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O' N f De Ni 6 p uco 4
UNITED STATES 3
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-,i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20666 3
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July 22, 1992 NOTE 10:
Mort Fleishman i
Office of Cosnissioner Rogers p
'ES FROM:
James L. Blaha Assistant for Operations Office of the Executive Director 1
for Operations
 
==SUBJECT:==
SITES WITH EXCLUSION AREAS LESS THAN 0.4 MILid The staff paper (SECY-92-215) which proposed revisions to the reactor site criteria, 10 CFR Part 100, noted that 25 of the current 75 reactor sites had exclusion area sizes that were less than 0.4 miles, but did not name the specific sites.
In your telephone call of July 16, 1992 to Len Soffer you inoicated that Commissioner Rogers wished to see a listing of those reactor sites.
Enclosed is a listing of all U. S. sites where reactors are currently operating or under construction. Those sites having an exclusion area size less than 640 meters (0.4 miles) are marked.
This list was included as to staff paper SECY-90-341, " Staff Study on Source Term Update and Decoupling Siting fom Design."
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1s L. Blaha A sistant for Operations OdiceoftheExecutiveDirector for Operations
 
==Enclosure:==
As stated l
l cc: Technical Assistaiit, IS Technical Assistant, JC
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Technical Assistant, FR Technical Assistant, GD SECY J. Taylor, ED0 J. Sniezek, DEDR 9408160108 940629 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
 
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l ENCLOSURE 3 EXISTING U.S. REACTOR SITES
.JXCLUSION LOW POPULATION.
AR':A BOUNDARY ZONE (LPZ).
' POP. CENTER
'i DISTANCE OUTER RADIUS DISTANCE l
REACTOR SITE (METERS)
(METERS)
(MILES) 1.
Arkansas 10'46' 4024 4
/ 2.
Beaver Valley 610 5795 5
3.
Bellefonte 914 3219 4
4.
Big Rock Pt 817 6439 45' i
/ 5.
Braidwood 457 1810 20
)
I 6.
Browns Ferry, 1219 3219 10 i
7.
Brunswick 914 3219 16 V 8.
Byron 460 4827 17 9.
Callaway.
1100 4023
'25 j
: 10. Calvert Cliffs 1150 3219 45 i
: 11. Catawba 762 6097 5.1
: 12. Clinton 975 4025 22
: 13. Comanche Pk.
1400 6440 40.
/14. Cook 610 3219 8
: 15. Cooper 746 1609 60
: 16. Crystal River 1340 8047 55
/17.DavisBesse 634 3219
~20
: 18. Diablo Canyon 800 9656 12
: 19. Dresden 671 8000 14
/20. Duane Arnold 440 9659 8
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I EAB LPZ PCD
: 21. Farley 1260 3219 16.5
{
: 22. Fermi 915 4828 6
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: 23. Fitzpatrick 975 5470 7
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/24. Ft. Calhoun 375 4827 10 l
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/25.ft.St.Vrain 590 4827 14 r
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/26. Ginna 457 4827 16
: 27. Grand Gulf 752 3219 25
/28. Haddam Neck 530 11,263 9.5 o
: 29. Hatch 1250 7250 48 i
I
: 30. Hope Creek 792 8045 18
/31. Indian Pt.
330 1100 0.87
: 32. Kewaunee 1200 4S27 17.5
/33. LaSalle 515 6400 5
: 34. Limerick 760 2043-1.7 d5.MaineYankee 610 9654 26 l
i
: 36. McGuire 762 8850 11
/37. Millstone 503 3700 3.2
/38. Monticello 488 1609 22
: 39. Nine Mile Pt.
1555 6115 7'
: 40. North Anna 1350 9656
. 24
: 41. Oconee 1609 9654 21 1
I V 42. Oyster Creek 402 3219 8
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: 43. Palisades 671 4827 20
: 44. Palo Verde 900 6437 34 2
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PCD I
: 45. Peach Bottom 820 7300 18
: 46. Perry 915 6437 6.3
/47. Pilgrim 441 2414 2.5
: 48. Pt. Beach 1207 9012 8
i
: 49. Prairie Is.
715 2414 26
/50.QuadCities 380 4827 7
: 51. Rancho Seco 640 8000 17
: 52. River Bend 914
-4023 24
/53. Robinson 425 7242 25
: 54. St. Lucie 1554 8049 8
: 55. Salem 1165 8047 18
: 56. San Onofre 800 4827 17 i
: 57. Seabrook 914 2413 4
/58.Sequoyah 585 4827 16 1
: 59. Shearon Harris 2133 4827 12 j
: 60. 50. Texas 1430,
4827 26
: 61. Summer 1630 4827 26 l
/ 62. Surry 560 4827 4.5
/63. Susquehanna 567 4800 12,
/ 64. Three Mile Is.
610 3219 12
~
: 65. Trojan 662 4023 6
: 66. Turkey Pt.
1269 8047 15
/ 67. Vt. Yankee
~277 8047 30
: 68. Vogtle 1098 3219 26 l
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l EAB LPZ PCD
: 69. WPPSSI 1950 6440 8
: 70. WPPSS-2 1950 4827 12
: 71. Wate; ford 915 3219 13
: 72. Watts Bar 1200 4827 40
: 73. Wolf Creek 1200 4023 28
: 74. Yankee Rowe 945 3219 25
/ 75. Zion 415 1600 6
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4 NEWMAN & HoLTzIwonn, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT L AW I6IS L STR E ET, N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20036 S600 TELEPHONE:(202) ess seco rAx:(mor) a7a ose:
June 1, 1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn Docketing and Service Branch Res Proposed Rule on Reactor Site Criteria; Including Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial of Petition for Rulemaking i
From Free Environment, Inc. et al. (57 Fed. Reg. 47,802 (October 20, 1992))'
Dear Mr. Chilk l
The law firm of Newman &'Holtzinger, P.C., on behalf of l
clients in its International Siting Group (ISG), hereby submits the original copy, three hard copies and one electronic copy of the ISG's comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed rule, " Reactor Site Criteria; _ Including Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial of Petition for Rulemaking From Free Environment, Inc. et al.," (57 l
Fed. Reg. 47,802 (October 20, 1992))'.9 The ISG has the following memberships l
Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.
Electricite de France The Federation of Electric Power Companies Hokkaido Electric Power Co.
Tohoku Electric Power Co.
l Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Chubu Electric Power Co.
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
The Kansai Electric Power Co.
The Chugoku Electric Power Co.
Shikoku Electric Power Co.
Kyushu Electric Power Co.
The Japan Atomic Power Co.
Taiwan Power Company.
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U Nessrs. Villian O. Daab and L. Manning batsing and Ms. Janet E.B. Eckar, ammbers of the firm, entered noticos of appearance as counsel for members of the IAC in this ruiamaking proceeding.
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NewxAN & HoLTz1xoza RC.
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 1, 1993 Page 2 The ISG was formed 'in response to the Commission _'s desire to seek the views of the internation81 community concerning the proposed revisions to the siting criteria.
ISG Members own and-operate nuclear _ power plants in ISG Member countries.- Siting of nuclear power plants in ISG Member ~ countries is governed by-national nuclear safety standards, which are. consistent with the nuclear safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
These international and national siting standards were strongly influenced by, the Commission's siting. standards.
.The Commission's proposed revisions to its siting regulations in 10 CFR -
Part 100, if adopted, would result in fundamental changes to the process for selecting new nuclear power plant sites.
For the reasons set forth' below and in the enclosed comments, International Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting _ criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceedings (1)
Adoption of. the proposed revisions to the Commission's-demographic regulations in 10 CFR
/
Part 100 will do major damage to the evolvingi international - consensus on nuclear safety standards and~1ead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the; siting of nuclear power plants and standards of. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national standards. in ISG Member countries.
(2)
The existing demographic regulations'in'10 CFR Part 100 have worked well.
Adoption of the i
proposed' revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation'through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design.
Adoption of the proposed revisions will not provide a ' substantial increase in protection or contribute to increased defense-in-depth.
The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.
(3)
The technical basis for the proposed revisions to the Siting Criteria ' is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.
i (4)
The proposed revisions to the Seismic Criteria i
should not be adopted.
Revision should await resolution of the controversy on the use of deterministic versus probabilistic methods in site selection.
Any revision adopted should
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O NzwxAw & Hotrzmoen, RC.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 1, 1993 Page 3 meet the Commission's rulemaking objective of regulatory stability.
l (5)
The Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with the proposed revisions is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.
(6)
Finalization of the proposed revisions to the siting regulations would not be in accord with sound agency decisionmaking.
j Each of the above reasons is sufficient grounds for the j
Commission to terminate the rulemaking proceeding.
When taken together, the arguments are overwhelming that to proceed at this i
time with the siting rulemaking is contrary to sound public policy concerning the protection of the public health and safety and the environment from radiological hazard and disruptive of internationally accepted safety norms regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants.
Ve neerel,
j v
1 William O. Dou u
L. Manning Muntzing J.E.B. Ecker cc Chairman Ivan Selin Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers Commissioner James R. Curtiss Commissioner Forrest J. Remick Commissioner E. Gail de Planque Mr. William C. Parler, General Counsel Mr. James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations l
Dr. Eric S. Beckjord, Director l
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
Mr. Carlton Stoiber, Director l
Office of International Programs Dr. Paul G. Shewmon, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l
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i INTERNATIONAL SITING GROUP (ISG)
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO U.S. NuctRAR rowEn ruNr SITING REGULATIONS i
i June 1,1993 1
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Newman & Holtainger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
)j State 1000 WasNngton, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-6600 4
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b TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EX ECUTIVE SU M M ARY.................................... iv 1.
INTRODUCTION 1
A.
Background................................... 1 i
1.
Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Siting Regulations 1
l l
l 2.
International Siting Group (ISG) Membership........
3 i
3.
ISG Members Have an Interest in Participating in This Rulemaking to Revise NRC's Nuclear Power Plant Site Safety Regulations in Part 100..................
4 l
4.
The Commission Has an Obligation to Consider the Implications of the Proposed Revisions to its Siting Regulations on International Nuclear Power Plant Saf ety and Siting........................... 6 B.
Summary of Reasons for Requesting Termination of the l
Rulemaking Proceeding to Change the Commission's Siting l
Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100............'........
10 l
II.
MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING REQUIREMENTS...........
12 l
A.
Adoption of the Proposed Revisions to the Commission's l
Demographic Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Will Do Major Damage to the Evolving International Consensus on Nuclear Safety Standards and Lead to Needless inconsistency Between U.S. Nuclear Safety Standards for the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants and Standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and National Standards in ISG Member Countries. The Existing Demographic Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Have Worked Well. Adoption of the Proposed Revisions is Not Needed to Ensure Adequate Protection of the Public Health and Safety Nor to Achieve Site isolation Through "Decoupling" of Nuclear Power Plant l
Newman & Hokaftiger. P.C.
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i Siting and Design. Adoption of the Proposed Revisions Will Not Provide a Substantial increase in Protection or i
Contribute to increased Defense-in-Depth. The Adverse
]
Impacts of the Proposed Revisions Greatly Exceed Their Benefits..................................... 12
)
1.
Adoption of the proposed revisions to the i
Commission's demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major damage to the evolving international
- 1 consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety.
~
standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and
)
standards of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national standards in ISG Member l
co u ntrie s............................... 13 i
2.
The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 have worked well. Adoption of the proposed
)
revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. Adoption of the proposed revisions will not provide a substantial increase in protection or contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits................................. 21 a.
The existing demographic regulationq;in 10 CFR l
Part 100 have worked well 21 I
b.
Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.................
31 j
c.
Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to achieve site isolation through l
"decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and l
desig n............................. 37 I
d.
Adoption of the proposed revisions to the i
demographic regulations in Part 100 will not provide a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The l
adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits..............
42 n mer, s mnama, r.c.
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The Technical Basis for the Proposed Revisions to the Site
. Safety Criteria is inadequate, Internally inconsistent and C o n f u si n g................................... 57 C..
The Proposed Revisions to the Seismic Criteria Should Not Be Adopted. Revision Should Await Resolution of the Controversy on the Use of Deterministic Versus Probabilistic Methods in Site Selection. Any Revision Adopted Should Meet the Commission's Rulemaking Objective of Regulatory.
Stability 61 1.
The Commission should resolve the controversy l
between use of deterministic versus probabilistic l
techniques before proceeding to rulemaking 62 2.
The proposed requirements are unlil;ely to meet the stated objectives of greater predictability and stability.......................
64 j
3.
Any revision to the Commission's seismic regulations.
shculd provide regulatory stability..............
66 l
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D.
The Environmental Assessment Prepared in Conjunction with l
the Proposed Revisions is inadequate as a Matter of Law to l
Support a Finding of No Significant Environmentalimpact 39 l
E.
Finalization of the Proposed Revisions to the Siting Regulations Would Not Be in Accord With Sound Agency Decisionmaking 78 1
Ill.
CO N CLU SION S.................................... 81 APPENDIX............................................A1 i
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==SUMMARY==
The law firm of Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., on behalf of clients in its International Siting Group (ISG), hereby submits comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed rule, " Reactor Site Criteria; including Seismic i
l and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial n Petition for Rulemaking From Free Environment, Inc. et al.,"-(57 Fed. Reg.
47,80.' (October 20,1992)). The IS'G has the following membership:
~ Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.
Electricit6 de France The Federation of Electric Power Companies Hr,kkaido Electric Power Co.
1 Tohoku Electric Power Co.
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
1 Chubu Electric Power Co.
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
The Kansai Electric Power Co.
The Chugoku Electric Power Co.
Shikoku Electric Power Co.
Kyushu Electric Power Co.
The Japan Atomic Power Co.
Taiwan Power Company.
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Ag l
ISG Members own and operate nuclear power plants in ISG Member l
countries. Siting of nuclear power plants in ISG Member countries is governed by national nuclear safety standards, which are consistent with the nuclear safety I
standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency _(IAEA). These international and national siting standards were strongly influenced by the Commission's siting standards. The Commission's proposed revisions to its site safety regulations in 10 CFR Part 100, if adopted, would result in fundamental changes to the process for selecting new nuclear power plant sites. The fundamental nature.of the changes likely would force reconsideration of IAEA and national nuclear safety siting standards and raise questions in ISG Members' countries concerning the j
adequacy of present and future nuclear power plant sites to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. ISG Members ask that the proposed revisions be withdrawn.
The proposed revisions are not necessary to achieve siting of nuclear power plants in areas of lower population density and awah from population centers and they are inconsistent with the internationally accepted principle of L
establishing site safety standards which permit (and recognize the necessity to l
i l
have) flexibility in balancing the various factors important to the safe siting of nuclear power plants.
If adopted, the regulation could force review of the presently accepted site safety principles and raise questions about whether
)
l presently operating nuclear power plants provide adequate protection of the public and environment when the plants are located in more densely populated areas or l
l have smaller exclusion areas than the revised criteria would permit. Moreover, newma, a now,wa, r.c.
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should these proposed revisions become the norm, they could preclude the siting _
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of nuclear power plants in many areas of Western Europe and Asia and result in r
a dependence on energy alternatives with less favorable environmental impacts.
ISG Members believe that the NRC should consider the international implications of the proposed revisions to the Commission's siting regulations. A fundamental result of international nuclear cooperation has been an increased appreciation for safety standards that are shared by the entire international l
community. For the U.S. to develop and promulgate new site safety regulations without an appreciation for the international nuclear standards could imply a repudiation of current international safety standard development efforts. The proposed numerical criteria would be grossly limiting, unnecessarily so because the reviews required by the NRC and regulatory bodies in other countries using standards which are reflective of international siting norms result in adequate i
protection of the public health and safety and in the selection of sites which are I
among the best reasonably to be found after balancing the s'ite characteristics important to adequate protection of the public and the environment. Likewise, decoupling of dung criteria from source terms and dose calculations to achieve site isolation would be entirely unsatisfactory as it would eliminate a key measure of merit of the site-plant combination, would prevent the advantageous utilization of special design provisions in siting decisions and could provide a disincentive to improvement of plant safety design features. Such a change would be extremely limiting and certainly the wrong approach in countries or regions of countries where siting options are limited. As to the seismic criteria being propossd for n ~ men s nonameer, r.c.
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3 codification, adoption seems premature, making them unsuitable to serve as the basis for an international safety standard. Moreover, the division within the NRC Staff and among its experts concerning the use of probabilistic versus deterministic evaluation techniques illustrates well that the criteria do not embody the consensus associated with international safety standards.
For the reasons set forth in the main text of the ISG comments, International Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceeding.
The principal reasons for this position include the following:
(1)
Adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major damage to the evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead. to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for
~ he siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the t
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national:
standards in ISG Member countries.
(2)
The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR, Part 100 have worked well.
Adoption of the. proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. Adoption of the proposed revisions will not provide a substantia! increase in protection or contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.
(3)
The technical basis for the proposed revisions to the Site Safety Criteria in 10 CFR Part 100 is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.
(4)
The proposed revisions to the Seismic Criteria should not be adopted. Revision should await resolution of the controversy on the use of deterministic versus I
probabilistic methods in site selection. Any revision m.-=, a mmm n, r.c.
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adopted should meet the Commission's rulemaking
~
objective of regulatory stability.
(5)
The Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with the proposed revisions is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.
(6)
Finalization of the proposed revisions to the siting regulations would not be in accord with sound agency decisionmaking.
i Each of the above reasons alone is sufficient grounds for the j
i Commission to terminate the rulemaking proceeding. When taken together, the arguments are overwhelming that to proceed at this time with the siting l
rulemaking is contrary to sound public policy concerning the protection of the public health and safety and the environment from radiological hazard and l
disruptive of internationally accepted safety norms regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants.
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I.
INTRODUCTION A.
 
===Background===
1.
Summary of Proposed Revisions to.the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Siting Regulations On October 20, 1992, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) published in the Federal Register (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,802) a proposed rule to change the reactor site safety requirements in 10 CFR Part 100 (Part 100) to include specific numerical demographic requirements and to revise the seismic and geologic siting criteria in use since 1972.
The proposed changes to the site safety regulations in Part 100 concerning demographics would set a minimum distance for an exclusion area surrounding a nuclear power reactor at 0.4 miles (640 meters).. The requirement for a low population zone surrounding the exclusion area would be deleted from the present Part 100 on the basis that the required Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) i and the proposed population density requirements obviate the need for a low population zone requirement. The proposed regulation would codify in Part 100 i
(the site safety regulation) the population density limits currently provided as guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.7 in connection wit consideration of alternative sites. There would be a critical loss of necessary flexibility in making site safety
' determinations. Maximum population density _at the time of initial site approval would be 500 people per square mile averaged out to 30 miles. The projected population density 40 years after initial site approval could be no more than 1000 people per square mile averaged out to 30 miles.
i newmen a n-t,. r.c.
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t In addition to these numerical changes in the site safety regulations.
concerning demographics, a number of other revisions are proposed. - Some of these proposed revisions include the deletion of meteorological factors from radiological dose calculations for siting purposes; modification of hydrological
- factor requirements; the addition of review of nearby industrial and transportation facilities; and the addition of periodic reporting requirements for non-related' activities.
The proposed revisions to Part 100 concoming seismic and geologic.
siting criteria for nuclear power plants are intended to reflect advances in the earth.
sciences and in earthquake engineering.
Under.the seismic portion of the regulation, Safe Shutdown Earthquake'(SSE) Ground Motion and site suitability criteria would be separated from design-related criteria, and detailed seismic guidance would be removed from the regulation. The regulation would require both probabilistic and deterministic evaluations to determine. site suitability, j
including an explicit criterion that the probability of exceed'ing the SSE at a proposed site must be lower than the median annual probability of exceeding the SSE for the current generation of operating plants. In addition, the SSE calculation i
assumptions would be revised to decouple the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) from the SSE. Finally, the proposed regulation would require plant shutdown in l
the event of vibratory ground motion in excess of the OBE.
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~o 2.
International Siting Group (ISG) Membership 1
The law firm of Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., on behalf of clients in its International Siting Group (ISG), hereby submits comments on the Nuclear l
Regulatory Commission's proposed rule, " Reactor Site Criteria; including Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial of Petition for Rulemaking From Free Environment, Inc. et al.," (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,802 (October 20,1992)).V The ISG has the following membership:
I Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.
Electricit6 de France The Federation of Electric Power Companies Hokkaido Electric Power Co.
Tohoku Electric Power Co.
Tokyo Electric Power Co.
Chubu Electric Power Co.
Hokuriku Electric Power Co.
The Kansal Electric Power Co.
The Chugoku Electric Power Co.
Shikoku Electric Power Co.
Kyushu Electric Power Co.
The Japan Atomic Power Co.
Taiwan Power Company.
I l'
Messrs. Williern D. Doub and L. Manning Muntring and Ms. Janet E.B. Ecker, rnombers of the 'irrn, entered notices of appearance as counsel for members of the ISG in tNe rulemaking proceeding.
Neewmen & : '_, _. P.C.
960e 3
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l h
i The ISG was formed in response to the Commission's desire to seek i
j the views of the international community concerning the proposed revisions to the i
site safety criteria. San Staff Requirements Memorandum, "SECY 92-215 --
j Revision of 10 CFR Part 100, Revisions to 10 CFR Part 50, New Appendix B to 10 i
CFR Part 100 and New Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50" (August 18, 1992). In i
order to ensure that the comments of ISG Members on the proposed changes l
would be fully considered by the Commission in considering the disposition of the -
i j.
proposed changes, Newman'& Holtzinger filed a request for an extension of the -
)
i I
i public comment period to June 1,1993. On March 22,1993, the Commission 1
i approved the extension request.
3.
ISG Members Have an interest In Participating in.This Rulemaking to Revise NRC's Nuclear Power Plant Site Safety j
Regulations in Part 100.
1 ISG Members own and operate nuclear power plants in ISG Member l
j countries. Siting of nuclear power plants in ISG Member countries is governed by national nuclear safety standards, which are consistent with the nuclear safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These international i
and national siting standards were strongly influenced by the Commission's siting.
l standards. The Commission's proposed revisions to its site safety regulations in 4
j 10 CFR Part 100, if adopted, would result in fundamental changes to the process i
i for selecting new nuclear power plant sites. Specifically, adoption of the proposed t
revisions to the site safety requirements in Part 100 concerning demographics j
would change demographics from one of several balancing factors to be I
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b considered in selecting a nuclear power plant site to a screening factor to be applied first before taking into account the other safety-related site characteristics i
to be evaluated during the site selection process. TMsa othar safety-related site characteristics would be relegated to secondary importance in the site selection process, as they would be considered only in connection with sites which first met the demographic requirements. The fundamental nature of the changes likely would force reconsideration of IAEA and national nuclear safety siting standards and raise questions in ISG Members' countries concerning the adequacy of present 5
and future nuclear power plant sites to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.
As discussed below, the proposed revisions are not necessary to l
achieve siting of nuclear power plants in areas of lower population density and away from population centers and they are inconsistent with th'e internationally accepted principle of establishing site safety ' standards which permit (and l
recognize the necessity to have) flexibility in balancing the various factors important to the safe siting of nuclear power plants, if adopted, the regulation could unnecessarily force review of the presently accepted site safety principles and raise questions about whether presently operating nuclear power plants provide adequate protection of the public and environment when the plants are located in more densely populated areas or have smaller exclusion areas than the i
revised criteria would permit. Moreover, should these proposed revisions become the norm, they could preclude the siting of nuclear power plants in many areas of i
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i Western Europe and Asia and result in a dependence on energy alternatives with j
less favorable environmental impacts, t
4.
'The Commission Has an Obligation to Consider the implications of the Proposed Revisions to its Siting Regulations '
i on Intemational Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Siting.
)
i The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957 (IAEA Act), 71 Stat. 453, provides in Section 3 that, "The participation of the i
1 United States in the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes of the Agency set forth in its statute and the policy concerning the development, use and control of atomic energy set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.'
In-conducting the instant rulemaking, the. NRC thus far has failed to take into adequate-account. the relationship of its actions with those of the IAEA. ISG Members believe that pursuant to the IAEA Act, the NRC should consider the implications of the proposed revisions to the Commission's site safety regulations on the IAEA's guidelines and process with respect to siting. In order to assist the Commission in inis consideration, the ISG is submitting comments regarding such implications.
1 The IAE A, an autonomous member of the United Nations family of organizations, came into being when its statute entered into force on July 29, 1957. As a member of the IAEA, the United States subscribes to the IAEA's objectives as defined in its statute. One of these objectives is "[to] encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for i
peaceful uses throughout the world." Among the IAEA's activities related to safety in atomic energy are development of standards, regulations, codes of newme,, s n_ ?__.,
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practice and recommendations concerning specific radiological rules, emergency procedures, and other matters.
The IAEA has long considered siting of nuclear installations to be an important matter. The United States participated in a symposium held in Vienna, Austria, in December 1974 under the joint sponsorship of the IAEA and the t
l l
Nuclear Energy. Agency.of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).2' Several papers were submitted on behalf of the United i
States concerning its practice with respect to such matters as acceptability of -
l l
nuclear sites and environmental protection. Other nations also presented papers l
l and participated in discussions, leading to a rather comprehensive discussion of the matter which was published by the IAEA in 1975. Over the years, the IAEA has l
published a series of standards concerning the siting of nuclear facilities. For example, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) included siting safety principles in its Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3, " Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants" (1988). A " Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:
1 l
Siting" was prepared in 1978 and revised in 1988 (Siting Code). Thirteen titles l
in the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) series concern siting.
l l
The extens'on of the public comment period to June 1,1993, permits I
the NRC to satisfy its international obligations under the IAEA Act by taking into account the implications for international siting and safety standards and the role of the United States in their development. Although not every NRC rulemaking 2'
Sitino of Nuclear Facilities. Proceedings of the. symposium held in Vienna, Austria, December 9-13,1974, Jointly Organized by the IAEA and NEA (OECD).
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3 need be accompanied by a detailed review of foreign policy implications, there are certain NRC rulemakings having such an obvious and direct bearing on international nuclear matters that failure to consider United States rules in the context of a global nuclear regime is contrary to the basic spirit of United States participation l
l in the IAEA. The conduct of the instant rulemaking proceeding is one such activity.
United States interest in the IAEA received renewed attention in the
~
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). As stated in Section 201 of the l
l NNPA,' the United States is " committed to a strengthened and more effective i
i l
Internatianal Atomic Energy Agency and to a comprehensive safeguards system l
administered by the Agency to deter proliferation." In addition to safeguards matters, the NNPA recognizes a number of other important roles for the IAEA. In 1
particular, Section 104 of the NNPA specifies a number of desired international undertakings to be accomplished with other nations and " groups of nations such L
as the IAEA." Given the primacy of the IAEA in today's ndclear society, the l
United States should act with a careful regard to IAEA activities. Otherwise, the United States may be perceived as undermining the effectiveness of the IAEA.
The present rulemaking has not yet dealt with the subject of IAEA activities in the siting of nuclear facilities. In considering whether to adopt the proposed revisions, the NRC should give appropriate consideration to the role of the IAEA.
The NRC has been directed by Congress in the NNPA and other acts to give suitable consideration to the vitally important matter of nuclear non-proliferation, in this rulemaking the NRC should consider the two subjects of newman s : t,. r.c.
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lo siting of nuclear facilities and international impacts of NRC rules, which are obviously related to nuclear non-proliferation.
l United States foreign policy recognizes the place of nuclear energy in i
the economies of both the developed and the developing countries of the world.
l The safety standards and regulations developed by the NRC for the U.S. civilian nuclear industry continue to serve as models for the development of international' nuclear safety standards. The proposed revisions to the site safety criteria threaten to have an adverse effect on international nuclear cooperation and to disrupt the evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards.
A fundamental result of international nuclear cooperation has been an increased appreciation for safety standards that.are shared by the entire international community. For the U.S. to develop and promulgate new site safety requiations without an appreciation for the international nuclear standards could imply a repudiation of current international safety standard development efforts.
i I
The proposed numerical criteria would be grossly limiting, unnecessarily so because the reviews required by the NRC and regulatory bodies in other countries I
using standards which are reflective of international siting norms result in adequate protection of the public health and safety and in the selection of sites which are among the best reasonably to be found after balancing the site characteristics important to adequate protection of the public and the environment. Likewise, _
j decoupling of siting criteria from source terms and dose calculations to achieve site isolation would be entirely unsatisfactory as it would eliminate a key measure of merit of the site-plant combination, would prevent the advantageous utilization of l
Newmen a Nann \\ww, r.c.
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o special design provisions in siting decisions and could provide a disincentive to improvement of plant safety design features. Such a change would be extremely limiting and certainly the wrong approach in countries or regions of countries where siting options are limited.
As to the seismic criteria being proposed for codification, adoption seems premature, making them unsuitable to serve as the basis for an international safety standard. Moreover, the division within'the NRC Staff and among its experts concerning the use of probabilistic versus deterministic evaluation techniques illustrates well that the criteria do. not embody the consensus associated with international safety standards.
B.
Summarv of Reasons for Reauestina Termination of the Raalamakina Proceeding to Change the Commission's Siting Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Based on the foregoing discussion and for the reasons set forth below in Section ll, International Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceeding. The principal reasons for this position include the following:
l l
(1)
Adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's l
demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major damage to the evolving international consensus i
on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless
)
inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the j.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national l
standards in ISG Member countries.
L i
(2)
The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part j
100 have worked well.
Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of l-the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation Newman &."-il
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through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and l
design. Adoption of the proposed revisions will not l
. provide a substantialincrease in protection or contribute to increased defense in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.
(3)
The technical basis for the proposed revisions to the Site Safety Criteria in 10 CFR Part 100 is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.
l (4)
The proposed revisions to the Seismic Criteria should not be adopted. Revision should await resolution of the controversy on the use of _ deterministic versus probabilistic methods in site selection. Any revision j
adopted should meet the Commission's rulemaking l
objective of regulatory stability.
(5)
The Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with the proposed revisions is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.
(6)
Finalization of the proposed revisions to the siting regulations would not be in accord with sound agency decisionmaking.
Each of the above reasons alone is sufficient grounds for the Commission to terminate the rulemaking proceeding. When taken together, the arguments are overwhelming that to proceed at this time with the siting i
rulemaking is contrary to sound public policy concerning the protection of the i
public health and safety and the environment from radiological hazard and i
disruptive of internationally accepted safe ty norms regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants.
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O II.
MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRQPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING REQUIREMENTS i
The international Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceeding? In the sections which follow, the basir; *.,r the ISG's request is set forth in detail. The arguments focus on the impact of the proposed revisions on internationally accepted standards for nuclear safety; how well the present regulatory framework has worked in achieving the goal of remote siting; how well the proposed revisions would contribute to reduction in nuclear power plant risk and increased defense-in-depth; and how well the proposed revisions would meet the Commission's stated objectives in the October 20,1992 Federal Register notice (FRN) proposing the revisions.
A.
Adoption of the Proposed Revisions to the Commission's Demographic Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Wal Do Maior Damage to the Evolving International Consensus on Nuclear Safety Standards and Lead to Needless inconsistency Between U.S. Nu&r-Safety Standards for the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants and Standards of the International Atomic Enerav Anancy (IAEA) and National Standards in ISG Member Countries. The Ewi=*Ina Demo-i et. c Reenletions in 10 CFR Part 100 Have Worked Wall. Adontion of the Proposed Revisions is Not Needed to Ensure Adeauate Pietectieri of the Pehlic Health and Safetv Nor to Achieve Site isolation Threueh "Decoualina" of Nuclear Power Plant Sitina and Desion. Adontion of the Proposed Revisions WR1 Not Provide a Sub=tantl=1 Incr==== in Protection or Contribute to increased Defense-in-Death. The Adverse imoacts of the Proposed Revisions Greativ Exceed Their Benefits.
l 2'
The associated draft regulatory guides, in particular Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 l
(Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7), rhould also be withdrawn.
i Newmen & lW;, AC.
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I o
1.
Adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's i
demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major I
damage to the evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national standards in ISG Member countries.
l The United States has had and will continue to have a major influence l
on nuclear power plant siting practices elsewhere in the world. The IAF.A has established a wide-ranging program to provide its Member States with guidance i
on many aspects of safety associated with thermal neutron nuclear power reactors. The program has involved the preparation of many publications in the form of Codes of Practice and S6fety Guides, many of which concern safe siting, of nuclear facilities. Review of the siting documents reveals both the extensive participation by the United States in their development and the influence the United States has had on the substantive positions set forth in the documents.
l The INSAG of the IAEA in its Safety Series No. 71li INSAG-3, " Basic l
Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants," (1988), sets forth basic safety principles for nuclear power plant siting:
The choice of sites takes into account the results of investigations of local factors which could adversely affect the safety of the plant.
Sites are investigated from the radiologicalimpact of the plant in normal operations and in accident conditions.
Site characteristics which can influence fne air, food-chain and water supply pathways are to be investigated, including physical characteristic:.,
environmental characteristics, the use of land and water resources and the population distribution around the site.
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i The site selected for a nuclear power plant is compatible with the off-site countermeasures that may be necessary to limit the effects of accidental releases of radioactive substances, and is expected to remain compatible with such measures.
The site selected for a nuclear power plant has a reliable long term heat sink that can remove energy generated in the plant after. shutdown, both immediately after shutdown and over the longer term. 75-INSAG-3 at 23, 26.
An IAEA Code of Practice and a series of thirteen Safety Guides implement these safety principles for the siting of nuclear power plants.F The Siting Code, which was revised in 1988, establishes the objectives and basic requirements that must I
be met to ensure adequate safety in the operation of nuclear power plants. The i
j l'
The thirteen titles in the Nuclear Safety Standards series concerning siting are:
1.
50-SG-S1 (Rev. I) - Earthquakes and Associated Topics in Relation to Nuclear Power Plant Siting (1991);
i 2.
50-SG-S2 - Seismic Analysis and Testing of Nuclear Power Plants (1979);
3.
50-SG-S3 - Atmospheric Dispersion in Nuclear Power Plant Siting (1980); I j
4.
50-SG-S4 - Site Selection and Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Population Distribution (1980);
5.
50-SG S5 - External Man-Induced Events in Relation to Nuclear Power Plant Siting (1981);
6.
50-SG-S6 - Hydrological Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Relation to Nuclear Power Nnt Siting (1985);
7.
50-SG-S7 - Nuclear Power Nnt Siting: Hydrogeological Aspects (1984);
8.
50-SG-S8 - Safety Aspects of the Foundations of Nucle 6r Power Plants (1986);
9.
50-SG-S9 - Site Survey for Nuclear Power Nnts (1984):
10.
50-SG-S10A - Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Nnts on River Sites (1983):
11.
50-SG-S10B - Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Nnts on Coastal Sites (1983);
i 12, 50-SG S11 A - Extreme Meteorological Events in Nuclear Power Nnt Siting.
l Excluding Tropical Cyclones (1981); and 13.
50-SG-S118 - Design Basis Tropical Cyclone for Nuclear Power Nnts (1984).
Siting experts from the NRC participated in the development of these documents, the contents of which strongly refiect U.S. siting practices.
j i
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Siting Code at page 9 describes the main objective in siting nuclear power plants from the viewpoint of nuclear safety as:
protection of the public and the environment against the radiological impact of accidental releases of radioactivity; normal radioactive releases from nuclear power plants have also to be considered. In the evaluation of the suitability of a site for a nuclear power plant the following aspects shall be considered:
(a)
Effects of external events occurring in the region of the particular site (these events could be of natural or man induced origin);
(b)
- Characteristics of the site and its environment which could influence the transfer of relcased radioactive material to man; (c?
Population density and distribution and other characteristics of the external zone in relation to the possibi'ity of implementing emergency measures and the l
need to evaluate the risk to individuals and the population.
Methods and solutions set out in the siting guides provide assurance that plants can be sited without undue risk to the health and sa,fety of the general
)
public. Together the Siting Code and guides establish an essential basis for safety i
l in the siting of nuclear power plants, including the desirability of keeping reactors j
away from densely populated centers.F The Siting Code and siting guides l
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i i
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Safety Guide No.50-SG-S4, " Site Selection and Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Population Distribution," states at 2 (1980):
Countries which have developed their own nuclett power programmes from the beginning have, as far as has been practicable, begun by selecting sites in regions away from population centres and with low population densities.
As experience was acquired and with technological progress, some of these countries were able to justify the choice of sites away from (continued...)
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3 emphasire that "it is essential to ensure that all site-related characteristics have been taken into account" during the selection of the preferred candidates. Sag lAEA Safety Guide No. 50-SG-S9, " Site Survey for Nuclear Power Plants," at 10 l
(1984). That guide identifies fourteen (14) safety-related site characteristics to be l
evaluated during the she selection process, of which population distribution is but l
one.8' The guide recognizes the difficulty in comparing sites based on population and suggests that "[ilt may be appropriate to compare all other site characteristics, l
and then to evaluate the sites independently from the point of view of population l
l distribution." E at 32.
During the original development of these publications and during the l
l revision process, care has been taken to ensure that all Member States of the 1'(... continued) i population centres but with higher population densities. Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme may consider it prudent to give the Greatest preference to sites with a low population density in the region.
2' The other thirteen are:
- Surface faultino
- Seismicity
- Suitability of subsurface material
- Vulcanism
- Flooding
- Extreme meteorolo0 cal phenomena i
- Man-induced events
- Dispersion in air
- Dispersion in water
- Emeroency Planning
- Land use
- Availability of cooling water
- Other site characteristics as appropriate, such as avalanche, landslide, surface collapse.
lAEA Safety Guide No. 50-SG-S9 at 10-13.
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IAEA,in particular those with active nuclear power programs such as the United States, provide their input and that the resulting standards embody an international l
consensus, indeed, the United States, in particular Commission representatives, l
have played an important rola in the development of these guidance documents.
l l
Each significantly reflects regulatory practices in the United States, as the -
foregoing discussion demonstrates. One of the IAEA's hopes forbe revised Siting Code is that it will be used, accepted and respected by Member States as a basis for the regulation of the safety of power reactors within the respective national legal and regulatory frameworks. San Siting Code at Foreword.
l Siting, along with emergency planning and design, is viewed as an j
important element of defense-in-depth, a fundamental safety principle underlying the use of nuclear power. The INSAG of the IAEA describes defense-in-depth as i
follows:
' Defense in depth' is singled out ~amongst the fundamental principles since it underlies the ' safety technology of nuclear rower.
All safety activities, whether organizationai, behavioral or equipment related,.
are subject to layers of overlapping provisions, so that if a failure should occur it would be compensated for or corrected without causing harm to individuals or the public at large. This idea of multiple levels of protection is the central feature of defence in depth, and it is repeatedly used in the specific safety, principles that follow.
Two corollary principles of defence in depth are defined, i
namely, accident prevention and accident mitigation.
These corollary principles follow the general statement of defence in depth.
Safety. Series Report No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988) at 13.
See also Appendix to the report, which provides an expanded discussion of defense-in-depth.
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The NRC, in discussing comments received on its 1980 Notice Of intent to prepare
-l an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in connection with revision of the I
demographic regulations in Part 100 (45 Fed. Reg. 79,820 (December 2,1980)),.
stated:
i Siting, design, and emergency planning are three factors which each in its own way goes as far as is reasonable toward protecting the public health and safety. This is l
the ' defense-in-depth' concept.... [A rulemaking on any one] must consider the premises of the other two.
NUREG-0833, ' Environmental Impact Statement on the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants Scoping Summary Report,' at 13 (December 1981).
The foregoing is not meant to imply that the United States is bound to implement the codes and guides of the I AEA's Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) program and may not change its regulations. However, it is meant to suggest that, in the spirit of acceptance of and respect for the NUSS program, account should be taken of the implications for change upon the international consensus standards encompassed by the NUSS program, when changes,to national safety standards, such as 10 CFR Part 100, are being considered.
It is in this spirit that ISG Members are offering comments on the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100. As discussed in the sections which follow, the proposed revisions will do major damage to the I
evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the IAEA and national standards in ISG Member countries. Specifically, adoption of the revisions by the United States would likely newme,, a n-m-, r.c.
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5 force fundamental reconsideration of international site safety standards and the adequacy of sites selected in accordance with present standards. However, the changes being considered by the NRC are not necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety; they will not result in improved safety; and they have the potential for destablizing an international safety framework that has worked well in the selection of suitable nuclear power plant sites in both the l
U.S. and elsewhere in the world.
l L
For example, the guidelines used by the Japan Atomic Energy l
l Commission in reactor site evaluation closely resemble the current U.S. siting framework. An exclusion area surrounds each site, which is, in turn, surrounded l
by a low population zone. The reactor must also be sited away from densely populated areas. The size of the exclusion zone and population distances are chosen to limit radiation effects in the unlikely event of an accident.
Fixed j
demographic limits are not imposed.
j in Canada, the suitability of a site is based o'n the risk to the population (doses under normal operation and potential doses in accidents). The risk is based on a conservative prediction of actual plant performance and site l
l characteristics and is evaluated using all the exposure pathways, including land i
contamination, and such site characteristics as meteorology. Societal judgment about the acceptability of the risk is also a key factor in determining site suitability.
As in Japan, fixed demographic limits are not imposed.
i in France, the current practice of the safety authorities is to pay special attention to demographics while assessing the suitability of potential sites Newmen & Hekakeer P.C.
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for nuclear power plants. French safety authorities rely on a site-by-site analysis, l
l which encompasses both the safety features of the plant design and the suitability of the local background with respect to population distribution around the site, existing thoroughfares and the ability to take emergency action.
Fixed demographic limits are not imposed.
Taiwan, Belgium and Korea 2/ base their siting practices on U.S. siting l
standards. Taiwan establishes exclusion area distances in accordance with the l
evaluated potential radiological consequences and limited available site area, I
making use, in particular, of multi-reactor sites. Korea's approach is similar.
Instead of detailed Belgian-specific rules (apart from a licensing procedure, an -
inspection system and ICRP-type rules), Belgium safety authorities apply NRC rules j
in so far as practicable using a transposition process.
The proposed changes to the U.S. siting standards, if adopted, will j
force reconsideration of siting practices elsewhere in the world. For the additional
^
reasons set forth in the sections which follow, the members of the International i
l Siting. Group urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the i
Commission's siting regulations, along with the associated draft Regulatory Guide l
DG-4003 (Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7).
2' We have been able to obtain information about Belgian and Korean standards and, hence, are including it here, even though no Belgian or Korean organization is an ISG Member.
Newmen a Nehm,ww. P.c.
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l 2.
The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 104 have worked well. Adoption of the proposed revisions is not andeded to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. Adoption of the proposed revisions w31 not provide a substantial increase in protection or I
contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions gready exceed their benefits.
I a.
The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 have worked well. -
A basic assumption underlying the proposed changes to the I
demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 (Part 100) is that plant design features have improved as a result of applying Part 100, but that site isolation has been de-emphasized. This crucial assumption - that site isolation has been de-emphasized -- drives the proposed revisions, but has no basis in fact. As such, it does not provide a valid basis for the demographic criteria in the proposed rule.
Contrary to this assumption, under the existing NRC regulatory i
framework for nuclear power plant siting, based on 10 CFR Parts 50, 51 and 100 l
and on the philosophy and guidelines published in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1),
U.S. nuclear power plants have been sited away from highly populated areas and l
the Commission's remote siting objective has been achieved. Very recently, NRC Staff representatives underscored this fact when meeting with members of the 1
international community in January 1993, attending a meeting of the Committee 1
l on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) of the OECD in Paris. The Staff's briefing charts stated:
4 l
Use of Reg. Guide 4.7 [Rev.1] in conjunction with Part l
100 provides effective means to keep reactors away
)
from densely populated centers. NRC Staff Trip Report i
i l
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l Concerning CNRA Meeting, enclosure at 8 (February 5, 1993).
i i
1.
Summary of existing NRC framework for siting nuclear power p'. ants.
The demographic regulations in Part 100 were promulgated in 1962.
)
The Supplementary information for these safety regulations identified as a basic l
l 1
l objective of the regulations assurance that "the cumulative exposure dose to large -
l numbers of people as a consequence of any nuclear accident should be low in comparison with what might be considered reasonable for total population dose.
... [Another objective is to] provide for protection against excessive exposure doses to people in large centers, where effective protective measures might not be feasible." 27 Fed. Reg. 3,509 (April 12,1962). The regulations identified site evaluation factors, which included population density and "use characteristics" h, characteristic human activities) of the site environs; and provided guidance for determining the suitability of the proposed site. on the basis of a dose assessment which took into account:
i the characteristics of the reactor design; population density and use characteristics, including the exclusion area, low population zone and population zone l
distance; and physical characteristics of the site, including seismology, meteorology, geology, and hydrology.
L Flexibility of application was an important aspect of implementation to make certain that the concept of environmentalisolation did not receive undue emphasis Tw wmen s non=ma. r.c.
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m and to recognize the importance of engineered safeguards in meeting the l
regulation's objective. See li r
Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 establishes the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for nuclear power plants. A number of these'-
4 criteria are directly related to site characteristics, as well as to events and l
conditions outside the nuclear power unit.. Part 50 also specifies emergency l
l planning and preparedness requirements.
i Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 l
l l
(NEPA)8'is also a factor in nuclear power plant siting. NEPA requires that a cost benefit analysis be completed before any major federal action significantly affecting the human environment is undertake n. Nuclear power plant siting, being the initial step of a major federal action to license a plant'for operation, is necessarily encompassed by the provisions. of NEPA.8' NRC requires preparation of i
i alternative site studies.uhich balance environmental costs and benefits of several preselected sites. Population characteristics are among the site characteristics l
entering into the cost-benefit balancing. The site selected by the applicant is to be among the best reasonably ta be found for which no obviously superior alternative has been identified.12' l
l' 42 U.S.C. I 4332(2)(c) (1988).
E' Calvert Cliffs Coordinatina Committee v. AEC. 449 F.2d 1109,1112 (D.C. Cir.1971).
19' Sag 10 CFR Part 51 and Regu'atory Guide 4.2, Rev. 2, " Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Statians" (1976).
Newmen a Nakarnow. P.c.
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!O Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1), " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations," was issued in November -1975.u/
The guide is intended to assist applicants in the initial stage of selecting potential sites for t
nuclear power stations. Regulatory Guide 4.7 provides guidance related to both the site's safety and its environmental qualities.
Regulatory Guide 4.7 implements the safety criteria in 10 CFR i 100.11 pertaining to demographics as follows.
Each. nuclear power plant applicant must determine the following:
1.
An exclusion area of such size that an individuallocated at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated fission product release -
would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in-excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure..
l 2.'
A low population zone of such size that an individual located at 'any point on its outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from -
j iodine exposure.
l 3.
A population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. In applying this guide, the boundary of the population conter shall be determined - upon consideration of population distribution. Political boundaries are not controlling in the application of this guide. Where very large cities are M'
in November 1992, the NRC issued for public comment Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 (Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7). Relevant differences between Rev.1 and Proposed Rev. 2 are noted where appropriate. The chan0es in Proposed Revision 2 -
conform to the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 100.
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3 involved a greater distance may be necessary because of total integrated population dose consideration.M' j
i Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) also provides guidance concerning j
l consideration of alternative sites when numerical demographic criteria given in the i
j guide are exceeded. The guide states:
i j
If the population density, including weighted transient i
population, projected at the time of initial operation of i
the nuclear power station exceeds 500 persons per i
square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30
~ miles (cumulative population at a distance divided by an i
area at that distance), or the projected population
}
' density over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1000 j
persons per square mile averaged over any radial j
distance out to 30 miles, snacial attention should be j
niven to the consideration of alternative sites with lower i
nooulation densities (emphasis added).3' In sum, Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) makes clear that "(t]he decision I
i that a station may be built on a specific candidate site is based on a detailed evaluation of the proposed site-plant combination and a cost-benefit analvsis l
)
I i
I i
H' 10 CFR I 100.11 (1993).
i i
D' Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) at 16. Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 states substantially 1
the same at 9:
1 As set forth in 10 CFR Part 100, nuclear power station sites should.
be located in areas with low population density. If the populatien density of a proposed site (1) excerds 500 people por square mile 1
averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles or (2) is projected i
to exceed 1000 people per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (50 kilometers) 40 years after the time of i
site approval, the applicants should Give special attention to j
alternative sites.
i Alewmen & l" 'J.
. P.C.
hire 26 I
 
3 comnarina it with alternative site-olant combinations..." (emphasis added).H' As' discussed above, the analysis includes consideration of site safety issues and environmental issues. The site safety issues include geologic / seismic, hydrolog!c and atmospheric characteristics of proposed sites; potential effects on the station from accidents associated.with nearby industrial,- transportation, and military facilities; and population densities in the site environs as they relate to protecting
' the general public from the potential radiation hazards.of postulated serious accidents.3' When an applicant's preferred site does not meet the numerical population density guidelines in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1), consideration is T
given to alternative sites.
Like the international ' site safety standards described above, implementation of the Commission's current site safety regulations requires a balanced account of all factors contributing to safety and to reduced risk of s
l l
M' Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) at 1.
While Draft Guide DG-4003 replaces " site-plant 3
combination" with " site," it makes clear at 3 that "Islite selection involves considerations i
of public health and safety, enninee,ina and deston, economics, institutional requirements, j
environmental impacts, and other factors." (Emphasis added.) -
i M'
E at 1-2. Draft Guide DG-4003 states at 4:
j 1
i Generally, the most restrictive safety-related site characteristics j
considered in determining the suitability of a site are surface 4
faulting, potential ground motion and foundation conditions j
(including liquefaction, subsidence, and landslide potential), and
{
seismically induced floods.
Of atmospheric extremes, the Draft Guide states at 5:
i
[T}he atmospheric extremes that' may occur at a site are not j
normally critical in determining the suitability of a site because 4
safetv-related structures. systems. and components can be f
desianed to withstand most atmospheric extremes. (Emphasis j
added.)
i Newmen & :' _,. P.C.
p>pe gg i
i a
y.,,
~
r 7
-,w,--
 
ib accident consequences. The emphasis on dose calculations to determine exclusion areas, low population zones and population center distances places significant importance on engineered safety features found at plants that reduce and contain
}
potential accidental releases of radioactivity from the plant. Additionally, emphasis is placed on emergency preparedness in that the exclusion areas surrounding the plant must be totally controlled by the reactor licensee and the low population zone
'I immediately surrounding the exclusion area must be such that the population -
number and distribution provide a reasonable probability that appropriate measures could be taken in the event of a serious accident. The guidance on Regulatory Guide 4.7 also emphasizes that when a site is surrounded by more than 500 persons per square mile over a radial distance 30 miles from the plant, consideration should be given to better alternative sites.
ii.
Existing siting regulations have achieved site isolation.
In its publication, " Demographic Statistics Pertaining to Nuclear Power Reactor Sites" (NUREG-0348), issued in October 1979, the NRC examined in detail -
the demographic characteristics surrounding plant sites. NUREG-0348 discussed the results of a trend analysis and provided a variety of data on population densities and distances from population centers. The purpose of the NUREG-0348 analysis was to determine if a trend existed toward greater site isolation. The analysis performed indicated that nuclear power plants were being sited away from high population areas.N l
l l
18' NUREG-0348, Fig.17.
Newmen a ww. v.c.
~
hee n
 
io.
t i
Even more significant than this result is what the data indicate about site isolation. The data demonstrate conclusively that the goal of remote siting l
was achieved in the 1970s. Of the 58 new sites docketed at the NRC fmm 1971 to 1979, Perryman was the only new site proposed that did not meet the population density requirements at 30 miles. Saalgt at Table 1. When the staff received the application for an early site review for Perryman, it concluded that an obviously superior alternate site was preferable. The application for the Perryman site was subsequently withdrawn.1Z' In addition, only about seven of the sites in the United States today. (approximately 10%) have population-densities in excess of the Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rcv.1) guidelines. In each case, the sites.
comprising the seven were given construction permits prior to the adoption of the Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) parameters in November 1975.5 Thus, the j
Commission's framework for nuclear power plant siting developed in the 1970s has achieved site isolation.
l The basic assumption underiving the proposed changes to.the l
j demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 - nemely, that as a result of applying Part 100, site isolation had been de-emphasized --is taken from the August 1979 NRC " Report of the Siting Policy Task Force" (NUREG-0625).*
As the E'
lst at 20.
E' NRC Staff Trip Report Concerning CNRA Meetion. enclosure at 7 (February 5,1993).
M' NUREG-0625 was the result of several. years study of possible revisions to the Commission's siting regulations. The purpose of the report was to obtain an overview of the siting policy and practice that resulted from 25 years of licensing of civilian nuclear power plants. Another purpose was to determine whether current siting policy and (continued...)
Nmmen s Nonenwer, r.c.
nweas
 
i foregoing discussion of the NUREG-0348 data demonstrates, this critical l
assumption that site isolation has been de-emphasized has no basis in fact. As such, it cannot provide a valid basis for the proposed demographic regulation.
The lack of factual basis was recognized at the time NUREG-0625 was undergoing internal NRC review prior to its release. Robert B. Minogue, the Director of NRC's Office of Standards Development, after reviewing NUREG-0625, stated in a letter to Daniel R. Muller, Chairman of the Siting Policy Task Force, dated August 15,1979:
The implication in the discussion of past practices that the demographic features of population and distances have been getting progressively worse at licensed sites is not true.. Indian Point, San Onofre, and Zion sites were reviewed and approved more than 10 years ago.
Demographic features of current licensed sites have~
actually been improving somewhat since the above listed sites were approved.29' Mr. Minogue stated further, "... we are concerned about the prospect that the report may be forced to be used as a basis for immediate' rulemaking and is l
inadequate for that purpose."E' l
al... continued) practice should be changed. The report made nine recommendations, the most important of which were to divorce from the siting framework the use of plant design features to compensate for unfavorable site characteristics and to develop population density and distribution limits beyond the exclusion area which would be functions of the average population in different regions of the United States. Dependance on the avera0e population of a region meant that areas of the United States having lower avera0e population densities might be subject to higher population density and distribution limits than more densely populated re0 ons of the country, such as the Northeast.
i NUREG-0625 at 78.
1 at 77.
Newmen a Nonmower. v.c.
noe se
 
D l
l Another NRC official also discussed limitations in the use of the NURFG-0625 recommendations, in a letter to Mr. Muller, dated August 14,1979, Norman M. Haller, then NRC's Director of the Office of Management and Program Analysis, recommended publication of a definitive value-impact analysis of all Task-Force recommendations contained in NUREG-0625 before any recommendations were released for public comment. Mr. Haller stated:
... the not or true cost cannot be estimated unless the next best alternative (namely, allowing trade-offs between distance and unique design features to be made) is also analyzed.
In
: general, adoption of the distance-related recommendations in this report ' would appear to undermine the philosophy that reactors.can operate safely primarily because their designs satisfy NRC regulations. And, we believe that adoption of these recommendations would leave the Commission open to the charge that some existing reactors aren't safe enough (since they rely on design features).8 I
j in sum, no basis exists for the statement in NUREG O625 tha. nuclear power plant site isolation in the United States has been de-emphasized. To the l
contrary, under the existing siting regulations in 10 CFR Parts 50, 51 and 100 and implementing guidance, the objective of remote siting has been achieved.
l l
H' JA at 75, newme,, a nw. r.c.
w so.
 
4 b.
Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and j
safety.
The Supplementary information for the proposed revisions to Part 100 indicates that since promulgation of the reactor site regulations in 1962, the Commission has approved more than 75 sites for nuclear power reactors. 57 Fed.
Reg. at 47,803. These approvals required an affirmative finding of adequate protection of the public health and safety. We may conclude, therefore, that adoption of the proposed revisions is not necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.
Other considerations buttress this conclusion.
As recently as i
December 1988, the NRC denied a petition for rulemaking (PRM) to amend Part 100 to specify demographic criteria to be met for all new nuclear power plant sites. 53 Fed. Reg. 50,232 (December 14,1988). The NRC denied the petition for the following reasons:
(1) it would unnecessarily restrict NRC's regul'atory l
siting policies and procedures by elevating population density criteria above other siting criteria such as i
environmental and ecological factors, and (2) it would not result in a substantial increase in overall protection l
of the public health and safety, as compared to the i
current siting criteria when combined with calculations of potential health effects.
The NRC has carefully considered the issues raised in the petition, and has taken them into account in reaching a decision on the l
areas which fall within its jurisdiction. jsL The petitioners had requested that the Commisrion amend its regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 to set numericallimits on allowable population density around nuclear power reactor sites. The amendments to 10 CFR I newmen s : w. r.c.
r,. s1
 
I l
k.
100.11(a) proposed by the petitioners would set 0.4 miles and 3 miles as the minimum distances for the outer boundaries of the exclusion area and the low population zone, respectively. A new section of 10 CFR 5100.12 proposed by l
l the petitioners would set a maximum population density of 400 persons per square i
mile averaged over any radial distance out to a distance of 40 niles.
The petitioners proposed that the Commission also' deny Construc. ion Permit applications where, during the effective period of the plant's license, the maximum projected population density would exceed 800 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to a distance of 40 miles. Additionally, the petitioners -
i proposed that all population figures and projections include transit populations.
The Commission amplified its reasons for denial as follows:
At first glance, it might appear that the NRC's population density siting parameters and the population density siting parameters indicated by the petitioner are similar - 500 vs. 400 per square miles averaged over any radial distance of 40 vs. 30 miles for the initial operation of the nuclear power plants. However,, the real difference between the NRC's and the petitioner's population density siting requirements is regulatory flexibility. The NRC's siting requirements allow for the consideration of alternative sites with superior environmental parameters, e.g., suitable meteorological, natural resou.cos and. water temperature conditions or superior geophysical conditions, e.g., suitable geologic, hydrologic, and tectonic conditions if the population density parameters cannot be met. However, on the other hand, the petition's siting requirements would automatically eliminate any site from further consideration if specific population density criteria are not met regardless of any mitigating factors.
The NRC believes that Regulatory Guide 4.7 [Rev.1) adequately addresses population density siting considera-tions and that no new rulenwking as proposed no.w,w, a non=,e r. v.c.
nr 22 i
l
 
'O by'the petitioners is justified at this time. Also, the petitioner offers no basis for the specific numerical population density limits indicated in. the petition.
Therefore, the ostition would not result in a substantial increase in the overall orotection of the oublic health and safetv. as comnared to the current NRC sitina criteria when combined with calculations of notantial health effects.. E at 50,233 (emphasis added).
I i
Consideration of Commission findings concerning the residual risk from severe accidents and compliance with the Commission's safety goals also testifies to the adequacy of the present siting regulations in ensuring adequate i
0 protection of the public health and safety. In 1985, the Commission issued its
" Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants." 50 Fed. Reg. 32,138 (August 8,1985).
The Commission emphasized that "[o]n the basis of currently available information, the Commission concludes that existing plants pose no undue risk to public health and safety and-sees no present basis for immediate action on generic rulemaking or other regulatory changes for those plants because of severe accide,nt risk." E The Commission stated that its " severe accident policy is that the Commission intends to take all reasonable steps to reduce the chances of occurrence of a severe accident involving substantial damage to the reactor core and to mitigate the consequences of such an accident should one occur."
E at 32,139.
In promulgating the Safety Goal Policy Statement, the Commission stated its belief that " Current regulatory practices are believed to ensure that the basic statutory requirement, adequate protection of the public is met." 51 Fed. Reg. 30,028, at 30,029 (August 21, 1986). The Safety Goal Policy Statement " expresses the newn=n a memwa, r.c.
w as
:o Commission's views on the level of risks to public health and safety that the industry should strive for in its nuclear power plants" and provides a framework "for testing -the adequacy of and need for current and proposed regulatory l
requirements" in order to " lead to a more coherent and consistent regulation'of
[
nuclear power plants, a more predictable regulatory process,- a public understanding of the regulatory criteria that the NRC applies, and public confidence l
in the safety of operating plants." ist in 1990, NUREG-1150, " Severe Accident Risk Assessment for Five l
l U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," was published; and in 1992, NUREG-1465, " Accident i
~
l Source Terms for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"' was issued for public l
. comment.
Using state-of-the-art risk assessment techniques, NUREG-1150 studied the risks from severe accidents in five nuclear power plants representative of plants presently in operation today in the United States. Draft NUREG-1465, 1
using updated knowledge about severe LWR accidents, and the resulting behavior of the released fission products, developed over a 30-year kriod, provides a l
postulated fission product source term released into containment.
The issuance of the Severe Accident and Safety Goal Policy statements and the enhanced capability to evaluate severe accident risk and understand severe accident source terms, as demonstrated by NUREG-1150 and NUREG-1465 results, allow the Commission to evaluate the risk significance of any revisions to the Part 100 regulations that might be proposed. Indeed, the purpose of the Commission's earlier suspension of the siting rulemaking was, first, to develop such a capability and, then, to utilize that capability in evaluating the newme,o a nonswa. r.c.
wu l
1 _
 
l e
safety significance of alternative proposals to revise the regulatory framework for siting nuclear power plants.&
in the 1992 Supplementary Information for the proposed changes to the siting regulations, the Commission relied on NUREG-1150 as one of:
)
[N]umerous risk studies on radioactive material releases to the environment under severe accident conditions
[which] have all confirmed that the present siting practice is expected to effectively limit risk to the public. 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,803.
Figure 13.2 of NUREG-1150, reproduced on the next page, demonstrates that the i
quantitative health effects objectives specified in the Safety Goal Policy Statement D'
in the Summer of 1980, the Commission began an effort to revise the siting criteria in 10 CFR Part 100. On July 29,1980, the NRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (45 Fed. Reg 50,350), in which the Commission announced its intention to revise the reactor siting criteria and requested comments on seven of the nine recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force, as well as certain alternative approaches.
l i
i in conjunction with the rulemaking effort, the' Commission also issued a Notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an Environmental impact Statement (EIS) (45 Fed. Reg. 79,280 (December 2, 19801). The NOI, among other things, identified the technical approach to detailed analyses that would be followed in developing the bases for any proposed revisions. Egg i
E at 79,822-23. In December 1981, the NRC published the Scoping Summary Report for the EIS (NUREG-0833). The report addressed comments received on both the ANPR and the NOl and provided further discussion of the efforts which would be undertaken to develop an adequate technical basis for any revisions. The report recognized that the siting rulemaking must take into account promises concerning reactor design and emergency planning. Ett NUREG-0833 at 13. It also restated that "a systematic evaluation of accident consequences for a full range of reactor accidents would be a fundamental part of the technical basis for the siting rulemaking....* JgL at 20. See also E at 14 regarding consideration of a full range of accidents in establishing siting criteria.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission directed the NRC Staff to sospend work on revision of l
the siting (demographic) criteria until safety goals were developed and a reassessment of l
source terms was completed. Sag NUREG-0885, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Policy and Planning Guidance" (January 1982).
Newmen a Nanaiwar, r.c.
w as
: 13. R:sourca Document O '
Individual early fatality /ry 1.0E-06
!> Safety Goal
.=s 1.0E-07 s
i 1
- es 1.0E-08
=
i i
1.0E-09 1.0E-10 m
i l
I 1.0E-11 SURRY PEACH SEQUORH GRAND ZION BOTTOM GULF Individual latent cancer fatality /ry 1.0 E-0 5
=
5 Legend
-~ Safety Goal 1.0E-06 s
.a 5
mesi n-.
- as 1.0E-07 s
1.0E-08 s 3
~
1.OE-09 s 1.0 E-10 SURRY PEACH SEQUOYAH GRAND ZION BOTTOM GULF Note: As discussed in Reference 13.23. estimated risks at or below 1E-7 per reactor year should be viewed with caution because of the potential impact of events not studied in j
the risk analyses.
l Figure 13.2 Comparison of individual early and latent cancer fatality risks at all plants (internal initiators).
i NUREG-1150 l
 
have been metB and, consequently, that the basic statutory requirement of adequate protection has been met under present (site-plant combination) siting practice.
Of particular interest are the results from one of these five plants, the Zion plant.H' The Zion population censity figure is close to the 500 people / square mile value in the propo;ed rule. As Figure 13.2 shows, the Zion E
The prompt fatality health effects objective, a measure of whether the individual safety goal has been met, states:
The risk to an average individualin the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed. 51 Fed.
Reg. at 30,030.
The latent cancer mortality health objective, a measure of whether the societal safety goal l
has been met, states:
1 The risk to the population in the area of a nuciear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent 10.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all causes.1 i
l E
The average population density around the Zion piant was 457 people / square mile in the l
early 1980s, when calculated over an area with a 30 mile radius originating at the plant l
site. NUREG/CR-2239, " Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development," (November 1982).
Niewman & Hohxhwer P.C.
Page 26 i
 
c l
l early and latent fatality risks are quite low and well below the Safety Goals, thus supporting the conclusion that present siting practice has worked well in limiting I
public risk from nuclear power plant operation. Future plants, with even greater safety capabilities, would show even greater margins. The Severe Accident Policy Statement requires, in effect, that all new plant designs meet certain " fundamental criteria" to reduce severe accident risk and that cost-effective features of a preventive or mitigative nature be included in the design. The Safety Goal Policy Statement provides guidance in determining cost-effectiveness. Taken together, these two policy statements ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety and a very low level of residual risk.
In sum, adoption of the proposed revisions is not necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.
c.
Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design.
In addition to specifying fixed, numerical requirernents in Part 100, the proposed revisions relocate certain design requirements pertaining to plant design to 10 CFR Part 50, "thereby effectively decoupling siting from plant design." San Supplementary Information for the proposed revisions at 57 Fed.
Reg. 47,803. The proposed decoupling is directed at ensuring that engineering safeguards or advanced safety features are not used as a substitute for site isolation. The proposed decoupling is intended to implement the Sitinr Policy Task i
Force goal:
i l
m.m.,, a man
: a. r.c.
wn i
t
 
i i
?
t i
To strengt5 en siting as a factor in defense in depth by i
i i
establishing requirements for site approval that are independent of plant design consideration. The present
(
policy of permitting plant design features to compensate for unfavorable site characteristics has resulted in improved designs but has tended to deemphasize site isolation. N!JREG-0625 at iil (emphasis added).
As discussed in the preceding sections, the Commission's present i
siting requirements in Parts 50, 51 and 100, and implementing guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.7, have achieved site isolation. In particular, consideration of alternative sites when numerical demographic criteria in Regulatory Guide 4.7 have l
I i
been exceeded ensures site isolation. Thus, decoupling is not needed to achieve I
site isolation.
1 1
The fact that the proposed revisions to the Commission's i
)
demographic regulations in Part 100 are unnecessary to achieve isolation in nuclear
~
i j
power plant siting by decoupling siting and design is buttressed by consideration i
i of the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52, "Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," adopted by the J
l Commission in 1989. With the adoption of Part 52, it is not necessary to revise
~
Part 100 to accomplish such "decoupling." Part 52 promotes the use of pre-approved standardized designs which are certified (approved) by the Commission j
in a design certification rulemaking proceeding, conducted pursuant to Subpart B j
j of Part 52.8 Certification does not involve consideration of specific sites so 1
3 j
E Subpart B to Part 52, " Standard Design Certifications," sets forth the requirements and i
procedures for "cartification," or pre-approval through a hybrid rulemaking process, of new j
standardized nuclear power plant designs to ensure that all safety-related design issues are i
resolved prior to the purchase or construction of a new standard plant.
j (continued...)
j me n a u.aw,,.r. p.c.
Av.as I
i 4
 
a there is no tailoring of a design to compensate for site deficiencies. Certified -
designs incorporated by reference into a nuclear power plant application would not be subject to further review or challenge in a licensing proceeding unless the applicant proposed to make changes to the certified design. In particular, Subpart C of Part 52 provides for issuance of a combined construction permit / operating license and permits applicants for such to incorporate by reference certified designs into the application. These limitations on review and challenge in a nuclear i
power plant licensing proceeding implicitly encourage the selection of sites falling l
within the siting envelope specified in the design certification and discourage the i
l selection of sites which would require changes to the certified design.
f Additionally, Put 52 provides for early approval of sites in a licen sing i
proceeding conducted in accordance with Subpart A of Part 52.22' While genere:!
i i
E(... continued) 1 i
Specifically, an applicant for design certification must provide, among other things, all j
technical information which is required of applicants for construction permits and operating licenses by 10 CFR Parts 20, 50 and its appendices,73 and 100, which is technically
]
relevant to the design and not site-specific. Subpart B further requires the design certification applicant to prepare a design-specific probabilistic risk assessment (10 CFR 5 i
52.47(a)(1)(v)), and include proposed inspections, test, analyses and acceptance criteria which are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that if the tests, j
inspections and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a plant which references the design is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification.
Egg 10 CFR 5 52.47(a)(1)(vil (1993).
i E'
Subpart A of Part 52, "Early Site Permits," allows for early resolution of site-related safety and environmental issues and authorizes pre-approval of sites for new nuclear power plants 1
j
- separate and apart from design approval. Subpart A will allow utilities to " bank" sites i
for new nuclear power plant facilities before the need for them has materialized and i
independent of design details for a nuclear power plant tailored to the site. In particular,
~
an applicant for an early site permit must provide, among other things, a description of:
(1) the number, type, and thermal power level of the facilities for which the site may be used; (2) the anticipated maximum levels of radiological and thermal effluents each facility l
will produce; (3) the type of cooling systems that may be associated with each facility; (4)
(continued...)
}
Tkwmen & HaMower, r.c.
rape as I
 
2 design information must be specified in an early site approval application, Part 52, when viewed in its entirety, creates incentives to choose sites suitable for use as the location of a plant of certified design.
l lSG Members believe that there are significant disadvantages to j
i decoupling siting and plant design so that siting does not take into account plant design features. First, decoupling siting and plant design in the manner proposed i
is not necessary to achieve site isolation. Second, decoupling eliminates an i
accepted measure of the overall merit of the site-plant combination with respect to safety without providing for a substitute. Third, some of the major advances in design have come because designers wished to ensure greater safety for a
)
i E(... continued) the seismic, meteorological, hydrologic, and geologic characteristics of the proposed site (as set forth in existing Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100); and (5) the existing and projected future population profile of the area surrounding the site. Egg 10 CFR l 52.17(a)(1)(i)-(viii) l (1993).
I l
Emergency planning must also be considered at the early site permit stage. Three options
{
are available to the applicant ranging from identification of significant impediments to a complete integrated plan. At a minimum, an early site permit applicant must identify any i
significant impediments to emergency planning and list the contacts and arrangements I
made with state, local and federal agencies with emergency planning responsibilities. Such l
impediments, if any, will be assessed in determining whether any altemative site is obviously superior. Egg 10 CFR I 52.17(b) (1993). In addition, an applicant may either i
request NRC approval for major features of an emergency plan, or approval of a complete integrated emergency plan. Sag 10 CFR 5 52.17(b)(2) (1993),
i Moreover, an early site permit applicant must provide a complete environmental report as required under Part 51, which includes an evaluation of altomative sites to determine whether any "obviously superior ahomative" to the proposed site exists. Est 10 CFR l 52.17(a)(2) (1993). The Part 52 sarly site permit process does, however, require certain limited consideration of design features. Specifically, an applicant must provide a description and safety assessment of the proposed site, "with appropriate attention to features affecting facility design." 10 CFR I 50.34(a)(1) (1993): Att Alag 10 CFR 5 52.17(a)(1) (1993). Such an assessment must "contain an analysis and evaluation of l
the major structures, systems and components of the facility which bear significantly on l
the acceptability of the site under the site evaluation factors identified in Part 100...."
E i
i i
j Neeness,p & #edesinger, P.C.
Aspe de l
l
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t
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~
specific site.
For example, the multi-unit vacuum containment for plants of
~
CANDU design originated as a means to ensure additional safety for the Pickering plant because of its location. The same containment concept was later used for rnulti unit stations at remote sites, even though the additional safety was not
- needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. More I
generally, in countries which have very few acceptable sites due to basic land j
i availability or cooling water supply or public acceptance, the regulatory structure should encourage designers to innovate to reduce public risk in making use of the available sites. The restrictions on siting contemplated by the proposed revisions to the demographic requirements in Part 100 will have to be ignored by such countries (with consequent justification as to why imposition _of NRC-like
-l l
requirements is not necessary) or will pose real and unnecessary restrictions to the I
growth of nuclear power in places where it is most needed, in sum, adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's site l
safety regulations in Part 100 is not necessary to ensure site' isolation through decoupling of nuclear power plant siting and design. As discussed above, the regulatory position stated in Regulatory Guide 4.7 to consider alternative sites when numerical population density criteria are exceeded provides an appropriate context for ensuring site isolation.
l 1
newmen s : _
_. r.c.
w,
--:l
 
(.
. =. - -
o.
d.
Adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100 will not provide a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.
1.
NRC decisional framework when action is not necessary to ensure adequate protection. -
Discussa
% previous sections established that no change to the '
Commission's present demographic regulations in Part 100 is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. As discussed above, one of the primary reasons the Commission adopted the Safety Goals was to establish a coherent and consistent set 'of safety regulations and provide a means to determine whether future safety regulations were necessary. Consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, safety requirements must be imposed when they are necessary to provide adequate protection of-the public health and safety.
Safety.
requirements may be imposed when they are not needed for adequate protection, if they are cost-effective and afford a substantial increase in pr.otection. When it can be shown that the Safety Goals are met, the Commission has indlcated that an increase in protection cannot be substantial and that no additional safety requirements need or should be imposed. By setting limits on population density in Part 100, adoption of the proposed rule would establish additional safety requirements beyond the Safety Goals which are not needed and of little benefit, i
1 thus creating an inconsistency in the Commission's regulatory philosophy.
Consistent with the decisional framework for implementation of the Safety Goal Policy Statement, the Commission, in deciding whether to adopt the
%wmuu s :
,. P.c.
hee et
 
proposed changes to the demographic regulations in Part 100, should consider _
(1) whether they will provide a substantial increase.in protection of the public 1
health and safety and (2) whether the benefits from the changes will outweigh the impacts.
Absent an affirmative finding on both of these questions, the Commission should not adopt the proposed changes. As discussed below, ISG Members believe that adoption will not provide a substantial increase in protection -
and that the impacts will far outweigh the benefits.
.l In its safety regulation of nuclear power. plants, the Commission j
i distinguishes between changes necessary to ensure adequate protection of the j
public health and safety and changes imposed to effect safety improvements beyond the minimum needed for adequate protection. This principle was clarified l
as a result of litigation about the initial formulation of the so-called "backfit.
~
rule" (10 CFR 5 50.109), which distinguishes between the two kinds of changes.2a' When establishing safety requirements which are not necessary for adequate protection of the public health and safety:
[T]he Commission shall require the backfitting of a facility only when it determines... that there is a j
substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of ims smsntation for that facility are lustified in view of this increased nrotection.
10 CFR I 50.109(a)(3) (1993) (emphasis added).
D' ISG Members believe that the direction the Commission has provided on the application of the Safety Goal Policy to backfit decisions is relevant and should guide Commission decisionmaking concerning adoption of the proposed revisions to Part 100 to ensure regulatory coherence and consistency in establishing Commission requirements.
newmn s :'-
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In adopting the present version of the backfit rule, the Commission stated:
l l
In this rulemaking the Commission has adhered to the following safety principle for all _ of its backfitting decisions. The Atomic Energy Act commands the Commission to ensure that nuclear power: plant operation provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. In defining, redefining or enforcing -
this statutory standard of adequate protaction, the Commission will not consider economic costs.
i However, adequate protection is not absolute protection or zero risk. Hence safety improvements beyond the minimum needed for adequate protection are possible.
The Commission is empowered under section 161 of the Act to impose additional safety requirements not needed -
for adequate protection and to consider economic costs in doing so. 53 Fed. Reg. 20,603, at 20,604 (June 6, 1988).
In a
Staff Requirements Memorandum, - "SECY-89-102 Implementation of the Safety Goals," dated June 15, 1990, the Commission addressed the meaning of " substantial mcrease in protection as an application of L
the Safety Goals." The Commission indicated that once it could be established that the Safety Goals have been met, any further increase in prdtection would not be substantial. This development allows the Commission to make decisions about l
proposed regulatory actions based on their safety significance.
In sum, when examined against the backdrop of these developments, j
it is clear that the Commission may 1mke into account the adverse impacts (costs) of adopting a new safety regulation, when adoption of the regulation is not necessary to provide adequate protection. Moreover, ISG Members believe that the Commission's decisional framework for Safety Goal implementation should be i
used when considering whether a proposed change in safety requirements will newme,, a : -
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i o
contribute reasonably to increased defense-in-depth. Since imposition of fixed, numerical demographic criteria through changes to _the present demographic regulations in Part 100 clearly is not necessary for. adequate protection, as discussed above, it is aquelly clear that the adverse impacts (costs) that result-from such imposition may be weighed against the benefits of their imposition.
When such an approach is taken to evaluate the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100, two conclusions inexorably follow.
First, adoption of the proposed revisions will not result in a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth. Second, the adverse impacts from their adoption will far outweigh the benefits.
Based on such conclusions, the ISG Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions and terminate the present rulemaking proceeding.
ii.
No substantial increase in protection or defense-in-depth is afforded by the proposed revisions.
Concerning the first point, in 1988 the NRC denied a 1976 petition for rulemaking (PRM-100-2) to set more restrictive siting distances and population densities than in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1), partly on the grounds that granting of the petition would not result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. (Saa suora Section ll.A.2.b.) Clearly then, the less restrictive numerical criteria of Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) being proposed for inclusion in the demographic regulations could not provide a substantial increase in protection through the mere act of codification.
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Similarly, the mere act of codification will not contribute to increased
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defense-in-depth. The Commission and Staff have made it abundantly clear that the proposed changes will have an insignificant impact on risk. Specifically, the Supplementary information for the proposed rule makes clear that present practice -
has effectively limited risk to the public. (Sam augta Section ll.A.2.b, concerning the discussion of NUREG-1150 results.) In discussions before the Commission's i
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in January 1992, the NRC Staff tried to explain the basis for the proposed revisions, as well as provide some background on the thinking of the 1979 Siting Policy Task Force. Mr. Soffer, a member of the NRC Staff who had been a member of the task force, explained:
The major recommendations of this task force were to establish requirements for. site approval that were independent of plant design, to try to take into consideration the risk of accidents beyond the design basis by establishing population and density distribution criteria and that selected sites should be among the best available in the region, that siting requirements should be stringent enough in the view' of the Siting Policy. Task Force to reduce residual risk but not so stringent as to eliminate siting -from large regions of' the country.
Transcript of ACRS Meeting at 45 (January 7,1992).
l j
Mr. Soffer then explained that due to the " low frequency of core damage that is associated with the plants themselves, [blasically, the safety goal and the ability of the plants themselves is such that they could be sited almost anywhere and meet the safety coal." isL at 47 (emphasis added). In other words, contrary to the Siting Policy Task Force's assumptions, putting the numerical demographic criteria presently in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) into Part 100 would have no or very little effect on reducing the residual health risk to the population (lA, prompt l
nowmu, a : =. r.c.
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P fatalities, genetic effects or excess cancers) over what has been achieved under the current regulatory framework for siting nuclear power plants.
s Within the Commission's Safety Goal decisional framework, substantial increase in protection is based upon consideration of rJak; namely, health effects upon the individual and population (aan suora note 24 regarding health effects objectives). That is, the measure of whether there has been a 1
substantial increase in protection (Lt, reduction in risk) takes into account b.Q1b the orobability of an accident and the conseauences of an accident should one occur. Contrary to the Commission's Safety Goal decisional framework, the
)
justification for the proposed changes to the demographic regulations rests, in large part, on consideration of conseouences alone independent of their probability of occurrence. In particular, the proposed changes are justified on the basis that 1
i control of population density out to 30 miles would obviate the need to condemn j
I j
a large population center (as opposed to less intensively used land) should a very l
low probability severe accident occur and release cesium oI strontium to the i
environment. jiing Transcript of ACRS Meeting at 70-81 (January 7,1992).E l
Thus, the basis for the proposed numerical demographic criteria is not so much protection of the public health and safety through avoidance of health 1
E' As ISG Members understand the land condemnation rationale presented by the NRC Staff, l
the issue is not so much protection of the population within a condemned population center from health effects, but avoidance of condemnation (and the attendant property losses) of land that is the site of a large population center. This is because the NUREG-1150 analysis assumes that effective emeroency action has been taken. NUREG 1150 at 2-20.
Thus, the residualissue is condemnation of land and loss of economic productivity of that j
land. By requiring population centers to be located 30 or more miles from a nuclear power plant, any land condemnation would not include a population center, but, at most, land having less intensive use.
I Newmen & Nananeer, P.C.
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consequences (and, hence, defense-in-depth), but avoidance of the need to l
i condemn land on which is situated a major population center for which the l
emergency actions to protect the population have already been taken.
From the Commission's statements to the effect that plants with a smaller exclusion area boundary than O.4 miles would cause a "very low level of risk" (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,804) and that " nuclear power plants meeting current safety standards could be located at sites significantly more dense than" (lgL at 47,805) the population density levels proposed, placing such stringent demographic limits in the Commission's regulations is not necessary to satisfy the Commission's Safety Goals. Moreover, even if consequences alone are relied upon as the basis for justification, such codification would not result in a substantial increase in protection. This conclusion is even more compelling when codification carries with it the potential to decrease the benefits accrued from the 'present flexib e application of the demographic guidelines in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1).
iii.
The adverse impacts of the hroposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.
l In addition to being unnecessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety or a substantialincrease in such protection, the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100, if adopted, would impose significant adverse impacts (costs), without commensurate benefit. Therefore, in accordance with the Commission's Safety Goal decisional framework, the proposed revisions, along with draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 (Proposed Revision newme, a man,,u. r.c.
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5 i
l 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7), should be withdrawn and the current framework left intact.
j The proposed revisions,if adopted, would impose a hierarchy of site l
characteristics, which elevates demographics over other physical characteristics-1 of the site and other safety-related aspects of nuclear power plant siting which i
I may have greater potential for reducing risk. This, in turn, would create the j
possibility that sites with a better balance overall of favorable-safety-related characteristics might be eliminated from further consideration on the basis of f
i demographics alone. Thus, adoption of the proposed revisions would upset
-l fundamental, internationally accepted siting principles directed at selecting sites j
based on a careful weighing of site characteristics,' including demographic i
- characteristics. Such an outcome would be contrary to the public interest, sound' I
regulation, and the fundamental safety principles governing the siting of nuclear l
power plants in the United States and elsewhere in the world.
I in order to avoid this undesirable outcome, it is necessary that any site safety requirements be flexible enough to take into account demographics, I
while simultaneously recognizing that demographics alone do not define the risk reduction potential of a site. The present regulations have the necessary inherent flexibility. In 1988, as discussed above, the NRC denied a 1976 petition for rulemaking (PRM-100-2) dealing with siting distances and population densities that would have eliminated flexibility in making site-safety determinations.
The Commission found that adoption of PRM-100-2 would have unnecessarily l
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restricted NRC's regulatory siting policies and would not have resulted in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public's health and safety.
Another adverse consequence of the proposed regulations is that if the proposed 500 people / square mile population density limit, applied out to 30 -
miles, is adopted, otherwise superior sites would be judged to be unacceptable under the proposed rule. The impact of the proposed change can be seen in Figure -
F9.14 found in NUREG/CR-2239, " Technical Guidance.for Siting Criteria Development" (November 1982), replicated on the next page. The shaded areas in this figure display locations where the 500 people / square mile limit out to 30 miles in the proposed rule would not be met as of November 1982. More recent census data would likely show the elimination of larger areas and a greater number
]
of areas. Furthermore, the burden of the proposed rule would not fall evenly across the United States. The Mid-Atlantic and New England areas would be most heavily affected. Therefore, the proposed rule would be more restrictive from what is -
acceptable today. Like PRM-100-2, it could lead to eliminatiorI of superior sites.
i in particular, it would lead to the elimination of sites already approved as superior sites for nuclear power plants.
The risk reduction benefit from codification in Part 100 of the demographic limits in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) would not outweigh the potential for elimination of superior sites. Ein hne product of the probability of an event times the consequences from the event should it occur) are already very low, as discussed above. This inherently precludes further risk reductions that are
-l substantial. However, the proposed rule discusses conseauences as well as daks.
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Even if probability is not taken into account -- an inherent regulatory deficiency --
the proposed rule would not provide any significant reduction in early injury or early fatality consequences. Additionally, the proposed rule, if adopted, would result in only a very limited potential decrease in latent fatality consequences.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the loss of nomsary flexibility t
l to ensure selection of sites with the most favorable overall characteristics for l
protection of the public health and safety may compromise fundamental safety l
principles with no or little enhancement of safety. Thus, the adoption of the l
proposed revisions cannot be justified on. grounds of substantial safety q
l enhancements. When other significant factors are incorporated into the decision- -
making process, including the adequacy of present U.S. sites, impact on sites in ISG Member countries and elsewhere, and economic impacts, it is clear that the l
adverse impacts overwhelm any benefit that might result from adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100.
l Imposition of the proposed numerical exclusion area and demographic l
requirements could lead to questions concerning the safety of current nuclear power sites. Although the Federal Register notice on the proposed rule states,
"[aln exclusion area of this size [0.4 miles) or larger is fairly common for most power reactors in the U.S.," (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,804), it does not acknowledge that 33% of the present U.S. nuclear power plant sites have an exclusion area smaller than the proposed numerical standard. Similarly,10% of the present U.S.
nuclear power plant sites exceed the proposed numerical criteria for population density surrounding the plant site. SECY-92-215 at 6. The situation is similar newmm, a nues er. r.c.
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elsewhere in the world. In France for example, roughly half of the plants in operation do not meet the proposed exclusion area of 0.4 miles and 5 of the plants do not comply with the proposed population density requirement of 500 persons per square mile, in Belgium, Holland, the Rhineland or Luxembourg, the proposed population density and distance requirements, if applied, could exclude all or nearly all nuclear power stations. In these areas, the average population density is over 300 persons /sq. km. (750 persons /sq. mi.) - versus 500 persons /sq. mi. In the proposed revisions -- and the average distance between major population centers
(> than 100,000 persons) is about 50 km. (31 miles). Also, the proposed revisions, if imposed, would not only preclude most siting possibilities in these countries, but also raise questions about the location of French power plants on French territory near the relevant borders. In this respect, two of the French sites l-now in operation, which do not meet the proposed population density criterion, are located near the French border with Germany or Luxembourg. 'A similar situation 1
l pertains to Taiwan, where there is also a need to use existing sites for new plants, as well as in Korea.
The comments of Atomic Energy Council of Taiwan to the NRC (February 17,1993) summarize the likely impact of the proposed revisions on the nuclear power plant siting in other countries:
Reactor Siting Criteria (Nonseismic)- An Exclusion Area Distance of 0.4 miles (640 meters):
The distance of the exclusion area boundary for nuclear l
power plants in Taiwan are 800, 600,1000, and 350 l
meters for Chinshan, Kuosheng, Maanshan, and Yenliao l
sites, respectively.
Once the minimum distance of w no a mwww. r.c.
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1 exclusion area is specified explicitly as 640 meter. two sites are already not complied with the revised regulation. It is believed that, although the revision only applies to the new sites as stated, we are still going to j
face the challenge from the general public on the related safety issue and spend a great deal of ' effort _in communication and explanation. More than that, due to the limitation of location arrangement, compliance with this requirement is impossible if adding now units to the
)
existing sites is considered.
In other words, the proposed rule change will impose a very big impact, which we think is not absolutely necessary.from the-safety point of view, on the development of our nuclear applications. We would therefore suggest that, instead of requiring a minimum exclusion area distance, NRC place this distance as a recommended value in the Regulatory Guide.
Reactor Siting Criteria (Nonseismic) - Population Density Criteria:
The population density of 1990, with the unit of person per square mile, within 30 miles of domestic nuclear power plants are as follows:
Chinshan Kuoshena Manshan
- Yenli42 7257 6339 209 6453
,j lt is evident that only Maanshan site can mee; this requirement as proposed in the revision'of regulation.
Again, even though the proposed rule change will not affect the operation of the existing plants as stated, this population density requirerr.ent will definitely serve as a i
strong argument to against the domestic nuclear development.
The Korea Electric Power Corporation's comments to the NRC (December 22, 1992) similarly highlighted the difficulties:
A.
The application of the proposed population density requirement of 500 persons per square mile in Korea will greatly aggravate our ability to acquire suitable sites, which has been a major problem for nuclear power construction due to a public acceptance problem.
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(1)
The average national population density as of 1992 is 1.126 persons per square mile, which far exceeds the proposed NRC requirement.
J (2)
Coastal areas, where the siting of nuclear power plants is most practical and possible is more densely populated than other parts of Korea due to the fact that these areas are also suitable for other industrial activities.
(3)
Since Korea is an actively industrializing country, the projected population density will be even greater in coastal areas.
B.
Major Asian countries possessing nuclear power plants such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are all densely populated, and the proposed regulation will undermine the execution of futura projects in these countries as well as other Asian countries.
l Population Density Country (persons /sq. mile)
Remarks Korea 1,126' as of '92 Japan 838 as of '90 1,450 as of '90 Taiwan -
C.
The numerical demographic criteria will lead to questions concerning the safety of current nuclear power sites which do not meet the proposed population density criteria, not only in the United States but in other countries as well.-
D.
There is no current need for codifying demographic.
criteria because the present Regulatory Guide 4.7 works sufficiently for regulatory purposes.
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l Although the applicability of the proposed revisions is explicitly limited to future plants, the fact that large numbers of present U.S. sites would not meet limits purportedly relating to site safety and having the force of law raises troubling public acceptance problems about the adequacy of present sites, at the least, and quite possibly could provide an arguable basis for petitions and other actions to shut down currently operating reactors.
The proposed codification of numerical exclusion area and l
demographic criteria in Part 100 could adversely impact the siting of future nuclear power plants by unnecessarily limiting the number of potential future sites. Such '
unnecessary limitation is especially troubling because of the availability of additional design features to improve, when necessary, plant safety. Within the United States, geographical regions such as the Northeast, which have higher i
relative population densities and less available open land area, may well be-
]
precluded from consideration for future nuclear power plant sites if the proposed l
numerical demographic regulations are adopted. Furthermor'e, the regulations would preclude siting additional nuclear power plant units at approximately one-third of the presently operating reactor sites in the U.S, even though these sites l
possess acceptable physical characteristics, important to safe siting. The situation
~I is worse in Western Europe and Asia where size alone limits the availability of accepta' ole sites. Outside the U.S., particularlyin countries with higher population i
densities and less available land, the public pressure to adopt safety standards
]
i similar to the proposed U.S. siting regulations may well make siting additional j
nuclear plants extremely difficult, if not impossible. ISG Members believe that w w men a m n n e w. r.c.
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i existing sites which are otherwise acceptable should be able to receive new plants with enhanced built-in safety characteristics and margins.
If the rule results in acceptable sites being located far from
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metropolitan areas, there will be a need for longer transmission lines. In general, l
longer transmission lines will result in a higher cost for the facility as well as certain disadvantages frem power losses which occur over long transmission l
routes. In some cases, a state or states rnay find that few,'if any, acceptable sites -
l are available after the new rule is promulgated. If such states must purchase power from utilities located in adjoining sta'tes having more favorable sites, there will be obvious economic impacts on the consumer and the unfavored state. While-some favorable economic impacts are also possible, since remote sites may be less expensive to acquire, this possible benefit seems highly theoretical since utilities l
already strive to obtain the best sites at the lowest possible cost. The foregoing l
l list does not purport to be a comprehensive list of economic impacts. Indeed, l
through careful review, NRC would doubtless discover many'other varieties of economic impacts.8 1
B'
' The siting rule may operate to favor certain utilities in that their competitive advantage is greatly enhanced. At the same time, the rule could deprive some utilities of any acceptable.
sites for nuclear facilities. In some states or regions, the siting rule could operate to render nuclear power uneconomic (or of marginal economic benefit) and thus raise the cost of power in a region or force it to rely on an energy source which has adverse impacts.' This may be especially severe in densely populated areas of the country where nuclear power presents a logical answer to high base load demand and where the contamination or po!!ution from coal or other methods of power generation would be an unacceptable added burden on air standards, i
i Newmen & M-t,:. P.C.
Pmpe 66 l
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B.
The Technical Basis for the Proposed Revisions to the Site Safety Criteria is inadeauste. Internally inconsistent and Confusina.
The Commission fails to provide an adequate or internally consistent technical basis for including numerical exclusion area boundary and demographic limits in its site safety regulations in Part 100. The proposed regulations would arbitrarily codify the 0.4 mile exclusion area boundary on the basis of design considerations, but reject the use of dose calculations by fixing the population density limits (500 people per square mile out to 30 miles at the time of initial site approval and 1000 people per square mile 40 years later). The Commission indicates that codification of the exclusion boundary limit in Part 100 would
" assure a ymy IDE 1RYal of fi&k to individuals, even for those located close to the plant," 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,804 (emphasis added), and that the population density limits would " meet the Commission's Safety Goals." 11 at 47,805. However, as discussed in the foregoing sections, codification of these numerical standards in Part 100 would be inconsistent with the Commission's stated policies on regulatory decision-making, in particular, those associated with Safety Goal implementation. Moreover, codification in Part 100 is not necessary to meet the Commission's remote siting goal. ' Consideration of alternative sites when numerical demographic criteria in Regulatory Guide 4.7 have been exceeded is sufficient to accomplish this goal, as discussed above.
The proposed changes are intended to achieve site isolation through decoupling siting and design, but the rationale for the proposed changes is fundamentally linked to the contributions of design to the reduction of the residual i newmen s :=,. r.c.
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L risk from a severe nuclear power plant accident. For example, reference is made to numerous risk studies, such as WASH-1400 and NUREG-1150, which estimate I
risk considering both ' siting and design characteristics. Further, the justification for
{
an exclusion area distance of 0.4 miles is based on " typical engineered safety features." JgL at 47,804. Thus, the proposed revisions rely on past success in design improw.snts as a basis for achieving site isolation by decoupling siting i
from design, but refuse to allow credit for future safety. improvements to the design in siting new plants. Specifically, "the proposed regulation would eliminate the use of a postulated source term, [and] assumptions regarding mitigating i
i systems..." in order to achieve site isolation through decoupling. 57 Fed. Reg.
at 47,804.
In sum, the proposed rule is inconsistent because it precludes the use of design and risk as a basis for selecting sites, but relies on design and risk as the basis for such preclusion. Additionally, in contravention of the Safety Goal decisional framework for imposing safety requirements which'are not necessary for adequate protection, it uses the consequences of a very low probability severe accident, as opposed to risk, as the basis for imposing the requirements.
Further exacerbating the inconsistent technical basis is the Commission's invitation to comment on the size of the exclusion area for plants whose power levels are significantly lower than 3800 MW (thermal). Power level i
is a determinant of the source term, which the Commission would eliminate as a i
basis for determining exclusion area size.
Thus,. the proposed rule sends i
conflicting messages on the importance of source term issues.
i Newmen s Nehairwer. r.c.
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i As presently constructed, the proposed rule would have site issues affect the determination of the design, but not have design characteristics widen the choice of sites. Design and risk arguments are used to support certain of the proposed revisions, but, largely based on consequences, revisions would exclude the application of design and risk considerations in site selection. Even in this narrower and more inappropriate measure of acceptability, no numerical evaluation I
of the benefits is offered. When analyses are made of the proposed rule on the basis of consequences, the benefits from codification are shown to be either zero or very small. No counterbalancing analysis is provided for the economic and health benefits of alternative formulations of regulations which would be consistent with accepted safety principles for siting nuclear power plants.
i The inconsistency between the basis for the rule and the requirements 1
the rule would impose is made all the more striking when the implications of the proposed rule for the use of existing sites for additional power units or replacement j
power units are considered. All existing sites are acceptable on the basis of safety considerations. Without grandfathering, however, some existing sites, which l
would not meet the proposed demographic criteria, would have to be discarded as sites for additional or replacement units, even though they are superior sites from an overall safety perspective. Prohibition of grandfathering'would needlessly result in loss of investment and loss of use of safe sites. Grandfathering, however, would likely lead to endless disputes regarding the safety of the existing units.
This example illustrates the flaw inherent in establishing a dual regulatory structure in Part 100 where there is no compelling safety rationale for its existence.
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2, The first of three objectives of the proposed rule is to "[s] tate the criteria for future sites that, based uoon exoerience and imoortance to risk. have i
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been shown as key to protecting public health and safety." 57 Fed. Reg. at l
47,803 (emphasis added). However, the proposed rule would impose arbitrary j
presenptive criteria without any attempt to determine the significance of or I
necessity for the criteria, such as specified exclusion area distances and specified
[
population densi+ies. In this regard, the Supplementary information published with j
the proposed changes reflects a misunderstanding of the fundamental purpose of 1
l the Safety Goal decisional framework. One of the stated purposes of the Safety i
Goal de'cisional framework is to provide a better means for testing the adequacy i
i of and need for current and proposed safety requirements. Eng 51 Fed. Reg. at j
28,044. In contravention of this stated purpose, the Safety Goal decisional i;.
framework is cited as the basis for an unjustifiable ratchet.
i j
Given the progress the nuclear industry has made since 1980 in j
understanding severe accident source terms and the increased application of l
probabilistic risk assessment techniques to severe ~ accident analysis, the l
l radiological risk to the public is now understood to be considerably different from i
i and less than it was previously thought to be.
When coupled with the i
incorporation of severe accident risk reduction features into new reactor designs, the magnitude of the residual severe accident risk has become small enough that further reductions in the residual risk from siting on the basis of demographics will 3
be very small. Tc ks judged adequate and credible, particularly in light of the i
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Commission's rulemaking objective quoted above, the technical basis must reflect such facts.
C.
The Proposed Revisions to the Seismic Criteria Should Not Be i
Adopted. Revision Should Awa8t Resolution of the Controversy i
on_the_Una_of_ Deterministic _VersualrohahRiatin. Methods _ in. Site i
l Selection. Any Revision Adopted Should Meet the Commission's l
Rulemaking Objective of Regulatory Stability.
1 j
The Commission issued seismic and geologic siting criteria in 1973 1
in the form of Appendix A to Part 100 (38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (November 13,
{
l 1973)). At the time of their issuance, the seismic criteria reflected state-of-the-art 1
l understandings in the conduct of seismic and geologic investigations and were i
}
developed with the cooperation of the U.S. Geological Survey and the National I
j Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. E at 31,280.
i
)
The primary reasons given in the Federal Register notice for the.
I j.
proposed changes to the seismic and geologic criteria are (1) to benefit from i
l experience gained in the application of the procedures and methods set forth in the i
i j
present regulations; (2) to incorporate the rapid advances in the earth sciences and i
1 earthquake engineering that have been made since the criteria were first published 1
i in 1972; and (3) to reduce the difficulty encountered by nuclear power plant applicants and the NRC Staff in exercising needed judgment in applying the criteria and using evolving methods of analyses within the context of, the -licensing
)
process, thereby leading to a more stable and predictabic licensing process than l
[
in the past. San 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,803. The ISG does not believe that the I
proposed revisions to the present criteria in Part 100 will accomplish these objectives. To the contrary, the proposed revisions could lead in greater instability l
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l and less predictability in the licensing process than under the present regulatory
'i regime. In view of the potential attractiveness of other alternatives and the lack l
of a resolution methodology should deterministic and probabilistic methods give divergent results, the prudent course is for the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions.
1.
The Commission should resolve the controversy between use of dotarministic versus probabilistic techniques before proceeding to rulemaking.
l The Supplementary information published with the proposed changes makes clear that the present, deterministic approach "has worked reasonably well for the past two decades,in the sense that SSEs [ Safe Shutdown Earthquakes] for l
plants sited with this approach are judged to be suitably conservative, [even though] the approach has not explicitly recognized uncertainty in the geoscience parameter." list 47,807. Because the NRC wants to require use of probabilistic
]
l methods, which allow treatment of this uncertainty, the revisions are being proposed. The proposal to use a dual scheme by adding probabilistic methodology to the existing deterministic methodology Or seismic design criteria will unnecessarily complicate and destabilize doe.isions concerning selection of design l
basis ground motion and, consequently, site selection. Controversy over the appropriate probabilistic methodology for seismic analysis has led to the l
development of two distinctly different approaches in the U.S.
As the NRC l
acknowledges, "[b]ecause so little is known about earthquake phenomena l
(especially in the United States)... [e]xperts often delineate very different i
estimates of the largest earthquakes to be considered and different ground-motion Newmen & HootArwer. P.C.
Page 62 i
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{
models." E Application to seismic analyses of a probabilistic methodology that o
i has not yet been fully evaluated and tested through actual use in the licensing process results in even greater controversy. In particular, the bottom-line results from probabilistic seismic hazard analyses tend to be dominated by the extremes rather than the central tendencies of the distributions of knowledge and expert opinions. E This controversy among seismic experts, coupled with the divergent views within the NRC Staff as to the role probabilistic seismic hazard analysis should play in the licensing arena,--will undoubtedly have a destabilizing, rather than a stabilizing, effect on the siting process.
Given the controversy surrounding the appropriateness of using such analyses in the licensing process, the lack of experience on the part of both the NRC Staff and nuclear power plant applicants in such use in the licensing process, and the availability to the Commission of other, more suitable means to gain experience with the application of probabilistic methodology to seismic analyses (such as the use of pilot programs er issuance of a policy stateinent), there is no valid reason for proceeding with these revisions.
At a minimum, if the Commission insists' upon codifying a l
methodology requiring that both deterministic and probabilistic methods be used in nuclear power plant siting, it should identify a resolution methodology to be
. applied 'whenever the two kinds of studies produce divergent results. Without such a methodology, the revisions requiring use of both deterministic and probabilistic studies will destabilize the licensing process and introduce greater unpredictability into it.
m a:
-, r.c.
% sa -
i 4
 
2.
The proposed requirements are unlikely to meet the stated objectives of greater predictability and stability.
i There is not consensus within the NRC Staff as to whether or how
]
probabilistic analyses should be used in making siting decisions. 47 Fed. Reg. at 47,812. Moreover, the application in the licensing process of such analyses to l
i nuclear power plant siting has not yet been tested. Lack of consensus and lack l
l of a body of licensing practice are destabilizing forces in the licensing process.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be expected that adoption of the proposed revisions to the seismic criteria will lead to greater predictability and stability.
l lmposition at this time of seismic criteria in the form proposed is especially inappropriate. In the seismic-hazard area, the Commission has stated that the bottom-line results from probabilistic analyses tend to be dominated by the extremes rather than the central tendencies of the distributions of knowledge and expert opinions. Also, "[b]ecause so little is known about earthquake phenomena i
l (especially in the eastern United States),... [e]xperts often delineate very different estimates of the largest earthquakes to be considered and different ground-motion models." E at 47,807. Additionally, there are divergent views J
within the NRC Staff as to the role probabilistic seismic hazard analysis should play l
in the licensing arena.
In particular, " views range from an advocacy of a predominantly probabilistic analysis to the probabilistic/ deterministic analysis (being] proposed [in the revisions) to a predominantly deterministic approach as used currently." E at 47,812.
l l
Newme,, a nonsmeer. r.c.
wa
 
t o
t Due to the divergence of views among the NRC Staff, the Commission is requesting comments on specific questions. The Commission has l
s asked whether deterministic and probabilistic evaluations should be combined or weighted, whether the procudme ea.9fied in one of the draft Regulatory Guldes l
to determine controlling earthquahn trom h e)robabilistic analysis is adequate, i
I whether median values of the seism:c terard analysis should be used to the exclusion of other statistical measures, whether the exceedance criterion for the 1
Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion is properly specified, and how many l
earthquakes should be generated to cover the frequency bands of' concern for nuclear power plants. San d at 47,812-13. As discussed above, the controversy i
should be resolved before adopting new requirements, due to the fundamental l
problems remaining in the criteria as proposed. For example, further effort should.
l be expended in developing the earthquake database, improved techniques for weighting the seismic zone area, and improved expressions for the attenuation equation. At a minimum, no rule should be proposed which does not resolve all i
issues which could lead to instability in the licensing process. Even though the present criteria are not perfect, their operation is understood by both applicants and the NRC. The proposed revisions are fraught with regulatory uncertainty of l
a fundamental nature and should not be' finalized until further evaluation is completed.
Newman & Nohamyar, P.C.
g gg
 
?
l l
3.
Any revision to the Commission's _ seismic regulations should provide regulatory stability.
As discussed above, there is not agreement among the NRC Staff as j
i to how probabilistic analyses should be used in siting nuclear power plants. This
'l is because neither the NRC Staff nor the nuclear industry has developed a body of practice in the licensing context.
As the Federal Register notice implicitly l
acknowledges, the nuclear regulatory experience is limited to those who l
l participated in either the NRC-Lawrence Livermore. National Laboratory or the i
Electric Power Research Institute seismic hazard research projects over the last decade. Sag kL Additionally, under the sponsorship of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NfJMARC) an alternative has been developed.
Therefore, it is both appropriate and prudent for the Commission to proceed cautiously w'th codification of requirements in the absence of licensing experience with implementation of the requirements. In similar instances in the past, the Commission has employed a trial approach in order to develop the l
necessary body of practice within the regulatory context. Such an approach is j
especially appropriate where, as is the case here, the proposed revisions have
\\
l limitations e.nd there is significant controversy among experts as to whether and j
how the probabilistic criteria should be applied. For example, in implementation j
of the Policy Statement on Safety Goals, the Commission proceeded cautiously and, in the area of severe accident regulation, it is only now embarking on a rulemaking based on years of safety research. 57 Fed. Reg. at 44,513 (September 27, 1992).
Also, NUMARC's proposal appears to merit evaluation by the newmeo, a murwa r.c.
noe se
 
l, 1
k Commission before the Commission makes a final decision on the structure and content of revised siting criteria.
j The Endaral Register notice for the proposed revision to the seismic t
criteria asserts without elaboration that "the NRC believes that this approach is the j
has way to accomplish the objective,... and arrive, through analysis, at a site-t i
specific ground motion that appropriately captures what is known about the
)
seismic regime"; and that the approach "should lead to a more stable and predictable licensing process than in the past." 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,807 (emphasis added). Two aspects of this assertion need to be addressed. First, rulemaking does not have to be used to achieve the desired result.- Second, the approach taken in the proposed rule has not been shown to be the has approach.
As to the first point, the Commission does not have to modify the existing Part 100 seismic and geologic criteria in Appendix A no Part 100 in order to obtain the submittal of probabilistic analyses in addition to deterministic l
l analyses as part of the assessment of the seismic and geologic properties of a site.
l l
Applicants who wish to conduct probabilistic analyses and submit them to the NRC ln conjunction with their deterministic analyses are certainly not prohibited from doing so and the NRC Staff can indicate to applicants its interest in such analyses.
if the Commission wishes to require such probabilistic analyses, it could issue a policy statement requiring the submittal of probabilistic analyses.
This would be similar to the approach taken in the Comm!ssion's Severe Accident Policy Statement (50 Fed. Reg. 32,138), which requires that a Probabilistic Risk new me,,a : =,. r.c.
w er l
 
