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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:February 8, 2021 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | |||
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2020004 AND 05000301/2020004 | |||
==Dear Mr. Strope:== | |||
On December 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On January 12, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Bryan Woyak, Safety Assurance and Learning Site Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | |||
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. | |||
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. A traditional enforcement follow-up inspection associated with this violation is not warranted in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, because it did not involve willfulness, impeding the regulatory process, or actual safety consequences. | |||
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: | |||
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | |||
Sincerely, | |||
/RA/ | |||
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | |||
As stated | |||
==Inspection Report== | |||
Docket Numbers: | |||
05000266 and 05000301 | |||
License Numbers: | |||
DPR-24 and DPR-27 | |||
Report Numbers: | |||
05000266/2020004 and 05000301/2020004 | |||
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-004-0064 | |||
Licensee: | |||
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC | |||
Facility: | |||
Point Beach Nuclear Plant | |||
Location: | |||
Two Rivers, WI | |||
Inspection Dates: | |||
October 01, 2020 to December 31, 2020 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
K. Barclay, Reactor Inspector | |||
J. Bozga, Senior Reactor Inspector | |||
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist | |||
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector | |||
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector | |||
T. McGowan, Resident Inspector | |||
R. Ng, Project Engineer | |||
Approved By: | |||
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief | |||
Branch 4 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
=SUMMARY= | |||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115 | |||
===List of Findings and Violations=== | |||
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified. | |||
===Additional Tracking Items=== | |||
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000266/2020004-01 Letdown Isolation Valve, 1RC-427, Failed to Open from Main Control Room 71111.12 Open LER 05000301/2020-001-00 Reactor Protection System Channel Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specification 71153 Closed | |||
=PLANT STATUS= | |||
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 97 percent rated thermal power. On October 3, 2020, the plant was shutdown for refueling outage U1R39. On October 26, 2020, Unit 1 was restarted. On October 28, 2020, the unit was synchronized to the grid, and on November 5, 2020, it achieved full power. The unit remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period. | |||
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period. | |||
==INSPECTION SCOPES== | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection, unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met, consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | |||
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP. | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | |||
==71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection== | |||
===Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures. | |||
==71111.04 - Equipment Alignment== | |||
===Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains: | |||
: (1) Unit 1 train B containment spray system on November 18, 2020 | |||
: (2) Unit 1 train A component cooling water system on November 24, 2020 | |||
: (3) Unit 2 125 Volt DC system on December 1, 2020 | |||
===Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling water system on October 13, 2020. | |||
==71111.05 - Fire Protection== | |||
===Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas: | |||
(1)fire zones 505, 511, 516, and 520 on October 24, 2020 (2)fire zone 680 on November 2, 2020 (3)fire zones 304N, 304S, and 305 on November 5, 2020 | |||
===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.08|count=1}} | |||
: (1) The inspectors verified the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the documentation for the following activities from October 6-November 3, 2020: | |||
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities. | |||
* ultrasonic examination (UT) of closure head peripheral CRD 22 and 26 | |||
* liquid penetrant (PT) examination of integral welded attachment SI-2501R-5-SI10-IWA | |||
* PT examination of 1HX-1B Steam Generator Channel Head Drain | |||
* PT examination of 1HX-1B Steam Generator Channel Head | |||
* pressure boundary field welds of 1B Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD)manifolds (Work Order 40584606) | |||
* pressure boundary field welds of 1AF-106 Valve (Work Order 40575122) | |||
* pressure boundary field welds of 1AF-107 Valve (Work Order 40575123) | |||
03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities. | |||
* boric acid evaluations for 1HX-1B and 1RC-526B | |||
* boric acid condition reports for boric acid on 1FT-626 and Incore Flux Mapping Thimble Tubes | |||
==71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance== | |||
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples) | |||
: (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during Unit 1 plant shutdown on October 3, 2020. | |||
: (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during Unit 1 reactor startup and turnover on October 26, 2020. | |||
===Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated just-in-time training for Unit 1 reactor and plant startup on October 24. 2020. | |||
==71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness== | |||
===Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function: | |||
(1)1CV-1296, Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation valve (2)1RC-427, RC Loop B Cold Leg to CVCS Letdown Isolation valve failed on October 4, 2020 | |||
: (3) Radiation Monitoring System | |||
===Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function: | |||
: (1) The inspectors reviewed six work packages covering a variety of maintenance activities on safety related and/or risk significant systems to evaluate whether licensee quality control verifications are properly specified in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program and are implemented as specified. | |||
===Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria: | |||
(1)2HX-12D component cooling water heat exchanger | |||
==71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | |||
===Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed: | |||
: (1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to short time to boil and reduced inventory on October 8, 2020 | |||
: (2) Unit 1 emergent work to lift and reinstall reactor pressure vessel head due to cavity leak on October 9, 2020 (3)both units elevated risk due to maintenance on a battery charger, on November 1, 2020 | |||
==71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | |||
===Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments: | |||
: (1) Unit 1 train A safety injection pump flow low during testing | |||
: (2) G-02 emergency diesel generator had abnormal air bank pressure drop during start (3)foreign material found inside main feed isolation valve actuator 3-way valve | |||
: (4) Unit 2 pressurizer pressure controller experienced abnormal operation | |||
==71111.18 - Plant Modifications== | |||
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications: | |||
: (1) EC 295378, Replace 1RC-526A and 1RC-526B with a Pipe Cap | |||
==71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing== | |||
===Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality: | |||
(1)2-SOP-AF-001, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation - Motor Driven, after replacement of AF-4089, 1/2P-53 AFP Mini-Recirc Relief on October 7, 2020 | |||
: (2) IT 300D, Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Test Train A Unit 1, after replacement of the main feedwater isolation valve actuator 3-way valve, on October 8, 2020 | |||
: (3) IT 03 Train B, Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves Train B Unit 1, after maintenance on 1RH-625, HX-11B RHR HX Outlet Valve, on October 17,2020 | |||
: (4) ORT 59, Train A Spray System CIV Leakage Test Unit 1, after maintenance on 1SI-868A, Containment Spray Nozzle A Header Isolation, on October 22, 2020 (5)0-SOP-DC-004, 125 VDC System operating procedure after maintenance on D-106/D-108, on December 7, 2020 | |||
==71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities== | |||
===Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) The inspectors evaluated U1R39 activities from October 1-November 5, 2020. | |||
==71111.22 - Surveillance Testing== | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: | |||
===Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=1}} | |||
: (1) ORT 3A, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train A) | |||
Unit 1, on October 5, 2020 | |||
===Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) IT 760, Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves (Refueling) Unit 1, on October 9, 2020 | |||
===Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) IT 250, Chemical and Volume Control and Component Cooling System Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, on October 20, 2020 | |||
==71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes== | |||
===Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) The inspectors completed an evaluation of submitted emergency action level and emergency plan changes on December 11, 2020. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval. | |||
==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation== | |||
===Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
The inspectors evaluated: | |||
: (1) an emergency coordinator classification evaluation on November 3, | |||
==RADIATION SAFETY== | |||
==71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls== | |||
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Partial) | |||
(1) | |||
(Partial) | |||
The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers. | |||
However, the completion of the sample requires direct inspector observations which could not be performed due to COVID-19 restrictions. | |||
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | |||
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | |||
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151|count=2}} | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittal listed below: | |||
: (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020) | |||
: (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020) | |||
===MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittal listed below: | |||
: (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020) | |||
: (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020) | |||
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples) | |||
: (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2019-September 30, 2020) | |||
: (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2019-September30, 2020) | |||
===OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)=== | |||
(1) | |||
(September 1, 2019-September30, 2020) | |||
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample) | |||
(1) | |||
(September 1, 2019-September 30, 2020) | |||
==71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution== | |||
===Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)=== | |||
: (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in human performance errors that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. | |||
===Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)=== | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues: | |||
: (1) Action Request (AR) 2369621; Part 21: Nutherm Continuously Energized Eaton D26 Relays; and AR 2373438; Additional Action Required for Part 21 - AR 02369621 | |||
: (2) AR 2350545; 2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response and AR 2361516; 1993 Part 21 Documentation Ambiguous | |||
===71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)=== | |||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71153|count=1}} | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs): | |||
: (1) LER 05000301/2020-001-00, Reactor Protection System Channel Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications. | |||
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20163A561) | |||
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results section. | |||
==INSPECTION RESULTS== | |||
Unresolved Item (Open) | |||
Letdown Isolation Valve, 1RC-427, Failed to Open from Main Control Room URI 05000266/2020004-01 71111.12 | |||
=====Description:===== | |||
On October 4, 2020, letdown isolation valve 1RC-427 failed to close remotely from the control room when operators were transitioning reactor unit 1 from hot standby to cold shutdown in accordance with revision 19 of procedure OP 3C Unit 1, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Unit 1. This motor-operated valve (MOV) is connected to the reactor coolant system (RCS)and is part of the RCS pressure boundary. The licensee documented this issue in the Corrective Action Program as condition report (AR) 2370332. This AR declared the MOV as functional for the ability to maintain the RCS pressure boundary. On October 11, 2020, the licensee locally and manually throttled the MOV to a mid-position and then was able to successfully stroke the valve remotely using the associated control room switch. On October 21, 2020, the licensee performed revision 24 of procedure IT 320, CVCS Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, to verify the valve stroke time met the inservice testing program requirements. The MOV stroked within the prescribed time band. | |||
The licensee completed a maintenance rule functional failure (MRFF) evaluation on October 24, 2020, and determined the valve did not have a functional failure. However, the inspectors noted the MRFF evaluation stated the MOV had a function to close for NFPA 805 safe shutdown, abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), and emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The inspectors became concerned because the initial functionality assessment only considered the impact of the MOV failure to the RCS pressure boundary function. In addition, the licensee did not have an action to address these additional functions. Furthermore, the inspectors noted this MOV had experienced similar failures in at least three previous refueling outages. For example, AR 2307067 documented a similar failure during the 2019 refueling outage and referenced similar issues that occurred in 2017 and 2013. The 2019 issue was also corrected by manually and locally placing the valve in a mid-position followed by successful electrical stroking of the valve. Again, the licensee believed the MOV remained functional and only evaluated against the RCS pressure boundary function. | |||
The inspectors questioned the MOV ability to perform its functions to close remotely from the control room and automatically for NFPA 805 safe shutdown, AOPs, and EOPs, when it has been unable to remotely close when transitioning reactor unit 1 from hot standby to cold shutdown in at least four separate occasions. At the end of this inspection period, the licensee agreed the valve was non-functional with respect to NFPA 805 functions and is working on a past functionality review. | |||
Planned Closure Actions: Additional information is needed from the licensee for the NRC to evaluate the following concerns: | |||
* whether or not the maintenance being performed on the valve is appropriate | |||
* if the licensee has adequately evaluated the functionality of 1RC-427 | |||
Licensee Actions: On December 23, 2020, the licensee declared 1RC-427 non-functional and implemented hourly fire watches in several fire zones to minimize the likelihood of a fire affecting the 1CV-200A/B/C valves. In addition, if unable to close (or maintain closed) either 1RC-427 or the 1CV-200 valves the licensee has direction to open the breakers for 1CV-200A/B/C to remove power from the valves allowing them to close. The 1CV-200A/B/C are valves located downstream of the flow orifices, which are downstream of 1RC-427. | |||
These valves are interlocked with 1RC-427 such that they will receive an automatic close signal if 1RC-427 is not full open. The licensee considers the 1CV-200 valves as a backup to 1RC-427. | |||
Corrective Action References: ARs 2378631, 2370332, 2307067 | |||
Observation: Semi Annual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors noted a continued trend in the human performance (HU) error rate at the station. The station initiated Condition Report 2375752 to evaluate the HU error rate. During 2020, the station had one "significant" error, six "noteworthy" errors, 117 "minor" errors, and 91 precursor events, as defined by their processes. This trend was similar than the 2019 HU error rate trend. The licensee determined there was no adverse trend and that the error rate was "sustained performance." Nonetheless, the licensee initiated a level 1 assessment (AR 2380282) to determine if any common drivers/gaps existed related to the HU errors. | |||
One of the gaps identified was that managers/supervisors did not help the workers understand what HU tools were appropriate for a given task. The message given to the workers was "use your HU tools" without any specifics. The licensee plans to conduct a HU campaign focusing on HU tool selection and usage. Within this campaign, the safety/HU group plans to provide four monthly HU sharing information updates and perform an effectiveness review in the first quarter of 2022. In addition, since many of the HU errors occurred due to failures to follow procedure use and adherence standards, the station issued an escalated action (Condition Report 2375766) to address the gaps for procedure use standards. This escalation will look into any cultural aspects that may be leading to the performance gaps. | |||
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations during their review that have not already been addressed. | |||
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. | |||
Violation: Point Beach Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," stated that the RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be operable. Table 3.3.1-1 included the overtemperature delta temperature function (i.e., Function #5) and required four channels in Modes 1 and 2 or entry to Condition D. When one channel was inoperable, Condition D required the licensee to place the channel in trip within 1 hour or be in Mode 3 within 7 hours. | |||
Contrary to the above, from April 10 to April 13, 2020, the licensee failed to have operable RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1-1. Specifically, one of four channels (i.e., Channel #4) associated with the overtemperature delta temperature function on the Unit 2 reactor was inoperable while in Mode 1 and the licensee did not place the inoperable channel in trip within 1 hour or Unit 2 reactor in Mode 3 within 7 hours. The licensee restored compliance on April 13, 2020, at 10:50 am, when they placed the inoperable channel in trip. This issue is associated with LER 05000301/2020-001-00, Reactor Protection System Channel Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications. | |||
Significance/Severity: No Performance Deficiency. Severity Level IV. Traditional Enforcement is being used to disposition this violation with no associated Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) performance deficiency, per NRC Enforcement Policy Sections 2.2.4.d and 3.10. The inspectors concluded this violation was not associated with an ROP performance deficiency because it was not within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the RPS channel failure was not reasonably evident to the operators. While the channel signal amplitude peaks decreased, the average value of the signal did not change after the failure. Thus, the indication on the operator control boards remained unchanged. | |||
Additionally, the inoperable channel module was procured as a safety-related component and functioned properly during its installation and calibration less than a month before its failure. | |||
Corrective Action References: AR | |||
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | |||
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | |||
* On January 12, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. B. Woyak, Safety Assurance and Learning Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
* On October 26, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Ms. J. Walters, Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
* On November 3, 2020, the inspectors presented the ISI inspection results to Mr. B. Woyak, Safety Assurance and Learning Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
* On December 11, 2020, the inspectors presented the Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes inspection results to Mr. D. Smith, Emergency Preparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
71111.01 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
List of Work Orders Coded Seasonal Readiness (Winter) | |||
11/10/2020 | |||
Procedures | |||
OP-AA-102-1002 | |||
Seasonal Readiness | |||
71111.04 | |||
Drawings | |||
110E017, Sheet 3 | |||
P&ID Safety Injection System | |||
110E018, Sheet 3 | |||
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System | |||
110E018, Sheet 4 | |||
P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System | |||
110E018, Sheet 5 | |||
P&ID CCW Minimum Flow Recirculation Cross Connect | |||
Details, Unit 1 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
1-CL-CC-001 | |||
Component Cooling Unit 1 | |||
CL 5C | |||
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Refueling Water Circulating | |||
Pump Normal Operation Valve Lineup | |||
CL 7A | |||
Safety Injection System Checklist Mode 1, 2, 3 Unit 1 | |||
71111.05 | |||
Fire Plans | |||
PFP-0-CB | |||
Pre-Fire Plan Control Building Elev 8 FT, 26 FT, 44 FT, | |||
and 66 FT | |||
PFP-0-PAS | |||
Pre-Fire Plan Protected Area South (Inside the Fence) | |||
PFP-1-CONT-FAC | |||
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment Building/Facade | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
FPTE 2016-028 | |||
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report: Fire Compartment | |||
505 Containment - Unit 1 - EL 8'0" | |||
FPTE 2016-029 | |||
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report: Fire Compartment | |||
511 Containment - Unit 1 - EL 21'0" | |||
FPTE 2016-030 | |||
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report: Fire Compartment | |||
516 Containment - Unit 1 - EL 46'0" | |||
71111.08P | |||
Calculations | |||
LTR-CECO-20-089 | |||
Evaluation of Material Removal at Point Beach Unit 1 | |||
Steam Generator Channel Head Drain | |||
WCAP-17905-P | |||
Model 44F Replacement Steam Generator Stress Report | |||
Addendum 3 for Point Beach Unit 1 Channel Head Bowl | |||
Drain Modification | |||
WCAP-17905-P | |||
Model 44F Replacement Steam Generator Stress Report | |||
Addendum 3 for Point Beach Unit 1 Channel Head Bowl | |||
Drain Modification | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2297583 | |||
West NSAL 05-02 Rev 1 OE Review | |||
01/11/2019 | |||
AR 2310042 | |||
Support AC-152N-17-H11 Gap Less than Design | |||
Drawing | |||
04/11/2019 | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
AR 2370320 | |||
1RC-526B Liquid Penetrant Indications | |||
10/04/2020 | |||
AR 2371547 | |||
Unit 1 B SG Channel Head Liquid Penetrant Indications | |||
10/13/2020 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2371957 | |||
NRC Walkdown Discovered Boric Acid on Components | |||
10/16/2020 | |||
AR 2373417 | |||
FSAR Table A.5-3 Changed in Error (Legacy) | |||
10/27/2020 | |||
AR 2373596 | |||
File Copy of Specification 955381 Rev 2 Missing Even # | |||
Pages | |||
10/28/2020 | |||
AR 2373861 | |||
Stress Report for Unit 1 SGs Does Not Document SSE | |||
Results | |||
10/30/2020 | |||
Engineering | |||
Changes | |||
295371 | |||
Steam Generator Channel Head Drain Weld Removal to | |||
Address Field Indications (U1R39) | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Design Specification | |||
No. 955381 | |||
NextEra Energy Point Beach Unit 1 Model 44F | |||
Replacement Steam Generators | |||
Repair/Replacement | |||
Activity No. 2020- | |||
29 | |||
10/12/2020 | |||
Repair/Replacement | |||
Activity No. 2020- | |||
031 | |||
10/14/2020 | |||
NDE Reports | |||
1RC-526B | |||
Liquid Penetrant Examination of 1HX-1B Steam | |||
Generator Channel Head Drain | |||
10/04/2020 | |||
20U1VT-009 | |||
RPV Closure Head (BACC Outage Visual) | |||
10/15/2020 | |||
20U1VT-010 | |||
RPV Bottom Mounted Instrumentation | |||
10/07/2020 | |||
Unit 1 Steam | |||
Generator B | |||
Lower Bowl Drain Surface Area | |||
10/16/2020 | |||
Unit 1 Steam | |||
Generator B | |||
Liquid Penetrant Examination of Unit 1 Steam Generator | |||
B Bowl Drain | |||
10/12/2020 | |||
Procedures | |||
NDE 120 | |||
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Control Rod Drive and | |||
Instrument Nozzle Housing Welds | |||
NDE 401 | |||
Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Expanded | |||
Temperature Applications (60F TO 350F) | |||
NDE 451 | |||
Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Temperature | |||
Applications 40F to 125F | |||
NDE 757 | |||
Visual Examination for Leakage of Pressure Vessel | |||
Penetrations | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
Work Orders | |||
40713753-20 | |||
HX-1B SG Channel Head DRAIN | |||
10/12/2020 | |||
40744957-04 | |||
1HX-1B Surface Anomaly on Steam Generator B Lower | |||
10/16/2020 | |||
71111.11Q Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2373292 | |||
OP-1B Step Marked N/A After Subsequent Steps | |||
Performed | |||
10/26/2020 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
PBN LOC Mod 1-5 | |||
JITT | |||
Simulator Exercise Guide - Mode 1 thru 5 JITT | |||
Procedures | |||
OP 1B | |||
Reactor Startup | |||
OP 3A Unit 1 | |||
Power Operation to Hot Standby Unit 1 | |||
OP 3B | |||
Reactor Shutdown | |||
71111.12 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2307067 | |||
1RC-427, RC Loop to CVCS Letdown, Does Not Close | |||
03/24/2019 | |||
AR 2355570 | |||
2HX-12D As-Found Coating Inspection | |||
05/05/2020 | |||
AR 2359423 | |||
RMS System Exceeds Maximum Number of Functional | |||
Failures | |||
06/10/2020 | |||
AR 2370332 | |||
1RC-427 Will Not Stroke Shut From 1C04 in Control | |||
10/04/2020 | |||
AR 2371361 | |||
1CV-1296 Failed Primary Boundary Leak Test | |||
10/12/2020 | |||
AR 2372314 | |||
1CV-1296 Actuator is Out of Alignment, Causing | |||
Packing Leakage | |||
10/19/2020 | |||
AR 2372321 | |||
AR for Excessive Leakage on ORT 46 | |||
10/20/2020 | |||
AR 2372690 | |||
1CV-1296 Exceeds Admin Limit of ORT 46 | |||
10/21/2020 | |||
AR 2372766 | |||
Replace 1CV-01296 During Next Outage | |||
10/22/2020 | |||
AR 2373171 | |||
Active Boric Acid Leak on 1CV-1296 | |||
10/26/2020 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2377247 | |||
RMP 9006-6 Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul | |||
Missing QC | |||
2/03/2020 | |||
AR 2378631 | |||
Screening Adequacy Questioned for 1RC-427 MOV Fail | |||
to Close | |||
2/16/2020 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan - Radiation | |||
Monitoring System | |||
10/09/2020 | |||
Procedures | |||
EN-AA-206 | |||
Renewed License Process | |||
LR-AMP-021- | |||
OCCW | |||
Open Cycle Cooling (Service) Water System | |||
Surveillance Program Basis Document for License | |||
Renewal | |||
NP 11.1.14 | |||
Inspection Planning | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
NP 11.1.15 | |||
Quality Control Procedures | |||
WO 40659838 | |||
2HX-012D GL 89-13 Open/Inspect/Clean/Close HX | |||
05/12/2020 | |||
Work Orders | |||
WO 40635290 01 | |||
2R-1 Remove and Reinstall RV Head | |||
04/04/2020 | |||
WO 40658841 07 | |||
HX-12B Contingency to Repair Coating if Required | |||
04/30/2020 | |||
WO 40659838 20 | |||
2HX-012D Contingency to Weld Repair Heat Exchanger | |||
05/07/2020 | |||
WO 40677714 01 | |||
P-035B-E/Small Oil Leak on Valve Cover for P-035B-E | |||
08/29/2019 | |||
WO 40687597 01 | |||
3Y Mechanical Maintenance | |||
06/11/2020 | |||
WO 40693366 01 | |||
M-3-5-16-W21/Repair Fire Penetration | |||
01/07/2020 | |||
WO 40711598 01 | |||
2P-11A CCW Pump Inboard Seal Oil Leak | |||
03/27/2020 | |||
71111.13 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2377034 | |||
D-105 Battery Did Not Have Local GE Sign | |||
2/01/2020 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection | |||
Checklist | |||
10/09/2020 | |||
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection | |||
Checklist | |||
2/01/2020 | |||
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection | |||
Checklist | |||
10/08/2020 | |||
Procedures | |||
NP 10.3.7 | |||
On-Line Safety Assessment | |||
71111.15 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2370318 | |||
1CS-256A, FM Found Inside the Valve and Exhaust | |||
Muffler | |||
10/04/2020 | |||
AR 2370982 | |||
1SI-899A Flow Low Out of Limits In IT-760 | |||
10/09/2020 | |||
AR 2371249 | |||
G-02 EDG Air Bank Pressure Drop | |||
10/11/2020 | |||
AR 2374863 | |||
G-02 Air Start Motor No Residual Oil | |||
11/08/2020 | |||
AR 2379147 | |||
Pressurizer Pressure Controller Abnormal Operation | |||
2/23/2020 | |||
71111.18 | |||
Calculations | |||
20-0008 | |||
Unit 1 Steam Generator Drain Line Nozzle Loads | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2371710 | |||
U1 SG B Bowl Drain Pipe Internal Pit | |||
10/15/2020 | |||
AR 2372091 | |||
Difficulty Welding Drain Cap on Unit 1 B SG | |||
10/18/2020 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2371782 | |||
U1 SG Drain Line Stress Analysis May Not be Bounding | |||
10/15/2020 | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
Engineering | |||
Changes | |||
295378 | |||
Replace 1RC-526A and 1RC-526B With A Pipe Cap | |||
71111.19 | |||
Procedures | |||
0-SOP-DC-004 | |||
25 VDC System, Bus D-04 & Components | |||
0-SOP-DC-005 | |||
25 VDC System, Swing Buses & Components | |||
IT 03 Train B | |||
Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves Train B | |||
Unit 1 | |||
ORT 59 | |||
Train A Spray System CIV Leakage Test Unit 1 | |||
Work Orders | |||
WO 40657564 | |||
1SI-868A Exceeds Administrative Leakage Limit | |||
10/22/2020 | |||
WO 40662959 | |||
AF-4089 Replace Relief Valve Require Duel Unit TSAC | |||
10/06/2020 | |||
WO 40666356 | |||
1CS-00256A / Replace Seat and Seal Material Per EC | |||
294033 | |||
10/08/2020 | |||
WO 40666758 | |||
D-106/D-108, Bat Disch & Charger Maint and SR Tests | |||
WO 40731898 | |||
1RH-625/Part 21 Woodruff Key Replacement | |||
10/17/2020 | |||
71111.20 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2370236 | |||
B RCP Pump Cubicle Lower Level Area Oil Present | |||
10/03/2020 | |||
AR 2371957 | |||
NRC Walkdown Discovered Boric Acid on Components | |||
10/16/2020 | |||
AR 2373033 | |||
Unit 1 Containment Walkdown Identified the Following 3 | |||
Items | |||
10/24/2020 | |||
Procedures | |||
1RMP 9096-1 | |||
Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using | |||
Biach Tensioning System | |||
NP 8.4.7 | |||
Control of Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual | |||
OP 1B | |||
Reactor Startup | |||
OP 1C Unit 1 | |||
Startup to Power Operation Unit 1 | |||
OP 3C Unit 1 | |||
Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Unit 1 | |||
SLP 1 | |||
Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual - Items Lifted by | |||
Containment Polar Crane Unit 1 | |||
71111.22 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2369297 | |||
Found Flow Transmitter Out of Tolerance During | |||
Calibration | |||
09/24/2020 | |||
AR 2370982 | |||
1SI-889A Flow Low Out of Limits in IT 760 | |||
10/09/2020 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2372028 | |||
U1 ORT 3A Documentation and Signoff Inconsistencies | |||
10/17/2020 | |||
Procedures | |||
IT 250 | |||
Chemical and Volume Control and Component Cooling | |||
System Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1 | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
IT 760 | |||
Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves | |||
(Refueling) Unit 1 | |||
ORT 3A Unit 1 | |||
Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered | |||
Safeguards AC (Train A) Unit 1 | |||
71114.04 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
4Q19 EP-5.0 | |||
CFR 50.54(q)(2) - Revising the Emergency Plan | |||
Evaluation Form | |||
10/09/2019 | |||
4Q19-EPIP 1-3-1 | |||
CFR 50.54 (q)(2) Revising the Emergency Plan | |||
Evaluation Form | |||
10/09/2019 | |||
4Q19-EPIP 1-3-2 | |||
CFR 50.54 (q)(2) Revising the Emergency Plan | |||
Evaluation Form | |||
10/09/2019 | |||
4Q19-EPIP 4-2 | |||
CFR 50.54 (q)(2) Revising the Emergency Plan | |||
Evaluation Form | |||
10/09/2019 | |||
71114.06 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
PBN EPR 203 003D | |||
EC DEP Opportunity - September 2020 | |||
09/09/2020 | |||
71124.01 | |||
ALARA Plans | |||
ALARA Package | |||
No: R021 RWP 20- | |||
1062 | |||
Pre-Job ALARA Review - Emergent 1RC-526B Steam | |||
Generator Bowl Drain Repair | |||
10/07/2020 | |||
Radiation | |||
Surveys | |||
PBPROD-M- | |||
201003-33 | |||
Primary Manway Platform B Side - Insulation Removal | |||
10/03/2020 | |||
PBPROD-M- | |||
201003-7 | |||
Primary Manway Platform B Side - Initial Entry | |||
10/03/2020 | |||
PBPROD-M- | |||
201005-1 | |||
Primary Manway Platform - B Side | |||
10/05/2020 | |||
PBPROD-M- | |||
201005-37 | |||
Unit 1 CTMT Primary Manway Platform, B Side | |||
Contamination Survey | |||
10/05/2020 | |||
Radiation Work | |||
Permits (RWPs) | |||
20-1062 | |||
RCS Leak Repair | |||
71151 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
MSPI Margin Reports; Units 1 and 2 | |||
10/01/2019- | |||
09/30/2020 | |||
MSPI Derivation Reports; Residual Heat Removal, | |||
Cooling Water; Units 1 and 2 | |||
10/01/2019- | |||
09/30/2020 | |||
NP 5.2.16 | |||
B | |||
PI Data Collection, Review and Approval; RCS Activity- | |||
Fuel Performance | |||
Various | |||
NP 5.2.16 | |||
B | |||
PI Data Collection, Review and Approval; ODCM Rad. | |||
Eff. Occurrences | |||
Various | |||
Inspection | |||
Procedure | |||
Type | |||
Designation | |||
Description or Title | |||
Revision or | |||
Date | |||
NP 5.2.16 | |||
B | |||
PI Data Collection, Review and Approval; Occ. Exp. | |||
Cont. Effectiveness | |||
Various | |||
Procedures | |||
PBN-BFJR-18-054 | |||
MSPI Basis Document for PBNP | |||
71152 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2350536 | |||
Unit 2 High RHR Flow | |||
03/30/2020 | |||
AR 2350547 | |||
2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response | |||
03/30/2020 | |||
AR 2362363 | |||
Inspect 2RH-624 Shaft to Lever Arm Keyways | |||
07/10/2020 | |||
AR 2369621 | |||
Part 21: Nutherm Continuously Energized Eaton D26 | |||
Relays | |||
09/29/2020 | |||
AR 2373438 | |||
Additional Action Required for Part 21 - AR 2369621 | |||
10/27/2020 | |||
AR 2375752 | |||
Adverse Trend: HU Issues in 2020 | |||
11/16/2020 | |||
CAP 14698 | |||
Sheared Woodruff Key in 2-RH00624 | |||
10/22/1991 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
Resulting from | |||
Inspection | |||
AR 2359462 | |||
MRFF Needed for AR 2350547 | |||
06/10/2020 | |||
AR 2361516 | |||
1993 Part 21 Documentation Ambiguous | |||
07/01/2020 | |||
Drawings | |||
H-11051 Sheet 1 | |||
8IN. 300# Type 7613 AOV W/Extension | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Trend ARs 06-02-2020 thru 11-30-2020 | |||
2/01/2020 | |||
Work Orders | |||
WO 346830 | |||
2RH-00624; Disassemble and Inspect Valve | |||
04/25/2008 | |||
WO 391386 | |||
2RH-00624: License Renewal Follow-up Inspection | |||
03/27/2011 | |||
WO 40712503 | |||
2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response | |||
04/01/2020 | |||
71153 | |||
Corrective Action | |||
Documents | |||
AR 2346369 | |||
Mode Panel Switches on New NUSI TMD Modules | |||
Faulty | |||
2/27/2020 | |||
AR 2351694 | |||
2TI-407A Blue Channel Setpoint 1 Failure | |||
04/07/2020 | |||
AR 2352490 | |||
Replace Setpoint 1 Yellow Channel (2TM-404B) | |||
04/13/2020 | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 11:09, 29 November 2024
| ML21040A188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach |
| Issue date: | 02/08/2021 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Strope M Point Beach |
| References | |
| IR 2020004 | |
| Download: ML21040A188 (22) | |
Text
February 8, 2021
SUBJECT:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2020004 AND 05000301/2020004
Dear Mr. Strope:
On December 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. On January 12, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Bryan Woyak, Safety Assurance and Learning Site Director, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. A traditional enforcement follow-up inspection associated with this violation is not warranted in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, because it did not involve willfulness, impeding the regulatory process, or actual safety consequences.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Point Beach Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000266 and 05000301 License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000266 and 05000301
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000266/2020004 and 05000301/2020004
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-004-0064
Licensee:
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
Facility:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Location:
Two Rivers, WI
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2020 to December 31, 2020
Inspectors:
K. Barclay, Reactor Inspector
J. Bozga, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector
T. McGowan, Resident Inspector
R. Ng, Project Engineer
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 7115
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000266/2020004-01 Letdown Isolation Valve, 1RC-427, Failed to Open from Main Control Room 71111.12 Open LER 05000301/2020-001-00 Reactor Protection System Channel Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specification 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 97 percent rated thermal power. On October 3, 2020, the plant was shutdown for refueling outage U1R39. On October 26, 2020, Unit 1 was restarted. On October 28, 2020, the unit was synchronized to the grid, and on November 5, 2020, it achieved full power. The unit remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power and remained at or near full power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection, unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met, consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 train B containment spray system on November 18, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 train A component cooling water system on November 24, 2020
- (3) Unit 2 125 Volt DC system on December 1, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the spent fuel pool cooling water system on October 13, 2020.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
(1)fire zones 505, 511, 516, and 520 on October 24, 2020 (2)fire zone 680 on November 2, 2020 (3)fire zones 304N, 304S, and 305 on November 5, 2020
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the documentation for the following activities from October 6-November 3, 2020:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
- liquid penetrant (PT) examination of integral welded attachment SI-2501R-5-SI10-IWA
- PT examination of 1HX-1B Steam Generator Channel Head Drain
- PT examination of 1HX-1B Steam Generator Channel Head
- pressure boundary field welds of 1B Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD)manifolds (Work Order 40584606)
- pressure boundary field welds of 1AF-106 Valve (Work Order 40575122)
- pressure boundary field welds of 1AF-107 Valve (Work Order 40575123)
03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.
- boric acid evaluations for 1HX-1B and 1RC-526B
- boric acid condition reports for boric acid on 1FT-626 and Incore Flux Mapping Thimble Tubes
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during Unit 1 plant shutdown on October 3, 2020.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during Unit 1 reactor startup and turnover on October 26, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated just-in-time training for Unit 1 reactor and plant startup on October 24. 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)1CV-1296, Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation valve (2)1RC-427, RC Loop B Cold Leg to CVCS Letdown Isolation valve failed on October 4, 2020
- (3) Radiation Monitoring System
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) The inspectors reviewed six work packages covering a variety of maintenance activities on safety related and/or risk significant systems to evaluate whether licensee quality control verifications are properly specified in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program and are implemented as specified.
Aging Management (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the aging management program for the following SSCs that did not meet their inspection or test acceptance criteria:
(1)2HX-12D component cooling water heat exchanger
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to short time to boil and reduced inventory on October 8, 2020
- (2) Unit 1 emergent work to lift and reinstall reactor pressure vessel head due to cavity leak on October 9, 2020 (3)both units elevated risk due to maintenance on a battery charger, on November 1, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1 train A safety injection pump flow low during testing
- (2) G-02 emergency diesel generator had abnormal air bank pressure drop during start (3)foreign material found inside main feed isolation valve actuator 3-way valve
- (4) Unit 2 pressurizer pressure controller experienced abnormal operation
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
(1)2-SOP-AF-001, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation - Motor Driven, after replacement of AF-4089, 1/2P-53 AFP Mini-Recirc Relief on October 7, 2020
- (2) IT 300D, Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Test Train A Unit 1, after replacement of the main feedwater isolation valve actuator 3-way valve, on October 8, 2020
- (3) IT 03 Train B, Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves Train B Unit 1, after maintenance on 1RH-625, HX-11B RHR HX Outlet Valve, on October 17,2020
- (4) ORT 59, Train A Spray System CIV Leakage Test Unit 1, after maintenance on 1SI-868A, Containment Spray Nozzle A Header Isolation, on October 22, 2020 (5)0-SOP-DC-004, 125 VDC System operating procedure after maintenance on D-106/D-108, on December 7, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated U1R39 activities from October 1-November 5, 2020.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) ORT 3A, Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train A)
Unit 1, on October 5, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) IT 760, Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves (Refueling) Unit 1, on October 9, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) IT 250, Chemical and Volume Control and Component Cooling System Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, on October 20, 2020
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors completed an evaluation of submitted emergency action level and emergency plan changes on December 11, 2020. This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) an emergency coordinator classification evaluation on November 3,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.
However, the completion of the sample requires direct inspector observations which could not be performed due to COVID-19 restrictions.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08)===
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittal listed below:
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittal listed below:
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2019-September30, 2020)
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
(1)
(September 1, 2019-September30, 2020)
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
(1)
(September 1, 2019-September 30, 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in human performance errors that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Action Request (AR) 2369621; Part 21: Nutherm Continuously Energized Eaton D26 Relays; and AR 2373438; Additional Action Required for Part 21 - AR 02369621
- (2) AR 2350545; 2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response and AR 2361516; 1993 Part 21 Documentation Ambiguous
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000301/2020-001-00, Reactor Protection System Channel Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications.
(ADAMS Accession No. ML20163A561)
The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results section.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Open)
Letdown Isolation Valve, 1RC-427, Failed to Open from Main Control Room URI 05000266/2020004-01 71111.12
Description:
On October 4, 2020, letdown isolation valve 1RC-427 failed to close remotely from the control room when operators were transitioning reactor unit 1 from hot standby to cold shutdown in accordance with revision 19 of procedure OP 3C Unit 1, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Unit 1. This motor-operated valve (MOV) is connected to the reactor coolant system (RCS)and is part of the RCS pressure boundary. The licensee documented this issue in the Corrective Action Program as condition report (AR) 2370332. This AR declared the MOV as functional for the ability to maintain the RCS pressure boundary. On October 11, 2020, the licensee locally and manually throttled the MOV to a mid-position and then was able to successfully stroke the valve remotely using the associated control room switch. On October 21, 2020, the licensee performed revision 24 of procedure IT 320, CVCS Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1, to verify the valve stroke time met the inservice testing program requirements. The MOV stroked within the prescribed time band.
The licensee completed a maintenance rule functional failure (MRFF) evaluation on October 24, 2020, and determined the valve did not have a functional failure. However, the inspectors noted the MRFF evaluation stated the MOV had a function to close for NFPA 805 safe shutdown, abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), and emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The inspectors became concerned because the initial functionality assessment only considered the impact of the MOV failure to the RCS pressure boundary function. In addition, the licensee did not have an action to address these additional functions. Furthermore, the inspectors noted this MOV had experienced similar failures in at least three previous refueling outages. For example, AR 2307067 documented a similar failure during the 2019 refueling outage and referenced similar issues that occurred in 2017 and 2013. The 2019 issue was also corrected by manually and locally placing the valve in a mid-position followed by successful electrical stroking of the valve. Again, the licensee believed the MOV remained functional and only evaluated against the RCS pressure boundary function.
The inspectors questioned the MOV ability to perform its functions to close remotely from the control room and automatically for NFPA 805 safe shutdown, AOPs, and EOPs, when it has been unable to remotely close when transitioning reactor unit 1 from hot standby to cold shutdown in at least four separate occasions. At the end of this inspection period, the licensee agreed the valve was non-functional with respect to NFPA 805 functions and is working on a past functionality review.
Planned Closure Actions: Additional information is needed from the licensee for the NRC to evaluate the following concerns:
- whether or not the maintenance being performed on the valve is appropriate
- if the licensee has adequately evaluated the functionality of 1RC-427
Licensee Actions: On December 23, 2020, the licensee declared 1RC-427 non-functional and implemented hourly fire watches in several fire zones to minimize the likelihood of a fire affecting the 1CV-200A/B/C valves. In addition, if unable to close (or maintain closed) either 1RC-427 or the 1CV-200 valves the licensee has direction to open the breakers for 1CV-200A/B/C to remove power from the valves allowing them to close. The 1CV-200A/B/C are valves located downstream of the flow orifices, which are downstream of 1RC-427.
These valves are interlocked with 1RC-427 such that they will receive an automatic close signal if 1RC-427 is not full open. The licensee considers the 1CV-200 valves as a backup to 1RC-427.
Corrective Action References: ARs 2378631, 2370332, 2307067
Observation: Semi Annual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors noted a continued trend in the human performance (HU) error rate at the station. The station initiated Condition Report 2375752 to evaluate the HU error rate. During 2020, the station had one "significant" error, six "noteworthy" errors, 117 "minor" errors, and 91 precursor events, as defined by their processes. This trend was similar than the 2019 HU error rate trend. The licensee determined there was no adverse trend and that the error rate was "sustained performance." Nonetheless, the licensee initiated a level 1 assessment (AR 2380282) to determine if any common drivers/gaps existed related to the HU errors.
One of the gaps identified was that managers/supervisors did not help the workers understand what HU tools were appropriate for a given task. The message given to the workers was "use your HU tools" without any specifics. The licensee plans to conduct a HU campaign focusing on HU tool selection and usage. Within this campaign, the safety/HU group plans to provide four monthly HU sharing information updates and perform an effectiveness review in the first quarter of 2022. In addition, since many of the HU errors occurred due to failures to follow procedure use and adherence standards, the station issued an escalated action (Condition Report 2375766) to address the gaps for procedure use standards. This escalation will look into any cultural aspects that may be leading to the performance gaps.
The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations during their review that have not already been addressed.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Point Beach Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," stated that the RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be operable. Table 3.3.1-1 included the overtemperature delta temperature function (i.e., Function #5) and required four channels in Modes 1 and 2 or entry to Condition D. When one channel was inoperable, Condition D required the licensee to place the channel in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from April 10 to April 13, 2020, the licensee failed to have operable RPS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.1-1. Specifically, one of four channels (i.e., Channel #4) associated with the overtemperature delta temperature function on the Unit 2 reactor was inoperable while in Mode 1 and the licensee did not place the inoperable channel in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or Unit 2 reactor in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. The licensee restored compliance on April 13, 2020, at 10:50 am, when they placed the inoperable channel in trip. This issue is associated with LER 05000301/2020-001-00, Reactor Protection System Channel Failure Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Significance/Severity: No Performance Deficiency. Severity Level IV. Traditional Enforcement is being used to disposition this violation with no associated Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) performance deficiency, per NRC Enforcement Policy Sections 2.2.4.d and 3.10. The inspectors concluded this violation was not associated with an ROP performance deficiency because it was not within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the RPS channel failure was not reasonably evident to the operators. While the channel signal amplitude peaks decreased, the average value of the signal did not change after the failure. Thus, the indication on the operator control boards remained unchanged.
Additionally, the inoperable channel module was procured as a safety-related component and functioned properly during its installation and calibration less than a month before its failure.
Corrective Action References: AR
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 12, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. B. Woyak, Safety Assurance and Learning Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 26, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to Ms. J. Walters, Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 3, 2020, the inspectors presented the ISI inspection results to Mr. B. Woyak, Safety Assurance and Learning Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 11, 2020, the inspectors presented the Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes inspection results to Mr. D. Smith, Emergency Preparedness Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
List of Work Orders Coded Seasonal Readiness (Winter)
11/10/2020
Procedures
Seasonal Readiness
Drawings
110E017, Sheet 3
P&ID Safety Injection System
110E018, Sheet 3
P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System
110E018, Sheet 4
P&ID Auxiliary Cooling System
110E018, Sheet 5
P&ID CCW Minimum Flow Recirculation Cross Connect
Details, Unit 1
Miscellaneous
1-CL-CC-001
Component Cooling Unit 1
CL 5C
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Refueling Water Circulating
Pump Normal Operation Valve Lineup
CL 7A
Safety Injection System Checklist Mode 1, 2, 3 Unit 1
Fire Plans
Pre-Fire Plan Control Building Elev 8 FT, 26 FT, 44 FT,
and 66 FT
Pre-Fire Plan Protected Area South (Inside the Fence)
PFP-1-CONT-FAC
Pre-Fire Plan Unit 1 Containment Building/Facade
Miscellaneous
FPTE 2016-028
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report: Fire Compartment
505 Containment - Unit 1 - EL 8'0"
FPTE 2016-029
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report: Fire Compartment
511 Containment - Unit 1 - EL 21'0"
FPTE 2016-030
PBNP Detailed Fire Modeling Report: Fire Compartment
516 Containment - Unit 1 - EL 46'0"
Calculations
LTR-CECO-20-089
Evaluation of Material Removal at Point Beach Unit 1
Steam Generator Channel Head Drain
Model 44F Replacement Steam Generator Stress Report
Addendum 3 for Point Beach Unit 1 Channel Head Bowl
Drain Modification
Model 44F Replacement Steam Generator Stress Report
Addendum 3 for Point Beach Unit 1 Channel Head Bowl
Drain Modification
Corrective Action
Documents
West NSAL 05-02 Rev 1 OE Review
01/11/2019
Support AC-152N-17-H11 Gap Less than Design
Drawing
04/11/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
1RC-526B Liquid Penetrant Indications
10/04/2020
Unit 1 B SG Channel Head Liquid Penetrant Indications
10/13/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC Walkdown Discovered Boric Acid on Components
10/16/2020
FSAR Table A.5-3 Changed in Error (Legacy)
10/27/2020
File Copy of Specification 955381 Rev 2 Missing Even #
Pages
10/28/2020
Stress Report for Unit 1 SGs Does Not Document SSE
Results
10/30/2020
Engineering
Changes
295371
Steam Generator Channel Head Drain Weld Removal to
Address Field Indications (U1R39)
Miscellaneous
Design Specification
No. 955381
NextEra Energy Point Beach Unit 1 Model 44F
Replacement Steam Generators
Repair/Replacement
Activity No. 2020-
29
10/12/2020
Repair/Replacement
Activity No. 2020-
031
10/14/2020
NDE Reports
Liquid Penetrant Examination of 1HX-1B Steam
Generator Channel Head Drain
10/04/2020
RPV Closure Head (BACC Outage Visual)
10/15/2020
RPV Bottom Mounted Instrumentation
10/07/2020
Unit 1 Steam
Generator B
Lower Bowl Drain Surface Area
10/16/2020
Unit 1 Steam
Generator B
Liquid Penetrant Examination of Unit 1 Steam Generator
B Bowl Drain
10/12/2020
Procedures
NDE 120
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Control Rod Drive and
Instrument Nozzle Housing Welds
NDE 401
Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Expanded
Temperature Applications (60F TO 350F)
NDE 451
Visible Dye Penetrant Examination Temperature
Applications 40F to 125F
NDE 757
Visual Examination for Leakage of Pressure Vessel
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Work Orders
40713753-20
HX-1B SG Channel Head DRAIN
10/12/2020
40744957-04
1HX-1B Surface Anomaly on Steam Generator B Lower
10/16/2020
71111.11Q Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
OP-1B Step Marked N/A After Subsequent Steps
Performed
10/26/2020
Miscellaneous
PBN LOC Mod 1-5
Simulator Exercise Guide - Mode 1 thru 5 JITT
Procedures
Reactor Startup
OP 3A Unit 1
Power Operation to Hot Standby Unit 1
Reactor Shutdown
Corrective Action
Documents
1RC-427, RC Loop to CVCS Letdown, Does Not Close
03/24/2019
2HX-12D As-Found Coating Inspection
05/05/2020
RMS System Exceeds Maximum Number of Functional
Failures
06/10/2020
1RC-427 Will Not Stroke Shut From 1C04 in Control
10/04/2020
