IR 05000334/2015003: Difference between revisions
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| number = ML15309A605 | | number = ML15309A605 | ||
| issue date = 11/10/2015 | | issue date = 11/10/2015 | ||
| title = | | title = IR 05000334/2015003 & 05000412/2015003, July 1, 2015 to September 30, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station, Integrated Inspection | ||
| author name = Kennedy S R | | author name = Kennedy S R | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 | ||
Revision as of 08:45, 13 February 2018
| ML15309A605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/10/2015 |
| From: | Kennedy S R NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Emily Larson FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| KENNEDY, SR | |
| References | |
| IR 2015003 | |
| Download: ML15309A605 (30) | |
Text
November 10, 2015
Mr. Eric Larson Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P. O. Box 4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077
SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2015003 AND 05000412/2015003
Dear Mr. Larson:
On September 30, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 5, 2015, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding, or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC'(if any) will be available Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412 License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000334/2015003 and 05000412/2015003
w/Attachment:
Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY
IR 05000334/2015003 and 05000412/2015003; 07/01/2015 09/30/2015; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion. This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which did not involve a violation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting Aspects Within Cross-December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the February 4, 2015safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A self- NOP-LP-2001, Specifically, FENOC incorrectly cancelled the work sight glass with incorrect minimum and maximum oil levels. This led to the motor bearing failure, which caused the pump to trip on overcurrent, and required the operators to insert a manual reactor trip. FENOC entered the issue into their correct action program, condition report (CR) 2015-05256. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, NOP-LP-2001, section 4.2.3, states that condition report/correct action owners should ensure that actions are developed to resolve the primary cause identified in the condition report. Instead of correcting the low oil level in the motor, FENOC cancelled the work order to add oil. This subsequently caused the operators to trip the plant when the condensate pump motor bearing overheated and the motor tripped on overcurrent. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process, because FENOC did not seek input from the appropriate work group (engineering) prior to cancelling the work order to add oil to the condensate pump motor [H.13]. (Section 4OA3)
4
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at or near full power until August 31, 2015, when the unit entered end-of-cycle coastdown operations. On September 25, 2015, operators commenced a shutdown and entered into a planned refueling outage (2R18) and remained shutdown until the end of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 2 cooling pump was out of service for pump overhaul on July 27, 2015 maintenance on July 28, 2015 was out of service for scheduled maintenance on August 14, 2015 driven auxiliary feedwater pump train was inoperable on August 20, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that FENOC controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
Unit 1 control room, fire area CR-1, on July 27, 2015 Unit 2 cooling tower pump house, fire area CTP-1, on July 27, 2015 Unit 1 East cable vault, fire area CV-2, on August 4, 2015 Unit 1/2 alternate intake structure, fire area AIS-1, on August 5, 2015 Unit 1 pipe tunnel, fire area PT-1, on August 19, 2015 Unit 2 cable spreading room, fire area SB-3, on September 28, 2015 Unit 2 reactor containment building, fire area RC-1, on September 29, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on August 20, 2015. The first scenario included a pressurizer pressure transmitter failure, a reactor trip with loss of secondary heat sink, and a faulted steam generator. The second scenario included a loss of vital bus, a loss of coolant accident, and the failure of selected components to automatically start as required. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the plant shutdown and cooldown of Unit 2 on September 25 and 26, 2015. The inspectors observed use of and compliance with procedures, crew communications, interpretation, diagnosis, and understanding of plant alarms, use of human error prevention techniques, documentation of activities, and management oversight of the evolution to verify that the crew was following procedures and plant expectations for conduct of operations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed the following inspection activities of the Unit 2 licensed operator requalification program in accordance with NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1, and Inspection icensed Operator Requalification Program and Examination Results Requalification examination results (operating test, only) for year 2015 were reviewed to determine if pass/fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance crew) did not exceed 20 percent.
The overall individual operator failure rate was 12.8 percent.
The overall crew failure rate was 11.1 percent. Written Examination Quality The inspectors reviewed a sample of comprehensive written examinations that facility staff previously administered to Unit 2 operators in March and April 2015. Operating Test Quality The inspectors reviewed operating test scenarios and job performance measures (JPMs) associated with the on-site examination week.
Licensee Administration of Operating Tests The inspectors observed facility training staff administer dynamic simulator examinations and JPMs during the week of June 22, 2015. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual operator performance during the simulator examinations and individual performance of JPMs. Exam Security The inspectors assessed whether facility staff properly safeguarded examination material, and whether test item repetition was excessive.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors reviewed remedial training packages and the associated re-exams for a crew that failed the scenario portion of their 2015 operating test.
Conformance with License Conditions License reactivation and license proficiency records were reviewed to ensure that 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 55.53 license conditions and applicable program requirements were met. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of records for requalification training attendance, and a sample of medical examinations for compliance with license conditions and NRC regulations.
Simulator Performance Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant control room. A sample of simulator deficiency reports was also reviewed to ensure facility staff addressed identified modeling problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted an in-office review of results of licensee-administered 2015 annual operating tests for Unit 1 operators. The inspection assessed whether Pass/Fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process dual or crew) did not exceed 20 percent.
The overall individual failure rate was 2.8 percent. The crew failure rate was 0.0 percent.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, or component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, corrective action program documents, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that FENOC was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by FENOC staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that FENOC staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.
Unit 1 spent fuel pool cool and purification system on July 14, 2015 Unit 1 125 volts direct current control system on July 27, 2015 Unit 2 residual heat removal system on August 12, 2015 Unit 2 radiation monitoring system on September 24, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that FENOC performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that FENOC personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When FENOC performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Planned yellow risk for planned deluge test of the B system station service transformer on July 7, 2015 Unplanned loss of Unit 2 vital bus 2-3 during replacement of temperature instrumentation power supplies on July 28, 2015 quench spray pump testing and 1-1 emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump testing on August 11, 2015 Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump train unplanned inoperability on August 20, 2015 Unit 2 risk assessment for
==2R18 refueling outage on September 24, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
==
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: (FCV-1FW-489), stroke time outside of American Society of Mechanical Engineers acceptable range on July 16, 2015 Unit 1 and 2 operator work-arounds, burdens, and control room deficiencies on July 24, 2015. Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump recirculation valve pressure switch reset out of tolerance on August 20, 2015 Unit 2 2-2 emergency diesel generator service water flow below the acceptance criteria on August 31, 2015 Unit 2 reactor coolant system pressure isolation check valve (2SIS*545) exceeded leakage criteria on September 30, 2015 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by FENOC. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
Unit 2 piping on July 13, 2015 temperature instrument on August 5, 2015 Unit 2 repair of service water leak in the safeguards building on August 26, 2015 Unit 2 modification to increase the stroke of 2SVS-PCV101A, 21A steam generator atmospheric dump valve, on September 14, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied technical specifications, the UFSAR, and FENOC procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: 2MSP-37.04-E, 2P 480 Volt Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Relays 27-RP200AB and 27-RP200BC Test, Revision 21 on August 4, 2015 1OST-30.1B, Auxiliary River Water Pump Test, Revision 46 on August 5, 2015 in-service test (IST) 1OST-7.19D, Safety Injection Relay Test (Slave Relay K610) Train B, Revision 5 on August 7, 2015 2MSP-6.12-I, 2RCS-P455, Pressurizer Pressure Loop Protection Channel I Test, Revision 9 on August 12, 2015 2OST-36.1, Emergency Diesel Generator (2EGS*EG2-1) Monthly Test, Revision 71 on August 19, 2015 2OST-30.13B, Train Service Water System Full Flow Test, Revision 36 on August 31, 2015 (IST) 2OST-36.02, Emergency Diesel Generator (2EGS*EG2-2) Monthly Test, Revision 71, on September 2, 2015 1OST-24.4, Steam Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test (1FW-P-2), Revision 54, on September 4, 2015 2OST-24.2, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test (2FWE*P23A) Test, Revision 39, on September 9, 2015 2OST-36.3, Emergency Diesel Generator (2EGS*EG2-1) Automatic Test, Revision 41, on September 27, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified. Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system (ANS). During this inspection, the inspectors conducted a review of the Beaver Valley siren and tone alert radio testing and maintenance programs. The inspectors reviewed the associated ANS procedures and the Federal Emergency Management Agency approved ANS Design Report to ensure compliance with design report commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 2. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of the Beaver Valley Emergency Response Organization (ERO) augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERO. The review was performed to verify the readiness of key FENOC staff to respond to an emergency event and to verify s ability to activate their emergency response facilities (ERFs) in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed the Beaver Valley Emergency Plan for ERF activation and ERO staffing requirements, the ERO duty roster, applicable station procedures, augmentation test reports, the most recent drive-in drill reports, and corrective action reports related to this inspection area.
