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| {{Adams | | {{Adams |
| | number = ML18128A074 | | | number = ML18023A110 |
| | issue date = 05/08/2018 | | | issue date = 01/23/2018 |
| | title = Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans - Inspection Report 05000298/2018010 | | | title = CNS - Notification of NRC Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans (05000298/2018010) and Request |
| | author name = Kozal J | | | author name = Kozal J |
| | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C | | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
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| | docket = 05000298 | | | docket = 05000298 |
| | license number = DPR-046 | | | license number = DPR-046 |
| | contact person = Kozal J | | | contact person = Miller G |
| | document report number = IR 2018010 | | | document report number = IR 2018010 |
| | document type = Inspection Report, Letter | | | document type = Inspection Plan, Letter |
| | page count = 14 | | | page count = 7 |
| }} | | }} |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:May 8, 2018 | | {{#Wiki_filter:January 23, 2018 |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/ | | COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - NOTIFICATION OF NRC INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/ STAFFING/MULTI-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS (05000298/2018010) AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION |
| STAFFING/MULTI-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS - INSPECTION REPORT 05000298/2018010 | |
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| ==Dear Mr. Dent:== | | ==Dear Mr. Dent:== |
| On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of this inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On April 16, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
| | The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) |
| | staff will conduct a mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events, spent fuel pool instrumentation, and emergency preparedness enhancements inspection at the Cooper Nuclear Station, from March 12-16, 2018. The inspection will consist of two reactor inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office, one reactor inspector from the NRCs Region III office, plus one of the assigned Resident Inspectors at the Cooper Nuclear Station for one week. The inspection will be conducted in accordance with the NRCs Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders, and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans. |
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| The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication, Staffing, and Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
| | Experience has shown that this inspection is resource intensive both for the NRC inspectors and licensee staff. In order to minimize the impact to your onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for documents needed for this inspection activity. Please note that the documents are requested to be provided by February 23, 2018. |
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| NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. | | During the onsite inspection, inspectors will verify that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 are in place and are being implemented. Inspectors will also verify the establishment of staffing and communications plans provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter, and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013. These plans and information were provided in the site specific submittals, which were subsequently reviewed by the NRC staff for understanding and documented in the NRCs plant safety evaluations (SEs) and safety assessments. Therefore, appropriate personnel knowledgeable of the stations FLEX strategies, spent fuel pool instrumentation, and emergency preparedness enhancements should be available to support the inspectors at the site during the inspection. We have discussed the schedule for this inspection activity with your staff and understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be Brenda Kirkpatrick of your licensing organization. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please contact the lead inspector, Michael H. Stafford, by telephone at 402-825-3371 or by e-mail at Michael.Stafford@nrc.gov. |
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| The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. | | This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150 0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number. |
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| If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear Station. Jr.
| | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). |
| | |
| This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
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| Sincerely, | | Sincerely, |
| /RA/ | | /RA/ |
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| Jason W. Kozal, Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects | | Jason W. Kozal, Branch Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects |
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| Docket: 50-298 License: DPR-46
| | Dockets: 50-298 Licenses: DPR-46 |
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| Enclosure: | | Enclosure: |
| Inspection Report 05000298/2018010 w/Attachment: | | FLEX Strategies, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, & EP Enhancements Inspection Request for Information |
| Documents Reviewed
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| Enclosure | | Enclosure Request for Information FLEX Strategies, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, & EP Enhancements Inspection Cooper Nuclear Station |
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| U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| | Inspection Report: |
| | |
| ==Inspection Report==
| |
| Docket Number:
| |
| 05000298
| |
| | |
| License Number:
| |
| DPR-46
| |
| | |
| Report Number:
| |
| 05000298/2018010 | | 05000298/2018010 |
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| Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0017
| | Inspection Dates: |
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| Licensee:
| | March 12 - 16, 2018 |
| Nebraska Public Power District
| |
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| Facility:
| | Inspection Procedure: |
| Cooper Nuclear Station
| | Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders, and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans |
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| Location:
| | Inspectors: |
| Brownville, Nebraska
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| Inspection Dates:
| | Michael H. Stafford, Team Lead, CNS Resident Inspector |
| March 12, 2018 to April 16, 2018
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| Inspectors:
| | Ryan D. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer, Region IV |
| M. Stafford, Resident Inspector - Cooper (Team Leader)
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| R. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer - Region IV
| | John M. Mateychick, Sr. Reactor Inspector, Region IV |
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| J. Mateychick, Sr. Reactor Inspector - Region IV
| | Stuart N. Sheldon, Project Engineer, Region III |
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| S. Sheldon, Project Engineer - Region III
| | Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week |
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| Approved By:
| | The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic format (use of the Certrec IMS information portal is preferred), to the attention of Ryan Alexander, by February 23, 2018. Additionally, a copy of any material sent to the Region IV office should also be delivered to the resident inspectors office at Cooper Nuclear Station. The inspectors will select specific items from the information requested below and then request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week. Also, we request that you categorize the documents in your response with the numbered list below. Please provide requested documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard copy formats are available, please inform the lead inspector, and provide subject documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection. If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the lead inspector as soon as possible. |
| Jason Kozal
| |
| Chief, Project Branch C
| |
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| Division of Reactor Projects
| | TI 2515/191 - Appendix A A. Provide current revision of the FLEX Final Integrated Plan (i.e., current FLEX Program Document), including any revisions since January 2017 submission to the NRC. |
|
| |
|
| =SUMMARY=
| | B. Provide the FLEX Strategy Basis Document. |
| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/
| |
| Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
| |
|
| |
|
| ===List of Findings and Violations===
| | C. Provide each operating, off-normal, abnormal, and/or emergency procedures where entry into one or more FLEX Support Guideline(s) are initiated. |
| Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness
| |
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| |
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| Green FIN 05000298/2018010-01 Closed H.3 -
| | D. Provide a list and copies of every FLEX Support Guideline (FSG) or equivalent procedure which you developed or revised to implement your mitigating strategies. |
| Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensees failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
| |
|
| |
|
| =INSPECTION SCOPES=
| | E. Provide a list of key pieces of equipment that directly perform a FLEX mitigation strategy for core cooling, containment, and/or spent fuel pool cooling. |
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| |
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| Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
| | F. Provide a listing/summaries of plant modifications completed related to the FLEX program. |
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| ==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
| | G. Provide a listing of calculations, evaluations, and 50.59 reviews related to the FLEX program and modifications. |
| - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
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| TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans
| | H. Applicable site specific hazards for the Cooper Nuclear Station: |
| | 1) Provide documents which show the locations and configuration of structure(s) which store FLEX equipment. |
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| |
|
| Inspectors verified plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.
| | 2) Seismic (a) Provide the travel route(s) for FLEX equipment from storage location(s) to their location(s) of use, AND evaluation(s) which demonstrate that for the potential for soil liquefaction is not of a concern for these travel route(s). |
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| |
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| ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No.
| | (b) Seismic concerns for water source(s) |
| | (1) If the FLEX water sources are seismically robust, then provide the assessment that shows that they are. |
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| |
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| ML12339A262).
| | (2) If the FLEX water sources are not seismically robust, then provide: |
| : (1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals [including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily:
| | (a) an assessment of alternate water sources, and (b) the procedure(s) which describe when and how to access those sources. |
|
| |
|
| a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; c) protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards; d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability; e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design basis events; and f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be available from off-site locations.
| | 3) External Flooding (a) Provide description of where FLEX equipment is stored relative to protection from flood waters in accordance with site flood analysis. |
| : (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals [including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No.
| |
|
| |
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| ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation.
| | (1) If any FLEX equipment is stored below flood level, then (i) on an event timeline, show when that equipment will be needed; and (ii) provide the procedure(s) used to retrieve and deploy that equipment. |
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| The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily :
| | (b) Provide your plans/procedures to support successful FLEX equipment deployment for flooding/ponding from localized intense precipitation (which persist over a long time period). |
| a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluation; b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals; c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
| |
| : (3) The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCs March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
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| a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and c) the licensee implemented multi-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
| | (c) If credited in the strategy, provide plans/procedures for storage and deployment of temporary flood barriers, including timeline of deployment strategy. |
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| The inspectors verified that non-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
| | 4) Severe storms with high winds (a) Provide evaluation/evidence as to how FLEX equipment is stored relative to protection from severe storms with high winds (including tornadic): |
| | (1) In a structure that meets the plants design basis for high wind hazards (e.g., |
| | existing safety-related structure); OR |
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|
| ==INSPECTION RESULTS==
| | (2) In a structure that meets the design requirements as described in ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, given the limiting tornado wind speeds from Regulatory Guide 1.76, and/or design-basis hurricane wind speeds. |
| Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness
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| Green FIN 05000298/2018010-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensees failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
| | (b) Provide pathways via which you plan to move FLEX equipment from onsite storage areas to final deployment locations. |
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| =====Description:=====
| | (1) Show how you designated and evaluated those pathways for post-storm accessibility for staging and connecting FLEX equipment. |
| The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, Support Functions - Communications, states, in part: NEI 12-01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)Satellite phones are credited for off-site communicationDocking stations and remote antennas have been installed to allow use of the satellite phones from inside buildings.
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| NEI 12-01, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities, Revision 0, Section 4.5, Equipment Location Requirements, states: to be assumed operable, a piece of on-site communications equipment should be in a location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design basis external eventEquipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that can be readily accessed when neededThe above guidance applies to equipment at the point of use as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas.
| | 5) Snow, Ice, and Extreme Cold For each key piece of equipment described in Item E (above) that directly performs or implements a FLEX mitigation strategy: |
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| Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12-01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings.
| | (a) Provide procedures/documents demonstrating how the FLEX equipment is maintained at a temperature within a range to ensure that it will function when called upon. |
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| These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack)and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3.
| | (b) Proved procedures/documents demonstrating how the FLEX equipment can be moved from the storage location to its deployment location during extreme snowfall and ice storms. |
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| In moving the physical location of the satellite phones from the control room and TSC, the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBEE. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading, and the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event.
| | 6) Extreme high temperatures For each key piece of equipment described in Item E (above) that directly performs or implements a FLEX mitigation strategy: |
| | (a) Provide procedures/documents which describes the high-temperature limit of the range within which the equipment will function. |
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| The team determined that, by implementing this enhancement to communications systems, the licensee placed their satellite phone equipment in locations that are vulnerable to BDBEE.
| | (b) Provide procedures/documents which describe how the equipment is maintained below that limit in its storage location. |
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| This does not meet the requirements of NEI 12-01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document.
| | I. Provide the station-specific FLEX strategies time validation study(ies). |
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| Corrective Action(s): In response to the teams questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program. Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to stage in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12-01.
| | J. Provide the relevant station procedure(s)/guideline(s) which describe the testing and maintenance program for FLEX equipment. As applicable, provide a listing of the model work orders established to conduct period testing and maintenance activities for FLEX equipment. |
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| Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-CNS-2018-01499
| | NOTE - A sample of records for completed maintenance/testing activities will be requested for review during the onsite inspection week. |
|
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|
| =====Performance Assessment:=====
| | K. Provide documents/procedures which describe the programmatic controls in place to ensure that if equipment and applicable connections are unavailable (e.g., due to maintenance, non-functionality), then compensatory measures are implemented in accordance with guidance outlined NEI 12-06. |
| Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12-01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds.
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| Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to contact any offsite organizations.
| | L. Provide the station-specific National SAFER Center Playbook M. Relative to personnel training on FLEX strategies, provide: |
| | 1) FLEX training bases document(s) |
| | 2) Lesson plans/training documents for site emergency response leaders responsible for the implementation of FLEX strategies. |
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| Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051), dated October 7, 2016. The team determined that the performance deficiency did not
| | NOTE - Records for staff completing this training may be requested for review during the onsite inspection week. |
| : (1) impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA-12-051);
| |
| : (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX equipment for 72 hours or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions;
| |
| : (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions;
| |
| : (4) did not have a product of the exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E-6; and
| |
| : (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
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| Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room [H.3].
| | 3) Lesson plans/training documents for site personnel responsible for the execution of mitigating strategies for BDBEEs (i.e., operators, craft personnel, security, radiation protection, etc.). |
| | NOTE - Records for staff completing this training may be requested for review during the onsite inspection week. |
|
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|
| =====Enforcement:=====
| | N. A current copy of administrative procedure(s) for the CAP, modification program, operations procedure writing and implementation, and top-level documents for the work control and work scheduling programs. (If FLEX related procedures such as FSGs or the FIP are maintained under a different process, please include copies of those procedures.) |
| Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
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|
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|
| ==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
| | O. A current copy of the U/FSAR, Technical Specifications, and Technical Specification Bases documents. |
| The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
| |
| * On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on-site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the site staff.
| |
| * On April 16, 2018, the lead inspector presented the final inspection results in an exit meeting to Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the site staff.