1CV-1296 Failed Primary Boundary Leak Test
10/12/2020
1CV-1296 Actuator is Out of Alignment, Causing
Packing Leakage
10/19/2020
AR for Excessive Leakage on ORT 46
10/20/2020
1CV-1296 Exceeds Admin Limit of ORT 46
10/21/2020
Replace 1CV-01296 During Next Outage
10/22/2020
Active Boric Acid Leak on 1CV-1296
10/26/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
RMP 9006-6 Component Cooling Water Pump Overhaul
Missing QC
2/03/2020
Screening Adequacy Questioned for 1RC-427 MOV Fail
to Close
2/16/2020
Miscellaneous
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Action Plan - Radiation
Monitoring System
10/09/2020
Procedures
Renewed License Process
LR-AMP-021-
OCCW
Open Cycle Cooling (Service) Water System
Surveillance Program Basis Document for License
Renewal
NP 11.1.14
Inspection Planning
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NP 11.1.15
Quality Control Procedures
2HX-012D GL 89-13 Open/Inspect/Clean/Close HX
05/12/2020
Work Orders
WO 40635290 01
2R-1 Remove and Reinstall RV Head
04/04/2020
WO 40658841 07
HX-12B Contingency to Repair Coating if Required
04/30/2020
WO 40659838 20
2HX-012D Contingency to Weld Repair Heat Exchanger
05/07/2020
WO 40677714 01
P-035B-E/Small Oil Leak on Valve Cover for P-035B-E
08/29/2019
WO 40687597 01
3Y Mechanical Maintenance
06/11/2020
WO 40693366 01
M-3-5-16-W21/Repair Fire Penetration
01/07/2020
WO 40711598 01
2P-11A CCW Pump Inboard Seal Oil Leak
03/27/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
D-105 Battery Did Not Have Local GE Sign
2/01/2020
Miscellaneous
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
10/09/2020
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
2/01/2020
PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment and Fire Inspection
Checklist
10/08/2020
Procedures
NP 10.3.7
On-Line Safety Assessment
Corrective Action
Documents
1CS-256A, FM Found Inside the Valve and Exhaust
Muffler
10/04/2020
1SI-899A Flow Low Out of Limits In IT-760
10/09/2020
G-02 EDG Air Bank Pressure Drop
10/11/2020
G-02 Air Start Motor No Residual Oil
11/08/2020
Pressurizer Pressure Controller Abnormal Operation
2/23/2020
Calculations
20-0008
Unit 1 Steam Generator Drain Line Nozzle Loads
Corrective Action
Documents
U1 SG B Bowl Drain Pipe Internal Pit
10/15/2020
Difficulty Welding Drain Cap on Unit 1 B SG
10/18/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
U1 SG Drain Line Stress Analysis May Not be Bounding
10/15/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Engineering
Changes
295378
Replace 1RC-526A and 1RC-526B With A Pipe Cap
Procedures
0-SOP-DC-004
25 VDC System, Bus D-04 & Components
0-SOP-DC-005
25 VDC System, Swing Buses & Components
IT 03 Train B
Low Head Safety Injection Pumps and Valves Train B
Unit 1
ORT 59
Train A Spray System CIV Leakage Test Unit 1
Work Orders
1SI-868A Exceeds Administrative Leakage Limit
10/22/2020
AF-4089 Replace Relief Valve Require Duel Unit TSAC
10/06/2020
1CS-00256A / Replace Seat and Seal Material Per EC 294033
10/08/2020
D-106/D-108, Bat Disch & Charger Maint and SR Tests
1RH-625/Part 21 Woodruff Key Replacement
10/17/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
B RCP Pump Cubicle Lower Level Area Oil Present
10/03/2020
NRC Walkdown Discovered Boric Acid on Components
10/16/2020
Unit 1 Containment Walkdown Identified the Following 3
Items
10/24/2020
Procedures
1RMP 9096-1
Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Installation Using
Biach Tensioning System
NP 8.4.7
Control of Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual
Reactor Startup
OP 1C Unit 1
Startup to Power Operation Unit 1
OP 3C Unit 1
Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown Unit 1
SLP 1
Safe Load Path and Rigging Manual - Items Lifted by
Containment Polar Crane Unit 1
Corrective Action
Documents
Found Flow Transmitter Out of Tolerance During
Calibration
09/24/2020
1SI-889A Flow Low Out of Limits in IT 760
10/09/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
U1 ORT 3A Documentation and Signoff Inconsistencies
10/17/2020
Procedures
IT 250
Chemical and Volume Control and Component Cooling
System Valves (Cold Shutdown) Unit 1
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
IT 760
Flow Test of High Head Safety Injection Check Valves
(Refueling) Unit 1
ORT 3A Unit 1
Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered
Safeguards AC (Train A) Unit 1
Miscellaneous
4Q19 EP-5.0
CFR 50.54(q)(2) - Revising the Emergency Plan
Evaluation Form
10/09/2019
4Q19-EPIP 1-3-1
CFR 50.54 (q)(2) Revising the Emergency Plan
Evaluation Form
10/09/2019
4Q19-EPIP 1-3-2
CFR 50.54 (q)(2) Revising the Emergency Plan
Evaluation Form
10/09/2019
4Q19-EPIP 4-2
CFR 50.54 (q)(2) Revising the Emergency Plan
Evaluation Form
10/09/2019
Miscellaneous
PBN EPR 203 003D
EC DEP Opportunity - September 2020
09/09/2020
ALARA Plans
ALARA Package
No: R021 RWP 20-
1062
Pre-Job ALARA Review - Emergent 1RC-526B Steam
Generator Bowl Drain Repair
10/07/2020
Radiation
Surveys
PBPROD-M-
201003-33
Primary Manway Platform B Side - Insulation Removal
10/03/2020
PBPROD-M-
201003-7
Primary Manway Platform B Side - Initial Entry
10/03/2020
PBPROD-M-
201005-1
Primary Manway Platform - B Side
10/05/2020
PBPROD-M-
201005-37
Unit 1 CTMT Primary Manway Platform, B Side
Contamination Survey
10/05/2020
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
20-1062
RCS Leak Repair
71151
Miscellaneous
MSPI Margin Reports; Units 1 and 2
10/01/2019-
09/30/2020
MSPI Derivation Reports; Residual Heat Removal,
Cooling Water; Units 1 and 2
10/01/2019-
09/30/2020
NP 5.2.16
B
PI Data Collection, Review and Approval; RCS Activity-
Fuel Performance
Various
NP 5.2.16
B
PI Data Collection, Review and Approval; ODCM Rad.
Eff. Occurrences
Various
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NP 5.2.16
B
PI Data Collection, Review and Approval; Occ. Exp.
Cont. Effectiveness
Various
Procedures
PBN-BFJR-18-054
MSPI Basis Document for PBNP
Corrective Action
Documents
Unit 2 High RHR Flow
03/30/2020
2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response
03/30/2020
Inspect 2RH-624 Shaft to Lever Arm Keyways
07/10/2020
Part 21: Nutherm Continuously Energized Eaton D26
Relays
09/29/2020
Additional Action Required for Part 21 - AR 2369621
10/27/2020
Adverse Trend: HU Issues in 2020
11/16/2020
CAP 14698
Sheared Woodruff Key in 2-RH00624
10/22/1991
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
MRFF Needed for AR 2350547
06/10/2020
1993 Part 21 Documentation Ambiguous
07/01/2020
Drawings
H-11051 Sheet 1
8IN. 300# Type 7613 AOV W/Extension
Miscellaneous
Trend ARs 06-02-2020 thru 11-30-2020
2/01/2020
Work Orders
2RH-00624; Disassemble and Inspect Valve
04/25/2008
2RH-00624: License Renewal Follow-up Inspection
03/27/2011
2RH-624 Opened with No Flow Response
04/01/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
Mode Panel Switches on New NUSI TMD Modules
Faulty
2/27/2020
2TI-407A Blue Channel Setpoint 1 Failure
04/07/2020
Replace Setpoint 1 Yellow Channel (2TM-404B)
04/13/2020