The inspectors also reviewed a sample of ERO responder training records to verify training and qualifications were up to date. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 3. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a number of activities to evaluate the efficacy of FENOCefforts to maintain the Beaver Valley emergency preparedness (EP) program. The inspectors reviewed: memorandums of agreement with offsite agencies; the 10 CFR 50.54(q) Emergency Plan change process and practice; Beaver Valleyequipment important to EP; records of evacuation time estimate population evaluation; and provisions for, and implementation of, primary, backup, and alternative emergency response facility maintenance. The inspectors also verified FENOCBeaver Valley with NRC EP regulations regarding: emergency action levels for hostile action events; protective actions for on-site personnel during events; emergency declaration timeliness; ERO augmentation and alternate facility capability; evacuation time estimate updates; on-shift ERO staffing analysis; and, ANS back-up means. The inspectors further evaluated s ability to maintain EP program through their identification and correction of EP weaknesses, by reviewing a sample of drill reports, self-assessments, and 10 CFR 50.54(t) reviews. Also, the inspectors reviewed a sample of EP-related condition reports initiated at Beaver Valley from October 2013 through March 2015. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114.05. Title 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine FENOC emergency drill on July 23, 2015 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator, technical support center, and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified by FENOC staff in order to evaluate critique and to verify whether the FENOC staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index (6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed submittal of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index for the following systems for the period of July 1, 2014, through June 30, 2015: Unit 1 Heat Removal System (Auxiliary Feedwater) Unit 2 Heat Removal System (Auxiliary Feedwater) Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Systems (Low Head Safety Injection and Recirculation Spray) Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System (Recirculation Spray) Unit 1 Cooling Water System (River Water) Unit 2 Cooling Water System (Service Water) To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, 7. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators (3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed data for the following three Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators for the period April 1, 2014, through March 31, 2015.
Drill and Exercise Performance Emergency Response Organization Readiness ANS Reliability To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Performance I.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that FENOC entered issues into the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective action program and periodically attended condition report screening meetings.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by FENOC outside of the corrective action program, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or corrective action program backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program database for the first and second quarters of 2015 to assess condition reports written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily condition report review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed the FENOC performance assessment report for February 1, 2015, through July 31, 2015, conducted under NOBP-LP-202 and the operations, training, and maintenance departments integrated performance assessment and trending reports to verify that FENOC personnel were appropriately evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of cause evaluations completed within the last year to determine if the corrective actions were appropriate and effective.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. The inspectors determined that the performance assessment report followed the guidance in procedure NOBP-LP-2023 in that new and closed elevations and escalations for the reporting period were identified as well as elevations and escalations remaining open. Additionally, performance was rated for each of the ten functional areas including examples of improvement in areas as well as identifying areas where gaps exist. The inspectors determined that, in general, FENOC has been identifying adverse trends in the organization. The inspectors noted that FENOC continues to have challenges in plant status control and control of transient combustibles as evidenced by fleet oversight escalations in these areas that have been open since November 2014 and June 2014 respectively.
For the review of the corrective actions associated with the seven cause evaluations, the inspectors determined that, in general, the corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors noted that in some instances the corrective actions may not have been effective at reducing the occurrence of the issue. The two examples that follow provide illustration. In CR 2014-16248, pressurizer level control left in manual, the cause was lack of operator adherence to standards for control board manipulations, specifically not properly documenting when a component was taken out of the normal system alignment. This was similar to the Unit 1 trip in April 2015 caused by lack of proper documentation of required condensate pump motor oil level. In CR 2014-09260, Unit 2 accumulator fill misposition in May 2014, the cause was not following procedures. This is similar to the trip response to the Unit 1 trip in April 2015 when the control room did not follow the emergency operating procedures rules of usage and inappropriately reverted back to a previous step to emergency borate. The inspectors noted procedure use and adherence is a continuing focus area of the operations department as documented in their integrated performance assessment and trending report.
.3 10 CFR
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000334/2015-001-00: Manual Reactor Trip and Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Due to Condensate Pump Motor Failure On April 15, 2015, following a condensate pump trip. Prior to the trip, the unit was performing an emergent pump motor. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the auxiliary feedwater system actuated as designed. The unit was stabilized in Mode 3 with main feedwater in service and auxiliary feedwater secured.
Introduction.
A Green self-lower motor bearing in accordance with NOP-LP- Specifically, FENOC failed to execute the wo, instead, installed a placard on the oil level sight glass with improper oil level indications. This led to the motor bearing failure, which caused the pump to trip on overcurrent, and required the operators to insert a manual reactor trip.
Descriptionmoisture intrusion. During initial oil filling and motor operation, oil leaked around the motor shaft. After contacting the vendor, FENOC determined that the correct oil level was at the bottom of the oil sight glass. During the forced outage in January 2014, the sight glass was replaced with one that has a lower viewing window and a placard was attached with minimum and maximum oil levels. In May 2014, a notification was written to add oil to the motor because oil level in the lower motor bearing had dropped to the minimum level. The notification was incorrectly closed to an existing outage work order for the motor. A second notification was written in June 2014 to add oil to the motor which was converted into a work order and assigned a priority in accordance with NOP-WM-1003. Three additional notifications were written in July 2014 to add oil to the motor. In August 2014, CR 2014-13579 was written to identify that motor lower bearing oil level was below minimum. In September 2014, the superintendent of work planning took ownership to resolve the issue identified in the condition report and incorrectly determined that oil should not be added until the oil level reaches the bottom of the sight glass. This was based on the assumption that the original sight glass was installed. The existing work order and notifications were cancelled, and a corrective action was initiated to install a new placard on the sight glass to show a minimum oil level at the bottom of the sight glass. In February 2015, the old placard was removed and the new placard was installed.
On April 15, 2015, the control room received a high temperature alarm on the condensate pump lower motor bearing. Operators reported oil misting, smoke, and high vibrations at the motor. Operations commenced an unplanned power reduction to 85 percent power. The motor tripped on overcurrent, causing operations to insert a manual reactor trip in accordance with their loss of feedwater procedure. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions implemented to resolve CR 2014-13579 were not in accordance with NOP-LP-2001. Section 4.2.3 of NOP-LP-2001 states that condition report/correct action owners should ensure that actions are developed to resolve the primary cause identified in the condition report. The corrective action implemented did not resolve the low oil level in the motor.
Analysis.
The inspectors determined that failure to correct the low oil level condition in -LP-2001, was a performance deficiency that was within the capability of FENOC to foresee and correct, and therefore should have been prevented. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, cancelling the work order to add oil to the motor bearing subsequently caused the operators to trip the plant when the condensate pump motor bearing overheated due to oil starvation and the motor tripped on overcurrent.
Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment.
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process, because FENOC did not seek input from the appropriate work group (engineering) prior to cancelling the work order to add oil to the condensate pump motor [H.13].
Enforcement.
