IR 05000416/2020003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000416/2020003

ML20302A448
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	10/28/2020
From:	Jason Kozal NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C
To:	Franssen R Entergy Operations
References
IR 2020003
Download: ML20302A448 (18)

Text

October 28, 2020

SUBJECT:

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2020003

Dear Mr. Franssen:

On September 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. On October 8, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. G. Hawkins, Regulatory Assurance Performance Improvement Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Jason W. Kozal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch C Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000416 License No. NPF-29

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000416

License Number:

NPF-29

Report Number:

05000416/2020003

Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Location:

Port Gibson, MS

Inspection Dates:

July 1, 2020 to September 30, 2020

Inspectors:

T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Thomas, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Jason W. Kozal, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Adequately Troubleshoot the Control Room Air Conditioner B Compressor Trip Prior to Returning to Service Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000416/2020003-01 Open/Closed

[H.13] -

Consistent Process 71111.19 An NRC-identified, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly identify, through adequate troubleshooting, a condition adverse to quality and to correct the condition adverse to quality prior to returning a safety-related component to an operable status. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately troubleshoot the cause of the control room air conditioner B compressor trip, as required by quality Procedure EN-MA-125, Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities,

Revision 25, and correct the issue prior to declaring the system operable.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began this inspection period at full rated power. On July 18, 2020, the unit was downpowered to 68 percent power due to a control fluid leak on a main turbine control valve. On August 8, 2020, a reactor scram occurred from 87 percent power due to reactor power oscillations caused by main turbine control valve position oscillations.

Following repairs and modifications to the main turbine valves, the unit was restarted on August 23, 2020. During startup, the plant automatically scrammed due to a main feedwater pump trip on August 24, 2020. Following repairs, the unit was restarted on August 27, 2020, and reached full rated power on August 31, 2020. On September 9, 2020, the unit was downpowered to 83 percent power due to a control fluid leak on a main turbine control valve.

The unit remained at or near 83 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.

As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal high temperatures for the following systems:

• Standby diesel generators and all divisions of standby service water

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather from Hurricane Laura on August 28, 2020.

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Division 3 standby diesel generator partial alignment while the Division 2 standby diesel generator was out of service for maintenance on July 7, 2020

(2) Diesel driven fire pump B and fire protection system on September 12, 2020

(3) Division 2 standby fresh air following maintenance on September 12, 2020

(4) Automatic depressurization system valve lineup during high pressure core spray testing on September 30, 2020

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the low pressure core spray system on September 24, 2020.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) High pressure core spray pump room on September 1, 2020

(2) Division 1 standby diesel generator room on September 2, 2020

(3) Low pressure core spray pump room on September 24, 2020

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on September 4, 2020.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) High pressure core spray pump room and auxiliary building 93 foot north east corner on September 1, 2020

(2) Low pressure core spray pump room on September 24, 2020

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during startup activities from Forced Outage 23-02 on August 23, 2020.

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during scram recovery on August 25, 2020.

(3) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during startup from Forced Outage 23-02 on August 28, 2020.

(4) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a unit downpower on September 9, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator on July 23, 2020.

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator on September 10, 2020.

(3) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during an evaluated training scenario on September 14, 2020.

(4) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the simulator during an evaluated training scenario on September 28, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-08197, control room air conditioning B compressor tripped and subsequent rebuild on September 1, 2020

(2) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-00915, restoration of oil quality and traceability in safety-related components on September 18, 2020

(3) Turbine control valve actuator repairs following electrohydraulic fluid leaks on September 4, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Yellow risk sample when the Division 2 standby diesel generator was out of service on July 7, 2020

(2) Yellow risk protected system lineup while reactor core isolation cooling in maintenance window on July 30, 2020

(3) Yellow shutdown risk assessment walkdown while in shutdown cooling on August 13, 2020

(4) Maintenance risk assessment during Division 3 emergency core cooling system testing on September 30, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-08104, control room air conditioning unit fan motor outboard vibrations high on July 21, 2020

(2) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-09034, automatic depressurization system A found inoperable following discovery of an air leak on August 18, 2020

(3) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-08980, containment spray B nozzle leak on September 1, 2020

(4) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-9294, potential quality-related issues for components installed in the plant on September 3, 2020

(5) Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-08135, residual heat removal containment isolation valve over-thrusted on September 9, 2020

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Changes 72779, 72780, and 76310 for the turbine control system digital upgrade on September 11, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Work Order 52927210-01, Division 2 standby diesel generator post maintenance test following lube oil full flow filter replacement on July 9, 2020

(2) Work Order 547983, control room air conditioning B initial troubleshooting and post maintenance test on July 23, 2020