4 l-i Assessment (PRA) be completed for all new plants and included with the application. This PRA must be used to expose the severe accident vulnerabilities initiated by both internal and external events that are associated with a plant of-q j
new design. For the Severe Accident Policy Statement, the NRC Staff must -
I-complete a review of a PRA as part of its licensing review of a design for a new j
nuclear power plant. Although a policy statement does not establish a requirement I
)
as a legal matter, it has the practical effect of a requirement. In conjunction with d
i Issuing such a Policy Statement on probabilistic seismic analyses, the NRC Staff l 5
might issue guidance as to how the Policy Statement would be implemented for
\\
[
both the Staff itself and applicants.
\\
l As to the second point, the Commission has not provided any i
j justification that the proposed revisions to the seismic criteria are the htti. To the i
f contrary, the Supplementary information for the proposed revisions demonstrates l
j that there is controversy concerning their formulation.
Additionally, in its comments on the proposed revisions to 'Part 100, NUMARC has proposed an l
alternative which appears to warrant evaluation. At a minimum, the Commission i
j should evaluate the NUMARC proposal (and any other attractive alternatives) and j
resolve the present controversy before finalizing any changes. Such an evaluation j
would also permit the Commission to make further progress in such areas as development of an earthquake detabase, improved techniques for weighting the i
.1 i
seismic zone area, and improved expressions for the attenuation equation. In view I
of the infirmities in the rule as a whole, the ISG urges the Commission to withdraw the rule in its entirety until these issues are adequately addressed.
i i
l Newmen A #s4minpar, AC.
Aspe as i
i.
j
 
D.-
The Environmental Assessment Pranared in Coniunction with the Proposed Revisions is inadeauate as a Matter of Law to Suonort a Finding of No Significant EnvironmentalImpact.
The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51 specify the procedures necessary for compliance with NEPA. At a minimum, Part 51 requires that an Environmental A.ssessment (EA) be prepared examining the environmental impacts of the proposed action and reasonable altematives to the proposed action.
The purpose of an EA is to determine whether a comprehensive Environmental impact Statement (EIS) must be prepared. Section 51.30 requires that an EA identify the proposed action and include:
)
j (1)
A brief discussion of:
(i)
The need for the proposed action:
(ii)
Alternatives as required by section 102(2)(E) of NEPA; (iii)
The environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives as appropriate; and (2)
A list of agencies and persons consulted, and identification of sources used.
The EA prepared in conjunction with revision of the Commission's siting criteria fails to meet the Commission's NEPA requirements in Part 51 and is otherwise not i
in accordance with law.
The proposed revisions to the 10 CFR Part 100 siting regulations will result in substantive and significant changes to the Commission's regulatory framework for siting new nuclear power plants, if adopted. Specifically, the demographic criteria as formulated in the proposed rule do not ensure that the sites chosen will be among the best reasonably to be found. Given the importance of the U.S. siting regulations and guidance to the formulation of international site l
l mwme,, a mns,a, r.c.
re, so
 
i o
safety standards,' adoption would force reconsideration of present international safety standards and raise questions about the adequacy of present siting practices. Adoption could have the practical effect of making it difficult, if not impossible, to site nuclear power plants in any portion of the United States which did not meet the numerical demographic criteria specified in the regulation, as well as elsewhere in the world. Adoption also has the potential to create confusion among members of the public as to the adequacy of existing nuclear power plant i
sites and the adequacy of existing emergency planning requirements. The EA fails to address the issue of multi unit sites and the economic impacts of the regulation on siting decisions. These are the kinds of environmental impacts which NEPA requires be addressed and taken into account as part of the process to decide whether to make the proposed revisions final.
The inadequacy of the current EA is corroborated by the fact that in 1980, the Commission determined that it would prepare an Environmental Impact l
Statement (EIS) in connection with revision of its siting criteria to incorporate numerical demographic criteria into a revised 10 CFR Part 100.E in support of l
E On July 29,1980, the NRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (45 i
Fed. Reg. 50,350), in which the Commission announced its intention to revise the reactor I
siting criteria and requested comments on seven of the nine recommendations of the Siting I
Policy Task Force, as well as certain alternative approaches. In conjunction with the l
rulemaking effort, the Commission also issued a Notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 45 Fed. Reg.~ 79,280 (December 2,1980). The j
NOI, among other things, identified the technical approach to detailed analyses that would be followed in developing the bases for any proposed revisions. 333 % at 79,822 23. In December 1981, the NRC published the Scoping Summary Report for the EIS (NUREG _
i 0833). The report addressed comments received on both the ANPR and the NOl and l
provided further discussion of the efforts which would be undertaken to dev6 lop an adequate technical basis for any revisions. The report recognized that the siting rulemaking must take into account premises concerning reactor design and emergency planning. Egg (continued...)
l i
Newmen & N-T i. P.C.
hoe 70 I
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a the development of the EIS, the NRC identified major studies to be undertaken to
~
understand the impacts. Significant changes have occurred since issuance of the Notice of intent and Scoping Summary Report in Commission policy, practice and capability to determine how it will proceed in establishing requirements, such as the proposed changes to the siting regulations, when such changes are not necessaryto ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. However, the kinds of studies identified remain as valid in 1993 as they were in 1980 for assessing the impacts of the proposed regulation and serving as the basis for an EA. For example, the following studies were identified in the 1980 Notice of Intent (sra 45 Fed. Reg. at 79,822-23):
t (1) RadiologicalConseauencesof Accidents: Proposed criteria will be compared with realistic alternatives on the basis of impacts on public health and safety. For demographic criteria this means that variation in doses l
to the maximally expot,ed individual and the population -
from a full range of accident releases must be examined for alternative ways of specifying constraints on l
population density and distribution. Existing sites and i
a hypothetical site will be evaluated. Consequences considered will include early fatalities, injuries, latent fatalities, and property damage. Both individual and l
societal risk will be evaluated but may differ in relative l
importance for establishing different criteria.
(2)
Fansibuity of Protective Actions:
The topics under consideration for rulemaking with respect to demographic criteria and external hazards will be examined to determine whether the capability to take protective action in the ' vicinity of a site under 21'(... continued)
NUREG-0833 at 13.
It also restated that "a' systematic evaluation of accident consequences for a full range of reactor accidents would be a fundamental part of the l'
technical basis for the sitirg rulemaking...." E at 20. See also E at 14, regarding consideration of a full range of accidents in establishing siting criteria.
i Newmen a :':-_,. P.c.
noe 71 l
l l
 
2 accident conditions might be impaired or enhanced by various choices of alternative criteria.
(3)
Definition of Region:
Alternative schemes of regionalization will be eFamined to determine a proper basis for establishing regional criteria. Socioeconomic and physiographic units will be examined to establish
. potential regional breakdowns. Effects of uniformity of population distribution, water resource restrictions and any other: appropriate regional concerns will be-considered when deciding on the proper regionalization i
scheme.
~
i (4)
Site AvagabNity:'
Consistent with the intent of the NRC FY-80 Authorization Acta 2/,
the new.
22' In June 1980, the U.S. Congress passed the NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (FY-80), Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780 (1980). Section 108 of the Act provided in pertinent part that:
(a)... [T)he Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized and directed... to develop and promulgate regulations establishing demographic requirements for the siting of utilization facilities...
)
(c) The regulations... shall'specify demographic criteria, including maximum j
density and population distribution for zones surrounding the facility without regard to any design, engineering, or other differences among such facilities.
1 The Conference Report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1070, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24(1980)),
linked the legislation to the Siting Policy Task Force recommendatio'n to strengthen siting j
as a factor in defense-in-depth, but without eliminating further siting of nuclear reactors l
in any region of the United States. Egg H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1070 at 25-26. Like the Siting Policy Task Force Report upon which it relied, the FY-80 NRC Authorization Act reflected understandings of the time that codification of remote siting requirements in the j
Commission's regulations would contribute significantly to reducing the residual risk from i
j a severe nuclear power plant accident and, hence would crsntribute to increased defense-in-
'{
depth.
?
Section 108 of the Fiscal Year 1980 Authorization Act has long since expired, as evidenced by its not having been codified in the U.S. Code and its having no language indicating permanency. In Massachusetts v. NRC. the Court referred to the FY 80 NRC Authorization Act as "an expired fiscal appropriations law, Ithat) was not in effect when 4
' CLI-90-2 was decided and therefore did not limit the licensing discretion otherwise
{-
conferred on the Commission by Congress." Massachusetts v. NRC. 924 F.2d 311,324 (D.C. Cir.1991). However, the assessment identified in the 1980 Notice of Intent to J
ensure that new demographic regulations do not preclude further siting of nuclear power i
plants in any region of the United States is still needed, the more so because changes to i
the demographic regulations in Part 100 are not needed to ensure adequate protection of
]
the public health and safety.
I a
i J
Newmu a ::L:. P.c.
nave 72 l
1 4
~.
 
i-l y
a demographic criteria should not preclude further siting of nuclear power plants in any region of the United States. An assessment will be made for each region that identifies the variation in availability of sites for nuclear power plants as a function of the structure of i
the criteria and the variation in numerical values as well as realistic constraints on sitino such as water -
availability and violation of safety criteria. The benefits of regionally based criteria versus nationwide criteria will be examined. Basic information will be developed frora existing siting studies which, taken together, cover large portions of the country. (Emphasis added.)'
(4)
Socioeconomic Imoscts:
The socioeconomic impacts of varying degrees or remoteness will be investigated.
Economic - impact of - increased transmission distances, impacts on land use and other-factors will be addressed along with sociological penalties and inequities in distribution of cost and benefits of such siting.
(5) Severity of Extemal Hazards: A literature review will be performed to establish the potential level of hazard associated with the external hazards listed in the
[ANPR] and any other appropriate topics. Staff practice for dealing with these hazards will be assessed.
Available models for characterizing the effect of a hazardous external event will be evaluated., The i
feasibility of - establishing a meaningful prote'ctive distance will be examined. The availability of sites i
associated with the demographic criteria proposed by the staff will be reexamined to oetermine whether the standoff criteria will significantly alter site availability.
(6) Engineering Alternatives to Standoff Distances: The feasibility of design performance requirements as opposed to specific standoff distances will be evaluated.
(7) Procludina Sitina of Nuclear Reactors in Anv Realan of the United States:
Energy generation from any source has its associated risk and risks from some energy sources may be greater than that of the nuclear l
option. Therefore, it has been suggested that the siting criterla should not be so stringent as to preclude the use of nuclear power from any region of the United States.
Newmen s : L
, r.c.
hoe n
 
f hj 1
1 The implications of not precluding nuclear power from
-l any region of the United States will be examined.
(8) Effect of Groundwater interdiction Criteria on Site AvaHabHity: The effect of site availability of alternative i
l siting criteria that assure the capability for groundwater interdiction would be examined.
(9) Use of Existing Sites: The existing sites would be examined for various levels of criteria to determine which sites were acceptable under each proposal. The feasibility of adding additional units to each of these sites would then be examined and an estimate made by region of ' remaining siting capacity.
Using the l
characteristics of the selected site, an estimate would I
l be prepared of the availability of multi-unit sites as a.
modification of the availability information. for ' the various demographic criteria and standoff distances.
(10) Use of Unusual or Unoroven Enginepring Design to Compensate for Site Deficiencies: An estimate would' be made of the effect on site availability of instituting such a requirement, particularly where large areas might have a common deficiency which might preclude siting -
from a large region.
l The economic aspects of reactor siting have long been a fundamental part of the NRC's NEPA review. In numerous cases'the Comrnission's tribuna!s have considered the economic aspects, among other factors, of alternative facility sites.U' Since the NRC has consistently interpreted NEPA as requiring it to assess cost-benefit matters, including economic factors, in individual adjudications concerning construction permits and operating licenses, the NRC is plainly under a duty to inquire into the cost-benefit aspects of its proposed siting rule. The need for a comprehensive and accurate inquiry into economic impacts cannot be i
22' Sag Union of Concerned Scientists v. AK,499 F.2d 1069,1084-85 (D.C. Cir.1974).
s Newme,p & N-- S-
_, P.C.
Aspe 74 l
 
I P
overstated. Since acceptable sites for nuclear power plants are difficult to find and costly to acquire, a siting rule is certain to have significant impacts on the costs 1
of constructing a nuclear facility. An irony concerning the cost of nuclear facilities is that costs have risen sharply in response to tightened NRC engineering safety requirements. Yet through this proposed rulemaking, the NRC would ignore many of the engineered safety features which have been required for plants at considerable cost. Some of the more obvious economic impacts of such a siting l
rule are discussed above in Section ll.A.2.c.iv.
I l
An agency's Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact, and hence the adequacy of the EA which provides the basis for the finding, is judged against a standard of reasonableness. San Natural Resources Defense Council v.
j Duvall, 777 F.Supp.1533,1537 (E.D. Cal.1991). In determining adequacy, l
courts have considered, among other things, the following questions:
I Has the agency accurately identified the relevant environmental concern?
Once the agency has identified the problem, has it taken a "hard look" at the problem in preparing the EA?
if a finding of no significant impact is made, will the agency be l
able to make a convincing case for its finding?
l San Sierra Club v. DOT. 753 F.2d 120,127 (D.C. Cir.1985) (citations omitted).
The draft EA prepared in connection with the proposed revisions to i
the siting regulations would not be found adequate under this test. In its 1980 ANPR, the Commission sought public comment on substantially the same revisions l
Newman & Hokainger. P.C.
page 7g
 
~ - - - -
i
'o 1
to the Commission's demographic regulations in Part 100. The Commission received a number of comments on the ANPR. Commenters emphasized that l
current siting practices were effective in achieving isolation, with the trend being toward the siting of nuclear power plants away from highly populated areas.
l Commenters expressed concern about the inadequacy of the technical basis for the changes under consideration and requested that the Commission develop safety goals, quantify residual-risk and establish 'an - overall risk criterion before j
proceeding. Several commenters thought that an EIS should be prepared, which -
l would consider among other things, the disadvantages of remote siting and the I
elimination of new nuclear power plants from certain regions of the country should the contemplated revisions be adopted. The potentialimpact on worldwide siting was also called to the Commission's attention.
s The Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l
(ACRS) also commented on the issues presented in 1980 when the Commission issued the ANPR. While the ACRS agreed that siting, as a factof in the defense-in-depth philosophy should be strengthened, the ACRS stated:
(T]he ACRS believes that any minimum requirements for parameters such as the' exclusion zone radius, surrounding population density, or distance from i
population centers should be established, if possible, within the framework of an overall Nuclear Regulatory i
Commission safety philosophy for future reactors.
i l
l Such a philosophy should be based on preestablished' Commission objectives for acceptable risk to both individuals and society. This will, of necessity, include consideration of matters such as the potential effects of a broad spectrum of reactor accidents, the identification of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) criterion Newmen & Nekanper, P.C.
hnpe 16
 
i l
N l
for the reduction of risk from accidents, and a general statement of policy concerning the objectives to be sought in reactor design with regard to the prevention l
and mitigation of accidents.
j The establishment of demographic-related site criteria will inevitably require a considerable amount of judgment. However, the choice will be less arbitrary if made within the framework of an overall NRC safety policy. 45 Fed. Reg. at 50,352.
~
An Errata Sheet to the 1981-Scoping Summary Report, which addressed comments received on both the ANPR and Notice of Intent, indicated '
]
that the Commission would re-examine its decision to prepara an EIS when it 1
resumed the rulemaking to revise.the siting regulations. ISG members do not believe issuance of the draft EA without explanation of why the Commission apparently changed its mind about preparing an EIS is consistent with case law.
+
An agency's decision not to proceed with an EIS is unreasonable if the agency t
" fails to supply a convincing statement of reasons why potential effects are f
insignificant." Seattle Community Council Federation v. FAA,9.61 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). An agency's decision is also unreasonable if-substantial questions are raised regarding "whether the proposed action may have a significant impact upon the human environment." J.d, Sgt alan Blue Ocean Preservation Societv v. Watkins, 767 F. Supp.1518,1526 (D. Haw.1991). The Commission's seeming failure, in preparing the EA for the 1992 proposed revisions, to take into account the comments generated in response to the 1980 i
ANPR and Notice of Intent cannot be considered reasonable, given their continuing i
I Newmen a Monauww p.c.
m yy i
I
, ~,
~
.m m
 
P relevance to the changes proposed. ignoring those earlier comments is not o
" convincing statement."
in sum, the Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with i
- the proposed revisions to the Commission's siting regulations is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.
I E.
Finalization of the Proposed Revisions to the Siting Reaulations Would Not Be in Accord With Sound Agency Decisionmaking.
As the Supreme Court held in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Coro.
: v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), administrative agencies have reasonable latitude in the rulemaking process, and the courts will not impose their own notion of what procedures are best or most likely to further the public good. Still standing, however, is the requirement that an agency avoid conduct which is arbitrary or capricious, and that it provide a reasonable statement of the basis and purpose of its rules. Moreover,'an agency must obey its own i
regulations. On many occasions ths courts have struc'c down agency rules which i
l were adopted without adequate agency review of major matters related to the i
rulemaking. The NRC's present course is perilously close to the type of conduct which courts frequently strike down.
The siting rule, if promulgated, may well be vulnerable to legal challenge on the grounds that the Commission's analyses and decisionmaking have omitted consideration of critical information in the formulation of the proposed l
revisions, even though such information was available to the Commission as a l
result of the earlier issuance of the ANPR and Notice of Intent. Furthermore, the l
l l
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a. is v
i
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b I
l l
proposed rule lacks an adequate technical. basis, and the Environmental Assessment required by NEPA is patently inadequate. Additionally, the analytic f
^
l process prescribed by the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement and implementing guidance has not been followed in formulating the technical basis.
Given the importance of the siting rule, it is critical that the Commission closely observe prudent administrative practices. Too much is at stake here for the I
Commission to proceed further when important aspects of the siting rule are not yet developed.
Following publication in the Federal Register of the Advance Notice l
of Proposed Rulemaking in July 1980, the NRC supplemented the notice in December 1980 with its Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact j
l Statement. The following year,in December of 1981, the Commission " deferred" its rulemaking process concerning siting criteria to await development of Safety Goals and improved research on accident source terms. Finally, on October 20, 1992, the NRC issued a proposed rule concerning reactor' siting criteria.
1 The NRC's decision to publish the ANPR began the rulemaking process regarding siting criteria. Indeed, the NRC's October 20,1992, Federal Reaister notice states that the rulemaking process began over twelve years ago.
I 57 Fed. Reg. 47,802. Although the 1986 Regulatory Agenda and 1988 denial of I
PRM-100 2 indicate. that the NRC's Executive Director for Operations had concluded the 1980 rulemaking should be terminated, the Commission, by its own admiscion in the 1992 Federal Register notice, clearly regards the rulemaking as ongoing since 1980.
Consequently, the NRC, in formulating the proposed Newmen & Neetainger, P.C.
Aage ys.
 
2 revisions to the demographic regulations, should have considered the comments submitted in response to the ANPR issued on July 29, 1980, as well as the December 2,1980 Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS and the responses thereto by the NRC Staff in the December 1981 Scoping Summary Report.
Under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.
5 552 A.t191 (1988)), an agency must " incorporate in the rules adopted a precise j
)
general statement'of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. I 553(c) (1988). A failure to address substantive comments or concerns raised during the rulemaking renders that process invalid. Marsh v. Oreoon Resources Council,490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Bethesda Hoso. v. Heckler, 609 F. Supp.1360,1371 (S.D. Ohio i
1985). If, upon review, a court cannot discern that an agency made a reasoned decision after consideration of relevant factors, the agency action is arbitrary and capricious.1 As discussed above, the Commission's failure thus far to address relevant comments in proceeding from one stage of the rulemaking to the next, in the process of revising its siting regulations, has the potential to render any rule i
which may be adopted vulnerable to invalidation.
Also, an agency is also bound by its own regulations. Robert E.
Dereckter of Rhode Island. Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp.1059,1063 (D.R.I.
1980). The NRC's NEPA regulations in Part 51, described above, require the NRC to explain the basis for its actions. To the extent that the Commission has ignored its earlier ANPR and NOl actions, the NHC is out of compliance with its own regulations.
Similarly, the technical basis for the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations is inconsistent with the Commission's Safety Goal mma s :L _
.,. c.
w so
 
(
l decisional framework. The problems with the proposed revisions to the siting l
regulations and the rulemaking process leading up to their proposal are so great that withdrawal of the proposed revisions and termination of the proceeding seems the most prudent course.
Ill.
CONCLUSIONS For the reasons set forth above, ISG Members believe that:
The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 have worked well; I
The proposed revisions to the demographic regulations are unnecessary; Contrary to the Supplementary information published with the proposed rule, the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations do not codify present siting practice, but change practice in a fundamental way such that there no longer can be assurance that a site proposed for a nuclear power plant will be among the best reasonably to be found; The proposed revisions to the demographic regula'tions are unduly restrictive and without commensurate benefit; and l
l Adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations will have adverse consequences on the internationally accepted consensus standards of the-IAEA on the siting of nuclear power plants and on national standards in ISG Member countries.
Consequently, ISG Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions, along with draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 (Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7), to the demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100.
l l
Newmen & W. P.C.
Page 31
~.
 
i i
Likewise, ISG Members' request the Commission to withdraw the proposed changes to the seismic criteria in Part 100. Withdrawal would allow
(
resolution of present controversios concerning the proposed changes and i
l 1
evaluation of alternatives. Withdrawal and evaluation of alternatives would provide a better basis for the development of international consensus stt:ndards reflecting the principles embodied in the NRC regulations.
l l
i l
l l
1 1
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APPENDIX i
l In addition to soliciting comments on all aspects of this rulemaking, the l
Commission, in Section XI of the Federal Realster notice requested comments on a number of questions. The International Siting Group's responses to these questions are found in this Appendix.
A.
REACTOR SITING CRITERIA (NONSEISMIC) 1.
Should the Commission grandfather existing reactor sites having an exclusion area distance less than 0.4 miles (640 meters) for the possible placement of additional units, if those sites are found suitable from safety consideration?
ISG Response:
This question presupposes that the Commission j
will revise the existing reactor siting regulations to include a i
numerical size requirement, in terms of distance, for the exclusion area. The International Siting Group (ISG) does not believe that it is i
either necessary or desirable to change the existing siting regulations.
As discussed in Section il(A)(1) of the ISG Comments on the l
proposed revisions to the siting regulations, it is bssential for siting l
l standards to be sufficiently flexible to " ensure 11at all site related l
characteristics have been taken into account" during the selection of I
the preferred candidate sites. See IAEA Safety Guide No. 50-SG-S9, i
Site Survey for Nuclear Power Plants (1984) at 10. That guide identifies fourteen (14) safety-related site characteristics to be evaluated during the site selection process, of which population
- A1 -
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distribution is but one? The guide recognizes the. difficulty in comparing sites based on population and suggests that "[ilt may be appropriate to compara all other site characteristics, arid then to i
evaluate the sites independently from the. point of population distribution." 11 at 32. Contrary to what is essential in the selection
)
of preferred sites, the proposed revisions, if sdopted, would impose a hierarchy of site characteristics, which elevates demographics over other physical characteristics of the site and other safety-related.
aspects of nuclear power ' plant. siting. which may have greater potential for reducing risk. This, in turn, creates the possibility that sites with a better balance overall of favorable - safety-related characteristics may be eliminated from further consideration on the basis of demographics alone. Such an outcome would be contrary to
[
t the public interest and sound regulation and the fundamental safety The other thirteen are:
l l
- Surface faulting j
- Seismicity
- Suitability of subsurface material l
- Vulcanism
- Flooding
- Extreme meteorological phenomena
- Man-induced events
- Dispersion in air
- Dispersion in water
- Emergency Pcnning
- Land use
- Availability of cooling water
- Other site characteristics as appropriate, such as avalanche, landslide, surface collapse.
E at 10-13.
l
-A2-I i
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i P'
l principles governing the siting of nuclear power plants everywhere in the world.-
Regulations which grandfather are always problematic.
They establish a dual system of seemingly conflicting standards and are confusing to the public. Grandfathering conveys to the public the message that what is grandfathered is less safe than what is not I
grandfathered. Once this occurs, it is very difficult to con'vince the public otherwise.
In the case of_ the proposed revisions to _the demographic requirements in the' Commission's siting regulations, there is no need to introduce grandfathering clauses into.the Commission's demographic requirements because there is no need to change the requirements at all. As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(a) of the ISG Comments on the proposed revisions to the siting regulations, the existing siting regulations have achieved - site isolation.
As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(b), adoption-of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(c),
adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100 will not provide a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth.
Further, the adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits. And,
- A3 -
i
 
a as discussed in Section ll(B), the technical basis for the proposed revisions to the siting criteria is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.
2.
Should the exclusion area distance be smaller than 0.4 mile (640 meters) for plants having reactor power levels significantly less than 3800 Megawatts (thermal) and should the exclusion area distance be allowed to very according to power level with a minimum value (for example,0.25 miles or 400 meters)?
ISG Response:
See ISG Response to Question 1 above. The exclusion area should be allowed to vary according to power level, as is the case with the current regulations. In this regard, power level is a determinant of the source term which is used in setting exclusion
(
area size.
l i
The question illustrates a basic inconsistency in the technical basis l
for the proposed rule. The proposed rule, if adopted, would eliminate l
source term as a basis for determining exclusion area size.
Question 2, however, implicitly suggests that consideration of the l
source term is an appropriate way to determine exclusion area size.
i
-A4-r l
t I
 
h 3.
The Commission proposes to codify the population density guidelines in Regulatory Guide 4.7 which states that the population density should not exceed 500 people per square mile out to a distance of 30 miles at the time of site approvaland 1000 people per square mile 40 years thereafter.
Comments are specifically requested on questions 3(a),3(b), and 3(c) given below.
i (a)
Should numerical values of population density appear in the regulation or should the regulation provide merely general guidance, with numerical values provided in a regulatory guide?
I ISG Response:
See ISG Response to Question 1 above.
)
J Numerical values should not be codified in the si+ing regulations.
Any numerical values should be placed sa regulatory guides, as is the case under present requirements.
l i
i 1
i (b)
Assuming numerical values are to be codified, are the values of 500 persons per square mile at the time of site approval and 1000 persons per square mile 40 years thereafter appropriate?
If not, what other numerical values should be codified and j
what is the basis for these values?
ISG Response: No changes should be made to the present siting regulations.
See ISG Response to Question 1.
As discussed in the ISG Response to Question 1 and the referenced sections of the ISG Comments, the proposed changes to the siting requirements lack an adequate technical basis. Any changes to the regulations must have an adequate l
technical basis. At this time, no adequate technical basis to I
l support any numericel values has been identified.
-A5-i
 
(-
I l
Additionally, the requirement to project population densities
-(
out to 40 years is problematic.
Would there be safety significance if the projections were exceeded? If not, why I
should the projections be made in the first place? If exceeding the projections has safety significance, what regulatory t
measures would NRC take?
i I
(c)
Should population density be specified out to a distance other than 30 miles (50 km), for example,20 muss (32 kml? If a different distance is recommended, what is its basis?
J ISG Response: No changes should be made to the present siting regulations. See ISG Response to Question 1.
As discussed in the - ISG Response to Question 1 and the referenced sections of the ISG Comments, the proposed changes to the siting requirements lack an adequate technical l
basis. Any changas to the regulations must have an adequate l
l technical basis.
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-A6-g n,
 
4.
Should the Commission approve sites that exceed the proposed population values of 10 CFR 100.21, and if so, under what conditions?
ISG Response: Yes, the Commission should approve sites that exceed the proposed population values of 10 CFR 100.21 if the l
results of an evaluation of the best available sites, considering all r
l relevant factors, lead to selection of such a site. The Commission makes clear in the Statement of Considerationr,that " numerous risk studies on radioactive material releases to the environment' under severe accident conditions have all confirmed that the present siting practice is expected to effectively limit risk to the public." 57 Fed.
Reg. 47,803.
Moreover, as discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(b),
population densities far in excess of 500 persons / square mile would l
not cause risks to exceed the safety goals. More importantly, as discussed in Section ll(A)(1), population is but one factor to be 1
evaluated during the site selection process. ' Selection of sites among the best reasonably to be found requires consideration of additional factors, such as surface faulting, seismicity, suitability of subsurface material, vulcanism, flooding, extreme meteorological phenomena, i
man-induced events, dispersion in air, dispersion in water, emergency planning, land use, availability of cooling water, and other site characteristics as appropriate, such as avalanche, landslide and surface collapse.
It is essential to ensure that all site-related
-A7-i
 
characteristics have been taken into account during the selection of the preferred candidates. As discussed in Section il(A)(2)(c)(iii) of the ISG Comments, the adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits. The proposed revisions, if adopted, would impose
: a. hierarchy 'of site characteristics, which elevates demographics over other physical characteristics of the site and other safety-related aspects of nuclear power plant siting which may have greater potential for reducing risk. This, in tum, would create the possibility that sites with a better balance overall of favorable safety-related characteristics mights be eliminated from further consideration on the basis of demographics alone.
5.
Should holders of 'early alte permits, construction permits, and I
operating license permits be required to periodically report changes in potential offsite hazards (for example, every 5 years within 5 miles)?
If so, what regulatory purpose would auch reporting requirements serve?
l ISG Response:
ISG Members question why existing reporting requirements are not sufficient for the reporting of significant changes. If a change presents no significant hazard, why would the NRC wish to impose new reporting requirements?
Wouldn't this result in increased costs without a commensurate increase in protection of public health and safety? If a change would potentially present a significant hazard, wouldn't the current U.S. regulations
-A8-L
 
3 require analylsis of its significance and a report of the change to the NRC if the change was found to present a significant hazard?
6.
What continuing regulatory significance should the safety requirements in 10 CFF pn* 100 have after granting the initial operating license or combined operating license under 10 CFR part 527 ISG Response:
See ISG ikyonse to Question 1 above. The ISG does not believe it is necessary to modify Part 100 and, hence, change the regulatory significance of Part 100 from what it is today.
7.
Are there certain site meteorological conditions that should preclude the siting of a nuclear power plant? If so, what are the conditions that can not be adequately compensated for by design features?
ISG Response:
Unfavorable meteorological conditions alone are not sufficient to reject candidate sites.
1 8.
In the description of the disposition of the recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force report (NUREG-0625), it was noted that the Commission was not adopting every element of each l
recommendation. Are there compelling reasons to reconsider any l
recommendation not adapted and, if so, what are the bases for reconsideration?
ISG Response:
As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(a)(ii) of the ISG Comments, the Siting PolicyTask Force Report (NUREG-0625) should not be used as the basis for making changes to the regulations. The Siting Policy Task Force report was issued in 1979. Since that time,
-A9-
 
i new information regarding severe accident phenomena, probcbility i
and consequences has been developed and new regulations established which invalidate assumptions underlying the report's recommendations. The limitations in the use of NUREG-0625 were recognized as early as 1979 by the Director of NRC's Office of f
Standards Development and the Director of NRC's Office' of Management and Program Analysis. Given regulatory developments -
since then, there are no compelling reasons to reconsider any additional recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force Report.
B.
REACTOR SITING CRITERIA (SEISMIC) 1.
In making use of both deterministic and probabilistic evaluations, how should they be combined or weighted; that is, should one dominate the other?
I ISG Response: As discussed in the main text of our comments (see Section ll(C)(1)), ISG Members are not in favor of requiring the use, by regulation, of both deterministic and probabilistic methods to determine the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. By the Commission's own admission, the present regulation has worked reasonably well for two decades. Also, experts differ on estimates of the largest earthquakes and choice of ground-motion models.
The Supplementary information published with the proposed rule makes clear there is controversy over the kind of probabilistic methods to use and the
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o balance to be struck between probabilistic and deterministic methods.
All of this underscores the prematurity of codifying the proposed regulations at this time where there are so many unanswered questions. The need for further evaluation by the Commission is reinforced by the alternative to the proposed changes to the seismic l
criteria submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council
)
(NUMARC) as part of its comments.
1 ISG Members believe that a more prudent course is to continue evaluation until consensus is reached on an appropriate approach.
Absent such consensus, it is highly unlikely that the proposed revisions, if adopted, will lead to anything other than regulatory I
instability. In no circumstances should the Commission codify a requirement to use both deterministic and probabilistic analyses without prescribing a way to reconcile differences in the analyses.
Without a reconciliation method, it is certain that closure of seismic issues in the licensing process would be vastly more difficult.
I 2.
In making use of the probabilistic and deterministic evaluations as proposed in Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1015, is [ sic] the proposed j
procedures in ' appendix C to DG-1015, adequate to determine controlling earthquakes from the probabRistic analyses? -
i ISG Response: As part of its comments on the proposed revisions to the selsmic-criteria in Part 100, the Nuclear Management and
- A11 -
 
~
i
(
j Resources Council (NUMARC) submitted comments on DG-1015,
]
which included a major markup of appendix C. In responding to this j
question, NUMARC requested that the Commission carefully evaluate NUMARC's alternative before adopting any revisions to the seismic i
criteria and implementing regulatory guides. ISG Members believe l
l that further evaluation of the proposed revisions and alternatives thereto is highly desirable before the Commission adopts any changes i
to the seismic criteria presently in Part 100.
t
{
3.
The proposed Appendix B to 10 CFR part 100 has included in Paragraph V(c) a criterion that states: "The annual probabRity of exceeding the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion is considered acceptably low if it is less than the median annual probability computed from the current [ EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE j
FINAL RULE] population of nuclear power plants." This is a relative criterion without any specific numerical value of the annual i
probabHity of exceedance because of the current status of the probabRistic seismic hazard analysis. However, this requirement i
1 assures that the design levels at new sites wBI be comparable to those at many existing sites, particulady more recently licensed sites.
Method dependent annual probabuities or target levels (adh,1 E-4 for j
LLNL or 3E-5 for EPRI) are identified in the proposed regulatory guide.
Sensitivity studies addressing the effects of different target i
probabuities are discussed in the Bemreuter to Murphy letter report.
Comments are solicited as to: (a) whether the above criterion, as j
stated, needs to be included in the regulation? and, (b) if not, should it be included in the regulation in a different form (RJL, a specific
)
numerical value, a level other than the median annual probability computed for the current plants)?
ISG Response: As discussed in Section ll(C) of our comments, ISG 4
l Members do not believe the proposed revisions to the Commission's i
seismic regulations in Part 100 should be adopted, i-i
- A12 -
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4.
In determining the controlling earthquakes, should be [ sic) median l
values of the seismic hazard analysis, as described in appendix C to l
Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1015, be used to the exclusion of other statistical measures, such as mean or 85th percentNe? (The staff has selected probabRity of exceedance values associated with the median hazard analysis estimates as they provide more stable estimates of controlling earthquakes.)
ISG Response:
There is no scientific or regulatory justification for choosing the median, particularly because each existing plant has been judged to be acceptable in seismic terms. Hence, every seismic spectrum for existing plants should be acceptable. However, if the Commission decides to require the use of probablistic criteria, then it would be appropriate for the choice of controlling earthquakes to employ the Safety Goal decisional framework. That is, for very severe, very rare natural events, a useful criterion might be that for such events, the incremental harm due to the presence of the nuclear plant be small compared to that due to the event itself.
5.
For the probabRistic analysis, how many controlling earthquakes should be generated te cover the frequency band of concern for nuclear power plants? (Hor the four trial plants used to develop the criteria presented in Drait Regulatory Guide DG-1015, the average of results for the 5 Hz and 10 Hz spectral velocities was used to I
establish the probabuity of exceedancelevel. Controlling earthquakes were evaluated for this frequency band, for the average of 1 and 2.5 Hz spectral responses, and for peak ground acceleration.)
i ISG Response: See above response to Question 2 (seismic).
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Latest revision as of 09:14, 26 May 2025

Forwards Listing of All Us Sites Where Reactors Currently Operating or Under Const Re Proposed Rev to 10CFR100
ML20072B408
Person / Time
Issue date: 07/22/1992
From: Blaha J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Fleishman M
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20024G666 List: ... further results
References
NUDOCS 9408160108
Download: ML20072B408 (6)
v • d • e


Text

...