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| =DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=
| | P. Listing of corrective action program document summaries generated related to FLEX equipment, strategies, procedures, and/or training. |
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| Other Activities - TI 2515/191
| | NOTE - Complete corrective action program documents for a selection of those included in the summary will be requested for review during the onsite inspection week. |
| Procedures/Instructions
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| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| 0-CNS-OU-108
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| Shutdown Safety Management Program
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| 0.50.5
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| Outage Shutdown Safety
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| 2.4FPC
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| Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble
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| 5.1FLOOD
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| Emergency Operations Procedure: Flood
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| 7.0.11
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| Maintenance Procedure: Flood Control Barriers
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| 14.41.1.1
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| FPC-LIT-1 Testing
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| EOF08
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| Position Instruction Manual: Logistics Coordinator
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX
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| FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs)
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| FSG 5.10FLEX.01
| |
| 25 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.02
| |
| 25 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.03
| |
| 250 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.04
| |
| 250 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.05
| |
| Reliable Hardened Containment Vent Battery
| |
| Charger Tie-in
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.06
| |
| Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie-In
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.07
| |
| 4160 F Bus Tie-in with Off-Site Generator
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.08
| |
| 4160 G Bus Tie-in with Off-Site Generator
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.09
| |
| Hotwell to ECST FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.10
| |
| ECST Makeup from North Well
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.11
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Supply FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.12
| |
| Reactor Building Reliable Air FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.13
| |
| REC SW FLEX Supply
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.14
| |
| RHR Div 1 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.15
| |
| RHR Div 2 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.16
| |
| Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)
| |
| Div 1 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.17
| |
| Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)
| |
| Div 2 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.18
| |
| Alternate Reactor Building Ventilation FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.19
| |
| Alternate Ventilation FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.20
| |
| Debris Removal in Support of FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.21
| |
| Shutdown Injection FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.22
| |
| Communications and Lighting Equipment FLEX
| |
| Power
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.23
| |
| Reactor Equipment Cooling FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.24
| |
| Control Building Temporary Heating FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
|
| |
|
| FSG 5.10FLEX.25
| | Q. A copy of any audits/self-assessments related to your preparation for this inspection, as well as any related to the implementation or maintenance of the FLEX program. |
| Alternate RPV Injection thru RHR SW Riser or RHR-
| |
| B B.5.B Connection
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.26
| |
| RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 1 FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.27
| |
| RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 2 FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.28
| |
| Vital Instrumentation FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.29
| |
| Alternate Reactor Vessel Injection from Missouri
| |
| River
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.30
| |
| Hardened Containment Vent System FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.31
| |
| FLEX Equipment Refueling Operations | |
| 5.3SBO
| |
| Station Blackout
| |
| 5.7.17
| |
| CNS Dose Assessment
| |
| 5.7.17.1
| |
| Dose Assessment (Manual)
| |
| 6.FPC.701
| |
| FPC Level Transmitter Functional Test
| |
| OI 25
| |
| Operations Routine Duties
| |
| Security
| |
| Procedure 2.8
| |
| Access Control Devices
| |
| Site Services
| |
| Procedure 1.1
| |
| Station Security
| |
|
| |
|
| FLEX Final Integrated Plan
| | TI 2515/191 - Appendix B R. Provide the procedures implemented for maintenance, testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) instrumentation channels. |
|
| |
|
| FLEX Program Document
| | S. Provide lesson plans/training documents which describe the training program that address the use, maintenance, calibration, surveillance, and the use of alternate power to the primary and backup SFP instrument channels. |
|
| |
|
| Preventative Maintenance Activities
| | TI 2515/191 - Appendix C T. Communications: |
| Number
| | 1) Provide documents which show that the communications system(s), technologies, equipment and power supplies would be available from the beginning of the event and operate during an ELAP. |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| 5067082
| |
| SAMG Diesel Generator Testing
| |
| 9/27/2016
| |
| 5155721
| |
| Perform Vendor FLEX Maintenance Activities (1 year
| |
| Operational Inspections)
| |
| 5/23/2017
| |
| 5164463
| |
| Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6
| |
| month)
| |
| 11/06/2017
| |
| 5194852
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS
| |
| 2/29/2017
| |
| Drawings
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| 453010422
| |
| Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks
| |
| AB/02
| |
| R110827
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Strategy Topography Survey
| |
| 8/23/2012
| |
| Other Documents/Reports
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| EC 6036621
| |
| Install Remote Satellite Units
| |
| EE 01-057
| |
| Class I Restrained Seismic Design Basis of Class IIS
| |
| Piping
| |
| EE 01-147
| |
| Summary of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
| |
| Leakage Pathway to the Condenser Seismic
| |
| Qualification
| |
| ER 2016-002
| |
| FLEX Portable Equipment Deployment Path
| |
| Liquefaction Evaluation
| |
|
| |
|
| Number
| | 2) Provide the procedures and/or guidance used to implement the communication capabilities. |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| INT0350113
| |
| FLEX Modifications
| |
| INT0350114
| |
| FLEX Strategy
| |
| INT0350116
| |
| FLEX Strategy Walkdown
| |
| Lesson Plan
| |
| IAC202-00-00
| |
| Level Measurement & Devices
| |
| LO#2018-0092
| |
| 2018 CNS TI-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP)
| |
| Inspection Assessment
| |
| MEC 500-01-01
| |
| MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview
| |
| ML17226A032
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Regarding
| |
| Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
| |
| EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and
| |
| MF0972)
| |
| 9/20/2017
| |
| MP
| |
| 800000050260
| |
| FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air
| |
| Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel
| |
| Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps
| |
| {Not Dated}
| |
| NEDC 09-102
| |
| Internal Flooding - HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line
| |
| Break
| |
| NEDC 14-001
| |
| Storage Facility Structural Calculation
| |
| NEDC 14-027
| |
| Review of ERIN Calculation C122140001-11622,
| |
| MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy
| |
| NEI 12-01
| |
| Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis
| |
| Accident Response Staffing and Communications
| |
| Capabilities
| |
| NEI 12-06
| |
| Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)
| |
| Implementation Guidelines
| |
| NLS2013028
| |
| Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution
| |
| Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals
| |
| Associated with Near-Term Task Force
| |
| Recommendation 9.3
| |
| 2/21/13
| |
| NSRC-005
| |
| SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station
| |
| 9/15/2015
| |
| PM Notification
| |
| 11417703
| |
| Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision
| |
| 10/25/2017
| |
| Purchase Order
| |
| 4500200470
| |
| Preventive Maintenance Program
| |
| 3/06/17
| |
| Technical
| |
| Requirements
| |
| Manual Section
| |
| 3.12
| |
| Beyond Design Basis Components
| |
| 11/06/16
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing
| |
| Assessment
| |
| 4/21/2016
| |
| FLEX Validation Document
| |
|
| |
|
| NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT-
| | 3) Provide documents which show that you have added any new communications equipment, portable power supplies and/or systems have been added to ongoing testing and preventative maintenance programs. |
| 251/NAN-56252
| |
|
| |
|
| NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT-
| | U. Staffing: |
| 253/NAN-56254
| | 1) Provide documents which show that onsite and augmented staff will be available to implement the strategies in response to a large scale natural event that results an ELAP and impedes access to the site, and that functions/tasks have been appropriately staffed. |
|
| |
|
| Corrective Action Program Documents (CR-CNS-)
| | 2) Provide documents which show that the site access methods (e.g., roadways, navigable bodies of water and dockage, airlift, etc.) expected to be available following the event and available to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) [as described in the Phase 1 and 2 staffing assessments and NRC safety assessment]. |
| 2016-02845
| | 3) Provide documents which show the testing, training, and drills/exercises performed by the station to demonstrate the EROs ability to utilize the communications systems and/or equipment. |
| 2016-02869
| |
| 2017-01463
| |
| 2017-02565
| |
| 2017-02568
| |
| 2017-02799
| |
| 2017-02801
| |
| 2017-03089
| |
| 2017-03777
| |
| 2017-05033
| |
| 2017-05285
| |
| 2017-06372
| |
| 2018-01166
| |
| 2018-01243
| |
| 2018-01442*
| |
| 2018-01443*
| |
| 2018-01450*
| |
| 2018-01451*
| |
| 2018-01457*
| |
| 2018-01458*
| |
| 2018-01463*
| |
| 2018-01469*
| |
| 2018-01475*
| |
| 2018-01494*
| |
| 2018-01496*
| |
| 2018-01499*
| |
| 2018-01500*
| |
| 2018-01509*
| |
| 2018-01511*
| |
| 2018-02294*
| |
|
| |
|
| * - Initiated as a result of this inspection
| | V. Provide documents and procedures which show that your dose assessment process/program is capable of analyzing concurrent radiological releases from all on-site significant sources, including releases from spent fuel pools (i.e., multi-unit/multi-source dose assessment capability). |
| ML18128A074
| |
| SUNSI Review
| |
| By: MHS2/rdr
| |
| Non-Sensitive
| |
| Sensitive
| |
| Publicly Available
| |
| Non-Publicly Available
| |
| Keyword:
| |
| NRC-002
| |
| OFFICE
| |
| RI:DRP/C/CNS
| |
| SPE:DRP/A
| |
| SRI:DRS/EB2
| |
| RIII:DRP/PE
| |
| BC:DRP/C
| |
| NAME
| |
| MStafford
| |
| RAlexander
| |
| JMateychick
| |
| SSheldon
| |
| JKozal
| |
| SIGNATURE
| |
| /RA-E/
| |
| /RA/
| |
| /RA/
| |
| /RA-E/ | |
| /RA/
| |
| DATE
| |
| 4/19/18
| |
| 4/19/18
| |
| 4/20/18
| |
| 4/19/18
| |
| 5/8/18
| |
|
| |
|
| May 8, 2018
| | Lead Inspector Contact Information: |
| Mr. John Dent, Jr.
| |
| Vice President-Nuclear and CNO
| |
| Nebraska Public Power District
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Station
| |
| 2676 648A Avenue
| |
| P.O. Box 98
| |
| Brownville, NE 68321
| |
| SUBJECT:
| |
| COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
| |
| MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/
| |
| STAFFING/MULTI-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS - INSPECTION
| |
| REPORT 05000298/2018010
| |
| Dear Mr. Dent:
| |
| On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite
| |
| portion of this inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On April 16, 2018, the NRC
| |
| inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr.
| |
| : [[contact::J. Kalamaja]], General Manager of
| |
| Plant Operations, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are
| |
| documented in the enclosed report.
| |
| The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the
| |
| implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049
| |
| and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication, Staffing, and Multi-Unit Dose
| |
| Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the
| |
| conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of
| |
| selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station
| |
| personnel.
| |
| NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
| |
| The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
| |
| If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a
| |
| regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
| |
| of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
| |
| Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the
| |
| Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear
| |
| Station.
| |
|
| |
|
| J. Dent Jr.
| | Michael H. Stafford, Resident Inspector Mailing Address: |
| | 402-825-3371 U.S. NRC, Region IV Michael.Stafford@nrc.gov Attn: Ryan Alexander, DRP |
|
| |
|
| This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
| | 1600 East Lamar Blvd. |
| and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
| |
| Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for
| |
| Withholding.
