05000482/FIN-2013003-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = B Correll, C Hunt, C Peabody, C Speer, J O,' | | Inspector = B Correll, C Hunt, C Peabody, C Speer, J O, 'Donnelll Ricketson, M Bloodgood, M Williams, N O, 'Keefer Kopriva | ||
| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to properly update operating procedures and train operators on the effects of a recently installed modification. Specifically, procedures were not adequately revised to provide guidance for operating the new Westinghouse Ovation digital turbine controls. As a result, operators shifted operating modes at a power level that caused an 11 percent power increase due to the combined characteristics of the steam control valves and the turbine control unit. Additionally, operators were trained to shift control modes at low power levels, where minor transients occurred, but were not restricted from performing the shift at high power levels, where the transient could be more significant. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program under Condition Report 68711. Failure to update station operating procedures to provide adequate guidance for design changes, and failure to adequately train operators on those implemented design changes is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the design control, procedure quality, and human performance attributes of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Checklist 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a reactor trip coincident with the loss of mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance area of work control, because the licensee did not appropriately communicate and coordinate during activities in which interdepartmental coordination was necessary to assure plant and human performance. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not communicate and coordinate to ensure that procedure guidance and operator training adequately conveyed the operational impacts of shifting turnine control modes at different power levels. | | description = A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for failure to properly update operating procedures and train operators on the effects of a recently installed modification. Specifically, procedures were not adequately revised to provide guidance for operating the new Westinghouse Ovation digital turbine controls. As a result, operators shifted operating modes at a power level that caused an 11 percent power increase due to the combined characteristics of the steam control valves and the turbine control unit. Additionally, operators were trained to shift control modes at low power levels, where minor transients occurred, but were not restricted from performing the shift at high power levels, where the transient could be more significant. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program under Condition Report 68711. Failure to update station operating procedures to provide adequate guidance for design changes, and failure to adequately train operators on those implemented design changes is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it affected the design control, procedure quality, and human performance attributes of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Checklist 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a reactor trip coincident with the loss of mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance area of work control, because the licensee did not appropriately communicate and coordinate during activities in which interdepartmental coordination was necessary to assure plant and human performance. Specifically, Wolf Creek did not communicate and coordinate to ensure that procedure guidance and operator training adequately conveyed the operational impacts of shifting turnine control modes at different power levels. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:48, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000482/2013003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll C Hunt C Peabody C Speer J O 'Donnelll Ricketson M Bloodgood M Williams N O 'Keefer Kopriva |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |