IR 05000390/2011004

IR 05000390-11-004; 07/01/2011 - 09/30/2011; Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2; Fire Protection, Flood Protection Measures, Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML113010456
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/28/2011
From:	Scott Shaeffer Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To:	James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR-11-004
Download: ML113010456 (31)

Text

October 28, 2011

SUBJECT:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2011004

Dear Mr. Shea:

On September 30, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on October 5, 2011, with Mr. D.

Grissette and other members of the Watts Bar staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents four NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).

These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Watts Bar facility.

In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.

TVA

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-390 License No.: NPF-90

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000390/2011004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No:

50-390

License No:

NPF-90

Report No:

05000390/2011004

Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)

Facility:

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1

Location:

Spring City, TN 37381

Dates:

July 1 - September 30, 2011

Inspectors:

R. Monk, Senior Resident Inspector

K. Miller, Resident Inspector

Approved by:

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000390/2011-004; 07/01/2011 - 09/30/2011; Watts Bar, Units 1 & 2; Fire Protection, Flood

Protection Measures, Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional inspectors. Four Green findings were identified each of which involved non-cited violations (NCVs) of NRC requirements. The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,

Significance Determination Process (SDP); the cross-cutting aspect was determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV,

Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, for the licensees failure to ensure that 6.9Kv breaker 0-BKR-569-4605025-S, which had been identified as defective, was not labeled or otherwise segregated to prevent it from being installed into the plant.

The licensees failure to ensure that defective 6.9Kv breaker 0-BKR-569-4605025-S was not installed into the plant is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern; specifically, the subject safety-related breaker could have been installed in a more critical application or have been installed for a longer period of time, up to 18 months, in the Alternate Feeder application. Additionally, the finding was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it would not contribute to both a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect that the licensee ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities in the Work Practices component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure that a defective component was not installed into the plant.

H.4(c) (Section 4OA2)

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

Corrective Action, for the licensees repeat occurrence of a level A problem evaluation report (PER) 176604 written July 17, 2009.

The licensees failure to ensure that all corrective actions for A level PER 176604 were complete is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern; specifically, the subject safety-related breaker could have been installed in a more critical application or have been installed for a longer period of time, up to 18 months, in the alternate feeder application. Additionally, the finding was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it would not contribute to both a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect for appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance and complexity in the Corrective Action Program component of the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions to prevent repetition of the fast transfer switch mal-adjustment. Specifically, effective corrective actions to preclude repetition were not implemented but signed as completed when the 1A shutdown board alternate feeder breaker was placed in service. (P.1(d)) (See Section 4OA2)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building in accordance with the approved Fire Protection Plan (FPP).

As a result, a drum containing approximately 38 gallons of new hydrocarbon oil was relocated, but not removed from a safety-related area of the auxiliary building, without addressing the FPP requirement for an approved transient combustible evaluation. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 380910 and PER 388926. The remaining oil was removed from the affected room or identified with an approved transient combustible evaluation.

The licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building in accordance with the approved FPP is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because it affected the Protection Against External Factors attribute (i.e., fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, in that it affected the objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events.

Because the finding increased the fire loading due to an increase in the volume of the predominant combustible in the area, the inspectors completed a SDP Phase I analysis that indicated that the finding was not a major degradation of fire prevention or administrative controls. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component. It was directly related to the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures. H.4(b) Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the control of transient combustibles procedure by allowing the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building. (See Section 1R05)

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) 7.01, Maximum Probable Flood. As a result the inspectors found that the boat was not in serviceable condition, and there was no procedure to address preventive maintenance of the boat. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 417920 and developing a long-term maintenance strategy.

The licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI 7.01, was a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because of the lack of an important piece of equipment (motor boat) necessary for coping with the probable maximum flood (PMF) impact on Unit 1. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee would have sufficient warning (27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br />) to obtain a replacement boat before it would be impacted by a PMF event. The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the Corrective Action Program component. It was directly related to the licensee taking appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and complexity. Specifically, the licensee failed to fully implement corrective actions to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI 7.01. (P.1(d)) (See Section 1R01).

