IR 05000293/2012003

IR 05000293-12-003, on 04/01/2012 - 06/30/2012, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Flood Protection Measures

ML12205A176
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	07/23/2012
From:	Ronald Bellamy NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Rich Smith Entergy Nuclear Operations
Bellamy R
References
IR-12-003
Download: ML12205A176 (46)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 23, 2012

SUBJECT:

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2012003

Dear Mr. Smith:

On June 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 18, 2012 with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it has been entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a written response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-293 License Nos.: DPR-35

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000293/2012003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-293 License Nos.: DPR-35 Report No.: 05000293/2012003 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Location: 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360 Dates: April 1, 2012 through June 30, 2012 Inspectors: M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Smith, Resident Inspector, DRP T. Setzer, Senior Project Engineer, DRP T. Moslak, Health Physicist, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) S. Barr, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector, DRS T. Burns, Reactor Inspector, DRS K. Cronk, Project Engineer, DRP A. Turilin, Project Engineer, DRP K. Dunham, Project Engineer, DRP A. Dugandzic, Project Engineer, DRP T. Hedigan, Operations Engineer, DRS B. Haagensen, Resident Inspector, Millstone, DRP B. Fuller, Operations Engineer, DRS N. Lafferty, Project Engineer, DRP M. Patel, Reactor Engineer, DRS C. Newport, Operations Engineer, DRS J. Brand, Reactor Engineer, DRS P. Presby, Operations Engineer, DRS M. Orr, Reactor Engineer, DRS E. Miller, Project Engineer, DRP J. DAntonio, Operations Engineer, DRS Enclosure

Approved By: Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 5 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................... 5 1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 6 1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 7 1R06 Flood Protection Measures ...................................................................................... 8 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program .......................................................... 10 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness .................................................................................... 11 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ............................... 11 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments................................... 12 1R18 Plant Modifications ................................................................................................. 12 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ...................................................................................... 13 1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities ............................................................................. 14 1R22 Surveillance Testing ............................................................................................... 14 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes ....................................... 15 1EP6 Drill Evaluation ....................................................................................................... 15 2. RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 16 2RS01 Radioactive Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ...................................... 16 2RS03 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation ........................................... 16 2RS04 Occupational Dose Assessment ............................................................................ 19 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 23 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ......................................................................... 23 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .................................................................... 23 4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion ................................. 26 4OA5 Other Activies ......................................................................................................... 28 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit ......................................................................................... 29 ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION................................................................ 29 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-2 LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-14 Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000293/2012003; 04/01/201206/30/2012; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Flood

Protection Measures This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green) which was a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The cross-cutting aspect for the finding was determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or may be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because Entergy did not verify the adequacy of the design of the Motor Control Center (MCC) B-18 enclosure. Specifically, Entergy had not previously evaluated the susceptibility of MCC B-18 to internal flooding from a potential pipe break by the use of calculational methods or by the performance of design reviews.

Entergy entered this issue in the corrective action program (CR-PNP-2012-1351).

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstones objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors used IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings and IMC 0609 Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design deficiency and did not represent a loss of system and/or function or the loss of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification outage time. The finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the verification of the MCC B18 design is not indicative of current licensee performance. Entergys current design change procedures require an evaluation of flooding vulnerabilities for new modifications. (Section 1R06)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) began the inspection period operating at 100 percent reactor power. On April 13, 2012, operators reduced reactor power to 80 percent to support a control rod pattern adjustment and maintenance on the A Reactor Feedpump. Pilgrim returned to 100 percent reactor power later that same day. On May 22, operators reduced reactor power to 50 percent to perform a thermal backwash of the main condenser. During the downpower, condenser vacuum degraded and operators initiated a manual scram of the reactor before vacuum had degraded to the turbine generator trip setpoint. Pilgrim entered a forced outage to investigate and correct the cause of the degrading condenser vacuum. On May 27, Pilgrim returned to 100 percent reactor power. On June 25, operators reduced reactor power to 50 percent to perform a thermal backwash of the main condenser. On June 26, Pilgrim returned to 100 percent reactor power. On June 27, operators reduced reactor power to 80 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to 100 percent reactor power later that same day. On June 30, operators reduced reactor power to 35 percent to investigate a generator field ground alarm and remained at 35 percent reactor power through the end of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of severe weather preparations during the weekend of June 9. The inspectors evaluated the site's readiness for the onset of the hurricane season, including the readiness of three risk-significant systems, the intake structure, the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), and the Station Blackout (SBO) Diesel Generator. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of areas adjacent to the switchyard, the Unit Auxiliary Transformer, Shutdown Transformer, and Main Transformer. The inspectors examined selected equipment and supporting structures to determine if they were configured in accordance with Entergy procedures and if adequate controls were in place to ensure functionality of the systems. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the intake structure, the EDG enclosures, and the SBO enclosure to determine the adequacy of equipment protection from the effects of hurricanes. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate Alternating Current (AC) Power Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of plant features and procedures for the operation and continued availability of the offsite and alternate AC power system to evaluate readiness of the systems prior to seasonal high grid loading. The inspectors reviewed Entergys procedures affecting these areas and the communication protocols between the transmission system operator and Entergy. This review focused on changes to the established program and the material condition of the offsite and alternate AC power equipment. The inspectors assessed whether Entergy established and implemented appropriate procedures and protocols to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite alternate AC power system. The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the associated equipment by reviewing open work orders and walking down portions of the offsite and AC power systems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: A EDG during maintenance on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and with severe weather pending HPCI system following a plant startup Both trains of the Standby Liquid Control system SBO Diesel Generator following switchyard maintenance on 345 kV Line 355 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TS), work orders (WO), condition reports (CR), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance or their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify that system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP)for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection