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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:August 11, 2009  
                                NUC LE AR RE G UL AT O RY C O M M I S S I O N
Mr. John T. Conway
                                                    R E GI ON I V
Senior Vice President-Energy Supply  
                                        612 EAST LAMAR BLVD , SU I TE 400
   & Chief Nuclear Officer
                                          AR LI N GTON , TEXAS 76011-4125
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
                                            August 11, 2009
P.O. Box 3
Mr. John T. Conway
Mail Code 104/6/601  
Senior Vice President-Energy Supply
Avila Beach, California 93424
   & Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00133/09-002  
P.O. Box 3
Mail Code 104/6/601
Dear Mr. Conway:  
Avila Beach, California 93424
SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00133/09-002
This refers to the inspection conducted on July 13-16, 2009, at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant,  
Dear Mr. Conway:
Unit 3 facility. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as  
This refers to the inspection conducted on July 13-16, 2009, at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant,
they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the  
Unit 3 facility. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as
conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination  
they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the
of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with  
conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination
personnel. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. In summary, the  
of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with
inspector determined that you were conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with  
personnel. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. In summary, the
regulatory and license requirements.  
inspector determined that you were conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with
regulatory and license requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its  
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available  
enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs  
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs
document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy,
rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy,  
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without
proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without  
redaction.
redaction.  
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact Mr. Robert Evans,
Senior Health Physicist, at (817) 860-8234 or the undersigned at (817) 860-8197.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact Mr. Robert Evans,  
                                                    Sincerely,
Senior Health Physicist, at (817) 860-8234 or the undersigned at (817) 860-8197.  
                                                    /RA/
                                                    Jack E. Whitten, Chief
                                                    Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B
Docket No.: 050-00133
License No.: DPR-7
Enclosure:
  NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/09-002
cc w/enclosure:
Sincerely,  
/RA/  
Jack E. Whitten, Chief  
Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B  
Docket No.: 050-00133  
License No.: DPR-7  
Enclosure:  
  NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/09-002    
cc w/enclosure:  
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM ISSION
R E GI ON  I V
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125


Pacific Gas and Electric Company       -2-
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
James Becker, Site Vice President
- 2 -
and Station Director
James Becker, Site Vice President
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
  and Station Director  
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
P.O. Box 56
Diablo Canyon Power Plant  
Avila Beach, CA 93424
P.O. Box 56  
Jennifer L. Post, Esq.
Avila Beach, CA 93424
PG&E
P.O. Box 7442
Jennifer L. Post, Esq.
San Francisco, CA 94120
PG&E  
Paul Roller, Director and Plant Manager
P.O. Box 7442  
Humboldt Bay Power Plant, PG&E
San Francisco, CA 94120  
1000 King Salmon Avenue
Eureka, CA 95505
Paul Roller, Director and Plant Manager  
Chairman
Humboldt Bay Power Plant, PG&E  
Humboldt County Board of Supervisors
1000 King Salmon Avenue  
County Courthouse
Eureka, CA 95505  
825 Fifth Street
Eureka, CA 95501
Chairman  
Law Office of Linda J. Brown, Esq.
Humboldt County Board of Supervisors  
300 Drakes Landing Road, Suite 172
County Courthouse  
Greenbrae, CA 94904
825 Fifth Street  
Regional Radiation Representative
Eureka, CA 95501  
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IX Office
Law Office of Linda J. Brown, Esq.  
75 Hawthorne Street
300 Drakes Landing Road, Suite 172  
San Francisco, CA 94105
Greenbrae, CA 94904  
Dr. Richard Ferguson, Energy Chair
Sierra Club California
Regional Radiation Representative  
1100 11th Street, Suite 311
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency  
Sacramento, CA 95814
Region IX Office  
Dr. James F. Davis, State Geologist
75 Hawthorne Street  
Department of Conservation
San Francisco, CA 94105  
Division of Mines & Geology
801 K Street MS 12-30
Dr. Richard Ferguson, Energy Chair  
Sacramento, CA 95814-3531
Sierra Club California  
Director, Radiologic Health Branch
1100 11th Street, Suite 311  
State Department of Health Services
Sacramento, CA 95814  
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414
Dr. James F. Davis, State Geologist  
Department of Conservation  
Division of Mines & Geology  
801 K Street MS 12-30  
Sacramento, CA 95814-3531  
Director, Radiologic Health Branch  
State Department of Health Services  
P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)  
Sacramento, CA 95899-7414  


Pacific Gas and Electric Company -3-
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
Director
- 3 -
Energy Facilities Siting Division
Director  
Energy Resources Conservation &
Energy Facilities Siting Division  
Development Commission
Energy Resources Conservation &  
1516 9th Street
  Development Commission  
Sacramento, CA 95814
1516 9th Street  
Gretchen Dumas, Esq.
Sacramento, CA 95814  
Public Utilities Commission
of the State of California
Gretchen Dumas, Esq.  
5066 State Building
Public Utilities Commission  
San Francisco, CA 94102
  of the State of California  
Redwood Alliance
5066 State Building  
P.O. Box 293
San Francisco, CA 94102  
Arcata, CA 95521
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
Redwood Alliance  
California Energy Commission
P.O. Box 293  
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Arcata, CA 95521  
Sacramento, CA 95814
James D. Boyd, Commissioner  
California Energy Commission  
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)  
Sacramento, CA 95814  


Pacific Gas and Electric Company               -4-
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
bcc w/enclosure:
- 4 -
A. Howell, D:DNMS
bcc w/enclosure:
C. Cain, DD:DNMS
A. Howell, D:DNMS  
J. Whitten, C:DNMS/NMSB-B
C. Cain, DD:DNMS  
S. Williams, OEDO RIV Coordinator
J. Whitten, C:DNMS/NMSB-B  
J. Weil, Congressional Affairs Officer
S. Williams, OEDO RIV Coordinator
J. Hickman, FSME/DWMEP/DURLD/RDB
J. Weil, Congressional Affairs Officer  
R. Evans, NMSB-B
J. Hickman, FSME/DWMEP/DURLD/RDB  
Fee Coordinator, DRMA
R. Evans, NMSB-B  
DRAFT: S:\DNMS\!NMSB-B\RJE\HB 050-00133-09-002.doc
Fee Coordinator, DRMA  
FINAL: R:\_DNMS\_HB\2009\HB 050-00133-09-002.doc                   MLxxxxxxxx
  ADAMS           Yes No         SUNSI Rev Complete Reviewer Initials: RJE
Publicly Avail. Yes No         Sensitive Value:
  RIV:DNMS:NMSB-B         C:NMSB-B
  RJEvans                 JEWhitten
  /RA/                   /RA/
  08/02/09               08/10/09
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY                                T=Telephone      E=E-mail F=Fax
DRAFT: S:\\DNMS\\!NMSB-B\\RJE\\HB 050-00133-09-002.doc                    
FINAL: R:\\_DNMS\\_HB\\2009\\HB 050-00133-09-002.doc    
MLxxxxxxxx            
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY  
T=Telephone          E=E-mail        F=Fax
ADAMS  
Yes No  
SUNSI Rev Complete  
Reviewer Initials:  
RJE  
Publicly Avail.  
Yes No  
Sensitive Value:  
   
RIV:DNMS:NMSB-B  
C:NMSB-B  
   
RJEvans  
JEWhitten  
   
/RA/  
/RA/  
   
08/02/09  
08/10/09  


              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ENCLOSURE
                                REGION IV
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No.:       050-00133
REGION IV
License No.:       DPR-7
Report No.:       050-00133/09-002
Licensee:         Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Facility:         Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3
Docket No.:  
Location:         1000 King Salmon Avenue
                  Eureka, California 95503
050-00133  
Dates:             July 13-16, 2009
Inspector:         Robert Evans, PE, CHP, Senior Health Physicist
                  Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B
License No.:
Accompanied By:   Arthur T. Howell III, Director
DPR-7  
                  Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Approved By:       Jack E. Whitten, Chief
                  Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B
Report No.:  
Attachment:       Supplemental Inspection Information
                                                                  ENCLOSURE
050-00133/09-002
Licensee:  
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
Facility:  
Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3  
Location:  
1000 King Salmon Avenue  
Eureka, California 95503  
Dates:
July 13-16, 2009  
Inspector:  
Robert Evans, PE, CHP, Senior Health Physicist  
Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B  
Accompanied By:  
Arthur T. Howell III, Director  
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety  
Approved By:
Jack E. Whitten, Chief  
Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B  
Attachment:  
Supplemental Inspection Information  


                                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                                  Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3
ENCLOSURE
                              NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/09-002
- 2 -
This inspection was a routine, announced inspection of decommissioning activities being
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
conducted at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 facility. In summary, the licensee was
conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements.
Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3  
Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications
NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/09-002  
*       The licensees safety review program was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59
        requirements (Section 1).
This inspection was a routine, announced inspection of decommissioning activities being  
Maintenance and Surveillance
conducted at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 facility. In summary, the licensee was  
*       The licensee continued to operate and maintain necessary plant equipment in
conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements.  
        accordance with license and procedure requirements (Section 2).
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review
Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications  
*       The licensee was conducting decommissioning activities with an emphasis on
        radiological safety. Radiation protection controls had been implemented in accordance
*  
        with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Section 3.2.a).
*       The licensee conducted an infrequently performed heavy load test in accordance with
The licensees safety review program was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59  
        work order instructions and with an emphasis on industrial safety (Section 3.2.b).
requirements (Section 1).  
*       The license implemented a cross contamination plan in the new fossil generation facility
        in accordance with license requirements (Section 3.2.c).
Maintenance and Surveillance  
*       The licensees training program was in agreement with Defueled Safety Analysis Report
        requirements, but at the time of the inspection, the licensee was significantly upgrading
*  
        the training program to account for the site-specific radiological hazards involving alpha
        particulate contamination (Section 3.2.d).
The licensee continued to operate and maintain necessary plant equipment in  
Occupational Radiation Exposure
accordance with license and procedure requirements (Section 2).  
*       The licensee implemented an occupational exposure program that effectively monitored
        the internal and external doses to radiation. No individual exceeded the regulatory limit
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review  
        for total effective dose equivalent exposures during calendar year 2008 (Section 4.2.a).
*       During 2009, the licensee began implementing a program for control of worker
*  
        exposures to alpha particulate contamination. This program supports the concept of As
The licensee was conducting decommissioning activities with an emphasis on  
        Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and should help control worker exposures to
radiological safety. Radiation protection controls had been implemented in accordance  
        licensed material (Section 4).
with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Section 3.2.a).  
                                                -2-                                  ENCLOSURE
*  
The licensee conducted an infrequently performed heavy load test in accordance with  
work order instructions and with an emphasis on industrial safety (Section 3.2.b).  
*  
The license implemented a cross contamination plan in the new fossil generation facility  
in accordance with license requirements (Section 3.2.c).  
*  
The licensees training program was in agreement with Defueled Safety Analysis Report  
requirements, but at the time of the inspection, the licensee was significantly upgrading  
the training program to account for the site-specific radiological hazards involving alpha  
particulate contamination (Section 3.2.d).  
Occupational Radiation Exposure  
*  
The licensee implemented an occupational exposure program that effectively monitored  
the internal and external doses to radiation. No individual exceeded the regulatory limit  
for total effective dose equivalent exposures during calendar year 2008 (Section 4.2.a).  
 