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) from the beginning of the reporting period, July 1, 2011, until August 8, 2011, when the unit was ramped to 90 percent due to increased vibrations on the #11 turbine bearing. The unit was brought back to 100 percent within a few hours after some adjustments to the turbine and seal oil system oil temperatures. Operation continued at approximately 100 percent until August 27, 2011, when a misalignment of the turbo-toc system caused abnormally high oil reservoir levels in the 1B main feedwater pump requiring it to be manually tripped. This caused an automatic turbine runback to approximately 73 percent power. The 1B main feed pump was checked out, returned to service, and the unit was returned to approximately 100 percent the following day.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

==1R01 External Flood Protection Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the licensees readiness to cope with external flooding.

External flooding from a probable maximum flood (PMF) or design basis flood (DBF) has the potential for internal flooding of a portion of a number of the plant structures. During this type of external flooding event, the reactor core decay heat will be removed by the flood protection provisions designed to remain operational up to the DBF elevation in accordance with position 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.59. Provisions have also been made to cool the spent fuel pool. Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOI)-7.01 documents the shutdown requirements for the plant during this event. The inspectors reviewed the feasibility of several of these provisions for coping with this type of event to determine if they would achieve the desired results. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees related corrective action documents (problem evaluation reports) to ensure any nonconforming conditions related to potential flooding were properly addressed.

Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report. This inspection satisfied one inspection sample.

b. Findings

===.1

=

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI-7.01, Maximum Probable Flood.

Description:

On August 12, 2011, the inspectors noted that the licensee did not fully implement corrective actions to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI-7.01, Maximum Probable Flood. Specifically, problem evaluation report (PER) 342131 had identified, on March 22, 2011, that the boat used for flood mode preparation was not reliable. Corrective Action 1 required that a responsible organization be assigned for boat ownership, and Corrective Action 2 required that procedure MI-17.004, Movement of Equipment, Flood Mode Preparation, clarify organizational responsibility for the site boat, owner contact information, and location of the boat keys. Corrective Action 1 was closed on May 23, 2011, stating the name of organization designated for boat responsibility and specifying that the procedure would address preventive maintenance of the boat. Corrective Action 2 was closed on June 24, 2011, stating that a procedure change request (PCR) #725 would revise procedure MI-17.004.

In accordance with licensee procedure NPG-SPP-03.1.7, PER Actions, the action taken was expected to match the original PER action. Procedure MI-17.004, Revision 0, was issued for use on August 3, 2011, as an implementing procedure for AOI-7.01. The inspectors visually inspected the motor boat on August 12, 2011, with members of the responsible organization and determined that the boat was not in serviceable condition to support AOI-7.01 implementation. The inspectors also verified that MI-17.004 did not address preventive maintenance of the boat. The motor boat is necessary to move equipment above the DBF elevation. The DBF is the calculated upper limit flood that includes the probable maximum flood (PMF) plus the maximum wave run-up and surge levels. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 417920 and is developing a long-term maintenance strategy.

Analysis:

The licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI-7.01 is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would increase the probability that an important piece of equipment (motor boat) necessary for coping with the PMF would not be available when needed. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee has 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> to implement this procedure and could obtain a substitute boat. The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution associated with the Corrective Action Program component. It was directly related to the licensee taking appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and complexity. Specifically, the licensee failed to fully implement corrective actions to address maintaining a reliable motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI-7.01. (P.1(d))

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, the licensee signed off as complete corrective actions that were not fully implemented to address a motor boat necessary for flood mode preparation in accordance with AOI-7.01. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PER 417920, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000390/2011004-02, Failure to Fully Implement Corrective Actions for a Motor Boat Necessary for Flood Mode Preparation.

===.2

=

During review of corrective actions associated with PER 206105, the unauthorized placement of temporary structures supporting Unit 2 construction in the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) drainage path, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI). Drainage related to the PMP was impeded by temporary structures and additional items that had been erected in the drainage areas. It is unclear whether these items would increase the probability of water draining into the safety-related structures and damaging safety-related equipment.

Description:

The inspectors noted that PER 206105 initiated on October 28, 2009, identified that Unit 2 temporary facilities had been placed inside the plant protected area surrounding Unit 1 and 2 without verifying impacts to the critical flood elevation. Some of the temporary structures supporting Unit 2 construction had been located in the PMP drainage path. The PMP event is an operating basis event wherein drainage is required to be directed away from plant safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment necessary for continued operation of the plant. Exceeding this elevation would impact the operability of safety-related equipment required for Unit 1 safe operation. In conjunction with this PER, a functional evaluation (FE) was prepared and approved on December 4, 2009, that identified several structures that would need to be moved or modified prior to March 1, 2010. The PER required a corrective action plan due date of February 14, 2010, but a corrective action plan was never developed and there was no FE to address the adverse condition impact on Unit 1 beyond February 28, 2010.

In accordance with licensee procedure NPG-SPP-03.1.4, Corrective Action Program Screening and Oversight, the PER screening committee assigns the responsible organization for the PER. In this case the PER was assigned to an organization outside of the nuclear power group that did not have the ability to develop a corrective action plan. This assignment was outside the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B approved corrective action program process and there was no follow-up by the PER screening committee to ensure the corrective action plan development assignment was completed. No further action was taken until the inspectors identified the lack of corrective action to the PER screening committee on August 4, 2011. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 413818 and also initiated PER 417148 to address the continuing potential plant impact from the addition of more temporary structures since the initial problem was identified in 2009. A new drainage model subsequently determined that some of the current temporary structures could cause the PMP drainage to exceed the critical plant elevation impacting plant safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment necessary for continued operation. Pending additional information from the licensee involving potential for drainage to affect safety-related structures, systems, and components, this item is identified as URI 050000390/2011004-01, Failure to Develop and Implement Corrective Actions for PMP Drainage Path Impact on Unit 1.

==1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors conducted four equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional system descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and technical specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

• Partial walkdown for 1A containment spray (CS) pump while 1B CS pump out of service (OOS) for planned maintenance

• Partial walkdown of residual heat removal (RHR) A-train alignment with B RHR train unavailable (SOI-74.01, Section 8.8, ECCS Standby Mode)

• Partial walkdown of CCS pump 1B-B aligned to B-train (standby) (SOI-70.01, Section 8.1, Align to 1B HDR) while the C-S CCS pump was OOS for planned maintenance.

• Partial post-restoration walkdown of RHR pump 1B (SOI-74.01, Section 8.8, ECCS Standby Mode)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R05 Fire Protection

==

.1 Fire Protection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the six areas important to reactor safety, listed below, to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in the Fire Protection Program, Nuclear Power Group Standard Programs and Processes (NPG-SPP)-18.4.6, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, NPG-SPP-18.4.8, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work). The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to:

(1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;

(2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and

(3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. This activity constituted six inspection samples. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Auxiliary instrument room

• 1A-A emergency diesel generator (EDG)

• 2A-A EDG

• 1B-B EDG

• 2B-B EDG

• Intake pumping station

b. Findings

Introduction:

A Green NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building in accordance with the approved Fire Protection Plan (FPP).

Description:

PER 371383, Immediate Actions Taken, documented that an inspector-identified improperly stored drum of oil was removed from the entrance walkway of the 1B charging pump room on May 18, 2011. The drum contained approximately 38 gallons of new hydrocarbon oil, and there was no transient combustible evaluation for it in this safety-related location. The PER was closed and archived on June 1, 2011. NCV 05000390/2011003-03, Failure to Perform a Transient Combustible Evaluation for Storage of Oil in a Safety-Related Area in Accordance with the Approved Fire Protection Plan, was issued for the unapproved storage of this drum of oil in the 1B charging pump room. The inspectors discovered this same drum of oil on June 14, 2011, in another room a short distance down the hallway from the 1B charging pump room. There was no transient combustible evaluation for the storage of the drum of oil in this safety - related location either. PER 371383 was annotated that the adverse condition was corrected immediately and, therefore, the PER was closed as complete.

In accordance with licensee procedure NPG-SPP-03.1.9, PER Closure, a PER cannot be closed that has identified a degraded or non-conforming condition until the corrective actions to resolve the degraded or non-conforming condition are completed. Per Part II of the Fire Protection Report (FPR), the FPP, Section 10.0, Control of Combustibles, the use and handling of flammable/combustible gases and liquids are controlled in safety-related areas. Implementing procedure NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, Section 3.2.1.J., specifies that flammable and combustible liquids shall be stored in approved storage rooms or storage cabinets when not in use. Since the oil was not in use, an approved transient combustible evaluation was required for storage in the affected room if it was not stored in an approved storage cabinet. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as PER 380910 and PER 388926.

The remaining oil was removed from the affected room or identified with an approved transient combustible evaluation.

Analysis:

The licensees failure to fully implement corrective actions to address the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building in accordance with the approved FPP is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because it affected the Protection Against External Factors attribute (i.e., fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, in that if left uncorrected, there would have been an increased potential to negatively affect the objective of ensuring availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Because the finding increased the fire loading due to an increase in the volume of the predominant combustible in the area, the inspectors completed a Phase 1 and SDP Appendix F analysis that indicated that the finding was not a major degradation of fire prevention or administrative controls.

Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component. It was directly related to the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures. H.4(b) Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the control of transient combustibles procedure by allowing the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building in accordance with the approved Fire Protection Plan (FPP).

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to fully implement corrective actions to address the unapproved storage of a large quantity of oil in a safety-related area of the auxiliary building in accordance with the approved FPP.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PER 380910 and PER 388926, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000390/2011004-03, Failure to Fully Implement Corrective Actions for the Unapproved Storage of Oil in a Safety-Related Area.

.2 Annual Drill Observations

a. Inspection Scope

On September 28, 2011, the inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill for a simulated fire of the air conditioning unit on the Unit 2 lower containment weld rod distribution and storage shack. The drill was observed to evaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff identified deficiencies; openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:

(1) specified number of individuals responding;

(2) proper wearing of turnout gear;

(3) self-contained breathing apparatus available and properly worn and used;

(4) control room personnel followed procedures for initiation and verification of response;

(5) fire brigade leader exhibited command and had a copy of the pre-fire plan;

(6) fire brigade leader maintained control starting at the dress-out area;

(7) fire brigade response was timely and followed the appropriate access route;

(8) command/control set up near the location and communications were established;

(9) proper use and layout of fire hoses;

(10) fire area entered in a controlled manner;

(11) sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the scene;

(12) search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; (13)utilization of pre-planned strategies;

(14) adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario and drill objectives acceptance criteria were met; and

(15) firefighting equipment returned to a condition of readiness to respond to an actual fire. This activity constituted one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed internal flood protection measures for the emergency diesel generator building. Flood protection features were examined to verify that they were installed and maintained consistent with the plant design basis. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee flooding study calculation for determining maximum flood level in all building rooms for piping failures in both the essential raw cooling water (ERCW)system and the fire protection system and confirmed that flood mitigation features such as drains and curbs were not degraded in such a manner as to adversely impact the conclusions of the study. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This activity constituted one inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors performed two heat sink performance reviews. The inspectors reviewed the licensees program for maintenance and testing of the 2B-B emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchangers. Specifically, the review included the performance testing and analysis of the 2B1 (2-HTX-082-720B1-B) and 2B2 (2-HTX-082-720B2-B)

EDG jacket water heat exchangers. The inspectors reviewed the ERCW system description, the heat exchanger performance, and the eddy current testing program document as well as completed work orders documenting the testing and visual inspection and associated corrective actions to verify that corrosion or fouling did not impact the heat exchanger from achieving its design basis heat removal capacity. The inspectors reviewed periodic test data of ERCW flow rates as well as inlet and outlet temperatures to determine whether potential degradation was being monitored and/or prevented. The inspectors also reviewed eddy current inspection results to determine whether wall loss indications and tube plugging requirements were being identified. The inspectors reviewed the fouling factor calculation. Documents reviewed are listed in the

. This inspection satisfied two annual inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

==

On July 13, 2011, the inspectors observed the simulator evaluations for Operations Crew 5 per 3-OT-SRT-FR-C.2-1, Rev. 0, Small RCS Leak, Small Break LOCA and Degraded Core Cooling. The plant conditions led to a Site Area Emergency level classification. PI credit was taken.

The inspectors specifically evaluated the following attributes related to the operating crews performance:

• Clarity and formality of communication

• Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit

• Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms

• Correct use and implementation of Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOI), and Emergency Operating Instructions (EOI)

• Timely and appropriate Emergency Action Level declarations per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

The inspectors also attended the critique to assess the effectiveness of the licensee evaluators, and to verify that licensee-identified issues were comparable to issues identified by the inspector.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the two performance-based problems listed below. A review was performed to assess the effectiveness of maintenance efforts that apply to scoped SSCs and to verify that the licensee was following the requirements of TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting

.65, and

NPG-SPP-03.4, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting

.65. Reviews focused, as appropriate, on:

(1) appropriate work practices;

(2) identification and resolution of common cause failures;

(3) scoping in accordance with

===.65 ;

(4) characterization of reliability issues;

(5) charging unavailability time;

(6) trending===

key parameters; (7)

===.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification; and

(8) the===

appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).

• Reviewed a(1) action plan for hydrogen recombiners

• Reviewed basis for return of B main control room chiller to a(2) status

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, for the five work activities listed below:

(1) the effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;

(2) the management of risk;

(3) that, upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities; and

(4) that maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of

.65 (a)(4); SPP-7.0, Work Control and Outage

Management; NPG-SPP-07.1, One Line Work Management; and TI-124, Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix. This inspection satisfied two inspection samples for Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control.

• Risk assessment for emergent work related to the 1A charging pump room cooler with turbine-drive auxiliary feedwater pump, 1B SI pump, C-S CCS pump and 2B EDG scheduled to be OOS

• Risk assessment for emergent work related to G ERCW pump extended maintenance window with the A auxiliary air compressor OOS

• Risk assessment for A emergency board room chiller work carry-over into a B-train work week. Licensee decided to avoid yellow risk by deferring work on B shutdown board room chiller

• Risk assessment for emergent work on 1B RHR pump room cooler with 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and 1B CS pump OOS

• Risk assessment for work week 107 with CCS pump 1B, CCP pump 1B and H-B ERCW pump OOS for planned maintenance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, listed below, to assess, as appropriate:

(1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;

(2) whether continued system operability was warranted;

(3) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled;

(4) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and the risk significance in accordance with the significant determination process (SDP). The inspectors verified that the operability evaluations were performed in accordance with NPG-SPP-03.1, Corrective Action Program.

• FE for PER 252600, Ice condenser functionality in high humidity conditions

• FE for PER 412119, Pinhole leak in weld on Unit 1 side of Unit 2 interface valve in ERCW system at valve 2-67-603B

• FE for PER 404515, Use of B-train CERPI linearization coefficients in A-train CERPI

• FE related to LER 390/2011-003 for functionality of TDAFW pump while binding issue with governor existed

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification against the requirements of NPG-SPP-09.5, Temporary Alterations, and NPG-SPP-09.4, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments, and verified that the modification did not affect system operability or availability as described by the TS or the UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors determined whether:

(1) the installation of the temporary modification was in accordance with the work package;

(2) adequate configuration control was in place; (3)procedures and drawings were updated; and

(4) post-installation tests verified operability of the affected systems.

• TACF 0-10-0006-257, Revision 2, Provide a source of temporary power for the normal 480 volt supply to the security system uninterruptible power supply transformers

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, (listed below) as appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether:

(1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;

(2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed;

(3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;

(4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;

(5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;

(6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;

(7) test equipment was removed following testing; and

(8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The inspectors verified that these activities were performed in accordance with NPG-SPP-06.9, Testing Programs; NPG-SPP-06.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing; and NPG-SPP-07.1, On Line Work Management.

• Work order (WO) 09-822633-000, OSI-31-903-A, Electric board room chilled water circulation pump A-A quarterly performance test

• WO 111349308, WBN-1-HS-003-0116A/8-A, Replace local closed push button switch and indicating light for AFW pump 1A-A suction valve

• WO 1120322599, 1-SI-74-62-B, 18 month channel calibration of remote shutdown control RHR pump 1B-B miniflow 1-FIS-74-24

• WO 111429852, Diesel generator 1A-A, four year diesel engine inspection (0-MI-82.005), two year diesel general engine inspection (MI-82.003)

• WO 111984-023, 2-AHU-031-0461-A, Electric board room air conditioning unit 2A-A, general inspection

• WO 112691762, Replace ERCW pump B-A motor (0-MTR-067-0032-A)

b. Findings

No findings were identified

==1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors witnessed five surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs, listed below, to assess, as appropriate, whether the SSCs met the requirements of the TS; the UFSAR; SPP-8.0, Testing Programs; NPG-SPP-06.9.2, Surveillance Test Program; and SPP-9.1, ASME Section XI. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.

