a FIRE occurring within thePROTECTED AREA of an ISFSI located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.for platS 1 t#h an IRP euts-de the plant Protected Area]EAL #4 BasisIf a FIRE within the plant or ISFSI Plant6 w.ith an ISFS, the plant Pr-tetedAea]-PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require a response by an offsitefirefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then the level of plant safety ispotentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requiresan emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting effortsbecause the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Declarationis not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions.Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix RAppendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part:Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, andcomponents important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize,consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires andexplosions."When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achievingand maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safetybecause damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolantthrough boil-off.Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of functionof systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents underpost-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit firedamage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions isgreater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigatethe consequences of design basis accidents.In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safetycircuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify asingle alarm is well within this worst-case 1-hour time period.Month 20XXOCGS 3-121EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovater Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyte Cre Generatin....... Sai-In.. Anne....E..... n.. Nucle...rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYDepending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA26 or MASAQ.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU42. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-122EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) tl a+ar ('raghk rZonarnfin -Q+!mfirn AnngvFwainn PJ"AanrAuLa (~ck ~ ~ 2unAnvFan ~~~rw~ ~ ~ ~ .U. f...r.. nr .S*-Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU42Initiating Condition:Seismic event greater than OBE levels.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Seismic event > Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by:1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event.AND2. The occurrence of a seismic event has resulted in a spurious Reactor Scram orrequired a Plant shutdown in accordance with ABN-38, Station Seismic Event.SeismiG event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (013E) as indicated byla. (site rpecfic. indication that e vent met or exceeded 01E limits)Basis:This IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greaterthan those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)1.An earthquake greaterthan an OBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)2 should have nosignificant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however,some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-eventcondition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Giventhe time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand anyimpacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following anOBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel andrecognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g).The Shift Manager or Emergency Director may seek external verification if deemedappropriate (e.g., a call to the USGS, check internet news sources, etc.); however, theverification action must not preclude a timely emergency declaration.EAL #2 Basis1 An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plantnecessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the?ublic will remain functional.An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related)structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional.Month 20XXOCGS 3-123EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating- Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYEAL #2 is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrationscaused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager orEmergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call toUSGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude atimely emergency declaration. This guidance recognizes that it may cause the site todeclare an Unusual Event while another site, similarly affected but with readily availableOBE indications in the Control Room, may not.Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA26 or MA5SAQ.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU22. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)Month 20XXOCGS 3-124EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I fgr f'roole IZongwafin -Q+--ifinn AnngvIF::alnn MNrd-lanrfl~,o*or (~ roo I. (~o nor~*i nn n An nov Fvolnn IJumr~Io2rTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5Initiating Condition:Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations,cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out ofservice, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification iswarranted.1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in a Table H3 area.Table H3Areas with Entry Related Mode ApplicabilityArea Entry Related ModeApplicabilityReactor Building* Modes 3 and 4*Areas required to establish shutdown coolingAND2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impededNo-te:- If the equipment in the listed room or area war- already inoperable Or Outof service before the event occurred, then no emnergencY classification iswaFanted.-(1) a. Release of a toxiccroie asphyxiant or flammable gars ante any of theIy p.In I I*m ,o a e -I(site specifc list of plant Fooms Or areas with ent-;-related modeapplicability idntifi;ed)IA-NDl lI. Int; inlt o e room or area IS or impeBasis:This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes orimpedes access to equipment necessary to transition the plant from normal plantMonth 20XXOCGS 3-125EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) fl a+ar roale t' Zanarnfin -Q+n+ion AnngvFvalnn Mid-loarAuLa U~~I ~~~in~~i~ n~ vlnMula -*S l ~* i t* ~ fTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYoperation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant proceduretomaintainnormal plant operatio or r red fo a norm.al plant Gooldown and ,hutdown. Thiscondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability thatcontain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plantfrom normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operatingprocedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plantwould not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown.This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to performactions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routineinspections).This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/designfeatures are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of ahazardous gas.An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the gaseous releasepreclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in serviceat the tim.9 f the Felease. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actuallynecessary at the time of the release.Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires theEmergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area issufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. Thisjudgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis,report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operatingexperience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impededif extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affectedroom/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is notroutinely employed).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the timeof the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseousrelease occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown andshutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4." The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures whichaddress the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppressionsystem testing)." The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or recordkeeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).Month 20XXOCGS 3-126EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY* The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, andwould not actually prevent or impede a required action.An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerouslevels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosedenvironment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level ofaround 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke, that automaticallyor manually activate a fire suppression system in an area, or to intentional inerting ofcontainment.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category RA,C or F ICs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA52. ABN-33, Toxic or Flammable Gas Release3. AR 660892, Station Halon and IDLH Evaluations4. 29CFR1910.134(b) and 29CFR1910.134(d)(2)(iii)Month 20XXOCGS 3-127EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) 11 afar ('-rank (' Zonarnfin Afnfinn AnnoyF:::alnn kNn nr~l=fLutrCakAnr*n **n nc vInMrarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU63Initiating Condition:Hazardous EventOperating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents.1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA.OR2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual orautomatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required byTechnical Specifications for the current operating mode.OR3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsiteevent involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gasrelease).OR4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plantstaff from accessing the site via personal vehicles.OR5. Abnormal Intake Structure level, as indicated by EITHER:* > 4.5 ft. MSL (> 4.25 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or > 4.5 ft MSLon CR-423-11 pt 24 and pt 23).OR* b. < -3.0 ft. MSL (< 0.95 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or < -3.0 ftMSL on CR-423-11 pt 24 and pt 23).MSL = Mean Sea LevelNote! EAL #3 does not apply to routine traffic uch as fog, snow, ice, orveh\ic broakdownA or accidonts.(1) A tornado strike wiA.th~in the PROTECTED AREA.Month 20XXOCGS 3-128EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
I=xAInn NunlAgrOvster Creek (Anersatinn St~ation Annex Exellnn Nucle~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY(2) I Itnlo or area flooding of a agn itude sufAcie nt to require Man oIa utomatic electrical isolation Aof -A SAFET SYSTEM=h4 -F coponent nee-dted fo-r thcurrent operating moede-.(3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA. is impeded due to anoffite event involIving hazardoul mnaterials (e.g., an offlite chemical Spill Or Wtigas e4easee*?(1) A hazardous- even~t that results inR on 6ite conditions sufflicient to prohibit the plant.st-aff from. accessing the site via personal vehiG196.(5) (Site specifi liAt- Of natur-Ial or tec~hnological hazard- events)Basis:PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potentialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisaAddresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating powerto a SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns.Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automaticisolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker orrelay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must berequired by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. Manual isolation ofpower to a SAFETY SYSTEM component as a result of leakage is an event of lesserimpact and would be expected to cause small and localized damage. The consequenceof this type of event is adequately assessed and addressed in accordance withTechnical Specifications.EAL #3 BasisaAddresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and ofsufficient magnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTEDAREA.Month 20XXOCGS 3-129EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexI:vtulnn Khir-loarTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSEAL #4 BasisaAddresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movementand significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personalvehicles. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavyrains, up--rVor wator roloas-., dam failuro, , Or an on site train dor.FailMent blkingthe acce6 ,.ad r high winds.This EAL is not intended to apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as theHurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the CooperStation during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in2011.EAL #5 Basis:High Intake Structure level, is sufficiently high to require plant shutdown per ABN-32,Abnormal Intake Level.Low Intake Structure level indicates the possible loss of Radwaste Service Water1UmDS and is anoroachina levels, which may result in a loss of vital coolina eauiDment.EAL= #6 addrocccc (site specifiG deccriPti0on)r.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be based on ICs in RecognitionCategories RA, F, MS, H or C.Basis Reference(s):1.2.3.4.NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU3FSAR Update 3.3.1 (High winds)ABN-31, High WindsABN-32, Abnormal Intake LevelMonth 20XXOCGS 3-130EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)j Ovater Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):(1-) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENTsubstantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity orHOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelineexposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Basis:IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for aGeneral Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG7Month 20XXOCGS 3-131EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
() afar rank (' Zonaratin Atmfinn AnngavFvalnn Mwla2rflu@*~r t~ male flcnar~*i nfl ~t2tinn An nay Fvalnn NIi.v~Ia2r -.. .fl .£. t** ....... U.. EU fl n....Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):( Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failuresof plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results inintentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that couldlead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed forthe protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levelswhich exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the siteboundary.'Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a SiteArea Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS7Month 20XXOCGS 3-132EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rl afar rAmak ('Zonarnfin -Qf!mtirn AnnavPyi:= nn Mif,-loarfl,~a ~ ae ~na~in l~rn nna van N.v~~ -* | |||
* S S U5 ***f. *S las**~dTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an ALERT Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):(M- Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event thatinvolves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipmentbecause of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to smallfractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anAlert.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA7Month 20XXOCGS 3-133EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) lFyalnn N~nlonrnVwatar rl ok (rgongIrnling Vtntinn Annoy iAInn ii Ia~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an (NOQ")UFNUSUAL EVENT.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):(1-) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation ofthe level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has beeninitiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring areexpected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.Basis:This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anEVENT.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU7Month 20XXOCGS 3-134EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatinci Station AnnexExelon NuclearOytrCee eeainc tto nexEeo ulaTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSE-HUIInitiating ConditionDamage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by a radiationreading:* > 800mr/hr (gamma + neutron) 3 feet from the HSM surfaceOR* > 200mrdhr (gamma + neutron) outside the HSM door on centerline of DSCOR* > 40mr/hr (gamma + neutron) end of shield wall exterior(-1)---Damage to a loaded caask CO0NIFINEMENT B3OUNDARY as indicated by, an on-contacat radiation reading greater than (2 times the site specific caSk specificG technicalpeification allowable radiation level) On the up c of the spent fuel cask.Basis:CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) betweenareas containing radioactive substances and the environment.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) : A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARYof a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed fordry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The wordcask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for drystorage of irradiated fuel. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actualrelease path to the environment, degradation of one OrF mreany fuel assemblies due toenvironmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges inremoving the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The technicalspecification multiple of "2 times", which is also used in Recognition Category RA ICMonth 20XXOCGS 3-133EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSRAU 1, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions.The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spentfuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognizedthat in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the "on-contact" doserate limit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate atsome distance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HAl.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU12. Oyster Creek Generating Station ISFSI 10CFR72.212 Evaluation Rev. 5Month 20XXOCGS 3-134EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisEmergency Action Level Technical Basis Page IndexGeneral Site Area Alert Unusual EventEAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg.RG1 3-33 RS1 3-35 RA1 3-37 RU1 3-40RA2 3-43 RU2 3-45RA3 3-47 RU3 3-50FG1 3-51 FS1 3-52 FA1 3-53 _Fuel Clad RCS ContainmentFC1 3-54FC2 3-55 RC2 3-59 CT2 3-66RC3 3-61 CT3 3-67RC4 3-62FC5 3-57 RC5 3-64 CT5 3-69CT6 3-70FC7 3-58 1 RC7 3-65 CT7 3-73MG1 3-74 MS1 3-76 MA1 3-78 MUW 3-80MG2 3-81 MS2 3-83MS3 3-84 MA3 3-86 MU3 3-88MA4 3-91 MU4 3-93MA5 3-95MU6 3-97MU7 3-99CA1 3-101 CU1 3-103CA2 3-105CU3 3-107CU4 3-108CA5 3-110 CU5 3-112CG6 3-115 CS6 3-119 CA6 3-121 CU6 3-123HG1 3-125 HS1 3-127 HA1 3-129 HU1 3-132HS2 3-134 HA2 3-136HU3 3-137HU4 3-141HA5 3-143HU6 3-146HG7 3-149 HS7 3-150 HA7 3-151 HU7 3-1521 1 1 1 1 1 E-HU1 3-153Month 20XXOCGS 3-32EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRGIInitiating Condition:Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1000 mRem TEDEor 5000 mRem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time." Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes." The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment usingactual meteorology are available.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table R1 value for > 15 minutes.OR2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the siteboundary of EITHER:a. > 1000 mRem TEDEORb. > 5000 mRem CDE ThyroidOR3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER:a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continuefor > 60 minutes.ORb. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem CDE Thyroid for60 minutes of inhalation.Month 20XXOCGS 3-33EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatina Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRGI (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):Table RI Effluent Monitor Effluent Monitor General EmergencyMain Stack RAGEMS 8.69 E+01 uCi/cc HRMOR3.53 E-08 amps HRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 7.17 E-01 uCi/cc HRMHRM = High Range MonitorBasis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actualoffsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude willrequire implementation of protective actions for the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 5000 mRem thyroid CDEwas established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroidCDE.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG12. EP-EAL-0610, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-170-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. EP-AA-1 10-200, Dose Assessment6. EP-AA-1 10-201, On Shift Dose AssessmentMonth 20XXOCGS 3-34EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRS1Initiating Condition:Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDEor.500 mRem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time.* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment usingactual meteorology are available.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table R1 value for > 15 minutes.OR2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the siteboundary of EITHER:a. > 100 mRem TEDEORb. > 500 mRem CDE ThyroidOR3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER:a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continuefor > 60 minutes.ORb. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem CDE Thyroid for60 minutes of inhalation.Month 20XXOCGS 3-35EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatinl Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRS1 (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):Table RI Effluent Monitor ThresholdsEffluent Monitor Site Area EmergencyMain Stack RAGEMS 8.69 E+00 uCi/cc HRMOR3.53 E-09 amps HRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 3.65 E+05 cpm LRMHRM = High Range Monitor LRM = Low Range MonitorBasis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actualoffsite doses greater than or equal to 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude areassociated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.The TEDE dose is set at 10% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 500 mRemthyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDEand thyroid CDE.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RGI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS12. EP-EAL-061 0, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-1 70-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. EP-AA-1 10-200, Dose Assessment6. EP-AA-1 10-201, On Shift Dose AssessmentMonth 20XXOCGS 3-36EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station Annex.... Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRAIInitiating Condition:Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mRemTEDE or 50 mRem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time." Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes." The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment usingactual meteorology are available.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table RI value for > 15 minutes.OR2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the siteboundary of EITHER:a. > 10 mRem TEDEORb. > 50 mRem CDE ThyroidOR3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate thatwould result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the siteboundarya. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposureORb. 50 mRem CDE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposureORMonth 20XXOCGS 3-37EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(~Iafar Cr-rok (~onarn$inn -Q*ntirn Anng~vI=v,mlrt n K, ,r-I--orJL 22Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS i RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA1 (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):4. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER:a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates > 10 mR/hr are expected tocontinue for 2 60 minutes.ORb. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem CDEThyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation.Table R1 Effluent Monitor ThresholdsEffluent Monitor AlertMain Stack RAGEMS 8.69 E-01 uCi/cc HRMOR3.53 E-10 amps HRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 3.65 E+04 cpm LRMHRM = High Range Monitor LRM = Low Range MonitorBasis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected oractual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1% of the EPA Protective Action Guides(PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of thismagnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits(e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.The TEDE dose is set at 1% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 50 mRem thyroidCDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE andthyroid CDE.The radwaste liquid discharge system is currently closed off with a plant modificationinstalled blank flange. To perform a discharge would require a plant modification toremove the flange. Since the liquid radwaste system is not operable, no EAL thresholdhas been developed for this release point.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RS1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-38EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA2. EP-EAL-0610, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-170-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. ABN-27, Inadvertent Overboard Radioactive Release or Cross Contamination6. EP-EAL-0617, Oyster Creek Criteria for Choosing Liquid Effluent EAL ThresholdValuesMonth 20XXOCGS 3-39EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
I=xelnn NuclearOvster Creek fleneratinn Staftion Annex ExeInn Nuclea~rThble OCOS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisTable OCGS 3-2RECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU1Initiating Condition:Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM limits for 60minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time." Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table R1 value for > 60 minutes:Table R1 Effluent Monitor ThresholdsEffluent Monitor Unusual EventMain Stack RAGEMS 4.07 E+03 cps LRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 4.16 E+02 cpm LRMLRM = Low Range MonitorOR2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrationsor release rates > 2 times ODCM Limit with a release duration of > 60 minutes.Month 20XXOCGS 3-40EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovs1ter Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU1 (cont)Basis:This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by alow-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extendedperiod of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquidradiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivitydischarge permit is normally prepared.Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release ofradioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controlsestablished to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentionalreleases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to theenvironment is indicative of degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.Releases should not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 timesrelease limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.The radwaste liquid discharge system is currently closed off with a plant modificationinstalled blank flange. To perform a discharge would require a plant modification toremove the flange. Since the liquid radwaste system is not operable, no EAL thresholdhas been developed for this release point.EAL #1 BasisThis EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitoredgaseous effluent pathways.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sampleanalyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills ofradioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-41EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRUI (cont);Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU2. EP-EAL-061 0, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-1 70-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. ABN-27, Inadvertent Overboard Radioactive Release or Cross ContaminationMonth 20XXOCGS 3-42EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station Annex FvAimnn NMiurIanrThhIA OCOw a-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisTable OCGS 3-2RECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA2Initiating Condition:Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.OR2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel asindicated by ANY Table R2 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr.Table R2 Refuel Floor ARM's" C-5, Crit Mon* C-10, North Wall* C-9, North Wall" B-9, Open FloorBasis:REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through whichirradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below theflange..IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within arelatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) betweenareas containing radioactive substances and the environment.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiatedfuel assembly. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personneland are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment. As such, theyrepresent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that theloaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss ofthe CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-43EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
N f)vster Creek Generatinn Station AnnexFyoInn Nia-IlearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA2 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #1 BasisThis EAL escalates from RU2 in that the loss of level, in the affected portion of theREFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery ofirradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visualobservation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as well as significantchanges in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters. Computational aidsmay also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL shouldbe based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.While an area radiation monitor could detect a rise in a dose rate due to a lowering ofwater level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be areliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered. To the degreepossible, readings should be considered in combination with other available indications ofinventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage toirradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of anassembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly. A rise in readings on radiationmonitors should be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of apotential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).Escalation of the emergency would be based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA22. RAP G-7-a, SKM SRG TNK LVL LO-LO3. RAP-1OF-1-m, Crit Mon C5 Hi4. RAP-10F-3-m, North Wall C9 Hi Vent Trip5. RAP-10F-2-m, North Wall C10 Hi6. RAP-10F-4-m, North Wall B9 Hi Vent TripMonth 20XXOCGS 3-44EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovater Creek Ganeratina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOster Creek Gener...t... Sion....Anne...Exelon Nuc.earTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU2Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated byANY of the following:* Refueling Cavity water level < 583 inches (GEMAC Wide Range,floodup calibration).OR" Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELINGPATHWAY.ANDb. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitorsin Table R2.Table R2 Refuel Floor ARM's* C-5, Grit Mon" C-10, North Wall* C-9, North Wall* B-9, Open FloorMonth 20XXOCGS 3-45EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
IF:alnn INl-hlanrOvster Creek Generatinn Station Annex FcInMi~~iTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU2 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through whichirradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below theflange.This IC addresses a loss in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevatedradiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is alsoindicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It istherefore a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.A water level loss will be primarily determined by indications from available levelinstrumentation. Other sources of level indications may include reports from plantpersonnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available) or fromany other temporarily installed monitoring instrumentation. A significant drop in the waterlevel may also cause a rise in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detectedby monitors in those locations.The effects of planned evolutions should be considered. For example, a refueling bridgearea radiation monitor reading may rise due to planned evolutions such as lifting of thereactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicableonly in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA2.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU22. RP-AA-203 Exposure Control and Authorization3. RAP-G-7-a, SKM SRG TNK LVL LO-LO4. 205.94.0 RPV Floodup Using Core Spray5. 205.95.0 Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down6. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-46EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Fv~Inn M.uI0~rQ --f,-r Creek Generating Station Annex Fvalnn N"ManrTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA3Initiating Condition:Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations,cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R4 was already inoperable, orout of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification iswarranted.1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following Table R3 areas:Table R3Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy" Main Control Room" Central Alarm Station -(by survey)OR2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impedeaccess to ANY of the following Table R4 plant rooms or areas:Table R4Areas with Entry Related Mode ApplicabilityArea Entry Related ModeApplicabilityReactor Building* Modes 3 and 4*Areas required to establish shutdown coolingMonth 20XXOCGS3-47EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExellon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA3 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient topreclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to transition the plantfrom normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plantprocedures. As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of thelevel of safety of the plant. The Emergency Director should consider the cause of theincreased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.Table R4 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that containequipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant fromnormal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operatingprocedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plantwould not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown.This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to performactions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routineinspections).Rooms and areas listed in EAL #1 do not need to be included in EAL #2, including theControl Room.For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, ormay be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the elevatedradiation levels preclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergencyclassification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of theincreased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinarymeasures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g.,installing temporary shielding beyond that required by procedures, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normaladministrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply." The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time ofthe elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiationrise occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdowndo not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4." The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includescompensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room orarea (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).Month 20XXOCGS 3-48EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(1uQfPr rragk rýpnarnfinn Station AnnoyI=valnn NI A~,Qt~r Cr~s~k (~g~n~r~tinn ~t2tinn Ann~v Fv~Inn Mmmr~Ia~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA3 (cont)Basis (cont):* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or recordkeeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections)." The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, andwould not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, Cor F lCs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA32. ABN-29, Plant Fires3. EMG-3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control Safe Shutdown AreaMonth 20XXOCGS 3-49EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Fxnlnn Ouster Creek Generatinn St~ation Annexv ExeInn Nucla~IirTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU3Initiating Condition:Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Offgas system radiation monitor Hi-Hi alarm.OR2. Specific coolant activity > 4.0 uCl/gm Dose equivalent 1-131.Basis:This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limitspecified in Technical Specifications. This condition is a precursor to a more significantevent and represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Conditions that cause the specified monitor to alarm that are not related to fuel claddegradation should not result in the declaration of an Unusual Event.This EAL addresses site-specific radiation monitor readings that provide indication of adegradation of fuel clad integrity.An Unusual Event is only warranted when actual fuel clad damage is the cause of theelevated coolant sample activity (as determined by laboratory confirmation). Fuel claddamage should be assumed to be the cause of elevated Reactor Coolant activity unlessanother cause is known.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs FA1 or the RecognitionCategory R ICs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU32. Technical Specifications 3.6.A3. ABN-26, High Main Steam Line or Off Gas Activity4. RAP10F-1-c, Offgas HI-HIMonth 20XXOCGS 3-50EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFG1Initiating Condition:Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determinebarrier status.Basis:Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.At the General Emergency classification level each barrier is weighted equally.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-51EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFS1Initiating Condition:Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two barriers.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determinebarrier status.Basis:Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.At the Site Area Emergency classification level, each barrier is weighted equally.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-52EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) f)afme*r 9~nmak t'Z~ng2rt*i nr -Qfnfin An nmmvF::yg'-Inn kh irl-hnrJL ksTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFA1Initiating Condition:ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determinebarrier status.Basis:Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.At the Alert classification level, Fuel Cladding and RCS barriers are weighted moreheavily than the Containment barrier. Unlike the Containment barrier, loss or potentialloss of either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier may result in the relocation of radioactivematerials or degradation of core cooling capability. Note that the loss or potential loss ofContainment barrier in combination with loss or potential loss of either Fuel Cladding orRCS barrier results in declaration of a Site Area Emergency under EAL FS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-53EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExalan NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFClInitiating Condition:RCS ActivityOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSSCoolant activity > 300 uCilgm Dose Equivalent 1-131.Basis:This threshold indicates that RCS radioactivity concentration is greater than 300 ýLCi/gmdose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than thatexpected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuelclad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel claddamage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.It is recognized that sample collection and analysis of reactor coolant with highlyelevated activity levels could require several hours to complete. Nonetheless, asample-related threshold is included as a backup to other indications.There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-54EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC2Initiating Condition:RPV Water LevelOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Plant conditions indicate primary containment flooding is required.POTENTIAL LOSS2. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > 0 inches TAF.OR3. RPV water level cannot be determined.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThe Loss threshold represents the EOP requirement for primary containment flooding.This is identified in the BWROG EPGs/SAGs when the phrase, "Primary ContainmentFlooding Is Required," appears. Since a site-specific RPV water level is not specifiedhere, the Loss threshold phrase, "Primary containment flooding required," alsoaccommodates the EOP need to flood the primary containment when RPV water levelcannot be determined and core damage due to inadequate core cooling is believed tobe occurring.Potential Loss Threshold #2 and #3 BasisThis water level corresponds to the top of the active fuel and is used in the EOPs toindicate a challenge to core cooling.The RPV water level threshold is the same as RCS Barrier RC2 Loss threshold. Thus,this threshold indicates a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and a Loss of the RCSbarrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site AreaEmergency.This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specificEOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified levelfollowing depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of theRCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injectionsources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization. EOPs allow the operator a widechoice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to withinprescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitateRPV water level control with low-pressure injection sources. In some events, elevatedRPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops belowthe shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this Fuel Clad barrierPotential Loss is met only after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or requiredMonth 20XXOCGS 3-55EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) tl afar r-rank rZonarnfin -CZ+n+inn Annovlnnhr-lonrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC2 (cont)Basis (cont):emergency RPV depressurization has been attempted, giving the operator anopportunity to assess the capability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPVwater level or 2) no low pressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPVdepressurization in an attempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory.The term "cannot be restored and maintained above" means the value of RPV waterlevel is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). Thedetermination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relationto the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when athreshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does notrequire immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of activefuel, but does not permit extended operation below the limit; the threshold must beconsidered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot beattained.In high-power ATWS/failure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator todeliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although suchaction is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need toreduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictatethe need for emergency classification.Since the loss of ability to determine if adequate core cooling is being provided presentsa significant challenge to the fuel clad barrier, a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier isspecified.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -With ATWS4. EMG-3200.08A, RPV Flooding -No ATWS5. EMG-3200.08B, RPV Flooding -With ATWS6. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment ControlMonth 20XXOCGS 3-56EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC5Initiating Condition:Primary Containment RadiationOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSSContainment Hi Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading > 530 R/hr.Basis:The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactorcoolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activityequals 300 ýtCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level isgreater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate rangeof 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amountof fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.The radiation monitor reading in this threshold is higher than that specified for RCSBarrier RC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad Barrier andthe RCS Barrier. Note that a combination of the two monitor readings appropriatelyescalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency.There is no Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss threshold associated with PrimaryContainment Radiation.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. Core Damage Assessment MethodologyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-57EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC7Initiating Condition:Emergency Director Judgment.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the FuelClad Barrier.POTENTIAL LOSS2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Lossof the Fuel Clad Barrier.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the EmergencyDirector in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is lost.Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Directorin determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Directorshould also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the eventthat barrier status cannot be monitored.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-58EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
FYelnn N rOvster Creek Generatinn Station Annex FwAlnn NuclarIzrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC2Initiating Condition:RPV Water LevelOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > 0 inches TAF.OR2. RPV water level cannot be determined.Basis:This water level corresponds to the Top of Active Fuel (TAF) and is used in the EOPs toindicate challenge to core cooling.The RPV water level threshold is the same as Fuel Clad Barrier FC2 Potential Lossthreshold. Thus, this threshold indicates a Loss of the RCS barrier and Potential Loss ofthe Fuel Clad barrier and that appropriately escalates the emergency classification levelto a Site Area Emergency.This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specificEOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified levelfollowing depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of theRCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injectionsources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization EOPs allow the operator a widechoice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to withinprescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitateRPV water level control with low-pressure injection sources. In some events, elevatedRPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops belowthe shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this RCS barrier Loss is metonly after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or required emergency RPVdepressurization has been attempted, giving the operator an opportunity to assess thecapability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPV water level or 2) no lowpressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPV depressurization in anattempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory.The term, "cannot be restored and maintained above," means the value of RPV waterlevel is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). Thedetermination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relationto the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when athreshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does notrequire immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of activefuel, but does not permit extended operation beyond the limit; the threshold must beconsidered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot beattained.Month 20XXOCGS 3-59EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) l::Ymlnn Ovster Creek Generatinn St~ation Annex FYAlnn N~ir-lonrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC2 (cont)Basis (cont):In high-power ATWS/failure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator todeliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although suchaction is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need toreduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictatethe need for emergency classification.There is no RCS Potential Loss threshold associated with RPV water level.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline3. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP Users GuideMonth 20XXOCGS 3-60EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) nvster Creek Generatina Station Anne~x FviaInn NucleIarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC3Initiating Condition:Primary Containment PressureOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Drywell pressure > 3.0 psig.AND2. Drywell pressure rise is due to RCS leakageBasis:The > 3.0 psig primary containment pressure is the Drywell high pressure setpointwhich indicates a LOCA by automatically initiating ECCS.The second threshold condition focuses the fission product barrier loss threshold on afailure of the RCS instead of the non-LOCA malfunctions that may adversely affectprimary containment pressure. Pressures of this magnitude can be caused by non-LOCA events such as a loss of Drywell cooling or inability to control primarycontainment vent/purge.The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of anyrelief valve does not warrant an emergency classification.A stuck-open Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) or EMRV leakage is not consideredeither identified or unidentified leakage by Technical Specification and, therefore, is notapplicable to this EAL.There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Pressure.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's GuideMonth 20XXOCGS 3-61EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC4Initiating Condition:RCS Leak RateOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. UNISOLABLE Main Steam Line (MSL), Isolation Condenser, Feedwater, or RWCUline break.OR2. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required.POTENTIAL LOSS3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following:a. Secondary Containment area temperature > EMG-3200.11 Max Normal(Table 11) operating level.ORb. Secondary Containment area radiation level > EMG-3200.11 Max Normal(Table 12) operating level.Basis:UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely orlocally.Classification of a system break over system leakage is based on information availableto the Control Room from the event. Indications that should be considered are:* Reports describing magnitude of steam or water release." Use of system high flow alarms / indications, if available," Significant changes in makeup requirements," Abnormal reactor water level changes in response to the event.The use of the above indications provides the Control Room the bases to determine thatthe ongoing event is more significant than the indications that would be expected fromsystem leakage and therefore should be considered a system break.Loss Threshold #1 BasisLarge high-energy lines that rupture outside primary containment can dischargesignificant amounts of inventory and jeopardize the pressure-retaining capability of theRCS until they are isolated. If it is determined that the ruptured line cannot be promptlyisolated, the RCS barrier Loss threshold is met.Month 20XXOCGS 3-62EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC4 (cont)Basis (cont):Loss Threshold #2 BasisEmergency RPV Depressurization in accordance with the EOPs is indicative of a loss ofthe RCS barrier. If Emergency RPV Depressurization is performed, the plant operatorsare directed to open Electromatic relief valves (EMRVs) and keep them open. Eventhough the RCS is being vented into the torus, a Loss of the RCS barrier exists due tothe diminished effectiveness of the RCS to retain fission products within its boundary.Potential Loss Threshold #3 BasisPotential loss of RCS based on primary system leakage outside the primarycontainment is determined from EOP temperature or radiation Max Normal Operatingvalues in areas such as Trunnion room, Isolation Condenser, RWCU etc., whichindicate a direct path from the RCS to areas outside primary containment.A Max Normal Operating value is the highest value of the identified parameter expectedto occur during normal plant operating conditions with all directly associated supportand control systems functioning properly.The indicators reaching the threshold barriers and confirmed to be caused by RCSleakage from a primary system warrant an Alert classification. A primary system isdefined to be the pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPVsuch that a reduction in RPV pressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water beingdischarged through an unisolated break in the system.In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system isdischarging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area radiation conditiondoes not necessarily indicate that a primary system is discharging into the ReactorBuilding since this may be caused by radiation shine from nearby steam lines or themovement of radioactive materials. Conversely, a high area radiation condition inconjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, high area temperatures, reports ofsteam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpectedMain Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharginginto the Reactor Building.An UNISOLABLE leak which is indicated by Max Normal Operating values escalates toa Site Area Emergency when combined with Containment Barrier CT6 Loss Threshold#1 (after a containment isolation) and a General Emergency when the Fuel Clad Barriercriteria is also exceeded.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.11, Secondary Containment Control3. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical GuidelineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-63EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afar rracle rZonarnfin -Qtatitn Annovl~v,',Inn Ki,,rlIgmrA~,c*ar t~r~aL' (~n~r~*inn ~t2tinn Ann~v ~vaI,~n hi. ~ -* .F** | |||
* S* * ** 4*** .I .tt.. U-... .fl a.,. ..b..4.Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC5Initiating Condition:Primary Containment RadiationOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSSContainment Hi Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading > IOOR/hr.Basis:The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactorcoolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activityequals Technical Specification allowable limits. This value is lower than that specifiedfor Fuel Clad Barrier FC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of the RCS Barrieronly.There is no Reactor Coolant System Potential Loss threshold associated with PrimaryContainment Radiation.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EP-EAL-061 1, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation Monitor ReadingIndicative of Loss of RCS BarrierMonth 20XXOCGS 3-64EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC7Initiating Condition:Emergency Director Judgment.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCSBarrier.POTENTIAL LOSS2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Lossof the RCS Barrier.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the EmergencyDirector in determining whether the RCS Barrier is lost.Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Directorin determining whether the RCS Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Directorshould also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the eventthat barrier status cannot be monitored.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-65EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT2Initiating Condition:RPV Water LevelOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:POTENTIAL LOSSPlant conditions indicate primary containment flooding is required.Basis:The Potential Loss threshold is identical to the Fuel Clad Barrier FC2 Loss thresholdRPV water level. The Potential Loss requirement for Primary Containment Floodingindicates adequate core cooling cannot be restored and maintained and that coredamage is possible. BWR EOPs/SAMGs specify the conditions that require primarycontainment flooding. When primary containment flooding is required, the EOPs areexited and SAMGs are entered. Entry into SAMGs is a logical escalation in response tothe inability to restore and maintain adequate core cooling.PRA studies indicate that the condition of this Potential Loss threshold could be a coremelt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to RPV failure and increased potentialfor primary containment failure. In conjunction with the RPV water level Loss thresholdsin the Fuel Clad and RCS barrier columns, this threshold results in the declaration of aGeneral Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -With ATWS3. EMG-3200.08A, RPV Flooding -No ATWS4. EMG-3200.08B, RPV Flooding -With ATWS5. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control6. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWSMonth 20XXOCGS 3-66EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT3Initiating Condition:Primary Containment ConditionsOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. UNPLANNED rapid drop in Drywell pressure following Drywell pressure rise.OR2. Drywell pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions.POTENTIAL LOSS3. Drywell pressure > 44 psig and rising.OR4. a. Drywell or Torus Hydrogen concentration > 6%.ANDb. Drywell or Torus Oxygen concentration > 5%.OR5. Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (EMG-3200.02 Fig. F) exceeded.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.Loss Threshold #1 and #2 BasisRapid UNPLANNED loss of Drywell pressure (i.e., not attributable to Drywell spray orcondensation effects) following an initial pressure rise indicates a loss of Drywellintegrity. Drywell pressure should rise as a result of mass and energy release into theDrywell from a LOCA. Thus, Drywell pressure not increasing under these conditionsindicates a loss of primary containment integrity.These thresholds rely on operator recognition of an unexpected response for thecondition and therefore a specific value is not assigned. The unexpected(UNPLANNED) response is important because it is the indicator for a containmentbypass condition. A pressure suppression bypass path would not be an indication of acontainment breach.Month 20XXOCGS 3-67EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT3 (cont)Basis (cont):Potential Loss Threshold #3 BasisThe threshold pressure is the Drywell internal design pressure. Structural acceptancetesting demonstrates the capability of the Drywell to resist pressures greater than theinternal design pressure. A pressure of this magnitude is greater than those expected toresult from any design basis accident and, thus, represent a Potential Loss of theContainment barrier.Potential Loss Threshold #4 BasisIf hydrogen concentration reaches or exceeds the lower flammability limit, as defined inplant EOPs, in an oxygen rich environment, a potentially explosive mixture exists. If thecombustible mixture ignites inside the primary containment, loss of the Containmentbarrier could occur.Potential Loss Threshold #5 BasisThe HCTL is a function of RPV pressure, torus temperature and torus water level. It isutilized to preclude failure of the containment and equipment in the containmentnecessary for the safe shutdown of the plant and therefore, the inability to maintainplant parameters below the limit constitutes a potential loss of containment.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. FSAR Update 6.2.1.1.33. Technical Specifications 5.2 Basis4. EMG-3200.02 Primary Containment ControlMonth 20XXOCGS 3-68EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT5Initiating Condition:Primary Containment RadiationOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:POTENTIAL LOSSContainment Hi Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading > 1210 R/hr.Basis:There is no Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation.The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactorcoolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that 20% of the fuel cladding hasfailed. This level of fuel clad failure is well above that used to determine the analogousFuel Clad Barrier Loss and RCS Barrier Loss thresholds.NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear PowerPlant Accidents, indicates the fuel clad failure must be greater than approximately 20%in order for there to be a major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protectiveactions. For this condition to exist there must already have been a loss of the RCSBarrier and the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is therefore prudent to treat this condition as apotential loss of containment which would then escalate the emergency classificationlevel to a General Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM)Month 20XXOCGS 3-69EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT6Initiating Condition:Primary Containment Isolation FailureOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primarycontainment isolation signal.OR2. Intentional Primary Containment venting/purging per EOPs or SAMGs due toaccident conditions.OR3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following:a. Secondary Containment area temperature > EMG-3200.11 Max Safe(Table 11) operating level.ORb. Secondary Containment area radiation level > EMG-3200.11 Max Safe (Table12) operating level.Basis:UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely orlocally.These thresholds address incomplete containment isolation that allows anUNISOLABLE direct release to the environment.Loss Threshold #1 BasisThe use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates againstrelease paths through interfacing liquid systems or minor release pathways, such asinstrument lines, not protected by the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS).Leakage into a closed system is to be considered only if the closed system is breachedand thereby creates a significant pathway to the environment. Examples includeunisolable Main Steamline, Isolation Condenser line breaks, unisolable RWCU systembreaks, and unisolable containment atmosphere vent paths.Examples of "downstream pathway to the environment" could be through theTurbine/Condenser, or direct release to the Turbine or Reactor Building.The existence of a filter is not considered in the threshold assessment. Filters do notremove fission product noble gases. In addition, a filter could become ineffective due toiodine and/or particulate loading beyond design limits (i.e., retention ability has beenexceeded) or water saturation from steam/high humidity in the release stream.Month 20XXOCGS 3-70EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Gonaratina Station AnnaxI=xelon Nuclearte Creek ..e...er.. ......... Stat......Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT6 (cont)Basis (cont):Following the leakage of RCS mass into primary containment and a rise in primarycontainment pressure, there may be minor radiological releases associated withallowable primary containment leakage through various penetrations or systemcomponents. Minor releases may also occur if a primary containment isolation valve(s)fails to close but the primary containment atmosphere escapes to an enclosed system.These releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of primary containment butshould be evaluated using the Recognition Category R ICs.Loss Threshold #2 BasisEOPs may direct primary containment isolation valve logic(s) to be intentionallybypassed, even if offsite radioactivity release rate limits will be exceeded. Under theseconditions with a valid primary containment isolation signal, the containment should alsobe considered lost if primary containment venting is actually performed.Intentional venting of primary containment for primary containment pressure orcombustible gas control to the secondary containment and/or the environment is a Lossof the Containment. Venting for primary containment pressure control when not in anaccident situation (e.g., to control pressure below the Drywell high pressure scramsetpoint) does not meet the threshold condition.Loss Threshold #3 BasisThe Max Safe Operating Temperature and the Max Safe Operating Radiation Level areeach the highest value of these parameters at which neither: (1) equipment necessaryfor the safe shutdown of the plant will fail, nor (2) personnel access necessary for thesafe shutdown of the plant will be precluded. EOPs utilize these temperatures andradiation levels to establish conditions under which RPV depressurization is required.The temperatures and radiation levels should be confirmed to be caused by RCSleakage from a primary system. A primary system is defined to be the pipes, valves, andother equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPVpressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water being discharged through anunisolated break in the system.In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system isdischarging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area radiation conditiondoes not necessarily indicate that a primary system is discharging into the ReactorBuilding since this may. be caused by radiation shine from nearby steam lines or themovement of radioactive materials. Conversely, a high area radiation condition inconjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, high area temperatures, reports ofsteam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpectedMain Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharginginto the Reactor Building.In combination with RCS Barrier RC4 Potential Loss Threshold #3 this threshold wouldresult in a Site Area Emergency.Month 20XXOCGS 3-71EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT6 (cont)Basis (cont):There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment IsolationFailure.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline3. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control4. Support Procedures -32, -34, -41, -445. 2000-GLN-3200.03, OCNGS Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for SevereAccident Guidelines6. EMG-3200.11, Secondary Containment ControlMonth 20XXOCGS 3-72EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I cfar rrank rZanarnfin -Qfntinn AnnavI~y-nlrn ki1,,rl-orfl~,Qt~r Cr~'k fl~n~r~atinn ~t2tinn Ann~v Fv~Ir~n hi. it ia~rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT7Initiating Condition:Emergency Director Judgment.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of theContainment Barrier.POTENTIAL LOSS2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Lossof the Containment Barrier.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the EmergencyDirector in determining whether the Containment Barrier is lost.Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Directorin determining whether the Containment Barrier is potentially lost. The EmergencyDirector should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in theevent that barrier status cannot be monitored.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-73EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex.......... w .....Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG1Initiating Condition:Prolonged loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC power to emergency busses.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1 Loss of ALL offsite AC power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. EITHER of the following:a. Restoration of at least one 4160V Bus (1C or 1D) in < 1 hour is not likely.ORb. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -20 inches TAF.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses. Aloss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiringelectric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heatremoval/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. Aprolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of any fission product barriers. Inaddition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under theseconditions.The EAL should require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting thethresholds for IC FGI. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsiteprotective actions.Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it isprojected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the endof the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses andMonth 20XXOCGS 3-74EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG1 (cont)Basis (cont):event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihoodof challenges to multiple fission product barriers.The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realisticappraisal of the situation. Mitigation actions with a low probability of success should notbe used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize thetime available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public.The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC powerresults in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat fromthe core.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG12. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout6. TDR-1099, "Station Blackout Evaluation Report"7. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide8. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline9. OCNGS Drawing BR 300010. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site PowerMonth 20XXOCGS 3-75EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek GeAnerztina Staition Annex Fvalnn NHamur~ITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS1Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes orlonger.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. Loss of ALL offsite AC Power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. Failure to restore power to at least one 4160V Bus (1C or 1D) in < 15 minutes fromthe time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of allSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycore cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may bedegraded under these conditions. This IC represents a condition that involves actual orlikely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RG1, FG1, MG1, orMG2.Month 20XXOCGS 3-76EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS12. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System3. OCNGS Drawing BR 30004. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power5. ABN-37, Station Blackout6. ABN-60, Grid EmergencyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-77EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA1Initiating Condition:Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and 1 D reduced to only one of the followingpower sources for > 15 minutes.* Startup Transformer SA* Startup Transformer SB* EDG-1 Emergency Diesel Generator* EDG-2 Emergency Diesel GeneratorAND2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources suchthat any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETYSYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or morethan one, train of safety-related equipment. This IC provides an escalation path from ICMUI.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in ABNs and EOPs, and capable ofsupplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition arepresented below.* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).Month 20XXOCGS 3-78EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA1 (cont)Basis (cont):" A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.* A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a singletrain of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof power.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA12. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System2. OCNGS Drawing BR 30003. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power4. ABN-37, Station Blackout5. ABN-60, Grid EmergencyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-79EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU1Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and 1 D for >15 minutes.Basis:This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sourcesrenders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency buses.This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant.For emergency classification purposes, "capability" means that an offsite AC powersource(s) is available to the emergency buses, whether or not the buses are poweredfrom it.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof offsite power.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MAI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System3. OCNGS Drawing BR 30004. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power5. ABN-60, Grid EmergencyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-80EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afar ('rAmak (' Zonarnfin -Qf2fien AnnovP::v~mlnn Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG2Initiating Condition:Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to 4160V Busesl C and 1 D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. Voltage is < 115 VDC on 125 VDC battery busses B and C.AND4. ALL AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost for > 15 minutes.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and Vital DC power. Aloss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiringelectric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heatremoval/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss ofVital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. Asustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fissionproduct barriers.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when all EALconditions are met.Month 20XXOCGS 3-81EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG2 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG82. UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems3. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System4. OCNGS Drawing BR 30005. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power6. ABN-37, Station Blackout7. ABN-60, Grid Emergency8. ABN-54, Loss of DC Distribution Center B9. ABN-55, Loss of DC Distribution Center CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-82EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS2Initiating Condition:Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.Voltage is < 115 VDC on 125 VDC battery busses B and C for> 15 minutes.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitorand control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this conditioninvolves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RG1, FG1 or MG2.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS82. OCNGS Drawing BR 30003. ABN-54, Loss of DC Distribution Center B4. ABN-55, Loss of DC Distribution Center CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-83EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rAw~tar (rrjok (0narntinn Station Annex Pvalnn NII-vlInrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS3Initiating Condition:Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV Water Level or RCS heatremoval.Operating Mode Applicability:1Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 2%.AND2. ALL manual / ARI actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful asindicated by Reactor Power > 2%.AND3. EITHER of the following conditions exist:* RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -20 inches TAF.OR" Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (EMG-3200.02 Fig. F) exceeded.Basis:This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manualreactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, all subsequent operator manualactions, both inside and outside the Control Room including driving in control rods andboron injection, are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging thecapability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition willlead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and thus warrantsthe declaration of a Site Area Emergency.In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may behigher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptomsagainst the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs. This is appropriate in that theRecognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by afailure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timelydeclaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown thereactor.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency OperatingProcedure criteria.EAL #3 is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specific EOPs, RPVwater level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or FG1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-84EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS3 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS52. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -with ATWS3. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide5. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline6. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -no ATWSMonth 20XXOCGS 3-85EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rflu~tar (rraek Generating St~ation Annex Fvalnn NucleIazrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA3Initiating Condition:Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manualactions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down thereactor.Operating Mode Applicability:1Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:0 A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes thecontrol rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manuallydriving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.1. Automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by ReactorPower > 2%.AND2. Manual / ARI actions taken at the Reactor Console are not successful in shuttingdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 2%.Basis:This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manualreactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manualactions taken at the reactor consoles to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful.This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level ofsafety of the plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor issubsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor consoles since thisevent entails a significant failure of the RPS.A manual action at the reactor consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, whichcauses the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manualreactor scram. This action does not include manually driving in control rods orimplementation of boron injection strategies. If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operatorswould immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the reactorconsoles (e.g., locally opening breakers). Actions taken at back-panels or otherlocations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are notconsidered to be "at the reactor consoles".Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scramaction.Month 20XXOCGS 3-86EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA3 (cont)Basis (cont):The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will varybased upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event,availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, otherconcurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolongedenough to cause a challenge to the RPV water level or RCS heat removal safetyfunctions, the emergency classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency viaIC MS3. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possiblevia IC FS1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC MS3 or FS1, an Alertdeclaration is appropriate for this event.It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declarationin accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL areincluded to ensure a timely emergency declaration.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency OperatingProcedure criteria.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA52. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -no ATWS3. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -with ATWS4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide5. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical GuidelineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-87EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) t'l afmar r-rook ('Zonarnfin -Qf!mfien AnnavIPv,-I^n Nim-l-mrA~,a*car (~r~i~Ir (~n~r~tinn ~*~*ir~n Ann~v Mu ir~Ia~r-*o t~e* W ~ * | |||
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* rS* ..*n ~as. .~. ...-~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU3Initiating Condition:Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor.Operating Mode Applicability:1Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes thecontrol rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manuallydriving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.1. a. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by ReactorPower > 2%.ANDb. Subsequent manual / ARI action taken at the Reactor Console is successfulin shutting down the reactor.OR2. a. Manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 2%.ANDb. EITHER of the following:1. Subsequent manual / ARI action taken at the Reactor Console issuccessful in shutting down the reactor.OR2. Subsequent automatic scram / ARI is successful in shutting down thereactor.Basis:This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manualreactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operatormanual action taken at the reactor consoles or an automatic scram is successful inshutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition andthus represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisFollowing the failure on an automatic reactor scram, operators will promptly initiatemanual actions at the reactor consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manualreactor scram). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor,Month 20XXOCGS 3-88EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) fl afAmr 9'rook (Zanarnfin _Qfnfien Anngv:vgln Nninim11g r* 0 t* .-- .s ... sc... .~. -...c.. .. a-c... .n fl~, *~** * ~ 'Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU3 (cont)Basis (cont):core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decayheat removal systems.EAL #2 BasisIf an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manualaction at another location(s) on the reactor consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g.,initiate a manual reactor scram / ARI using a different switch). Depending upon severalfactors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually scram the reactor, or a concurrentplant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor scram signal. If asubsequent manual or automatic scram / ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor,core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decayheat removal systems.A manual action at the reactor consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, whichcauses the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manualreactor scram). This action does not include manually driving in control rods orimplementation of boron injection strategies. Actions taken at back-panels or otherlocations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are notconsidered to be "at the reactor consoles".Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scramaction.The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will varybased upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event,availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, otherconcurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at thereactor consoles are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then theemergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC MA3. Depending upon theplant response, escalation is also possible via IC FAI. Absent the plant conditionsneeded to meet either IC MA3 or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate forthis event.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency OperatingProcedure criteria.Should a reactor scram signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpointtesting), the following classification guidance should be applied." If the signal generated as a result of plant work causes a plant transient that createsa real condition that should have included an automatic reactor scram and the RPSfails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable,and should be evaluated." If the signal generated as a result of plant work does not cause a plant transient butshould have generated an RPS scram signal and the scram failure is determinedthrough other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALsare not applicable and no classification is warranted.Month 20XXOCGS 3-89EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU3 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU52. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -no ATWS3. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -with ATWS4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide5. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical GuidelineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-90EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexExelon NuclearExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatinq Station Annex Exelon Nude~rTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA4Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with asignificant transient in progress.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameterfrom within the Control Room for > 15 minutes.Table M1 Control Room Parameters* Reactor Power" RPV Water Level* RPV Pressure* Drywell Pressure* Torus Water Level* Torus Water TemperatureAND2. ANY Table M2 transient in progress.Table M2 Significant Transients" Turbine Trip* Reactor Scram* ECCS Actuation" Thermal power change > 25%* Thermal Power oscillations > 10%Month 20XXOCGS 3-91EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovstar Creek Gonaratina Station AnnaxExplon NuciparTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA4 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECOS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plantconditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parametersfrom within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fissionproduct barrier challenge is reduced. It thus represents a potential substantialdegradation in the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, an "inability to mohitor" means that values for any of the listedparameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation wouldrequire a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). Forexample, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, computerpoint, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems isevaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022)to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if itsignificantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular,emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures,emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing proceduresaddressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective actiondecision-making.This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the keysafety functions of reactivity control, RPV water level and RCS heat removal. The lossof the ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room isconsidered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if allindication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determinethe values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. Forexample, if the value for RPV water level cannot be determined from the indications andrecorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability ofother parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs FS1 or IC RS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA2Month 20XXOCGS 3-92EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) nufla~r Cr-rek Ganarpating Rtstinn Annoy Fvalnn Muuit-larTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU4Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:0 The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameters fromwithin the Control Room for > 15 minutes.Table M1 Control Room Parameters" Reactor Power* RPV Water Level* RPV Pressure* Drywell Pressure* Torus Water Level" Torus Water TemperatureBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditionswithout the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the ControlRoom. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents apotential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for any of the listedparameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation wouldrequire a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). Forexample, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital andrecorder source within the Control Room.Month 20XXOCGS 3-93EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
I:xplnn Ovster Creek Generatina Station Annex FvAlnn NiuIclarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU4 (cont)Basis (cont):An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems isevaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022)to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if itsignificantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular,emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures,emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing proceduresaddressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective actiondecision-making.This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the keysafety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss ofthe ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room isconsidered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if allindication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determinethe values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. Forexample, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indicationsand recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availabilityof other parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MA4.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2Month 20XXOCGS 3-94EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
QvQtar rrook rZancirnfin Atntinn AnnoyI~vg%1lnn Ke ig-Immrflw~t~r (~rn~k (~n~r~atinn ~t2tinn Ann~v ~v~~Inn kIIIPLai~2rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA5Initiating Condition:Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:" Seismic event (earthquake)" Internal or external flooding event" High winds or tornado strike" FIRE" EXPLOSION" Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by theShift ManagerAND2. EITHER of the following:a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance inat least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by TechnicalSpecifications for the current operating mode.ORb. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure required by Technical Specifications for thecurrent operating mode.ORc. A seismic event required a manual reactor scram per ABN-38,Station Seismic Event.Basis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due tocombustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from highenergy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits,grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Suchevents may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosionare present.Month 20XXOCGS 3-95EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oustar (r-rapk (Aneratinn Station Annax Fyalnn Nuir ianrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA5 (cont)Basis (cont):SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observablewithout measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage issufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affectedcomponent or structure.This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, required for the current operatingmode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the currentoperating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potentialloss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electricalisolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitutedegraded performance and is classified under HU6.EAL #2.a addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operationsince indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degradedperformance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability orreliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.EAL #2.b addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not inoperation or readily apparent through indications alone, as well as damage to astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make thisdetermination based on the totality of available event and damage report information.This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantificationof the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FS1 or RS1.If the EAL conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 SA92. ABN-38Month 20XXOCGS 3-96EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovs~ter Creek (GAneratinn Station Annex Fxplnn NucleI~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU6Initiating Condition:RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage in the Drywell > 10 gpm for> 15 minutes.OR2. RCS identified leakage in the Drywell >25 gpm for > 15 minutes.OR3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside the Drywell >25 gpm for > 15 minutes.Basis:UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely orlocally.This IC addresses RCS leakage which may be a precursor to a more significant event.In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicableprocedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is consideredto be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 and EAL #2 BasisThese EALs are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage","pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are definedin the plant Technical Specifications).EAL #3 BasisThis EAL addresses a RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through aninterfacing system.These EALs thus apply to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system or alocation outside of containment.The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observablewith normal Control Room indications. Lesser values typically require time-consumingcalculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation). EAL #1 uses a lower valuethat reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.Month 20XXO(3GS 3-97EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU6 (cont)Basis (cont):The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of anyrelief valve does not warrant an emergency classification.A stuck-open Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) or EMRV leakage is not consideredeither identified or unidentified leakage by Technical Specification and, therefore, is notapplicable to this EAL.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions toisolate the leakage, if possible.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs of RecognitionCategory R or F.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU42. Technical Specifications 3.3.D, Reactor Coolant System LeakageMonth 20XXOCGS 3-98EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afar tr-rok floanartinn _4Zftin~n Annowi%:Y,1ln Niiirl-nirTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU7Initiating Condition:Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table M3 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table M3 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table M3 Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone system X X XNARS XHPN X XENS X XBasis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).Month 20XXOCGS 3-99EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU7 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #1 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.EAL #2 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.EAL #3 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU62. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-100EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA1Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes orlonger.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. Loss of all offsite AC power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D..AND3. Failure to restore power to at least one 4160V bus (1C or 1D) in < 15 minutesfrom the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-relatedThis IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of allSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycore cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore anemergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decayheat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus,when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-101EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-102EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
I=v~lnn NiirlInrOuster Creek Generatinn Station Annex FyPinn Nyt-lonrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSculInitiating Condition:Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and ID reduced to only one of thefollowing power sources for > 15 minutes.* Startup Transformer SA" Startup Transformer SB" EDG-1 Emergency Diesel Generator* EDG-2 Emergency Diesel GeneratorAND2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC powerto SAFETY SYSTEMS.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources suchthat any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETYSYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or morethan one, train of safety-related equipment.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source toservice. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and thelower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in thesemodes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant.Month 20XXOCGS 3-103EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCUI (cont)Initiating Condition:An "AC power source" is a source recognized in ABNs and EOPs, and capable ofsupplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition arepresented below." A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator)." A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator." A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a singletrain of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event toan Alert in accordance with IC CAl.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 CU22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-104EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA2Initiating Condition:Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:" Seismic event (earthquake)* Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike" FIRE" EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by theShift ManagerAND2. EITHER of the following:a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance inat least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by TechnicalSpecifications for the current operating mode.ORb. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure required by Technical Specifications for thecurrent operating mode.ORc. A seismic event required a manual reactor scram per ABN-38,Station Seismic EventBasis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due tocombustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from highenergy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits,grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Suchevents may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosionare present.Month 20XXOCGS 3-105EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) fl afar rtrgatale rZonarnfin _qfnfinn AnnoyIPv,-ltn hiirlanrAuQt~r (~ra~Ie (~n~r~i*inn ~*~*i,~n Ann~v -.-.~. ~. ~ ~ .~. a... .s -t t.. .0*** *fl ~ .~. ..U -~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA2 (cont)Basis (cont):SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observablewithout measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage issufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affectedcomponent or structure.This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, required for the current operatingmode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the currentoperating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potentialloss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electricalisolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitutedegraded performance and is classified under HU6.EAL #2.a addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operationsince indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degradedperformance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability orreliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.EAL #2.b addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not inoperation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containingSAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on thetotality of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a briefassessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1.If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA62. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)4. FSAR Update Section 3.3.1 (High winds)5. ABN-31, High Winds6. ABN-32, Abnormal Intake Level7. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-106EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU3Initiating Condition:Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.Voltage is < 115 VDC on required 125 VDC battery busses B and C for> 15 minutes.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitorand control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown orrefueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantlyreduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditionsincrease the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition isconsidered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, "required" means the Vital DC buses necessary to supportoperation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenancework and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train Bwould require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train Awould not warrant an emergency classification.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be viaIC CA6 or CA5, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU42. UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems3. OCNGS Drawing BR 30004. ABN-54, DC Bus B and Panel/MCC Failures5. ABN-55, DC Bus C and Panel/MCC FailuresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-107EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afmr 1rdainle flmnarnfin -Qfnfitn AnnavM~v--Itnn Kiiie-lgnrfl~,a4~r 1~ r~~k (~an~r~4a nn ~*atir~n An n~v v~ Ir~ ii hi. .,. rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU4Initiating Condition:Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table C1 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table C1 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table C1 -Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone System X X XNARS XHPN X XENS X XBasis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.Month 20XXOCGS 3-108EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU4 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #2 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.EAL #3 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU52. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-109EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA5Initiating Condition:Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212*F due to loss of decay heatremoval for > Table C2 duration.Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration ThresholdsRCS Containment Closure Heat-upStatus Status DurationIntact Not Applicable 60 minutes*Not Intact Established 20 minutes*Not Established 0 minutes* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation withinthis time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced,then EAL #1 is not applicable.OR2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise > 10 psig as a result of temperature rise due toloss of decay heat removal.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).Month 20XXOCGS 3-110EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA5 (cont)Basis (cont):This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or anaddition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Eithercondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses a rise in RCS temperaturewhen CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact. The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address thetemperature rise.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses a rise in RCS temperaturewith the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in thiscondition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission productrelease. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address thetemperature rise without a substantial degradation in plant safety.Finally, in the case where there is a rise in RCS temperature, the RCS is not intact, andCONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0minutes). This is because 1) the evaporated reactor coolant may be released directlyinto the Containment atmosphere and subsequently to the environment, and 2) there isreduced reactor coolant inventory above the top of irradiated fuel.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA32. Technical Specifications 1.73. OU-AA-103, Shutdown Safety Management ProgramMonth 20XXOCGS 3-111EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ous~ter Creek Gener~atinn Station Annex FvoInn Nuclei~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU5Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperatureOperating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely beexceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212°F due to loss of decay heatremoval.OR2. Loss of the following for >15 minutes.* ALL RCS temperature indicationsAND* ALL RPV water level indicationsBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature above the TechnicalSpecification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCStemperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of theplant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established duringthis event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA5.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.Month 20XXOCGS 3-112EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(luster (r-rook r-anerating Rtzitinn Annex~ Fvalnn Ki-krinTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU5 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to theRCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolanttemperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specifiedin Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fueldamage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation ofpower operation.During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above thereactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactorvessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removalat reduced inventory may result in a rapid rise in reactor coolant temperature dependingon the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentationcapability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable tomonitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During thiscondition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heatload has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA6 based on an inventory loss or IC CA5 based onexceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU32. Technical Specifications 1.73. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline4. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray5. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-downMonth 20XXOCGS 3-113EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. a. RPV water level < 0 inches TAF for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:* Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate coreuncovery.OR* Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-1 0, North Wall, reading>3 R/hr.ANDc. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise** UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Month 20XXOCGS 3-114EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) rOvster Creek eneratina Station Annex Evininn NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6 (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications* Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration > 6% and Oxygen Concentration > 5%" UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established** Any Secondary Containment radiation monitor > EMG-3200.11 Maximum Safe (Table 12).* if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncoverytime limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above thetop of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual orIMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containmentintegrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective ActionGuidelines (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a directand unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENTCLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declarationof a General Emergency is not required.Month 20XXOCGS 3-115EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexIJlWlVl I I Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6 (cont)Basis (cont):UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containmentatmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at thelower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and couldresult in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. Ittherefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to acore uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installedhydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel claddingdamage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentrationreading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access.During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service,operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment ischallenged.EAL #1 BasisThe 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actuallyoccurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentationuncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminateleakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/orpower failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. Ifwater level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss isoccurring by observing changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Month 20XXOCGS 3-116EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CGI2. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. Technical Specifications 5.2 Basis4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for SevereAccident5Guidelines5. EMG-3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control6. FSAR Update 6.2.1.1.37. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control8. EP-AEL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-117EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS6Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV water level < 56 inchesTAF.OR2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV water level < 0 inches TAF.OR3. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutesANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:" Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.OR* Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-1 0, North Wall, reading >3 R/hr.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Month 20XXOCGS 3-118EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Niirl#=arOus~ter Creek (Aner~atinn Rttzioin Annax F~vplnn Nmir-Io2rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS6 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configurationcontrol or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures ofplant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site AreaEmergency declaration.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifyingCONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory controlfunctions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs #1 and #2reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lowerprobability of a fission product release to the environment.In EAL #3.a the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e.,the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actuallyoccurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentationuncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminateleakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/orpower failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. Ifwater level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss isoccurring by observing changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG6 or RGI.Month 20XXOCGS 3-119EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS6 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for EOPs5. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-120EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Fxelnn Ovstmr Creek (Anermtinn StaMion Annexv mmvln mNucearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA6Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. a. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < 86 inches TAF.OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 15 minutes.ANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequatelycool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). Thiscondition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.EAL #1 BasisA lowering of water level below 86 inches indicates that operator actions have not beensuccessful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of thecoolant will rise as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing drop in waterlevel will lead to core uncovery.Month 20XXOCGS 3-121EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA6 (cont)Basis (cont):Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not thepotential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of aResidual Heat Removal suction point). A rise in RCS temperature caused by a loss ofdecay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA5.EAL #2 BasisThe inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/orpower failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. Ifwater level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss isoccurring by observing changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half ofthe EAL duration specified in IC CS6If the RPV water level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency wouldbe via IC CS6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. 2000-BAS-3200.02 EOP User's Guide4. 2000-GLN-3200.01 Plant Specific Technical Guideline5. 205.94.0 RPV Floodup Using Core Spray6. 205.95.0 Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down7. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-122EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovstar Creak Ganaratina Station AnnexExelon Nuclearyster Creek ..e... er...t..... Station..Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU6Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintainRPV water level to above the procedurally established lower limit for> 15 minutes.OR2. a. RPV water level unknownANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise** UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a requiredminimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPVwater level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions isconsidered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Month 20XXOCGS 3-123EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
() afar r-rook (' Zonarnfin Rfnfinn AnnavI::y--Inn Pml-LwarAuQtcr (~r~~k (~anbr~tinn ~ Annav ~vaIv~n Mi ir~Ia2rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU6 (cont)Basis (cont):The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band established abovethe procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedural limit,but it is the procedurally established lower limit.Refueling evolutions that lower RCS water inventory are carefully planned andcontrolled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below aprocedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to thereduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 BasisRecognizes that the minimum required RPV water level can change several timesduring the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and systemlineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the currentplant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level istypically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in anothercontrolling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions torestore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transientconditions causing a brief lowering of water level.EAL #2 BasisAddresses a condition where all means to determine RPV water level have been lost.In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring byobserving changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus level changesmust be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they areindicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergencyclassification level via either IC CA6 or CA5.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 CU12. Technical Specifications Section 3.3.D3. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray4. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down5. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-124EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex.......... ww ....Exelon NuclearOytrCee eeainqSainA exEAn .rIrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG1Initiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring orhas occurred within the PROTECTED AREA.AND2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be controlled or maintained.ORb. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENTTable H1 Safety Functions* Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)" RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)" RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.Month 20XXOCGS 3-125EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG1 (cont)Basis (cont):HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control ofthe facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessaryto maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to aloss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls,etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot bemaintained.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG15. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-126EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afar rrankrdanarnfin _QfnfinnAnnovI9vdltnn Ki, -lonrfliietar V~ raal (~ancr~*i nn ~*~tir~n An nay FvaIr~n Ni iIa~rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHSIInitiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the PROTECTED AREA.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTEDAREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility fordamage to plant equipment.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].Month 20XXOCGS 3-127EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I afgar 9ragak I'lamornfin -Qfnfifn AnnavM:v--Inn kl~rl-hmrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS1 (cont)Basis (cont):As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize OROresources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actionsin the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions.This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTEDAREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should beassessed using IC HA1. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events,acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by aHOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters,physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events isadequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR§ 50.72.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HGI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS13. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-128EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ouster Creek (GAneratinn Station Annexv Expinn Nucleg~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA1Initiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threatwithin 30 minutes.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat < 30 minutes fromthe site.OR2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station andowned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for officialbusiness.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will requirerapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to thePROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraftimpact.Month 20XXOCGS 3-129EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHAI (cont)Basis (cont):Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness ofOffsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it benecessary to consider further actions.This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience,or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE.Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputesbetween employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressedby other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72.EAL #1 BasisAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipatedarrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-relatednotifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in aheightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information hasbeen validated in accordance with ABN-41, Security Event.EAL #2 BasisApplicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI that islocated outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee ifthe threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided byNORAD through the NRC.In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected,although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site wouldclarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD,FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs,should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-130EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HA12. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security EventMonth 20XXOCGS 3-131EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ous~ter C~reek Gennertinn Sta~tion Annex Fvyiann Niir-IanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHUIInitiating Condition:Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined perSY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities.OR2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.OR3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does notinvolve a HOSTILE ACTION.Basis:SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved securitycontingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to sitepersonnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITYCONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTIONSAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEMequipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety.Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by therequirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed asHOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-132EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExellon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHUI (cont)Basis (cont):Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plantpersonnel and OROs.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].EAL #1 BasisAddresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat isassessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132.EAL #2 BasisAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRCHeadquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threatinvolves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORADthrough the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with ABN-41,Security Event.EAL #3 BasisReferences Security Force because these are the individuals trained to confirm that asecurity event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event confirmation andclassification is controlled due to the nature of Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39information.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HAl.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HU12. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security Event4. SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual ActivitiesMonth 20XXOCGS 3-133EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
(I efor rrank rZanarnfin Qfnfinn AnnovP~v,-Inn khfnnrlrA~,Qt~r Crc~aIe (~n~r~*inn ~t~*inn Ann~~v ---- --- -- --.. p p --*~ ** -,-~. p. .~n ~ .~. ..U --*~~*Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS2Initiating Condition:Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.AND2. Control of ANY Table H1 safety function is not reestablished in < 15 minutes.Table H1 Safety Functions" Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)* RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)" RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)Basis:The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either:a. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control RoomORb. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room.This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot bereestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety functionfollowing a transfer of plan control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge toany fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time.The determination of whether or not "control" is established at the remote safeshutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The EmergencyDirector is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within 15 minuteswhether or not the operating staff has control of key safety functions from the remotesafe shutdown location(s).Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG6.Month 20XXOCGS 3-134EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS2 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-135EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA2Initiating Condition:Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.Basis:This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to controlthe plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradationin the level of plant safety.Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternateshutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the ControlRoom, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the ControlRoom, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel.Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding tothese challenges.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS2.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-136EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) | |||
Fxplnn Ovster Creek £GAneratina Station Annex FYAlnn Nuclar~ITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3Initiating Condition:FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely beexceeded.1. A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not extinguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of thefollowing FIRE detection indications:" Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)" Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications" Field verification of a single fire alarmTable H2 Vital Areas* Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt)0 4160V Switchgear Rooms (1C and 1D)0 Control Room Complex (MOB, Upper and Lower CableSpreading Rooms)* Main Transformer/Condensate Transfer Pad* Intake Structure* #1 EDG Vault* #2 EDG Vault* EDG Fuel Oil Storage TankOR2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indicationsof a FIRE).ANDb. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt.OR3 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in< 60 minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication.OR4 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA that requires firefightingsupport by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.Month 20XXOCGS 3-137EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
IFw~lnn Ovster Creek Ganarytinn Afqtinn Annex Fyalnn NiirlanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3 (cont)Basis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of apotential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisThe intent of the 15-minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate againstsmall FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). Inaddition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure,automatic activation of a suppression system, etc.Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial firealarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declarationclock starts at the time that the initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and notthe time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire durationclock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is notverified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt,operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EALassessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm wasreceived, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed.A single fire alarm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipmentfailure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional timeis allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonableamount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, andabsent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress.Month 20XXOCGS 3-138EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3 (cont)Basis (cont):If an actual FIRE is verified by a report from the field, then EAL #1 is immediatelyapplicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to an equipment failure or aspurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutes of the receipt of thealarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergency declaration is warranted.EAL #3 BasisIn addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plantPROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degradethe level of plant safety. This basis extends to a FIRE occurring within thePROTECTED AREA of an ISFSI located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.EAL #4 BasisIf a FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require aresponse by an offsite firefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then thelevel of plant safety is potentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefightingagency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to activelysupport firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade toextinguish. Declaration is not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions.Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix RAppendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part:Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, andcomponents important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize,consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires andexplosions."When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achievingand maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safetybecause damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolantthrough boil-off.Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of functionof systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents underpost-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit firedamage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions isgreater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigatethe consequences of design basis accidents.Month 20XXOCGS 3-139EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3 (cont)Basis (cont):In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safetycircuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify asingle alarm is well within this worst-case 1-hour time period.Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU42. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-140EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) f) afar rrehak anarnfin _Qffsfinn AnnavI:=vcblnn Pd,,rlamrA'*,c*car Croak (~n~r2tinn ~f~ti~-~n Ann~v FvaIr~n Mir~Ig~~r -.-.~. -.-- .' -U --. -t~ t* -..,-~. U U * ~fl .-~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU4Initiating Condition:Seismic event greater than OBE levels.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Seismic event as indicated by:1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event.AND2. The occurrence of a seismic event has resulted in a spurious Reactor Scram orrequired a Plant shutdown in accordance with ABN-38, Station Seismic Event.Basis:This IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greaterthan those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)1.An earthquake greaterthan an OBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)2 should have nosignificant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however,some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-eventcondition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Giventhe time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand anyimpacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following anOBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel andrecognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g).EAL #2 is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrationscaused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager orEmergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call toUSGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude atimely emergency declaration. This guidance recognizes that it may cause the site todeclare an Unusual Event while another site, similarly affected but with readily availableOBE indications in the Control Room, may not.Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5.1 An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plantnecessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of theFublic will remain functional.An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related)structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional.Month 20XXOCGS 3-141EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU4 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU22. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)Month 20XXOCGS 3-142EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