*  
During 2009, the licensee began implementing a program for control of worker  
exposures to alpha particulate contamination. This program supports the concept of As  
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and should help control worker exposures to  
licensed material (Section 4).  


Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
*     The effluent and environment monitoring programs were in compliance with license
ENCLOSURE
      requirements. All required samples had been collected, no sample result exceeded
- 3 -
      applicable limits, and no adverse trends were identified. Annual doses to the public
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring  
      were well below the regulatory limit (Section 5).
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials
*  
*     To support the planned decommissioning activities as described in the Post-Shutdown
The effluent and environment monitoring programs were in compliance with license  
      Decommissioning Activities Report, the licensee developed formal plans for control and
requirements. All required samples had been collected, no sample result exceeded  
      shipping of radioactive wastes. These plans provided detailed reviews and assessments
applicable limits, and no adverse trends were identified. Annual doses to the public  
      of work challenges involving radioactive waste disposals (Section 6).
were well below the regulatory limit (Section 5).  
                                              -3-                                ENCLOSURE
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials  
*  
To support the planned decommissioning activities as described in the Post-Shutdown  
Decommissioning Activities Report, the licensee developed formal plans for control and  
shipping of radioactive wastes. These plans provided detailed reviews and assessments  
of work challenges involving radioactive waste disposals (Section 6).  


                                            Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
ENCLOSURE
At the time of the inspection, Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3, was being
- 4 -
decommissioned in accordance with commitments specified in the Post-Shutdown
Report Details  
Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated June 30, 2009. The licensee commenced
with decommissioning during May 2009. Since May 2009, the licensee has removed the Unit 3
Summary of Plant Status  
transformers and generator exciter.
In the near future, the licensee plans to remove the generator, seal oil exciter switchgear, and
At the time of the inspection, Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3, was being  
reactor feed pump room equipment. The licensee may also conduct a radiological survey and
decommissioned in accordance with commitments specified in the Post-Shutdown  
study of the reactor vessel, in part, to ascertain the various options for its removal and disposal.
Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated June 30, 2009. The licensee commenced  
Also during the inspection, the licensee continued to construct a new power generating plant on
with decommissioning during May 2009. Since May 2009, the licensee has removed the Unit 3  
the site property. Following construction of the new power generating plant, the licensee plans
transformers and generator exciter.  
to commence with decommissioning of Units 1 and 2.
1       Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications (37801)
In the near future, the licensee plans to remove the generator, seal oil exciter switchgear, and  
1.1     Inspection Scope
reactor feed pump room equipment. The licensee may also conduct a radiological survey and  
        The inspector conducted reviews of the licensees design change program to ensure
study of the reactor vessel, in part, to ascertain the various options for its removal and disposal.  
        compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.
Also during the inspection, the licensee continued to construct a new power generating plant on  
1.2     Observations and Findings
the site property. Following construction of the new power generating plant, the licensee plans  
        The licensee conducted one 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation during 2009. Evaluation
to commence with decommissioning of Units 1 and 2.  
        09-01 eliminated a previously analyzed accident scenario. The evaluation deleted the
        spent fuel pool (SFP) rupture scenario from the Defueled Safety Analysis Report
1  
        (DSAR). Rupture of the SFP was possible based on a seismic event or heavy load drop.
Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications (37801)  
        To prevent a heavy load drop accident, plant procedures previously prohibited the
        movement of loads greater than 10 tons over the SFP.
1.1  
        The spent fuel was removed from the SFP by December 2008. The licensee conducted
Inspection Scope  
        the analysis using the NRC sponsored computer code RESRAD-OFFSITE to verify that
        the remaining radioactive material would result in minimal offsite dose in the event of a
The inspector conducted reviews of the licensees design change program to ensure  
        rupture of the SFP. Following its approval, this change now allows the licensee to move
compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.  
        heavy loads over the SFP as part of decommissioning activities.
        During the inspection, representatives of the licensee stated that several documents
1.2  
        would be updated in the near future including the DSAR. These documents will be
Observations and Findings  
        updated, in part, to account for the impacts and hazards of alpha contamination.
1.3     Conclusions
The licensee conducted one 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation during 2009. Evaluation  
        The licensees safety review program was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59
09-01 eliminated a previously analyzed accident scenario. The evaluation deleted the  
        requirements.
spent fuel pool (SFP) rupture scenario from the Defueled Safety Analysis Report  
                                                -4-                                  ENCLOSURE
(DSAR). Rupture of the SFP was possible based on a seismic event or heavy load drop.  
To prevent a heavy load drop accident, plant procedures previously prohibited the  
movement of loads greater than 10 tons over the SFP.  
The spent fuel was removed from the SFP by December 2008. The licensee conducted  
the analysis using the NRC sponsored computer code RESRAD-OFFSITE to verify that  
the remaining radioactive material would result in minimal offsite dose in the event of a  
rupture of the SFP. Following its approval, this change now allows the licensee to move  
heavy loads over the SFP as part of decommissioning activities.  
During the inspection, representatives of the licensee stated that several documents  
would be updated in the near future including the DSAR. These documents will be  
updated, in part, to account for the impacts and hazards of alpha contamination.  
1.3  
Conclusions  
The licensees safety review program was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59  
requirements.  


2   Maintenance and Surveillance (62801)
2.1 Inspection Scope
ENCLOSURE
    The inspector conducted a review of the equipment that remained in service to support
- 5 -
    plant operations, and the inspector observed the performance of selected maintenance
2  
    and surveillance activities.
Maintenance and Surveillance (62801)  
2.2 Observations and Findings
    At the time of the inspection, the licensee continued to maintain selected plant systems.
2.1  
    The components that will remain in service included the plant alarm system,
Inspection Scope  
    seismograph, stack gas flow monitor, liquid radwaste monitor, radwaste system
    components, ventilation equipment, SFP support equipment, instrument air, service air,
The inspector conducted a review of the equipment that remained in service to support  
    and electrical controls. The licensee also continued to operate various in-plant radiation
plant operations, and the inspector observed the performance of selected maintenance  
    monitors; however, these monitors are scheduled for permanent removal in the near
and surveillance activities.  
    future.
    The inspector compared operating plant parameters to the procedure limits specified in
2.2  
    the license. All parameters reviewed by the inspector were found to be within the
Observations and Findings  
    allowed range. For example, the SFP water level was being maintained in the range
    stipulated by plant procedures. In summary, the licensee operated the remaining
At the time of the inspection, the licensee continued to maintain selected plant systems.
    equipment in accordance with procedure requirements.
The components that will remain in service included the plant alarm system,  
    The inspector observed the performance of three maintenance and surveillance tests:
seismograph, stack gas flow monitor, liquid radwaste monitor, radwaste system  
          Discharge canal sample station back flush
components, ventilation equipment, SFP support equipment, instrument air, service air,  
          Stack particulate monitor sampling
and electrical controls. The licensee also continued to operate various in-plant radiation  
          Quarterly ventilation system test in the refueling building
monitors; however, these monitors are scheduled for permanent removal in the near  
    In summary, the tests observed by the inspector were completed satisfactorily, and the
future.  
    operators/technicians appeared knowledgeable of the tasks being conducted.
2.3 Conclusions
The inspector compared operating plant parameters to the procedure limits specified in  
    The licensee continued to operate and maintain necessary plant equipment in
the license. All parameters reviewed by the inspector were found to be within the  
    accordance with and procedure requirements specified in the license.
allowed range. For example, the SFP water level was being maintained in the range  
3   Decommissioning Performance and Status Review (71801)
stipulated by plant procedures. In summary, the licensee operated the remaining  
3.1 Inspection Scope
equipment in accordance with procedure requirements.  
    The inspector evaluated whether the licensee and its contracted workforce were
    conducting decommissioning activities in accordance with license and regulatory
The inspector observed the performance of three maintenance and surveillance tests:  
    requirements.
                                            -5-                                ENCLOSURE
Discharge canal sample station back flush  
Stack particulate monitor sampling  
Quarterly ventilation system test in the refueling building  
In summary, the tests observed by the inspector were completed satisfactorily, and the  
operators/technicians appeared knowledgeable of the tasks being conducted.  
2.3  
Conclusions  
The licensee continued to operate and maintain necessary plant equipment in  
accordance with and procedure requirements specified in the license.  
3  
Decommissioning Performance and Status Review (71801)  
3.1
Inspection Scope  
The inspector evaluated whether the licensee and its contracted workforce were  
conducting decommissioning activities in accordance with license and regulatory  
requirements.  


3.2 Observations and Findings
  a. Site Tours
ENCLOSURE
    The inspector toured the fuel handling building, Unit 3 control room, and the other
- 6 -
    radiologically restricted areas of the facility. Radiological postings were clearly visible,
3.2  
    and the postings met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. Housekeeping was being
Observations and Findings  
    controlled in these areas. During the site tours, the inspector conducted radiological
    surveys to verify the accuracy of radiation area postings. The inspector did not identify
  a.  
    any radiation area that was incorrectly posted by the licensee.
Site Tours  
  b. Heavy Load Lift
    During the inspection, the licensee conducted a 125-percent load test of the main 75-ton
The inspector toured the fuel handling building, Unit 3 control room, and the other  
    crane located within the refueling building. The licensee conducted the test to certify the
radiologically restricted areas of the facility. Radiological postings were clearly visible,  
    75-ton crane to be able to lift a 90-ton load. The load that was lifted during the test
and the postings met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. Housekeeping was being  
    consisted of the shield plug and various free weights. The weight of the lift was
controlled in these areas. During the site tours, the inspector conducted radiological  
    determined by calculation versus direct measurement. A State of California inspector
surveys to verify the accuracy of radiation area postings. The inspector did not identify  
    was present during the load test.
any radiation area that was incorrectly posted by the licensee.  
    Since this activity was an infrequently performed evolution, a special pre-job briefing was
    conducted. The test was then conducted using instructions provided in a work order.
  b.  
    The test included a lift and hold to ensure that the crane breaks worked as designed.
Heavy Load Lift  
    The crane was also moved in each of the four major compass directions, although the
    crane movement was constrained by the location of the SFP. In accordance with the
During the inspection, the licensee conducted a 125-percent load test of the main 75-ton  
    work order, the licensee elected to avoid lifting the heavy load over the SFP.
crane located within the refueling building. The licensee conducted the test to certify the  
    In summary, the load test was completed in a satisfactory manner, and industrial safety
75-ton crane to be able to lift a 90-ton load. The load that was lifted during the test  
    was evident during all portions of the test. The load test certification has a four year
consisted of the shield plug and various free weights. The weight of the lift was  
    recertification interval, although annual crane inspections will still be required to keep the
determined by calculation versus direct measurement. A State of California inspector  
    certification current.
was present during the load test.  
  c. Cross-Contamination Plan
    License Condition 2.C.4 specifies that a cross-contamination prevention and monitoring
Since this activity was an infrequently performed evolution, a special pre-job briefing was  
    plan be maintained for the location of the new fossil generation facility. The inspector
conducted. The test was then conducted using instructions provided in a work order.
    reviewed the licensees implementation of its cross contamination plan. Site procedure
The test included a lift and hold to ensure that the crane breaks worked as designed.
    C-220, Cross Contamination Prevention and Monitoring Plan (Plan), provides the
The crane was also moved in each of the four major compass directions, although the  
    instructions for the program. The inspector noted that the Plan provided an adequate
crane movement was constrained by the location of the SFP. In accordance with the  
    overview of the survey program, but the Plan lacked specificity for the implementation of
work order, the licensee elected to avoid lifting the heavy load over the SFP.  
    the cross-contamination prevention and monitoring program. The Plan referenced a
    radiation protection procedure for implementation details, but when examined by the
In summary, the load test was completed in a satisfactory manner, and industrial safety  
    inspector this secondary procedure had not fully incorporated the requirements of the
was evident during all portions of the test. The load test certification has a four year  
    Plan. During the inspection, a licensee representative stated that the procedure would
recertification interval, although annual crane inspections will still be required to keep the  
    be updated in the near future.
certification current.  
    Despite the procedure limitation, the licensee conducted an initial radiological survey as
    required by the cross contamination plan. The survey was conducted during early July
  c.  
    2009. The radiological survey results obtained indicated that all measurements taken
Cross-Contamination Plan  
    were indistinguishable from background levels. These survey results suggest that the
    licensee has effectively implemented the requirements of the cross contamination plan.
License Condition 2.C.4 specifies that a cross-contamination prevention and monitoring  
                                              -6-                                  ENCLOSURE
plan be maintained for the location of the new fossil generation facility. The inspector  
reviewed the licensees implementation of its cross contamination plan. Site procedure  
C-220, Cross Contamination Prevention and Monitoring Plan (Plan), provides the  
instructions for the program. The inspector noted that the Plan provided an adequate  
overview of the survey program, but the Plan lacked specificity for the implementation of  
the cross-contamination prevention and monitoring program. The Plan referenced a  
radiation protection procedure for implementation details, but when examined by the  
inspector this secondary procedure had not fully incorporated the requirements of the  
Plan. During the inspection, a licensee representative stated that the procedure would  
be updated in the near future.  
Despite the procedure limitation, the licensee conducted an initial radiological survey as  
required by the cross contamination plan. The survey was conducted during early July  
2009. The radiological survey results obtained indicated that all measurements taken  
were indistinguishable from background levels. These survey results suggest that the  
licensee has effectively implemented the requirements of the cross contamination plan.  


d. Site Training Program
  The inspector reviewed the training program for compliance with 10 CFR 19.12 and
ENCLOSURE
  DSAR requirements. Section 4.2.1 of the DSAR provides the training requirements.
- 7 -
  The training programs include general employee training, program-specific training, and
  d.  
  respiratory protection training. Details of the training program are included in HBPP
Site Training Program  
  procedures B-2, General Training Requirements for On-Site Personnel, and B-200,
  Radiation Protection Training Program. The inspector noted that the licensee was in the
The inspector reviewed the training program for compliance with 10 CFR 19.12 and  
  process of significantly updating the training program to account for the radiological
DSAR requirements. Section 4.2.1 of the DSAR provides the training requirements.
  hazards that are present at the site.
The training programs include general employee training, program-specific training, and  
  At the time of the inspection, general employee and industrial safety training was
respiratory protection training. Details of the training program are included in HBPP  
  provided by the site training department. Function-specific training was provided by the
procedures B-2, General Training Requirements for On-Site Personnel, and B-200,  
  various departments such as radiation protection, security, and emergency
Radiation Protection Training Program. The inspector noted that the licensee was in the  
  preparedness departments. General employee training consisted of computer based
process of significantly updating the training program to account for the radiological  
  training, formal classroom lectures, videotapes, handouts, and an examination.
hazards that are present at the site.  
  The radiation protection staff was revising its program-specific training to include the
  hazards of alpha contamination. The licensee recently created a new, offsite training
At the time of the inspection, general employee and industrial safety training was  
  center that included mockups. The mockups will be used to train workers in the
provided by the site training department. Function-specific training was provided by the  
  protocols of foaming, cutting, and sealing pipes that may contain alpha contamination.
various departments such as radiation protection, security, and emergency  
  The mockups included glove boxes and tents that will be used to help control the spread
preparedness departments. General employee training consisted of computer based  
  of contamination.
training, formal classroom lectures, videotapes, handouts, and an examination.  
  The training certifications of selected instructors were reviewed. The inspector
  determined that the instructors were certified to teach specific classes. The inspector
The radiation protection staff was revising its program-specific training to include the  
  reviewed selected class records and confirmed that the instructors associated with the
hazards of alpha contamination. The licensee recently created a new, offsite training  
  requisite training classes were qualified to teach the classes at the time the class was
center that included mockups. The mockups will be used to train workers in the  
  given. The licensee maintained an informal list of all classes and the primary instructors
protocols of foaming, cutting, and sealing pipes that may contain alpha contamination.
  for those classes. Based on a random review, the inspector determined that the
The mockups included glove boxes and tents that will be used to help control the spread  
  instructors were certified for the courses that were assigned to them.
of contamination.  
  The inspector reviewed the respiratory protection training program with the applicable
  supervisor. The training consisted of computer-based training, a medical physical, and a
The training certifications of selected instructors were reviewed. The inspector  
  fit test. At the time of the inspection, the fit test program was suspended pending receipt
determined that the instructors were certified to teach specific classes. The inspector  
  of new masks for fit testing. Previous fit test failures were attributed to improper sealing
reviewed selected class records and confirmed that the instructors associated with the  
  of the probe that penetrated the test respirator. The supervisor expects the fit test
requisite training classes were qualified to teach the classes at the time the class was  
  program to be full operational prior to commencement of work activities involving alpha
given. The licensee maintained an informal list of all classes and the primary instructors  
  contamination.
for those classes. Based on a random review, the inspector determined that the  
  The inspector also discussed the applicable respiratory protection procedure with the
instructors were certified for the courses that were assigned to them.  
  radiation protection supervisor. The inspector noted that the procedure had been
  updated to account for the new fit testing protocol and special respiratory cleaning and
The inspector reviewed the respiratory protection training program with the applicable  
  sampling requirements that must be implemented because of alpha contamination. The
supervisor. The training consisted of computer-based training, a medical physical, and a  
  supervisor expected the fit testing procedure to be updated prior to commencement of
fit test. At the time of the inspection, the fit test program was suspended pending receipt  
  work involving alpha contamination. Finally, the licensee plans to construct a new glove
of new masks for fit testing. Previous fit test failures were attributed to improper sealing  
  box for cleaning alpha-contaminated respirators, and the licensee plans to provide
of the probe that penetrated the test respirator. The supervisor expects the fit test  
  special training to workers who will wash and maintain the respirators.
program to be full operational prior to commencement of work activities involving alpha  
                                              -7-                                ENCLOSURE
contamination.  
The inspector also discussed the applicable respiratory protection procedure with the  
radiation protection supervisor. The inspector noted that the procedure had been  
updated to account for the new fit testing protocol and special respiratory cleaning and  
sampling requirements that must be implemented because of alpha contamination. The  
supervisor expected the fit testing procedure to be updated prior to commencement of  
work involving alpha contamination. Finally, the licensee plans to construct a new glove  
box for cleaning alpha-contaminated respirators, and the licensee plans to provide  
special training to workers who will wash and maintain the respirators.  


3.3  Conclusions
    The licensee was conducting decommissioning activities with an emphasis on
ENCLOSURE
    radiological safety. Radiation protection controls had been implemented in accordance
- 8 -
    with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The licensee conducted an infrequently performed
3.3  
    heavy load test on the 75-ton crane in accordance with work order instructions and with
Conclusions
    an emphasis on industrial safety. The license implemented a cross contamination plan
   
    in the new fossil generation facility in accordance with license requirements. The
The licensee was conducting decommissioning activities with an emphasis on  
    licensees training program was in agreement with DSAR requirements, but at the time
radiological safety. Radiation protection controls had been implemented in accordance  
    of the inspection, the licensee was significantly upgrading the training program to
with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The licensee conducted an infrequently performed  
    account for the site-specific radiological hazards involving alpha particulate
heavy load test on the 75-ton crane in accordance with work order instructions and with  
    contamination.
an emphasis on industrial safety. The license implemented a cross contamination plan  
4   Occupational Radiation Exposure (83750)
in the new fossil generation facility in accordance with license requirements. The  
4.1 Inspection Scope
licensees training program was in agreement with DSAR requirements, but at the time  
    The inspector reviewed occupational radiation exposures to verify compliance with
of the inspection, the licensee was significantly upgrading the training program to  
    10 CFR Part 20 limitations. The inspector also reviewed the implementation of the
account for the site-specific radiological hazards involving alpha particulate  
    licensee=s As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program.
contamination.  
4.2  Observations and Findings
  a. Occupational Exposures
4  
    Occupational radiation exposures consisted of both external and internal exposures.
Occupational Radiation Exposure (83750)  
    The licensee monitored and maintained records of Unit 3 exposures. The inspector
    reviewed the occupational exposure records for calendar year 2008. During 2008, 267
4.1  
    thermoluminescent dosimeters were issued to individuals to measure external gamma
Inspection Scope  
    doses. The combined total effective dose equivalent for all individuals with a
    measurable gamma dose was about 2.05 person-rems. During 2008, the work projects
The inspector reviewed occupational radiation exposures to verify compliance with  
    with the highest dose potential included cleaning of the SFP, offloading of the fuel, and
10 CFR Part 20 limitations. The inspector also reviewed the implementation of the  
    shipping of radioactive resins.
licensee=s As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program.  
    The highest total effective dose equivalent exposure recorded during 2008 to one
    individual was 121 millirems. The highest committed effective dose equivalent exposure
4.2   
    was 27 millirems, a dose that was assigned to two individuals. The regulatory limit for
Observations and Findings
    total effective dose equivalents, a combination of deep dose equivalent and committed
    effective dose equivalent, is 5,000 millirems. In summary, site doses during 2008 were
  a.  
    well below the regulatory limit.
Occupational Exposures  
    To help monitor for internal doses, the licensee conducted bioassay sampling. Bioassay
    sampling included entrance, exit, annual, and event-based whole body counting. No
Occupational radiation exposures consisted of both external and internal exposures.
    positive whole-body counts were attributed to plant events during 2008, and to the date
The licensee monitored and maintained records of Unit 3 exposures. The inspector  
    of this inspection in 2009.
reviewed the occupational exposure records for calendar year 2008. During 2008, 267  
    The inspector reviewed the licensees ALARA program for future work activities. During
thermoluminescent dosimeters were issued to individuals to measure external gamma  
    interviews, the licensees staff predicted the work activities planned during 2009 that had
doses. The combined total effective dose equivalent for all individuals with a  
    the greatest potential for doses to individuals would be the reactor vessel
measurable gamma dose was about 2.05 person-rems. During 2008, the work projects  
    characterization study (if conducted) and turbine-generator decommissioning. The
with the highest dose potential included cleaning of the SFP, offloading of the fuel, and  
    licensee estimated that the decommissioning of Unit 3 would result in a total combined
shipping of radioactive resins.  
                                              -8-                                ENCLOSURE
The highest total effective dose equivalent exposure recorded during 2008 to one  
individual was 121 millirems. The highest committed effective dose equivalent exposure  
was 27 millirems, a dose that was assigned to two individuals. The regulatory limit for  
total effective dose equivalents, a combination of deep dose equivalent and committed  
effective dose equivalent, is 5,000 millirems. In summary, site doses during 2008 were  
well below the regulatory limit.  
To help monitor for internal doses, the licensee conducted bioassay sampling. Bioassay  
sampling included entrance, exit, annual, and event-based whole body counting. No  
positive whole-body counts were attributed to plant events during 2008, and to the date  
of this inspection in 2009.  
The inspector reviewed the licensees ALARA program for future work activities. During  
interviews, the licensees staff predicted the work activities planned during 2009 that had  
the greatest potential for doses to individuals would be the reactor vessel  
characterization study (if conducted) and turbine-generator decommissioning. The  
licensee estimated that the decommissioning of Unit 3 would result in a total combined  


  dose of approximately 208 person-rems. The projects with the highest dose potential
  include decommissioning of the reactor vessel, SFP, shutdown and cleanup heat
ENCLOSURE
  exchangers, and area vaults.
- 9 -
b. Control of Exposures to Alpha Contamination
dose of approximately 208 person-rems. The projects with the highest dose potential  
  The inspector conducted a review of the licensees plans to control occupational
include decommissioning of the reactor vessel, SFP, shutdown and cleanup heat  
  exposures to alpha contamination. The site has a unique radiological hazard due to
exchangers, and area vaults.  
  alpha particulate contamination. Early fuel failures resulted in the internal contamination
  of plant systems with fission products and transuranic radionuclides. The alpha
  b.  
  particulate hazard has increased over time from the decay of plutonium-241, while the
Control of Exposures to Alpha Contamination  
  gamma radiation hazards have decreased due to the decay of cobalt-60 and
  cesium-137.
The inspector conducted a review of the licensees plans to control occupational  
  The licensee plans to commence work that has the potential for exposures to alpha
exposures to alpha contamination. The site has a unique radiological hazard due to  
  particulate contamination during October 2009. In response, the licensee developed a
alpha particulate contamination. Early fuel failures resulted in the internal contamination
  radiation protection procedure for performing and evaluating alpha particulate
of plant systems with fission products and transuranic radionuclides. The alpha
  contamination postings and surveys. In addition, the procedure provides new controls
particulate hazard has increased over time from the decay of plutonium-241, while the  
  for alpha zones. The implementation of this new procedure should help minimize the
gamma radiation hazards have decreased due to the decay of cobalt-60 and  
  potential for worker exposures to alpha contamination.
cesium-137.  
  To help assess the alpha contamination hazard inside of plant piping, the licensee
  recently collected a number of coupon samples from various locations including the
The licensee plans to commence work that has the potential for exposures to alpha  
  turbine and feedwater piping. These samples were submitted to an offsite laboratory for
particulate contamination during October 2009. In response, the licensee developed a  
  analysis. The results of these samples will be used, in part, to help characterize the
radiation protection procedure for performing and evaluating alpha particulate  
  material for waste disposal and for transportation.
contamination postings and surveys. In addition, the procedure provides new controls  
  The licensee plans to conduct the cutting of alpha contaminated pipes within glove
for alpha zones. The implementation of this new procedure should help minimize the  
  boxes or containment tents. The use of glove boxes and tents is expected to reduce the
potential for worker exposures to alpha contamination.  
  potential for worker exposures to loose alpha contamination. In addition, the licensee
  plans to inject foam material into the pipes to fixate the alpha contamination during
To help assess the alpha contamination hazard inside of plant piping, the licensee  
  cutting operations. Site workers that enter a contaminated area will be required to wear
recently collected a number of coupon samples from various locations including the  
  lapel air samplers to help the licensee assess worker exposures to radioactive
turbine and feedwater piping. These samples were submitted to an offsite laboratory for  
  particulate contamination.
analysis. The results of these samples will be used, in part, to help characterize the  
  During the inspection, the licensee was in the process of upgrading its training program
material for waste disposal and for transportation.  
  for workers that will be potentially exposed to alpha contamination. Industry experts
  were being used to upgrade the lesson plan and to teach the class to site workers. All
The licensee plans to conduct the cutting of alpha contaminated pipes within glove  
  workers are expected to be retrained prior to commencement of work activities involving
boxes or containment tents. The use of glove boxes and tents is expected to reduce the  
  alpha contamination. In addition, the licensee established a mock-up facility to support
potential for worker exposures to loose alpha contamination. In addition, the licensee  
  training of workers that will be cutting and handling the alpha-contaminated piping.
plans to inject foam material into the pipes to fixate the alpha contamination during  
  These training enhancements are expected to help reduce the potential for inhalation or
cutting operations. Site workers that enter a contaminated area will be required to wear  
  ingestion of alpha contamination.
lapel air samplers to help the licensee assess worker exposures to radioactive  
  Routine whole-body counts are generally ineffective for identifying uptakes of alpha
particulate contamination.  
  contamination. The licensee plans to implement an enhanced bioassay program that
  will include collection of urine and fecal samples for monitoring of internally deposited
During the inspection, the licensee was in the process of upgrading its training program  
  alpha-emitting radionuclides.
for workers that will be potentially exposed to alpha contamination. Industry experts  
  The licensee has been procuring new equipment to conduct real-time monitoring of
were being used to upgrade the lesson plan and to teach the class to site workers. All  
  alpha contamination. The licensee recently placed into service a number of continuous
workers are expected to be retrained prior to commencement of work activities involving  
                                            -9-                                  ENCLOSURE
alpha contamination. In addition, the licensee established a mock-up facility to support  
training of workers that will be cutting and handling the alpha-contaminated piping.
These training enhancements are expected to help reduce the potential for inhalation or  
ingestion of alpha contamination.  
Routine whole-body counts are generally ineffective for identifying uptakes of alpha  
contamination. The licensee plans to implement an enhanced bioassay program that  
will include collection of urine and fecal samples for monitoring of internally deposited  
alpha-emitting radionuclides.  
The licensee has been procuring new equipment to conduct real-time monitoring of  
alpha contamination. The licensee recently placed into service a number of continuous  