In-Service Test:

• WO 112016643, O-SI-32-902-A, Auxiliary air compressor cooling water inlet valve full cycle exercising during normal operation - Train-A

Other Surveillances

• WO 112015293, 1-SI-3-903-A, Valve full stroke exercising during plant operation - auxiliary feedwater (Train-A)

• WO 111993880, 1-SI-68-901B, Valve full stroke exercising during plant operation:

reactor coolant B-train

• WO 111944409, 0-SI-82-11-B, Monthly diesel generator start and load test - DG 1B-B

• WO 112004235, 1-SI-74-901-B, RHR pump 1B-B quarterly performance test

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

.1 On July 13, 2011, the inspectors observed a licensee-evaluated emergency

preparedness drill, listed below, to verify that the emergency response organization was properly classifying the event in accordance with EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart, and making accurate and timely notifications and protective action recommendations in accordance with EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event; EPIP-3, Alert; EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency; EPIP-5, General Emergency; and the Radiological Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors verified that licensee evaluators were identifying deficiencies and properly dispositioning performance against the performance indicator criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

• An external event led to a loss of all AC power requiring a Site Area Emergency classification

• The loss of power extended for the period of coping time and beyond requiring a General Emergency classification

.2 On September 21, 2011, the inspectors observed a licensee-evaluated emergency

preparedness drill, listed below, to verify that the emergency response organization was properly classifying the event in accordance with EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart, and making accurate and timely notifications and protective action recommendations in accordance with EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event; EPIP-3, Alert; EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency; EPIP-5, General Emergency; and the Radiological Emergency Plan. In addition, the inspectors verified that licensee evaluators were identifying deficiencies and properly dispositioning performance against the performance indicator criteria in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

• An external event led to a ground motion detector alarm requiring an Alert classification

• A plant trip resulted from an after-shock, there was a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), and there was a loss of off-site power and standby power requiring a Site Area Emergency classification

• Ventilation monitors outside of containment provided a response requiring a General Emergency classification

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the five PIs listed below. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during the periods listed, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 5, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.

• Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) - High pressure injection system

• MSPI - Cooling water systems

• MSPI - Heat removal system

• MSPI - RHR system

• MSPI - Emergency AC power

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification & Resolution of Problems

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily PER summary reports and attending daily PER review meetings.

.2 Annual Sample:

Corrective Actions Associated with PER 176604 Equipment Failure Resulted in Loss of 2B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action plan and the completed actions for PER 177604.

b. Findings and Observations

===.1

=

A Green, NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees repeat occurrence of a level A PER 176604 written July 17, 2009.

Description:

Inspectors noted an operator log entry which indicated that the 1A shutdown board failed to transfer from the alternate electrical source to the normal electrical source as designed. The normal feeder attempted to close prematurely prior to the alternate feeder being opened. As a result, the licensee wrote PER 358654 which was closed to WO 112197064 to troubleshoot and repair. The licensee failed to recognize that this was the same issue as PER 176604 from July 17, 2009.

WO 112197064 resulted in determining that the transfer switch problem previously identified in PER 176604 had outstanding WO 09-817480-000 for this problem. WO 09-817480-000 had been written as a result of troubleshooting on WO 09-817021-000 on July 21, 2009. WO 09-817021-000 was a corrective action of the original PER 176604.

In other words, one of the corrective actions was closed to a WO which did not fix the identified problem but spawned another WO that was completely decoupled from the originating PER to fix the transfer switch mal-adjustment. This spawned WO was left in the work control system from July 2009 until April 2011. During this time frame, the defective breaker was stored in a spare cubicle in the 1A shutdown board until February 2011 when it was placed in service as the alternate source breaker for the 1A shutdown board. (See NCV 05000390/2011004-05 this section)

Analysis:

The licensees failure to ensure that all corrective actions for the A level PER 176604 were complete is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern; specifically the subject safety-related breaker could have been installed in a more critical application or have been installed for a longer period of time, up to 18 months, in the alternate feeder application. Additionally, the finding was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because it would not contribute to both a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect for appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance and complexity in the Corrective Action Program component of the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions to prevent repetition of the fast transfer switch mal-adjustment. Specifically, effective corrective actions to preclude repetition were not implemented but signed as completed when the 1A shutdown board alternate feeder breaker was placed in service.

(P.1(d)).

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part, that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above requirement, the corrective actions taken by the licensee to properly adjust the fast transfer switch circuit resulted in a repetition of the previously identified failure when, on April 23, 2011, the 1A shutdown board failed to transfer as part of a surveillance test.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PER 407285, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000390/2011004-04, Incomplete Corrective Actions involving the Failure of a Shutdown Board to Transfer.

===.2

=

A Green, NRC identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to ensure that 6.9Kv breaker 0-BKR-569-4605025-S, which had been identified as defective, was not labeled or otherwise segregated to prevent it from being installed into the plant.

Description:

During review of PER 176604 corrective actions (See NCV 05000390/2011004-04 this section) inspectors noted that 6.9Kv breaker 0-BKR-569-4605025-S had been determined by WO 09-817021-000 to have a defective fast transfer switch. The licensee documented this defective breaker on WO 09-817480-000 in July 2007 and placed the breaker in a spare cubicle in safety-related shutdown board 1A. No effective actions were taken to identify this breaker as defective or to segregate it. In February 2011, the licensee placed this breaker in service as the alternate source breaker for the 1A shutdown board. It remained in service until April 2011 when it failed to fast transfer during a surveillance test.

Analysis:

The licensees failure to ensure that defective 6.9Kv breaker 0-BKR-569-4605025-S was not installed into the plant is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, specifically the subject safety-related breaker could have been installed in a more critical application or have been installed for a longer period of time, up to 18 months, in the alternate feeder application. Additionally, the finding was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using the Phase I screening worksheet of IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it would not contribute to both a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect that the licensee ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities in the Work Practices component of the area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure that a defective component was not installed into the plant. (H.4(c))

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, states, in part, that measures shall be established to control materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to prevent their inadvertent use or installation. These measures shall include, as appropriate, procedures for identification, documentation, segregation, disposition, and notification to affected organizations. Contrary to the above requirement, the licensee failed to properly segregate 6.9Kv breaker 0-BKR-569-4605025-S so as to prevent installation into the shutdown board 1A. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as PER 407285, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy and is identified as NCV 05000390/2011004-05, Failure to Adequately Control Non-Conforming or Degraded Equipment.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000390/2011-002:

Essential Raw Cooling Water System Valve Misalignment

While performing Surveillance Instruction 1-SI-67-1 on June 22, 2009, TVA discovered that both primary ERCW supply valve 2-FCV-67-66 and backup ERCW supply valve 2-FCV-67-68 to the 2A-A emergency diesel generator heat exchangers were open. Under normal operating conditions, 2-FCV-67-66 is open and 2-FCV-67-68 is closed. With both supply valves open, the system was not properly aligned, and ERCW supply headers 1A and 2B were cross-connected. This misalignment caused the ERCW system to be inoperable in accordance with TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.8 and the system could not meet surveillance requirement (SR) 3.7.8.1, to verify valves are in the correct position. With both ERCW trains inoperable, the plant entered LCO 3.0.3.

Valve 2-FCV-67-68 was closed immediately upon discovery, and the plant exited LCO 3.0.3. However, subsequent evaluation of the system alignment indicated that there was no loss of safety function. This violation of TS was identified by inspectors during problem and identification inspection 05000390/2011008 and an NCV 05000390/2011008-01, Failure to Submit a Licensee Event Report for a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications Associated with the Essential Raw Cooling Water System was issued. This LER is closed.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000390/2011-003:

Mode Change Without Meeting Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5

On May 14, 2011, at 14:28 Eastern Daylight Saving Time, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 entered Mode 3 with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump inoperable following maintenance during WBN Cycle 10 refueling outage. The inoperable condition was identified during performance of SR 3.7.5.2 on May 16, 2011. The TDAFW pump failed SR 3.7.5.2 due to equipment failure, and the plant entered LCO 3.7.5, Condition B.

The faulty equipment was repaired and the TDAFW pump was re-tested in accordance with SR 3.7.5.2. The TDAFW pump met the acceptance criteria within the allowable time, and the plant exited LCO 3.7.5 at 17:45 on May 19, 2011.

Inspectors reviewed the event in detail. Inspectors requested and received analysis that this pump could perform all safety-related functions even with the identified binding issues on the governor linkage during the time frame of the troubleshooting less the time that the pump was tagged for investigation. This LER is closed.

.3 (Closed) LER 390/2011-004: Reactor/Turbine Trip due to Loss of Main

Generator Excitation

On May 29, 2011, 01:55 Eastern Daylight Saving Time with Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power, the reactor tripped automatically on a main generator/turbine trip due to loss of main generator excitation, which resulted from a spurious fault signal from the extended gate controller (EGC) in the automatic voltage regulator (AVR). The most probable cause of the spurious signal was an intermittent fault in a ribbon cable to the EGC. Following cooldown to no-load equilibrium conditions, main feedwater isolation occurred due to reactor trip coincident with low reactor coolant system TAVG. Main feedwater isolation resulted in a main feed pump turbine trip signal which resulted in the automatic startup of the auxiliary feedwater system. No overcooling transient occurred and no safety injection signal was initiated for this event.

Plant personnel immediately entered appropriate trip response procedures and stabilized the plant.

The EGC circuit has been bypassed to prevent further spurious trips. The ribbon cable will be replaced at the next outage, and EGC output will be monitored for approximately one cycle to confirm no spurious trip signals before placing the EGC back in service.

Inspectors reviewed the event and determined this to be an infant mortality issue with a newly installed design. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On October 5, 2011, the Resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Don Grissette, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

4OA7 Licensee Indentified Violations

None.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

G. Boerschig, Plant Manager

J. Bushnell, Licensing Engineer

R. Crews, Operations Training Manager

T. Detchemende, Emergency Preparedness Manager

K. Dutton, Engineering Director

D. Grissette, Site Vice President

D. Guinn, Licensing Manager

E. Higgins, Mechanical/Civil Design Manager

W. Hooks, Radiation Protection Manager

P. Huffman, ISI Coordinator

D. Hughes, Training Supervisor

B. Hunt, Operations Superintendent

D. Hutchinson, Chemistry Manager

C. Kato, BACC Coordinator

W. Mahan, Site Welding Engineer

J. Milner, Technical Support Superintendent, Radiation Protection

D. Murphy, Maintenance Manager

B. Perkins, Bechtel Civil Engineering

W. Prevatt, Operations Manager

C. Riedl, Licensing

A. Scales, Work Control Manager

S. Sweet, Licensing Engineer

J. Wilcox, Security Manager

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000390/2011004-01 URI Failure to Develop and Implement Corrective Actions for PMP Drainage Path Impact on Unit 1 (Section 1R01.2)

Opened and Closed

05000390/2011004-02 NCV Failure to Fully Implement Corrective Actions

for a Motor Boat Necessary for Flood Mode

Preparation (Section 1R01.1)

05000390/2011004-03 NCV

Failure to Fully Implement Corrective Actions

for the Unapproved Storage of Oil in a Safety

Related Area (Section 1R05.1)

05000390/2011004-04 NCV

Inadequate Corrective Actions involving the Failure

of a Shutdown Board to Transfer (Section 4OA2.2)

05000390/2011004-05 NCV

Failure to Adequately Control Non-Conforming

or Degraded Equipment (Section 4OA2.2)

Closed

390/2011-002 LER Essential Raw Cooling Water System Valve Misalignment (Section 4OA3.1)

390/2011-003 LER

Mode Change without meeting Limiting

Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.5 (Section

4OA3.2)

390/2011-004 LER

Reactor/Turbine Trip due to Loss of Main

Generator Excitation (Section 4OA3.3)

Discussed

None.