O' N f De Ni 6 p uco 4

UNITED STATES 3

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-,i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20666 3

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July 22, 1992 NOTE 10:

Mort Fleishman i

Office of Cosnissioner Rogers p

'ES FROM:

James L. Blaha Assistant for Operations Office of the Executive Director 1

for Operations

SUBJECT:

SITES WITH EXCLUSION AREAS LESS THAN 0.4 MILid The staff paper (SECY-92-215) which proposed revisions to the reactor site criteria, 10 CFR Part 100, noted that 25 of the current 75 reactor sites had exclusion area sizes that were less than 0.4 miles, but did not name the specific sites.

In your telephone call of July 16, 1992 to Len Soffer you inoicated that Commissioner Rogers wished to see a listing of those reactor sites.

Enclosed is a listing of all U. S. sites where reactors are currently operating or under construction. Those sites having an exclusion area size less than 640 meters (0.4 miles) are marked.

This list was included as to staff paper SECY-90-341, " Staff Study on Source Term Update and Decoupling Siting fom Design."

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1s L. Blaha A sistant for Operations OdiceoftheExecutiveDirector for Operations

Enclosure:

As stated l

l cc: Technical Assistaiit, IS Technical Assistant, JC

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Technical Assistant, FR Technical Assistant, GD SECY J. Taylor, ED0 J. Sniezek, DEDR 9408160108 940629 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

l 4

l ENCLOSURE 3 EXISTING U.S. REACTOR SITES

.JXCLUSION LOW POPULATION.

AR':A BOUNDARY ZONE (LPZ).

' POP. CENTER

'i DISTANCE OUTER RADIUS DISTANCE l

REACTOR SITE (METERS)

(METERS)

(MILES) 1.

Arkansas 10'46' 4024 4

/ 2.

Beaver Valley 610 5795 5

3.

Bellefonte 914 3219 4

4.

Big Rock Pt 817 6439 45' i

/ 5.

Braidwood 457 1810 20

)

I 6.

Browns Ferry, 1219 3219 10 i

7.

Brunswick 914 3219 16 V 8.

Byron 460 4827 17 9.

Callaway.

1100 4023

'25 j

10. Calvert Cliffs 1150 3219 45 i
11. Catawba 762 6097 5.1
12. Clinton 975 4025 22
13. Comanche Pk.

1400 6440 40.

/14. Cook 610 3219 8

15. Cooper 746 1609 60
16. Crystal River 1340 8047 55

/17.DavisBesse 634 3219

~20

18. Diablo Canyon 800 9656 12
19. Dresden 671 8000 14

/20. Duane Arnold 440 9659 8

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21. Farley 1260 3219 16.5

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22. Fermi 915 4828 6

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23. Fitzpatrick 975 5470 7

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/24. Ft. Calhoun 375 4827 10 l

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/25.ft.St.Vrain 590 4827 14 r

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/26. Ginna 457 4827 16

27. Grand Gulf 752 3219 25

/28. Haddam Neck 530 11,263 9.5 o

29. Hatch 1250 7250 48 i

I

30. Hope Creek 792 8045 18

/31. Indian Pt.

330 1100 0.87

32. Kewaunee 1200 4S27 17.5

/33. LaSalle 515 6400 5

34. Limerick 760 2043-1.7 d5.MaineYankee 610 9654 26 l

i

36. McGuire 762 8850 11

/37. Millstone 503 3700 3.2

/38. Monticello 488 1609 22

39. Nine Mile Pt.

1555 6115 7'

40. North Anna 1350 9656

. 24

41. Oconee 1609 9654 21 1

I V 42. Oyster Creek 402 3219 8

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43. Palisades 671 4827 20
44. Palo Verde 900 6437 34 2

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45. Peach Bottom 820 7300 18
46. Perry 915 6437 6.3

/47. Pilgrim 441 2414 2.5

48. Pt. Beach 1207 9012 8

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49. Prairie Is.

715 2414 26

/50.QuadCities 380 4827 7

51. Rancho Seco 640 8000 17
52. River Bend 914

-4023 24

/53. Robinson 425 7242 25

54. St. Lucie 1554 8049 8
55. Salem 1165 8047 18
56. San Onofre 800 4827 17 i
57. Seabrook 914 2413 4

/58.Sequoyah 585 4827 16 1

59. Shearon Harris 2133 4827 12 j
60. 50. Texas 1430,

4827 26

61. Summer 1630 4827 26 l

/ 62. Surry 560 4827 4.5

/63. Susquehanna 567 4800 12,

/ 64. Three Mile Is.

610 3219 12

~

65. Trojan 662 4023 6
66. Turkey Pt.

1269 8047 15

/ 67. Vt. Yankee

~277 8047 30

68. Vogtle 1098 3219 26 l

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l EAB LPZ PCD

69. WPPSSI 1950 6440 8
70. WPPSS-2 1950 4827 12
71. Wate; ford 915 3219 13
72. Watts Bar 1200 4827 40
73. Wolf Creek 1200 4023 28
74. Yankee Rowe 945 3219 25

/ 75. Zion 415 1600 6

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4 NEWMAN & HoLTzIwonn, P.C.

ATTORNEYS AT L AW I6IS L STR E ET, N.W.

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20036 S600 TELEPHONE:(202) ess seco rAx:(mor) a7a ose:

June 1, 1993 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn Docketing and Service Branch Res Proposed Rule on Reactor Site Criteria; Including Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial of Petition for Rulemaking i

From Free Environment, Inc. et al. (57 Fed. Reg. 47,802 (October 20, 1992))'

Dear Mr. Chilk l

The law firm of Newman &'Holtzinger, P.C., on behalf of l

clients in its International Siting Group (ISG), hereby submits the original copy, three hard copies and one electronic copy of the ISG's comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed rule, " Reactor Site Criteria; _ Including Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial of Petition for Rulemaking From Free Environment, Inc. et al.," (57 l

Fed. Reg. 47,802 (October 20, 1992))'.9 The ISG has the following memberships l

Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.

Electricite de France The Federation of Electric Power Companies Hokkaido Electric Power Co.

Tohoku Electric Power Co.

l Tokyo Electric Power Co.

Chubu Electric Power Co.

Hokuriku Electric Power Co.

The Kansai Electric Power Co.

The Chugoku Electric Power Co.

Shikoku Electric Power Co.

Kyushu Electric Power Co.

The Japan Atomic Power Co.

Taiwan Power Company.

p l

U Nessrs. Villian O. Daab and L. Manning batsing and Ms. Janet E.B. Eckar, ammbers of the firm, entered noticos of appearance as counsel for members of the IAC in this ruiamaking proceeding.

DD

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NewxAN & HoLTz1xoza RC.

I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 1, 1993 Page 2 The ISG was formed 'in response to the Commission _'s desire to seek the views of the internation81 community concerning the proposed revisions to the siting criteria.

ISG Members own and-operate nuclear _ power plants in ISG Member countries.- Siting of nuclear power plants in ISG Member ~ countries is governed by-national nuclear safety standards, which are. consistent with the nuclear safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

These international and national siting standards were strongly influenced by, the Commission's siting. standards.

.The Commission's proposed revisions to its siting regulations in 10 CFR -

Part 100, if adopted, would result in fundamental changes to the process for selecting new nuclear power plant sites.

For the reasons set forth' below and in the enclosed comments, International Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting _ criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceedings (1)

Adoption of. the proposed revisions to the Commission's-demographic regulations in 10 CFR

/

Part 100 will do major damage to the evolvingi international - consensus on nuclear safety standards and~1ead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the; siting of nuclear power plants and standards of. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national standards. in ISG Member countries.

(2)

The existing demographic regulations'in'10 CFR Part 100 have worked well.

Adoption of the i

proposed' revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation'through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design.

Adoption of the proposed revisions will not provide a ' substantial increase in protection or contribute to increased defense-in-depth.

The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.

(3)

The technical basis for the proposed revisions to the Siting Criteria ' is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.

i (4)

The proposed revisions to the Seismic Criteria i

should not be adopted.

Revision should await resolution of the controversy on the use of deterministic versus probabilistic methods in site selection.

Any revision adopted should

\\

O NzwxAw & Hotrzmoen, RC.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 1, 1993 Page 3 meet the Commission's rulemaking objective of regulatory stability.

l (5)

The Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with the proposed revisions is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.

(6)

Finalization of the proposed revisions to the siting regulations would not be in accord with sound agency decisionmaking.

j Each of the above reasons is sufficient grounds for the j

Commission to terminate the rulemaking proceeding.

When taken together, the arguments are overwhelming that to proceed at this i

time with the siting rulemaking is contrary to sound public policy concerning the protection of the public health and safety and the environment from radiological hazard and disruptive of internationally accepted safety norms regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants.

Ve neerel,

j v

1 William O. Dou u

L. Manning Muntzing J.E.B. Ecker cc Chairman Ivan Selin Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers Commissioner James R. Curtiss Commissioner Forrest J. Remick Commissioner E. Gail de Planque Mr. William C. Parler, General Counsel Mr. James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations l

Dr. Eric S. Beckjord, Director l

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Mr. Carlton Stoiber, Director l

Office of International Programs Dr. Paul G. Shewmon, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l

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4 I

1 li 1

i INTERNATIONAL SITING GROUP (ISG)

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS TO U.S. NuctRAR rowEn ruNr SITING REGULATIONS i

i June 1,1993 1

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Newman & Holtainger, P.C.

1615 L Street, N.W.

)j State 1000 WasNngton, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-6600 4

,i l

b TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EX ECUTIVE SU M M ARY.................................... iv 1.

INTRODUCTION 1

A.

Background................................... 1 i

1.

Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Siting Regulations 1

l l

l 2.

International Siting Group (ISG) Membership........

3 i

3.

ISG Members Have an Interest in Participating in This Rulemaking to Revise NRC's Nuclear Power Plant Site Safety Regulations in Part 100..................

4 l

4.

The Commission Has an Obligation to Consider the Implications of the Proposed Revisions to its Siting Regulations on International Nuclear Power Plant Saf ety and Siting........................... 6 B.

Summary of Reasons for Requesting Termination of the l

Rulemaking Proceeding to Change the Commission's Siting l

Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100............'........

10 l

II.

MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING REQUIREMENTS...........

12 l

A.

Adoption of the Proposed Revisions to the Commission's l

Demographic Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Will Do Major Damage to the Evolving International Consensus on Nuclear Safety Standards and Lead to Needless inconsistency Between U.S. Nuclear Safety Standards for the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants and Standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and National Standards in ISG Member Countries. The Existing Demographic Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Have Worked Well. Adoption of the Proposed Revisions is Not Needed to Ensure Adequate Protection of the Public Health and Safety Nor to Achieve Site isolation Through "Decoupling" of Nuclear Power Plant l

Newman & Hokaftiger. P.C.

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I

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i Siting and Design. Adoption of the Proposed Revisions Will Not Provide a Substantial increase in Protection or i

Contribute to increased Defense-in-Depth. The Adverse

]

Impacts of the Proposed Revisions Greatly Exceed Their Benefits..................................... 12

)

1.

Adoption of the proposed revisions to the i

Commission's demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major damage to the evolving international

- 1 consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety.

~

standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and

)

standards of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national standards in ISG Member l

co u ntrie s............................... 13 i

2.

The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 have worked well. Adoption of the proposed

)

revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. Adoption of the proposed revisions will not provide a substantial increase in protection or contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits................................. 21 a.

The existing demographic regulationq;in 10 CFR l

Part 100 have worked well 21 I

b.

Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.................

31 j

c.

Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to achieve site isolation through l

"decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and l

desig n............................. 37 I

d.

Adoption of the proposed revisions to the i

demographic regulations in Part 100 will not provide a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The l

adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits..............

42 n mer, s mnama, r.c.

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l B.

The Technical Basis for the Proposed Revisions to the Site

. Safety Criteria is inadequate, Internally inconsistent and C o n f u si n g................................... 57 C..

The Proposed Revisions to the Seismic Criteria Should Not Be Adopted. Revision Should Await Resolution of the Controversy on the Use of Deterministic Versus Probabilistic Methods in Site Selection. Any Revision Adopted Should Meet the Commission's Rulemaking Objective of Regulatory.

Stability 61 1.

The Commission should resolve the controversy l

between use of deterministic versus probabilistic l

techniques before proceeding to rulemaking 62 2.

The proposed requirements are unlil;ely to meet the stated objectives of greater predictability and stability.......................

64 j

3.

Any revision to the Commission's seismic regulations.

shculd provide regulatory stability..............

66 l

l l

D.

The Environmental Assessment Prepared in Conjunction with l

the Proposed Revisions is inadequate as a Matter of Law to l

Support a Finding of No Significant Environmentalimpact 39 l

E.

Finalization of the Proposed Revisions to the Siting Regulations Would Not Be in Accord With Sound Agency Decisionmaking 78 1

Ill.

CO N CLU SION S.................................... 81 APPENDIX............................................A1 i

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l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The law firm of Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., on behalf of clients in its International Siting Group (ISG), hereby submits comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's proposed rule, " Reactor Site Criteria; including Seismic i

l and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial n Petition for Rulemaking From Free Environment, Inc. et al.,"-(57 Fed. Reg.

47,80.' (October 20,1992)). The IS'G has the following membership:

~ Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.

Electricit6 de France The Federation of Electric Power Companies Hr,kkaido Electric Power Co.

1 Tohoku Electric Power Co.

Tokyo Electric Power Co.

1 Chubu Electric Power Co.

Hokuriku Electric Power Co.

The Kansai Electric Power Co.

The Chugoku Electric Power Co.

Shikoku Electric Power Co.

Kyushu Electric Power Co.

The Japan Atomic Power Co.

Taiwan Power Company.

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Ag l

ISG Members own and operate nuclear power plants in ISG Member l

countries. Siting of nuclear power plants in ISG Member countries is governed by national nuclear safety standards, which are consistent with the nuclear safety I

standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency _(IAEA). These international and national siting standards were strongly influenced by the Commission's siting standards. The Commission's proposed revisions to its site safety regulations in 10 CFR Part 100, if adopted, would result in fundamental changes to the process for selecting new nuclear power plant sites. The fundamental nature.of the changes likely would force reconsideration of IAEA and national nuclear safety siting standards and raise questions in ISG Members' countries concerning the j

adequacy of present and future nuclear power plant sites to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. ISG Members ask that the proposed revisions be withdrawn.

The proposed revisions are not necessary to achieve siting of nuclear power plants in areas of lower population density and awah from population centers and they are inconsistent with the internationally accepted principle of L

establishing site safety standards which permit (and recognize the necessity to l

i l

have) flexibility in balancing the various factors important to the safe siting of nuclear power plants.

If adopted, the regulation could force review of the presently accepted site safety principles and raise questions about whether

)

l presently operating nuclear power plants provide adequate protection of the public and environment when the plants are located in more densely populated areas or l

l have smaller exclusion areas than the revised criteria would permit. Moreover, newma, a now,wa, r.c.

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should these proposed revisions become the norm, they could preclude the siting _

I j

of nuclear power plants in many areas of Western Europe and Asia and result in r

a dependence on energy alternatives with less favorable environmental impacts.

ISG Members believe that the NRC should consider the international implications of the proposed revisions to the Commission's siting regulations. A fundamental result of international nuclear cooperation has been an increased appreciation for safety standards that are shared by the entire international l

community. For the U.S. to develop and promulgate new site safety regulations without an appreciation for the international nuclear standards could imply a repudiation of current international safety standard development efforts. The proposed numerical criteria would be grossly limiting, unnecessarily so because the reviews required by the NRC and regulatory bodies in other countries using standards which are reflective of international siting norms result in adequate i

protection of the public health and safety and in the selection of sites which are I

among the best reasonably to be found after balancing the s'ite characteristics important to adequate protection of the public and the environment. Likewise, decoupling of dung criteria from source terms and dose calculations to achieve site isolation would be entirely unsatisfactory as it would eliminate a key measure of merit of the site-plant combination, would prevent the advantageous utilization of special design provisions in siting decisions and could provide a disincentive to improvement of plant safety design features. Such a change would be extremely limiting and certainly the wrong approach in countries or regions of countries where siting options are limited. As to the seismic criteria being propossd for n ~ men s nonameer, r.c.

n,,, a

3 codification, adoption seems premature, making them unsuitable to serve as the basis for an international safety standard. Moreover, the division within the NRC Staff and among its experts concerning the use of probabilistic versus deterministic evaluation techniques illustrates well that the criteria do not embody the consensus associated with international safety standards.

For the reasons set forth in the main text of the ISG comments, International Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceeding.

The principal reasons for this position include the following:

(1)

Adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major damage to the evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead. to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for

~ he siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the t

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national:

standards in ISG Member countries.

(2)

The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR, Part 100 have worked well.

Adoption of the. proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. Adoption of the proposed revisions will not provide a substantia! increase in protection or contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.

(3)

The technical basis for the proposed revisions to the Site Safety Criteria in 10 CFR Part 100 is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.

(4)

The proposed revisions to the Seismic Criteria should not be adopted. Revision should await resolution of the controversy on the use of deterministic versus I

probabilistic methods in site selection. Any revision m.-=, a mmm n, r.c.

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adopted should meet the Commission's rulemaking

~

objective of regulatory stability.

(5)

The Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with the proposed revisions is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.

(6)

Finalization of the proposed revisions to the siting regulations would not be in accord with sound agency decisionmaking.

i Each of the above reasons alone is sufficient grounds for the j

i Commission to terminate the rulemaking proceeding. When taken together, the arguments are overwhelming that to proceed at this time with the siting l

rulemaking is contrary to sound public policy concerning the protection of the public health and safety and the environment from radiological hazard and l

disruptive of internationally accepted safety norms regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants.

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I.

INTRODUCTION A.

Background

1.

Summary of Proposed Revisions to.the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Reactor Siting Regulations On October 20, 1992, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) published in the Federal Register (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,802) a proposed rule to change the reactor site safety requirements in 10 CFR Part 100 (Part 100) to include specific numerical demographic requirements and to revise the seismic and geologic siting criteria in use since 1972.

The proposed changes to the site safety regulations in Part 100 concerning demographics would set a minimum distance for an exclusion area surrounding a nuclear power reactor at 0.4 miles (640 meters).. The requirement for a low population zone surrounding the exclusion area would be deleted from the present Part 100 on the basis that the required Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) i and the proposed population density requirements obviate the need for a low population zone requirement. The proposed regulation would codify in Part 100 i

(the site safety regulation) the population density limits currently provided as guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.7 in connection wit consideration of alternative sites. There would be a critical loss of necessary flexibility in making site safety

' determinations. Maximum population density _at the time of initial site approval would be 500 people per square mile averaged out to 30 miles. The projected population density 40 years after initial site approval could be no more than 1000 people per square mile averaged out to 30 miles.

i newmen a n-t,. r.c.

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t In addition to these numerical changes in the site safety regulations.

concerning demographics, a number of other revisions are proposed. - Some of these proposed revisions include the deletion of meteorological factors from radiological dose calculations for siting purposes; modification of hydrological

- factor requirements; the addition of review of nearby industrial and transportation facilities; and the addition of periodic reporting requirements for non-related' activities.

The proposed revisions to Part 100 concoming seismic and geologic.

siting criteria for nuclear power plants are intended to reflect advances in the earth.

sciences and in earthquake engineering.

Under.the seismic portion of the regulation, Safe Shutdown Earthquake'(SSE) Ground Motion and site suitability criteria would be separated from design-related criteria, and detailed seismic guidance would be removed from the regulation. The regulation would require both probabilistic and deterministic evaluations to determine. site suitability, j

including an explicit criterion that the probability of exceed'ing the SSE at a proposed site must be lower than the median annual probability of exceeding the SSE for the current generation of operating plants. In addition, the SSE calculation i

assumptions would be revised to decouple the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) from the SSE. Finally, the proposed regulation would require plant shutdown in l

the event of vibratory ground motion in excess of the OBE.

u.

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~o 2.

International Siting Group (ISG) Membership 1

The law firm of Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., on behalf of clients in its International Siting Group (ISG), hereby submits comments on the Nuclear l

Regulatory Commission's proposed rule, " Reactor Site Criteria; including Seismic and Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Proposed Denial of Petition for Rulemaking From Free Environment, Inc. et al.," (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,802 (October 20,1992)).V The ISG has the following membership:

I Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.

Electricit6 de France The Federation of Electric Power Companies Hokkaido Electric Power Co.

Tohoku Electric Power Co.

Tokyo Electric Power Co.

Chubu Electric Power Co.

Hokuriku Electric Power Co.

The Kansal Electric Power Co.

The Chugoku Electric Power Co.

Shikoku Electric Power Co.

Kyushu Electric Power Co.

The Japan Atomic Power Co.

Taiwan Power Company.

I l'

Messrs. Williern D. Doub and L. Manning Muntring and Ms. Janet E.B. Ecker, rnombers of the 'irrn, entered notices of appearance as counsel for members of the ISG in tNe rulemaking proceeding.

Neewmen & : '_, _. P.C.

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i The ISG was formed in response to the Commission's desire to seek i

j the views of the international community concerning the proposed revisions to the i

site safety criteria. San Staff Requirements Memorandum, "SECY 92-215 --

j Revision of 10 CFR Part 100, Revisions to 10 CFR Part 50, New Appendix B to 10 i

CFR Part 100 and New Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50" (August 18, 1992). In i

order to ensure that the comments of ISG Members on the proposed changes l

would be fully considered by the Commission in considering the disposition of the -

i j.

proposed changes, Newman'& Holtzinger filed a request for an extension of the -

)

i I

i public comment period to June 1,1993. On March 22,1993, the Commission 1

i approved the extension request.

3.

ISG Members Have an interest In Participating in.This Rulemaking to Revise NRC's Nuclear Power Plant Site Safety j

Regulations in Part 100.

1 ISG Members own and operate nuclear power plants in ISG Member l

j countries. Siting of nuclear power plants in ISG Member countries is governed by national nuclear safety standards, which are consistent with the nuclear safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These international i

and national siting standards were strongly influenced by the Commission's siting.

l standards. The Commission's proposed revisions to its site safety regulations in 4

j 10 CFR Part 100, if adopted, would result in fundamental changes to the process i

i for selecting new nuclear power plant sites. Specifically, adoption of the proposed t

revisions to the site safety requirements in Part 100 concerning demographics j

would change demographics from one of several balancing factors to be I

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b considered in selecting a nuclear power plant site to a screening factor to be applied first before taking into account the other safety-related site characteristics i

to be evaluated during the site selection process. TMsa othar safety-related site characteristics would be relegated to secondary importance in the site selection process, as they would be considered only in connection with sites which first met the demographic requirements. The fundamental nature of the changes likely would force reconsideration of IAEA and national nuclear safety siting standards and raise questions in ISG Members' countries concerning the adequacy of present 5

and future nuclear power plant sites to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.

As discussed below, the proposed revisions are not necessary to l

achieve siting of nuclear power plants in areas of lower population density and away from population centers and they are inconsistent with th'e internationally accepted principle of establishing site safety ' standards which permit (and l

recognize the necessity to have) flexibility in balancing the various factors important to the safe siting of nuclear power plants, if adopted, the regulation could unnecessarily force review of the presently accepted site safety principles and raise questions about whether presently operating nuclear power plants provide adequate protection of the public and environment when the plants are located in more densely populated areas or have smaller exclusion areas than the i

revised criteria would permit. Moreover, should these proposed revisions become the norm, they could preclude the siting of nuclear power plants in many areas of i

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i Western Europe and Asia and result in a dependence on energy alternatives with j

less favorable environmental impacts, t

4.

'The Commission Has an Obligation to Consider the implications of the Proposed Revisions to its Siting Regulations '

i on Intemational Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Siting.

)

i The International Atomic Energy Agency Participation Act of 1957 (IAEA Act), 71 Stat. 453, provides in Section 3 that, "The participation of the i

1 United States in the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes of the Agency set forth in its statute and the policy concerning the development, use and control of atomic energy set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.'

In-conducting the instant rulemaking, the. NRC thus far has failed to take into adequate-account. the relationship of its actions with those of the IAEA. ISG Members believe that pursuant to the IAEA Act, the NRC should consider the implications of the proposed revisions to the Commission's site safety regulations on the IAEA's guidelines and process with respect to siting. In order to assist the Commission in inis consideration, the ISG is submitting comments regarding such implications.

1 The IAE A, an autonomous member of the United Nations family of organizations, came into being when its statute entered into force on July 29, 1957. As a member of the IAEA, the United States subscribes to the IAEA's objectives as defined in its statute. One of these objectives is "[to] encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for i

peaceful uses throughout the world." Among the IAEA's activities related to safety in atomic energy are development of standards, regulations, codes of newme,, s n_ ?__.,

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Ma

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practice and recommendations concerning specific radiological rules, emergency procedures, and other matters.

The IAEA has long considered siting of nuclear installations to be an important matter. The United States participated in a symposium held in Vienna, Austria, in December 1974 under the joint sponsorship of the IAEA and the t

l l

Nuclear Energy. Agency.of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).2' Several papers were submitted on behalf of the United i

States concerning its practice with respect to such matters as acceptability of -

l l

nuclear sites and environmental protection. Other nations also presented papers l

l and participated in discussions, leading to a rather comprehensive discussion of the matter which was published by the IAEA in 1975. Over the years, the IAEA has l

published a series of standards concerning the siting of nuclear facilities. For example, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) included siting safety principles in its Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3, " Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants" (1988). A " Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:

1 l

Siting" was prepared in 1978 and revised in 1988 (Siting Code). Thirteen titles l

in the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) series concern siting.

l l

The extens'on of the public comment period to June 1,1993, permits I

the NRC to satisfy its international obligations under the IAEA Act by taking into account the implications for international siting and safety standards and the role of the United States in their development. Although not every NRC rulemaking 2'

Sitino of Nuclear Facilities. Proceedings of the. symposium held in Vienna, Austria, December 9-13,1974, Jointly Organized by the IAEA and NEA (OECD).

Newmen a."'. _. r.c.

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3 need be accompanied by a detailed review of foreign policy implications, there are certain NRC rulemakings having such an obvious and direct bearing on international nuclear matters that failure to consider United States rules in the context of a global nuclear regime is contrary to the basic spirit of United States participation l

l in the IAEA. The conduct of the instant rulemaking proceeding is one such activity.

United States interest in the IAEA received renewed attention in the

~

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). As stated in Section 201 of the l

l NNPA,' the United States is " committed to a strengthened and more effective i

i l

Internatianal Atomic Energy Agency and to a comprehensive safeguards system l

administered by the Agency to deter proliferation." In addition to safeguards matters, the NNPA recognizes a number of other important roles for the IAEA. In 1

particular, Section 104 of the NNPA specifies a number of desired international undertakings to be accomplished with other nations and " groups of nations such L

as the IAEA." Given the primacy of the IAEA in today's ndclear society, the l

United States should act with a careful regard to IAEA activities. Otherwise, the United States may be perceived as undermining the effectiveness of the IAEA.

The present rulemaking has not yet dealt with the subject of IAEA activities in the siting of nuclear facilities. In considering whether to adopt the proposed revisions, the NRC should give appropriate consideration to the role of the IAEA.

The NRC has been directed by Congress in the NNPA and other acts to give suitable consideration to the vitally important matter of nuclear non-proliferation, in this rulemaking the NRC should consider the two subjects of newman s : t,. r.c.

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lo siting of nuclear facilities and international impacts of NRC rules, which are obviously related to nuclear non-proliferation.

l United States foreign policy recognizes the place of nuclear energy in i

the economies of both the developed and the developing countries of the world.

l The safety standards and regulations developed by the NRC for the U.S. civilian nuclear industry continue to serve as models for the development of international' nuclear safety standards. The proposed revisions to the site safety criteria threaten to have an adverse effect on international nuclear cooperation and to disrupt the evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards.

A fundamental result of international nuclear cooperation has been an increased appreciation for safety standards that.are shared by the entire international community. For the U.S. to develop and promulgate new site safety requiations without an appreciation for the international nuclear standards could imply a repudiation of current international safety standard development efforts.

i I

The proposed numerical criteria would be grossly limiting, unnecessarily so because the reviews required by the NRC and regulatory bodies in other countries I

using standards which are reflective of international siting norms result in adequate protection of the public health and safety and in the selection of sites which are among the best reasonably to be found after balancing the site characteristics important to adequate protection of the public and the environment. Likewise, _

j decoupling of siting criteria from source terms and dose calculations to achieve site isolation would be entirely unsatisfactory as it would eliminate a key measure of merit of the site-plant combination, would prevent the advantageous utilization of l

Newmen a Nann \\ww, r.c.

pure s

o special design provisions in siting decisions and could provide a disincentive to improvement of plant safety design features. Such a change would be extremely limiting and certainly the wrong approach in countries or regions of countries where siting options are limited.

As to the seismic criteria being proposed for codification, adoption seems premature, making them unsuitable to serve as the basis for an international safety standard. Moreover, the division within'the NRC Staff and among its experts concerning the use of probabilistic versus deterministic evaluation techniques illustrates well that the criteria do. not embody the consensus associated with international safety standards.

B.

Summarv of Reasons for Reauestina Termination of the Raalamakina Proceeding to Change the Commission's Siting Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Based on the foregoing discussion and for the reasons set forth below in Section ll, International Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceeding. The principal reasons for this position include the following:

l l

(1)

Adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's l

demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major damage to the evolving international consensus i

on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless

)

inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the j.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national l

standards in ISG Member countries.

L i

(2)

The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part j

100 have worked well.

Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of l-the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation Newman &."-il

, P.C.

playe 70 l

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through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and l

design. Adoption of the proposed revisions will not l

. provide a substantialincrease in protection or contribute to increased defense in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.

(3)

The technical basis for the proposed revisions to the Site Safety Criteria in 10 CFR Part 100 is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.

l (4)

The proposed revisions to the Seismic Criteria should not be adopted. Revision should await resolution of the controversy on the use of _ deterministic versus probabilistic methods in site selection. Any revision j

adopted should meet the Commission's rulemaking l

objective of regulatory stability.

(5)

The Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with the proposed revisions is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.

(6)

Finalization of the proposed revisions to the siting regulations would not be in accord with sound agency decisionmaking.

Each of the above reasons alone is sufficient grounds for the Commission to terminate the rulemaking proceeding. When taken together, the arguments are overwhelming that to proceed at this time with the siting i

rulemaking is contrary to sound public policy concerning the protection of the i

public health and safety and the environment from radiological hazard and i

disruptive of internationally accepted safe ty norms regarding the siting and design of nuclear power plants.

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O II.

MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRQPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING REQUIREMENTS i

The international Siting Group Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the siting criteria and terminate the rulemaking proceeding? In the sections which follow, the basir; *.,r the ISG's request is set forth in detail. The arguments focus on the impact of the proposed revisions on internationally accepted standards for nuclear safety; how well the present regulatory framework has worked in achieving the goal of remote siting; how well the proposed revisions would contribute to reduction in nuclear power plant risk and increased defense-in-depth; and how well the proposed revisions would meet the Commission's stated objectives in the October 20,1992 Federal Register notice (FRN) proposing the revisions.

A.

Adoption of the Proposed Revisions to the Commission's Demographic Regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 Wal Do Maior Damage to the Evolving International Consensus on Nuclear Safety Standards and Lead to Needless inconsistency Between U.S. Nu&r-Safety Standards for the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants and Standards of the International Atomic Enerav Anancy (IAEA) and National Standards in ISG Member Countries. The Ewi=*Ina Demo-i et. c Reenletions in 10 CFR Part 100 Have Worked Wall. Adontion of the Proposed Revisions is Not Needed to Ensure Adeauate Pietectieri of the Pehlic Health and Safetv Nor to Achieve Site isolation Threueh "Decoualina" of Nuclear Power Plant Sitina and Desion. Adontion of the Proposed Revisions WR1 Not Provide a Sub=tantl=1 Incr==== in Protection or Contribute to increased Defense-in-Death. The Adverse imoacts of the Proposed Revisions Greativ Exceed Their Benefits.

l 2'

The associated draft regulatory guides, in particular Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 l

(Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7), rhould also be withdrawn.

i Newmen & lW;, AC.

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1.

Adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's i

demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 will do major I

damage to the evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national standards in ISG Member countries.

l The United States has had and will continue to have a major influence l

on nuclear power plant siting practices elsewhere in the world. The IAF.A has established a wide-ranging program to provide its Member States with guidance i

on many aspects of safety associated with thermal neutron nuclear power reactors. The program has involved the preparation of many publications in the form of Codes of Practice and S6fety Guides, many of which concern safe siting, of nuclear facilities. Review of the siting documents reveals both the extensive participation by the United States in their development and the influence the United States has had on the substantive positions set forth in the documents.

l The INSAG of the IAEA in its Safety Series No. 71li INSAG-3, " Basic l

Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants," (1988), sets forth basic safety principles for nuclear power plant siting:

The choice of sites takes into account the results of investigations of local factors which could adversely affect the safety of the plant.

Sites are investigated from the radiologicalimpact of the plant in normal operations and in accident conditions.

Site characteristics which can influence fne air, food-chain and water supply pathways are to be investigated, including physical characteristic:.,

environmental characteristics, the use of land and water resources and the population distribution around the site.

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i The site selected for a nuclear power plant is compatible with the off-site countermeasures that may be necessary to limit the effects of accidental releases of radioactive substances, and is expected to remain compatible with such measures.

The site selected for a nuclear power plant has a reliable long term heat sink that can remove energy generated in the plant after. shutdown, both immediately after shutdown and over the longer term. 75-INSAG-3 at 23, 26.

An IAEA Code of Practice and a series of thirteen Safety Guides implement these safety principles for the siting of nuclear power plants.F The Siting Code, which was revised in 1988, establishes the objectives and basic requirements that must I

be met to ensure adequate safety in the operation of nuclear power plants. The i

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The thirteen titles in the Nuclear Safety Standards series concerning siting are:

1.

50-SG-S1 (Rev. I) - Earthquakes and Associated Topics in Relation to Nuclear Power Plant Siting (1991);

i 2.

50-SG-S2 - Seismic Analysis and Testing of Nuclear Power Plants (1979);

3.

50-SG-S3 - Atmospheric Dispersion in Nuclear Power Plant Siting (1980); I j

4.

50-SG-S4 - Site Selection and Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Population Distribution (1980);

5.

50-SG S5 - External Man-Induced Events in Relation to Nuclear Power Plant Siting (1981);

6.

50-SG-S6 - Hydrological Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Relation to Nuclear Power Nnt Siting (1985);

7.

50-SG-S7 - Nuclear Power Nnt Siting: Hydrogeological Aspects (1984);

8.

50-SG-S8 - Safety Aspects of the Foundations of Nucle 6r Power Plants (1986);

9.

50-SG-S9 - Site Survey for Nuclear Power Nnts (1984):

10.

50-SG-S10A - Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Nnts on River Sites (1983):

11.

50-SG-S10B - Design Basis Flood for Nuclear Power Nnts on Coastal Sites (1983);

i 12, 50-SG S11 A - Extreme Meteorological Events in Nuclear Power Nnt Siting.

l Excluding Tropical Cyclones (1981); and 13.

50-SG-S118 - Design Basis Tropical Cyclone for Nuclear Power Nnts (1984).

Siting experts from the NRC participated in the development of these documents, the contents of which strongly refiect U.S. siting practices.

j i

Newman a f M

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Siting Code at page 9 describes the main objective in siting nuclear power plants from the viewpoint of nuclear safety as:

protection of the public and the environment against the radiological impact of accidental releases of radioactivity; normal radioactive releases from nuclear power plants have also to be considered. In the evaluation of the suitability of a site for a nuclear power plant the following aspects shall be considered:

(a)

Effects of external events occurring in the region of the particular site (these events could be of natural or man induced origin);

(b)

- Characteristics of the site and its environment which could influence the transfer of relcased radioactive material to man; (c?

Population density and distribution and other characteristics of the external zone in relation to the possibi'ity of implementing emergency measures and the l

need to evaluate the risk to individuals and the population.

Methods and solutions set out in the siting guides provide assurance that plants can be sited without undue risk to the health and sa,fety of the general

)

public. Together the Siting Code and guides establish an essential basis for safety i

l in the siting of nuclear power plants, including the desirability of keeping reactors j

away from densely populated centers.F The Siting Code and siting guides l

\\

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Safety Guide No.50-SG-S4, " Site Selection and Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants with Respect to Population Distribution," states at 2 (1980):

Countries which have developed their own nuclett power programmes from the beginning have, as far as has been practicable, begun by selecting sites in regions away from population centres and with low population densities.

As experience was acquired and with technological progress, some of these countries were able to justify the choice of sites away from (continued...)

Newman s wwww, r.c.

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3 emphasire that "it is essential to ensure that all site-related characteristics have been taken into account" during the selection of the preferred candidates. Sag lAEA Safety Guide No. 50-SG-S9, " Site Survey for Nuclear Power Plants," at 10 l

(1984). That guide identifies fourteen (14) safety-related site characteristics to be l

evaluated during the she selection process, of which population distribution is but l

one.8' The guide recognizes the difficulty in comparing sites based on population and suggests that "[ilt may be appropriate to compare all other site characteristics, l

and then to evaluate the sites independently from the point of view of population l

l distribution." E at 32.

During the original development of these publications and during the l

l revision process, care has been taken to ensure that all Member States of the 1'(... continued) i population centres but with higher population densities. Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme may consider it prudent to give the Greatest preference to sites with a low population density in the region.

2' The other thirteen are:

- Surface faultino

- Seismicity

- Suitability of subsurface material

- Vulcanism

- Flooding

- Extreme meteorolo0 cal phenomena i

- Man-induced events

- Dispersion in air

- Dispersion in water

- Emeroency Planning

- Land use

- Availability of cooling water

- Other site characteristics as appropriate, such as avalanche, landslide, surface collapse.

lAEA Safety Guide No. 50-SG-S9 at 10-13.

Newman & Nakmew. P.c.

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IAEA,in particular those with active nuclear power programs such as the United States, provide their input and that the resulting standards embody an international l

consensus, indeed, the United States, in particular Commission representatives, l

have played an important rola in the development of these guidance documents.

l l

Each significantly reflects regulatory practices in the United States, as the -

foregoing discussion demonstrates. One of the IAEA's hopes forbe revised Siting Code is that it will be used, accepted and respected by Member States as a basis for the regulation of the safety of power reactors within the respective national legal and regulatory frameworks. San Siting Code at Foreword.

l Siting, along with emergency planning and design, is viewed as an j

important element of defense-in-depth, a fundamental safety principle underlying the use of nuclear power. The INSAG of the IAEA describes defense-in-depth as i

follows:

' Defense in depth' is singled out ~amongst the fundamental principles since it underlies the ' safety technology of nuclear rower.

All safety activities, whether organizationai, behavioral or equipment related,.

are subject to layers of overlapping provisions, so that if a failure should occur it would be compensated for or corrected without causing harm to individuals or the public at large. This idea of multiple levels of protection is the central feature of defence in depth, and it is repeatedly used in the specific safety, principles that follow.

Two corollary principles of defence in depth are defined, i

namely, accident prevention and accident mitigation.

These corollary principles follow the general statement of defence in depth.

Safety. Series Report No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988) at 13.

See also Appendix to the report, which provides an expanded discussion of defense-in-depth.

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The NRC, in discussing comments received on its 1980 Notice Of intent to prepare

-l an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in connection with revision of the I

demographic regulations in Part 100 (45 Fed. Reg. 79,820 (December 2,1980)),.

stated:

i Siting, design, and emergency planning are three factors which each in its own way goes as far as is reasonable toward protecting the public health and safety. This is l

the ' defense-in-depth' concept.... [A rulemaking on any one] must consider the premises of the other two.

NUREG-0833, ' Environmental Impact Statement on the Siting of Nuclear Power Plants Scoping Summary Report,' at 13 (December 1981).

The foregoing is not meant to imply that the United States is bound to implement the codes and guides of the I AEA's Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) program and may not change its regulations. However, it is meant to suggest that, in the spirit of acceptance of and respect for the NUSS program, account should be taken of the implications for change upon the international consensus standards encompassed by the NUSS program, when changes,to national safety standards, such as 10 CFR Part 100, are being considered.

It is in this spirit that ISG Members are offering comments on the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100. As discussed in the sections which follow, the proposed revisions will do major damage to the I

evolving international consensus on nuclear safety standards and lead to needless inconsistency between U.S. nuclear safety standards for the siting of nuclear power plants and standards of the IAEA and national standards in ISG Member countries. Specifically, adoption of the revisions by the United States would likely newme,, a n-m-, r.c.

w rs l.

5 force fundamental reconsideration of international site safety standards and the adequacy of sites selected in accordance with present standards. However, the changes being considered by the NRC are not necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety; they will not result in improved safety; and they have the potential for destablizing an international safety framework that has worked well in the selection of suitable nuclear power plant sites in both the l

U.S. and elsewhere in the world.

l L

For example, the guidelines used by the Japan Atomic Energy l

l Commission in reactor site evaluation closely resemble the current U.S. siting framework. An exclusion area surrounds each site, which is, in turn, surrounded l

by a low population zone. The reactor must also be sited away from densely populated areas. The size of the exclusion zone and population distances are chosen to limit radiation effects in the unlikely event of an accident.

Fixed j

demographic limits are not imposed.

j in Canada, the suitability of a site is based o'n the risk to the population (doses under normal operation and potential doses in accidents). The risk is based on a conservative prediction of actual plant performance and site l

l characteristics and is evaluated using all the exposure pathways, including land i

contamination, and such site characteristics as meteorology. Societal judgment about the acceptability of the risk is also a key factor in determining site suitability.

As in Japan, fixed demographic limits are not imposed.

i in France, the current practice of the safety authorities is to pay special attention to demographics while assessing the suitability of potential sites Newmen & Hekakeer P.C.

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for nuclear power plants. French safety authorities rely on a site-by-site analysis, l

l which encompasses both the safety features of the plant design and the suitability of the local background with respect to population distribution around the site, existing thoroughfares and the ability to take emergency action.

Fixed demographic limits are not imposed.

Taiwan, Belgium and Korea 2/ base their siting practices on U.S. siting l

standards. Taiwan establishes exclusion area distances in accordance with the l

evaluated potential radiological consequences and limited available site area, I

making use, in particular, of multi-reactor sites. Korea's approach is similar.

Instead of detailed Belgian-specific rules (apart from a licensing procedure, an -

inspection system and ICRP-type rules), Belgium safety authorities apply NRC rules j

in so far as practicable using a transposition process.

The proposed changes to the U.S. siting standards, if adopted, will j

force reconsideration of siting practices elsewhere in the world. For the additional

^

reasons set forth in the sections which follow, the members of the International i

l Siting. Group urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions to the i

Commission's siting regulations, along with the associated draft Regulatory Guide l

DG-4003 (Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7).

2' We have been able to obtain information about Belgian and Korean standards and, hence, are including it here, even though no Belgian or Korean organization is an ISG Member.

Newmen a Nehm,ww. P.c.

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The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 104 have worked well. Adoption of the proposed revisions is not andeded to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety nor to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. Adoption of the proposed revisions w31 not provide a substantial increase in protection or I

contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions gready exceed their benefits.

I a.

The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 have worked well. -

A basic assumption underlying the proposed changes to the I

demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 (Part 100) is that plant design features have improved as a result of applying Part 100, but that site isolation has been de-emphasized. This crucial assumption - that site isolation has been de-emphasized -- drives the proposed revisions, but has no basis in fact. As such, it does not provide a valid basis for the demographic criteria in the proposed rule.

Contrary to this assumption, under the existing NRC regulatory i

framework for nuclear power plant siting, based on 10 CFR Parts 50, 51 and 100 l

and on the philosophy and guidelines published in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1),

U.S. nuclear power plants have been sited away from highly populated areas and l

the Commission's remote siting objective has been achieved. Very recently, NRC Staff representatives underscored this fact when meeting with members of the 1

international community in January 1993, attending a meeting of the Committee 1

l on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) of the OECD in Paris. The Staff's briefing charts stated:

4 l

Use of Reg. Guide 4.7 [Rev.1] in conjunction with Part l

100 provides effective means to keep reactors away

)

from densely populated centers. NRC Staff Trip Report i

i l

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l Concerning CNRA Meeting, enclosure at 8 (February 5, 1993).

i i

1.

Summary of existing NRC framework for siting nuclear power p'. ants.

The demographic regulations in Part 100 were promulgated in 1962.

)

The Supplementary information for these safety regulations identified as a basic l

l 1

l objective of the regulations assurance that "the cumulative exposure dose to large -

l numbers of people as a consequence of any nuclear accident should be low in comparison with what might be considered reasonable for total population dose.

... [Another objective is to] provide for protection against excessive exposure doses to people in large centers, where effective protective measures might not be feasible." 27 Fed. Reg. 3,509 (April 12,1962). The regulations identified site evaluation factors, which included population density and "use characteristics" h, characteristic human activities) of the site environs; and provided guidance for determining the suitability of the proposed site. on the basis of a dose assessment which took into account:

i the characteristics of the reactor design; population density and use characteristics, including the exclusion area, low population zone and population zone l

distance; and physical characteristics of the site, including seismology, meteorology, geology, and hydrology.

L Flexibility of application was an important aspect of implementation to make certain that the concept of environmentalisolation did not receive undue emphasis Tw wmen s non=ma. r.c.

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m and to recognize the importance of engineered safeguards in meeting the l

regulation's objective. See li r

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 establishes the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for nuclear power plants. A number of these'-

4 criteria are directly related to site characteristics, as well as to events and l

conditions outside the nuclear power unit.. Part 50 also specifies emergency l

l planning and preparedness requirements.

i Compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 l

l l

(NEPA)8'is also a factor in nuclear power plant siting. NEPA requires that a cost benefit analysis be completed before any major federal action significantly affecting the human environment is undertake n. Nuclear power plant siting, being the initial step of a major federal action to license a plant'for operation, is necessarily encompassed by the provisions. of NEPA.8' NRC requires preparation of i

i alternative site studies.uhich balance environmental costs and benefits of several preselected sites. Population characteristics are among the site characteristics l

entering into the cost-benefit balancing. The site selected by the applicant is to be among the best reasonably ta be found for which no obviously superior alternative has been identified.12' l

l' 42 U.S.C. I 4332(2)(c) (1988).

E' Calvert Cliffs Coordinatina Committee v. AEC. 449 F.2d 1109,1112 (D.C. Cir.1971).

19' Sag 10 CFR Part 51 and Regu'atory Guide 4.2, Rev. 2, " Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Statians" (1976).

Newmen a Nakarnow. P.c.

hoe 23

_, _ _. ~......

!O Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1), " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations," was issued in November -1975.u/

The guide is intended to assist applicants in the initial stage of selecting potential sites for t

nuclear power stations. Regulatory Guide 4.7 provides guidance related to both the site's safety and its environmental qualities.

Regulatory Guide 4.7 implements the safety criteria in 10 CFR i 100.11 pertaining to demographics as follows.

Each. nuclear power plant applicant must determine the following:

1.

An exclusion area of such size that an individuallocated at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated fission product release -

would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in-excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure..

l 2.'

A low population zone of such size that an individual located at 'any point on its outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from -

j iodine exposure.

l 3.

A population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. In applying this guide, the boundary of the population conter shall be determined - upon consideration of population distribution. Political boundaries are not controlling in the application of this guide. Where very large cities are M'

in November 1992, the NRC issued for public comment Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 (Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7). Relevant differences between Rev.1 and Proposed Rev. 2 are noted where appropriate. The chan0es in Proposed Revision 2 -

conform to the proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 100.

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3 involved a greater distance may be necessary because of total integrated population dose consideration.M' j

i Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) also provides guidance concerning j

l consideration of alternative sites when numerical demographic criteria given in the i

j guide are exceeded. The guide states:

i j

If the population density, including weighted transient i

population, projected at the time of initial operation of i

the nuclear power station exceeds 500 persons per i

square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30

~ miles (cumulative population at a distance divided by an i

area at that distance), or the projected population

}

' density over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1000 j

persons per square mile averaged over any radial j

distance out to 30 miles, snacial attention should be j

niven to the consideration of alternative sites with lower i

nooulation densities (emphasis added).3' In sum, Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) makes clear that "(t]he decision I

i that a station may be built on a specific candidate site is based on a detailed evaluation of the proposed site-plant combination and a cost-benefit analvsis l

)

I i

I i

H' 10 CFR I 100.11 (1993).

i i

D' Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) at 16. Draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 states substantially 1

the same at 9:

1 As set forth in 10 CFR Part 100, nuclear power station sites should.

be located in areas with low population density. If the populatien density of a proposed site (1) excerds 500 people por square mile 1

averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles or (2) is projected i

to exceed 1000 people per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (50 kilometers) 40 years after the time of i

site approval, the applicants should Give special attention to j

alternative sites.

i Alewmen & l" 'J.

. P.C.

hire 26 I

3 comnarina it with alternative site-olant combinations..." (emphasis added).H' As' discussed above, the analysis includes consideration of site safety issues and environmental issues. The site safety issues include geologic / seismic, hydrolog!c and atmospheric characteristics of proposed sites; potential effects on the station from accidents associated.with nearby industrial,- transportation, and military facilities; and population densities in the site environs as they relate to protecting

' the general public from the potential radiation hazards.of postulated serious accidents.3' When an applicant's preferred site does not meet the numerical population density guidelines in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1), consideration is T

given to alternative sites.

Like the international ' site safety standards described above, implementation of the Commission's current site safety regulations requires a balanced account of all factors contributing to safety and to reduced risk of s

l l

M' Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) at 1.

While Draft Guide DG-4003 replaces " site-plant 3

combination" with " site," it makes clear at 3 that "Islite selection involves considerations i

of public health and safety, enninee,ina and deston, economics, institutional requirements, j

environmental impacts, and other factors." (Emphasis added.) -

i M'

E at 1-2. Draft Guide DG-4003 states at 4:

j 1

i Generally, the most restrictive safety-related site characteristics j

considered in determining the suitability of a site are surface 4

faulting, potential ground motion and foundation conditions j

(including liquefaction, subsidence, and landslide potential), and

{

seismically induced floods.

Of atmospheric extremes, the Draft Guide states at 5:

i

[T}he atmospheric extremes that' may occur at a site are not j

normally critical in determining the suitability of a site because 4

safetv-related structures. systems. and components can be f

desianed to withstand most atmospheric extremes. (Emphasis j

added.)

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ib accident consequences. The emphasis on dose calculations to determine exclusion areas, low population zones and population center distances places significant importance on engineered safety features found at plants that reduce and contain

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potential accidental releases of radioactivity from the plant. Additionally, emphasis is placed on emergency preparedness in that the exclusion areas surrounding the plant must be totally controlled by the reactor licensee and the low population zone

'I immediately surrounding the exclusion area must be such that the population -

number and distribution provide a reasonable probability that appropriate measures could be taken in the event of a serious accident. The guidance on Regulatory Guide 4.7 also emphasizes that when a site is surrounded by more than 500 persons per square mile over a radial distance 30 miles from the plant, consideration should be given to better alternative sites.

ii.

Existing siting regulations have achieved site isolation.

In its publication, " Demographic Statistics Pertaining to Nuclear Power Reactor Sites" (NUREG-0348), issued in October 1979, the NRC examined in detail -

the demographic characteristics surrounding plant sites. NUREG-0348 discussed the results of a trend analysis and provided a variety of data on population densities and distances from population centers. The purpose of the NUREG-0348 analysis was to determine if a trend existed toward greater site isolation. The analysis performed indicated that nuclear power plants were being sited away from high population areas.N l

l l

18' NUREG-0348, Fig.17.

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Even more significant than this result is what the data indicate about site isolation. The data demonstrate conclusively that the goal of remote siting l

was achieved in the 1970s. Of the 58 new sites docketed at the NRC fmm 1971 to 1979, Perryman was the only new site proposed that did not meet the population density requirements at 30 miles. Saalgt at Table 1. When the staff received the application for an early site review for Perryman, it concluded that an obviously superior alternate site was preferable. The application for the Perryman site was subsequently withdrawn.1Z' In addition, only about seven of the sites in the United States today. (approximately 10%) have population-densities in excess of the Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rcv.1) guidelines. In each case, the sites.

comprising the seven were given construction permits prior to the adoption of the Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) parameters in November 1975.5 Thus, the j

Commission's framework for nuclear power plant siting developed in the 1970s has achieved site isolation.

l The basic assumption underiving the proposed changes to.the l

j demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 - nemely, that as a result of applying Part 100, site isolation had been de-emphasized --is taken from the August 1979 NRC " Report of the Siting Policy Task Force" (NUREG-0625).*

As the E'

lst at 20.

E' NRC Staff Trip Report Concerning CNRA Meetion. enclosure at 7 (February 5,1993).

M' NUREG-0625 was the result of several. years study of possible revisions to the Commission's siting regulations. The purpose of the report was to obtain an overview of the siting policy and practice that resulted from 25 years of licensing of civilian nuclear power plants. Another purpose was to determine whether current siting policy and (continued...)

Nmmen s Nonenwer, r.c.

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i foregoing discussion of the NUREG-0348 data demonstrates, this critical l

assumption that site isolation has been de-emphasized has no basis in fact. As such, it cannot provide a valid basis for the proposed demographic regulation.

The lack of factual basis was recognized at the time NUREG-0625 was undergoing internal NRC review prior to its release. Robert B. Minogue, the Director of NRC's Office of Standards Development, after reviewing NUREG-0625, stated in a letter to Daniel R. Muller, Chairman of the Siting Policy Task Force, dated August 15,1979:

The implication in the discussion of past practices that the demographic features of population and distances have been getting progressively worse at licensed sites is not true.. Indian Point, San Onofre, and Zion sites were reviewed and approved more than 10 years ago.

Demographic features of current licensed sites have~

actually been improving somewhat since the above listed sites were approved.29' Mr. Minogue stated further, "... we are concerned about the prospect that the report may be forced to be used as a basis for immediate' rulemaking and is l

inadequate for that purpose."E' l

al... continued) practice should be changed. The report made nine recommendations, the most important of which were to divorce from the siting framework the use of plant design features to compensate for unfavorable site characteristics and to develop population density and distribution limits beyond the exclusion area which would be functions of the average population in different regions of the United States. Dependance on the avera0e population of a region meant that areas of the United States having lower avera0e population densities might be subject to higher population density and distribution limits than more densely populated re0 ons of the country, such as the Northeast.

i NUREG-0625 at 78.

1 at 77.

Newmen a Nonmower. v.c.

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l Another NRC official also discussed limitations in the use of the NURFG-0625 recommendations, in a letter to Mr. Muller, dated August 14,1979, Norman M. Haller, then NRC's Director of the Office of Management and Program Analysis, recommended publication of a definitive value-impact analysis of all Task-Force recommendations contained in NUREG-0625 before any recommendations were released for public comment. Mr. Haller stated:

... the not or true cost cannot be estimated unless the next best alternative (namely, allowing trade-offs between distance and unique design features to be made) is also analyzed.

In

general, adoption of the distance-related recommendations in this report ' would appear to undermine the philosophy that reactors.can operate safely primarily because their designs satisfy NRC regulations. And, we believe that adoption of these recommendations would leave the Commission open to the charge that some existing reactors aren't safe enough (since they rely on design features).8 I

j in sum, no basis exists for the statement in NUREG O625 tha. nuclear power plant site isolation in the United States has been de-emphasized. To the l

contrary, under the existing siting regulations in 10 CFR Parts 50, 51 and 100 and implementing guidance, the objective of remote siting has been achieved.

l l

H' JA at 75, newme,, a nw. r.c.

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4 b.

Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and j

safety.

The Supplementary information for the proposed revisions to Part 100 indicates that since promulgation of the reactor site regulations in 1962, the Commission has approved more than 75 sites for nuclear power reactors. 57 Fed.

Reg. at 47,803. These approvals required an affirmative finding of adequate protection of the public health and safety. We may conclude, therefore, that adoption of the proposed revisions is not necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.

Other considerations buttress this conclusion.

As recently as i

December 1988, the NRC denied a petition for rulemaking (PRM) to amend Part 100 to specify demographic criteria to be met for all new nuclear power plant sites. 53 Fed. Reg. 50,232 (December 14,1988). The NRC denied the petition for the following reasons:

(1) it would unnecessarily restrict NRC's regul'atory l

siting policies and procedures by elevating population density criteria above other siting criteria such as i

environmental and ecological factors, and (2) it would not result in a substantial increase in overall protection l

of the public health and safety, as compared to the i

current siting criteria when combined with calculations of potential health effects.

The NRC has carefully considered the issues raised in the petition, and has taken them into account in reaching a decision on the l

areas which fall within its jurisdiction. jsL The petitioners had requested that the Commisrion amend its regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 to set numericallimits on allowable population density around nuclear power reactor sites. The amendments to 10 CFR I newmen s : w. r.c.

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k.

100.11(a) proposed by the petitioners would set 0.4 miles and 3 miles as the minimum distances for the outer boundaries of the exclusion area and the low population zone, respectively. A new section of 10 CFR 5100.12 proposed by l

l the petitioners would set a maximum population density of 400 persons per square i

mile averaged over any radial distance out to a distance of 40 niles.

The petitioners proposed that the Commission also' deny Construc. ion Permit applications where, during the effective period of the plant's license, the maximum projected population density would exceed 800 persons per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to a distance of 40 miles. Additionally, the petitioners -

i proposed that all population figures and projections include transit populations.

The Commission amplified its reasons for denial as follows:

At first glance, it might appear that the NRC's population density siting parameters and the population density siting parameters indicated by the petitioner are similar - 500 vs. 400 per square miles averaged over any radial distance of 40 vs. 30 miles for the initial operation of the nuclear power plants. However,, the real difference between the NRC's and the petitioner's population density siting requirements is regulatory flexibility. The NRC's siting requirements allow for the consideration of alternative sites with superior environmental parameters, e.g., suitable meteorological, natural resou.cos and. water temperature conditions or superior geophysical conditions, e.g., suitable geologic, hydrologic, and tectonic conditions if the population density parameters cannot be met. However, on the other hand, the petition's siting requirements would automatically eliminate any site from further consideration if specific population density criteria are not met regardless of any mitigating factors.

The NRC believes that Regulatory Guide 4.7 [Rev.1) adequately addresses population density siting considera-tions and that no new rulenwking as proposed no.w,w, a non=,e r. v.c.

nr 22 i

l

'O by'the petitioners is justified at this time. Also, the petitioner offers no basis for the specific numerical population density limits indicated in. the petition.

Therefore, the ostition would not result in a substantial increase in the overall orotection of the oublic health and safetv. as comnared to the current NRC sitina criteria when combined with calculations of notantial health effects.. E at 50,233 (emphasis added).

I i

Consideration of Commission findings concerning the residual risk from severe accidents and compliance with the Commission's safety goals also testifies to the adequacy of the present siting regulations in ensuring adequate i

0 protection of the public health and safety. In 1985, the Commission issued its

" Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants." 50 Fed. Reg. 32,138 (August 8,1985).

The Commission emphasized that "[o]n the basis of currently available information, the Commission concludes that existing plants pose no undue risk to public health and safety and-sees no present basis for immediate action on generic rulemaking or other regulatory changes for those plants because of severe accide,nt risk." E The Commission stated that its " severe accident policy is that the Commission intends to take all reasonable steps to reduce the chances of occurrence of a severe accident involving substantial damage to the reactor core and to mitigate the consequences of such an accident should one occur."

E at 32,139.

In promulgating the Safety Goal Policy Statement, the Commission stated its belief that " Current regulatory practices are believed to ensure that the basic statutory requirement, adequate protection of the public is met." 51 Fed. Reg. 30,028, at 30,029 (August 21, 1986). The Safety Goal Policy Statement " expresses the newn=n a memwa, r.c.

w as

o Commission's views on the level of risks to public health and safety that the industry should strive for in its nuclear power plants" and provides a framework "for testing -the adequacy of and need for current and proposed regulatory l

requirements" in order to " lead to a more coherent and consistent regulation'of

[

nuclear power plants, a more predictable regulatory process,- a public understanding of the regulatory criteria that the NRC applies, and public confidence l

in the safety of operating plants." ist in 1990, NUREG-1150, " Severe Accident Risk Assessment for Five l

l U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," was published; and in 1992, NUREG-1465, " Accident i

~

l Source Terms for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"' was issued for public l

. comment.

Using state-of-the-art risk assessment techniques, NUREG-1150 studied the risks from severe accidents in five nuclear power plants representative of plants presently in operation today in the United States. Draft NUREG-1465, 1

using updated knowledge about severe LWR accidents, and the resulting behavior of the released fission products, developed over a 30-year kriod, provides a l

postulated fission product source term released into containment.

The issuance of the Severe Accident and Safety Goal Policy statements and the enhanced capability to evaluate severe accident risk and understand severe accident source terms, as demonstrated by NUREG-1150 and NUREG-1465 results, allow the Commission to evaluate the risk significance of any revisions to the Part 100 regulations that might be proposed. Indeed, the purpose of the Commission's earlier suspension of the siting rulemaking was, first, to develop such a capability and, then, to utilize that capability in evaluating the newme,o a nonswa. r.c.

wu l

1 _

l e

safety significance of alternative proposals to revise the regulatory framework for siting nuclear power plants.&

in the 1992 Supplementary Information for the proposed changes to the siting regulations, the Commission relied on NUREG-1150 as one of:

)

[N]umerous risk studies on radioactive material releases to the environment under severe accident conditions

[which] have all confirmed that the present siting practice is expected to effectively limit risk to the public. 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,803.

Figure 13.2 of NUREG-1150, reproduced on the next page, demonstrates that the i

quantitative health effects objectives specified in the Safety Goal Policy Statement D'

in the Summer of 1980, the Commission began an effort to revise the siting criteria in 10 CFR Part 100. On July 29,1980, the NRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (45 Fed. Reg 50,350), in which the Commission announced its intention to revise the reactor siting criteria and requested comments on seven of the nine recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force, as well as certain alternative approaches.

l i

i in conjunction with the rulemaking effort, the' Commission also issued a Notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an Environmental impact Statement (EIS) (45 Fed. Reg. 79,280 (December 2, 19801). The NOI, among other things, identified the technical approach to detailed analyses that would be followed in developing the bases for any proposed revisions. Egg i

E at 79,822-23. In December 1981, the NRC published the Scoping Summary Report for the EIS (NUREG-0833). The report addressed comments received on both the ANPR and the NOl and provided further discussion of the efforts which would be undertaken to develop an adequate technical basis for any revisions. The report recognized that the siting rulemaking must take into account promises concerning reactor design and emergency planning. Ett NUREG-0833 at 13. It also restated that "a systematic evaluation of accident consequences for a full range of reactor accidents would be a fundamental part of the technical basis for the siting rulemaking....* JgL at 20. See also E at 14 regarding consideration of a full range of accidents in establishing siting criteria.

Shortly thereafter, the Commission directed the NRC Staff to sospend work on revision of l

the siting (demographic) criteria until safety goals were developed and a reassessment of l

source terms was completed. Sag NUREG-0885, "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Policy and Planning Guidance" (January 1982).

Newmen a Nanaiwar, r.c.

w as

13. R:sourca Document O '

Individual early fatality /ry 1.0E-06

!> Safety Goal

.=s 1.0E-07 s

i 1

- es 1.0E-08

=

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1.0E-09 1.0E-10 m

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I 1.0E-11 SURRY PEACH SEQUORH GRAND ZION BOTTOM GULF Individual latent cancer fatality /ry 1.0 E-0 5

=

5 Legend

-~ Safety Goal 1.0E-06 s

.a 5

mesi n-.

- as 1.0E-07 s

1.0E-08 s 3

~

1.OE-09 s 1.0 E-10 SURRY PEACH SEQUOYAH GRAND ZION BOTTOM GULF Note: As discussed in Reference 13.23. estimated risks at or below 1E-7 per reactor year should be viewed with caution because of the potential impact of events not studied in j

the risk analyses.

l Figure 13.2 Comparison of individual early and latent cancer fatality risks at all plants (internal initiators).

i NUREG-1150 l

have been metB and, consequently, that the basic statutory requirement of adequate protection has been met under present (site-plant combination) siting practice.

Of particular interest are the results from one of these five plants, the Zion plant.H' The Zion population censity figure is close to the 500 people / square mile value in the propo;ed rule. As Figure 13.2 shows, the Zion E

The prompt fatality health effects objective, a measure of whether the individual safety goal has been met, states:

The risk to an average individualin the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed. 51 Fed.

Reg. at 30,030.

The latent cancer mortality health objective, a measure of whether the societal safety goal l

has been met, states:

1 The risk to the population in the area of a nuciear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent 10.1 percent) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all causes.1 i

l E

The average population density around the Zion piant was 457 people / square mile in the l

early 1980s, when calculated over an area with a 30 mile radius originating at the plant l

site. NUREG/CR-2239, " Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development," (November 1982).

Niewman & Hohxhwer P.C.

Page 26 i

c l

l early and latent fatality risks are quite low and well below the Safety Goals, thus supporting the conclusion that present siting practice has worked well in limiting I

public risk from nuclear power plant operation. Future plants, with even greater safety capabilities, would show even greater margins. The Severe Accident Policy Statement requires, in effect, that all new plant designs meet certain " fundamental criteria" to reduce severe accident risk and that cost-effective features of a preventive or mitigative nature be included in the design. The Safety Goal Policy Statement provides guidance in determining cost-effectiveness. Taken together, these two policy statements ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety and a very low level of residual risk.

In sum, adoption of the proposed revisions is not necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety.

c.

Adoption of the proposed revisions is not needed to achieve site isolation through "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design.

In addition to specifying fixed, numerical requirernents in Part 100, the proposed revisions relocate certain design requirements pertaining to plant design to 10 CFR Part 50, "thereby effectively decoupling siting from plant design." San Supplementary Information for the proposed revisions at 57 Fed.

Reg. 47,803. The proposed decoupling is directed at ensuring that engineering safeguards or advanced safety features are not used as a substitute for site isolation. The proposed decoupling is intended to implement the Sitinr Policy Task i

Force goal:

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To strengt5 en siting as a factor in defense in depth by i

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establishing requirements for site approval that are independent of plant design consideration. The present

(

policy of permitting plant design features to compensate for unfavorable site characteristics has resulted in improved designs but has tended to deemphasize site isolation. N!JREG-0625 at iil (emphasis added).

As discussed in the preceding sections, the Commission's present i

siting requirements in Parts 50, 51 and 100, and implementing guidance in Regulatory Guide 4.7, have achieved site isolation. In particular, consideration of alternative sites when numerical demographic criteria in Regulatory Guide 4.7 have l

I i

been exceeded ensures site isolation. Thus, decoupling is not needed to achieve I

site isolation.

1 1

The fact that the proposed revisions to the Commission's i

)

demographic regulations in Part 100 are unnecessary to achieve isolation in nuclear

~

i j

power plant siting by decoupling siting and design is buttressed by consideration i

i of the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52, "Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," adopted by the J

l Commission in 1989. With the adoption of Part 52, it is not necessary to revise

~

Part 100 to accomplish such "decoupling." Part 52 promotes the use of pre-approved standardized designs which are certified (approved) by the Commission j

in a design certification rulemaking proceeding, conducted pursuant to Subpart B j

j of Part 52.8 Certification does not involve consideration of specific sites so 1

3 j

E Subpart B to Part 52, " Standard Design Certifications," sets forth the requirements and i

procedures for "cartification," or pre-approval through a hybrid rulemaking process, of new j

standardized nuclear power plant designs to ensure that all safety-related design issues are i

resolved prior to the purchase or construction of a new standard plant.

j (continued...)

j me n a u.aw,,.r. p.c.

Av.as I

i 4

a there is no tailoring of a design to compensate for site deficiencies. Certified -

designs incorporated by reference into a nuclear power plant application would not be subject to further review or challenge in a licensing proceeding unless the applicant proposed to make changes to the certified design. In particular, Subpart C of Part 52 provides for issuance of a combined construction permit / operating license and permits applicants for such to incorporate by reference certified designs into the application. These limitations on review and challenge in a nuclear i

power plant licensing proceeding implicitly encourage the selection of sites falling l

within the siting envelope specified in the design certification and discourage the i

l selection of sites which would require changes to the certified design.

f Additionally, Put 52 provides for early approval of sites in a licen sing i

proceeding conducted in accordance with Subpart A of Part 52.22' While genere:!

i i

E(... continued) 1 i

Specifically, an applicant for design certification must provide, among other things, all j

technical information which is required of applicants for construction permits and operating licenses by 10 CFR Parts 20, 50 and its appendices,73 and 100, which is technically

]

relevant to the design and not site-specific. Subpart B further requires the design certification applicant to prepare a design-specific probabilistic risk assessment (10 CFR 5 i

52.47(a)(1)(v)), and include proposed inspections, test, analyses and acceptance criteria which are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that if the tests, j

inspections and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a plant which references the design is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification.

Egg 10 CFR 5 52.47(a)(1)(vil (1993).

i E'

Subpart A of Part 52, "Early Site Permits," allows for early resolution of site-related safety and environmental issues and authorizes pre-approval of sites for new nuclear power plants 1

j

- separate and apart from design approval. Subpart A will allow utilities to " bank" sites i

for new nuclear power plant facilities before the need for them has materialized and i

independent of design details for a nuclear power plant tailored to the site. In particular,

~

an applicant for an early site permit must provide, among other things, a description of:

(1) the number, type, and thermal power level of the facilities for which the site may be used; (2) the anticipated maximum levels of radiological and thermal effluents each facility l

will produce; (3) the type of cooling systems that may be associated with each facility; (4)

(continued...)

}

Tkwmen & HaMower, r.c.

rape as I

2 design information must be specified in an early site approval application, Part 52, when viewed in its entirety, creates incentives to choose sites suitable for use as the location of a plant of certified design.

l lSG Members believe that there are significant disadvantages to j

i decoupling siting and plant design so that siting does not take into account plant design features. First, decoupling siting and plant design in the manner proposed i

is not necessary to achieve site isolation. Second, decoupling eliminates an i

accepted measure of the overall merit of the site-plant combination with respect to safety without providing for a substitute. Third, some of the major advances in design have come because designers wished to ensure greater safety for a

)

i E(... continued) the seismic, meteorological, hydrologic, and geologic characteristics of the proposed site (as set forth in existing Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100); and (5) the existing and projected future population profile of the area surrounding the site. Egg 10 CFR l 52.17(a)(1)(i)-(viii) l (1993).

I l

Emergency planning must also be considered at the early site permit stage. Three options

{

are available to the applicant ranging from identification of significant impediments to a complete integrated plan. At a minimum, an early site permit applicant must identify any i

significant impediments to emergency planning and list the contacts and arrangements I

made with state, local and federal agencies with emergency planning responsibilities. Such l

impediments, if any, will be assessed in determining whether any altemative site is obviously superior. Egg 10 CFR I 52.17(b) (1993). In addition, an applicant may either i

request NRC approval for major features of an emergency plan, or approval of a complete integrated emergency plan. Sag 10 CFR 5 52.17(b)(2) (1993),

i Moreover, an early site permit applicant must provide a complete environmental report as required under Part 51, which includes an evaluation of altomative sites to determine whether any "obviously superior ahomative" to the proposed site exists. Est 10 CFR l 52.17(a)(2) (1993). The Part 52 sarly site permit process does, however, require certain limited consideration of design features. Specifically, an applicant must provide a description and safety assessment of the proposed site, "with appropriate attention to features affecting facility design." 10 CFR I 50.34(a)(1) (1993): Att Alag 10 CFR 5 52.17(a)(1) (1993). Such an assessment must "contain an analysis and evaluation of l

the major structures, systems and components of the facility which bear significantly on l

the acceptability of the site under the site evaluation factors identified in Part 100...."

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specific site.

For example, the multi-unit vacuum containment for plants of

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CANDU design originated as a means to ensure additional safety for the Pickering plant because of its location. The same containment concept was later used for rnulti unit stations at remote sites, even though the additional safety was not

- needed to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. More I

generally, in countries which have very few acceptable sites due to basic land j

i availability or cooling water supply or public acceptance, the regulatory structure should encourage designers to innovate to reduce public risk in making use of the available sites. The restrictions on siting contemplated by the proposed revisions to the demographic requirements in Part 100 will have to be ignored by such countries (with consequent justification as to why imposition _of NRC-like

-l l

requirements is not necessary) or will pose real and unnecessary restrictions to the I

growth of nuclear power in places where it is most needed, in sum, adoption of the proposed revisions to the Commission's site l

safety regulations in Part 100 is not necessary to ensure site' isolation through decoupling of nuclear power plant siting and design. As discussed above, the regulatory position stated in Regulatory Guide 4.7 to consider alternative sites when numerical population density criteria are exceeded provides an appropriate context for ensuring site isolation.

l 1

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d.

Adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100 will not provide a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth. The adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.

1.

NRC decisional framework when action is not necessary to ensure adequate protection. -

Discussa

% previous sections established that no change to the '

Commission's present demographic regulations in Part 100 is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. As discussed above, one of the primary reasons the Commission adopted the Safety Goals was to establish a coherent and consistent set 'of safety regulations and provide a means to determine whether future safety regulations were necessary. Consistent with the Atomic Energy Act, safety requirements must be imposed when they are necessary to provide adequate protection of-the public health and safety.

Safety.

requirements may be imposed when they are not needed for adequate protection, if they are cost-effective and afford a substantial increase in pr.otection. When it can be shown that the Safety Goals are met, the Commission has indlcated that an increase in protection cannot be substantial and that no additional safety requirements need or should be imposed. By setting limits on population density in Part 100, adoption of the proposed rule would establish additional safety requirements beyond the Safety Goals which are not needed and of little benefit, i

1 thus creating an inconsistency in the Commission's regulatory philosophy.

Consistent with the decisional framework for implementation of the Safety Goal Policy Statement, the Commission, in deciding whether to adopt the

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proposed changes to the demographic regulations in Part 100, should consider _

(1) whether they will provide a substantial increase.in protection of the public 1

health and safety and (2) whether the benefits from the changes will outweigh the impacts.

Absent an affirmative finding on both of these questions, the Commission should not adopt the proposed changes. As discussed below, ISG Members believe that adoption will not provide a substantial increase in protection -

and that the impacts will far outweigh the benefits.

.l In its safety regulation of nuclear power. plants, the Commission j

i distinguishes between changes necessary to ensure adequate protection of the j

public health and safety and changes imposed to effect safety improvements beyond the minimum needed for adequate protection. This principle was clarified l

as a result of litigation about the initial formulation of the so-called "backfit.

~

rule" (10 CFR 5 50.109), which distinguishes between the two kinds of changes.2a' When establishing safety requirements which are not necessary for adequate protection of the public health and safety:

[T]he Commission shall require the backfitting of a facility only when it determines... that there is a j

substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of ims smsntation for that facility are lustified in view of this increased nrotection.

10 CFR I 50.109(a)(3) (1993) (emphasis added).

D' ISG Members believe that the direction the Commission has provided on the application of the Safety Goal Policy to backfit decisions is relevant and should guide Commission decisionmaking concerning adoption of the proposed revisions to Part 100 to ensure regulatory coherence and consistency in establishing Commission requirements.

newmn s :'-

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In adopting the present version of the backfit rule, the Commission stated:

l l

In this rulemaking the Commission has adhered to the following safety principle for all _ of its backfitting decisions. The Atomic Energy Act commands the Commission to ensure that nuclear power: plant operation provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. In defining, redefining or enforcing -

this statutory standard of adequate protaction, the Commission will not consider economic costs.

i However, adequate protection is not absolute protection or zero risk. Hence safety improvements beyond the minimum needed for adequate protection are possible.

The Commission is empowered under section 161 of the Act to impose additional safety requirements not needed -

for adequate protection and to consider economic costs in doing so. 53 Fed. Reg. 20,603, at 20,604 (June 6, 1988).

In a

Staff Requirements Memorandum, - "SECY-89-102 Implementation of the Safety Goals," dated June 15, 1990, the Commission addressed the meaning of " substantial mcrease in protection as an application of L

the Safety Goals." The Commission indicated that once it could be established that the Safety Goals have been met, any further increase in prdtection would not be substantial. This development allows the Commission to make decisions about l

proposed regulatory actions based on their safety significance.

In sum, when examined against the backdrop of these developments, j

it is clear that the Commission may 1mke into account the adverse impacts (costs) of adopting a new safety regulation, when adoption of the regulation is not necessary to provide adequate protection. Moreover, ISG Members believe that the Commission's decisional framework for Safety Goal implementation should be i

used when considering whether a proposed change in safety requirements will newme,, a : -

. r.c.

w

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contribute reasonably to increased defense-in-depth. Since imposition of fixed, numerical demographic criteria through changes to _the present demographic regulations in Part 100 clearly is not necessary for. adequate protection, as discussed above, it is aquelly clear that the adverse impacts (costs) that result-from such imposition may be weighed against the benefits of their imposition.

When such an approach is taken to evaluate the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100, two conclusions inexorably follow.

First, adoption of the proposed revisions will not result in a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth. Second, the adverse impacts from their adoption will far outweigh the benefits.

Based on such conclusions, the ISG Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions and terminate the present rulemaking proceeding.

ii.

No substantial increase in protection or defense-in-depth is afforded by the proposed revisions.

Concerning the first point, in 1988 the NRC denied a 1976 petition for rulemaking (PRM-100-2) to set more restrictive siting distances and population densities than in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1), partly on the grounds that granting of the petition would not result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. (Saa suora Section ll.A.2.b.) Clearly then, the less restrictive numerical criteria of Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) being proposed for inclusion in the demographic regulations could not provide a substantial increase in protection through the mere act of codification.

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Similarly, the mere act of codification will not contribute to increased

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defense-in-depth. The Commission and Staff have made it abundantly clear that the proposed changes will have an insignificant impact on risk. Specifically, the Supplementary information for the proposed rule makes clear that present practice -

has effectively limited risk to the public. (Sam augta Section ll.A.2.b, concerning the discussion of NUREG-1150 results.) In discussions before the Commission's i

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in January 1992, the NRC Staff tried to explain the basis for the proposed revisions, as well as provide some background on the thinking of the 1979 Siting Policy Task Force. Mr. Soffer, a member of the NRC Staff who had been a member of the task force, explained:

The major recommendations of this task force were to establish requirements for. site approval that were independent of plant design, to try to take into consideration the risk of accidents beyond the design basis by establishing population and density distribution criteria and that selected sites should be among the best available in the region, that siting requirements should be stringent enough in the view' of the Siting Policy. Task Force to reduce residual risk but not so stringent as to eliminate siting -from large regions of' the country.

Transcript of ACRS Meeting at 45 (January 7,1992).

l j

Mr. Soffer then explained that due to the " low frequency of core damage that is associated with the plants themselves, [blasically, the safety goal and the ability of the plants themselves is such that they could be sited almost anywhere and meet the safety coal." isL at 47 (emphasis added). In other words, contrary to the Siting Policy Task Force's assumptions, putting the numerical demographic criteria presently in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) into Part 100 would have no or very little effect on reducing the residual health risk to the population (lA, prompt l

nowmu, a : =. r.c.

n,ee ns I

P fatalities, genetic effects or excess cancers) over what has been achieved under the current regulatory framework for siting nuclear power plants.

s Within the Commission's Safety Goal decisional framework, substantial increase in protection is based upon consideration of rJak; namely, health effects upon the individual and population (aan suora note 24 regarding health effects objectives). That is, the measure of whether there has been a 1

substantial increase in protection (Lt, reduction in risk) takes into account b.Q1b the orobability of an accident and the conseauences of an accident should one occur. Contrary to the Commission's Safety Goal decisional framework, the

)

justification for the proposed changes to the demographic regulations rests, in large part, on consideration of conseouences alone independent of their probability of occurrence. In particular, the proposed changes are justified on the basis that 1

i control of population density out to 30 miles would obviate the need to condemn j

I j

a large population center (as opposed to less intensively used land) should a very l

low probability severe accident occur and release cesium oI strontium to the i

environment. jiing Transcript of ACRS Meeting at 70-81 (January 7,1992).E l

Thus, the basis for the proposed numerical demographic criteria is not so much protection of the public health and safety through avoidance of health 1

E' As ISG Members understand the land condemnation rationale presented by the NRC Staff, l

the issue is not so much protection of the population within a condemned population center from health effects, but avoidance of condemnation (and the attendant property losses) of land that is the site of a large population center. This is because the NUREG-1150 analysis assumes that effective emeroency action has been taken. NUREG 1150 at 2-20.

Thus, the residualissue is condemnation of land and loss of economic productivity of that j

land. By requiring population centers to be located 30 or more miles from a nuclear power plant, any land condemnation would not include a population center, but, at most, land having less intensive use.

I Newmen & Nananeer, P.C.

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consequences (and, hence, defense-in-depth), but avoidance of the need to l

i condemn land on which is situated a major population center for which the l

emergency actions to protect the population have already been taken.

From the Commission's statements to the effect that plants with a smaller exclusion area boundary than O.4 miles would cause a "very low level of risk" (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,804) and that " nuclear power plants meeting current safety standards could be located at sites significantly more dense than" (lgL at 47,805) the population density levels proposed, placing such stringent demographic limits in the Commission's regulations is not necessary to satisfy the Commission's Safety Goals. Moreover, even if consequences alone are relied upon as the basis for justification, such codification would not result in a substantial increase in protection. This conclusion is even more compelling when codification carries with it the potential to decrease the benefits accrued from the 'present flexib e application of the demographic guidelines in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1).

iii.

The adverse impacts of the hroposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits.

l In addition to being unnecessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety or a substantialincrease in such protection, the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100, if adopted, would impose significant adverse impacts (costs), without commensurate benefit. Therefore, in accordance with the Commission's Safety Goal decisional framework, the proposed revisions, along with draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 (Proposed Revision newme, a man,,u. r.c.

ne,se

5 i

l 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7), should be withdrawn and the current framework left intact.

j The proposed revisions,if adopted, would impose a hierarchy of site l

characteristics, which elevates demographics over other physical characteristics-1 of the site and other safety-related aspects of nuclear power plant siting which i

I may have greater potential for reducing risk. This, in turn, would create the j

possibility that sites with a better balance overall of favorable-safety-related characteristics might be eliminated from further consideration on the basis of f

i demographics alone. Thus, adoption of the proposed revisions would upset

-l fundamental, internationally accepted siting principles directed at selecting sites j

based on a careful weighing of site characteristics,' including demographic i

- characteristics. Such an outcome would be contrary to the public interest, sound' I

regulation, and the fundamental safety principles governing the siting of nuclear l

power plants in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

I in order to avoid this undesirable outcome, it is necessary that any site safety requirements be flexible enough to take into account demographics, I

while simultaneously recognizing that demographics alone do not define the risk reduction potential of a site. The present regulations have the necessary inherent flexibility. In 1988, as discussed above, the NRC denied a 1976 petition for rulemaking (PRM-100-2) dealing with siting distances and population densities that would have eliminated flexibility in making site-safety determinations.

The Commission found that adoption of PRM-100-2 would have unnecessarily l

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restricted NRC's regulatory siting policies and would not have resulted in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public's health and safety.

Another adverse consequence of the proposed regulations is that if the proposed 500 people / square mile population density limit, applied out to 30 -

miles, is adopted, otherwise superior sites would be judged to be unacceptable under the proposed rule. The impact of the proposed change can be seen in Figure -

F9.14 found in NUREG/CR-2239, " Technical Guidance.for Siting Criteria Development" (November 1982), replicated on the next page. The shaded areas in this figure display locations where the 500 people / square mile limit out to 30 miles in the proposed rule would not be met as of November 1982. More recent census data would likely show the elimination of larger areas and a greater number

]

of areas. Furthermore, the burden of the proposed rule would not fall evenly across the United States. The Mid-Atlantic and New England areas would be most heavily affected. Therefore, the proposed rule would be more restrictive from what is -

acceptable today. Like PRM-100-2, it could lead to eliminatiorI of superior sites.

i in particular, it would lead to the elimination of sites already approved as superior sites for nuclear power plants.

The risk reduction benefit from codification in Part 100 of the demographic limits in Regulatory Guide 4.7 (Rev.1) would not outweigh the potential for elimination of superior sites. Ein hne product of the probability of an event times the consequences from the event should it occur) are already very low, as discussed above. This inherently precludes further risk reductions that are

-l substantial. However, the proposed rule discusses conseauences as well as daks.

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Even if probability is not taken into account -- an inherent regulatory deficiency --

the proposed rule would not provide any significant reduction in early injury or early fatality consequences. Additionally, the proposed rule, if adopted, would result in only a very limited potential decrease in latent fatality consequences.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the loss of nomsary flexibility t

l to ensure selection of sites with the most favorable overall characteristics for l

protection of the public health and safety may compromise fundamental safety l

principles with no or little enhancement of safety. Thus, the adoption of the l

proposed revisions cannot be justified on. grounds of substantial safety q

l enhancements. When other significant factors are incorporated into the decision- -

making process, including the adequacy of present U.S. sites, impact on sites in ISG Member countries and elsewhere, and economic impacts, it is clear that the l

adverse impacts overwhelm any benefit that might result from adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100.

l Imposition of the proposed numerical exclusion area and demographic l

requirements could lead to questions concerning the safety of current nuclear power sites. Although the Federal Register notice on the proposed rule states,

"[aln exclusion area of this size [0.4 miles) or larger is fairly common for most power reactors in the U.S.," (57 Fed. Reg. at 47,804), it does not acknowledge that 33% of the present U.S. nuclear power plant sites have an exclusion area smaller than the proposed numerical standard. Similarly,10% of the present U.S.

nuclear power plant sites exceed the proposed numerical criteria for population density surrounding the plant site. SECY-92-215 at 6. The situation is similar newmm, a nues er. r.c.

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elsewhere in the world. In France for example, roughly half of the plants in operation do not meet the proposed exclusion area of 0.4 miles and 5 of the plants do not comply with the proposed population density requirement of 500 persons per square mile, in Belgium, Holland, the Rhineland or Luxembourg, the proposed population density and distance requirements, if applied, could exclude all or nearly all nuclear power stations. In these areas, the average population density is over 300 persons /sq. km. (750 persons /sq. mi.) - versus 500 persons /sq. mi. In the proposed revisions -- and the average distance between major population centers

(> than 100,000 persons) is about 50 km. (31 miles). Also, the proposed revisions, if imposed, would not only preclude most siting possibilities in these countries, but also raise questions about the location of French power plants on French territory near the relevant borders. In this respect, two of the French sites l-now in operation, which do not meet the proposed population density criterion, are located near the French border with Germany or Luxembourg. 'A similar situation 1

l pertains to Taiwan, where there is also a need to use existing sites for new plants, as well as in Korea.

The comments of Atomic Energy Council of Taiwan to the NRC (February 17,1993) summarize the likely impact of the proposed revisions on the nuclear power plant siting in other countries:

Reactor Siting Criteria (Nonseismic)- An Exclusion Area Distance of 0.4 miles (640 meters):

The distance of the exclusion area boundary for nuclear l

power plants in Taiwan are 800, 600,1000, and 350 l

meters for Chinshan, Kuosheng, Maanshan, and Yenliao l

sites, respectively.

Once the minimum distance of w no a mwww. r.c.

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1 exclusion area is specified explicitly as 640 meter. two sites are already not complied with the revised regulation. It is believed that, although the revision only applies to the new sites as stated, we are still going to j

face the challenge from the general public on the related safety issue and spend a great deal of ' effort _in communication and explanation. More than that, due to the limitation of location arrangement, compliance with this requirement is impossible if adding now units to the

)

existing sites is considered.

In other words, the proposed rule change will impose a very big impact, which we think is not absolutely necessary.from the-safety point of view, on the development of our nuclear applications. We would therefore suggest that, instead of requiring a minimum exclusion area distance, NRC place this distance as a recommended value in the Regulatory Guide.

Reactor Siting Criteria (Nonseismic) - Population Density Criteria:

The population density of 1990, with the unit of person per square mile, within 30 miles of domestic nuclear power plants are as follows:

Chinshan Kuoshena Manshan

- Yenli42 7257 6339 209 6453

,j lt is evident that only Maanshan site can mee; this requirement as proposed in the revision'of regulation.

Again, even though the proposed rule change will not affect the operation of the existing plants as stated, this population density requirerr.ent will definitely serve as a i

strong argument to against the domestic nuclear development.

The Korea Electric Power Corporation's comments to the NRC (December 22, 1992) similarly highlighted the difficulties:

A.

The application of the proposed population density requirement of 500 persons per square mile in Korea will greatly aggravate our ability to acquire suitable sites, which has been a major problem for nuclear power construction due to a public acceptance problem.

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(1)

The average national population density as of 1992 is 1.126 persons per square mile, which far exceeds the proposed NRC requirement.

J (2)

Coastal areas, where the siting of nuclear power plants is most practical and possible is more densely populated than other parts of Korea due to the fact that these areas are also suitable for other industrial activities.

(3)

Since Korea is an actively industrializing country, the projected population density will be even greater in coastal areas.

B.

Major Asian countries possessing nuclear power plants such as Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are all densely populated, and the proposed regulation will undermine the execution of futura projects in these countries as well as other Asian countries.

l Population Density Country (persons /sq. mile)

Remarks Korea 1,126' as of '92 Japan 838 as of '90 1,450 as of '90 Taiwan -

C.

The numerical demographic criteria will lead to questions concerning the safety of current nuclear power sites which do not meet the proposed population density criteria, not only in the United States but in other countries as well.-

D.

There is no current need for codifying demographic.

criteria because the present Regulatory Guide 4.7 works sufficiently for regulatory purposes.

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l Although the applicability of the proposed revisions is explicitly limited to future plants, the fact that large numbers of present U.S. sites would not meet limits purportedly relating to site safety and having the force of law raises troubling public acceptance problems about the adequacy of present sites, at the least, and quite possibly could provide an arguable basis for petitions and other actions to shut down currently operating reactors.

The proposed codification of numerical exclusion area and l

demographic criteria in Part 100 could adversely impact the siting of future nuclear power plants by unnecessarily limiting the number of potential future sites. Such '

unnecessary limitation is especially troubling because of the availability of additional design features to improve, when necessary, plant safety. Within the United States, geographical regions such as the Northeast, which have higher i

relative population densities and less available open land area, may well be-

]

precluded from consideration for future nuclear power plant sites if the proposed l

numerical demographic regulations are adopted. Furthermor'e, the regulations would preclude siting additional nuclear power plant units at approximately one-third of the presently operating reactor sites in the U.S, even though these sites l

possess acceptable physical characteristics, important to safe siting. The situation

~I is worse in Western Europe and Asia where size alone limits the availability of accepta' ole sites. Outside the U.S., particularlyin countries with higher population i

densities and less available land, the public pressure to adopt safety standards

]

i similar to the proposed U.S. siting regulations may well make siting additional j

nuclear plants extremely difficult, if not impossible. ISG Members believe that w w men a m n n e w. r.c.

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i existing sites which are otherwise acceptable should be able to receive new plants with enhanced built-in safety characteristics and margins.

If the rule results in acceptable sites being located far from

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metropolitan areas, there will be a need for longer transmission lines. In general, l

longer transmission lines will result in a higher cost for the facility as well as certain disadvantages frem power losses which occur over long transmission l

routes. In some cases, a state or states rnay find that few,'if any, acceptable sites -

l are available after the new rule is promulgated. If such states must purchase power from utilities located in adjoining sta'tes having more favorable sites, there will be obvious economic impacts on the consumer and the unfavored state. While-some favorable economic impacts are also possible, since remote sites may be less expensive to acquire, this possible benefit seems highly theoretical since utilities l

already strive to obtain the best sites at the lowest possible cost. The foregoing l

l list does not purport to be a comprehensive list of economic impacts. Indeed, l

through careful review, NRC would doubtless discover many'other varieties of economic impacts.8 1

B'

' The siting rule may operate to favor certain utilities in that their competitive advantage is greatly enhanced. At the same time, the rule could deprive some utilities of any acceptable.

sites for nuclear facilities. In some states or regions, the siting rule could operate to render nuclear power uneconomic (or of marginal economic benefit) and thus raise the cost of power in a region or force it to rely on an energy source which has adverse impacts.' This may be especially severe in densely populated areas of the country where nuclear power presents a logical answer to high base load demand and where the contamination or po!!ution from coal or other methods of power generation would be an unacceptable added burden on air standards, i

i Newmen & M-t,:. P.C.

Pmpe 66 l

l l

B.

The Technical Basis for the Proposed Revisions to the Site Safety Criteria is inadeauste. Internally inconsistent and Confusina.

The Commission fails to provide an adequate or internally consistent technical basis for including numerical exclusion area boundary and demographic limits in its site safety regulations in Part 100. The proposed regulations would arbitrarily codify the 0.4 mile exclusion area boundary on the basis of design considerations, but reject the use of dose calculations by fixing the population density limits (500 people per square mile out to 30 miles at the time of initial site approval and 1000 people per square mile 40 years later). The Commission indicates that codification of the exclusion boundary limit in Part 100 would

" assure a ymy IDE 1RYal of fi&k to individuals, even for those located close to the plant," 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,804 (emphasis added), and that the population density limits would " meet the Commission's Safety Goals." 11 at 47,805. However, as discussed in the foregoing sections, codification of these numerical standards in Part 100 would be inconsistent with the Commission's stated policies on regulatory decision-making, in particular, those associated with Safety Goal implementation. Moreover, codification in Part 100 is not necessary to meet the Commission's remote siting goal. ' Consideration of alternative sites when numerical demographic criteria in Regulatory Guide 4.7 have been exceeded is sufficient to accomplish this goal, as discussed above.

The proposed changes are intended to achieve site isolation through decoupling siting and design, but the rationale for the proposed changes is fundamentally linked to the contributions of design to the reduction of the residual i newmen s :=,. r.c.

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L risk from a severe nuclear power plant accident. For example, reference is made to numerous risk studies, such as WASH-1400 and NUREG-1150, which estimate I

risk considering both ' siting and design characteristics. Further, the justification for

{

an exclusion area distance of 0.4 miles is based on " typical engineered safety features." JgL at 47,804. Thus, the proposed revisions rely on past success in design improw.snts as a basis for achieving site isolation by decoupling siting i

from design, but refuse to allow credit for future safety. improvements to the design in siting new plants. Specifically, "the proposed regulation would eliminate the use of a postulated source term, [and] assumptions regarding mitigating i

i systems..." in order to achieve site isolation through decoupling. 57 Fed. Reg.

at 47,804.

In sum, the proposed rule is inconsistent because it precludes the use of design and risk as a basis for selecting sites, but relies on design and risk as the basis for such preclusion. Additionally, in contravention of the Safety Goal decisional framework for imposing safety requirements which'are not necessary for adequate protection, it uses the consequences of a very low probability severe accident, as opposed to risk, as the basis for imposing the requirements.

Further exacerbating the inconsistent technical basis is the Commission's invitation to comment on the size of the exclusion area for plants whose power levels are significantly lower than 3800 MW (thermal). Power level i

is a determinant of the source term, which the Commission would eliminate as a i

basis for determining exclusion area size.

Thus,. the proposed rule sends i

conflicting messages on the importance of source term issues.

i Newmen s Nehairwer. r.c.

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i As presently constructed, the proposed rule would have site issues affect the determination of the design, but not have design characteristics widen the choice of sites. Design and risk arguments are used to support certain of the proposed revisions, but, largely based on consequences, revisions would exclude the application of design and risk considerations in site selection. Even in this narrower and more inappropriate measure of acceptability, no numerical evaluation I

of the benefits is offered. When analyses are made of the proposed rule on the basis of consequences, the benefits from codification are shown to be either zero or very small. No counterbalancing analysis is provided for the economic and health benefits of alternative formulations of regulations which would be consistent with accepted safety principles for siting nuclear power plants.

i The inconsistency between the basis for the rule and the requirements 1

the rule would impose is made all the more striking when the implications of the proposed rule for the use of existing sites for additional power units or replacement j

power units are considered. All existing sites are acceptable on the basis of safety considerations. Without grandfathering, however, some existing sites, which l

would not meet the proposed demographic criteria, would have to be discarded as sites for additional or replacement units, even though they are superior sites from an overall safety perspective. Prohibition of grandfathering'would needlessly result in loss of investment and loss of use of safe sites. Grandfathering, however, would likely lead to endless disputes regarding the safety of the existing units.

This example illustrates the flaw inherent in establishing a dual regulatory structure in Part 100 where there is no compelling safety rationale for its existence.

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2, The first of three objectives of the proposed rule is to "[s] tate the criteria for future sites that, based uoon exoerience and imoortance to risk. have i

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been shown as key to protecting public health and safety." 57 Fed. Reg. at l

47,803 (emphasis added). However, the proposed rule would impose arbitrary j

presenptive criteria without any attempt to determine the significance of or I

necessity for the criteria, such as specified exclusion area distances and specified

[

population densi+ies. In this regard, the Supplementary information published with j

the proposed changes reflects a misunderstanding of the fundamental purpose of 1

l the Safety Goal decisional framework. One of the stated purposes of the Safety i

Goal de'cisional framework is to provide a better means for testing the adequacy i

i of and need for current and proposed safety requirements. Eng 51 Fed. Reg. at j

28,044. In contravention of this stated purpose, the Safety Goal decisional i;.

framework is cited as the basis for an unjustifiable ratchet.

i j

Given the progress the nuclear industry has made since 1980 in j

understanding severe accident source terms and the increased application of l

probabilistic risk assessment techniques to severe ~ accident analysis, the l

l radiological risk to the public is now understood to be considerably different from i

i and less than it was previously thought to be.

When coupled with the i

incorporation of severe accident risk reduction features into new reactor designs, the magnitude of the residual severe accident risk has become small enough that further reductions in the residual risk from siting on the basis of demographics will 3

be very small. Tc ks judged adequate and credible, particularly in light of the i

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Commission's rulemaking objective quoted above, the technical basis must reflect such facts.

C.

The Proposed Revisions to the Seismic Criteria Should Not Be i

Adopted. Revision Should Awa8t Resolution of the Controversy i

on_the_Una_of_ Deterministic _VersualrohahRiatin. Methods _ in. Site i

l Selection. Any Revision Adopted Should Meet the Commission's l

Rulemaking Objective of Regulatory Stability.

1 j

The Commission issued seismic and geologic siting criteria in 1973 1

in the form of Appendix A to Part 100 (38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (November 13,

{

l 1973)). At the time of their issuance, the seismic criteria reflected state-of-the-art 1

l understandings in the conduct of seismic and geologic investigations and were i

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developed with the cooperation of the U.S. Geological Survey and the National I

j Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. E at 31,280.

i

)

The primary reasons given in the Federal Register notice for the.

I j.

proposed changes to the seismic and geologic criteria are (1) to benefit from i

l experience gained in the application of the procedures and methods set forth in the i

i j

present regulations; (2) to incorporate the rapid advances in the earth sciences and i

1 earthquake engineering that have been made since the criteria were first published 1

i in 1972; and (3) to reduce the difficulty encountered by nuclear power plant applicants and the NRC Staff in exercising needed judgment in applying the criteria and using evolving methods of analyses within the context of, the -licensing

)

process, thereby leading to a more stable and predictabic licensing process than l

[

in the past. San 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,803. The ISG does not believe that the I

proposed revisions to the present criteria in Part 100 will accomplish these objectives. To the contrary, the proposed revisions could lead in greater instability l

2

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l and less predictability in the licensing process than under the present regulatory

'i regime. In view of the potential attractiveness of other alternatives and the lack l

of a resolution methodology should deterministic and probabilistic methods give divergent results, the prudent course is for the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions.

1.

The Commission should resolve the controversy between use of dotarministic versus probabilistic techniques before proceeding to rulemaking.

l The Supplementary information published with the proposed changes makes clear that the present, deterministic approach "has worked reasonably well for the past two decades,in the sense that SSEs [ Safe Shutdown Earthquakes] for l

plants sited with this approach are judged to be suitably conservative, [even though] the approach has not explicitly recognized uncertainty in the geoscience parameter." list 47,807. Because the NRC wants to require use of probabilistic

]

l methods, which allow treatment of this uncertainty, the revisions are being proposed. The proposal to use a dual scheme by adding probabilistic methodology to the existing deterministic methodology Or seismic design criteria will unnecessarily complicate and destabilize doe.isions concerning selection of design l

basis ground motion and, consequently, site selection. Controversy over the appropriate probabilistic methodology for seismic analysis has led to the l

development of two distinctly different approaches in the U.S.

As the NRC l

acknowledges, "[b]ecause so little is known about earthquake phenomena l

(especially in the United States)... [e]xperts often delineate very different i

estimates of the largest earthquakes to be considered and different ground-motion Newmen & HootArwer. P.C.

Page 62 i

l

{

models." E Application to seismic analyses of a probabilistic methodology that o

i has not yet been fully evaluated and tested through actual use in the licensing process results in even greater controversy. In particular, the bottom-line results from probabilistic seismic hazard analyses tend to be dominated by the extremes rather than the central tendencies of the distributions of knowledge and expert opinions. E This controversy among seismic experts, coupled with the divergent views within the NRC Staff as to the role probabilistic seismic hazard analysis should play in the licensing arena,--will undoubtedly have a destabilizing, rather than a stabilizing, effect on the siting process.

Given the controversy surrounding the appropriateness of using such analyses in the licensing process, the lack of experience on the part of both the NRC Staff and nuclear power plant applicants in such use in the licensing process, and the availability to the Commission of other, more suitable means to gain experience with the application of probabilistic methodology to seismic analyses (such as the use of pilot programs er issuance of a policy stateinent), there is no valid reason for proceeding with these revisions.

At a minimum, if the Commission insists' upon codifying a l

methodology requiring that both deterministic and probabilistic methods be used in nuclear power plant siting, it should identify a resolution methodology to be

. applied 'whenever the two kinds of studies produce divergent results. Without such a methodology, the revisions requiring use of both deterministic and probabilistic studies will destabilize the licensing process and introduce greater unpredictability into it.

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2.

The proposed requirements are unlikely to meet the stated objectives of greater predictability and stability.

i There is not consensus within the NRC Staff as to whether or how

]

probabilistic analyses should be used in making siting decisions. 47 Fed. Reg. at 47,812. Moreover, the application in the licensing process of such analyses to l

i nuclear power plant siting has not yet been tested. Lack of consensus and lack l

l of a body of licensing practice are destabilizing forces in the licensing process.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be expected that adoption of the proposed revisions to the seismic criteria will lead to greater predictability and stability.

l lmposition at this time of seismic criteria in the form proposed is especially inappropriate. In the seismic-hazard area, the Commission has stated that the bottom-line results from probabilistic analyses tend to be dominated by the extremes rather than the central tendencies of the distributions of knowledge and expert opinions. Also, "[b]ecause so little is known about earthquake phenomena i

l (especially in the eastern United States),... [e]xperts often delineate very different estimates of the largest earthquakes to be considered and different ground-motion models." E at 47,807. Additionally, there are divergent views J

within the NRC Staff as to the role probabilistic seismic hazard analysis should play l

in the licensing arena.

In particular, " views range from an advocacy of a predominantly probabilistic analysis to the probabilistic/ deterministic analysis (being] proposed [in the revisions) to a predominantly deterministic approach as used currently." E at 47,812.

l l

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t Due to the divergence of views among the NRC Staff, the Commission is requesting comments on specific questions. The Commission has l

s asked whether deterministic and probabilistic evaluations should be combined or weighted, whether the procudme ea.9fied in one of the draft Regulatory Guldes l

to determine controlling earthquahn trom h e)robabilistic analysis is adequate, i

I whether median values of the seism:c terard analysis should be used to the exclusion of other statistical measures, whether the exceedance criterion for the 1

Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion is properly specified, and how many l

earthquakes should be generated to cover the frequency bands of' concern for nuclear power plants. San d at 47,812-13. As discussed above, the controversy i

should be resolved before adopting new requirements, due to the fundamental l

problems remaining in the criteria as proposed. For example, further effort should.

l be expended in developing the earthquake database, improved techniques for weighting the seismic zone area, and improved expressions for the attenuation equation. At a minimum, no rule should be proposed which does not resolve all i

issues which could lead to instability in the licensing process. Even though the present criteria are not perfect, their operation is understood by both applicants and the NRC. The proposed revisions are fraught with regulatory uncertainty of l

a fundamental nature and should not be' finalized until further evaluation is completed.

Newman & Nohamyar, P.C.

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3.

Any revision to the Commission's _ seismic regulations should provide regulatory stability.

As discussed above, there is not agreement among the NRC Staff as j

i to how probabilistic analyses should be used in siting nuclear power plants. This

'l is because neither the NRC Staff nor the nuclear industry has developed a body of practice in the licensing context.

As the Federal Register notice implicitly l

acknowledges, the nuclear regulatory experience is limited to those who l

l participated in either the NRC-Lawrence Livermore. National Laboratory or the i

Electric Power Research Institute seismic hazard research projects over the last decade. Sag kL Additionally, under the sponsorship of the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NfJMARC) an alternative has been developed.

Therefore, it is both appropriate and prudent for the Commission to proceed cautiously w'th codification of requirements in the absence of licensing experience with implementation of the requirements. In similar instances in the past, the Commission has employed a trial approach in order to develop the l

necessary body of practice within the regulatory context. Such an approach is j

especially appropriate where, as is the case here, the proposed revisions have

\\

l limitations e.nd there is significant controversy among experts as to whether and j

how the probabilistic criteria should be applied. For example, in implementation j

of the Policy Statement on Safety Goals, the Commission proceeded cautiously and, in the area of severe accident regulation, it is only now embarking on a rulemaking based on years of safety research. 57 Fed. Reg. at 44,513 (September 27, 1992).

Also, NUMARC's proposal appears to merit evaluation by the newmeo, a murwa r.c.

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l, 1

k Commission before the Commission makes a final decision on the structure and content of revised siting criteria.

j The Endaral Register notice for the proposed revision to the seismic t

criteria asserts without elaboration that "the NRC believes that this approach is the j

has way to accomplish the objective,... and arrive, through analysis, at a site-t i

specific ground motion that appropriately captures what is known about the

)

seismic regime"; and that the approach "should lead to a more stable and predictable licensing process than in the past." 57 Fed. Reg. at 47,807 (emphasis added). Two aspects of this assertion need to be addressed. First, rulemaking does not have to be used to achieve the desired result.- Second, the approach taken in the proposed rule has not been shown to be the has approach.

As to the first point, the Commission does not have to modify the existing Part 100 seismic and geologic criteria in Appendix A no Part 100 in order to obtain the submittal of probabilistic analyses in addition to deterministic l

l analyses as part of the assessment of the seismic and geologic properties of a site.

l l

Applicants who wish to conduct probabilistic analyses and submit them to the NRC ln conjunction with their deterministic analyses are certainly not prohibited from doing so and the NRC Staff can indicate to applicants its interest in such analyses.

if the Commission wishes to require such probabilistic analyses, it could issue a policy statement requiring the submittal of probabilistic analyses.

This would be similar to the approach taken in the Comm!ssion's Severe Accident Policy Statement (50 Fed. Reg. 32,138), which requires that a Probabilistic Risk new me,,a : =,. r.c.

w er l

4 l-i Assessment (PRA) be completed for all new plants and included with the application. This PRA must be used to expose the severe accident vulnerabilities initiated by both internal and external events that are associated with a plant of-q j

new design. For the Severe Accident Policy Statement, the NRC Staff must -

I-complete a review of a PRA as part of its licensing review of a design for a new j

nuclear power plant. Although a policy statement does not establish a requirement I

)

as a legal matter, it has the practical effect of a requirement. In conjunction with d

i Issuing such a Policy Statement on probabilistic seismic analyses, the NRC Staff l 5

might issue guidance as to how the Policy Statement would be implemented for

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both the Staff itself and applicants.

