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| number = ML17345A892
| number = ML17345A892
| issue date = 12/11/2017
| issue date = 12/11/2017
| title = Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, NRC Team Inspection Report 05000424/2017010 and 05000425/2017010
| title = NRC Team Inspection Report 05000424/2017010 and 05000425/2017010
| author name = Sandal S R
| author name = Sandal S
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB6
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB6
| addressee name = Myers D J
| addressee name = Myers D
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| addressee affiliation = Southern Nuclear Operating Co, Inc
| docket = 05000424, 05000425
| docket = 05000424, 05000425
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:December 11, 2017
[[Issue date::December 11, 2017]]


Mr. Darin VP Nuclear Plant Site Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.
==SUBJECT:==
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2017010 AND 05000425/2017010


Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830
==Dear Mr. Myers:==
On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
 
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
 
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.


SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2017010 AND 05000425/2017010
Sincerely,
/RA/  


==Dear Mr. Myers:==
Shane Sandal, Chief
On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.


The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
Reactor Projects Branch 6


The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Division of Reactor Projects


Sincerely,/RA/
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81  
Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010  
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
 
REGION II==
Docket No.:
50-424, 50-425
 
License No.:
NPF-68, NPF-81
 
Report No.:
05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010
 
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc
 
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
 
Location:
Waynesboro, GA 30830
 
Dates:
November 13 - 16, 2017
 
Inspectors:
P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)
 
S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst


===w/Attachment:===
R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer A. Alen, Resident Inspector
Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ
 
Approved by:
Shane Sandal, Chief
 
Reactor Projects Branch 6
 
Division of Reactor Projects


=SUMMARY=
=SUMMARY=
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010; 11/13/2017 - 11/16/2017; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the
IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010; 11/13/2017 - 11/16/2017; Vogtle Electric  


Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.


The inspection covered a one-week inspection by one senior resident inspector, one senior reactor analyst, one senior project engineer, and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.
The inspection covered a one-week inspection by one senior resident inspector, one senior reactor analyst, one senior project engineer, and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 6.


No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.
Line 55: Line 93:


==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness  
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness  


{{a|4OA5}}
{{a|4OA5}}
==4OA5 Other Activities==
==4OA5 Other Activities==
  (TI 2515/191) The objectives of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, "Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans," were to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensee's Final Integrated Plan, which was described in a letter dated May 23, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16146A607), and the NRC's plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16277A404), to verify that the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in the spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI was also to verify the licensee has implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in the site-specific submittals and the NRC's safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing was sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event. The inspection verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond- Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) were in place and were being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per  COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262). The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation and, where appropriate, performed plant walkdowns to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensee's submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the team's inspection activities are described in the following sections. 1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events
(TI 2515/191)  


The objectives of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, were to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensees Final Integrated Plan, which was described in a letter dated May 23, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16146A607), and the NRCs plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16277A404), to verify that the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in the spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI was also to verify the licensee has implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in the site-specific submittals and the NRCs safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing was sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.
The inspection verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) were in place and were being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).
The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation and, where appropriate, performed plant walkdowns to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.
===1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team examined the licensee's established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess: (1) the adequacy and completeness of the procedures; (2) the familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; (3) the staging and compatibility of equipment; and (4) the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess:
: (1) the adequacy and completeness of the procedures;
: (2) the familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance;
: (3) the staging and compatibility of equipment; and
: (4) the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
b. Assessment  
 
Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
* Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
* Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
* Integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
* Integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
Line 72: Line 124:
* Developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
* Developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.


The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
No findings were identified. 2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation
No findings were identified.


===2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team examined the licensee's newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation. Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.
 
Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
b.
 
Assessment  
 
Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:
* Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
* Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
* Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
* Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
Line 86: Line 145:
* Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
* Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.


The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
No findings were identified. 3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information
No findings were identified.


===3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensee's staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensee's multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.


b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC'S March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
b.
 
Assessment  
 
The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCS March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
* Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
* Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
* EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
* EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
* Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site-specific dose assessment software and approach. The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.
* Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
 
The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.


====c. Findings====
====c. Findings====
No findings were identified.
No findings were identified.


{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
 
==4OA6 Exit==
==4OA6 Exit==
 
===Exit Meeting Summary===
=====Exit Meeting Summary=====
 
On November 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Myers and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
On November 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Myers and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.


ATTACHMENT:
ATTACHMENT:  


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
===Licensee personnel===
===Licensee personnel===
: [[contact::T. Baker]], Security Manager  
: [[contact::T. Baker]], Security Manager  
Line 124: Line 188:
: [[contact::T. Maddox]], Senior Program Engineer  
: [[contact::T. Maddox]], Senior Program Engineer  
: [[contact::E. Murphy]], Shift Support Supervisor  
: [[contact::E. Murphy]], Shift Support Supervisor  
: [[contact::D. Myers]], Site Vice President
: [[contact::D. Myers]], Site Vice President  
: [[contact::T. Petrak]], FLEX Project Manager  
: [[contact::T. Petrak]], FLEX Project Manager  
: [[contact::K. Walden]], Licensing Engineer
: [[contact::K. Walden]], Licensing Engineer  
: [[contact::E. Tew]], Licensing Supervisor  
: [[contact::E. Tew]], Licensing Supervisor  
: [[contact::K. Yechou]], Shift Operator  
: [[contact::K. Yechou]], Shift Operator  
: [[contact::T. Yonce]], Shift Operator
: [[contact::T. Yonce]], Shift Operator  
 
===NRC personnel===
===NRC personnel===
: [[contact::J. Quinnones-Navarro]], NRR/DLP/PBEB  
: [[contact::J. Quinnones-Navarro]], NRR/DLP/PBEB  
: [[contact::M. Endress]], Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector  
: [[contact::M. Endress]], Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector  
 
==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==
==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==
===Opened and Closed===
None


===Opened and Closed===
===Complete===
None
TI-2515/191, Appendix A, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events TI-2515/191, Appendix B, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation TI-2515/191, Appendix C, Staffing and Communications Request for Information  
Complete TI-2515/191, Appendix A, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events
TI-2515/191, Appendix B, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation TI-2515/191, Appendix C, Staffing and Communications Request for Information


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
===Procedures===
 
: 00012-C, Shift Manning Requirements, Ver. 20.1 11431-1, 120V AC 1E Vital Instrument Distribution System Alignment, Ver. 8.2
: 14958-C, Fire Brigade Equipment - Quarterly Inspection (FSAR Fire Protection Surveillance),
: Ver. 44
: 18031-1/2, Loss of Class 1 E Elect Systems, Ver. 1.1 19100-1, ECA 0.0, Loss of all AC Power, Ver. 4 19100-2, ECA 0.0, Loss of all AC Power, Ver. 5.2
: 23982-1, Spent Fuel Pool Back-Up Level Indication System 1L-5331 Channel Functional Check and Channel Calibration, Ver. 4
: 23989-2, Spent Fuel Pool Back-Up Level Indication System 2L-5331 Channel Functional Check    and Channel Calibration, Ver. 5
: NMP-AD-008, Applicability Determinations, Ver. 20.0
: NMP-AD-008-F01, Applicability Determination, Ver. 11.1
: NMP-EP-147, Offsite Dose Assessment, Ver. 2.0
: NMP-EP-147-004, Vogtle Units 1 and 2
: MIDAS-NU Dose Projections, Ver. 1.0
: NMP-GM-038, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program, Ver. 2.0
: NMP-GM-038-003, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies    (FLEX) Program, Ver. 1.2
: NMP-OS-014-003 VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program Ver. 3.1
: NMP-OS-018-305, Unit 1
: FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Ver. 1.1
: NMP-OS-018-306, Unit 1
: FSG-6, Alternate CST Makeup, Ver. 1.0
: NMP-OS-019, Beyond Design Bases Events, Ver. 1.0
: NMP-OS-019-001, EOF Support for Beyond Design Bases Events, Ver. 2.0
: NMP-OS-019-001, Security Support for Beyond Design Bases Events, Ver. 1.1
: NMP-OS-019-003, Security Support for Beyond Design Basis Events, Ver. 1.1
: NMP-OS-019-304, Unit 1
: FSG-4, ELAP DC Load Management, Ver. 1.1
: NMP-OS-019-305, FSG 5 Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, Ver. 1.1
: NMP-OS-019-362, Unit 1
: SIG-2, 480V Power, Ver. 3.2
: NMP-OS-019-363, Unit 1
: SIG-3, Core Cooling, Ver. 4.1
: NMP-OS-019-367, Unit C
: SIG-7 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer, Ver. 1.0
: NMP-OS-019-368, Vogtle Unit C
: SIG-8, Spent Fuel Pool Makeup, Ver. 1.3
: NMP-OS-019-370, Vogtle Unit C
: SIG-10, Ventilation, Ver. 2
: NMP-OS-019-391, Steam Generator FLEX Pump Operating Instructions, Ver. 1.0
: NMP-OS-019-395, Light Towers Operating Instructions, Ver. 1 
: SNC Standard Emergency Plan Annex for VEGP Units 1 and 2, Ver. 1
: V-IC-PP-07010, I&C FLEX Equipment Set-up, Communications, Rev. 1.0
: V-IC-CO-20153, Curriculum Outline Instrument and Control Maintenance, Rev. 1.0 V-IC-215, Curriculum Outline Instrument and Control Maintenance for Mitigating Core Damage,
: Rev. 7 
===Drawings===
: 1X3D-BH-G01X, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Gen Fuel Oil & Air Start System -
: 1-2403-P4-001-M01, Rev. 6 1X3D-BH-G01Z, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Gen Fuel Oil & Air Start System -
: 1-2403-P4-002-M01, Rev. 4 1X3D-BH-G02B, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Gen Fuel Oil & Air Start System -
: 1-2403-P4-003-M01, Rev. 7 1X3D-BH-G02D, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Gen Fuel Oil & Air Start System -
: 1-2403-P4-004-M01, Rev. 6 1X4DB161-1, P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Condensate Storage & Degasifier - System No. 1302, Ver. 46.0
: 1X4DB161-2, P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater - System No. 1302, Ver. 29.0 1X4DB161-3, P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Driver) - System No. 1302, Ver. 42.0 1X4DB184, P&I Diagram - Reactor Make-up Water Storage Tank and Degasifier - System No. 1228, Ver. 33.0 2X4DB161-1, P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater System Condensate Storage & Degasifier - System No. 1302, Ver. 37.0 2X4DB161-2, P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater - System No. 1302, Ver. 26.0 2X4DB161-3, P&I Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump System (Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Driver) - System No. 1302, Ver. 38.0 2X4DB184, P&I Diagram - Reactor Make-up Water Storage Tank and Degasifier - System No. 1228, Ver. 28.0 AX4DR023, Volumes and Water Elevations in the Primary System, Ver. 4.0
===Condition Reports===
: Reviewed
: 10081911
: 10167427
: 10168657
: 10181425
: 10182267
: 10218389
: 225117
: 10263821
: 10280033