    air monitors that monitor for alpha contamination in addition to beta-gamma
    contamination. Further, the licensee plans to install an alpha detecting monitor in the
ENCLOSURE
    plant ventilation stack. This monitor was expected to be installed during September
- 10 -
    2009, prior to start of decommissioning work involving alpha contamination.
air monitors that monitor for alpha contamination in addition to beta-gamma  
4.3 Conclusions
contamination. Further, the licensee plans to install an alpha detecting monitor in the  
    The licensee implemented an occupational exposure program that effectively monitored
plant ventilation stack. This monitor was expected to be installed during September  
    the internal and external doses to radiation. No individual exceeded the regulatory limit
2009, prior to start of decommissioning work involving alpha contamination.  
    for total effective dose equivalent exposures during calendar year 2008. During 2009,
    the licensee began implementing a program for control of worker exposures to alpha
4.3  
    particulate contamination. This program supports the concept of ALARA and should
Conclusions  
    help control worker exposures to licensed material.
5   Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
The licensee implemented an occupational exposure program that effectively monitored  
5.1 Inspection Scope
the internal and external doses to radiation. No individual exceeded the regulatory limit  
    The inspector reviewed the licensees program to control, monitor, and quantify releases
for total effective dose equivalent exposures during calendar year 2008. During 2009,
    of radioactive materials to the environment in liquid, gaseous, and particulate forms.
the licensee began implementing a program for control of worker exposures to alpha  
5.2 Observations and Findings
particulate contamination. This program supports the concept of ALARA and should  
    The inspector reviewed the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2008 dated
help control worker exposures to licensed material.  
    March 26, 2009, and the Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report for 2008
    dated April 30, 2009. The inspector compared the results presented in these reports to
5  
    the requirements provided in site procedures and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring  
    In summary, all required samples had been collected, and no sample result exceeded a
    licensed or regulatory limit. No adverse trends were apparent. The inspector identified
5.1  
    several report errors, and the licensee agreed to update the reports during the next
Inspection Scope  
    routine submittals.
    The inspector compared the effluent and environmental monitoring results to the public
The inspector reviewed the licensees program to control, monitor, and quantify releases  
    dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1301. In summary, the records indicate that the
of radioactive materials to the environment in liquid, gaseous, and particulate forms.  
    public dose limits were not exceeded. The licensees results suggest a maximum public
    dose of less than one millirem for 2008 with an annual regulatory limit of 100 millirems.
5.2
5.3 Conclusions
Observations and Findings
    The effluent and environment monitoring programs were in compliance with license
    requirements. All required samples had been collected, no sample result exceeded
The inspector reviewed the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2008 dated  
    applicable limits, and no adverse trends were identified. Annual doses to the public
March 26, 2009, and the Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report for 2008  
    were well below the regulatory limit.
dated April 30, 2009. The inspector compared the results presented in these reports to  
6   Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials
the requirements provided in site procedures and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
    (86750)
In summary, all required samples had been collected, and no sample result exceeded a  
6.1 Inspection Scope
licensed or regulatory limit. No adverse trends were apparent. The inspector identified  
    The inspector reviewed the licensees plans for characterizing and shipping the
several report errors, and the licensee agreed to update the reports during the next  
    radioactive wastes that will be generated during decommissioning.
routine submittals.  
                                            - 10 -                              ENCLOSURE
The inspector compared the effluent and environmental monitoring results to the public  
dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1301. In summary, the records indicate that the  
public dose limits were not exceeded. The licensees results suggest a maximum public  
dose of less than one millirem for 2008 with an annual regulatory limit of 100 millirems.  
5.3  
Conclusions  
The effluent and environment monitoring programs were in compliance with license  
requirements. All required samples had been collected, no sample result exceeded  
applicable limits, and no adverse trends were identified. Annual doses to the public  
were well below the regulatory limit.  
6  
Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials  
(86750)  
6.1  
Inspection Scope  
The inspector reviewed the licensees plans for characterizing and shipping the  
radioactive wastes that will be generated during decommissioning.  


6.2 Observations and Findings
    The PSDAR provides a description and schedule of planned decommissioning activities.
ENCLOSURE
    To support decommissioning, the licensee recently developed two plans, a Waste
- 11 -
    Management and Disposal Plan and a Transportation Plan. These plans were
6.2
    developed, in part, to identify the challenges for waste management and to identify
Observations and Findings
    potential options for these challenges. The unique challenges include:
        Control of the limited amount of area available for waste handling operations
The PSDAR provides a description and schedule of planned decommissioning activities.  
        Establishment of temporary waste storage areas inside and outside of site structures
To support decommissioning, the licensee recently developed two plans, a Waste  
        Control of alpha contaminated material
Management and Disposal Plan and a Transportation Plan. These plans were  
        Removal of contaminated concrete and soils below the water table
developed, in part, to identify the challenges for waste management and to identify  
        Removal of contaminated sediment from the intake and discharge canals
potential options for these challenges. The unique challenges include:  
    As explained in the PSDAR, the licensee has to decide whether to segment the reactor
    pressure vessel and its internals or to dispose of the vessel as a single item.
    The licensee estimates that the total volume of contaminated material to be removed
Control of the limited amount of area available for waste handling operations  
    from the site is about 660 thousand cubic feet. The material includes soils, building
    rubble, and equipment. The vast majority of the waste material generated will most
Establishment of temporary waste storage areas inside and outside of site structures  
    likely be classified as Class A wastes for disposal at an out-of-state disposal site. The
    wastes will be sorted based on disposal and shipping classification. The licensee also
Control of alpha contaminated material  
    plans to use radioactive waste processors to consolidate the wastes for disposal. The
    use of waste processors may allow the licensee to reduce the volume of wastes
Removal of contaminated concrete and soils below the water table  
    disposed.
    In response to the above challenges, the Waste Management and Disposal Plan provide
Removal of contaminated sediment from the intake and discharge canals  
    recommended flow paths for the movement of equipment from the location of
    dismantlement to the location of packaging for shipment. This plan also provides a
As explained in the PSDAR, the licensee has to decide whether to segment the reactor  
    recommended list of work areas for decommissioning. For example, the main
pressure vessel and its internals or to dispose of the vessel as a single item.  
    condenser is considered one such work area. The plan also describes the potential
    classification of the waste streams such as Class A bulk wastes and Class A general
The licensee estimates that the total volume of contaminated material to be removed  
    wastes.
from the site is about 660 thousand cubic feet. The material includes soils, building  
    In general, field crews will remove the equipment from a given area and will relocate the
rubble, and equipment. The vast majority of the waste material generated will most  
    equipment near the waste containers. The waste handling and packaging crews will
likely be classified as Class A wastes for disposal at an out-of-state disposal site. The  
    package the waste equipment, and the shipping and transportation crews will ship the
wastes will be sorted based on disposal and shipping classification. The licensee also  
    material for disposal. Based on the current work schedule, most wastes will be shipped
plans to use radioactive waste processors to consolidate the wastes for disposal. The  
    during the 2013-2014 time frame. The bulk of the wastes will consist mostly of soils and
use of waste processors may allow the licensee to reduce the volume of wastes  
    building debris.
disposed.  
    At the time of the inspection, the licensee was developing a system and area
    characterization plan. This plan will help establish the definitions of the various waste
In response to the above challenges, the Waste Management and Disposal Plan provide  
    streams and help establish the waste profiles for disposal and shipment. The waste
recommended flow paths for the movement of equipment from the location of  
    profiles have to be completed and approved prior to the actual shipment of the waste
dismantlement to the location of packaging for shipment. This plan also provides a  
    materials.
recommended list of work areas for decommissioning. For example, the main  
    As explained in the Transportation Plan, the licensee estimates that it will ship
condenser is considered one such work area. The plan also describes the potential  
    approximately 1500 shipments to the out-of-state waste disposal site. Challenges to
classification of the waste streams such as Class A bulk wastes and Class A general  
                                            - 11 -                                ENCLOSURE
wastes.  
In general, field crews will remove the equipment from a given area and will relocate the  
equipment near the waste containers. The waste handling and packaging crews will  
package the waste equipment, and the shipping and transportation crews will ship the  
material for disposal. Based on the current work schedule, most wastes will be shipped  
during the 2013-2014 time frame. The bulk of the wastes will consist mostly of soils and  
building debris.  
At the time of the inspection, the licensee was developing a system and area  
characterization plan. This plan will help establish the definitions of the various waste  
streams and help establish the waste profiles for disposal and shipment. The waste  
profiles have to be completed and approved prior to the actual shipment of the waste  
materials.  
As explained in the Transportation Plan, the licensee estimates that it will ship  
approximately 1500 shipments to the out-of-state waste disposal site. Challenges to


    transportation include the locations of the staging areas needed to support
    decommissioning. Because of the limited amount of space available, the licensee is
ENCLOSURE
    expected to tightly control the movement, handling, and storage of waste containers.
- 12 -
    A second transportation challenge is the location of the site. The site has limited access
transportation include the locations of the staging areas needed to support  
    to alternate modes of transportation. There are no rail or barge access points in the
decommissioning. Because of the limited amount of space available, the licensee is  
    immediate area of the site, so practically all wastes may have to be shipped by truck to
expected to tightly control the movement, handling, and storage of waste containers.  
    the disposal site. In addition, there are no easy, direct routes to the disposal site.
    Further, the licensee will have to comply with length restrictions on the local highways.
A second transportation challenge is the location of the site. The site has limited access  
    At the time of the inspection, the licensee was in the process of adding staff to the
to alternate modes of transportation. There are no rail or barge access points in the  
    radwaste packaging and transportation groups. Procedures were being upgraded to
immediate area of the site, so practically all wastes may have to be shipped by truck to  
    provide step-by-step instructions for the work that will be performed. The licensee was
the disposal site. In addition, there are no easy, direct routes to the disposal site.
    in the process of procuring intermodal containers for shipment of the wastes. The
Further, the licensee will have to comply with length restrictions on the local highways.  
    licensee was also reviewing its options for shipping large components.
    The licensee was reviewing its protocols for shipment of other types of waste streams,
At the time of the inspection, the licensee was in the process of adding staff to the  
    including oil and asbestos wastes, for disposal. For example, the licensee was
radwaste packaging and transportation groups. Procedures were being upgraded to  
    considering its options for disposal of the fuel oil storage tank, turbine lube oil, and
provide step-by-step instructions for the work that will be performed. The licensee was  
    exciter. These components may be disposed in an alternate manner, as allowed by
in the process of procuring intermodal containers for shipment of the wastes. The  
    10 CFR 20.2002. An alternate disposal methodology was being considered because of
licensee was also reviewing its options for shipping large components.  
    the low radiological hazards associated with these materials.
6.3 Conclusions
The licensee was reviewing its protocols for shipment of other types of waste streams,  
    To support the planned decommissioning activities as described in the PSDAR, the
including oil and asbestos wastes, for disposal. For example, the licensee was  
    licensee developed formal plans for control and shipping of radioactive wastes. These
considering its options for disposal of the fuel oil storage tank, turbine lube oil, and  
    plans provided detailed reviews and assessments of work challenges involving
exciter. These components may be disposed in an alternate manner, as allowed by  
    radioactive waste disposals.
10 CFR 20.2002. An alternate disposal methodology was being considered because of  
7   Exit Meeting
the low radiological hazards associated with these materials.  
    The inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection during an exit meeting
    that was conducted at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on July 16, 2009. The
6.3  
    licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed, by the
Conclusions  
    inspector.
                                            - 12 -                                ENCLOSURE
To support the planned decommissioning activities as described in the PSDAR, the  
licensee developed formal plans for control and shipping of radioactive wastes. These  
plans provided detailed reviews and assessments of work challenges involving  
radioactive waste disposals.  
7  
Exit Meeting  
The inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection during an exit meeting  
that was conducted at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on July 16, 2009. The  
licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed, by the  
inspector.  


                        SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION
                          PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
ATTACHMENT
J. Albers, Radiation Protection Manager
SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION  
B. Barley, Radiation Protection Planning
M. Celletti, Training Coordinator
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED  
J. Chadwick, Radiation Protection Engineer
J. Davis, Radiation Protection Engineer
J. Albers, Radiation Protection Manager  
J. Griffin, Engineering Consultant, AM Solutions
B. Barley, Radiation Protection Planning  
L. Hardwick, SAFSTOR Supervisor
M. Celletti, Training Coordinator  
L. Pulley, Deputy Decommissioning Manager
J. Chadwick, Radiation Protection Engineer  
K. Rod, Decommissioning Manager
J. Davis, Radiation Protection Engineer  
P. Roller, Director and Nuclear Plant Manager
J. Griffin, Engineering Consultant, AM Solutions  
T. Sanders, Site Services Manager
L. Hardwick, SAFSTOR Supervisor  
B. Sicotte, Quality Control Supervisor
L. Pulley, Deputy Decommissioning Manager  
M. Smith, Engineering Manager
K. Rod, Decommissioning Manager  
R. Snyder, Radwaste Supervisor
P. Roller, Director and Nuclear Plant Manager  
D. Sokolsky, Licensing Supervisor
T. Sanders, Site Services Manager  
M. Stein, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Bartlett
B. Sicotte, Quality Control Supervisor  
B. Stephens, Work Week Manager
M. Smith, Engineering Manager  
                              INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
R. Snyder, Radwaste Supervisor  
IP 37801   Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications
D. Sokolsky, Licensing Supervisor
IP 62801   Maintenance and Surveillance
M. Stein, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Bartlett  
IP 71801   Decommissioning Status
B. Stephens, Work Week Manager  
IP 83750   Occupational Radiation Exposure
IP 84750   Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring
IP 86750   Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED  
                          ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
IP 37801 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications  
None
IP 62801 Maintenance and Surveillance
Closed
IP 71801 Decommissioning Status
None
IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure  
Discussed
IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring  
None
IP 86750 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials
                                                                              ATTACHMENT
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED  
Opened  
None  
Closed  
None  
Discussed  
None  


                          LIST OF ACRONYMS
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ATTACHMENT
CFR   Code of Federal Regulations
- 2 -
DSAR Defueled Safety Analysis Report
LIST OF ACRONYMS  
HBPP  Humboldt Bay Power Plant
IP   Inspection Procedure
ALARA  
PSDAR Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
As Low As Reasonably Achievable  
SFP   Spent Fuel Pool
CFR  
                                  -2-                ATTACHMENT
Code of Federal Regulations  
DSAR  
Defueled Safety Analysis Report
HBPP   
Humboldt Bay Power Plant  
IP  
Inspection Procedure  
PSDAR  
Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report  
SFP  
Spent Fuel Pool
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 09:55, 14 January 2025

IR 05000133-09-002, on July 13-16, 2009, Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 Facility
ML092230614
Person / Time
Site: Humboldt Bay
Issue date: 08/11/2009
From: Whitten J
NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS/NMSB-B
To: Conway J
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR-09-002
Download: ML092230614 (18)


See also: IR 05000133/2009002

Text

August 11, 2009

Mr. John T. Conway

Senior Vice President-Energy Supply

& Chief Nuclear Officer

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P.O. Box 3

Mail Code 104/6/601

Avila Beach, California 93424

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00133/09-002

Dear Mr. Conway:

This refers to the inspection conducted on July 13-16, 2009, at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant,

Unit 3 facility. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as

they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the

conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination

of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with

personnel. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. In summary, the

inspector determined that you were conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with

regulatory and license requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available

electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs

document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy,

proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without

redaction.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact Mr. Robert Evans,

Senior Health Physicist, at (817) 860-8234 or the undersigned at (817) 860-8197.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jack E. Whitten, Chief

Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B

Docket No.: 050-00133

License No.: DPR-7

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/09-002

cc w/enclosure:

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM ISSION

R E GI ON I V

612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400

ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

- 2 -

James Becker, Site Vice President

and Station Director

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

P.O. Box 56

Avila Beach, CA 93424

Jennifer L. Post, Esq.

PG&E

P.O. Box 7442

San Francisco, CA 94120

Paul Roller, Director and Plant Manager

Humboldt Bay Power Plant, PG&E

1000 King Salmon Avenue

Eureka, CA 95505

Chairman

Humboldt County Board of Supervisors

County Courthouse

825 Fifth Street

Eureka, CA 95501

Law Office of Linda J. Brown, Esq.

300 Drakes Landing Road, Suite 172

Greenbrae, CA 94904

Regional Radiation Representative

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

Region IX Office

75 Hawthorne Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

Dr. Richard Ferguson, Energy Chair

Sierra Club California

1100 11th Street, Suite 311

Sacramento, CA 95814

Dr. James F. Davis, State Geologist

Department of Conservation

Division of Mines & Geology

801 K Street MS 12-30

Sacramento, CA 95814-3531

Director, Radiologic Health Branch

State Department of Health Services

P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610)

Sacramento, CA 95899-7414

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

- 3 -

Director

Energy Facilities Siting Division

Energy Resources Conservation &

Development Commission

1516 9th Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

Gretchen Dumas, Esq.

Public Utilities Commission

of the State of California

5066 State Building

San Francisco, CA 94102

Redwood Alliance

P.O. Box 293

Arcata, CA 95521

James D. Boyd, Commissioner

California Energy Commission

1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)

Sacramento, CA 95814

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

- 4 -

bcc w/enclosure:

A. Howell, D:DNMS

C. Cain, DD:DNMS

J. Whitten, C:DNMS/NMSB-B

S. Williams, OEDO RIV Coordinator

J. Weil, Congressional Affairs Officer

J. Hickman, FSME/DWMEP/DURLD/RDB

R. Evans, NMSB-B

Fee Coordinator, DRMA

DRAFT: S:\\DNMS\\!NMSB-B\\RJE\\HB 050-00133-09-002.doc

FINAL: R:\\_DNMS\\_HB\\2009\\HB 050-00133-09-002.doc

MLxxxxxxxx

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

ADAMS

Yes No

SUNSI Rev Complete

Reviewer Initials:

RJE

Publicly Avail.

Yes No

Sensitive Value:

RIV:DNMS:NMSB-B

C:NMSB-B

RJEvans

JEWhitten

/RA/

/RA/

08/02/09

08/10/09

ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.:

050-00133

License No.:

DPR-7

Report No.:

050-00133/09-002

Licensee:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Facility:

Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3

Location:

1000 King Salmon Avenue

Eureka, California 95503

Dates:

July 13-16, 2009

Inspector:

Robert Evans, PE, CHP, Senior Health Physicist

Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B

Accompanied By:

Arthur T. Howell III, Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Approved By:

Jack E. Whitten, Chief

Nuclear Materials Safety Branch B

Attachment:

Supplemental Inspection Information

ENCLOSURE

- 2 -

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3

NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/09-002

This inspection was a routine, announced inspection of decommissioning activities being

conducted at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 facility. In summary, the licensee was

conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements.

Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications

The licensees safety review program was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59

requirements (Section 1).

Maintenance and Surveillance

The licensee continued to operate and maintain necessary plant equipment in

accordance with license and procedure requirements (Section 2).

Decommissioning Performance and Status Review

The licensee was conducting decommissioning activities with an emphasis on

radiological safety. Radiation protection controls had been implemented in accordance

with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements (Section 3.2.a).

The licensee conducted an infrequently performed heavy load test in accordance with

work order instructions and with an emphasis on industrial safety (Section 3.2.b).

The license implemented a cross contamination plan in the new fossil generation facility

in accordance with license requirements (Section 3.2.c).

The licensees training program was in agreement with Defueled Safety Analysis Report

requirements, but at the time of the inspection, the licensee was significantly upgrading

the training program to account for the site-specific radiological hazards involving alpha

particulate contamination (Section 3.2.d).

Occupational Radiation Exposure

The licensee implemented an occupational exposure program that effectively monitored

the internal and external doses to radiation. No individual exceeded the regulatory limit

for total effective dose equivalent exposures during calendar year 2008 (Section 4.2.a).

During 2009, the licensee began implementing a program for control of worker

exposures to alpha particulate contamination. This program supports the concept of As

Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and should help control worker exposures to

licensed material (Section 4).