(3) Work Order 527791, standby gas treatment system A power monitoring modification post maintenance test on July 27, 2020

(4) Work Orders 509749 and 52696887, post maintenance test on the reactor core isolation cooling turbine steam supply 1E51F045 valve on July 30, 2020

(5) Work Orders 52823866 and 52844701, post maintenance tests on reactor core isolation cooling turbine trip and throttle valve and reactor core isolation cooling turbine steam supply bypass valve on July 31, 2020

(6) Work Order 548856, troubleshoot and replace reactor recirculation Loop B manual auto station 1B33K603B on August 13, 2020

(7) Work Order 549604, automatic depressurization system A drop test following accumulator relief valve replacement on August 20, 2020

(8) Work Order 547883, actuator repair/replacement for main turbine control valve A following electrohydraulic control leak on September 4, 2020

(9) Work Order 52872721-01, control room air conditioning compressor B rebuild on September 25, 2020

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Forced Outage 23-02 response activities from August 8, 2020, to August 27, 2020.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unidentified leakage rate shiftly surveillance on September 3, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Emergency preparedness training evolution (LOR-DEP opportunity) in the simulator on September 14, 2020

(2) Emergency preparedness training evolution (LOR-DEP opportunity) in the simulator on September 28,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

(1) April 1, 2019, through September 30, 2019

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2019, through June 30, 2020

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2019, through June 30, 2020

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2019, through June 30, 2020

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the Forced Outage 23-02 event and the licensee's response on August 8, 2020.

(2) The inspectors evaluated the second scram of Forced Outage 23-02 and the licensees response on August 25,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Adequately Troubleshoot the Control Room Air Conditioner B Compressor Trip Prior to Returning to Service Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000416/2020003-01 Open/Closed

[H.13] -

Consistent Process 71111.19 An NRC-identified, Green finding and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to promptly identify, through adequate troubleshooting, a condition adverse to quality and to correct the condition adverse to quality of a safety-related component prior to returning the component to an operable status. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately troubleshoot the cause of the control room air conditioner B compressor trip, as required by quality Procedure EN-MA-125, Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities, Revision 25, and correct the issue prior to declaring the system operable.

Description:

On July 17, 2020, control room air conditioner (CRAC) B compressor tripped following a rotation from CRAC A during a surveillance test. Operators in the main control room received associated alarms and entered the appropriate alarm response instruction procedures. Initial investigation into the CRAC B trip showed no oil in the compressor.

As part of the stations initial troubleshooting efforts, the licensee determined a low pressure sensing line on the CRAC B compressor needed to be cleared of obstruction and oil needed to be added. During the performance of the work activity to clear out the low pressure sensing line, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) technicians in the field stated that the low pressure sensing line found to be clear of obstruction and needed no further attention. The technicians subsequently added oil. Following the completion of this maintenance, the licensee returned the CRAC B train to service and declared it operable after observing the system being able to draw down and maintain temperature in the main control room on July 23, 2020.

On July 24, 2020, CRAC B tripped with the same alarms in the control room as were seen with the previous trip on July 17, 2020. As a result of the second CRAC B trip, the licensee acquired help from an HVAC vendor to conduct additional troubleshooting. The vendor ultimately determined that the compressor had a cracked piston ring and needed a rebuild.

Additionally, the vendor determined that the internal compressor degradation appeared to be affecting the compressor following its cycling to run the A train for the surveillance test. The licensee rebuilt the compressor and returned it to service on July 28, 2020.

After discussions with control room operators, the inspectors became concerned that the initial troubleshooting efforts were not sufficiently thorough to determine the direct cause of the compressor trip on July 17, 2020. Licensee Procedure EN-MA-125, Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities, Revision 25, Section 1.0, subsection 1, states that the purpose of the licensees maintenance troubleshooting procedure is to provide a systematic approach to data collection and a test/measurement plan that results in high confidence that the direct cause of system/equipment degradation has been identified and corrected where troubleshooting activities solved the problem.

The inspectors assessed that the licensees initial troubleshooting efforts were contrary to this step of Procedure EN-MA-125 because the licensees initial data collection and test/measurement plan did not result in a high confidence that the direct cause of the CRAC B trip had been identified and corrected prior to returning the component to operable status on July 23, 2020, as evidenced by its subsequent trip on July 24, 2020.

The inspectors also challenged the licensees July 23, 2020, declaration of operability because following a loss of offsite power event, the compressor would start upon restoration of power. Given the nature of the internal compressor degradation and how it would trip the compressor following starting, the inspectors concluded that there was no reasonable assurance of operability at that time given the evidence of the compressor trips.

Corrective Actions: The licensee rebuilt the CRAC B compressor and returned it to service.

Additionally, the licensee initiated a past operability review, an equipment failure evaluation, and a maintenance rule functional failure evaluation for this issue.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-GGN-2020-07074, CR-GGN-2020-07882, CR-GGN-2020-09991, CR-GGN-2020-08197, CR-GGN-2020-08349, and CR-GGN-2020-08653

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to adequately troubleshoot the cause of the CRAC B trip such that there was high confidence that the direct cause of the trip was identified and corrected prior to returning it to service, as required by Procedure EN-MA-125, "Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities," Revision 25, Section 1.0, step 1, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to adequately troubleshoot the cause of the CRAC B compressor trip led the licensee to return the compressor to service when the CRAC B would not have functioned during all design basis accidents.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. By answering no to the relevant questions in Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems), the inspectors screened this finding as having very low safety significance (Green). The finding did not represent a loss of the probabilistic risk assessment function of any technical specification system for greater than its allowed outage time.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. The apparent cause or most-significant contributor of the performance deficiency was that the licensee did not use a consistent, systematic approach when making the decision to return the CRAC B to service. Specifically, Procedure EN-MA-125 provides the licensee a systematic approach to troubleshooting that results in high confidence that the direct cause of system degradation is identified and corrected. Because the licensee did not use this systematic approach in troubleshooting the CRAC B trip, the licensee did not understand the problem occurring internally to the compressor, and the licensee returned the system to operable status without correcting the issue.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, on July 23, 2020, the licensee failed to assure that a condition adverse to quality, i.e. the control room air conditioner B compressor internal degradation, was promptly identified and corrected prior to declaring the system operable and returning it to service.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On October 8, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. G. Hawkins, Regulatory Assurance Performance Improvement Director, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.01

Calculations

CC-Q1111-16001

Maximum Leakage Past Sandbag Wall During Probable

Maximum Precipitation Flood

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2011-07687

Procedures

05-1-02-VI-1

Flooding

05-1-02-VI-2

Hurricanes, Tornadoes, and Severe Weather

139

EN-FAP-EP-010

5, Severe Weather Response Checklist

08/25/2020

71111.04

Calculations

MC-Q1111-84016 ECCS Pump Surveillance Criteria

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2017-06086, 2019-08259, 2019-10431, 2020-04555, 2020-

04602, 2020-07182, 2020-07281, 2020-07299, 2020-07642,

20-07728, 2020-09658, 2020-09744

Drawings

M-1077E

Nuclear Boiler System

M-1093A

HPCS Diesel Generator System

M-1093B

HPCS Diesel Generator System

M-1093C

HPCS Diesel Generator System

Miscellaneous

10539930

Purchase Order

10562792

Purchase Order

56407

Receipt Inspection

59692

Receipt Inspection

Procedures

04-1-01-B21-1

Nuclear Boiler System

04-1-01-E21-1

Low Pressure Core Spray System

04-1-01-P81-1

High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator

04-1-02-1H13-

P601

Alarm Response Instruction Panel No. 1H13-P601

2

04-S-01-P64-1

Fire Protection Water System

04-S-01-Z51-1

Control Room HVAC System

05-S-01-PSTG

Plant Specific Technical Guidelines

06-IC-1E21-R-

0005

LPCS Pump Discharge Flow Low Bypass Calibration

104

06-OP-1E21-C-

0004

LPCS Cold Shutdown Valve Test

110

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

06-OP-1E21-Q-

0002

LPCS MOV Functional Test

107

06-OP-1E21-Q-

0006

LPCS Quarterly Functional Test

2

GFIG-OPS-

E2202

Automatic Depressurization System and Safety Relief

Valves

Work Orders

WO 373906, 537199, 546109, 546155, 52883665, 52898163,

2910354, 52925222, 52934235

71111.05

Fire Plans

Fire Pre-Plan C-

Fire Pre-Plan DG-

Div I DG Room 1D302

FPP-VOL-1

GGNS Fire Pre Plans Volume I

71111.06

Procedures

07-1-24-T10-1

Periodic Leak Check of Airtight Door Sealing Surfaces

Work Orders

WO 2607263, 52761541

71111.11Q Procedures

EN-TQ-114

Licensed Operator Re-qualification Program Description

EN-TQ-210

Conduct of Simulator Training

71111.12

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

20-00915, 2020-05557, 2020-07074, 2020-08197, 2020-

08320, 2020-08349, 2020-08350, 2020-08653

Procedures

04-S-01-Z51-1

Control Room HVAC System

EN-MA-107

Post Maintenance Testing

EN-MA-125

Troubleshooting Control of Maintenance Activities

Work Orders

WO 478532, 497673, 508458, 538756, 538759, 538760, 538761,

538762, 538763, 538764, 547883, 547983, 549020, 549433,

2831300

71111.15

Calculations

CC-Q1111-90035

Yarway Valve Analysis

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2016-08433, 2018-08543, 2019-04312, 2019-04579, 2020-