N Ovster Creek (GAneratinn Station Annex FwAlnn Nui~clearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5Initiating Condition:Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations,cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out ofservice, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification iswarranted.1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in a Table H3 area.Table H3Areas with Entry Related Mode ApplicabilityArea Entry Related ModeApplicabilityReactor Building* Modes 3 and 4*Areas required to establish shutdown coolingAND2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impededBasis:This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes orimpedes access to equipment necessary to transition the plant from normal plantoperation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures. Thiscondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability thatcontain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plantfrom normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operatingprocedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plantwould not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not includerooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrativeor record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).Month 20XXOCGS 3-143EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Ovster Creek Generating Station Annexg i Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5 (cont)Basis (cont):This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/designfeatures are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of ahazardous gas.An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the gaseous releasepreclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergency classificationis not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the release.Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires theEmergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area issufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. Thisjudgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis,report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operatingexperience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impededif extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affectedroom/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is notroutinely employed).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply." The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the timeof the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseousrelease occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown andshutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4." The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures whichaddress the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppressionsystem testing)." The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or recordkeeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections)." The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, andwould not actually prevent or impede a required action.An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerouslevels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosedenvironment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level ofaround 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke, that automaticallyor manually activate a fire suppression system in an area, or to intentional inerting ofcontainment.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, Cor F ICs.Month 20XXOCGS 3-144EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA52. ABN-33, Toxic or Flammable Gas Release3. AR 660892, Station Halon and IDLH Evaluations4. 29CFR1910.134(b) and 29CFR1910.134(d)(2)(iii)Month 20XXOCGS 3-145EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU6Initiating Condition:Hazardous EventOperating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents.1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA.OR2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual orautomatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required byTechnical Specifications for the current operating mode.OR3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsiteevent involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gasrelease).OR4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plantstaff from accessing the site via personal vehicles.OR5. Abnormal Intake Structure level, as indicated by EITHER:a. > 4.5 ft. MSL (> 4.25 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or > 4.5 ft MSLon CR-423-1 1 pt 24 and pt 23).ORb. < -3.0 ft. MSL (< 0.95 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or < -3.0 ftMSL on CR-423-11 pt 24 and pt 23).MSL = Mean Sea LevelBasis:PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.Month 20XXOCGS 3-146EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) n afar ('rook rZanaratin Qtatinn AnnovIPYalen hhil--aarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU6 (cont)This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potentialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisAddresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area.EAL #2 BasisAddresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating power toa SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns.Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automaticisolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker orrelay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must berequired by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. Manual isolation ofpower to a SAFETY SYSTEM component as a result of leakage is an event of lesserimpact and would be expected to cause small and localized damage. The consequenceof this type of event is adequately assessed and addressed in accordance withTechnical Specifications.EAL #3 BasisAddresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and of sufficientmagnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA.EAL #4 BasisAddresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movementand significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personalvehicles. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavyrains, or high winds.This EAL is not intended to apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as theHurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the CooperStation during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in2011.EAL #5 Basis:High Intake Structure level, is sufficiently high to require plant shutdown per ABN-32,Abnormal Intake Level.Low Intake Structure level indicates the possible loss of Radwaste Service Waterpumps and is approaching levels, which may result in a loss of vital cooling equipment.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be based on ICs in RecognitionCategories R, F, M, H or C.Month 20XXOCGS 3-147EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU6 (cont)Basis Reference(s): ..." ......1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU32. FSAR Update 3.3.1 (High winds)3. ABN-31, High Winds4. ABN-32, Abnormal Intake LevelMonth 20XXOCGS 3-148EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) atar rank i'Zonaratin Qtzatinn Annov"orAuatcr 1~raaI, f~anaratinn ~t~atirhn Ann~v ~v~Ir~ui Mi .j.Ia~ir | |||
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* 5* ** .n fl~I 1 I I ~d E~LhITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.Operating. Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency ActioniLevel (EAL):..:.Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantialcore degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILEACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can bereasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsitefor more than the immediate site area.Basis~~.. .... .........: Basis:IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for aGeneral Emergency.... .. ..... .....Basis Reference(s):-.. NE. -. Rev6 HG7. ...1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG7Month 20XXOCGS 3-149EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) atar rank rZonaratin Qtntitn AnngavMo klm Ki IaAL uata M~rao (lnrutn QcianA nyI'Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS7Initiating Condition -:........ .Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.Operating Mode Applicability: ...... ...1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures ofplant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results inintentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that couldlead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed forthe protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levelswhich exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the siteboundary.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a SiteArea Emergency.Basis SRfefrence.(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS7Month 20XXOCGS 3-150EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annexm I Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA7in t a t n ..d i~ i n , ........ .... .... .ii .... ii ~ ~. i i.. ..: ii :' i .. ......... ii ..... .H 7......Initiating Condition:.ýOther conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an ALERT.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probablelife threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILEACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPAProtective Action Guideline exposure levels.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anAlert.Basis Reference(s):....... Referen.es ." .1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA7Month 20XXOCGS 3-151EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) 0 afar roak ('Zonaratin Qfafinn AnnovPvolnn Ni ilAar-.-t~ U * -- *~ --S ** t* * --t ** | |||
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* U * *S ~ r ~. U S * --*~~*Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU7Initkia~ting Cond'ition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level: (EAL)::..Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of thelevel of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has beeninitiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring areexpected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.Basis: .. ... ..This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anUNUSUAL EVENT.Basis Reference(s): .1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU7Month 20XXOCGS 3-152EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) n afmr rgagk 11aniaratin Qtatinn AnnovP::alnn INh AalrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSE-HU1Initiating Condition...Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability: ..........1, 2,3,4, DEmerge~ncy Action Level (EAL):Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by a radiationreading:* > 800mr/hr (gamma + neutron) 3 feet from the HSM surfaceOR* > 200mr/hr (gamma + neutron) outside the HSM door on centerline of DSCOR* > 40mr/hr (gamma + neutron) end of shield wall exteriorBasis: .. " .."CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) betweenareas containing radioactive substances and the environment.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) | |||
* A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARYof a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed fordry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The wordcask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for drystorage of irradiated fuel. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actualrelease path to the environment, degradation of any fuel assemblies due toenvironmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges inremoving the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The technicalspecification multiple of "2 times", which is also used in Recognition Category R IC RU1,is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. Theemphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuelcask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that inthe case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the "on-contact" dose ratelimit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate at somedistance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HA1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-153EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) | |||
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSE-HU1 (cont)Basis Re`feren-ce(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU12. Oyster Creek Generating Station ISFSI 10CFR72.212 Evaluation Rev. 5Month 20XXOCGS 3-154EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)}} | |||
Revision as of 04:13, 28 June 2018
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nuatar Croak ranarnfinn Atntinn AnnoyFwalnn Nnnlanrflumtnr (~mak (~gannr~tinn ~t~atinn Ann~v FvMnn hIIIt~I~2rTakhi r1('rZQ 29OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMSU761Initiating Condition:Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table M3 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table M3 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table M3 Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone System X X XNARS xHPN X XENS X XJ a ... .t i I I ---- !-LOtE~ OT !~LL O Tflfl TOIIOWInG OflEUT~ communication meTnoas:47ý(8ite SDOCifiC lict of communications methodSIo--s of ALL of th.e, folloA,;n- OR" commu r,) methods.(Site SWAGof 66 ist Of IMonth 20XXOCGS 3-76EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(I afar ('-rook (' Zonarnfin Afnfinn AnnovIPvalnn N, je-lonrflua*~r Crnok a~nor2tinn ~tn*inn Ann~v Fv.Inn NIumr~I~2r I ~*~* w. -- St ~ S~S ~*SS Sty --..~S S fft5 55 SSt ~st~ S ~* S U -~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS3. of AI- of the following NRC communictions methods:(sito specific. list of cormmuinications methods)Basis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, er--offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.-(6ee Deyeloper Notes)-.EAL #3 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU62. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-77EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOytrCee eeainaSainA exEenNuerTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCAI-21Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes orlonger.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Alei4-vent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 15 mFnnutes time has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.1. Loss of all offsite AC power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1 D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. Failure to restore power to at least one 4160V bus (1C or 1D) in < 15 minutesfrom the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.L--orss of ALL-' offeiote and ALL onsite AC Power to (site Specific emergency buses) for 1minuteS Or iengcr.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-relatedThis IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of allSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycore cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore anemergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decayheat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus,when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.Month 20XXOCGS 3-78EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexPylnn NJrlanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSFifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64- or RAS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-79EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) navtor (rnrok rantarntinn r~fnfinn Annax Exelnn NuclesarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU121Initiating Condition:Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual .' event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 4-5 ninutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D reduced to only one of thefollowing power sources for > 15 minutes.* Startup Transformer SA" Startup Transformer SB" EDG-1 Emergency Diesel Generator* EDG-2 Emergency Diesel GeneratorAND2. Any additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS.-~ A k'~ ,,~r -i; I +, ;F1 ;t-, nnel it ne +rr~ ~ j 1 n~~r ~ .., -~;n-~ I-npoW9r SOU c for 15 minutes Or on ANDh Amu additional siRale neweF SGUFGe fAih wp W611 Fersult in loss ef all AG neweF toSAFF=Pý SYSTEMS.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources suchthat any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETYSYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or morethan one, train of safety-related equipment.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source toMonth 20XXOCGS 3-80EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
I::xAIon NuclAarflvster Creek (Anersatinn Stsation Annex Exeonn NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSservice. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and thelower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in thesemodes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in AQ4e-ABNs and EOPs, and capable ofsupplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition arepresented below." A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).* A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.* A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a singletrain of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event toan Alert in accordance with IC CA12.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 CU22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-81EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) l=xAlon lvster Creek GAner~atinn Stt~ion Annexv Exelnn Nucler~ITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA26Initiating Condition:Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM nieed-required for the current operatingmode.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. a The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:" Seismic event (earthquake)" Internal or external flooding event" High winds or tornado strike* FIRE" EXPLOSION" (site ,pecifi, hazard.)* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by theShift ManagerAND2.b. EITHER of the following:a.4. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance inat least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed-required byTechnical Specifications for the current operating mode.ORb. 2. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure needed-required by TechnicalSpecifications for the current operating mode.ORc. A seismic event required a manual reactor scram per ABN-38,Station Seismic EventBasis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due tocombustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from highenergy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits,Month 20XXOCGS 3-82EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSgrounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Suchevents may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosionare present.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observablewithout measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage issufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affectedcomponent or structure.This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, Reeded-required for the currentoperating mode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications forthe current operating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss orpotential loss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electricalisolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitutedegraded performance and is classified under HU6.EAL--144-EAL #2.a addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required tobe operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is inseFv*Ge operation since indications for it will be readily available. The indications ofdegraded performance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding theoperability or reliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.EAL--b1-EAL #2.b addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that isrequired to be operable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, andis not in sePAIGe/operation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structurecontaining SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determinationbased on the totality of available event and damage report information. This is intendedto be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS64 or RAS1.If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA62. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)4. FSAR Update Section 3.3.1 (High winds)5. ABN-31, High Winds6. ABN-32, Abnormal Intake Level7. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-83EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU34Initiating Condition:Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusua! Eventcvent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 15 minutes time has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.Voltage is < 115 VDC on required 125 VDC battery busses B and C for> 15 minutes.Indic-ated voltage is loss than (esite specifi bus voltage value) orequrdVtlDbu--s.e s fo r 15 mi4nu--te s or lon igerF.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitorand control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown orrefueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantlyreduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditionsincrease the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition isconsidered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, "required" means the Vital DC buses necessary to supportoperation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenancework and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train Bwould require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train Awould not warrant an emergency classification.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be viaIC CA64- or CA53, or an IC in Recognition Category RA.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU42. UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems3. OCNGS Drawing BR 3000Month 20XXOCGS 3-84EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS4. ABN-54, DC Bus B and Panel/MCC Failures5. ABN-55, DC Bus C and Panel/MCC FailuresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-85EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatina Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU45 IInitiating Condition:Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table C1 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table C1 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table Cl Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone System X X XNARS xHPN X XENS X XI I p j Af Al I I ^ +ký ~I .r, ~~~~ iE Uf*llevjrn ,r S JL 'Jy SSSLSS~.tI i SS %.* %'Atf.I nM K 9-ý at, " ft " F."t."FRUR era "FIR 1-mr-A " ft* ..... r-2) 1 or.~ of Al I I nf th faIy~nrss CORO nmmn, ,ininntinnise methadsl-(G sito s 11 A c l o ctionM e th Qds 6',ALIVE IV I I IVLI BVHV*32. Loassb of. ALL-' of the foll-owinga NR-C- commun.'-Aications mFethodrs:Month 20XXOCGS 3-86EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Que-for Cr~ank (rgangarninn tAtninn Annex~ Explon NuclezarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSlist Of Basis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site,-eF offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.(soo DoVolopor Notes).EAL #3 BasisaAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU52. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-1 24-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-87EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Quafor Creek rannarnfing -Iqfnf inn AnnoyEXI~ynn Nnrilp~rflvfttAr CrnAk (~na~ratinn ~t2tinn Ann~av FvAInn M.iv~Ic~rTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA53Initiating Condition:Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Alej4-event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely beexceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212OF due to lossremoval for > Table C2 duration.of decay heatTable C2 RCS Heat-up Duration ThresholdsRCS Containment Closure Heat-upStatus Status DurationIntact Not Applicable 60 minutes*tEstablished 20 minutes*Not Established 20 minuteNot Established 0 minutes* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation withinthis time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced,then EAL #1 is not applicable.OR2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise > 10 psig as a result of temperature rise due toloss of decay heat removal.A I Illlltl A !* *= _ _ ?Jr"I.UNPL'ArNEL inGrcacc in 68. ieemperatue to greaieF than tsite specITNcfI B I m EI ecnnmcai z~cieGTica!ion Gcia SnUtaOWn tecm[orature limit) TOr Warter tnaA MfeAt or.,+in ennf lr% i k^ fnhln,.,mnný +r,Akl!Month 20XXOCGS 3-88EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) l=xalnn V lwaVr Creek vvnertinn Stvation Annewx Exevwn NuivloarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSTable: RCS Heat up Duration ThroeholdeRS-~~ ~Statue otmn lsur Heat up Duration!Rta~t(but Rt- atred-ced i'i'."entFry Not-appliGamle i n --i-te eNot intact (OFat ratoduIed dlteSinetF [0R)Not Established 0 MiUte*Iaf an ROS heat system is in operation withkn this time framea~n~d QRCs temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable2. UNPLANNED RCS peresure inrGease greater than (site specAifi pressurereading). (This E=AL= does not apply during water solid plant conditions.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or anaddition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Eithercondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses aR wGeaserise in RCStemperature when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact.T,,or RCS ..inentor; is red.u ed .(e.g., mid loop operation in 1216A .PRs). The 20-minutecriterion was included to allow time for operator action to address the temperaturer e rise.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses a4 iO, seaserise in RCStemperature with the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is notMonth 20XXOCGS 3-89EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) flauo$r (rnmak (' Znaratinn Atn*inn AnnoyF~n ~~~ar- .~5 ~ .. ~~UU*fS* fI=Yalnn NienlanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONScrucial in this condition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to afission product release. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time toaddress the temperature e rise without a substantial degradation in plant safety.Finally, in the case where there is af hrFease rise in RCS temperature, the RCS is notintact or is at reduc..d in,..nt. y [PWR, , and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is notestablished, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0 minutes). This is because 1) theevaporated reactor coolant may be released directly into the Containment atmosphereand subsequently to the environment, and 2) there is reduced reactor coolant inventoryabove the top of irradiated fuel.EAL-#2-EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RASI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA32. Technical Specifications 1.73. OU-AA-103, Shutdown Safety Management ProgramMonth 20XXOCGS 3-90EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU53IInitiating Condition:UNPLANNED e rise in RCS temperatureOperating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual E'-ntcvent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 45-mfrutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212°F due to loss of decay heatremoval-.OR2. Loss of the following for >15 minutes.ALL RCS temperature indicationsAND* ALL RPV water level indications1. UNPLANNED incGrease in RCS temperature to greater than (site specificTechnical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit)-.2. Loss of ALL RCS temperature anid reactor vessel!RCS level indication for 15minute r, lOn Gger.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED uiwaeaserise in RCS temperature above theTechnical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-91EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatina Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSRCS temperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not establishedduring this event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA53.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to theRCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolanttemperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specifiedin Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fueldamage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation ofpower operation.During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above thereactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactorvessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removalat reduced inventory may result in a rapid iOGeaserise in reactor coolant temperaturedepending on the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentationcapability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable tomonitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During thiscondition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heatload has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA64 based on an inventory loss or IC CA53 basedon exceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU32. Technical Specifications 1.73. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline4. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray5. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-downMonth 20XXOCGS 3-92EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) flv-ntpr Crank Genaniratinn Station Annexv Evx&Inn Nucler~IT2 hhi 1_(~.9OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG64-Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the General Em-er-eny. vent promptlyupon determining that the applicable time 30-minutes-has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.1. a. RPV water level < 0 inches TAF for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:" Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.OR* Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-10, North Wall, reading >3 R/hr.ANDc. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)IMonth 20XXOCGS 3-93EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOy-ter. C .eek.Generaina S..ation.Annex..x...n.Nucle.rTnhla n (' Z- 1-9OCGS EAL Technical BasisI RECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSTable C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications* Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration > 6% and OxygenConcentration > 5%o UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established** Any Secondary Containment radiation monitor > EMG-3200.11 MaximumSafe (Table 12).* if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minutecore uncovery time limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required.1. a. (Reactor ve66el!RCS level less than (cite specific level) for 30 m~inutes OrAMDb. ANY indicatfion fro~m the Cnimethlege Table (see belew).2.R Rewactr vessel!RCSR level ca;nnot ha monitored for 30 minuter, or lonaor.A &lifb. ~C n Crel uvr;m is .inicae by ANY of the following:= *p 11I ,o., I ..Jl I +J Ip 11 0 "^0f ay... ra -f.4*1L on fSfllf Jn r.=" anq.%fA -A.b *S1 s~f eFvau .f Itin Lt ..l~r ... nw.~' n s -----------s~a ,.-I 11SI-' ANNI-W]) 1"Aren'-q in 6sitp, 1qnRR1t4c 'iMn nnd4Ar UMUI~ 42.4eI'IR At- Q144IttR~tfnaanitude to hi n'Iieat' enre uneovefy-----I(o-1sther- site sfocciflo iadieatieios-1J V ANDMonth 20XXOCGS 3-94EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSG. ANY indication fom- the Containment Challenge Table (see below).Containment Challen.go TablCONTAINMENT CLOSURE not establishedl(Ex~plosive fFA*Pae) exists inside eontaimnentlUNPLANýNED incr-ease in eontaimnmnt pressure*if CONTAINMVENT CLOSURE ir, re established prior to eXceeding the 30 mninute tielim~it, tnen dAecar-afion o a Gencral Emegnc is not rcguirca.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above thetop of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual orIMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containmentintegrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective ActionGuidelines (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a directand unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENTCLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declarationof a General Emergency is not required.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containmentatmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at thelower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and couldresult in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. Ittherefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to acore uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installedMonth 20XXOCGS 3-95EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONShydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel claddingdamage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentrationreading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access.During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service,operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment ischallenged.l#-FAL-Threshod 2,b#1 Basis,-4The 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actuallyoccurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentationuncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminateleakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.The inability to monitor RPV-levetRPV water level may be caused by instrumentationand/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of availableinstrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that aninventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or taRk-Torus levels.Sump and/or ta4,k-Torus level changes must be evaluated against other potentialsources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CG12. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. Technical Specifications 5.2 Basis4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for SevereAccident5Guidelines5. EMG-3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control6. FSAR Update 6.2.1.1.37. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control8. EP-AEL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-96EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexD m Exelon NuclearOytr rekGneainaSainAnxex~nNdTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS64 IInitiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Site Area EmneFrencyvent promptlyupon determining that the applicable time 30 minutes -has been exceeded, or willlikely be exceeded.1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV water level < 56 inchesTAF.OR2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV water level < 0 inches TAF.OR3. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutesANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by any of the following:" Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.OR" Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-10, North Wall, reading >3 R/hr.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.1. a. CONTAINMENT CLOSUREM t. n sotetablished.Month 20XX OCGS 3-97 EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovater Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster..Creek..Gener.t... Station.Annex......n.NuclearTabIA OC~S 3-2OC~S EAL Te~hnk3I R~siRRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSANDD. Iicl-(aTor Vpe8Ifl(A ."i'.tior-uv WVV#K4OF)2 IOW'Oi 10C es tflf (CiI Eske CITICtdfglevel)2.a COTANMN CLSR ocaliehod--ANDI* l'/nlllll I I I LI * !ID.~~~ K-eacTGF V96eV ei:~ Wi-E'w.-OF or * ,--' i'Vq-M WONe Iee ;man Weib db dfsp8G~fiG 'eVeq-FA- aN -A3CO V4~ V1n~x i.'-4i orT. -A -AVM WýItAfV1 -A& io-%rni Ecanno.1T..1 no-T Monirortor IMinuteG Or longer.C .....IAMD03. %=9F8 Uno.' It AInuated lay ANY r. 1 theo falowing-p(Site speeific radiatien monitor) reading gr-eater- than (site specific va -1,-"r rj- y y ln% Ahie0 44 I-r ^li VQ1If'1 ril-6Anii~rIl'1MI1i Iati fHL' ..ar 33-I rkTDT A XThXLThU:ýr Al- +--1, 1 1 V P-c.W .a.nr o rt anV I*t orm 10 z45.5 *Xta. r40 0LAS .4~S vL
- Otfl1Jt rSS Cs U.n~,VR.3 *tL .3= Q2tJ ... i=Xaatd a~jJ%.,UflAA_1JA...... .. .... .... ... ... ..............i. .......Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.I I II fll~ it: annmR~c ~ FUflflmC~flT ~iflfl orotonrino I0~ 01 I-~I-"d inv~ntorv control anomakeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage" The lost inventory may be due toa RCS component failure, a loss of configuration control or prolonged boiling of reactorcoolant. These conditions entail major failures of plant functions needed for protectionof the public and thus warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfMonth 20XXOCGS 3-98EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifyingCONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory controlfunctions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs #1-.b and#2-b reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lowerprobability of a fission product release to the environment.k.-.AL--3,a-ln EAL #3.a the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable eventstart time (i.e., the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time tomonitor, assess and correlate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncoveryhas actually occurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression andinstrumentation uncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actionsto terminate leakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore levelmonitoring.The inability to monitor RPV-1eyeIRPV water level may be caused by instrumentationand/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of availableinstrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that aninventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or taRk-Torus levels.Sump and/or tak-Torus level changes must be evaluated against other potentialsources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG4-6 or ARG1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for EOPs5. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-99EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOytrCekGeeaigSatomneexeo ulaTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA64Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the event Ale4t-promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 1-5 jinutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. a. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < 86 inches TAF.OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 15 minutes.ANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise*" Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.1. Loss of reactor veseeIRCS inve'ctor,' as indicated by level less than (site specificlevel)2. a. ,esel/Rl8 leel cannot be monitored for 15 minutes Or longerANDbh. increase in (site specific sump and/Or tank) le due to aSlo 11ss of reactor verssoURS inyentorII.Month 20XXOCGS 3-100EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExellon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.--This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability toadequately cool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier).This condition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.FGr-EAL #11 Basis-aA lowering of water level below 86 inches Specific lovel) indicates that operatoractions have not been successful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. Theheat-up rate of the coolant will e rise as the available water inventory is reduced.A continuing derease--drop in water level will lead to core uncovery.Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not thepotential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of aResidual Heat Removal suction point). Aft iR, easerise in RCS temperature caused bya loss of decay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA53.F-Gr-EAL #2 Basis,-tThe inability to monitor RP-V-LeveIRPV water level may be caused by instrumentationand/or power failures, or water level dropping below the range of availableinstrumentation. If water level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that aninventory loss is occurring by observing changes in sump and/or taRk-Torus levels.Sump and/or taf k.-Torus level changes must be evaluated against other potentialsources of water flow to ensure they are indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half ofthe EAL duration specified in IC CS61-If the RPV iwater level continues to lower, then escalation to Site AreaEmergency would be via IC CS61-.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. 2000-BAS-3200.02 EOP User's Guide4. 2000-GLN-3200.01 Plant Specific Technical Guideline5. 205.94.0 RPV Floodup Using Core Spray6. 205.95.0 Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down7. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-101EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) flvmter Creek (GAneratina Station Annex Exelnn NucilearTn hia C)r-r.-q 2-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU64Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual Eventevent promptly upondetermining that the applicable time 1-5 ninutes-has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore andmaintain RPV water level to above the procedurally established lower limit for> 15 minutes.OR2. a. RPV water level unknownANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise*" Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.A I-- I P I- --- 9.0IIl~f d" I ... I I --- ,I1-- -- Aw I'll, ZTýZ;ýJwm faý ý 'Zý Z'14 xt-. -%ýýreuirodi oIor limit fo'r 15 meinuts oFr IonGre.2. a- Reacto-r ves;AeliRGS !eye! cannot be monitored-.A ND13II
- _l
- I9. UNWt-ANNIMrLL Increacerse in keite speGITIG SUMP anaWOr lall~i levels.% iBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.Month 20XXOCGS 3-102EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) t'l aar t'_roaI (Zona.n*inn A*2inn Annov=yalinn Nnlan~~crTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSThis IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a requiredminimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RP-VIevelRPV water level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of theseconditions is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band establishedabove the procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedurallimit, but it is the procedurally established lower limit.Refueling evolutions that deleaselower RCS water inventory are carefully planned andcontrolled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below aprocedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to thereduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 BasisfRecognizes that the minimum required RP-V-IeyeIRPV water level can change severaltimes during the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations andsystem lineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for thecurrent plant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimumlevel is typically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified inanother controlling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions torestore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transientconditions causing a brief lowering of water level.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses a condition where all means to determine RPV-IeveIRPV water level havebeen lost. In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurringby observing changes in sump and/or tank-Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus tank levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergencyclassification level via either IC CA6-- or CA53.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 CUl2. Technical Specifications Section 3.3.D3. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray4. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down5. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-103EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
() afar roak rýanarafin Atnfinn AnnowI::ralnn N.PrlanrAw1r(rJ lnrLn *a~n n~ v1n i rI~Table OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG1Initiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring orhas occurred within the PROTECTED AREA.AND2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be controlled or maintained.ORb. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENTTable H1 Safety Functions" Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)" RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)* RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)4 A W _qrTII r- I ; ,or.r-,. ,. k ...-.,,ry,4 ar.;ukar okb DDm -hTE('TEIA MIA ba~-,4r +kft f,;+am pt;g gegoa ir;+ti e-k~fif ga rtm.... ......r"y 11 r,b. EITHER of the haG occurred:-J A L BIB f alf a f ao d I1 'INY 01 TflR 1flhIfl""flfl R~TAT'! TIIflCTIflflft ('TlflflAT nfl r5flnTrflhIAcl orI g" Reactivity control" Coe e-eeliflg" RCS heat r-emoval0 R-iv .... vvu vgwz amnaqe to spont ruel has occu rred or is IMMIrJIPJ I.Month 20XXOCGS 3-104EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)I Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexI::alnn N, :PllanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYBasis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control ofthe facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessaryto maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to aloss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls,etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot bemaintained.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].Emer-gencay plans and implementing proedraesFe arc public documents; therefore, E=ALsshould not incorporate Security sensitive inomto.This includer, infomation thatmay be advantageous to a potential adversar,', such as the particulars cocrnnGswccific threat Or thro-at lcto.SecUrity rsensoitive information should beMonth 20XXOCGS 3-105EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexI~vghlrnn kl"rAaarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYcontainod in non public- derou-monts suc-h as the ScRbqwity Plan.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG15. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-106EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHSIInitiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the PROTECTED AREA.1. A HOST!LE ACTION is occurring Or has ....rro.d withn the PROTECTEDAREA aS reported by the (site specific. secr.ity shift superwision).Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTEDAREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility fordamage to plant equipment.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Month 20XXOCGS 3-107EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) afar i'trook (' Zinnarnfin Afnfinn AnnovPyalnn Niid-lanrAue+~r (~rnnk (~cnor~tinn ~t~*inn Anncv Fv~Inn Mmua~I~~r-V -t~U W* ~~Wt ~ *~* ~*** S., ~ t*~SU *~~* ** U~flTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYSecurity plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize OROresources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actionsin the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions.This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTEDAREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should beassessed using IC HAl. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events,acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by aHOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters,physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events isadequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR§ 50.72.~e~Ai~mnraene'.' nrnn~ ~ino imninmnn~inn nrooeaum~ 3m DUDIIO aocumenrn: mereGhoul-d noVLt in o Security onritioinformaAtio-n. ThiS inu s WARthl.~~~~~~~~~~~~U8 1 r ntnil 0nr"rih 6tn cIrm~enabnin thLeIspecific thro9tFor threat lnocatio. Security ....n.iti,,, inform.ation' should be con d inon public docu monts sucwh a theScrt Plan.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HG1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS13. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-108EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHAIInitiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threatwithin 30 minutes.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat < 30 minutes fromthe site.i.A HOST-ILE ~ACTION is occurring or- has occurred v.'thin the OWNEROR2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA.A validated n,-tifr,-ation frorm NRIC of an aircraft attack within 30 mRn.Uteothe seBasis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station andowned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for officialbusiness.Month 20XXOCGS 3-109EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station Annex..... V .... Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYPROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will requirerapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to thePROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraftimpact.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness ofOffsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it benecessary to consider further actions.This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience,or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE.Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputesbetween employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressedby other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72.EAL #1 BasisAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipatedarrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-relatednotifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in aheightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information hasbeen validated in accordance with ABN-41, Security Event.EAL #2 Basis4is-aApplicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in theOWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI thatis located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.Month 20XXOCGS 3-110EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYE.AL #2 addresses the throat fro~m the im.p~act of an -aircraft. on the plant, and theantidpated arr."al time it Within 30 mi"nt. "The i t of h;. tRAh I ;ris tAo ensue thatthre-at r-l-ato-d notfif~ic-ations are Made In Rta timely manner se that plant personnel andOROs are in a heightened statte of re-ad-inees. This EA~L is Met w"hen the threat relatodiAfnorm..ation has boon validated in accordance9 with (sate specifi procedure).The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee ifthe threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided byNORAD through the NRC.In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected,although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site wouldclarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD,FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs,should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency.Emergencly plans and implementiRg procedures are public documents; therefore, EALsshould not incorFporate Security sensitive informnation. This inclu~des information thatmay be advantageous to a peteItIal adversar,1 , such as the palticulars 'aspe -.A .1 hlnpseific thrcat Or threat lctin Security sensitive nomto should be conaind ~non public. documents suc ams the Secr.-ity Plan.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HAl2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security EventMonth 20XXOCGS 3-111EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU1Initiating Condition:Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined perSY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities.1 .A SECUJT-Y CONDITION thAt does not involve a HO0ST-ILE ACTION1 as r-epoied bythe (site speeffie security shift supervision).OR2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.2. Notificationt of a credible securfity threat dir-eeted at the site.OR3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does notinvolve a HOSTILE ACTION.3. A validated from the NRC p.O..iding Of An aircrAft th.eat.Basis:SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved securitycontingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to sitepersonnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITYCONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTIONSAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.Month 20XXOCGS 3-112EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEMequipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety.Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by therequirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed asHOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plantpersonnel and OROs.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].EAL #1 BasisAddresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat isassessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132. rofeFcenS (site Specific .ecurity shiftsupevisin) becsause these aro the individu als trained to confirm that A Recurwity event ioccurriAng r hn~asoccrred. Traing on ecr.ity eVent conmfirmation and classification icon~trolled du to the naturoe of Safeguards-and 10 CFýR -§ 2'."30 ,Finformna-tio-n.-EAL #2 BasisaAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRCHeadquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threatinvolves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORADthrough the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with ABN-41,Security Event. (Site Specific proccdurc. addrFesses the receipt of a_ credible Securitythreat. The Nredibilidanty of the threat is assessed in acordaRne with (site specPFGeedu~e)-.EAL #3 BasisfReferences Security sp...ecific security shift super+ision) -because these arethe individuals trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred.Training on security event confirmation and classification is controlled due to the natureof Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39 information.addresses the threat from the impact ofan aircraft on the plant. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) willcommunicate to the licensee if the threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of theplane may also be provided by NORAD through the NRC. Validation of the threat isperformed in accordance with (site-specific procedure).Month 20XXOCGS 3-113EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYEmer9genY plans and imleeninrocedures are public. docau-men~ts; therefore, E=ALsrhoud nt incorPorate Security sensitive information. This inclludes informaton thatmay be advantageous to a potential aad-versar,a-" -GucGh-as" the particulars concerninaSpecii theto hetlcto.Scrty sniienfrtonshould be contain~ed inno public, documents6 suc-h as the Security Plan.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HAl.Basis Reference(s):1 .NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HUI2. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security Event4. SY-AA-1 01 -1 32, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual ActivitiesMonth 20XXOCGS 3-114EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) tl fgsr Priagile f-'gngirinfin Qfnfinn Anng&vI:=v,-Ien Mi~rl--orZ2~, *2 2~~ ~fa~ml1~~unAn~ o~ ~ *u sa .w. -.. an .*Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS26Initiating Condition:Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):--Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Site Ara Emergency.ventpromptly upon determining that (site specific .. ,=,,,'- the applicable timeefminutes) has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.AND2. Control of ANY Table H1 safety function is not reestablished in < 15 minutes.Table H1 Safety Functions* Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)* RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)* RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)1. a. An ent h6ereulted in pat control being transferred panel6 andloclcontrol stations). from the Room to (site Ipecifc remote shuitAdonANDb. Coentrol oef.ANY of the following key safo* functions is not r~eostablishedwithin (6ite specific number of minutes).*Ro~actiVit' controlT Corescoolionrol PRi RPVlwater lesel [B iteBasis:The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either:Month 20XXOCGS 3-115EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearO-- e Cre Genera.. ........ Stai on.. Annex.....e... n.. Nu..le..rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYa. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control RoomORb. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room.This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot bereestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety functionfollowing a transfer of plan control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge toone orOmornany fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time.The determination of whether or not "control" is established at the remote safeshutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The EmergencyDirector is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within (the site spe...,.tmi-F,. ,anefo#, 15 minutes whether or not the operating staff has control of key safetyfunctions from the remote safe shutdown location(s).Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG64.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-116EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) nafor rookk (' Zonarnfin _qfafinn AnnovF:Yalnn Nn AnPlrAu tr(rJ L ~ ~ in~~~n An~ v~nMuI~r.- UW * *S S wt**5 E3s~.Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA26Initiating Condition:Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.An event has, roSulted in plant control being transferre9d from the COntro Rooem to the(site spec-ific- re-mote shut-down panels and local control Stations)-.Basis:This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to controlthe plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradationin the level of plant safety.Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternateshutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the ControlRoom, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the ControlRoom, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel.Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding tothese challenges.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS26.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-117EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) n afar rank rZonarafin Afafinn AnnovPyninn Nnela2rAu@*~r (~roaI flanar2tmnn ~*~tinn Ann~v Fv~Inn MuIr~I~2r -V Ia t* .*~ * ** .*.. ... -.. *** ..-.. .. Ian -~Table OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU34Initiating Condition:FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: The Emergency Director should declare the Unusual Eventevent promptlyupon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likelybe exceeded.1. A FIRE in any Table H2 area is no.t extinguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of thefollowing FIRE detection indications:00Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indicationsField verification of a single fire alarmTable H2 Vital Areas* Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt)* 4160V Switchgear Rooms (1C and 1D)* Control Room Complex (MOB, Upper and Lower CableSpreading Rooms)* Main Transformer/Condensate Transfer Pad* Intake Structure* #1 EDG Vault* #2 EDG Vaulto EDG Fuel Oil Storage TankOR2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in any Table H2 area (i.e., no other indicationsof a FIRE).ANDb. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt.ORMonth 20XXOCGS 3-118EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) afar 1'rook flonjarnfin -Qfnfifn AnnovF:valnn N,,ldlaarZ*rt ..IV I .I lA 1 SM St5e S /- *e l n, I e lUTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY3 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in < 60-minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication.OR4 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA that requires firefightingsupport by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish./4 A CID ;. Ki 4T ; kA ,;4k;, 4 r -.. f A IV f 4k-* -I;- ~ ~ ~ ..... .. ---- ; I ..9 Roport from the fgeld (i.e., visual observation)a P~rzaet 'f militinla imana~ thnnr 1'1 4.fiF9 nlrm r, cir dr t ..vA~ ~~.ni, .it enr:4~.ne.% * :~ I n~r ..e .% Inri.ANMTh r R i Io ca l ithin AN Y of t he e f allowin l a r o omsr ar W ans-:(.(sites seificlistof plantr omsonr, Or eas)(2% iI()a Re cGipt of as single firel armfn(i .e.,noG other indicationsof aF IIRE).AAND-1-mcq FIRR irs 1nn;atAd wamn A NY of the ;eiiewlRa elaR F FaF..... .... JE I....... \61le SmeGINGlist. of. WaRT MOMS eF aFea\ ..... iv ............ IV ............ iAND__ "lr'L .... ." __z =Gy. 4-RAexisteRoe ef- a F-1 In is not YeFified WKRIA 6W minutes of-Warm F-k-_AA1ER-.-rtdi A FIRE- Ava-hin the Want or-154=S-f imr-plants wifn an ;54=.3f eumide theplantIý;+kw A tA not emlngul6nea wanin ou Fninutes ofinitial FepeFt, alaFm eFindiGatien.141 A F! RF %Ar;+k*n thý !pn+ ^r 14Z Q1 rl;r-%r lqqfc% iA/;#h jqp 15ýr=S:j qjiffo;r1m fj"ftc "%"V040WGFett Ar-eal r-mw-+r=- ra-60 A r= that FeQUIFeS iffelmhunq supoet-t koy aneffbitefiFeFespense ageney to e)dlngu*shMonth 20XXOCGS 3-119EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) afar ('-raakI rlonarn*inn -Qfnirn AnnoyFon %~I~ f W S *tE* t*U~.* fI:valnn Ml"iAlnrZ nTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYBasis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of apotential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisThe intent of the 15-minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate againstsmall FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). Inaddition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure,automatic activation of a suppression system, etc.Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial firealarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declarationclock starts at the time that the initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and notthe time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire durationclock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is notverified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt,operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EALassessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm wasreceived, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed.A single fire alarm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipmentfailure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional timeis allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonableamount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, andabsent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress.If an actual FIRE is verified by a report from the field, then EAL #1 is immediatelyapplicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to anMonth 20XXOCGS 3-120EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rl a+gsr imak ('Zonarnfin _Q+--ifinn AnnovF:valnn N"Aalnrfluatar (~ rn~Ie t~n~r~*i nn n A n n~v Fvc Inn Muui~2r -Vt* S S~ *~ uflS WS5* rt. * .fl ....... * -**Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYequipment failure or a spurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutesof the receipt of the alarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergencydeclaration is warranted.EAL #3 BasisIn addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plantPROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degradethe level of plant safety. This basis extends to a FIRE occurring within thePROTECTED AREA of an ISFSI located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.for platS 1 t#h an IRP euts-de the plant Protected Area]EAL #4 BasisIf a FIRE within the plant or ISFSI Plant6 w.ith an ISFS, the plant Pr-tetedAea]-PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require a response by an offsitefirefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then the level of plant safety ispotentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requiresan emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting effortsbecause the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Declarationis not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions.Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix RAppendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part:Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, andcomponents important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize,consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires andexplosions."When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achievingand maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safetybecause damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolantthrough boil-off.Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of functionof systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents underpost-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit firedamage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions isgreater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigatethe consequences of design basis accidents.In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safetycircuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify asingle alarm is well within this worst-case 1-hour time period.Month 20XXOCGS 3-121EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovater Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyte Cre Generatin....... Sai-In.. Anne....E..... n.. Nucle...rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYDepending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA26 or MASAQ.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU42. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-122EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) tl a+ar ('raghk rZonarnfin -Q+!mfirn AnngvFwainn PJ"AanrAuLa (~ck ~ ~ 2unAnvFan ~~~rw~ ~ ~ ~ .U. f...r.. nr .S*-Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU42Initiating Condition:Seismic event greater than OBE levels.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Seismic event > Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by:1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event.AND2. The occurrence of a seismic event has resulted in a spurious Reactor Scram orrequired a Plant shutdown in accordance with ABN-38, Station Seismic Event.SeismiG event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (013E) as indicated byla. (site rpecfic. indication that e vent met or exceeded 01E limits)Basis:This IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greaterthan those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)1.An earthquake greaterthan an OBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)2 should have nosignificant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however,some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-eventcondition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Giventhe time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand anyimpacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following anOBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel andrecognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g).The Shift Manager or Emergency Director may seek external verification if deemedappropriate (e.g., a call to the USGS, check internet news sources, etc.); however, theverification action must not preclude a timely emergency declaration.EAL #2 Basis1 An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plantnecessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the?ublic will remain functional.An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related)structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional.Month 20XXOCGS 3-123EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating- Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYEAL #2 is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrationscaused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager orEmergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call toUSGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude atimely emergency declaration. This guidance recognizes that it may cause the site todeclare an Unusual Event while another site, similarly affected but with readily availableOBE indications in the Control Room, may not.Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA26 or MA5SAQ.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU22. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)Month 20XXOCGS 3-124EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(I fgr f'roole IZongwafin -Q+--ifinn AnngvIF::alnn MNrd-lanrfl~,o*or (~ roo I. (~o nor~*i nn n An nov Fvolnn IJumr~Io2rTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5Initiating Condition:Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations,cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out ofservice, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification iswarranted.1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in a Table H3 area.Table H3Areas with Entry Related Mode ApplicabilityArea Entry Related ModeApplicabilityReactor Building* Modes 3 and 4*Areas required to establish shutdown coolingAND2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impededNo-te:- If the equipment in the listed room or area war- already inoperable Or Outof service before the event occurred, then no emnergencY classification iswaFanted.-(1) a. Release of a toxiccroie asphyxiant or flammable gars ante any of theIy p.In I I*m ,o a e -I(site specifc list of plant Fooms Or areas with ent-;-related modeapplicability idntifi;ed)IA-NDl lI. Int; inlt o e room or area IS or impeBasis:This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes orimpedes access to equipment necessary to transition the plant from normal plantMonth 20XXOCGS 3-125EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) fl a+ar roale t' Zanarnfin -Q+n+ion AnngvFvalnn Mid-loarAuLa U~~I ~~~in~~i~ n~ vlnMula -*S l ~* i t* ~ fTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYoperation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant proceduretomaintainnormal plant operatio or r red fo a norm.al plant Gooldown and ,hutdown. Thiscondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability thatcontain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plantfrom normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operatingprocedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plantwould not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown.This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to performactions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routineinspections).This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/designfeatures are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of ahazardous gas.An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the gaseous releasepreclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in serviceat the tim.9 f the Felease. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actuallynecessary at the time of the release.Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires theEmergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area issufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. Thisjudgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis,report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operatingexperience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impededif extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affectedroom/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is notroutinely employed).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the timeof the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseousrelease occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown andshutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4." The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures whichaddress the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppressionsystem testing)." The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or recordkeeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).Month 20XXOCGS 3-126EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY* The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, andwould not actually prevent or impede a required action.An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerouslevels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosedenvironment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level ofaround 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke, that automaticallyor manually activate a fire suppression system in an area, or to intentional inerting ofcontainment.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category RA,C or F ICs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA52. ABN-33, Toxic or Flammable Gas Release3. AR 660892660892 Station Halon and IDLH Evaluations4. 29CFR1910.134(b) and 29CFR1910.134(d)(2)(iii)Month 20XXOCGS 3-127EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) 11 afar ('-rank (' Zonarnfin Afnfinn AnnoyF:::alnn kNn nr~l=fLutrCakAnr*n **n nc vInMrarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU63Initiating Condition:Hazardous EventOperating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note: EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents.1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA.OR2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual orautomatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required byTechnical Specifications for the current operating mode.OR3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsiteevent involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gasrelease).OR4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plantstaff from accessing the site via personal vehicles.OR5. Abnormal Intake Structure level, as indicated by EITHER:* > 4.5 ft. MSL (> 4.25 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or > 4.5 ft MSLon CR-423-11 pt 24 and pt 23).OR* b. < -3.0 ft. MSL (< 0.95 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or < -3.0 ftMSL on CR-423-11 pt 24 and pt 23).MSL = Mean Sea LevelNote! EAL #3 does not apply to routine traffic uch as fog, snow, ice, orveh\ic broakdownA or accidonts.(1) A tornado strike wiA.th~in the PROTECTED AREA.Month 20XXOCGS 3-128EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
I=xAInn NunlAgrOvster Creek (Anersatinn St~ation Annex Exellnn Nucle~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY(2) I Itnlo or area flooding of a agn itude sufAcie nt to require Man oIa utomatic electrical isolation Aof -A SAFET SYSTEM=h4 -F coponent nee-dted fo-r thcurrent operating moede-.(3) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA. is impeded due to anoffite event involIving hazardoul mnaterials (e.g., an offlite chemical Spill Or Wtigas e4easee*?(1) A hazardous- even~t that results inR on 6ite conditions sufflicient to prohibit the plant.st-aff from. accessing the site via personal vehiG196.(5) (Site specifi liAt- Of natur-Ial or tec~hnological hazard- events)Basis:PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potentialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisaAddresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area.EAL #2 BasisaAddresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating powerto a SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns.Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automaticisolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker orrelay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must berequired by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. Manual isolation ofpower to a SAFETY SYSTEM component as a result of leakage is an event of lesserimpact and would be expected to cause small and localized damage. The consequenceof this type of event is adequately assessed and addressed in accordance withTechnical Specifications.EAL #3 BasisaAddresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and ofsufficient magnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTEDAREA.Month 20XXOCGS 3-129EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexI:vtulnn Khir-loarTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSEAL #4 BasisaAddresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movementand significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personalvehicles. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavyrains, up--rVor wator roloas-., dam failuro, , Or an on site train dor.FailMent blkingthe acce6 ,.ad r high winds.This EAL is not intended to apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as theHurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the CooperStation during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in2011.EAL #5 Basis:High Intake Structure level, is sufficiently high to require plant shutdown per ABN-32,Abnormal Intake Level.Low Intake Structure level indicates the possible loss of Radwaste Service Water1UmDS and is anoroachina levels, which may result in a loss of vital coolina eauiDment.EAL= #6 addrocccc (site specifiG deccriPti0on)r.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be based on ICs in RecognitionCategories RA, F, MS, H or C.Basis Reference(s):1.2.3.4.NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU3FSAR Update 3.3.1 (High winds)ABN-31, High WindsABN-32, Abnormal Intake LevelMonth 20XXOCGS 3-130EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)j Ovater Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):(1-) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENTsubstantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity orHOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelineexposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Basis:IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for aGeneral Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG7Month 20XXOCGS 3-131EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
() afar rank (' Zonaratin Atmfinn AnngavFvalnn Mwla2rflu@*~r t~ male flcnar~*i nfl ~t2tinn An nay Fvalnn NIi.v~Ia2r -.. .fl .£. t** ....... U.. EU fl n....Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):( Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failuresof plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results inintentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that couldlead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed forthe protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levelswhich exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the siteboundary.'Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a SiteArea Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS7Month 20XXOCGS 3-132EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rl afar rAmak ('Zonarnfin -Qf!mtirn AnnavPyi:= nn Mif,-loarfl,~a ~ ae ~na~in l~rn nna van N.v~~ -*
- S S U5 ***f. *S las**~dTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an ALERT Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):(M- Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event thatinvolves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipmentbecause of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to smallfractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anAlert.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA7Month 20XXOCGS 3-133EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) lFyalnn N~nlonrnVwatar rl ok (rgongIrnling Vtntinn Annoy iAInn ii Ia~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an (NOQ")UFNUSUAL EVENT.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):(1-) Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicatethat events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation ofthe level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has beeninitiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring areexpected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.Basis:This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anEVENT.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU7Month 20XXOCGS 3-134EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatinci Station AnnexExelon NuclearOytrCee eeainc tto nexEeo ulaTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSE-HUIInitiating ConditionDamage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by a radiationreading:* > 800mr/hr (gamma + neutron) 3 feet from the HSM surfaceOR* > 200mrdhr (gamma + neutron) outside the HSM door on centerline of DSCOR* > 40mr/hr (gamma + neutron) end of shield wall exterior(-1)---Damage to a loaded caask CO0NIFINEMENT B3OUNDARY as indicated by, an on-contacat radiation reading greater than (2 times the site specific caSk specificG technicalpeification allowable radiation level) On the up c of the spent fuel cask.Basis:CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) betweenareas containing radioactive substances and the environment.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) : A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARYof a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed fordry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The wordcask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for drystorage of irradiated fuel. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actualrelease path to the environment, degradation of one OrF mreany fuel assemblies due toenvironmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges inremoving the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The technicalspecification multiple of "2 times", which is also used in Recognition Category RA ICMonth 20XXOCGS 3-133EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSRAU 1, is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions.The emphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spentfuel cask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognizedthat in the case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the "on-contact" doserate limit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate atsome distance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HAl.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU12. Oyster Creek Generating Station ISFSI 10CFR72.212 Evaluation Rev. 5Month 20XXOCGS 3-134EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisEmergency Action Level Technical Basis Page IndexGeneral Site Area Alert Unusual EventEAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg. EAL Pg.RG1 3-33 RS1 3-35 RA1 3-37 RU1 3-40RA2 3-43 RU2 3-45RA3 3-47 RU3 3-50FG1 3-51 FS1 3-52 FA1 3-53 _Fuel Clad RCS ContainmentFC1 3-54FC2 3-55 RC2 3-59 CT2 3-66RC3 3-61 CT3 3-67RC4 3-62FC5 3-57 RC5 3-64 CT5 3-69CT6 3-70FC7 3-58 1 RC7 3-65 CT7 3-73MG1 3-74 MS1 3-76 MA1 3-78 MUW 3-80MG2 3-81 MS2 3-83MS3 3-84 MA3 3-86 MU3 3-88MA4 3-91 MU4 3-93MA5 3-95MU6 3-97MU7 3-99CA1 3-101 CU1 3-103CA2 3-105CU3 3-107CU4 3-108CA5 3-110 CU5 3-112CG6 3-115 CS6 3-119 CA6 3-121 CU6 3-123HG1 3-125 HS1 3-127 HA1 3-129 HU1 3-132HS2 3-134 HA2 3-136HU3 3-137HU4 3-141HA5 3-143HU6 3-146HG7 3-149 HS7 3-150 HA7 3-151 HU7 3-1521 1 1 1 1 1 E-HU1 3-153Month 20XXOCGS 3-32EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRGIInitiating Condition:Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1000 mRem TEDEor 5000 mRem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time." Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes." The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment usingactual meteorology are available.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table R1 value for > 15 minutes.OR2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the siteboundary of EITHER:a. > 1000 mRem TEDEORb. > 5000 mRem CDE ThyroidOR3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER:a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >1000 mR/hr are expected to continuefor > 60 minutes.ORb. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 5000 mRem CDE Thyroid for60 minutes of inhalation.Month 20XXOCGS 3-33EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatina Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRGI (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):Table RI Effluent Monitor Effluent Monitor General EmergencyMain Stack RAGEMS 8.69 E+01 uCi/cc HRMOR3.53 E-08 amps HRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 7.17 E-01 uCi/cc HRMHRM = High Range MonitorBasis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actualoffsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Itincludes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude willrequire implementation of protective actions for the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 5000 mRem thyroid CDEwas established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroidCDE.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AG12. EP-EAL-0610, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-170-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. EP-AA-1 10-200, Dose Assessment6. EP-AA-1 10-201, On Shift Dose AssessmentMonth 20XXOCGS 3-34EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRS1Initiating Condition:Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mRem TEDEor.500 mRem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time.* Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment usingactual meteorology are available.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table R1 value for > 15 minutes.OR2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the siteboundary of EITHER:a. > 100 mRem TEDEORb. > 500 mRem CDE ThyroidOR3. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER:a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates >100 mR/hr are expected to continuefor > 60 minutes.ORb. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 500 mRem CDE Thyroid for60 minutes of inhalation.Month 20XXOCGS 3-35EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatinl Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRS1 (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):Table RI Effluent Monitor ThresholdsEffluent Monitor Site Area EmergencyMain Stack RAGEMS 8.69 E+00 uCi/cc HRMOR3.53 E-09 amps HRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 3.65 E+05 cpm LRMHRM = High Range Monitor LRM = Low Range MonitorBasis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actualoffsite doses greater than or equal to 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of this magnitude areassociated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.The TEDE dose is set at 10% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 500 mRemthyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDEand thyroid CDE.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RGI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AS12. EP-EAL-061 0, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-1 70-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. EP-AA-1 10-200, Dose Assessment6. EP-AA-1 10-201, On Shift Dose AssessmentMonth 20XXOCGS 3-36EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station Annex.... Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRAIInitiating Condition:Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mRemTEDE or 50 mRem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time." Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes." The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should be used foremergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment usingactual meteorology are available.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table RI value for > 15 minutes.OR2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses at or beyond the siteboundary of EITHER:a. > 10 mRem TEDEORb. > 50 mRem CDE ThyroidOR3. Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate thatwould result in doses greater than EITHER of the following at or beyond the siteboundarya. 10 mRem TEDE for 60 minutes of exposureORb. 50 mRem CDE Thyroid for 60 minutes of exposureORMonth 20XXOCGS 3-37EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(~Iafar Cr-rok (~onarn$inn -Q*ntirn Anng~vI=v,mlrt n K, ,r-I--orJL 22Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS i RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA1 (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):4. Field survey results at or beyond the site boundary indicate EITHER:a. Gamma (closed window) dose rates > 10 mR/hr are expected tocontinue for 2 60 minutes.ORb. Analyses of field survey samples indicate > 50 mRem CDEThyroid for 60 minutes of inhalation.Table R1 Effluent Monitor ThresholdsEffluent Monitor AlertMain Stack RAGEMS 8.69 E-01 uCi/cc HRMOR3.53 E-10 amps HRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 3.65 E+04 cpm LRMHRM = High Range Monitor LRM = Low Range MonitorBasis:This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected oractual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1% of the EPA Protective Action Guides(PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases. Releases of thismagnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant as indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits(e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.The TEDE dose is set at 1% of the EPA PAG of 1000 mRem while the 50 mRem thyroidCDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE andthyroid CDE.The radwaste liquid discharge system is currently closed off with a plant modificationinstalled blank flange. To perform a discharge would require a plant modification toremove the flange. Since the liquid radwaste system is not operable, no EAL thresholdhas been developed for this release point.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RS1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-38EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA2. EP-EAL-0610, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-170-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. ABN-27, Inadvertent Overboard Radioactive Release or Cross Contamination6. EP-EAL-0617, Oyster Creek Criteria for Choosing Liquid Effluent EAL ThresholdValuesMonth 20XXOCGS 3-39EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
I=xelnn NuclearOvster Creek fleneratinn Staftion Annex ExeInn Nuclea~rThble OCOS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisTable OCGS 3-2RECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU1Initiating Condition:Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the ODCM limits for 60minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Notes:" The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that theapplicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded." If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume thatthe release duration has exceeded the applicable time." Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to theenvironment is established. If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known tohave stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitorreading is no longer valid for classification purposes.1. Readings on ANY Table R1 Effluent Monitor > Table R1 value for > 60 minutes:Table R1 Effluent Monitor ThresholdsEffluent Monitor Unusual EventMain Stack RAGEMS 4.07 E+03 cps LRMTurbine Building RAGEMS 4.16 E+02 cpm LRMLRM = Low Range MonitorOR2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicate concentrationsor release rates > 2 times ODCM Limit with a release duration of > 60 minutes.Month 20XXOCGS 3-40EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovs1ter Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU1 (cont)Basis:This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by alow-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extendedperiod of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release). It includes any gaseous or liquidradiological release, monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivitydischarge permit is normally prepared.Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release ofradioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controlsestablished to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentionalreleases. The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to theenvironment is indicative of degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are also included to provide a basis for classifying events andconditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plantconditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALsmore fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.Releases should not be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 4 timesrelease limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.The radwaste liquid discharge system is currently closed off with a plant modificationinstalled blank flange. To perform a discharge would require a plant modification toremove the flange. Since the liquid radwaste system is not operable, no EAL thresholdhas been developed for this release point.EAL #1 BasisThis EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitoredgaseous effluent pathways.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sampleanalyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills ofradioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-41EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRUI (cont);Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU2. EP-EAL-061 0, Criteria for Choosing Radiological Gaseous Effluent EAL ThresholdOyster Creek Generating Station3. BNE Correspondence dated February 1, 20074. CY-OC-1 70-301, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual for Oyster Creek5. ABN-27, Inadvertent Overboard Radioactive Release or Cross ContaminationMonth 20XXOCGS 3-42EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station Annex FvAimnn NMiurIanrThhIA OCOw a-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisTable OCGS 3-2RECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA2Initiating Condition:Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.OR2. Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel asindicated by ANY Table R2 Radiation Monitor reading >1000 mRem/hr.Table R2 Refuel Floor ARM's" C-5, Crit Mon* C-10, North Wall* C-9, North Wall" B-9, Open FloorBasis:REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through whichirradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below theflange..IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met within arelatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) betweenareas containing radioactive substances and the environment.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiatedfuel assembly. These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personneland are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment. As such, theyrepresent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that theloaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss ofthe CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-43EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
N f)vster Creek Generatinn Station AnnexFyoInn Nia-IlearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA2 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #1 BasisThis EAL escalates from RU2 in that the loss of level, in the affected portion of theREFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery ofirradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visualobservation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as well as significantchanges in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters. Computational aidsmay also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL shouldbe based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.While an area radiation monitor could detect a rise in a dose rate due to a lowering ofwater level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be areliable indication of whether or not the fuel is actually uncovered. To the degreepossible, readings should be considered in combination with other available indications ofinventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage toirradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of anassembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly. A rise in readings on radiationmonitors should be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of apotential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).Escalation of the emergency would be based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA22. RAP G-7-a, SKM SRG TNK LVL LO-LO3. RAP-1OF-1-m, Crit Mon C5 Hi4. RAP-10F-3-m, North Wall C9 Hi Vent Trip5. RAP-10F-2-m, North Wall C10 Hi6. RAP-10F-4-m, North Wall B9 Hi Vent TripMonth 20XXOCGS 3-44EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovater Creek Ganeratina Station AnnexExelon NuclearOster Creek Gener...t... Sion....Anne...Exelon Nuc.earTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU2Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of water level above irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. a. UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated byANY of the following:* Refueling Cavity water level < 583 inches (GEMAC Wide Range,floodup calibration).OR" Indication or report of a drop in water level in the REFUELINGPATHWAY.ANDb. UNPLANNED Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on ANY radiation monitorsin Table R2.Table R2 Refuel Floor ARM's* C-5, Grit Mon" C-10, North Wall* C-9, North Wall* B-9, Open FloorMonth 20XXOCGS 3-45EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