This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of a regulatory requirement was identified. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 2015-05256. Because this finding did not involve a violation and was of very low safety significance (Green), it is identified as a FIN. (FIN 05000334/2015003-01, Failure to Correct a Low Oil Level in the Condensate Pump Motor)
4OA5 Other Activities
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the report for the INPO plant assessment of Beaver Valley Power Station conducted in March 2015. The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO accreditation team evaluation of the operations technical training programs conducted in September 2014. The inspectors reviewed these reports to determine whether INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC follow-up.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On November 6, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the Beaver Valley Power Station staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- E. Larson Site Vice President C. McFeaters Director, Site Operations
- A. Brunner System Engineer F. Etzel Analytical Methods Consulting Engineer C. Etzel-Hardman Design Engineer R. Ferrie Electrical Maintenance Supervisor K. Gillespie Radiation Monitoring System Engineer M. Gorham 125 VDC Control System Engineer D. Gratta Nuclear Engineering Specialist D. Jones IST Engineer J. Lebda Radiation Protection Specialist M. Manoleras DirectorProperty "Contact" (as page type) with input value "A. Brunner System Engineer F. Etzel Analytical Methods Consulting Engineer C. Etzel-Hardman Design Engineer R. Ferrie Electrical Maintenance Supervisor K. Gillespie Radiation Monitoring System Engineer M. Gorham 125 VDC Control System Engineer D. Gratta Nuclear Engineering Specialist D. Jones IST Engineer J. Lebda Radiation Protection Specialist M. Manoleras Director" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Site Engineering
- E. McFarland Simulator Supervisor J. Miller Fire Marshall K. Mitchell System Engineer T. Ponticel System Engineer A. Ray Supervisor, Maintenance Support
- B. Sepelak Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance R. Snowden Nuclear Specialist H. Szklinski Emergency Response Specialist H. Tremblay Auxiliary Feedwater System Engineer D. Wilson Air Operated Valve Program Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened/Closed
- 05000334/2015003-01 FIN Failure to Correct a Low Oil Level in the Condensate Pump Motor (Section 4OA3)
Closed
- 05000334/LER-2015-001-00 LER Manual Reactor Trip and Automatic Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Due to Condensate Pump Motor Failure.(Section 4OA3)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
- 1OM-24.3.B.1, Valve List
- 1FW, Revision 21 1OM-24.3.C, Power Supply and Control Switch List, Revision 13 2OM-15.3.B.1, Valve List
- 2CCP, Revision 20
- 2HVS, Revision 7 2OM-16.3.C, Power Supply and Control Switch List, Revision 6 2OM-30.3.B.1, Valve List
- 2SWS, Revision 45 2OM-30.3.C, Power Supply and Control Switch List, Revision 15
Condition Reports
- 2015-10025 2015-10089
Drawings
- RM-0424-002, Valve Oper No Diagram Feedwater System, Revision 19
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Miscellaneous
- 1-PFP-SFGB-722, Safeguards Area, Fire Area
- PT-1, Revision 0 1-PFP-SFGB-735, East Cable Vault, Fire Area
- CV-2, Revision 1 1-PFP-SRVB-735, Control Room & Computer Room Fire Area
- CR-1, Revision 1 2-PFP-CTP, Unit 2 Cooling Tower Pump House, Revision 1 2PFP-RCBX-692, Unit 2 Reactor Containment Building, Revision 1 2PFP-SRVB-745, Cable Spreading Room, Revision 3
- BVPS-1 Updated Fire Protection Appendix R Review, Revision 31
- BVPS-2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Addendum 38
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
- 1/2-ADM-1351, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program, Revision 12 1/2-ADM-1362, Security Provisions for Licensed Operator Examinations, Revision 12
- NOP-TR-1010, Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Development, Revision 2
- Comprehensive Written Exams (Previously administered)
- 2015U2C3E1
- 2015U2C3E4
- 2015U2C3E5
- Simulator Scenarios