: 10284813
: 10329548
: 10333989
: 10343882
: 10345429
: 10373730
: 10375054
: 10388817
: 10393869
: 10397553
: 10406848
: 10417479 
===Condition Reports===
: Generated as part of the Inspection
: 10431404, Revise
: NMP-OS-019-033
: 10431425, Revise Procedure
: NMP-GM-038
: 10431490, FLEX Equipment Procedures
: SIG-4 and
: SIG-10 Discrepancies
: 10431494, FLEX Procedures Figures Unreadable
: 10431496, Equipment Found Parking in FLEX No Parking Zone
: 10431498, Review and Update
: NMP-GM-038 and
: NMP-GM-038-003
: Work Orders/Work Requests: SNC766504, Unit 1 SFP Backup Level Channel Cal, 60 days prior to refueling outage, 02/27/16 SNC769448, Unit 1 SFP Backup Level Channel Cal, 60 days prior to refueling outage, 03/6/17
: SNC766503, Unit 1 SFP Backup Level Channel Cal, 60 days prior to refueling outage, 03/8/17
: SNC618138, Unit 2 SFP Primary Level Functional Check or Channel Cal (60 days prior to outage), 08/12/17 SNC813736, Unit 2 SFP Primary Level Functional Check or Channel Cal (60 days prior to    outage), 08/16/17
: SNC611957, Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Level Probe 1 Site Acceptance Test, 10/07/15 SNC576693, Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Level Probe 1 Site Acceptance Test, 10/21/15 SNC824575, A2800A4043 - 6 Month FLEX PM:
: Rapidcom Communications Functional Test and
: Inspection, 09/02/17 SNC824576, A2800A4044 - 6 Month FLEX PM:
: Rapid Communications Functional Test and
: Inspection, 10/19/17
: SNC829177, A2800P4015 - FLEX 1Y PM - Makeup FLEX Pump Operational Inspection, 08/16/17
: SNC829179, A2800P4016 - FLEX PM Makeup FLEX Pump Operational Inspection, 08/16/17
: SNC829180, A2800P4001 - FLEX PM: SG FLEX Pump Operational Inspection, 08/14/17 SNC829182, A2800P4002 - FLEX PM: SG FLEX Pump Operational Inspection, 08/17/17 SNC829194, A2800G4014 - FLEX
: PM 480V FLEX Generator Operational Inspection, 08/15/17 SNC829192, A2800G4012 - FLEX
: PM 480V FLEX Generator Operational Inspection, 08/16/17 SNC829183, A2800P4003 - FLEX 1YR PM - SG FLEX Pump Operational Inspection, 08/16/17
: SNC853909, A2800A4043 - Update Required for SAM/FLEX Satellite Communication
: Equipment, 04/06/17 SNC866708, A-2800-A4-009 - 20KW FLEX D/G Battery is Assumed Dead, Rev. 0 
===Preventative Maintenance Procedures===
: A2800R5002, SG FLEX Pump Functional Test & Inspection A2800R5004, 480V FLEX Functional Test & Inspection
: A2800R5005, SG FLEX Pump Functional Test & Inspection
: A2800R5011, Boron Injection Pump Operational Inspection
: A2800R0514, Submersible Pump Functional Test & Inspection
: A2800R5016, RCS Makeup Pump Functional Test & Inspection A2800R5019, Makeup FLEX Pump Functional Test & Inspection A2800R5014, 480V FLEX Generator Operational Inspection
: A2800R5027, Submersible Pump Operational Inspection & Performance Test
: A2800R5038, SG FLEX Pump Operational Inspection & Performance Test
: A2800R5051, 480V FLEX Generator Off-line Testing A2800R5055, 480V FLEX Generator Full Load Test A2800R5059, RCS Makeup Pump 100% Performance Test 
: A2800R5063, Boron Injection Pump 100% Performance Test
: A2800R5066, FLEX Hose Inspection & Testing
: A2800R5068, FLEX Cable Inspection & Insulation Testing A2800R5077, FLEX Standby Walkdown Visual Inspection of FSB Equipment A2800R5079, FLEX FSB Equipment Inventory
: A2800R5080, FLEX Protected Area Equipment Inventory Correspondence
: NL-13-013, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Units 1 and 2, Southern Nuclear Operating Company's Overall Integrated Plan In Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order EA-
: 2-051), 02/27/13 NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, 03/12/12 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340) NRC Letter, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
: EA-12-049 and
: EA-12-051, 11/14/16 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16301A419) Southern Nuclear Operating Company Letter (NL-13-0987), Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Units 1 &2, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Units 1 & 2, Vogtle Electric Generating Nuclear Plant - Units 1 & 2, Capability to Perform Emergency Multi-Unit Offsite Dose Assessments, 06/24/13 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Letter (NL-14-0585), Vogtle Electric Generating Nuclear Plant - Units 1 & 2 - Response to Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10CFR50.54(f)
: Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the NTTF Review of Insights from Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012, 05/16/14 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Letter, 60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10
: CFR 50.54( f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1,.2.3, and 9.3 of the NTTF Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012, 05/09/12
: Other AREVA Report No. 38-9238015-000, SAFER Response Plan for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Rev. 1 DCP SNC473105, Unit 1 FLEX Alternate Power, Ver. 4.0
: DCP SNC475956, Unit 2 FLEX Core Cooling, Ver. 2.0
: DCP SNC475965, Unit 2 FLEX Alternate Power, Ver. 6.0 DCP SNC475966, Unit 2 FLEX Boron Injection and RCS Feed, Ver. 3.0
: DCP SNC475969, Unit 2 FLEX Tank Makeup, Ver. 3.0
: DCP SNC475972, Unit 1 FLEX Tank Makeup, Ver. 2.0
: DCP SNC475973, Unit 1 FLEX Boron Injection and RCS Feed, Ver. 2.0
: DCP SNC477823, Unit 1 FLEX Core Cooling, Ver. 3.0 DCP SNC583177, Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Level Indication, Ver. 3.0 DCP SNC521783, Spent Fuel Level Instrumentation System (Unit 2), Ver. 4.0
: Focused Area Self-Assessment, VEGP 1&2 FLEX Compliance, 8/17/17
: NANTEL Training Records for ERO, 2014 - 2017
: NEI 10-05, Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities, Rev. 0
: NEI 12-01, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities, Rev. 0
: NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Rev. 2 Operator Course Completion Record, 2015 Licensed Operator Requalification, Segment 4, 06/15/15 to 07/17/15 NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim Staff Guidance - Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 0 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113010523) Standing Order
: C-2016-9, Tornado Missile Vulnerabilities, Rev. 2.0
: RapidCom Functional Test and Inspection Work Instructions RapidCase Functional Test and Inspection Work Instructions SNC528260, FLEX Building Ground Prep and Infrastructure, Sequence 1, 10/13/14 SNC528260, FLEX Building Ground Prep and Infrastructure, Sequence 2, 10/04/15
: SNCV065-PR-002, Engineering Report - Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) in Response to NRC Order
: EA-12-049 Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events for Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Rev. 2 Southern Nuclear Operating Company STANDARD EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2, Ver. 1 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Standard Emergency Plan, Ver. 1
: TE 921511, Add Additional Protection for Flex Conduit, 09/05/15
: TE 947083, FLEX Transfer Switch 2ABE37T in the FLEX Position with Battery Charger 2CD1CA 
: Low Current, 01/21/16
: TE 953763, Vogtle FLEX Staffing Study Update, 03/09/16
: TE 998411, Update to FLEX Documentation, 11/16/17
: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant FLEX Verification & Validation Report, approved 10/14/15 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Units 1 and 2, Final Integrated Plan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
: Commission Order
: EA-12-049, Strategies for beyond Design Basis External Events, Ver. 1,
: Vogtle Startup Safety Assessment (Unit 2), Beyond Design Basis External Event Mitigation
: Strategies, 01/08/16
: Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Notification of Full Compliance of Required Action for NRC Order
: EA-12-049 Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, 05/23/16 Vogtle Units 1 and 2 - Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
: EA-12-049 and
: EA-12-051, 11/14/16 X1AR50, Procurement Specification for FLEX Equipment Storage Building for Alvin Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Units 1 and 2, Edwin I. Hatch - Units 1 and 2, Joseph M. Farley -
: Units 1 and 2, Ver. 2.0 X4C1531S05,
: Main Control Room Heat-up During an Extended Loss of AC Power, Ver. 1
: X4C1593S03, Vogtle Auxiliary Feedwater Pump House Heat-up Evaluation during an Extended Loss of all AC Power, Ver. 1.0
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 11:28, 7 January 2025