ENCLOSURE

- 3 -

Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring

The effluent and environment monitoring programs were in compliance with license

requirements. All required samples had been collected, no sample result exceeded

applicable limits, and no adverse trends were identified. Annual doses to the public

were well below the regulatory limit (Section 5).

Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials

To support the planned decommissioning activities as described in the Post-Shutdown

Decommissioning Activities Report, the licensee developed formal plans for control and

shipping of radioactive wastes. These plans provided detailed reviews and assessments

of work challenges involving radioactive waste disposals (Section 6).

ENCLOSURE

- 4 -

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

At the time of the inspection, Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3, was being

decommissioned in accordance with commitments specified in the Post-Shutdown

Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) dated June 30, 2009. The licensee commenced

with decommissioning during May 2009. Since May 2009, the licensee has removed the Unit 3

transformers and generator exciter.

In the near future, the licensee plans to remove the generator, seal oil exciter switchgear, and

reactor feed pump room equipment. The licensee may also conduct a radiological survey and

study of the reactor vessel, in part, to ascertain the various options for its removal and disposal.

Also during the inspection, the licensee continued to construct a new power generating plant on

the site property. Following construction of the new power generating plant, the licensee plans

to commence with decommissioning of Units 1 and 2.

1

Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications (37801)

1.1

Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted reviews of the licensees design change program to ensure

compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

1.2

Observations and Findings

The licensee conducted one 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation during 2009. Evaluation

09-01 eliminated a previously analyzed accident scenario. The evaluation deleted the

spent fuel pool (SFP) rupture scenario from the Defueled Safety Analysis Report

(DSAR). Rupture of the SFP was possible based on a seismic event or heavy load drop.

To prevent a heavy load drop accident, plant procedures previously prohibited the

movement of loads greater than 10 tons over the SFP.

The spent fuel was removed from the SFP by December 2008. The licensee conducted

the analysis using the NRC sponsored computer code RESRAD-OFFSITE to verify that

the remaining radioactive material would result in minimal offsite dose in the event of a

rupture of the SFP. Following its approval, this change now allows the licensee to move

heavy loads over the SFP as part of decommissioning activities.

During the inspection, representatives of the licensee stated that several documents

would be updated in the near future including the DSAR. These documents will be

updated, in part, to account for the impacts and hazards of alpha contamination.

1.3

Conclusions

The licensees safety review program was conducted in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59

requirements.

ENCLOSURE

- 5 -

2

Maintenance and Surveillance (62801)

2.1

Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted a review of the equipment that remained in service to support

plant operations, and the inspector observed the performance of selected maintenance

and surveillance activities.

2.2

Observations and Findings

At the time of the inspection, the licensee continued to maintain selected plant systems.

The components that will remain in service included the plant alarm system,

seismograph, stack gas flow monitor, liquid radwaste monitor, radwaste system

components, ventilation equipment, SFP support equipment, instrument air, service air,

and electrical controls. The licensee also continued to operate various in-plant radiation

monitors; however, these monitors are scheduled for permanent removal in the near

future.

The inspector compared operating plant parameters to the procedure limits specified in

the license. All parameters reviewed by the inspector were found to be within the

allowed range. For example, the SFP water level was being maintained in the range

stipulated by plant procedures. In summary, the licensee operated the remaining

equipment in accordance with procedure requirements.

The inspector observed the performance of three maintenance and surveillance tests:

Discharge canal sample station back flush

Stack particulate monitor sampling

Quarterly ventilation system test in the refueling building

In summary, the tests observed by the inspector were completed satisfactorily, and the

operators/technicians appeared knowledgeable of the tasks being conducted.

2.3

Conclusions

The licensee continued to operate and maintain necessary plant equipment in

accordance with and procedure requirements specified in the license.

3

Decommissioning Performance and Status Review (71801)

3.1

Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated whether the licensee and its contracted workforce were

conducting decommissioning activities in accordance with license and regulatory

requirements.

ENCLOSURE

- 6 -

3.2

Observations and Findings

a.

Site Tours

The inspector toured the fuel handling building, Unit 3 control room, and the other

radiologically restricted areas of the facility. Radiological postings were clearly visible,

and the postings met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. Housekeeping was being

controlled in these areas. During the site tours, the inspector conducted radiological

surveys to verify the accuracy of radiation area postings. The inspector did not identify

any radiation area that was incorrectly posted by the licensee.

b.

Heavy Load Lift

During the inspection, the licensee conducted a 125-percent load test of the main 75-ton

crane located within the refueling building. The licensee conducted the test to certify the

75-ton crane to be able to lift a 90-ton load. The load that was lifted during the test

consisted of the shield plug and various free weights. The weight of the lift was

determined by calculation versus direct measurement. A State of California inspector

was present during the load test.

Since this activity was an infrequently performed evolution, a special pre-job briefing was

conducted. The test was then conducted using instructions provided in a work order.

The test included a lift and hold to ensure that the crane breaks worked as designed.

The crane was also moved in each of the four major compass directions, although the

crane movement was constrained by the location of the SFP. In accordance with the

work order, the licensee elected to avoid lifting the heavy load over the SFP.

In summary, the load test was completed in a satisfactory manner, and industrial safety

was evident during all portions of the test. The load test certification has a four year

recertification interval, although annual crane inspections will still be required to keep the

certification current.

c.

Cross-Contamination Plan

License Condition 2.C.4 specifies that a cross-contamination prevention and monitoring

plan be maintained for the location of the new fossil generation facility. The inspector

reviewed the licensees implementation of its cross contamination plan. Site procedure

C-220, Cross Contamination Prevention and Monitoring Plan (Plan), provides the

instructions for the program. The inspector noted that the Plan provided an adequate

overview of the survey program, but the Plan lacked specificity for the implementation of

the cross-contamination prevention and monitoring program. The Plan referenced a

radiation protection procedure for implementation details, but when examined by the

inspector this secondary procedure had not fully incorporated the requirements of the

Plan. During the inspection, a licensee representative stated that the procedure would

be updated in the near future.

Despite the procedure limitation, the licensee conducted an initial radiological survey as

required by the cross contamination plan. The survey was conducted during early July

2009. The radiological survey results obtained indicated that all measurements taken

were indistinguishable from background levels. These survey results suggest that the

licensee has effectively implemented the requirements of the cross contamination plan.

ENCLOSURE

- 7 -

d.

Site Training Program

The inspector reviewed the training program for compliance with 10 CFR 19.12 and

DSAR requirements. Section 4.2.1 of the DSAR provides the training requirements.

The training programs include general employee training, program-specific training, and

respiratory protection training. Details of the training program are included in HBPP

procedures B-2, General Training Requirements for On-Site Personnel, and B-200,

Radiation Protection Training Program. The inspector noted that the licensee was in the

process of significantly updating the training program to account for the radiological

hazards that are present at the site.

At the time of the inspection, general employee and industrial safety training was

provided by the site training department. Function-specific training was provided by the

various departments such as radiation protection, security, and emergency

preparedness departments. General employee training consisted of computer based

training, formal classroom lectures, videotapes, handouts, and an examination.

The radiation protection staff was revising its program-specific training to include the

hazards of alpha contamination. The licensee recently created a new, offsite training

center that included mockups. The mockups will be used to train workers in the

protocols of foaming, cutting, and sealing pipes that may contain alpha contamination.

The mockups included glove boxes and tents that will be used to help control the spread

of contamination.

The training certifications of selected instructors were reviewed. The inspector

determined that the instructors were certified to teach specific classes. The inspector

reviewed selected class records and confirmed that the instructors associated with the

requisite training classes were qualified to teach the classes at the time the class was

given. The licensee maintained an informal list of all classes and the primary instructors

for those classes. Based on a random review, the inspector determined that the

instructors were certified for the courses that were assigned to them.

The inspector reviewed the respiratory protection training program with the applicable

supervisor. The training consisted of computer-based training, a medical physical, and a

fit test. At the time of the inspection, the fit test program was suspended pending receipt

of new masks for fit testing. Previous fit test failures were attributed to improper sealing

of the probe that penetrated the test respirator. The supervisor expects the fit test

program to be full operational prior to commencement of work activities involving alpha

contamination.

The inspector also discussed the applicable respiratory protection procedure with the

radiation protection supervisor. The inspector noted that the procedure had been

updated to account for the new fit testing protocol and special respiratory cleaning and

sampling requirements that must be implemented because of alpha contamination. The

supervisor expected the fit testing procedure to be updated prior to commencement of

work involving alpha contamination. Finally, the licensee plans to construct a new glove

box for cleaning alpha-contaminated respirators, and the licensee plans to provide

special training to workers who will wash and maintain the respirators.

ENCLOSURE

- 8 -

3.3

Conclusions

The licensee was conducting decommissioning activities with an emphasis on

radiological safety. Radiation protection controls had been implemented in accordance

with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The licensee conducted an infrequently performed

heavy load test on the 75-ton crane in accordance with work order instructions and with

an emphasis on industrial safety. The license implemented a cross contamination plan

in the new fossil generation facility in accordance with license requirements. The

licensees training program was in agreement with DSAR requirements, but at the time

of the inspection, the licensee was significantly upgrading the training program to

account for the site-specific radiological hazards involving alpha particulate

contamination.

4

Occupational Radiation Exposure (83750)

4.1

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed occupational radiation exposures to verify compliance with

10 CFR Part 20 limitations. The inspector also reviewed the implementation of the

licensee=s As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) program.

4.2

Observations and Findings

a.

Occupational Exposures

Occupational radiation exposures consisted of both external and internal exposures.

The licensee monitored and maintained records of Unit 3 exposures. The inspector

reviewed the occupational exposure records for calendar year 2008. During 2008, 267

thermoluminescent dosimeters were issued to individuals to measure external gamma

doses. The combined total effective dose equivalent for all individuals with a

measurable gamma dose was about 2.05 person-rems. During 2008, the work projects

with the highest dose potential included cleaning of the SFP, offloading of the fuel, and

shipping of radioactive resins.