| |
| Sincerely,
| |
|
| |
|
| /RA/
| | Arlington, TX 76011-4511 |
| Jason
| |
| : [[contact::W. Kozal]], Chief
| |
| Project Branch C
| |
| Division of Reactor Projects
| |
| Docket: 50-298
| |
| License: DPR-46
| |
| Enclosure:
| |
| Inspection Report 05000298/2018010
| |
| w/Attachment:
| |
| Documents Reviewed
| |
|
| |
|
| U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
| | ML18023A110 SUNSI Review By: MHS/rdr ADAMS: |
| Inspection Report
| | Yes No Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Publicly Available Keyword NRC-002 OFFICE DRP/RPBC C:DRP/RPBC |
|
| |
|
| Docket Number:
| | NAME MStafford JKozal |
| 05000298
| |
|
| |
|
| License Number:
| |
| DPR-46
| |
|
| |
| Report Number:
| |
| 05000298/2018010
| |
|
| |
| Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0017
| |
|
| |
| Licensee:
| |
| Nebraska Public Power District
| |
|
| |
| Facility:
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Station
| |
|
| |
| Location:
| |
| Brownville, Nebraska
| |
|
| |
| Inspection Dates:
| |
| March 12, 2018 to April 16, 2018
| |
|
| |
| Inspectors:
| |
| : [[contact::M. Stafford]], Resident Inspector - Cooper (Team Leader)
| |
| : [[contact::R. Alexander]], Sr. Project Engineer - Region IV
| |
| : [[contact::J. Mateychick]], Sr. Reactor Inspector - Region IV
| |
| : [[contact::S. Sheldon]], Project Engineer - Region III
| |
|
| |
| Approved By:
| |
| Jason Kozal
| |
| Chief, Project Branch C
| |
|
| |
| Division of Reactor Projects
| |
|
| |
| SUMMARY
| |
| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance
| |
| by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/
| |
| Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the
| |
| Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for
| |
| overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
| |
| https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-
| |
| revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
| |
| List of Findings and Violations
| |
| Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They
| |
| Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events
| |
| Cornerstone
| |
| Significance
| |
| Cross-cutting
| |
| Aspect
| |
| Report
| |
| Section
| |
| Emergency
| |
| Preparedness
| |
| Green
| |
| FIN 05000298/2018010-01
| |
| Closed
| |
| H.3 -
| |
| Change
| |
| Management
| |
| TI 2515/191
| |
| The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensees failure to maintain
| |
| the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones
| |
| would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
| |
|
| |
| INSPECTION SCOPES
| |
| Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
| |
| effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
| |
| their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
| |
| rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
| |
| complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
| |
| consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
| |
| Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
| |
| observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
| |
| with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
| |
| OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
| |
| TI 2515/191 - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool
| |
| Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose
| |
| Assessment Plans
| |
| Inspectors verified plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses
| |
| with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
| |
| (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No.
| |
| ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel
| |
| Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by
| |
| the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and
| |
| communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for
| |
| information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information
| |
| provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency
| |
| Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No.
| |
| ML12339A262).
| |
| (1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee
| |
| satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping
| |
| Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals [including the Final
| |
| Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety
| |
| evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in
| |
| compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
| |
| Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. The
| |
| inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily:
| |
| a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX
| |
| strategies for postulated external events;
| |
| b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and
| |
| departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures;
| |
| c) protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards;
| |
| d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment
| |
| to ensure their availability and capability;
| |
|
| |
| e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of
| |
| beyond-design basis events; and
| |
| f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off-site FLEX equipment would be
| |
| available from off-site locations.
| |
| (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee
| |
| satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the
| |
| plant specific submittals [including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No.
| |
| ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and
| |
| determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA-12-051,
| |
| Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation.
| |
| The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily :
| |
| a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power
| |
| supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant
| |
| specific submittals and safety evaluation;
| |
| b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions
| |
| and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals;
| |
| c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and
| |
| use of the SFP instrumentation; and
| |
| d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable
| |
| SFP instrumentation.
| |
| (3) The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal
| |
| and in response to the NRCs March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS
| |
| No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented
| |
| enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to
| |
| a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to
| |
| all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
| |
| a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an
| |
| extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) scenario;
| |
| b) EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an
| |
| ELAP/LUHS scenario; and
| |
| c) the licensee implemented multi-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including
| |
| releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensees site-specific dose assessment
| |
| software and approach.
| |
| The inspectors verified that non-compliances with requirements and standards identified during
| |
| the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
| |
|
| |
| INSPECTION RESULTS
| |
| Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They
| |
| Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events
| |
| Cornerstone
| |
| Significance
| |
| Cross-cutting
| |
| Aspect
| |
| Report
| |
| Section
| |
| Emergency
| |
| Preparedness
| |
| Green
| |
| FIN 05000298/2018010-01
| |
| Closed
| |
| H.3 - Change
| |
| Management
| |
| TI 2515/191
| |
| The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensees failure to
| |
| maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the
| |
| phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
| |
| Description: The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section
| |
| 5.2.27, Support Functions - Communications, states, in part: NEI 12-01 provides required
| |
| emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power
| |
| (ELAP)Satellite phones are credited for off-site communicationDocking stations and
| |
| remote antennas have been installed to allow use of the satellite phones from inside
| |
| buildings.
| |
| NEI 12-01, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and
| |
| Communications Capabilities, Revision 0, Section 4.5, Equipment Location Requirements,
| |
| states: to be assumed operable, a piece of on-site communications equipment should be in a
| |
| location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design
| |
| basis external eventEquipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that
| |
| can be readily accessed when neededThe above guidance applies to equipment at the
| |
| point of use as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may
| |
| include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas.
| |
| Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve issues associated with
| |
| communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld
| |
| satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which
| |
| required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated
| |
| to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12-01. However,
| |
| in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a
| |
| means for personnel to be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings.
| |
| These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite
| |
| phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack)
| |
| and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk
| |
| phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the
| |
| NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution
| |
| Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near-Term Task Force
| |
| Recommendation 9.3.
| |
| In moving the physical location of the satellite phones from the control room and TSC, the
| |
| licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBEE. The
| |
| ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading, and the phones relocated from the control
| |
| room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the
| |
| elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the
| |
| elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event.
| |
|
| |
| The team determined that, by implementing this enhancement to communications systems,
| |
| the licensee placed their satellite phone equipment in locations that are vulnerable to BDBEE.
| |
| This does not meet the requirements of NEI 12-01 and therefore does not meet the
| |
| requirements of the FLEX Program Document.
| |
| Corrective Action(s): In response to the teams questions, the licensee documented the
| |
| concerns in the corrective action program. Additionally, the licensee is in the process of
| |
| procuring three additional satellite phones to stage in the control room, thereby restoring
| |
| compliance with NEI 12-01.
| |
| Corrective Action Reference(s): CR-CNS-2018-01499
| |
| Performance Assessment:
| |
| Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations
| |
| that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond
| |
| design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite
| |
| phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external
| |
| events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12-01,
| |
| Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore
| |
| the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally,
| |
| the antennas may not survive high wind speeds.
| |
| Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
| |
| because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency
| |
| Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of
| |
| implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of
| |
| a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are
| |
| not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to
| |
| contact any offsite organizations.
| |
| Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual
| |
| Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, Significance Determination Process for Mitigating
| |
| Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051), dated
| |
| October 7, 2016. The team determined that the performance deficiency did not (1) impact the
| |
| spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA-12-051); (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX
| |
| equipment for 72 hours or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the
| |
| FLEX functions; (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a
| |
| complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (4) did not have a product of the
| |
| exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E-6; and (5) did not
| |
| involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating
| |
| Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance
| |
| (Green).