- 2DRLS-E-1.001 2DRLS-FR-S.1.004 2DRLS-E-3.014
- 2DRLS-FR-H.1.008
- Simulator Testing
- 2SBT-2015-2DRLS-FR-S.1.004, Revision 2
- 2SBT-2015-2DRLS-E-1.001, Revision 1
Condition Reports
- 2014-11123 2014-12722 2014-16719 2015-04481
Miscellaneous
- 1DRLS-E-1.007, Licensed Operator Training Simulator Scenario, Revision 3 1DRLS-FR-H.1.010, Licensed Operator Training Simulator Scenario, Revision 0 2015 LOR Annual Operating Exam Sample Plan
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Condition Reports
- 2012-10747 2013-04461 2013-08600 2013-16707 2014-07088 2014-07968 2014-09544 2014-10103 2014-10680 2014-10694 2014-11397 2015-00599 2015-01928 2015-02673 2015-06365
Miscellaneous
- Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Unit 1 System 20, Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System Revision 5 Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Unit 1 System 39, 125 VDC Control System, Revision 3 Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Unit 2 System 10, Residual Heat Removal, Revision 4 Maintenance Rule System Basis Document, Unit 2 System 43, Radiation Monitoring, Revision 3 Unit 1 125 VDC Distribution System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Cool and Purification System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 1 System 39 Maintenance Rule Monthly Monitoring Report Unit 1 System 39 System Monitoring Plan Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal System Health Report, 2014-2
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
- 1/2-ADM-0822, Beaver Valley Substation Access Vehicle Administration and Work Controls, Revision 3
- 1OST-13.1, Quench Spray Pump [1QS-P-1A] Test, Revision 40 1OST-33.10H, 1B Service Station Transformer and ERFS Transformer 3B Deluge Test, Revision 8
Condition Reports
- 2015-09144 2015-10136 2015-11051
Work Orders
- 200523444
- 200649271
Miscellaneous
- 2R18 Pre-Outage Defense-in-Depth Report, Revision 1
- Beaver Valley Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of July 27, 2015, Revision 0
- Beaver Valley Unit 1 Weekly Maintenance Risk Summary for the Week of August 10, 2015, Revision 0
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
- 1OM-24.1.D, Steam Generator Feed System, Revision 6 1OM-53C.4.1.34.1, Loss of Station Instrument Air, Revision 19 2OST-11.16, Leakage Testing RCS Pressure Isolation Valves, Revision 24
- NOBP-OP-0012, Operator Work-Arounds, Control Room Deficiencies and Operations Aggregate Assessment, Revision 04
Condition Reports
- 2008-42087 2015-08609 2015-09681 2015-11066 2015-11473 2015-12901
Miscellaneous
- 8700-DMC-1293, Determination of the Valve Total Required Thrust, Actuator Capability and -1CC-103A1, B1, C1, Revision 4 Unit 1 and 2 control room deficiencies database
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
- 1/2CMP-75-Freeze Seal-1M, Freeze Sealing of Piping, Revision 19
- 1MSP-6.39-I, T-RC422 Delta T Tavg Protection Instrument Channel II Calibration, Revision 33 2-CMP-I-21-001, Kerry Fail-Closed Actuator Overhaul, Revision 1
- 2OST-15.1, Primary Component Cooling Water Pump [2CCP*P21A] Test, Revision 54 2OST-47.3M, Containment Penetration and ASME Valve Test
- Work Week 8, Revision 33
Condition Reports
- 2015-10398
- Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
- 200520701
- 200573876
- 200591498
- 200609837
- 200623111
- 200625314
- 200629181
Miscellaneous
- ECP 13-0624-004, FLEX Mod connections between 2CHS-TK21B and suction of 2CHS-P22B, Revision 5
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Condition Reports
- 2015-12218
Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation
Procedures
- 1/2-ADM-1107, Alert and Notification System (Sirens) Maintenance and Testing, Revision 13
Miscellaneous
- 2014 Siren Maintenance Schedule ANS Test Results Documentation Quarters 1, 2, and 3, 2015 Supplement to the Beaver Valley Station Emergency Warning Notification System Design Report, FEMA Approval letter dated May 22, 2003 Supplement to the Beaver Valley Station Emergency Warning Notification System Design Report, FEMA Approval letter dated August 31, 2006 Supplement to the Beaver Valley Station Emergency Warning Notification System Design Report, FEMA Approval letter dated June 13, 2011
Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Procedures
- 1/2-ADM-1101, Emergency Response Organization Administration, Revision 19 1/2-EPP-IP-1.1, Notifications, Revision 51 1/2-EPP-IP-1.7, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Teams, Revision 24
Miscellaneous
- 2015 Weekly Emergency Beeper Notification System Test Reports BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan, Section 5, Emergency Organization, Revision 29 BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan, Section 6, Emergency Measures, Revision 31 BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan, Section 7, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, Revision 28 BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan, Section 8, Maintaining Preparedness, Revision 23 BVPS ERO Call List, dated June 29, 2015
- SN-SA-2013-0218, 2013 Unannounced ERO Drive-In Drill Self-Assessment
Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
- Audits & Self Assessments
- MS-C-13-11-24, Fleet Oversight Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness
- MS-C-14-11-24, Fleet Oversight Audit Report, Emergency Preparedness
- PA-BV-13-03-3T13, Emergency Preparedness, QA Assessment
- PA-BV-14-01-3T13, Emergency Preparedness, QA Assessment
- PA-BV-14-02-3T13, Emergency Preparedness, QA Assessment
- PA-BV-14-03-3T13, Emergency Preparedness, QA Assessment
Condition Reports
- 2013-18770 2014-04178 2014-04205 2014-04213 2014-14428 2014-17061 2014-17233 2015-00717 2015-02707 2015-02814 2015-02816 2015-03076
Procedures
- BVRM-EP-5003, Equipment Important to Emergency Response, Revision 11
Miscellaneous
- Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan, Revision 44 BVPS March 2, 2014, Unusual Event Report, dated March 14, 2014 BVPS November 5, 2013, Unusual Event Report, dated November 26, 2013 KLD
- TR-495, BVPS Development of Evacuation Time Estimates, Revision 2 KLD
- TR-572, BVPS 2013 Population Update Analysis, Revision 0 KLD
- TR-661, BVPS 2014 Population Update Analysis, Revision 0
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
Procedures
- 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6, Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection Controlling Procedure, Revision 30
- 1/2-EPP-IP-2.6.13, BVPS MIDAS Dose Assessment Software, Revision 3
Condition Reports
- 2015-09993 2015-10113 2015-10114
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
- 1/2-ADM-1111, NRC EPP Performance Indicator Instructions, Revision 11
Condition Reports
- 2014-08273 2014-12144 2014-12593 2014-13286 2014-18292 2015-00395 2015-01082 2015-05057 2015-07158 2015-07271 2015-07282 2015-09612 2015-10184
Miscellaneous
- March 2015
- BVRM-RAS-0001, Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document Unit 1, Revision 7
- BVRM-RAS-0002, Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document Unit 2, Revision 9 DEP PI Data, April 2014
- March 2015 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 1 Containment Depressurization System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 1 River Water System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 1 Safety Injection System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 2 Containment Depressurization System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 2 Safety Injection System Health Report, 2014-2 Unit 2 Service Water System Health Report, 2014-2
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
- Fleet Oversight Performance Assessment Report, February 1, 2015 through July 31, 2015
Condition Reports
- 2014-00177 2014-00490
- 2014-09256 2014-09260 2014-09736 2014-10656 2014-10891
- 2014-15589
- 2015-10700 2015-10778
Miscellaneous
- BV-IP-SA-2015-0020, Training Section 2015 1st Quarter IPAT
- BV-IP-SA-2015-0021, Operations Section 2015 1st Quarter IPAT
- BV-IP-SA-2015-0023, Maintenance Section 2015 1st Quarter IPAT
Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Condition Reports
- 2014-13579 2015-05256
Miscellaneous
- NOBP-TR-1122, Operating Crew Performance Critique, Revision 1
- NOP-WM-1003, Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation, Screening, and Minor Deficiency Monitoring Process, Revision 7