IF:alnn INl-hlanrOvster Creek Generatinn Station Annex FcInMi~~iTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU2 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.REFUELING PATHWAY: all the cavities, tubes, canals and pools through whichirradiated fuel may be moved or stored, but not including the reactor vessel below theflange.This IC addresses a loss in water level above irradiated fuel sufficient to cause elevatedradiation levels. This condition could be a precursor to a more serious event and is alsoindicative of a minor loss in the ability to control radiation levels within the plant. It istherefore a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.A water level loss will be primarily determined by indications from available levelinstrumentation. Other sources of level indications may include reports from plantpersonnel (e.g., from a refueling crew) or video camera observations (if available) or fromany other temporarily installed monitoring instrumentation. A significant drop in the waterlevel may also cause a rise in the radiation levels of adjacent areas that can be detectedby monitors in those locations.The effects of planned evolutions should be considered. For example, a refueling bridgearea radiation monitor reading may rise due to planned evolutions such as lifting of thereactor vessel head or movement of a fuel assembly. Note that this EAL is applicableonly in cases where the elevated reading is due to an UNPLANNED loss of water level.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified inaccordance Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RA2.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AU22. RP-AA-203 Exposure Control and Authorization3. RAP-G-7-a, SKM SRG TNK LVL LO-LO4. 205.94.0 RPV Floodup Using Core Spray5. 205.95.0 Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down6. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-46EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Fv~Inn M.uI0~rQ --f,-r Creek Generating Station Annex Fvalnn N"ManrTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA3Initiating Condition:Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations,cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:If the equipment in the room or area listed in Table R4 was already inoperable, orout of service, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification iswarranted.1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following Table R3 areas:Table R3Areas Requiring Continuous Occupancy" Main Control Room" Central Alarm Station -(by survey)OR2. UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or significantly impedeaccess to ANY of the following Table R4 plant rooms or areas:Table R4Areas with Entry Related Mode ApplicabilityArea Entry Related ModeApplicabilityReactor Building* Modes 3 and 4*Areas required to establish shutdown coolingMonth 20XXOCGS3-47EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExellon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA3 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient topreclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to transition the plantfrom normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plantprocedures. As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of thelevel of safety of the plant. The Emergency Director should consider the cause of theincreased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.Table R4 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability that containequipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plant fromnormal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operatingprocedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plantwould not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown.This Table does not include rooms or areas for which entry is required solely to performactions of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routineinspections).Rooms and areas listed in EAL #1 do not need to be included in EAL #2, including theControl Room.For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, ormay be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the elevatedradiation levels preclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergencyclassification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of theincreased radiation levels. Access should be considered as impeded if extraordinarymeasures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g.,installing temporary shielding beyond that required by procedures, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normaladministrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply." The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time ofthe elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiationrise occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdowndo not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4." The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includescompensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room orarea (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).Month 20XXOCGS 3-48EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(1uQfPr rragk rýpnarnfinn Station AnnoyI=valnn NI A~,Qt~r Cr~s~k (~g~n~r~tinn ~t2tinn Ann~v Fv~Inn Mmmr~Ia~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRA3 (cont)Basis (cont):* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or recordkeeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections)." The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, andwould not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, Cor F lCs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, AA32. ABN-29, Plant Fires3. EMG-3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control Safe Shutdown AreaMonth 20XXOCGS 3-49EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Fxnlnn Ouster Creek Generatinn St~ation Annexv ExeInn Nucla~IirTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTRU3Initiating Condition:Reactor coolant activity greater than Technical Specification allowable limits.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Offgas system radiation monitor Hi-Hi alarm.OR2. Specific coolant activity > 4.0 uCl/gm Dose equivalent 1-131.Basis:This IC addresses a reactor coolant activity value that exceeds an allowable limitspecified in Technical Specifications. This condition is a precursor to a more significantevent and represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Conditions that cause the specified monitor to alarm that are not related to fuel claddegradation should not result in the declaration of an Unusual Event.This EAL addresses site-specific radiation monitor readings that provide indication of adegradation of fuel clad integrity.An Unusual Event is only warranted when actual fuel clad damage is the cause of theelevated coolant sample activity (as determined by laboratory confirmation). Fuel claddamage should be assumed to be the cause of elevated Reactor Coolant activity unlessanother cause is known.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs FA1 or the RecognitionCategory R ICs.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU32. Technical Specifications 3.6.A3. ABN-26, High Main Steam Line or Off Gas Activity4. RAP10F-1-c, Offgas HI-HIMonth 20XXOCGS 3-50EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFG1Initiating Condition:Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential Loss of the third barrier.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determinebarrier status.Basis:Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.At the General Emergency classification level each barrier is weighted equally.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-51EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFS1Initiating Condition:Loss or Potential Loss of ANY two barriers.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determinebarrier status.Basis:Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.At the Site Area Emergency classification level, each barrier is weighted equally.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-52EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) f)afme*r 9~nmak t'Z~ng2rt*i nr -Qfnfin An nmmvF::yg'-Inn kh irl-hnrJL ksTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFA1Initiating Condition:ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Refer to Fission Product Barrier Loss and Potential Loss threshold values to determinebarrier status.Basis:Fuel Cladding, RCS and Containment comprise the fission product barriers.At the Alert classification level, Fuel Cladding and RCS barriers are weighted moreheavily than the Containment barrier. Unlike the Containment barrier, loss or potentialloss of either the Fuel Cladding or RCS barrier may result in the relocation of radioactivematerials or degradation of core cooling capability. Note that the loss or potential loss ofContainment barrier in combination with loss or potential loss of either Fuel Cladding orRCS barrier results in declaration of a Site Area Emergency under EAL FS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-53EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExalan NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFClInitiating Condition:RCS ActivityOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSSCoolant activity > 300 uCilgm Dose Equivalent 1-131.Basis:This threshold indicates that RCS radioactivity concentration is greater than 300 ýLCi/gmdose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level is greater than thatexpected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate range of 2% to 5% fuelclad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amount of fuel claddamage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.It is recognized that sample collection and analysis of reactor coolant with highlyelevated activity levels could require several hours to complete. Nonetheless, asample-related threshold is included as a backup to other indications.There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with RCS Activity.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-54EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC2Initiating Condition:RPV Water LevelOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Plant conditions indicate primary containment flooding is required.POTENTIAL LOSS2. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > 0 inches TAF.OR3. RPV water level cannot be determined.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThe Loss threshold represents the EOP requirement for primary containment flooding.This is identified in the BWROG EPGs/SAGs when the phrase, "Primary ContainmentFlooding Is Required," appears. Since a site-specific RPV water level is not specifiedhere, the Loss threshold phrase, "Primary containment flooding required," alsoaccommodates the EOP need to flood the primary containment when RPV water levelcannot be determined and core damage due to inadequate core cooling is believed tobe occurring.Potential Loss Threshold #2 and #3 BasisThis water level corresponds to the top of the active fuel and is used in the EOPs toindicate a challenge to core cooling.The RPV water level threshold is the same as RCS Barrier RC2 Loss threshold. Thus,this threshold indicates a Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier and a Loss of the RCSbarrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification level to a Site AreaEmergency.This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specificEOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified levelfollowing depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of theRCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injectionsources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization. EOPs allow the operator a widechoice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to withinprescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitateRPV water level control with low-pressure injection sources. In some events, elevatedRPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops belowthe shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this Fuel Clad barrierPotential Loss is met only after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or requiredMonth 20XXOCGS 3-55EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) tl afar r-rank rZonarnfin -CZ+n+inn Annovlnnhr-lonrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC2 (cont)Basis (cont):emergency RPV depressurization has been attempted, giving the operator anopportunity to assess the capability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPVwater level or 2) no low pressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPVdepressurization in an attempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory.The term "cannot be restored and maintained above" means the value of RPV waterlevel is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). Thedetermination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relationto the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when athreshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does notrequire immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of activefuel, but does not permit extended operation below the limit; the threshold must beconsidered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot beattained.In high-power ATWS/failure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator todeliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although suchaction is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need toreduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictatethe need for emergency classification.Since the loss of ability to determine if adequate core cooling is being provided presentsa significant challenge to the fuel clad barrier, a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier isspecified.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -With ATWS4. EMG-3200.08A, RPV Flooding -No ATWS5. EMG-3200.08B, RPV Flooding -With ATWS6. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment ControlMonth 20XXOCGS 3-56EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC5Initiating Condition:Primary Containment RadiationOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSSContainment Hi Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading > 530 R/hr.Basis:The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactorcoolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activityequals 300 ýtCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131. Reactor coolant activity above this level isgreater than that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to an approximate rangeof 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. Since this condition indicates that a significant amountof fuel clad damage has occurred, it represents a loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.The radiation monitor reading in this threshold is higher than that specified for RCSBarrier RC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad Barrier andthe RCS Barrier. Note that a combination of the two monitor readings appropriatelyescalates the emergency classification level to a Site Area Emergency.There is no Fuel Clad Barrier Potential Loss threshold associated with PrimaryContainment Radiation.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. Core Damage Assessment MethodologyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-57EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONFC7Initiating Condition:Emergency Director Judgment.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the FuelClad Barrier.POTENTIAL LOSS2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Lossof the Fuel Clad Barrier.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the EmergencyDirector in determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is lost.Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Directorin determining whether the Fuel Clad Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Directorshould also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the eventthat barrier status cannot be monitored.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-58EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
FYelnn N rOvster Creek Generatinn Station Annex FwAlnn NuclarIzrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC2Initiating Condition:RPV Water LevelOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > 0 inches TAF.OR2. RPV water level cannot be determined.Basis:This water level corresponds to the Top of Active Fuel (TAF) and is used in the EOPs toindicate challenge to core cooling.The RPV water level threshold is the same as Fuel Clad Barrier FC2 Potential Lossthreshold. Thus, this threshold indicates a Loss of the RCS barrier and Potential Loss ofthe Fuel Clad barrier and that appropriately escalates the emergency classification levelto a Site Area Emergency.This threshold is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specificEOPs, RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified levelfollowing depressurization of the RPV (either manually, automatically or by failure of theRCS barrier) or when procedural guidance or a lack of low pressure RPV injectionsources preclude Emergency RPV depressurization EOPs allow the operator a widechoice of RPV injection sources to consider when restoring RPV water level to withinprescribed limits. EOPs also specify depressurization of the RPV in order to facilitateRPV water level control with low-pressure injection sources. In some events, elevatedRPV pressure may prevent restoration of RPV water level until pressure drops belowthe shutoff heads of available injection sources. Therefore, this RCS barrier Loss is metonly after either: 1) the RPV has been depressurized, or required emergency RPVdepressurization has been attempted, giving the operator an opportunity to assess thecapability of low-pressure injection sources to restore RPV water level or 2) no lowpressure RPV injection systems are available, precluding RPV depressurization in anattempt to minimize loss of RPV inventory.The term, "cannot be restored and maintained above," means the value of RPV waterlevel is not able to be brought above the specified limit (top of active fuel). Thedetermination requires an evaluation of system performance and availability in relationto the RPV water level value and trend. A threshold prescribing declaration when athreshold value cannot be restored and maintained above a specified limit does notrequire immediate action simply because the current value is below the top of activefuel, but does not permit extended operation beyond the limit; the threshold must beconsidered reached as soon as it is apparent that the top of active fuel cannot beattained.Month 20XXOCGS 3-59EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) l::Ymlnn Ovster Creek Generatinn St~ation Annex FYAlnn N~ir-lonrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC2 (cont)Basis (cont):In high-power ATWS/failure to scram events, EOPs may direct the operator todeliberately lower RPV water level in order to reduce reactor power. Although suchaction is a challenge to core cooling and the Fuel Clad barrier, the immediate need toreduce reactor power is the higher priority. For such events, ICs MA3 or MS3 will dictatethe need for emergency classification.There is no RCS Potential Loss threshold associated with RPV water level.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline3. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP Users GuideMonth 20XXOCGS 3-60EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) nvster Creek Generatina Station Anne~x FviaInn NucleIarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC3Initiating Condition:Primary Containment PressureOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Drywell pressure > 3.0 psig.AND2. Drywell pressure rise is due to RCS leakageBasis:The > 3.0 psig primary containment pressure is the Drywell high pressure setpointwhich indicates a LOCA by automatically initiating ECCS.The second threshold condition focuses the fission product barrier loss threshold on afailure of the RCS instead of the non-LOCA malfunctions that may adversely affectprimary containment pressure. Pressures of this magnitude can be caused by non-LOCA events such as a loss of Drywell cooling or inability to control primarycontainment vent/purge.The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of anyrelief valve does not warrant an emergency classification.A stuck-open Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) or EMRV leakage is not consideredeither identified or unidentified leakage by Technical Specification and, therefore, is notapplicable to this EAL.There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Pressure.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's GuideMonth 20XXOCGS 3-61EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC4Initiating Condition:RCS Leak RateOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. UNISOLABLE Main Steam Line (MSL), Isolation Condenser, Feedwater, or RWCUline break.OR2. Emergency RPV Depressurization is required.POTENTIAL LOSS3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following:a. Secondary Containment area temperature > EMG-3200.11 Max Normal(Table 11) operating level.ORb. Secondary Containment area radiation level > EMG-3200.11 Max Normal(Table 12) operating level.Basis:UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely orlocally.Classification of a system break over system leakage is based on information availableto the Control Room from the event. Indications that should be considered are:* Reports describing magnitude of steam or water release." Use of system high flow alarms / indications, if available," Significant changes in makeup requirements," Abnormal reactor water level changes in response to the event.The use of the above indications provides the Control Room the bases to determine thatthe ongoing event is more significant than the indications that would be expected fromsystem leakage and therefore should be considered a system break.Loss Threshold #1 BasisLarge high-energy lines that rupture outside primary containment can dischargesignificant amounts of inventory and jeopardize the pressure-retaining capability of theRCS until they are isolated. If it is determined that the ruptured line cannot be promptlyisolated, the RCS barrier Loss threshold is met.Month 20XXOCGS 3-62EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC4 (cont)Basis (cont):Loss Threshold #2 BasisEmergency RPV Depressurization in accordance with the EOPs is indicative of a loss ofthe RCS barrier. If Emergency RPV Depressurization is performed, the plant operatorsare directed to open Electromatic relief valves (EMRVs) and keep them open. Eventhough the RCS is being vented into the torus, a Loss of the RCS barrier exists due tothe diminished effectiveness of the RCS to retain fission products within its boundary.Potential Loss Threshold #3 BasisPotential loss of RCS based on primary system leakage outside the primarycontainment is determined from EOP temperature or radiation Max Normal Operatingvalues in areas such as Trunnion room, Isolation Condenser, RWCU etc., whichindicate a direct path from the RCS to areas outside primary containment.A Max Normal Operating value is the highest value of the identified parameter expectedto occur during normal plant operating conditions with all directly associated supportand control systems functioning properly.The indicators reaching the threshold barriers and confirmed to be caused by RCSleakage from a primary system warrant an Alert classification. A primary system isdefined to be the pipes, valves, and other equipment which connect directly to the RPVsuch that a reduction in RPV pressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water beingdischarged through an unisolated break in the system.In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system isdischarging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area radiation conditiondoes not necessarily indicate that a primary system is discharging into the ReactorBuilding since this may be caused by radiation shine from nearby steam lines or themovement of radioactive materials. Conversely, a high area radiation condition inconjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, high area temperatures, reports ofsteam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpectedMain Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharginginto the Reactor Building.An UNISOLABLE leak which is indicated by Max Normal Operating values escalates toa Site Area Emergency when combined with Containment Barrier CT6 Loss Threshold#1 (after a containment isolation) and a General Emergency when the Fuel Clad Barriercriteria is also exceeded.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.11, Secondary Containment Control3. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical GuidelineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-63EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
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- S* * ** 4*** .I .tt.. U-... .fl a.,. ..b..4.Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC5Initiating Condition:Primary Containment RadiationOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSSContainment Hi Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading > IOOR/hr.Basis:The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactorcoolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that reactor coolant activityequals Technical Specification allowable limits. This value is lower than that specifiedfor Fuel Clad Barrier FC5 Loss Threshold since it indicates a loss of the RCS Barrieronly.There is no Reactor Coolant System Potential Loss threshold associated with PrimaryContainment Radiation.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EP-EAL-061 1, Criteria for Choosing Containment Radiation Monitor ReadingIndicative of Loss of RCS BarrierMonth 20XXOCGS 3-64EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONRC7Initiating Condition:Emergency Director Judgment.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of the RCSBarrier.POTENTIAL LOSS2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Lossof the RCS Barrier.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the EmergencyDirector in determining whether the RCS Barrier is lost.Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Directorin determining whether the RCS Barrier is potentially lost. The Emergency Directorshould also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in the eventthat barrier status cannot be monitored.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-65EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT2Initiating Condition:RPV Water LevelOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:POTENTIAL LOSSPlant conditions indicate primary containment flooding is required.Basis:The Potential Loss threshold is identical to the Fuel Clad Barrier FC2 Loss thresholdRPV water level. The Potential Loss requirement for Primary Containment Floodingindicates adequate core cooling cannot be restored and maintained and that coredamage is possible. BWR EOPs/SAMGs specify the conditions that require primarycontainment flooding. When primary containment flooding is required, the EOPs areexited and SAMGs are entered. Entry into SAMGs is a logical escalation in response tothe inability to restore and maintain adequate core cooling.PRA studies indicate that the condition of this Potential Loss threshold could be a coremelt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to RPV failure and increased potentialfor primary containment failure. In conjunction with the RPV water level Loss thresholdsin the Fuel Clad and RCS barrier columns, this threshold results in the declaration of aGeneral Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -With ATWS3. EMG-3200.08A, RPV Flooding -No ATWS4. EMG-3200.08B, RPV Flooding -With ATWS5. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control6. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWSMonth 20XXOCGS 3-66EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT3Initiating Condition:Primary Containment ConditionsOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. UNPLANNED rapid drop in Drywell pressure following Drywell pressure rise.OR2. Drywell pressure response not consistent with LOCA conditions.POTENTIAL LOSS3. Drywell pressure > 44 psig and rising.OR4. a. Drywell or Torus Hydrogen concentration > 6%.ANDb. Drywell or Torus Oxygen concentration > 5%.OR5. Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (EMG-3200.02 Fig. F) exceeded.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.Loss Threshold #1 and #2 BasisRapid UNPLANNED loss of Drywell pressure (i.e., not attributable to Drywell spray orcondensation effects) following an initial pressure rise indicates a loss of Drywellintegrity. Drywell pressure should rise as a result of mass and energy release into theDrywell from a LOCA. Thus, Drywell pressure not increasing under these conditionsindicates a loss of primary containment integrity.These thresholds rely on operator recognition of an unexpected response for thecondition and therefore a specific value is not assigned. The unexpected(UNPLANNED) response is important because it is the indicator for a containmentbypass condition. A pressure suppression bypass path would not be an indication of acontainment breach.Month 20XXOCGS 3-67EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT3 (cont)Basis (cont):Potential Loss Threshold #3 BasisThe threshold pressure is the Drywell internal design pressure. Structural acceptancetesting demonstrates the capability of the Drywell to resist pressures greater than theinternal design pressure. A pressure of this magnitude is greater than those expected toresult from any design basis accident and, thus, represent a Potential Loss of theContainment barrier.Potential Loss Threshold #4 BasisIf hydrogen concentration reaches or exceeds the lower flammability limit, as defined inplant EOPs, in an oxygen rich environment, a potentially explosive mixture exists. If thecombustible mixture ignites inside the primary containment, loss of the Containmentbarrier could occur.Potential Loss Threshold #5 BasisThe HCTL is a function of RPV pressure, torus temperature and torus water level. It isutilized to preclude failure of the containment and equipment in the containmentnecessary for the safe shutdown of the plant and therefore, the inability to maintainplant parameters below the limit constitutes a potential loss of containment.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. FSAR Update 6.2.1.1.33. Technical Specifications 5.2 Basis4. EMG-3200.02 Primary Containment ControlMonth 20XXOCGS 3-68EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT5Initiating Condition:Primary Containment RadiationOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:POTENTIAL LOSSContainment Hi Range Radiation Monitoring System (CHRRMS) reading > 1210 R/hr.Basis:There is no Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment Radiation.The radiation monitor reading corresponds to an instantaneous release of all reactorcoolant mass into the primary containment, assuming that 20% of the fuel cladding hasfailed. This level of fuel clad failure is well above that used to determine the analogousFuel Clad Barrier Loss and RCS Barrier Loss thresholds.NUREG-1228, Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear PowerPlant Accidents, indicates the fuel clad failure must be greater than approximately 20%in order for there to be a major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protectiveactions. For this condition to exist there must already have been a loss of the RCSBarrier and the Fuel Clad Barrier. It is therefore prudent to treat this condition as apotential loss of containment which would then escalate the emergency classificationlevel to a General Emergency.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. Core Damage Assessment Methodology (CDAM)Month 20XXOCGS 3-69EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT6Initiating Condition:Primary Containment Isolation FailureOperating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after primarycontainment isolation signal.OR2. Intentional Primary Containment venting/purging per EOPs or SAMGs due toaccident conditions.OR3. UNISOLABLE primary system leakage that results in EITHER of the following:a. Secondary Containment area temperature > EMG-3200.11 Max Safe(Table 11) operating level.ORb. Secondary Containment area radiation level > EMG-3200.11 Max Safe (Table12) operating level.Basis:UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely orlocally.These thresholds address incomplete containment isolation that allows anUNISOLABLE direct release to the environment.Loss Threshold #1 BasisThe use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates againstrelease paths through interfacing liquid systems or minor release pathways, such asinstrument lines, not protected by the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS).Leakage into a closed system is to be considered only if the closed system is breachedand thereby creates a significant pathway to the environment. Examples includeunisolable Main Steamline, Isolation Condenser line breaks, unisolable RWCU systembreaks, and unisolable containment atmosphere vent paths.Examples of "downstream pathway to the environment" could be through theTurbine/Condenser, or direct release to the Turbine or Reactor Building.The existence of a filter is not considered in the threshold assessment. Filters do notremove fission product noble gases. In addition, a filter could become ineffective due toiodine and/or particulate loading beyond design limits (i.e., retention ability has beenexceeded) or water saturation from steam/high humidity in the release stream.Month 20XXOCGS 3-70EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Gonaratina Station AnnaxI=xelon Nuclearte Creek ..e...er.. ......... Stat......Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT6 (cont)Basis (cont):Following the leakage of RCS mass into primary containment and a rise in primarycontainment pressure, there may be minor radiological releases associated withallowable primary containment leakage through various penetrations or systemcomponents. Minor releases may also occur if a primary containment isolation valve(s)fails to close but the primary containment atmosphere escapes to an enclosed system.These releases do not constitute a loss or potential loss of primary containment butshould be evaluated using the Recognition Category R ICs.Loss Threshold #2 BasisEOPs may direct primary containment isolation valve logic(s) to be intentionallybypassed, even if offsite radioactivity release rate limits will be exceeded. Under theseconditions with a valid primary containment isolation signal, the containment should alsobe considered lost if primary containment venting is actually performed.Intentional venting of primary containment for primary containment pressure orcombustible gas control to the secondary containment and/or the environment is a Lossof the Containment. Venting for primary containment pressure control when not in anaccident situation (e.g., to control pressure below the Drywell high pressure scramsetpoint) does not meet the threshold condition.Loss Threshold #3 BasisThe Max Safe Operating Temperature and the Max Safe Operating Radiation Level areeach the highest value of these parameters at which neither: (1) equipment necessaryfor the safe shutdown of the plant will fail, nor (2) personnel access necessary for thesafe shutdown of the plant will be precluded. EOPs utilize these temperatures andradiation levels to establish conditions under which RPV depressurization is required.The temperatures and radiation levels should be confirmed to be caused by RCSleakage from a primary system. A primary system is defined to be the pipes, valves, andother equipment which connect directly to the RPV such that a reduction in RPVpressure will effect a decrease in the steam or water being discharged through anunisolated break in the system.In general, multiple indications should be used to determine if a primary system isdischarging outside Primary Containment. For example, a high area radiation conditiondoes not necessarily indicate that a primary system is discharging into the ReactorBuilding since this may. be caused by radiation shine from nearby steam lines or themovement of radioactive materials. Conversely, a high area radiation condition inconjunction with other indications (e.g. room flooding, high area temperatures, reports ofsteam in the Reactor Building, an unexpected rise in Feedwater flowrate, or unexpectedMain Turbine Control Valve closure) may indicate that a primary system is discharginginto the Reactor Building.In combination with RCS Barrier RC4 Potential Loss Threshold #3 this threshold wouldresult in a Site Area Emergency.Month 20XXOCGS 3-71EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT6 (cont)Basis (cont):There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with Primary Containment IsolationFailure.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-22. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline3. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control4. Support Procedures -32, -34, -41, -445. 2000-GLN-3200.03, OCNGS Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for SevereAccident Guidelines6. EMG-3200.11, Secondary Containment ControlMonth 20XXOCGS 3-72EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
(I cfar rrank rZanarnfin -Qfntinn AnnavI~y-nlrn ki1,,rl-orfl~,Qt~r Cr~'k fl~n~r~atinn ~t2tinn Ann~v Fv~Ir~n hi. it ia~rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYFISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATIONCT7Initiating Condition:Emergency Director Judgment.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Fission Product Barrier (FPB) Threshold:LOSS1. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Loss of theContainment Barrier.POTENTIAL LOSS2. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates Potential Lossof the Containment Barrier.Basis:Loss Threshold #1 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that are to be used by the EmergencyDirector in determining whether the Containment Barrier is lost.Potential Loss Threshold #2 BasisThis threshold addresses any other factors that may be used by the Emergency Directorin determining whether the Containment Barrier is potentially lost. The EmergencyDirector should also consider whether or not to declare the barrier potentially lost in theevent that barrier status cannot be monitored.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, Table 9-F-2Month 20XXOCGS 3-73EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex.......... w .....Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG1Initiating Condition:Prolonged loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC power to emergency busses.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1 Loss of ALL offsite AC power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. EITHER of the following:a. Restoration of at least one 4160V Bus (1C or 1D) in < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is not likely.ORb. RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -20 inches TAF.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a prolonged loss of all power sources to AC emergency buses. Aloss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiringelectric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heatremoval/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. Aprolonged loss of these buses will lead to a loss of any fission product barriers. Inaddition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may be degraded under theseconditions.The EAL should require declaration of a General Emergency prior to meeting thethresholds for IC FGI. This will allow additional time for implementation of offsiteprotective actions.Escalation of the emergency classification from Site Area Emergency will occur if it isprojected that power cannot be restored to at least one AC emergency bus by the endof the analyzed station blackout coping period. Beyond this time, plant responses andMonth 20XXOCGS 3-74EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG1 (cont)Basis (cont):event trajectory are subject to greater uncertainty, and there is an increased likelihoodof challenges to multiple fission product barriers.The estimate for restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realisticappraisal of the situation. Mitigation actions with a low probability of success should notbe used as a basis for delaying a classification upgrade. The goal is to maximize thetime available to prepare for, and implement, protective actions for the public.The EAL will also require a General Emergency declaration if the loss of AC powerresults in parameters that indicate an inability to adequately remove decay heat fromthe core.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG12. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout6. TDR-1099, "Station Blackout Evaluation Report"7. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide8. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline9. OCNGS Drawing BR 300010. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site PowerMonth 20XXOCGS 3-75EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek GeAnerztina Staition Annex Fvalnn NHamur~ITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS1Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes orlonger.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. Loss of ALL offsite AC Power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. Failure to restore power to at least one 4160V Bus (1C or 1D) in < 15 minutes fromthe time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of allSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycore cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink. In addition, fission product barrier monitoring capabilities may bedegraded under these conditions. This IC represents a condition that involves actual orlikely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RG1, FG1, MG1, orMG2.Month 20XXOCGS 3-76EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS12. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System3. OCNGS Drawing BR 30004. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power5. ABN-37, Station Blackout6. ABN-60, Grid EmergencyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-77EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA1Initiating Condition:Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and 1 D reduced to only one of the followingpower sources for > 15 minutes.* Startup Transformer SA* Startup Transformer SB* EDG-1 Emergency Diesel Generator* EDG-2 Emergency Diesel GeneratorAND2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC power toSAFETY SYSTEMS.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources suchthat any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETYSYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or morethan one, train of safety-related equipment. This IC provides an escalation path from ICMUI.An "AC power source" is a source recognized in ABNs and EOPs, and capable ofsupplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition arepresented below.* A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator).Month 20XXOCGS 3-78EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA1 (cont)Basis (cont):" A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator.* A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a singletrain of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof power.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA12. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System2. OCNGS Drawing BR 30003. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power4. ABN-37, Station Blackout5. ABN-60, Grid EmergencyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-79EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU1Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite AC power capability to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.Loss of ALL offsite AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and 1 D for >15 minutes.Basis:This IC addresses a prolonged loss of offsite power. The loss of offsite power sourcesrenders the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of power to AC emergency buses.This condition represents a potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant.For emergency classification purposes, "capability" means that an offsite AC powersource(s) is available to the emergency buses, whether or not the buses are poweredfrom it.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof offsite power.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MAI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System3. OCNGS Drawing BR 30004. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power5. ABN-60, Grid EmergencyMonth 20XXOCGS 3-80EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(I afar ('rAmak (' Zonarnfin -Qf2fien AnnovP::v~mlnn Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG2Initiating Condition:Loss of all AC and Vital DC power sources for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. Loss of ALL offsite AC power to 4160V Busesl C and 1 D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND3. Voltage is < 115 VDC on 125 VDC battery busses B and C.AND4. ALL AC and Vital DC power sources have been lost for > 15 minutes.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a concurrent and prolonged loss of both AC and Vital DC power. Aloss of all AC power compromises the performance of all SAFETY SYSTEMS requiringelectric power including those necessary for emergency core cooling, containment heatremoval/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal and the ultimate heat sink. A loss ofVital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control SAFETY SYSTEMS. Asustained loss of both AC and DC power will lead to multiple challenges to fissionproduct barriers.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses. The 15-minute emergency declaration clock begins at the point when all EALconditions are met.Month 20XXOCGS 3-81EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMG2 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SG82. UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems3. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power System4. OCNGS Drawing BR 30005. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power6. ABN-37, Station Blackout7. ABN-60, Grid Emergency8. ABN-54, Loss of DC Distribution Center B9. ABN-55, Loss of DC Distribution Center CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-82EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS2Initiating Condition:Loss of all vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.Voltage is < 115 VDC on 125 VDC battery busses B and C for> 15 minutes.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitorand control SAFETY SYSTEMS. In modes above Cold Shutdown, this conditioninvolves a major failure of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs RG1, FG1 or MG2.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS82. OCNGS Drawing BR 30003. ABN-54, Loss of DC Distribution Center B4. ABN-55, Loss of DC Distribution Center CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-83EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rAw~tar (rrjok (0narntinn Station Annex Pvalnn NII-vlInrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS3Initiating Condition:Inability to shutdown the reactor causing a challenge to RPV Water Level or RCS heatremoval.Operating Mode Applicability:1Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 2%.AND2. ALL manual / ARI actions to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful asindicated by Reactor Power > 2%.AND3. EITHER of the following conditions exist:* RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -20 inches TAF.OR" Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (EMG-3200.02 Fig. F) exceeded.Basis:This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manualreactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, all subsequent operator manualactions, both inside and outside the Control Room including driving in control rods andboron injection, are unsuccessful, and continued power generation is challenging thecapability to adequately remove heat from the core and/or the RCS. This condition willlead to fuel damage if additional mitigation actions are unsuccessful and thus warrantsthe declaration of a Site Area Emergency.In some instances, the emergency classification resulting from this IC/EAL may behigher than that resulting from an assessment of the plant responses and symptomsagainst the Recognition Category F ICs/EALs. This is appropriate in that theRecognition Category F ICs/EALs do not address the additional threat posed by afailure to shutdown the reactor. The inclusion of this IC and EAL ensures the timelydeclaration of a Site Area Emergency in response to prolonged failure to shutdown thereactor.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency OperatingProcedure criteria.EAL #3 is considered to be exceeded when, as specified in the site-specific EOPs, RPVwater level cannot be restored and maintained above the specified level.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC RG1 or FG1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-84EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMS3 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SS52. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -with ATWS3. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide5. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline6. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -no ATWSMonth 20XXOCGS 3-85EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) rflu~tar (rraek Generating St~ation Annex Fvalnn NucleIazrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA3Initiating Condition:Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent manualactions taken at the reactor control consoles are not successful in shutting down thereactor.Operating Mode Applicability:1Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:0 A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes thecontrol rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manuallydriving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.1. Automatic or manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by ReactorPower > 2%.AND2. Manual / ARI actions taken at the Reactor Console are not successful in shuttingdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power > 2%.Basis:This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manualreactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manualactions taken at the reactor consoles to shutdown the reactor are also unsuccessful.This condition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level ofsafety of the plant. An emergency declaration is required even if the reactor issubsequently shutdown by an action taken away from the reactor consoles since thisevent entails a significant failure of the RPS.A manual action at the reactor consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, whichcauses the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manualreactor scram. This action does not include manually driving in control rods orimplementation of boron injection strategies. If this action(s) is unsuccessful, operatorswould immediately pursue additional manual actions at locations away from the reactorconsoles (e.g., locally opening breakers). Actions taken at back-panels or otherlocations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are notconsidered to be "at the reactor consoles".Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scramaction.Month 20XXOCGS 3-86EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA3 (cont)Basis (cont):The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will varybased upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event,availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, otherconcurrent plant conditions, etc. If the failure to shutdown the reactor is prolongedenough to cause a challenge to the RPV water level or RCS heat removal safetyfunctions, the emergency classification level will escalate to a Site Area Emergency viaIC MS3. Depending upon plant responses and symptoms, escalation is also possiblevia IC FS1. Absent the plant conditions needed to meet either IC MS3 or FS1, an Alertdeclaration is appropriate for this event.It is recognized that plant responses or symptoms may also require an Alert declarationin accordance with the Recognition Category F ICs; however, this IC and EAL areincluded to ensure a timely emergency declaration.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency OperatingProcedure criteria.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA52. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -no ATWS3. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -with ATWS4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide5. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical GuidelineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-87EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) t'l afmar r-rook ('Zonarnfin -Qf!mfien AnnavIPv,-I^n Nim-l-mrA~,a*car (~r~i~Ir (~n~r~tinn ~*~*ir~n Ann~v Mu ir~Ia~r-*o t~e* W ~ *
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- rS* ..*n ~as. .~. ...-~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU3Initiating Condition:Automatic or manual scram fails to shutdown the reactor.Operating Mode Applicability:1Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:A manual action is any operator action, or set of actions, which causes thecontrol rods to be rapidly inserted into the core, and does not include manuallydriving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies.1. a. Automatic scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by ReactorPower > 2%.ANDb. Subsequent manual / ARI action taken at the Reactor Console is successfulin shutting down the reactor.OR2. a. Manual scram did not shutdown the reactor as indicated by Reactor Power> 2%.ANDb. EITHER of the following:1. Subsequent manual / ARI action taken at the Reactor Console issuccessful in shutting down the reactor.OR2. Subsequent automatic scram / ARI is successful in shutting down thereactor.Basis:This IC addresses a failure of the RPS to initiate or complete an automatic or manualreactor scram that results in a reactor shutdown, and either a subsequent operatormanual action taken at the reactor consoles or an automatic scram is successful inshutting down the reactor. This event is a precursor to a more significant condition andthus represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisFollowing the failure on an automatic reactor scram, operators will promptly initiatemanual actions at the reactor consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g., initiate a manualreactor scram). If these manual actions are successful in shutting down the reactor,Month 20XXOCGS 3-88EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) fl afAmr 9'rook (Zanarnfin _Qfnfien Anngv:vgln Nninim11g r* 0 t* .-- .s ... sc... .~. -...c.. .. a-c... .n fl~, *~** * ~ 'Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU3 (cont)Basis (cont):core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decayheat removal systems.EAL #2 BasisIf an initial manual reactor trip is unsuccessful, operators will promptly take manualaction at another location(s) on the reactor consoles to shutdown the reactor (e.g.,initiate a manual reactor scram / ARI using a different switch). Depending upon severalfactors, the initial or subsequent effort to manually scram the reactor, or a concurrentplant condition, may lead to the generation of an automatic reactor scram signal. If asubsequent manual or automatic scram / ARI is successful in shutting down the reactor,core heat generation will quickly fall to a level within the capabilities of the plant's decayheat removal systems.A manual action at the reactor consoles is any operator action, or set of actions, whichcauses the control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core (e.g., initiating a manualreactor scram). This action does not include manually driving in control rods orimplementation of boron injection strategies. Actions taken at back-panels or otherlocations within the Control Room, or any location outside the Control Room, are notconsidered to be "at the reactor consoles".Taking the Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown is considered to be a manual scramaction.The plant response to the failure of an automatic or manual reactor scram will varybased upon several factors including the reactor power level prior to the event,availability of the condenser, performance of mitigation equipment and actions, otherconcurrent plant conditions, etc. If subsequent operator manual actions taken at thereactor consoles are also unsuccessful in shutting down the reactor, then theemergency classification level will escalate to an Alert via IC MA3. Depending upon theplant response, escalation is also possible via IC FAI. Absent the plant conditionsneeded to meet either IC MA3 or FA1, an Unusual Event declaration is appropriate forthis event.A reactor shutdown is determined in accordance with applicable Emergency OperatingProcedure criteria.Should a reactor scram signal be generated as a result of plant work (e.g., RPS setpointtesting), the following classification guidance should be applied." If the signal generated as a result of plant work causes a plant transient that createsa real condition that should have included an automatic reactor scram and the RPSfails to automatically shutdown the reactor, then this IC and the EALs are applicable,and should be evaluated." If the signal generated as a result of plant work does not cause a plant transient butshould have generated an RPS scram signal and the scram failure is determinedthrough other means (e.g., assessment of test results), then this IC and the EALsare not applicable and no classification is warranted.Month 20XXOCGS 3-89EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU3 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU52. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -no ATWS3. EMG-3200.01 B, RPV Control -with ATWS4. 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User's Guide5. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical GuidelineMonth 20XXOCGS 3-90EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatinq Station AnnexExelon NuclearExelon NuclearOyster Creek Generatinq Station Annex Exelon Nude~rTable OCGS 3-2OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA4Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer with asignificant transient in progress.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameterfrom within the Control Room for > 15 minutes.Table M1 Control Room Parameters* Reactor Power" RPV Water Level* RPV Pressure* Drywell Pressure* Torus Water Level* Torus Water TemperatureAND2. ANY Table M2 transient in progress.Table M2 Significant Transients" Turbine Trip* Reactor Scram* ECCS Actuation" Thermal power change > 25%* Thermal Power oscillations > 10%Month 20XXOCGS 3-91EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovstar Creek Gonaratina Station AnnaxExplon NuciparTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA4 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECOS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring rapidly changing plantconditions during a transient without the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parametersfrom within the Control Room. During this condition, the margin to a potential fissionproduct barrier challenge is reduced. It thus represents a potential substantialdegradation in the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, an "inability to mohitor" means that values for any of the listedparameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation wouldrequire a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). Forexample, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, computerpoint, digital and recorder source within the Control Room.An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems isevaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022)to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if itsignificantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular,emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures,emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing proceduresaddressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective actiondecision-making.This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the keysafety functions of reactivity control, RPV water level and RCS heat removal. The lossof the ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room isconsidered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if allindication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determinethe values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. Forexample, if the value for RPV water level cannot be determined from the indications andrecorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availability ofother parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs FS1 or IC RS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SA2Month 20XXOCGS 3-92EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) nufla~r Cr-rek Ganarpating Rtstinn Annoy Fvalnn Muuit-larTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU4Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of Control Room indications for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:0 The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor ANY Table M1 parameters fromwithin the Control Room for > 15 minutes.Table M1 Control Room Parameters" Reactor Power* RPV Water Level* RPV Pressure* Drywell Pressure* Torus Water Level" Torus Water TemperatureBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses the difficulty associated with monitoring normal plant conditionswithout the ability to obtain SAFETY SYSTEM parameters from within the ControlRoom. This condition is a precursor to a more significant event and represents apotential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, an "inability to monitor" means that values for any of the listedparameters cannot be determined from within the Control Room. This situation wouldrequire a loss of all of the Control Room sources for the given parameter(s). Forexample, the reactor power level cannot be determined from any analog, digital andrecorder source within the Control Room.Month 20XXOCGS 3-93EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
I:xplnn Ovster Creek Generatina Station Annex FvAlnn NiuIclarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU4 (cont)Basis (cont):An event involving a loss of plant indications, annunciators and/or display systems isevaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (and associated guidance in NUREG-1022)to determine if an NRC event report is required. The event would be reported if itsignificantly impaired the capability to perform emergency assessments. In particular,emergency assessments necessary to implement abnormal operating procedures,emergency operating procedures, and emergency plan implementing proceduresaddressing emergency classification, accident assessment, or protective actiondecision-making.This EAL is focused on a selected subset of plant parameters associated with the keysafety functions of reactivity control, core cooling and RCS heat removal. The loss ofthe ability to determine any of these parameters from within the Control Room isconsidered to be more significant than simply a reportable condition. In addition, if allindication sources for any of the listed parameters are lost, then the ability to determinethe values of other SAFETY SYSTEM parameters may be impacted as well. Forexample, if the value for reactor vessel level cannot be determined from the indicationsand recorders on a main control board, the SPDS or the plant computer, the availabilityof other parameter values may be compromised as well.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC MA4.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU2Month 20XXOCGS 3-94EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
QvQtar rrook rZancirnfin Atntinn AnnoyI~vg%1lnn Ke ig-Immrflw~t~r (~rn~k (~n~r~atinn ~t2tinn Ann~v ~v~~Inn kIIIPLai~2rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA5Initiating Condition:Hazardous event affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:" Seismic event (earthquake)" Internal or external flooding event" High winds or tornado strike" FIRE" EXPLOSION" Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by theShift ManagerAND2. EITHER of the following:a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance inat least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by TechnicalSpecifications for the current operating mode.ORb. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure required by Technical Specifications for thecurrent operating mode.ORc. A seismic event required a manual reactor scram per ABN-38,Station Seismic Event.Basis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due tocombustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from highenergy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits,grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Suchevents may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosionare present.Month 20XXOCGS 3-95EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oustar (r-rapk (Aneratinn Station Annax Fyalnn Nuir ianrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMA5 (cont)Basis (cont):SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observablewithout measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage issufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affectedcomponent or structure.This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, required for the current operatingmode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the currentoperating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potentialloss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electricalisolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitutedegraded performance and is classified under HU6.EAL #2.a addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operationsince indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degradedperformance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability orreliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.EAL #2.b addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not inoperation or readily apparent through indications alone, as well as damage to astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make thisdetermination based on the totality of available event and damage report information.This is intended to be a brief assessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantificationof the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FS1 or RS1.If the EAL conditions of MA5 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 SA92. ABN-38Month 20XXOCGS 3-96EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovs~ter Creek (GAneratinn Station Annex Fxplnn NucleI~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU6Initiating Condition:RCS leakage for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage in the Drywell > 10 gpm for> 15 minutes.OR2. RCS identified leakage in the Drywell >25 gpm for > 15 minutes.OR3. Leakage from the RCS to a location outside the Drywell >25 gpm for > 15 minutes.Basis:UNISOLABLE: An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely orlocally.This IC addresses RCS leakage which may be a precursor to a more significant event.In this case, RCS leakage has been detected and operators, following applicableprocedures, have been unable to promptly isolate the leak. This condition is consideredto be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 and EAL #2 BasisThese EALs are focused on a loss of mass from the RCS due to "unidentified leakage","pressure boundary leakage" or "identified leakage" (as these leakage types are definedin the plant Technical Specifications).EAL #3 BasisThis EAL addresses a RCS mass loss caused by an UNISOLABLE leak through aninterfacing system.These EALs thus apply to leakage into the containment, a secondary-side system or alocation outside of containment.The leak rate values for each EAL were selected because they are usually observablewith normal Control Room indications. Lesser values typically require time-consumingcalculations to determine (e.g., a mass balance calculation). EAL #1 uses a lower valuethat reflects the greater significance of unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.Month 20XXO(3GS 3-97EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU6 (cont)Basis (cont):The release of mass from the RCS due to the as-designed/expected operation of anyrelief valve does not warrant an emergency classification.A stuck-open Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV) or EMRV leakage is not consideredeither identified or unidentified leakage by Technical Specification and, therefore, is notapplicable to this EAL.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions toisolate the leakage, if possible.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via ICs of RecognitionCategory R or F.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU42. Technical Specifications 3.3.D, Reactor Coolant System LeakageMonth 20XXOCGS 3-98EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(I afar tr-rok floanartinn _4Zftin~n Annowi%:Y,1ln Niiirl-nirTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU7Initiating Condition:Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table M3 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table M3 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table M3 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table M3 Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone system X X XNARS XHPN X XENS X XBasis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).Month 20XXOCGS 3-99EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYSYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSMU7 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #1 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.EAL #2 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.EAL #3 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, SU62. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-100EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA1Initiating Condition:Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to emergency busses for 15 minutes orlonger.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. Loss of all offsite AC power to 4160V Buses 1C and 1D.AND2. Failure of EDG-1 and EDG-2 Emergency Diesel Generators to supply power to4160V Buses 1C and 1D..AND3. Failure to restore power to at least one 4160V bus (1C or 1D) in < 15 minutesfrom the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-relatedThis IC addresses a total loss of AC power that compromises the performance of allSAFETY SYSTEMS requiring electric power including those necessary for emergencycore cooling, containment heat removal/pressure control, spent fuel heat removal andthe ultimate heat sink.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas a Site Area Emergency because of the increased time available to restore anemergency bus to service. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decayheat load, and the lower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus,when in these modes, this condition represents an actual or potential substantialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-101EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-102EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
I=v~lnn NiirlInrOuster Creek Generatinn Station Annex FyPinn Nyt-lonrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSculInitiating Condition:Loss of all but one AC power source to emergency buses for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. AC power capability to 4160V Buses 1C and ID reduced to only one of thefollowing power sources for > 15 minutes.* Startup Transformer SA" Startup Transformer SB" EDG-1 Emergency Diesel Generator* EDG-2 Emergency Diesel GeneratorAND2. ANY additional single power source failure will result in a loss of all AC powerto SAFETY SYSTEMS.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC describes a significant degradation of offsite and onsite AC power sources suchthat any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to SAFETYSYSTEMS. In this condition, the sole AC power source may be powering one, or morethan one, train of safety-related equipment.When in the cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode, this condition is not classifiedas an Alert because of the increased time available to restore another power source toservice. Additional time is available due to the reduced core decay heat load, and thelower temperatures and pressures in various plant systems. Thus, when in thesemodes, this condition is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety ofthe plant.Month 20XXOCGS 3-103EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCUI (cont)Initiating Condition:An "AC power source" is a source recognized in ABNs and EOPs, and capable ofsupplying required power to an emergency bus. Some examples of this condition arepresented below." A loss of all offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency powersource (e.g., an onsite diesel generator)." A loss of all offsite power and loss of all emergency power sources (e.g., onsitediesel generators) with a single train of emergency buses being back-fed from theunit main generator." A loss of emergency power sources (e.g., onsite diesel generators) with a singletrain of emergency buses being back-fed from an offsite power source.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof power.The subsequent loss of the remaining single power source would escalate the event toan Alert in accordance with IC CAl.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6 CU22. ABN-36, Loss of Off-Site Power3. ABN-37, Station Blackout4. ABN-60, Grid Emergency5. OCNGS Drawing BR 30006. UFSAR Section 8.2, Offsite Power SystemMonth 20XXOCGS 3-104EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA2Initiating Condition:Hazardous event affecting SAFETY SYSTEM required for the current operating mode.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):1. The occurrence of ANY of the following hazardous events:" Seismic event (earthquake)* Internal or external flooding event* High winds or tornado strike" FIRE" EXPLOSION* Other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by theShift ManagerAND2. EITHER of the following:a. Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance inat least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM required by TechnicalSpecifications for the current operating mode.ORb. The event has caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to a SAFETY SYSTEMcomponent or structure required by Technical Specifications for thecurrent operating mode.ORc. A seismic event required a manual reactor scram per ABN-38,Station Seismic EventBasis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due tocombustion, chemical reaction or overpressurization. A release of steam (from highenergy lines or components) or an electrical component failure (caused by short circuits,grounding, arcing, etc.) should not automatically be considered an explosion. Suchevents may require a post-event inspection to determine if the attributes of an explosionare present.Month 20XXOCGS 3-105EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) fl afar rtrgatale rZonarnfin _qfnfinn AnnoyIPv,-ltn hiirlanrAuQt~r (~ra~Ie (~n~r~i*inn ~*~*i,~n Ann~v -.-.~. ~. ~ ~ .~. a... .s -t t.. .0*** *fl ~ .~. ..U -~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA2 (cont)Basis (cont):SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to a component or structure that is readily observablewithout measurements, testing, or analysis. The visual impact of the damage issufficient to cause concern regarding the operability or reliability of the affectedcomponent or structure.This IC addresses a hazardous event that causes damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM, or astructure containing SAFETY SYSTEM components, required for the current operatingmode, "required", i.e. required to be operable by Technical Specifications for the currentoperating mode. This condition significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potentialloss of a fission product barrier, and therefore represents an actual or potentialsubstantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Manual or automatic electricalisolation of safety equipment due to flooding, in and of itself, does not constitutedegraded performance and is classified under HU6.EAL #2.a addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM train that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is in operationsince indications for it will be readily available. The indications of degradedperformance should be significant enough to cause concern regarding the operability orreliability of the SAFETY SYSTEM train.EAL #2.b addresses damage to a SAFETY SYSTEM component that is required to beoperable by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode, and is not inoperation or readily apparent through indications alone, or to a structure containingSAFETY SYSTEM components. Operators will make this determination based on thetotality of available event and damage report information. This is intended to be a briefassessment not requiring lengthy analysis or quantification of the damage.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1.If the EAL conditions of CA2 are not met then assess the event via HU3, HU4, or HU6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA62. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)4. FSAR Update Section 3.3.1 (High winds)5. ABN-31, High Winds6. ABN-32, Abnormal Intake Level7. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-106EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU3Initiating Condition:Loss of Vital DC power for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.Voltage is < 115 VDC on required 125 VDC battery busses B and C for> 15 minutes.Basis:SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.This IC addresses a loss of Vital DC power which compromises the ability to monitorand control operable SAFETY SYSTEMS when the plant is in the cold shutdown orrefueling mode. In these modes, the core decay heat load has been significantlyreduced, and coolant system temperatures and pressures are lower; these conditionsincrease the time available to restore a vital DC bus to service. Thus, this condition isconsidered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.As used in this EAL, "required" means the Vital DC buses necessary to supportoperation of the in-service, or operable, train or trains of SAFETY SYSTEM equipment.For example, if Train A is out-of-service (inoperable) for scheduled outage maintenancework and Train B is in-service (operable), then a loss of Vital DC power affecting Train Bwould require the declaration of an Unusual Event. A loss of Vital DC power to Train Awould not warrant an emergency classification.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary powerlosses.Depending upon the event, escalation of the emergency classification level would be viaIC CA6 or CA5, or an IC in Recognition Category R.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU42. UFSAR Section 8.3.2, DC Power Systems3. OCNGS Drawing BR 30004. ABN-54, DC Bus B and Panel/MCC Failures5. ABN-55, DC Bus C and Panel/MCC FailuresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-107EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
(I afmr 1rdainle flmnarnfin -Qfnfitn AnnavM~v--Itnn Kiiie-lgnrfl~,a4~r 1~ r~~k (~an~r~4a nn ~*atir~n An n~v v~ Ir~ ii hi. .,. rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU4Initiating Condition:Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Loss of all Table C1 Onsite communications capability affecting the ability toperform routine operations.OR2. Loss of all Table C1 Offsite communication capability affecting the ability toperform offsite notifications.OR3. Loss of all Table C1 NRC communication capability affecting the ability toperform NRC notifications.Table C1 -Communications CapabilitySystem Onsite Offsite NRCPlant Paging System XStation Radio XConventional Telephone lines X X XSatellite Phone System X X XNARS XHPN X XENS X XBasis:This IC addresses a significant loss of on-site, offsite, or NRC communicationscapabilities. While not a direct challenge to plant or personnel safety, this eventwarrants prompt notifications to Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) and the NRC.This IC should be assessed only when extraordinary means are being utilized to makecommunications possible (e.g., use of non-plant, privately owned equipment, relaying ofon-site information via individuals or multiple radio transmission points, individuals beingsent to offsite locations, etc.).EAL #1 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used in support of routine plantoperations.Month 20XXOCGS 3-108EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU4 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #2 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify all OROs of anemergency declaration. The OROs referred to here are listed in procedure EP-MA-1 14-100-F-03, State/Local Notification Form.EAL #3 BasisAddresses a total loss of the communications methods used to notify the NRC of anemergency declaration.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU52. UFSAR Section 9.5.2, Communication Systems3. EP-AA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment TestsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-109EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA5Initiating Condition:Inability to maintain the plant in cold shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212*F due to loss of decay heatremoval for > Table C2 duration.Table C2 RCS Heat-up Duration ThresholdsRCS Containment Closure Heat-upStatus Status DurationIntact Not Applicable 60 minutes*Not Intact Established 20 minutes*Not Established 0 minutes* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation withinthis time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced,then EAL #1 is not applicable.OR2. UNPLANNED RPV pressure rise > 10 psig as a result of temperature rise due toloss of decay heat removal.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).Month 20XXOCGS 3-110EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA5 (cont)Basis (cont):This IC addresses conditions involving a loss of decay heat removal capability or anaddition of heat to the RCS in excess of that which can currently be removed. Eithercondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table addresses a rise in RCS temperaturewhen CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but the RCS is not intact. The 20-minute criterion was included to allow time for operator action to address thetemperature rise.The RCS Heat-up Duration Thresholds table also addresses a rise in RCS temperaturewith the RCS intact. The status of CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not crucial in thiscondition since the intact RCS is providing a high pressure barrier to a fission productrelease. The 60-minute time frame should allow sufficient time to address thetemperature rise without a substantial degradation in plant safety.Finally, in the case where there is a rise in RCS temperature, the RCS is not intact, andCONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established, no heat-up duration is allowed (i.e., 0minutes). This is because 1) the evaporated reactor coolant may be released directlyinto the Containment atmosphere and subsequently to the environment, and 2) there isreduced reactor coolant inventory above the top of irradiated fuel.EAL #2 provides a pressure-based indication of RCS heat-up.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CS6 or RS1.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA32. Technical Specifications 1.73. OU-AA-103, Shutdown Safety Management ProgramMonth 20XXOCGS 3-111EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ous~ter Creek Gener~atinn Station Annex FvoInn Nuclei~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU5Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperatureOperating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely beexceeded.1. UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature > 212°F due to loss of decay heatremoval.OR2. Loss of the following for >15 minutes.* ALL RCS temperature indicationsAND* ALL RPV water level indicationsBasis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary) and its associated structures, systems, andcomponents as a functional barrier to fission product release under shutdownconditions.This IC addresses an UNPLANNED rise in RCS temperature above the TechnicalSpecification cold shutdown temperature limit, or the inability to determine RCStemperature and level, represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of theplant. If the RCS is not intact and CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is not established duringthis event, the Emergency Director should also refer to IC CA5.RCS is intact when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the ColdShutdown mode of operation (e.g. no freeze seals, or steam line nozzle plugs, etc.).A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdowntemperature limit when the heat removal function is available does not warrant aclassification.Month 20XXOCGS 3-112EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(luster (r-rook r-anerating Rtzitinn Annex~ Fvalnn Ki-krinTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU5 (cont)Basis (cont):EAL #1 involves a loss of decay heat removal capability, or an addition of heat to theRCS in excess of that which can currently be removed, such that reactor coolanttemperature cannot be maintained below the cold shutdown temperature limit specifiedin Technical Specifications. During this condition, there is no immediate threat of fueldamage because the core decay heat load has been reduced since the cessation ofpower operation.During an outage, the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above thereactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactorvessel flange are carefully planned and controlled. A loss of forced decay heat removalat reduced inventory may result in a rapid rise in reactor coolant temperature dependingon the time after shutdown.EAL #2 reflects a condition where there has been a significant loss of instrumentationcapability necessary to monitor RCS conditions and operators would be unable tomonitor key parameters necessary to assure core decay heat removal. During thiscondition, there is no immediate threat of fuel damage because the core decay heatload has been reduced since the cessation of power operation.Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary lossesof indication.Escalation to Alert would be via IC CA6 based on an inventory loss or IC CA5 based onexceeding plant configuration-specific time criteria.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CU32. Technical Specifications 1.73. 2000-GLN-3200.01, Plant Specific Technical Guideline4. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray5. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-downMonth 20XXOCGS 3-113EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. a. RPV water level < 0 inches TAF for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Any Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutes.ANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:* Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate coreuncovery.OR* Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-1 0, North Wall, reading>3 R/hr.ANDc. ANY Containment Challenge Indication (Table C4)Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise** UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Month 20XXOCGS 3-114EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) rOvster Creek eneratina Station Annex Evininn NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6 (cont)Emergency Action Level (EAL) (cont):Table C4 Containment Challenge Indications* Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration > 6% and Oxygen Concentration > 5%" UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure* CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established** Any Secondary Containment radiation monitor > EMG-3200.11 Maximum Safe (Table 12).* if CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute core uncoverytime limit, then escalation to a General Emergency is not required.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level above thetop of active fuel with containment challenged. This condition represents actual orIMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containmentintegrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective ActionGuidelines (PAG) exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, there is a high potential for a directand unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment. If CONTAINMENTCLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30-minute time limit, then declarationof a General Emergency is not required.Month 20XXOCGS 3-115EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexIJlWlVl I I Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6 (cont)Basis (cont):UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.The existence of an explosive mixture means, at a minimum, that the containmentatmospheric hydrogen concentration is sufficient to support a hydrogen burn (i.e., at thelower deflagration limit). A hydrogen burn will raise containment pressure and couldresult in collateral equipment damage leading to a loss of containment integrity. Ittherefore represents a challenge to Containment integrity.In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to acore uncovery could result in an explosive gas mixture in containment. If all installedhydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service during an event leading to fuel claddingdamage, it may not be possible to obtain a containment hydrogen gas concentrationreading as ambient conditions within the containment will preclude personnel access.During periods when installed containment hydrogen gas monitors are out-of-service,operators may use the other listed indications to assess whether or not containment ischallenged.EAL #1 BasisThe 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e., the totalloss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actuallyoccurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentationuncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminateleakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/orpower failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. Ifwater level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss isoccurring by observing changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Month 20XXOCGS 3-116EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCG6 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CGI2. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS3. Technical Specifications 5.2 Basis4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for SevereAccident5Guidelines5. EMG-3200.1 1, Secondary Containment Control6. FSAR Update 6.2.1.1.37. EMG-3200.02, Primary Containment Control8. EP-AEL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-117EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS6Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established, RPV water level < 56 inchesTAF.OR2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, RPV water level < 0 inches TAF.OR3. a. RPV water level unknown for > 30 minutesANDb. Core uncovery is indicated by ANY of the following:" Table C3 indications of a sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery.OR* Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor C-1 0, North Wall, reading >3 R/hr.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage" UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Month 20XXOCGS 3-118EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Niirl#=arOus~ter Creek (Aner~atinn Rttzioin Annax F~vplnn Nmir-Io2rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN I REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS6 (cont)Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined conditions or actions taken tosecure containment (primary or secondary for BWR) and its associated structures,systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release undershutdown conditions.The lost inventory may be due to a RCS component failure, a loss of configurationcontrol or prolonged boiling of reactor coolant. These conditions entail major failures ofplant functions needed for protection of the public and thus warrant a Site AreaEmergency declaration.Following an extended loss of core decay heat removal and inventory makeup, decayheat will cause reactor coolant boiling and a further reduction in reactor vessel level. IfRCS/reactor vessel level cannot be restored, fuel damage is probable.Outage/shutdown contingency plans typically provide for re-establishing or verifyingCONTAINMENT CLOSURE following a loss of heat removal or RCS inventory controlfunctions. The difference in the specified RCS/reactor vessel levels of EALs #1 and #2reflect the fact that with CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, there is a lowerprobability of a fission product release to the environment.In EAL #3.a the 30-minute criterion is tied to a readily recognizable event start time (i.e.,the total loss of ability to monitor level), and allows sufficient time to monitor, assess andcorrelate reactor and plant conditions to determine if core uncovery has actuallyoccurred (i.e., to account for various accident progression and instrumentationuncertainties). It also allows sufficient time for performance of actions to terminateleakage, recover inventory control/makeup equipment and/or restore level monitoring.The inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/orpower failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. Ifwater level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss isoccurring by observing changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.These EALs address concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay HeatRemoval; SECY 91-283, Evaluation of Shutdown and Low Power Risk Issues; NUREG-1449, Shutdown and Low-Power Operation at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States; and NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to AssessShutdown Management.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC CG6 or RGI.Month 20XXOCGS 3-119EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCS6 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CS12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control -No ATWS4. 2000-GLN-3200.03, Plant Specific Technical Guidelines for EOPs5. EP-EAL-0501, Estimation of Radiation Monitor Readings Indicating CoreUncoveryMonth 20XXOCGS 3-120EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Fxelnn Ovstmr Creek (Anermtinn StaMion Annexv mmvln mNucearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA6Initiating Condition:Loss of RPV inventory.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. a. Loss of RPV inventory as indicated by level < 86 inches TAF.OR2. a. RPV water level unknown for > 15 minutes.ANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise*" UNPLANNED Torus level rise*" UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.This IC addresses conditions that are precursors to a loss of the ability to adequatelycool irradiated fuel (i.e., a precursor to a challenge to the fuel clad barrier). Thiscondition represents a potential substantial reduction in the level of plant safety.EAL #1 BasisA lowering of water level below 86 inches indicates that operator actions have not beensuccessful in restoring and maintaining RPV water level. The heat-up rate of thecoolant will rise as the available water inventory is reduced. A continuing drop in waterlevel will lead to core uncovery.Month 20XXOCGS 3-121EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCA6 (cont)Basis (cont):Although related, EAL #1 is concerned with the loss of RCS inventory and not thepotential concurrent effects on systems needed for decay heat removal (e.g., loss of aResidual Heat Removal suction point). A rise in RCS temperature caused by a loss ofdecay heat removal capability is evaluated under IC CA5.EAL #2 BasisThe inability to monitor RPV water level may be caused by instrumentation and/orpower failures, or water level dropping below the range of available instrumentation. Ifwater level cannot be monitored, operators may determine that an inventory loss isoccurring by observing changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus levelchanges must be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure theyare indicative of leakage from the RPV.The 15-minute duration for the loss of level indication was chosen because it is half ofthe EAL duration specified in IC CS6If the RPV water level continues to lower, then escalation to Site Area Emergency wouldbe via IC CS6.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, CA12. Technical Specification Table 3.1.13. 2000-BAS-3200.02 EOP User's Guide4. 2000-GLN-3200.01 Plant Specific Technical Guideline5. 205.94.0 RPV Floodup Using Core Spray6. 205.95.0 Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down7. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-122EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovstar Creak Ganaratina Station AnnexExelon Nuclearyster Creek ..e... er...t..... Station..Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU6Initiating Condition:UNPLANNED loss of RPV inventory for 15 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:3,4Emergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in the inability to restore and maintainRPV water level to above the procedurally established lower limit for> 15 minutes.OR2. a. RPV water level unknownANDb. Loss of RPV inventory per Table C3 indications.Table C3 Indications of RCS Leakage* UNPLANNED floor or equipment sump level rise** UNPLANNED Torus level rise** UNPLANNED vessel make up rate rise** Observation of leakage or inventory loss*Rise in level is attributed to a loss of RPV inventory.Basis:UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not 1) the result of an intendedevolution or 2) an expected plant response to a transient. The cause of the parameterchange or event may be known or unknown.This IC addresses the inability to restore and maintain water level to a requiredminimum level (or the lower limit of a level band), or a loss of the ability to monitor RPVwater level concurrent with indications of coolant leakage. Either of these conditions isconsidered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Month 20XXOCGS 3-123EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
() afar r-rook (' Zonarnfin Rfnfinn AnnavI::y--Inn Pml-LwarAuQtcr (~r~~k (~anbr~tinn ~ Annav ~vaIv~n Mi ir~Ia2rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYCOLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONSCU6 (cont)Basis (cont):The procedurally established lower limit is not an operational band established abovethe procedural limit to allow for operator action prior to exceeding the procedural limit,but it is the procedurally established lower limit.Refueling evolutions that lower RCS water inventory are carefully planned andcontrolled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level decreasing below aprocedurally required limit warrants the declaration of an Unusual Event due to thereduced water inventory that is available to keep the core covered.EAL #1 BasisRecognizes that the minimum required RPV water level can change several timesduring the course of a refueling outage as different plant configurations and systemlineups are implemented. This EAL is met if the minimum level, specified for the currentplant conditions, cannot be maintained for 15 minutes or longer. The minimum level istypically specified in the applicable operating procedure but may be specified in anothercontrolling document.The 15-minute threshold duration allows sufficient time for prompt operator actions torestore and maintain the expected water level. This criterion excludes transientconditions causing a brief lowering of water level.EAL #2 BasisAddresses a condition where all means to determine RPV water level have been lost.In this condition, operators may determine that an inventory loss is occurring byobserving changes in sump and/or Torus levels. Sump and/or Torus level changesmust be evaluated against other potential sources of water flow to ensure they areindicative of leakage from the RPV.Continued loss of RCS inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergencyclassification level via either IC CA6 or CA5.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 CU12. Technical Specifications Section 3.3.D3. 205.94.0, RPV Floodup Using Core Spray4. 205.95.0, Reactor Flood-up / Drain-down5. FSAR Figure 7.6-3Month 20XXOCGS 3-124EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex.......... ww ....Exelon NuclearOytrCee eeainqSainA exEAn .rIrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG1Initiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring orhas occurred within the PROTECTED AREA.AND2. a. ANY Table H1 safety function cannot be controlled or maintained.ORb. Damage to spent fuel has occurred or is IMMINENTTable H1 Safety Functions* Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)" RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)" RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.Month 20XXOCGS 3-125EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG1 (cont)Basis (cont):HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses an event in which a HOSTILE FORCE has taken physical control ofthe facility to the extent that the plant staff can no longer operate equipment necessaryto maintain key safety functions. It also addresses a HOSTILE ACTION leading to aloss of physical control that results in actual or IMMINENT damage to spent fuel due to1) damage to a spent fuel pool cooling system (e.g., pumps, heat exchangers, controls,etc.) or, 2) loss of spent fuel pool integrity such that sufficient water level cannot bemaintained.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 HG15. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-126EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
(I afar rrankrdanarnfin _QfnfinnAnnovI9vdltnn Ki, -lonrfliietar V~ raal (~ancr~*i nn ~*~tir~n An nay FvaIr~n Ni iIa~rTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHSIInitiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A notification from the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the PROTECTED AREA.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTEDAREA. This event will require rapid response and assistance due to the possibility fordamage to plant equipment.Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].Month 20XXOCGS 3-127EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(I afgar 9ragak I'lamornfin -Qfnfifn AnnavM:v--Inn kl~rl-hmrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS1 (cont)Basis (cont):As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Site Area Emergency declaration will mobilize OROresources and have them available to develop and implement public protective actionsin the unlikely event that the attack is successful in impairing multiple safety functions.This IC does not apply to a HOSTILE ACTION directed at an ISFSI PROTECTEDAREA located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA; such an attack should beassessed using IC HA1. It also does not apply to incidents that are accidental events,acts of civil disobedience, or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by aHOSTILE FORCE. Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters,physical disputes between employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events isadequately addressed by other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR§ 50.72.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HGI.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HS13. Station Security Plan -Appendix CMonth 20XXOCGS 3-128EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ouster Creek (GAneratinn Station Annexv Expinn Nucleg~arTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA1Initiating Condition:HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threatwithin 30 minutes.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. A validated notification from NRC of an aircraft attack threat < 30 minutes fromthe site.OR2. Notification by the Security Force that a HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or hasoccurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA): The property associated with the station andowned by the company. Access is normally limited to persons entering for officialbusiness.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.HOSTILE FORCE: Any individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly orby stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming,or causing destruction.This IC addresses the occurrence of a HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA or notification of an aircraft attack threat. This event will requirerapid response and assistance due to the possibility of the attack progressing to thePROTECTED AREA, or the need to prepare the plant and staff for a potential aircraftimpact.Month 20XXOCGS 3-129EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHAI (cont)Basis (cont):Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].As time and conditions allow, these events require a heightened state of readiness bythe plant staff and implementation of onsite protective measures (e.g., evacuation,dispersal or sheltering). The Alert declaration will also heighten the awareness ofOffsite Response Organizations, allowing them to be better prepared should it benecessary to consider further actions.This IC does not apply to incidents that are accidental events, acts of civil disobedience,or otherwise are not a HOSTILE ACTION perpetrated by a HOSTILE FORCE.Examples include the crash of a small aircraft, shots from hunters, physical disputesbetween employees, etc. Reporting of these types of events is adequately addressedby other EALs, or the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72.EAL #1 BasisAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant, and the anticipatedarrival time is within 30 minutes. The intent of this EAL is to ensure that threat-relatednotifications are made in a timely manner so that plant personnel and OROs are in aheightened state of readiness. This EAL is met when the threat-related information hasbeen validated in accordance with ABN-41, Security Event.EAL #2 BasisApplicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA. This includes any action directed against an ISFSI that islocated outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee ifthe threat involves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may be provided byNORAD through the NRC.In some cases, it may not be readily apparent if an aircraft impact within the OWNERCONTROLLED AREA was intentional (i.e., a HOSTILE ACTION). It is expected,although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency to the site wouldclarify this point. In this case, the appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD,FBI, FAA or NRC. The emergency declaration, including one based on other ICs/EALs,should not be unduly delayed while awaiting notification by a Federal agency.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-130EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA1 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HA12. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security EventMonth 20XXOCGS 3-131EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ous~ter C~reek Gennertinn Sta~tion Annex Fvyiann Niir-IanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHUIInitiating Condition:Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):1. Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site as determined perSY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual Activities.OR2. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.OR3. Notification by the Security Force of a SECURITY CONDITION that does notinvolve a HOSTILE ACTION.Basis:SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved securitycontingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to sitepersonnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITYCONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTIONSAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the station.PROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses events that pose a threat to plant personnel or SAFETY SYSTEMequipment, and thus represent a potential degradation in the level of plant safety.Security events which do not meet one of these EALs are adequately addressed by therequirements of 10 CFR § 73.71 or 10 CFR § 50.72. Security events assessed asHOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under ICs HA1, HS1 and HG1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-132EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExellon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHUI (cont)Basis (cont):Timely and accurate communications between Security Shift Supervision and theControl Room is essential for proper classification of a security-related event.Classification of these events will initiate appropriate threat-related notifications to plantpersonnel and OROs.Security plans and terminology are based on the guidance provided by NEI 03-12,Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, SafeguardsContingency Plan [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program].EAL #1 BasisAddresses the receipt of a credible security threat. The credibility of the threat isassessed in accordance with SY-AA-101-132.EAL #2 BasisAddresses the threat from the impact of an aircraft on the plant. The NRCHeadquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threatinvolves an aircraft. The status and size of the plane may also be provided by NORADthrough the NRC. Validation of the threat is performed in accordance with ABN-41,Security Event.EAL #3 BasisReferences Security Force because these are the individuals trained to confirm that asecurity event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event confirmation andclassification is controlled due to the nature of Safeguards and 10 CFR § 2.39information.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HAl.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01 Rev 6, HU12. Station Security Plan -Appendix C3. ABN-41, Security Event4. SY-AA-101-132, Security Assessment and Response to Unusual ActivitiesMonth 20XXOCGS 3-133EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
(I efor rrank rZanarnfin Qfnfinn AnnovP~v,-Inn khfnnrlrA~,Qt~r Crc~aIe (~n~r~*inn ~t~*inn Ann~~v ---- --- -- --.. p p --*~ ** -,-~. p. .~n ~ .~. ..U --*~~*Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS2Initiating Condition:Inability to control a key safety function from outside the Control Room.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determiningthat the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.1. A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.AND2. Control of ANY Table H1 safety function is not reestablished in < 15 minutes.Table H1 Safety Functions" Reactivity Control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown)* RPV Water Level (ability to cool the core)" RCS Heat Removal (ability to maintain heat sink)Basis:The time period to establish control of the plant starts when either:a. Control of the plant is no longer maintained in the Main Control RoomORb. The last Operator has left the Main Control Room.This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations, and the control of a key safety function cannot bereestablished in a timely manner. The failure to gain control of a key safety functionfollowing a transfer of plan control to alternate locations is a precursor to a challenge toany fission product barriers within a relatively short period of time.The determination of whether or not "control" is established at the remote safeshutdown location(s) is based on Emergency Director judgment. The EmergencyDirector is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within 15 minuteswhether or not the operating staff has control of key safety functions from the remotesafe shutdown location(s).Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC FG1 or CG6.Month 20XXOCGS 3-134EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS2 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-135EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station AnnexExelon NuclearExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA2Initiating Condition:Control Room evacuation resulting in transfer of plant control to alternate locations.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):A Control Room evacuation has resulted in plant control being transferred from theControl Room to alternate locations per ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation.Basis:This IC addresses an evacuation of the Control Room that results in transfer of plantcontrol to alternate locations outside the Control Room. The loss of the ability to controlthe plant from the Control Room is considered to be a potential substantial degradationin the level of plant safety.Following a Control Room evacuation, control of the plant will be transferred to alternateshutdown locations. The necessity to control a plant shutdown from outside the ControlRoom, in addition to responding to the event that required the evacuation of the ControlRoom, will present challenges to plant operators and other on-shift personnel.Activation of the ERO and emergency response facilities will assist in responding tothese challenges.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via IC HS2.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA62. ABN-30 Control Room Evacuation3. Procedure 346 Operation of the Remote and Local Shutdown PanelsMonth 20XXOCGS 3-136EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX)
Fxplnn Ovster Creek £GAneratina Station Annex FYAlnn Nuclar~ITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3Initiating Condition:FIRE potentially degrading the level of safety of the plant.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upondetermining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely beexceeded.1. A FIRE in ANY Table H2 area is not extinguished in < 15-minutes of ANY of thefollowing FIRE detection indications:" Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)" Receipt of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications" Field verification of a single fire alarmTable H2 Vital Areas* Reactor Building (when inerted the Drywell is exempt)0 4160V Switchgear Rooms (1C and 1D)0 Control Room Complex (MOB, Upper and Lower CableSpreading Rooms)* Main Transformer/Condensate Transfer Pad* Intake Structure* #1 EDG Vault* #2 EDG Vault* EDG Fuel Oil Storage TankOR2. a. Receipt of a single fire alarm in ANY Table H2 area (i.e., no other indicationsof a FIRE).ANDb. The existence of a FIRE is not verified in < 30 minutes of alarm receipt.OR3 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA not extinguished in< 60 minutes of the initial report, alarm or indication.OR4 A FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA that requires firefightingsupport by an offsite fire response agency to extinguish.Month 20XXOCGS 3-137EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
IFw~lnn Ovster Creek Ganarytinn Afqtinn Annex Fyalnn NiirlanrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3 (cont)Basis:FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slippingdrive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation offlame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat areobserved.PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI): A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES that may be indicative of apotential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisThe intent of the 15-minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate againstsmall FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket). Inaddition to alarms, other indications of a FIRE could be a drop in fire main pressure,automatic activation of a suppression system, etc.Upon receipt, operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of an initial firealarm, indication, or report. For EAL assessment purposes, the emergency declarationclock starts at the time that the initial alarm, indication, or report was received, and notthe time that a subsequent verification action was performed. Similarly, the fire durationclock also starts at the time of receipt of the initial alarms, indication or report.EAL #2 BasisThis EAL addresses receipt of a single fire alarm, and the existence of a FIRE is notverified (i.e., proved or disproved) within 30-minutes of the alarm. Upon receipt,operators will take prompt actions to confirm the validity of a single fire alarm. For EALassessment purposes, the 30-minute clock starts at the time that the initial alarm wasreceived, and not the time that a subsequent verification action was performed.A single fire alarm, absent other indication(s) of a FIRE, may be indicative of equipmentfailure or a spurious activation, and not an actual FIRE. For this reason, additional timeis allowed to verify the validity of the alarm. The 30-minute period is a reasonableamount of time to determine if an actual FIRE exists; however, after that time, andabsent information to the contrary, it is assumed that an actual FIRE is in progress.Month 20XXOCGS 3-138EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3 (cont)Basis (cont):If an actual FIRE is verified by a report from the field, then EAL #1 is immediatelyapplicable, and the emergency must be declared if the FIRE is not extinguished within15-minutes of the report. If the alarm is verified to be due to an equipment failure or aspurious activation, and this verification occurs within 30-minutes of the receipt of thealarm, then this EAL is not applicable and no emergency declaration is warranted.EAL #3 BasisIn addition to a FIRE addressed by EAL #1 or EAL #2, a FIRE within the plantPROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 60-minutes may also potentially degradethe level of plant safety. This basis extends to a FIRE occurring within thePROTECTED AREA of an ISFSI located outside the plant PROTECTED AREA.EAL #4 BasisIf a FIRE within the plant or ISFSI PROTECTED AREA is of sufficient size to require aresponse by an offsite firefighting agency (e.g., a local town Fire Department), then thelevel of plant safety is potentially degraded. The dispatch of an offsite firefightingagency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to activelysupport firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade toextinguish. Declaration is not necessary if the agency resources are placed on stand-by, or supporting post-extinguishment recovery or investigation actions.Basis-Related Requirements from Appendix RAppendix R to 10 CFR 50, states in part:Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part specifies that "Structures, systems, andcomponents important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize,consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires andexplosions."When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achievingand maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to safetybecause damage to them can lead to core damage resulting from loss of coolantthrough boil-off.Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of functionof systems used to mitigate the consequences of design basis accidents underpost-fire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit firedamage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions isgreater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems required to mitigatethe consequences of design basis accidents.Month 20XXOCGS 3-139EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU3 (cont)Basis (cont):In addition, Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, requires, among other considerations, the use of1-hour fire barriers for the enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safetycircuits of one redundant train (G.2.c). As used in EAL #2, the 30-minutes to verify asingle alarm is well within this worst-case 1-hour time period.Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5.Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU42. ABN-29, Plant FiresMonth 20XXOCGS 3-140EP-AA-1 010 (Revision XX) f) afar rrehak anarnfin _Qffsfinn AnnavI:=vcblnn Pd,,rlamrA'*,c*car Croak (~n~r2tinn ~f~ti~-~n Ann~v FvaIr~n Mir~Ig~~r -.-.~. -.-- .' -U --. -t~ t* -..,-~. U U * ~fl .-~Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU4Initiating Condition:Seismic event greater than OBE levels.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Seismic event as indicated by:1. Control Room personnel feel an actual or potential seismic event.AND2. The occurrence of a seismic event has resulted in a spurious Reactor Scram orrequired a Plant shutdown in accordance with ABN-38, Station Seismic Event.Basis:This IC addresses a seismic event that results in accelerations at the plant site greaterthan those specified for an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)1.An earthquake greaterthan an OBE but less than a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)2 should have nosignificant impact on safety-related systems, structures and components; however,some time may be required for the plant staff to ascertain the actual post-eventcondition of the plant (e.g., performs walk-downs and post-event inspections). Giventhe time necessary to perform walk-downs and inspections, and fully understand anyimpacts, this event represents a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.Event verification with external sources should not be necessary during or following anOBE. Earthquakes of this magnitude should be readily felt by on-site personnel andrecognized as a seismic event (e.g., typical lateral accelerations are in excess of 0.08g).EAL #2 is included to ensure that a declaration does not result from felt vibrationscaused by a non-seismic source (e.g., a dropped load). The Shift Manager orEmergency Director may seek external verification if deemed appropriate (e.g., call toUSGS, check internet source, etc.) however, the verification action must not preclude atimely emergency declaration. This guidance recognizes that it may cause the site todeclare an Unusual Event while another site, similarly affected but with readily availableOBE indications in the Control Room, may not.Depending upon the plant mode at the time of the event, escalation of the emergencyclassification level would be via IC CA2 or MA5.1 An OBE is vibratory ground motion for which those features of a nuclear power plantnecessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of theFublic will remain functional.An SSE is vibratory ground motion for which certain (generally, safety-related)structures, systems, and components must be designed to remain functional.Month 20XXOCGS 3-141EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU4 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU22. ABN-38, Station Seismic Event3. FSAR Update Section 3. 7 (Seismic)Month 20XXOCGS 3-142EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
N Ovster Creek (GAneratinn Station Annex FwAlnn Nui~clearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5Initiating Condition:Gaseous release impeding access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations,cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:* If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable, or out ofservice, before the event occurred, then no emergency classification iswarranted.1. Release of a toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas in a Table H3 area.Table H3Areas with Entry Related Mode ApplicabilityArea Entry Related ModeApplicabilityReactor Building* Modes 3 and 4*Areas required to establish shutdown coolingAND2. Entry into the room or area is prohibited or impededBasis:This IC addresses an event involving a release of a hazardous gas that precludes orimpedes access to equipment necessary to transition the plant from normal plantoperation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal plant procedures. Thiscondition represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safetyof the plant.Table H3 is a list of plant rooms or areas with entry-related mode applicability thatcontain equipment which require a manual/local action necessary to transition the plantfrom normal plant operation to cooldown and shutdown as specified in normal operatingprocedures (establish shutdown cooling), where if this action is not completed the plantwould not be able to attain and maintain cold shutdown. This Table does not includerooms or areas for which entry is required solely to perform actions of an administrativeor record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).Month 20XXOCGS 3-143EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Ovster Creek Generating Station Annexg i Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5 (cont)Basis (cont):This Table does not include the Control Room since adequate engineered safety/designfeatures are in place to preclude a Control Room evacuation due to the release of ahazardous gas.An Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be,procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect and the gaseous releasepreclude the ability to place shutdown cooling in service. The emergency classificationis not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the release.Evaluation of the IC and EAL do not require atmospheric sampling; it only requires theEmergency Director's judgment that the gas concentration in the affected room/area issufficient to preclude or significantly impede procedurally required access. Thisjudgment may be based on a variety of factors including an existing job hazard analysis,report of ill effects on personnel, advice from a subject matter expert or operatingexperience with the same or similar hazards. Access should be considered as impededif extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affectedroom/area (e.g., requiring use of protective equipment, such as SCBAs, that is notroutinely employed).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply." The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affectedroom/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the timeof the gaseous release). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the gaseousrelease occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown andshutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4." The gas release is a planned activity that includes compensatory measures whichaddress the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., fire suppressionsystem testing)." The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or recordkeeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections)." The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, andwould not actually prevent or impede a required action.An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerouslevels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosedenvironment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level ofaround 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.This EAL does not apply to firefighting activities that generate smoke, that automaticallyor manually activate a fire suppression system in an area, or to intentional inerting ofcontainment.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be via Recognition Category R, Cor F ICs.Month 20XXOCGS 3-144EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA5 (cont)Basis Reference(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA52. ABN-33, Toxic or Flammable Gas Release3. AR 660892660892 Station Halon and IDLH Evaluations4. 29CFR1910.134(b) and 29CFR1910.134(d)(2)(iii)Month 20XXOCGS 3-145EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generatina Station AnnexExelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU6Initiating Condition:Hazardous EventOperating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Note:EAL #4 does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents.1. Tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA.OR2. Internal room or area flooding of a magnitude sufficient to require manual orautomatic electrical isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component required byTechnical Specifications for the current operating mode.OR3. Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is impeded due to an offsiteevent involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill or toxic gasrelease).OR4. A hazardous event that results in on-site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plantstaff from accessing the site via personal vehicles.OR5. Abnormal Intake Structure level, as indicated by EITHER:a. > 4.5 ft. MSL (> 4.25 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or > 4.5 ft MSLon CR-423-1 1 pt 24 and pt 23).ORb. < -3.0 ft. MSL (< 0.95 psig on PI-533-1172 and PI-533-1173 or < -3.0 ftMSL on CR-423-11 pt 24 and pt 23).MSL = Mean Sea LevelBasis:PROTECTED AREA: An area that normally encompasses all controlled areas within thesecurity protected area fence.SAFETY SYSTEM: A system required for safe plant operation, cooling down the plantand/or placing it in the cold shutdown condition, including the ECCS. These aretypically systems classified as safety-related.Month 20XXOCGS 3-146EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) n afar ('rook rZanaratin Qtatinn AnnovIPYalen hhil--aarTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU6 (cont)This IC addresses hazardous events that are considered to represent a potentialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant.EAL #1 BasisAddresses a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area.EAL #2 BasisAddresses flooding of a building room or area that results in operators isolating power toa SAFETY SYSTEM component due to water level or other wetting concerns.Classification is also required if the water level or related wetting causes an automaticisolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component from its power source (e.g., a breaker orrelay trip). To warrant classification, operability of the affected component must berequired by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode. Manual isolation ofpower to a SAFETY SYSTEM component as a result of leakage is an event of lesserimpact and would be expected to cause small and localized damage. The consequenceof this type of event is adequately assessed and addressed in accordance withTechnical Specifications.EAL #3 BasisAddresses a hazardous materials event originating at an offsite location and of sufficientmagnitude to impede the movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA.EAL #4 BasisAddresses a hazardous event that causes an on-site impediment to vehicle movementand significant enough to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site using personalvehicles. Examples of such an event include site flooding caused by a hurricane, heavyrains, or high winds.This EAL is not intended to apply to routine impediments such as fog, snow, ice, orvehicle breakdowns or accidents, but rather to more significant conditions such as theHurricane Andrew strike on Turkey Point in 1992, the flooding around the CooperStation during the Midwest floods of 1993, or the flooding around Ft. Calhoun Station in2011.EAL #5 Basis:High Intake Structure level, is sufficiently high to require plant shutdown per ABN-32,Abnormal Intake Level.Low Intake Structure level indicates the possible loss of Radwaste Service Waterpumps and is approaching levels, which may result in a loss of vital cooling equipment.Escalation of the emergency classification level would be based on ICs in RecognitionCategories R, F, M, H or C.Month 20XXOCGS 3-147EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU6 (cont)Basis Reference(s): ..." ......1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU32. FSAR Update 3.3.1 (High winds)3. ABN-31, High Winds4. ABN-32, Abnormal Intake LevelMonth 20XXOCGS 3-148EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) atar rank i'Zonaratin Qtzatinn Annov"orAuatcr 1~raaI, f~anaratinn ~t~atirhn Ann~v ~v~Ir~ui Mi .j.Ia~ir
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- 5* ** .n fl~I 1 I I ~d E~LhITable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHG7Initiating Condition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.Operating. Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency ActioniLevel (EAL):..:.Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantialcore degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILEACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can bereasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsitefor more than the immediate site area.Basis~~.. .... .........: Basis:IMMINENT: The trajectory of events or conditions is such that an EAL will be met withina relatively short period of time regardless of mitigation or corrective actions.HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for aGeneral Emergency.... .. ..... .....Basis Reference(s):-.. NE. -. Rev6 HG7. ...1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HG7Month 20XXOCGS 3-149EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) f) atar rank rZonaratin Qtntitn AnngavMo klm Ki IaAL uata M~rao (lnrutn QcianA nyI'Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHS7Initiating Condition -:........ .Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.Operating Mode Applicability: ...... ...1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures ofplant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results inintentional damage or malicious acts, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that couldlead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed forthe protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levelswhich exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the siteboundary.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for a SiteArea Emergency.Basis SRfefrence.(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HS7Month 20XXOCGS 3-150EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annexm I Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHA7in t a t n ..d i~ i n , ........ .... .... .ii .... ii ~ ~. i i.. ..: ii :' i .. ......... ii ..... .H 7......Initiating Condition:.ýOther conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an ALERT.Operating Mode Applicability:1, 2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level (EAL):Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantialdegradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probablelife threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILEACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPAProtective Action Guideline exposure levels.Basis:HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use ofviolent force to destroy equipment, take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee toachieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives,PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other actsthat satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not beconstrued to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of aconcerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to addresssuch activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the ownercontrolled area).HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demandswill be met by the stationPROJECTILE: An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for itscontinued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anAlert.Basis Reference(s):....... Referen.es ." .1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HA7Month 20XXOCGS 3-151EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) 0 afar roak ('Zonaratin Qfafinn AnnovPvolnn Ni ilAar-.-t~ U * -- *~ --S ** t* * --t **
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- U * *S ~ r ~. U S * --*~~*Table OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYHAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETYHU7Initkia~ting Cond'ition:Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrantdeclaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT.Operating Mode Applicability:1,2,3,4, DEmergency Action Level: (EAL)::..Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate thatevents are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of thelevel of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has beeninitiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring areexpected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.Basis: .. ... ..This IC addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but thatwarrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by theEmergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for anUNUSUAL EVENT.Basis Reference(s): .1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 HU7Month 20XXOCGS 3-152EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX) n afmr rgagk 11aniaratin Qtatinn AnnovP::alnn INh AalrTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSE-HU1Initiating Condition...Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.Operating Mode Applicability: ..........1, 2,3,4, DEmerge~ncy Action Level (EAL):Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY as indicated by a radiationreading:* > 800mr/hr (gamma + neutron) 3 feet from the HSM surfaceOR* > 200mr/hr (gamma + neutron) outside the HSM door on centerline of DSCOR* > 40mr/hr (gamma + neutron) end of shield wall exteriorBasis: .. " .."CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The irradiated fuel dry storage cask barrier(s) betweenareas containing radioactive substances and the environment.INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)
- A complex that isdesigned and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and otherradioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.This IC addresses an event that results in damage to the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARYof a storage cask containing spent fuel. It applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed fordry storage beginning at the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. The wordcask, as used in this EAL, refers to the storage container in use at the site for drystorage of irradiated fuel. The issues of concern are the creation of a potential or actualrelease path to the environment, degradation of any fuel assemblies due toenvironmental factors, and configuration changes which could cause challenges inremoving the cask or fuel from storage.The existence of "damage" is determined by radiological survey. The technicalspecification multiple of "2 times", which is also used in Recognition Category R IC RU1,is used here to distinguish between non-emergency and emergency conditions. Theemphasis for this classification is the degradation in the level of safety of the spent fuelcask and not the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate. It is recognized that inthe case of extreme damage to a loaded cask, the fact that the "on-contact" dose ratelimit is exceeded may be determined based on measurement of a dose rate at somedistance from the cask.Security-related events for ISFSIs are covered under ICs HU1 and HA1.Month 20XXOCGS 3-153EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)
Oyster Creek Generating Station Annex Exelon NuclearTable OCGS 3-2 OCGS EAL Technical BasisRECOGNITION CATEGORYISFSI MALFUNCTIONSE-HU1 (cont)Basis Re`feren-ce(s):1. NEI 99-01, Rev 6 E-HU12. Oyster Creek Generating Station ISFSI 10CFR72.212 Evaluation Rev. 5Month 20XXOCGS 3-154EP-AA-1010 (Revision XX)