| |
| Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated
| |
| with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the
| |
| enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack
| |
| an the PBX room [H.3].
| |
| Enforcement: Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated
| |
| with this finding.
| |
|
| |
| EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
| |
| The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
| |
| *
| |
| On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on-site inspection results in a
| |
| management debrief to Mr.
| |
| : [[contact::J. Kalamaja]], General Manager of Plant Operations, and other
| |
| members of the site staff.
| |
| *
| |
| On April 16, 2018, the lead inspector presented the final inspection results in an exit meeting
| |
| to Mr.
| |
| : [[contact::J. Kalamaja]], General Manager of Plant Operations, and other members of the site
| |
| staff.
| |
|
| |
| DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
| |
| Other Activities - TI 2515/191
| |
| Procedures/Instructions
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| 0-CNS-OU-108
| |
| Shutdown Safety Management Program
| |
| 0.50.5
| |
| Outage Shutdown Safety
| |
| 2.4FPC
| |
| Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble
| |
| 5.1FLOOD
| |
| Emergency Operations Procedure: Flood
| |
| 7.0.11
| |
| Maintenance Procedure: Flood Control Barriers
| |
| 14.41.1.1
| |
| FPC-LIT-1 Testing
| |
| EOF08
| |
| Position Instruction Manual: Logistics Coordinator
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX
| |
| FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs)
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.01
| |
| 25 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.02
| |
| 25 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.03
| |
| 250 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.04
| |
| 250 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.05
| |
| Reliable Hardened Containment Vent Battery
| |
| Charger Tie-in
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.06
| |
| Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie-In
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.07
| |
| 4160 F Bus Tie-in with Off-Site Generator
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.08
| |
| 4160 G Bus Tie-in with Off-Site Generator
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.09
| |
| Hotwell to ECST FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.10
| |
| ECST Makeup from North Well
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.11
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Supply FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.12
| |
| Reactor Building Reliable Air FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.13
| |
| REC SW FLEX Supply
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.14
| |
| RHR Div 1 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.15
| |
| RHR Div 2 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.16
| |
| Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)
| |
| Div 1 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.17
| |
| Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)
| |
| Div 2 FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.18
| |
| Alternate Reactor Building Ventilation FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.19
| |
| Alternate Ventilation FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.20
| |
| Debris Removal in Support of FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.21
| |
| Shutdown Injection FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.22
| |
| Communications and Lighting Equipment FLEX
| |
| Power
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.23
| |
| Reactor Equipment Cooling FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.24
| |
| Control Building Temporary Heating FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
|
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.25
| |
| Alternate RPV Injection thru RHR SW Riser or RHR-
| |
| B B.5.B Connection
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.26
| |
| RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 1 FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.27
| |
| RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 2 FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.28
| |
| Vital Instrumentation FLEX Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.29
| |
| Alternate Reactor Vessel Injection from Missouri
| |
| River
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.30
| |
| Hardened Containment Vent System FLEX
| |
| Operations
| |
| FSG 5.10FLEX.31
| |
| FLEX Equipment Refueling Operations
| |
| 5.3SBO
| |
| Station Blackout
| |
| 5.7.17
| |
| CNS Dose Assessment
| |
| 5.7.17.1
| |
| Dose Assessment (Manual)
| |
| 6.FPC.701
| |
| FPC Level Transmitter Functional Test
| |
| OI 25
| |
| Operations Routine Duties
| |
| Security
| |
| Procedure 2.8
| |
| Access Control Devices
| |
| Site Services
| |
| Procedure 1.1
| |
| Station Security
| |
|
| |
| FLEX Final Integrated Plan
| |
|
| |
| FLEX Program Document
| |
|
| |
| Preventative Maintenance Activities
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| 5067082
| |
| SAMG Diesel Generator Testing
| |
| 9/27/2016
| |
| 5155721
| |
| Perform Vendor FLEX Maintenance Activities (1 year
| |
| Operational Inspections)
| |
| 5/23/2017
| |
| 5164463
| |
| Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6
| |
| month)
| |
| 11/06/2017
| |
| 5194852
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS
| |
| 2/29/2017
| |
| Drawings
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| 453010422
| |
| Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks
| |
| AB/02
| |
| R110827
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Strategy Topography Survey
| |
| 8/23/2012
| |
| Other Documents/Reports
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| EC 6036621
| |
| Install Remote Satellite Units
| |
| EE 01-057
| |
| Class I Restrained Seismic Design Basis of Class IIS
| |
| Piping
| |
| EE 01-147
| |
| Summary of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
| |
| Leakage Pathway to the Condenser Seismic
| |
| Qualification
| |
| ER 2016-002
| |
| FLEX Portable Equipment Deployment Path
| |
| Liquefaction Evaluation
| |
|
| |
| Number
| |
| Title
| |
| Revision
| |
| INT0350113
| |
| FLEX Modifications
| |
| INT0350114
| |
| FLEX Strategy
| |
| INT0350116
| |
| FLEX Strategy Walkdown
| |
| Lesson Plan
| |
| IAC202-00-00
| |
| Level Measurement & Devices
| |
| LO#2018-0092
| |
| 2018 CNS TI-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP)
| |
| Inspection Assessment
| |
| MEC 500-01-01
| |
| MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview
| |
| ML17226A032
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Regarding
| |
| Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable
| |
| Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
| |
| EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and
| |
| MF0972)
| |
| 9/20/2017
| |
| MP
| |
| 800000050260
| |
| FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air
| |
| Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel
| |
| Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps
| |
| {Not Dated}
| |
| NEDC 09-102
| |
| Internal Flooding - HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line
| |
| Break
| |
| NEDC 14-001
| |
| Storage Facility Structural Calculation
| |
| NEDC 14-027
| |
| Review of ERIN Calculation C122140001-11622,
| |
| MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy
| |
| NEI 12-01
| |
| Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis
| |
| Accident Response Staffing and Communications
| |
| Capabilities
| |
| NEI 12-06
| |
| Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX)
| |
| Implementation Guidelines
| |
| NLS2013028
| |
| Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution
| |
| Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals
| |
| Associated with Near-Term Task Force
| |
| Recommendation 9.3
| |
| 2/21/13
| |
| NSRC-005
| |
| SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station
| |
| 9/15/2015
| |
| PM Notification
| |
| 11417703
| |
| Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision
| |
| 10/25/2017
| |
| Purchase Order
| |
| 4500200470
| |
| Preventive Maintenance Program
| |
| 3/06/17
| |
| Technical
| |
| Requirements
| |
| Manual Section
| |
| 3.12
| |
| Beyond Design Basis Components
| |
| 11/06/16
| |
| Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing
| |
| Assessment
| |
| 4/21/2016
| |
| FLEX Validation Document
| |
|
| |
| NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT-
| |
| 251/NAN-56252
| |
|
| |
| NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT-
| |
| 253/NAN-56254
| |
|
| |
| Corrective Action Program Documents (CR-CNS-)
| |
| 2016-02845
| |
| 2016-02869
| |
| 2017-01463
| |
| 2017-02565
| |
| 2017-02568
| |
| 2017-02799
| |
| 2017-02801
| |
| 2017-03089
| |
| 2017-03777
| |
| 2017-05033
| |
| 2017-05285
| |
| 2017-06372
| |
| 2018-01166
| |
| 2018-01243
| |
| 2018-01442*
| |
| 2018-01443*
| |
| 2018-01450*
| |
| 2018-01451*
| |
| 2018-01457*
| |
| 2018-01458*
| |
| 2018-01463*
| |
| 2018-01469*
| |
| 2018-01475*
| |
| 2018-01494*
| |
| 2018-01496*
| |
| 2018-01499*
| |
| 2018-01500*
| |
| 2018-01509*
| |
| 2018-01511*
| |
| 2018-02294*
| |
|
| |
| * - Initiated as a result of this inspection
| |
| ML18128A074
| |
| SUNSI Review
| |
| By: MHS2/rdr
| |
| Non-Sensitive
| |
| Sensitive
| |
| Publicly Available
| |
| Non-Publicly Available
| |
| Keyword:
| |
| NRC-002
| |
| OFFICE
| |
| RI:DRP/C/CNS
| |
| SPE:DRP/A
| |
| SRI:DRS/EB2
| |
| RIII:DRP/PE
| |
| BC:DRP/C
| |
| NAME
| |
| MStafford
| |
| RAlexander
| |
| JMateychick
| |
| SSheldon
| |
| JKozal
| |
| SIGNATURE | | SIGNATURE |
| /RA-E/
| |
| /RA/ | | /RA/ |
| /RA/ | | /RA/ |
| /RA-E/
| | |
| /RA/
| | DATE 01/23/2018 01/23/18 |
| DATE | |
| 4/19/18
| |
| 4/19/18
| |
| 4/20/18
| |
| 4/19/18
| |
| 5/8/18
| |
| }} | | }} |
Inspection Report - Cooper - 2018010 |
|---|
|
|
|
Text
January 23, 2018
SUBJECT:
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - NOTIFICATION OF NRC INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/ STAFFING/MULTI-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS (05000298/2018010) AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Dear Mr. Dent:
The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
staff will conduct a mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events, spent fuel pool instrumentation, and emergency preparedness enhancements inspection at the Cooper Nuclear Station, from March 12-16, 2018. The inspection will consist of two reactor inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office, one reactor inspector from the NRCs Region III office, plus one of the assigned Resident Inspectors at the Cooper Nuclear Station for one week. The inspection will be conducted in accordance with the NRCs Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders, and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans.
Experience has shown that this inspection is resource intensive both for the NRC inspectors and licensee staff. In order to minimize the impact to your onsite resources and to ensure a productive inspection, we have enclosed a request for documents needed for this inspection activity. Please note that the documents are requested to be provided by February 23, 2018.
During the onsite inspection, inspectors will verify that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 are in place and are being implemented. Inspectors will also verify the establishment of staffing and communications plans provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter, and multi-unit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013. These plans and information were provided in the site specific submittals, which were subsequently reviewed by the NRC staff for understanding and documented in the NRCs plant safety evaluations (SEs) and safety assessments. Therefore, appropriate personnel knowledgeable of the stations FLEX strategies, spent fuel pool instrumentation, and emergency preparedness enhancements should be available to support the inspectors at the site during the inspection. We have discussed the schedule for this inspection activity with your staff and understand that our regulatory contact for this inspection will be Brenda Kirkpatrick of your licensing organization. If there are any questions about this inspection or the material requested, please contact the lead inspector, Michael H. Stafford, by telephone at 402-825-3371 or by e-mail at Michael.Stafford@nrc.gov.
This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, control number 3150 0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget control number.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jason W. Kozal, Branch Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects
Dockets: 50-298 Licenses: DPR-46
Enclosure:
FLEX Strategies, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, & EP Enhancements Inspection Request for Information
Enclosure Request for Information FLEX Strategies, Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, & EP Enhancements Inspection Cooper Nuclear Station
Inspection Report:
05000298/2018010
Inspection Dates:
March 12 - 16, 2018
Inspection Procedure:
Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders, and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans
Inspectors:
Michael H. Stafford, Team Lead, CNS Resident Inspector
Ryan D. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer, Region IV
John M. Mateychick, Sr. Reactor Inspector, Region IV
Stuart N. Sheldon, Project Engineer, Region III
Information Requested for the In-Office Preparation Week
The following information should be sent to the Region IV office in hard copy or electronic format (use of the Certrec IMS information portal is preferred), to the attention of Ryan Alexander, by February 23, 2018. Additionally, a copy of any material sent to the Region IV office should also be delivered to the resident inspectors office at Cooper Nuclear Station. The inspectors will select specific items from the information requested below and then request from your staff additional documents needed during the onsite inspection week. Also, we request that you categorize the documents in your response with the numbered list below. Please provide requested documentation electronically if possible. If requested documents are large and only hard copy formats are available, please inform the lead inspector, and provide subject documentation during the first day of the onsite inspection. If you have any questions regarding this information request, please call the lead inspector as soon as possible.
TI 2515/191 - Appendix A A. Provide current revision of the FLEX Final Integrated Plan (i.e., current FLEX Program Document), including any revisions since January 2017 submission to the NRC.
B. Provide the FLEX Strategy Basis Document.
C. Provide each operating, off-normal, abnormal, and/or emergency procedures where entry into one or more FLEX Support Guideline(s) are initiated.
D. Provide a list and copies of every FLEX Support Guideline (FSG) or equivalent procedure which you developed or revised to implement your mitigating strategies.
E. Provide a list of key pieces of equipment that directly perform a FLEX mitigation strategy for core cooling, containment, and/or spent fuel pool cooling.
F. Provide a listing/summaries of plant modifications completed related to the FLEX program.
G. Provide a listing of calculations, evaluations, and 50.59 reviews related to the FLEX program and modifications.
H. Applicable site specific hazards for the Cooper Nuclear Station:
1) Provide documents which show the locations and configuration of structure(s) which store FLEX equipment.