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l As to the second point, the Commission has not provided any i

j justification that the proposed revisions to the seismic criteria are the htti. To the i

f contrary, the Supplementary information for the proposed revisions demonstrates l

j that there is controversy concerning their formulation.

Additionally, in its comments on the proposed revisions to 'Part 100, NUMARC has proposed an l

alternative which appears to warrant evaluation. At a minimum, the Commission i

j should evaluate the NUMARC proposal (and any other attractive alternatives) and j

resolve the present controversy before finalizing any changes. Such an evaluation j

would also permit the Commission to make further progress in such areas as development of an earthquake detabase, improved techniques for weighting the i

.1 i

seismic zone area, and improved expressions for the attenuation equation. In view I

of the infirmities in the rule as a whole, the ISG urges the Commission to withdraw the rule in its entirety until these issues are adequately addressed.

i i

l Newmen A #s4minpar, AC.

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D.-

The Environmental Assessment Pranared in Coniunction with the Proposed Revisions is inadeauate as a Matter of Law to Suonort a Finding of No Significant EnvironmentalImpact.

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 51 specify the procedures necessary for compliance with NEPA. At a minimum, Part 51 requires that an Environmental A.ssessment (EA) be prepared examining the environmental impacts of the proposed action and reasonable altematives to the proposed action.

The purpose of an EA is to determine whether a comprehensive Environmental impact Statement (EIS) must be prepared. Section 51.30 requires that an EA identify the proposed action and include:

)

j (1)

A brief discussion of:

(i)

The need for the proposed action:

(ii)

Alternatives as required by section 102(2)(E) of NEPA; (iii)

The environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives as appropriate; and (2)

A list of agencies and persons consulted, and identification of sources used.

The EA prepared in conjunction with revision of the Commission's siting criteria fails to meet the Commission's NEPA requirements in Part 51 and is otherwise not i

in accordance with law.

The proposed revisions to the 10 CFR Part 100 siting regulations will result in substantive and significant changes to the Commission's regulatory framework for siting new nuclear power plants, if adopted. Specifically, the demographic criteria as formulated in the proposed rule do not ensure that the sites chosen will be among the best reasonably to be found. Given the importance of the U.S. siting regulations and guidance to the formulation of international site l

l mwme,, a mns,a, r.c.

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safety standards,' adoption would force reconsideration of present international safety standards and raise questions about the adequacy of present siting practices. Adoption could have the practical effect of making it difficult, if not impossible, to site nuclear power plants in any portion of the United States which did not meet the numerical demographic criteria specified in the regulation, as well as elsewhere in the world. Adoption also has the potential to create confusion among members of the public as to the adequacy of existing nuclear power plant i

sites and the adequacy of existing emergency planning requirements. The EA fails to address the issue of multi unit sites and the economic impacts of the regulation on siting decisions. These are the kinds of environmental impacts which NEPA requires be addressed and taken into account as part of the process to decide whether to make the proposed revisions final.

The inadequacy of the current EA is corroborated by the fact that in 1980, the Commission determined that it would prepare an Environmental Impact l

Statement (EIS) in connection with revision of its siting criteria to incorporate numerical demographic criteria into a revised 10 CFR Part 100.E in support of l

E On July 29,1980, the NRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) (45 i

Fed. Reg. 50,350), in which the Commission announced its intention to revise the reactor I

siting criteria and requested comments on seven of the nine recommendations of the Siting I

Policy Task Force, as well as certain alternative approaches. In conjunction with the l

rulemaking effort, the Commission also issued a Notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 45 Fed. Reg.~ 79,280 (December 2,1980). The j

NOI, among other things, identified the technical approach to detailed analyses that would be followed in developing the bases for any proposed revisions. 333 % at 79,822 23. In December 1981, the NRC published the Scoping Summary Report for the EIS (NUREG _

i 0833). The report addressed comments received on both the ANPR and the NOl and l

provided further discussion of the efforts which would be undertaken to dev6 lop an adequate technical basis for any revisions. The report recognized that the siting rulemaking must take into account premises concerning reactor design and emergency planning. Egg (continued...)

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Newmen & N-T i. P.C.

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a the development of the EIS, the NRC identified major studies to be undertaken to

~

understand the impacts. Significant changes have occurred since issuance of the Notice of intent and Scoping Summary Report in Commission policy, practice and capability to determine how it will proceed in establishing requirements, such as the proposed changes to the siting regulations, when such changes are not necessaryto ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. However, the kinds of studies identified remain as valid in 1993 as they were in 1980 for assessing the impacts of the proposed regulation and serving as the basis for an EA. For example, the following studies were identified in the 1980 Notice of Intent (sra 45 Fed. Reg. at 79,822-23):

t (1) RadiologicalConseauencesof Accidents: Proposed criteria will be compared with realistic alternatives on the basis of impacts on public health and safety. For demographic criteria this means that variation in doses l

to the maximally expot,ed individual and the population -

from a full range of accident releases must be examined for alternative ways of specifying constraints on l

population density and distribution. Existing sites and i

a hypothetical site will be evaluated. Consequences considered will include early fatalities, injuries, latent fatalities, and property damage. Both individual and l

societal risk will be evaluated but may differ in relative l

importance for establishing different criteria.

(2)

Fansibuity of Protective Actions:

The topics under consideration for rulemaking with respect to demographic criteria and external hazards will be examined to determine whether the capability to take protective action in the ' vicinity of a site under 21'(... continued)

NUREG-0833 at 13.

It also restated that "a' systematic evaluation of accident consequences for a full range of reactor accidents would be a fundamental part of the l'

technical basis for the sitirg rulemaking...." E at 20. See also E at 14, regarding consideration of a full range of accidents in establishing siting criteria.

i Newmen a :':-_,. P.c.

noe 71 l

l l

2 accident conditions might be impaired or enhanced by various choices of alternative criteria.

(3)

Definition of Region:

Alternative schemes of regionalization will be eFamined to determine a proper basis for establishing regional criteria. Socioeconomic and physiographic units will be examined to establish

. potential regional breakdowns. Effects of uniformity of population distribution, water resource restrictions and any other: appropriate regional concerns will be-considered when deciding on the proper regionalization i

scheme.

~

i (4)

Site AvagabNity:'

Consistent with the intent of the NRC FY-80 Authorization Acta 2/,

the new.

22' In June 1980, the U.S. Congress passed the NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980 (FY-80), Pub. L. No.96-295, 94 Stat. 780 (1980). Section 108 of the Act provided in pertinent part that:

(a)... [T)he Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized and directed... to develop and promulgate regulations establishing demographic requirements for the siting of utilization facilities...

)

(c) The regulations... shall'specify demographic criteria, including maximum j

density and population distribution for zones surrounding the facility without regard to any design, engineering, or other differences among such facilities.

1 The Conference Report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1070, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 24(1980)),

linked the legislation to the Siting Policy Task Force recommendatio'n to strengthen siting j

as a factor in defense-in-depth, but without eliminating further siting of nuclear reactors l

in any region of the United States. Egg H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-1070 at 25-26. Like the Siting Policy Task Force Report upon which it relied, the FY-80 NRC Authorization Act reflected understandings of the time that codification of remote siting requirements in the j

Commission's regulations would contribute significantly to reducing the residual risk from i

j a severe nuclear power plant accident and, hence would crsntribute to increased defense-in-

'{

depth.

?

Section 108 of the Fiscal Year 1980 Authorization Act has long since expired, as evidenced by its not having been codified in the U.S. Code and its having no language indicating permanency. In Massachusetts v. NRC. the Court referred to the FY 80 NRC Authorization Act as "an expired fiscal appropriations law, Ithat) was not in effect when 4

' CLI-90-2 was decided and therefore did not limit the licensing discretion otherwise

{-

conferred on the Commission by Congress." Massachusetts v. NRC. 924 F.2d 311,324 (D.C. Cir.1991). However, the assessment identified in the 1980 Notice of Intent to J

ensure that new demographic regulations do not preclude further siting of nuclear power i

plants in any region of the United States is still needed, the more so because changes to i

the demographic regulations in Part 100 are not needed to ensure adequate protection of

]

the public health and safety.

I a

i J

Newmu a ::L:. P.c.

nave 72 l

1 4

~.

i-l y

a demographic criteria should not preclude further siting of nuclear power plants in any region of the United States. An assessment will be made for each region that identifies the variation in availability of sites for nuclear power plants as a function of the structure of i

the criteria and the variation in numerical values as well as realistic constraints on sitino such as water -

availability and violation of safety criteria. The benefits of regionally based criteria versus nationwide criteria will be examined. Basic information will be developed frora existing siting studies which, taken together, cover large portions of the country. (Emphasis added.)'

(4)

Socioeconomic Imoscts:

The socioeconomic impacts of varying degrees or remoteness will be investigated.

Economic - impact of - increased transmission distances, impacts on land use and other-factors will be addressed along with sociological penalties and inequities in distribution of cost and benefits of such siting.

(5) Severity of Extemal Hazards: A literature review will be performed to establish the potential level of hazard associated with the external hazards listed in the

[ANPR] and any other appropriate topics. Staff practice for dealing with these hazards will be assessed.

Available models for characterizing the effect of a hazardous external event will be evaluated., The i

feasibility of - establishing a meaningful prote'ctive distance will be examined. The availability of sites i

associated with the demographic criteria proposed by the staff will be reexamined to oetermine whether the standoff criteria will significantly alter site availability.

(6) Engineering Alternatives to Standoff Distances: The feasibility of design performance requirements as opposed to specific standoff distances will be evaluated.

(7) Procludina Sitina of Nuclear Reactors in Anv Realan of the United States:

Energy generation from any source has its associated risk and risks from some energy sources may be greater than that of the nuclear l

option. Therefore, it has been suggested that the siting criterla should not be so stringent as to preclude the use of nuclear power from any region of the United States.

Newmen s : L

, r.c.

hoe n

f hj 1

1 The implications of not precluding nuclear power from

-l any region of the United States will be examined.

(8) Effect of Groundwater interdiction Criteria on Site AvaHabHity: The effect of site availability of alternative i

l siting criteria that assure the capability for groundwater interdiction would be examined.

(9) Use of Existing Sites: The existing sites would be examined for various levels of criteria to determine which sites were acceptable under each proposal. The feasibility of adding additional units to each of these sites would then be examined and an estimate made by region of ' remaining siting capacity.

Using the l

characteristics of the selected site, an estimate would I

l be prepared of the availability of multi-unit sites as a.

modification of the availability information. for ' the various demographic criteria and standoff distances.

(10) Use of Unusual or Unoroven Enginepring Design to Compensate for Site Deficiencies: An estimate would' be made of the effect on site availability of instituting such a requirement, particularly where large areas might have a common deficiency which might preclude siting -

from a large region.

l The economic aspects of reactor siting have long been a fundamental part of the NRC's NEPA review. In numerous cases'the Comrnission's tribuna!s have considered the economic aspects, among other factors, of alternative facility sites.U' Since the NRC has consistently interpreted NEPA as requiring it to assess cost-benefit matters, including economic factors, in individual adjudications concerning construction permits and operating licenses, the NRC is plainly under a duty to inquire into the cost-benefit aspects of its proposed siting rule. The need for a comprehensive and accurate inquiry into economic impacts cannot be i

22' Sag Union of Concerned Scientists v. AK,499 F.2d 1069,1084-85 (D.C. Cir.1974).

s Newme,p & N-- S-

_, P.C.

Aspe 74 l

I P

overstated. Since acceptable sites for nuclear power plants are difficult to find and costly to acquire, a siting rule is certain to have significant impacts on the costs 1

of constructing a nuclear facility. An irony concerning the cost of nuclear facilities is that costs have risen sharply in response to tightened NRC engineering safety requirements. Yet through this proposed rulemaking, the NRC would ignore many of the engineered safety features which have been required for plants at considerable cost. Some of the more obvious economic impacts of such a siting l

rule are discussed above in Section ll.A.2.c.iv.

I l

An agency's Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact, and hence the adequacy of the EA which provides the basis for the finding, is judged against a standard of reasonableness. San Natural Resources Defense Council v.

j Duvall, 777 F.Supp.1533,1537 (E.D. Cal.1991). In determining adequacy, l

courts have considered, among other things, the following questions:

I Has the agency accurately identified the relevant environmental concern?

Once the agency has identified the problem, has it taken a "hard look" at the problem in preparing the EA?

if a finding of no significant impact is made, will the agency be l

able to make a convincing case for its finding?

l San Sierra Club v. DOT. 753 F.2d 120,127 (D.C. Cir.1985) (citations omitted).

The draft EA prepared in connection with the proposed revisions to i

the siting regulations would not be found adequate under this test. In its 1980 ANPR, the Commission sought public comment on substantially the same revisions l

Newman & Hokainger. P.C.

page 7g

~ - - - -

i

'o 1

to the Commission's demographic regulations in Part 100. The Commission received a number of comments on the ANPR. Commenters emphasized that l

current siting practices were effective in achieving isolation, with the trend being toward the siting of nuclear power plants away from highly populated areas.

l Commenters expressed concern about the inadequacy of the technical basis for the changes under consideration and requested that the Commission develop safety goals, quantify residual-risk and establish 'an - overall risk criterion before j

proceeding. Several commenters thought that an EIS should be prepared, which -

l would consider among other things, the disadvantages of remote siting and the I

elimination of new nuclear power plants from certain regions of the country should the contemplated revisions be adopted. The potentialimpact on worldwide siting was also called to the Commission's attention.

s The Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards l

(ACRS) also commented on the issues presented in 1980 when the Commission issued the ANPR. While the ACRS agreed that siting, as a factof in the defense-in-depth philosophy should be strengthened, the ACRS stated:

(T]he ACRS believes that any minimum requirements for parameters such as the' exclusion zone radius, surrounding population density, or distance from i

population centers should be established, if possible, within the framework of an overall Nuclear Regulatory i

Commission safety philosophy for future reactors.

i l

l Such a philosophy should be based on preestablished' Commission objectives for acceptable risk to both individuals and society. This will, of necessity, include consideration of matters such as the potential effects of a broad spectrum of reactor accidents, the identification of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) criterion Newmen & Nekanper, P.C.

hnpe 16

i l

N l

for the reduction of risk from accidents, and a general statement of policy concerning the objectives to be sought in reactor design with regard to the prevention l

and mitigation of accidents.

j The establishment of demographic-related site criteria will inevitably require a considerable amount of judgment. However, the choice will be less arbitrary if made within the framework of an overall NRC safety policy. 45 Fed. Reg. at 50,352.

~

An Errata Sheet to the 1981-Scoping Summary Report, which addressed comments received on both the ANPR and Notice of Intent, indicated '

]

that the Commission would re-examine its decision to prepara an EIS when it 1

resumed the rulemaking to revise.the siting regulations. ISG members do not believe issuance of the draft EA without explanation of why the Commission apparently changed its mind about preparing an EIS is consistent with case law.

+

An agency's decision not to proceed with an EIS is unreasonable if the agency t

" fails to supply a convincing statement of reasons why potential effects are f

insignificant." Seattle Community Council Federation v. FAA,9.61 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). An agency's decision is also unreasonable if-substantial questions are raised regarding "whether the proposed action may have a significant impact upon the human environment." J.d, Sgt alan Blue Ocean Preservation Societv v. Watkins, 767 F. Supp.1518,1526 (D. Haw.1991). The Commission's seeming failure, in preparing the EA for the 1992 proposed revisions, to take into account the comments generated in response to the 1980 i

ANPR and Notice of Intent cannot be considered reasonable, given their continuing i

I Newmen a Monauww p.c.

m yy i

I

, ~,

~

.m m

P relevance to the changes proposed. ignoring those earlier comments is not o

" convincing statement."

in sum, the Environmental Assessment prepared in conjunction with i

- the proposed revisions to the Commission's siting regulations is inadequate as a matter of law to support a finding of no significant environmental impact.

I E.

Finalization of the Proposed Revisions to the Siting Reaulations Would Not Be in Accord With Sound Agency Decisionmaking.

As the Supreme Court held in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Coro.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), administrative agencies have reasonable latitude in the rulemaking process, and the courts will not impose their own notion of what procedures are best or most likely to further the public good. Still standing, however, is the requirement that an agency avoid conduct which is arbitrary or capricious, and that it provide a reasonable statement of the basis and purpose of its rules. Moreover,'an agency must obey its own i

regulations. On many occasions ths courts have struc'c down agency rules which i

l were adopted without adequate agency review of major matters related to the i

rulemaking. The NRC's present course is perilously close to the type of conduct which courts frequently strike down.

The siting rule, if promulgated, may well be vulnerable to legal challenge on the grounds that the Commission's analyses and decisionmaking have omitted consideration of critical information in the formulation of the proposed l

revisions, even though such information was available to the Commission as a l

result of the earlier issuance of the ANPR and Notice of Intent. Furthermore, the l

l l

w a m-a, r.c.

a. is v

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proposed rule lacks an adequate technical. basis, and the Environmental Assessment required by NEPA is patently inadequate. Additionally, the analytic f

^

l process prescribed by the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement and implementing guidance has not been followed in formulating the technical basis.

Given the importance of the siting rule, it is critical that the Commission closely observe prudent administrative practices. Too much is at stake here for the I

Commission to proceed further when important aspects of the siting rule are not yet developed.

Following publication in the Federal Register of the Advance Notice l

of Proposed Rulemaking in July 1980, the NRC supplemented the notice in December 1980 with its Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact j

l Statement. The following year,in December of 1981, the Commission " deferred" its rulemaking process concerning siting criteria to await development of Safety Goals and improved research on accident source terms. Finally, on October 20, 1992, the NRC issued a proposed rule concerning reactor' siting criteria.

1 The NRC's decision to publish the ANPR began the rulemaking process regarding siting criteria. Indeed, the NRC's October 20,1992, Federal Reaister notice states that the rulemaking process began over twelve years ago.

I 57 Fed. Reg. 47,802. Although the 1986 Regulatory Agenda and 1988 denial of I

PRM-100 2 indicate. that the NRC's Executive Director for Operations had concluded the 1980 rulemaking should be terminated, the Commission, by its own admiscion in the 1992 Federal Register notice, clearly regards the rulemaking as ongoing since 1980.

Consequently, the NRC, in formulating the proposed Newmen & Neetainger, P.C.

Aage ys.

2 revisions to the demographic regulations, should have considered the comments submitted in response to the ANPR issued on July 29, 1980, as well as the December 2,1980 Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS and the responses thereto by the NRC Staff in the December 1981 Scoping Summary Report.

Under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.

5 552 A.t191 (1988)), an agency must " incorporate in the rules adopted a precise j

)

general statement'of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. I 553(c) (1988). A failure to address substantive comments or concerns raised during the rulemaking renders that process invalid. Marsh v. Oreoon Resources Council,490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Bethesda Hoso. v. Heckler, 609 F. Supp.1360,1371 (S.D. Ohio i

1985). If, upon review, a court cannot discern that an agency made a reasoned decision after consideration of relevant factors, the agency action is arbitrary and capricious.1 As discussed above, the Commission's failure thus far to address relevant comments in proceeding from one stage of the rulemaking to the next, in the process of revising its siting regulations, has the potential to render any rule i

which may be adopted vulnerable to invalidation.

Also, an agency is also bound by its own regulations. Robert E.

Dereckter of Rhode Island. Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp.1059,1063 (D.R.I.

1980). The NRC's NEPA regulations in Part 51, described above, require the NRC to explain the basis for its actions. To the extent that the Commission has ignored its earlier ANPR and NOl actions, the NHC is out of compliance with its own regulations.

Similarly, the technical basis for the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations is inconsistent with the Commission's Safety Goal mma s :L _

.,. c.

w so

(

l decisional framework. The problems with the proposed revisions to the siting l

regulations and the rulemaking process leading up to their proposal are so great that withdrawal of the proposed revisions and termination of the proceeding seems the most prudent course.

Ill.

CONCLUSIONS For the reasons set forth above, ISG Members believe that:

The existing demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100 have worked well; I

The proposed revisions to the demographic regulations are unnecessary; Contrary to the Supplementary information published with the proposed rule, the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations do not codify present siting practice, but change practice in a fundamental way such that there no longer can be assurance that a site proposed for a nuclear power plant will be among the best reasonably to be found; The proposed revisions to the demographic regula'tions are unduly restrictive and without commensurate benefit; and l

l Adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations will have adverse consequences on the internationally accepted consensus standards of the-IAEA on the siting of nuclear power plants and on national standards in ISG Member countries.

Consequently, ISG Members urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed revisions, along with draft Regulatory Guide DG-4003 (Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 4.7), to the demographic regulations in 10 CFR Part 100.

l l

Newmen & W. P.C.

Page 31

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i i

Likewise, ISG Members' request the Commission to withdraw the proposed changes to the seismic criteria in Part 100. Withdrawal would allow

(

resolution of present controversios concerning the proposed changes and i

l 1

evaluation of alternatives. Withdrawal and evaluation of alternatives would provide a better basis for the development of international consensus stt:ndards reflecting the principles embodied in the NRC regulations.

l l

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1 1

Newmen s ::-:. r.c.

m,,

l N

APPENDIX i

l In addition to soliciting comments on all aspects of this rulemaking, the l

Commission, in Section XI of the Federal Realster notice requested comments on a number of questions. The International Siting Group's responses to these questions are found in this Appendix.

A.

REACTOR SITING CRITERIA (NONSEISMIC) 1.

Should the Commission grandfather existing reactor sites having an exclusion area distance less than 0.4 miles (640 meters) for the possible placement of additional units, if those sites are found suitable from safety consideration?

ISG Response:

This question presupposes that the Commission j

will revise the existing reactor siting regulations to include a i

numerical size requirement, in terms of distance, for the exclusion area. The International Siting Group (ISG) does not believe that it is i

either necessary or desirable to change the existing siting regulations.

As discussed in Section il(A)(1) of the ISG Comments on the l

proposed revisions to the siting regulations, it is bssential for siting l

l standards to be sufficiently flexible to " ensure 11at all site related l

characteristics have been taken into account" during the selection of I

the preferred candidate sites. See IAEA Safety Guide No. 50-SG-S9, i

Site Survey for Nuclear Power Plants (1984) at 10. That guide identifies fourteen (14) safety-related site characteristics to be evaluated during the site selection process, of which population

- A1 -

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distribution is but one? The guide recognizes the. difficulty in comparing sites based on population and suggests that "[ilt may be appropriate to compara all other site characteristics, arid then to i

evaluate the sites independently from the. point of population distribution." 11 at 32. Contrary to what is essential in the selection

)

of preferred sites, the proposed revisions, if sdopted, would impose a hierarchy of site characteristics, which elevates demographics over other physical characteristics of the site and other safety-related.

aspects of nuclear power ' plant. siting. which may have greater potential for reducing risk. This, in turn, creates the possibility that sites with a better balance overall of favorable - safety-related characteristics may be eliminated from further consideration on the basis of demographics alone. Such an outcome would be contrary to

[

t the public interest and sound regulation and the fundamental safety The other thirteen are:

l l

- Surface faulting j

- Seismicity

- Suitability of subsurface material l

- Vulcanism

- Flooding

- Extreme meteorological phenomena

- Man-induced events

- Dispersion in air

- Dispersion in water

- Emergency Pcnning

- Land use

- Availability of cooling water

- Other site characteristics as appropriate, such as avalanche, landslide, surface collapse.

E at 10-13.

l

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l principles governing the siting of nuclear power plants everywhere in the world.-

Regulations which grandfather are always problematic.

They establish a dual system of seemingly conflicting standards and are confusing to the public. Grandfathering conveys to the public the message that what is grandfathered is less safe than what is not I

grandfathered. Once this occurs, it is very difficult to con'vince the public otherwise.

In the case of_ the proposed revisions to _the demographic requirements in the' Commission's siting regulations, there is no need to introduce grandfathering clauses into.the Commission's demographic requirements because there is no need to change the requirements at all. As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(a) of the ISG Comments on the proposed revisions to the siting regulations, the existing siting regulations have achieved - site isolation.

As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(b), adoption-of the proposed revisions is not needed to ensure "decoupling" of nuclear power plant siting and design. As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(c),

adoption of the proposed revisions to the demographic regulations in Part 100 will not provide a substantial increase in protection nor contribute to increased defense-in-depth.

Further, the adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits. And,

- A3 -

i

a as discussed in Section ll(B), the technical basis for the proposed revisions to the siting criteria is inadequate, internally inconsistent and confusing.

2.

Should the exclusion area distance be smaller than 0.4 mile (640 meters) for plants having reactor power levels significantly less than 3800 Megawatts (thermal) and should the exclusion area distance be allowed to very according to power level with a minimum value (for example,0.25 miles or 400 meters)?

ISG Response:

See ISG Response to Question 1 above. The exclusion area should be allowed to vary according to power level, as is the case with the current regulations. In this regard, power level is a determinant of the source term which is used in setting exclusion

(

area size.

l i

The question illustrates a basic inconsistency in the technical basis l

for the proposed rule. The proposed rule, if adopted, would eliminate l

source term as a basis for determining exclusion area size.

Question 2, however, implicitly suggests that consideration of the l

source term is an appropriate way to determine exclusion area size.

i

-A4-r l

t I

h 3.

The Commission proposes to codify the population density guidelines in Regulatory Guide 4.7 which states that the population density should not exceed 500 people per square mile out to a distance of 30 miles at the time of site approvaland 1000 people per square mile 40 years thereafter.

Comments are specifically requested on questions 3(a),3(b), and 3(c) given below.

i (a)

Should numerical values of population density appear in the regulation or should the regulation provide merely general guidance, with numerical values provided in a regulatory guide?

I ISG Response:

See ISG Response to Question 1 above.

)

J Numerical values should not be codified in the si+ing regulations.

Any numerical values should be placed sa regulatory guides, as is the case under present requirements.

l i

i 1

i (b)

Assuming numerical values are to be codified, are the values of 500 persons per square mile at the time of site approval and 1000 persons per square mile 40 years thereafter appropriate?

If not, what other numerical values should be codified and j

what is the basis for these values?

ISG Response: No changes should be made to the present siting regulations.

See ISG Response to Question 1.

As discussed in the ISG Response to Question 1 and the referenced sections of the ISG Comments, the proposed changes to the siting requirements lack an adequate technical basis. Any changes to the regulations must have an adequate l

technical basis. At this time, no adequate technical basis to I

l support any numericel values has been identified.

-A5-i

(-

I l

Additionally, the requirement to project population densities

-(

out to 40 years is problematic.

Would there be safety significance if the projections were exceeded? If not, why I

should the projections be made in the first place? If exceeding the projections has safety significance, what regulatory t

measures would NRC take?

i I

(c)

Should population density be specified out to a distance other than 30 miles (50 km), for example,20 muss (32 kml? If a different distance is recommended, what is its basis?

J ISG Response: No changes should be made to the present siting regulations. See ISG Response to Question 1.

As discussed in the - ISG Response to Question 1 and the referenced sections of the ISG Comments, the proposed changes to the siting requirements lack an adequate technical l

basis. Any changas to the regulations must have an adequate l

l technical basis.

i l

i l

l

-A6-g n,

4.

Should the Commission approve sites that exceed the proposed population values of 10 CFR 100.21, and if so, under what conditions?

ISG Response: Yes, the Commission should approve sites that exceed the proposed population values of 10 CFR 100.21 if the l

results of an evaluation of the best available sites, considering all r

l relevant factors, lead to selection of such a site. The Commission makes clear in the Statement of Considerationr,that " numerous risk studies on radioactive material releases to the environment' under severe accident conditions have all confirmed that the present siting practice is expected to effectively limit risk to the public." 57 Fed.

Reg. 47,803.

Moreover, as discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(b),

population densities far in excess of 500 persons / square mile would l

not cause risks to exceed the safety goals. More importantly, as discussed in Section ll(A)(1), population is but one factor to be 1

evaluated during the site selection process. ' Selection of sites among the best reasonably to be found requires consideration of additional factors, such as surface faulting, seismicity, suitability of subsurface material, vulcanism, flooding, extreme meteorological phenomena, i

man-induced events, dispersion in air, dispersion in water, emergency planning, land use, availability of cooling water, and other site characteristics as appropriate, such as avalanche, landslide and surface collapse.

It is essential to ensure that all site-related

-A7-i

characteristics have been taken into account during the selection of the preferred candidates. As discussed in Section il(A)(2)(c)(iii) of the ISG Comments, the adverse impacts of the proposed revisions greatly exceed their benefits. The proposed revisions, if adopted, would impose

a. hierarchy 'of site characteristics, which elevates demographics over other physical characteristics of the site and other safety-related aspects of nuclear power plant siting which may have greater potential for reducing risk. This, in tum, would create the possibility that sites with a better balance overall of favorable safety-related characteristics mights be eliminated from further consideration on the basis of demographics alone.

5.

Should holders of 'early alte permits, construction permits, and I

operating license permits be required to periodically report changes in potential offsite hazards (for example, every 5 years within 5 miles)?

If so, what regulatory purpose would auch reporting requirements serve?

l ISG Response:

ISG Members question why existing reporting requirements are not sufficient for the reporting of significant changes. If a change presents no significant hazard, why would the NRC wish to impose new reporting requirements?

Wouldn't this result in increased costs without a commensurate increase in protection of public health and safety? If a change would potentially present a significant hazard, wouldn't the current U.S. regulations

-A8-L

3 require analylsis of its significance and a report of the change to the NRC if the change was found to present a significant hazard?

6.

What continuing regulatory significance should the safety requirements in 10 CFF pn* 100 have after granting the initial operating license or combined operating license under 10 CFR part 527 ISG Response:

See ISG ikyonse to Question 1 above. The ISG does not believe it is necessary to modify Part 100 and, hence, change the regulatory significance of Part 100 from what it is today.

7.

Are there certain site meteorological conditions that should preclude the siting of a nuclear power plant? If so, what are the conditions that can not be adequately compensated for by design features?

ISG Response:

Unfavorable meteorological conditions alone are not sufficient to reject candidate sites.

1 8.

In the description of the disposition of the recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force report (NUREG-0625), it was noted that the Commission was not adopting every element of each l

recommendation. Are there compelling reasons to reconsider any l

recommendation not adapted and, if so, what are the bases for reconsideration?

ISG Response:

As discussed in Section ll(A)(2)(a)(ii) of the ISG Comments, the Siting PolicyTask Force Report (NUREG-0625) should not be used as the basis for making changes to the regulations. The Siting Policy Task Force report was issued in 1979. Since that time,

-A9-

i new information regarding severe accident phenomena, probcbility i

and consequences has been developed and new regulations established which invalidate assumptions underlying the report's recommendations. The limitations in the use of NUREG-0625 were recognized as early as 1979 by the Director of NRC's Office of f

Standards Development and the Director of NRC's Office' of Management and Program Analysis. Given regulatory developments -

since then, there are no compelling reasons to reconsider any additional recommendations of the Siting Policy Task Force Report.

B.

REACTOR SITING CRITERIA (SEISMIC) 1.

In making use of both deterministic and probabilistic evaluations, how should they be combined or weighted; that is, should one dominate the other?

I ISG Response: As discussed in the main text of our comments (see Section ll(C)(1)), ISG Members are not in favor of requiring the use, by regulation, of both deterministic and probabilistic methods to determine the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. By the Commission's own admission, the present regulation has worked reasonably well for two decades. Also, experts differ on estimates of the largest earthquakes and choice of ground-motion models.

The Supplementary information published with the proposed rule makes clear there is controversy over the kind of probabilistic methods to use and the

- A10 -

o balance to be struck between probabilistic and deterministic methods.

All of this underscores the prematurity of codifying the proposed regulations at this time where there are so many unanswered questions. The need for further evaluation by the Commission is reinforced by the alternative to the proposed changes to the seismic l

criteria submitted by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council

)

(NUMARC) as part of its comments.

1 ISG Members believe that a more prudent course is to continue evaluation until consensus is reached on an appropriate approach.

Absent such consensus, it is highly unlikely that the proposed revisions, if adopted, will lead to anything other than regulatory I

instability. In no circumstances should the Commission codify a requirement to use both deterministic and probabilistic analyses without prescribing a way to reconcile differences in the analyses.

Without a reconciliation method, it is certain that closure of seismic issues in the licensing process would be vastly more difficult.

I 2.

In making use of the probabilistic and deterministic evaluations as proposed in Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1015, is [ sic] the proposed j

procedures in ' appendix C to DG-1015, adequate to determine controlling earthquakes from the probabRistic analyses? -

i ISG Response: As part of its comments on the proposed revisions to the selsmic-criteria in Part 100, the Nuclear Management and

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i

(

j Resources Council (NUMARC) submitted comments on DG-1015,

]

which included a major markup of appendix C. In responding to this j

question, NUMARC requested that the Commission carefully evaluate NUMARC's alternative before adopting any revisions to the seismic i

criteria and implementing regulatory guides. ISG Members believe l

l that further evaluation of the proposed revisions and alternatives thereto is highly desirable before the Commission adopts any changes i

to the seismic criteria presently in Part 100.

t

{

3.

The proposed Appendix B to 10 CFR part 100 has included in Paragraph V(c) a criterion that states: "The annual probabRity of exceeding the Safe Shutdown Earthquake Ground Motion is considered acceptably low if it is less than the median annual probability computed from the current [ EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE j

FINAL RULE] population of nuclear power plants." This is a relative criterion without any specific numerical value of the annual i

probabHity of exceedance because of the current status of the probabRistic seismic hazard analysis. However, this requirement i

1 assures that the design levels at new sites wBI be comparable to those at many existing sites, particulady more recently licensed sites.

Method dependent annual probabuities or target levels (adh,1 E-4 for j

LLNL or 3E-5 for EPRI) are identified in the proposed regulatory guide.

Sensitivity studies addressing the effects of different target i

probabuities are discussed in the Bemreuter to Murphy letter report.

Comments are solicited as to: (a) whether the above criterion, as j

stated, needs to be included in the regulation? and, (b) if not, should it be included in the regulation in a different form (RJL, a specific

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numerical value, a level other than the median annual probability computed for the current plants)?

ISG Response: As discussed in Section ll(C) of our comments, ISG 4

l Members do not believe the proposed revisions to the Commission's i

seismic regulations in Part 100 should be adopted, i-i

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4.

In determining the controlling earthquakes, should be [ sic) median l

values of the seismic hazard analysis, as described in appendix C to l

Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1015, be used to the exclusion of other statistical measures, such as mean or 85th percentNe? (The staff has selected probabRity of exceedance values associated with the median hazard analysis estimates as they provide more stable estimates of controlling earthquakes.)

ISG Response:

There is no scientific or regulatory justification for choosing the median, particularly because each existing plant has been judged to be acceptable in seismic terms. Hence, every seismic spectrum for existing plants should be acceptable. However, if the Commission decides to require the use of probablistic criteria, then it would be appropriate for the choice of controlling earthquakes to employ the Safety Goal decisional framework. That is, for very severe, very rare natural events, a useful criterion might be that for such events, the incremental harm due to the presence of the nuclear plant be small compared to that due to the event itself.

5.

For the probabRistic analysis, how many controlling earthquakes should be generated te cover the frequency band of concern for nuclear power plants? (Hor the four trial plants used to develop the criteria presented in Drait Regulatory Guide DG-1015, the average of results for the 5 Hz and 10 Hz spectral velocities was used to I

establish the probabuity of exceedancelevel. Controlling earthquakes were evaluated for this frequency band, for the average of 1 and 2.5 Hz spectral responses, and for peak ground acceleration.)

i ISG Response: See above response to Question 2 (seismic).

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