The highest total effective dose equivalent exposure recorded during 2008 to one

individual was 121 millirems. The highest committed effective dose equivalent exposure

was 27 millirems, a dose that was assigned to two individuals. The regulatory limit for

total effective dose equivalents, a combination of deep dose equivalent and committed

effective dose equivalent, is 5,000 millirems. In summary, site doses during 2008 were

well below the regulatory limit.

To help monitor for internal doses, the licensee conducted bioassay sampling. Bioassay

sampling included entrance, exit, annual, and event-based whole body counting. No

positive whole-body counts were attributed to plant events during 2008, and to the date

of this inspection in 2009.

The inspector reviewed the licensees ALARA program for future work activities. During

interviews, the licensees staff predicted the work activities planned during 2009 that had

the greatest potential for doses to individuals would be the reactor vessel

characterization study (if conducted) and turbine-generator decommissioning. The

licensee estimated that the decommissioning of Unit 3 would result in a total combined

ENCLOSURE

- 9 -

dose of approximately 208 person-rems. The projects with the highest dose potential

include decommissioning of the reactor vessel, SFP, shutdown and cleanup heat

exchangers, and area vaults.

b.

Control of Exposures to Alpha Contamination

The inspector conducted a review of the licensees plans to control occupational

exposures to alpha contamination. The site has a unique radiological hazard due to

alpha particulate contamination. Early fuel failures resulted in the internal contamination

of plant systems with fission products and transuranic radionuclides. The alpha

particulate hazard has increased over time from the decay of plutonium-241, while the

gamma radiation hazards have decreased due to the decay of cobalt-60 and

cesium-137.

The licensee plans to commence work that has the potential for exposures to alpha

particulate contamination during October 2009. In response, the licensee developed a

radiation protection procedure for performing and evaluating alpha particulate

contamination postings and surveys. In addition, the procedure provides new controls

for alpha zones. The implementation of this new procedure should help minimize the

potential for worker exposures to alpha contamination.

To help assess the alpha contamination hazard inside of plant piping, the licensee

recently collected a number of coupon samples from various locations including the

turbine and feedwater piping. These samples were submitted to an offsite laboratory for

analysis. The results of these samples will be used, in part, to help characterize the

material for waste disposal and for transportation.

The licensee plans to conduct the cutting of alpha contaminated pipes within glove

boxes or containment tents. The use of glove boxes and tents is expected to reduce the

potential for worker exposures to loose alpha contamination. In addition, the licensee

plans to inject foam material into the pipes to fixate the alpha contamination during

cutting operations. Site workers that enter a contaminated area will be required to wear

lapel air samplers to help the licensee assess worker exposures to radioactive

particulate contamination.

During the inspection, the licensee was in the process of upgrading its training program

for workers that will be potentially exposed to alpha contamination. Industry experts

were being used to upgrade the lesson plan and to teach the class to site workers. All

workers are expected to be retrained prior to commencement of work activities involving

alpha contamination. In addition, the licensee established a mock-up facility to support

training of workers that will be cutting and handling the alpha-contaminated piping.

These training enhancements are expected to help reduce the potential for inhalation or

ingestion of alpha contamination.

Routine whole-body counts are generally ineffective for identifying uptakes of alpha

contamination. The licensee plans to implement an enhanced bioassay program that

will include collection of urine and fecal samples for monitoring of internally deposited

alpha-emitting radionuclides.

The licensee has been procuring new equipment to conduct real-time monitoring of

alpha contamination. The licensee recently placed into service a number of continuous

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air monitors that monitor for alpha contamination in addition to beta-gamma

contamination. Further, the licensee plans to install an alpha detecting monitor in the

plant ventilation stack. This monitor was expected to be installed during September

2009, prior to start of decommissioning work involving alpha contamination.

4.3

Conclusions

The licensee implemented an occupational exposure program that effectively monitored

the internal and external doses to radiation. No individual exceeded the regulatory limit

for total effective dose equivalent exposures during calendar year 2008. During 2009,

the licensee began implementing a program for control of worker exposures to alpha

particulate contamination. This program supports the concept of ALARA and should

help control worker exposures to licensed material.

5

Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring

5.1

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees program to control, monitor, and quantify releases

of radioactive materials to the environment in liquid, gaseous, and particulate forms.

5.2

Observations and Findings

The inspector reviewed the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2008 dated

March 26, 2009, and the Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report for 2008

dated April 30, 2009. The inspector compared the results presented in these reports to

the requirements provided in site procedures and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

In summary, all required samples had been collected, and no sample result exceeded a

licensed or regulatory limit. No adverse trends were apparent. The inspector identified

several report errors, and the licensee agreed to update the reports during the next

routine submittals.

The inspector compared the effluent and environmental monitoring results to the public

dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1301. In summary, the records indicate that the

public dose limits were not exceeded. The licensees results suggest a maximum public

dose of less than one millirem for 2008 with an annual regulatory limit of 100 millirems.

5.3

Conclusions

The effluent and environment monitoring programs were in compliance with license

requirements. All required samples had been collected, no sample result exceeded

applicable limits, and no adverse trends were identified. Annual doses to the public

were well below the regulatory limit.

6

Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials

(86750)

6.1

Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the licensees plans for characterizing and shipping the

radioactive wastes that will be generated during decommissioning.

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6.2

Observations and Findings

The PSDAR provides a description and schedule of planned decommissioning activities.

To support decommissioning, the licensee recently developed two plans, a Waste

Management and Disposal Plan and a Transportation Plan. These plans were

developed, in part, to identify the challenges for waste management and to identify

potential options for these challenges. The unique challenges include:

Control of the limited amount of area available for waste handling operations

Establishment of temporary waste storage areas inside and outside of site structures

Control of alpha contaminated material

Removal of contaminated concrete and soils below the water table

Removal of contaminated sediment from the intake and discharge canals

As explained in the PSDAR, the licensee has to decide whether to segment the reactor

pressure vessel and its internals or to dispose of the vessel as a single item.

The licensee estimates that the total volume of contaminated material to be removed

from the site is about 660 thousand cubic feet. The material includes soils, building

rubble, and equipment. The vast majority of the waste material generated will most

likely be classified as Class A wastes for disposal at an out-of-state disposal site. The

wastes will be sorted based on disposal and shipping classification. The licensee also

plans to use radioactive waste processors to consolidate the wastes for disposal. The

use of waste processors may allow the licensee to reduce the volume of wastes

disposed.

In response to the above challenges, the Waste Management and Disposal Plan provide

recommended flow paths for the movement of equipment from the location of

dismantlement to the location of packaging for shipment. This plan also provides a

recommended list of work areas for decommissioning. For example, the main

condenser is considered one such work area. The plan also describes the potential

classification of the waste streams such as Class A bulk wastes and Class A general

wastes.

In general, field crews will remove the equipment from a given area and will relocate the

equipment near the waste containers. The waste handling and packaging crews will

package the waste equipment, and the shipping and transportation crews will ship the

material for disposal. Based on the current work schedule, most wastes will be shipped

during the 2013-2014 time frame. The bulk of the wastes will consist mostly of soils and

building debris.

At the time of the inspection, the licensee was developing a system and area

characterization plan. This plan will help establish the definitions of the various waste

streams and help establish the waste profiles for disposal and shipment. The waste

profiles have to be completed and approved prior to the actual shipment of the waste

materials.

As explained in the Transportation Plan, the licensee estimates that it will ship

approximately 1500 shipments to the out-of-state waste disposal site. Challenges to

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transportation include the locations of the staging areas needed to support

decommissioning. Because of the limited amount of space available, the licensee is

expected to tightly control the movement, handling, and storage of waste containers.

A second transportation challenge is the location of the site. The site has limited access

to alternate modes of transportation. There are no rail or barge access points in the

immediate area of the site, so practically all wastes may have to be shipped by truck to

the disposal site. In addition, there are no easy, direct routes to the disposal site.

Further, the licensee will have to comply with length restrictions on the local highways.

At the time of the inspection, the licensee was in the process of adding staff to the

radwaste packaging and transportation groups. Procedures were being upgraded to

provide step-by-step instructions for the work that will be performed. The licensee was

in the process of procuring intermodal containers for shipment of the wastes. The

licensee was also reviewing its options for shipping large components.

The licensee was reviewing its protocols for shipment of other types of waste streams,

including oil and asbestos wastes, for disposal. For example, the licensee was

considering its options for disposal of the fuel oil storage tank, turbine lube oil, and

exciter. These components may be disposed in an alternate manner, as allowed by

10 CFR 20.2002. An alternate disposal methodology was being considered because of

the low radiological hazards associated with these materials.

6.3

Conclusions

To support the planned decommissioning activities as described in the PSDAR, the

licensee developed formal plans for control and shipping of radioactive wastes. These

plans provided detailed reviews and assessments of work challenges involving

radioactive waste disposals.

7

Exit Meeting

The inspector reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection during an exit meeting

that was conducted at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on July 16, 2009. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed, by the

inspector.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

J. Albers, Radiation Protection Manager

B. Barley, Radiation Protection Planning

M. Celletti, Training Coordinator

J. Chadwick, Radiation Protection Engineer

J. Davis, Radiation Protection Engineer

J. Griffin, Engineering Consultant, AM Solutions

L. Hardwick, SAFSTOR Supervisor

L. Pulley, Deputy Decommissioning Manager

K. Rod, Decommissioning Manager

P. Roller, Director and Nuclear Plant Manager

T. Sanders, Site Services Manager

B. Sicotte, Quality Control Supervisor

M. Smith, Engineering Manager

R. Snyder, Radwaste Supervisor

D. Sokolsky, Licensing Supervisor

M. Stein, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Bartlett

B. Stephens, Work Week Manager

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37801 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications

IP 62801 Maintenance and Surveillance

IP 71801 Decommissioning Status

IP 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure

IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring

IP 86750 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive Materials

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

ATTACHMENT

- 2 -

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALARA

As Low As Reasonably Achievable

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

DSAR

Defueled Safety Analysis Report

HBPP

Humboldt Bay Power Plant

IP

Inspection Procedure

PSDAR

Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report

SFP

Spent Fuel Pool