2) Seismic (a) Provide the travel route(s) for FLEX equipment from storage location(s) to their location(s) of use, AND evaluation(s) which demonstrate that for the potential for soil liquefaction is not of a concern for these travel route(s).
(b) Seismic concerns for water source(s)
(1) If the FLEX water sources are seismically robust, then provide the assessment that shows that they are.
(2) If the FLEX water sources are not seismically robust, then provide:
(a) an assessment of alternate water sources, and (b) the procedure(s) which describe when and how to access those sources.
3) External Flooding (a) Provide description of where FLEX equipment is stored relative to protection from flood waters in accordance with site flood analysis.
(1) If any FLEX equipment is stored below flood level, then (i) on an event timeline, show when that equipment will be needed; and (ii) provide the procedure(s) used to retrieve and deploy that equipment.
(b) Provide your plans/procedures to support successful FLEX equipment deployment for flooding/ponding from localized intense precipitation (which persist over a long time period).
(c) If credited in the strategy, provide plans/procedures for storage and deployment of temporary flood barriers, including timeline of deployment strategy.
4) Severe storms with high winds (a) Provide evaluation/evidence as to how FLEX equipment is stored relative to protection from severe storms with high winds (including tornadic):
(1) In a structure that meets the plants design basis for high wind hazards (e.g.,
existing safety-related structure); OR
(2) In a structure that meets the design requirements as described in ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, given the limiting tornado wind speeds from Regulatory Guide 1.76, and/or design-basis hurricane wind speeds.
(b) Provide pathways via which you plan to move FLEX equipment from onsite storage areas to final deployment locations.
(1) Show how you designated and evaluated those pathways for post-storm accessibility for staging and connecting FLEX equipment.
5) Snow, Ice, and Extreme Cold For each key piece of equipment described in Item E (above) that directly performs or implements a FLEX mitigation strategy:
(a) Provide procedures/documents demonstrating how the FLEX equipment is maintained at a temperature within a range to ensure that it will function when called upon.
(b) Proved procedures/documents demonstrating how the FLEX equipment can be moved from the storage location to its deployment location during extreme snowfall and ice storms.
6) Extreme high temperatures For each key piece of equipment described in Item E (above) that directly performs or implements a FLEX mitigation strategy:
(a) Provide procedures/documents which describes the high-temperature limit of the range within which the equipment will function.
(b) Provide procedures/documents which describe how the equipment is maintained below that limit in its storage location.
I. Provide the station-specific FLEX strategies time validation study(ies).
J. Provide the relevant station procedure(s)/guideline(s) which describe the testing and maintenance program for FLEX equipment. As applicable, provide a listing of the model work orders established to conduct period testing and maintenance activities for FLEX equipment.
NOTE - A sample of records for completed maintenance/testing activities will be requested for review during the onsite inspection week.
K. Provide documents/procedures which describe the programmatic controls in place to ensure that if equipment and applicable connections are unavailable (e.g., due to maintenance, non-functionality), then compensatory measures are implemented in accordance with guidance outlined NEI 12-06.
L. Provide the station-specific National SAFER Center Playbook M. Relative to personnel training on FLEX strategies, provide:
1) FLEX training bases document(s)
2) Lesson plans/training documents for site emergency response leaders responsible for the implementation of FLEX strategies.
NOTE - Records for staff completing this training may be requested for review during the onsite inspection week.
3) Lesson plans/training documents for site personnel responsible for the execution of mitigating strategies for BDBEEs (i.e., operators, craft personnel, security, radiation protection, etc.).
NOTE - Records for staff completing this training may be requested for review during the onsite inspection week.
N. A current copy of administrative procedure(s) for the CAP, modification program, operations procedure writing and implementation, and top-level documents for the work control and work scheduling programs. (If FLEX related procedures such as FSGs or the FIP are maintained under a different process, please include copies of those procedures.)
O. A current copy of the U/FSAR, Technical Specifications, and Technical Specification Bases documents.
P. Listing of corrective action program document summaries generated related to FLEX equipment, strategies, procedures, and/or training.
NOTE - Complete corrective action program documents for a selection of those included in the summary will be requested for review during the onsite inspection week.
Q. A copy of any audits/self-assessments related to your preparation for this inspection, as well as any related to the implementation or maintenance of the FLEX program.
TI 2515/191 - Appendix B R. Provide the procedures implemented for maintenance, testing, calibration, and use of the primary and backup Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) instrumentation channels.
S. Provide lesson plans/training documents which describe the training program that address the use, maintenance, calibration, surveillance, and the use of alternate power to the primary and backup SFP instrument channels.
TI 2515/191 - Appendix C T. Communications:
1) Provide documents which show that the communications system(s), technologies, equipment and power supplies would be available from the beginning of the event and operate during an ELAP.
2) Provide the procedures and/or guidance used to implement the communication capabilities.
3) Provide documents which show that you have added any new communications equipment, portable power supplies and/or systems have been added to ongoing testing and preventative maintenance programs.
U. Staffing:
1) Provide documents which show that onsite and augmented staff will be available to implement the strategies in response to a large scale natural event that results an ELAP and impedes access to the site, and that functions/tasks have been appropriately staffed.
2) Provide documents which show that the site access methods (e.g., roadways, navigable bodies of water and dockage, airlift, etc.) expected to be available following the event and available to the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) [as described in the Phase 1 and 2 staffing assessments and NRC safety assessment].
3) Provide documents which show the testing, training, and drills/exercises performed by the station to demonstrate the EROs ability to utilize the communications systems and/or equipment.
V. Provide documents and procedures which show that your dose assessment process/program is capable of analyzing concurrent radiological releases from all on-site significant sources, including releases from spent fuel pools (i.e., multi-unit/multi-source dose assessment capability).
Lead Inspector Contact Information:
Michael H. Stafford, Resident Inspector Mailing Address:
402-825-3371 U.S. NRC, Region IV Michael.Stafford@nrc.gov Attn: Ryan Alexander, DRP
1600 East Lamar Blvd.
Arlington, TX 76011-4511
ML18023A110 SUNSI Review By: MHS/rdr ADAMS:
Yes No Sensitive Non-Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Publicly Available Keyword NRC-002 OFFICE DRP/RPBC C:DRP/RPBC
NAME MStafford JKozal
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
DATE 01/23/2018 01/23/18