NRC Team Inspection Report 05000424/2017010 and 05000425/2017010
ML17345A892
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/11/2017
From: Shane Sandal
Reactor Projects Region 2 Branch 6
To: Myers D
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2017010
Download: ML17345A892 (14)
v • d • e


Text

December 11, 2017

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2017010 AND 05000425/2017010

Dear Mr. Myers:

On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Shane Sandal, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure:

IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.:

50-424, 50-425

License No.:

NPF-68, NPF-81

Report No.:

05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010

Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc

Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location:

Waynesboro, GA 30830

Dates:

November 13 - 16, 2017

Inspectors:

P. McKenna, Senior Resident Inspector (Team Leader)

S. Freeman, Senior Reactor Analyst

R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer A. Alen, Resident Inspector

Approved by:

Shane Sandal, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 6

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000424/2017010, 05000425/2017010; 11/13/2017 - 11/16/2017; Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.

The inspection covered a one-week inspection by one senior resident inspector, one senior reactor analyst, one senior project engineer, and one resident inspector. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 6.

No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

4OA5 Other Activities

(TI 2515/191)

The objectives of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, were to verify that the licensee has adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensees Final Integrated Plan, which was described in a letter dated May 23, 2016, (ADAMS Accession No. ML16146A607), and the NRCs plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16277A404), to verify that the licensee installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in the spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI was also to verify the licensee has implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in the site-specific submittals and the NRCs safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing was sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.

The inspection verified that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A679) were in place and were being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).

The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation and, where appropriate, performed plant walkdowns to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.

1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and emergency operating procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walkdowns with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess:

(1) the adequacy and completeness of the procedures;
(2) the familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance;
(3) the staging and compatibility of equipment; and
(4) the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios. The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staff most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment

Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee was generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • Developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events.
  • Integrated the FSGs into existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures.
  • Protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards.
  • Developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure its availability and capability.
  • Trained the staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
  • Developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.

The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.

Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant-specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel were physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Assessment

Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the spent fuel pool (SFP)instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • Installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation.
  • Installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals.
  • Trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.
  • Developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing, and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.

The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensees corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information

a. Inspection Scope

Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walkdowns, the team verified that the licensee had implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment, and facilities to support a multi-unit extended loss of offsite power scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee had implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees multi-unit dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b.

Assessment

The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCS March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that resulted in an extended loss of all alternating current power (ELAP) to the site and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:

  • Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an ELAP scenario.
  • EP communications equipment and facilities were sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
  • Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.

The inspectors verified that noncompliance with the current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection, were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On November 16, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Myers and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

T. Baker, Security Manager
R. Bunt, Fleet Program Post-Fukushima Manager
J. Deal, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
M. Euten, Fleet Licensing Engineer
T. English, Shift Operator
D. Komm, Plant Manager
T. Maddox, Senior Program Engineer
E. Murphy, Shift Support Supervisor
D. Myers, Site Vice President
T. Petrak, FLEX Project Manager
K. Walden, Licensing Engineer
E. Tew, Licensing Supervisor
K. Yechou, Shift Operator
T. Yonce, Shift Operator

NRC personnel

J. Quinnones-Navarro, NRR/DLP/PBEB
M. Endress, Vogtle Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Complete

TI-2515/191, Appendix A, Mitigating Strategies for Beyond Design Basis Events TI-2515/191, Appendix B, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation TI-2515/191, Appendix C, Staffing and Communications Request for Information

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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