00915, 2020-08104, 2020-08135, 2020-08980, 2020-09034,

20-09078, 2020-09082, 2020-09294

Drawings

M-1085A

P & I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

M-1085B

P & I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

M-1085C

P & I Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

M-1348G

System Piping Isometric RHR CTMT Spray HDRS A, C, & E

M-1348H

System Piping Isometric RHR CTMT Spray HDRS B, D, & F

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Miscellaneous

GGNS-MS-25.0

Mechanical Standard for Motor Operated Valve Torque and

Limit Switches

Material Receipt

Inspection No.

23502, 39960, 40763, 45140, 46685, 46902, 47619, 47717,

49121, 50059, 50607, 57937, 63424, MP025636-M00109

PDS0092

Containment Spray Rings A, C, E Stress Analysis

Procedures

SDC-Z51

Control Room HVAC System

Work Orders

WO

380167-5, 460582-9, 469225-2, 469813-1, 471436-1,

500520-1, 502379-10, 506738-1, 52583022-2, 52584258-2,

2594758-1, 52663685-5, 52703943-3, 52703945-3,

2758043-3, 52784074-2, 52804591-1, 52872721-1

71111.18

Drawings

EC72780-SK-006

HPU, Heat Exchangers and Pump Skid Mounting and Weld

Detail

F6059SPDI01

Speed Sensing Installation

Engineering

Changes

EC 72779

Turbine Control Protection System - Safety

EC 72780

Turbine Control Protection - Non-Safety

EC 76310

Turbine RPS Instrument Setpoint and Uncertainty

Evaluations

Miscellaneous

ECT-72780-01

Offline Turbine Control and Protection System (TCPS)

Functional Test

ECT-72780-02

Power Ascension Turbine Control and

Protection System (TCPS) Test

ECT-72780-03

Comprehensive Turbine Stop Valve and Control Valve

Transmitter and Electronics (RPS) Post Modification Test

ECT-727800-03A

Turbine Stop Valve Closure Transmitters (RPS) Post

Modification Response Time Test

ECT-727800-03B

Turbine Stop Valve Trip Fluid Low Pressure Functional

(RPS/EOC RPT) Post Modification Test

ECT-727800-03C

Turbine Stop Valve Trip Fluid Low Pressure

(rps/eos rpt) Calibration Post Modification Test

ECT-727800-03D

Turbine Control Valve (RPS) Transmitter Time Response

Post Modification Test

ECT-727800-03E

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Functional

(RPS/EOC RPT) Post Modification Test

ECT-727800-03F

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure *RPS/EOC RPT)

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Calibration Post Modification Test

ECT-727800-03H

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure RPS and EOC/RPT

Functional Test Post Modification Test

GLP-OPS-

OVATION-

19CYC02

Ovation Turbine Control System

GLP-OPS-TCSU-

19CYC1

Turbine Control System Upgrade

GLP-OPS-TCSU-

20CYC3

Turbine Control System Upgrade

WNA-PJ-00356-

GGGF1

Turbine Control and Protection System Project Document

Index

Procedures

EN-DC-115

Engineering Change Process

71111.19

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

20-05061, 2020-07892, 2020-07893, 2020-08197, 2020-

295, 2020-08320, 2020-08349, 2020-08350, 2020-09034,

20-09078, 2020-09082, 2020-09129

Engineering

Changes

EC 77973

Standby Gas Treatment System Loss of Power Detection

EC 83384

SGTS "A" Power Monitoring Modification

EC 87612

1B33K603A/B Model 2AX+M2N Style Comparison

Procedures

06-OP-1B21-O-

0004

ADS Air System Drop Test A Bank

106

06-OP-1E51-Q-

0002

RCIC System Quarterly Valve Operability Test

117

06-OP-1E51-Q-

0003

RCIC System Quarterly Pump Operability Verification

146

06-OP-1P75-M-

0002

Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) 12 Functional Test

144

06-OP-1T48-M-

0001

Standby Gas Treatment System A Operability

111

EN-MA-107

Post Maintenance Testing

EN-QV-102

Quality Control Inspection Program

Work Orders

WO 509749, 527791, 544711, 547883, 547983, 548856, 549020,

549433, 549604, 52696887, 52823866, 52844701,

2872721-01, 52927210-01

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.22

Miscellaneous

Shiftly Operating Logs from May 31, 2020, through June 18,

20

Procedures

06-OP-1000-D-

001

168

71151

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2019-03834

Engineering

Changes

EC 82963