IR 05000219/2012005

IR 05000219-12-005, 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Oyster Creek Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Other Activities

ML13031A540
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	01/31/2013
From:	Hunegs G NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co
Hunegs G
References
G20130037 IR-12-005
Download: ML13031A540 (52)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ary 31, 2013

SUBJECT:

OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2012005

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On December 31, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 22, 2013 with Russell Peak, Oyster Creek Plant Manager, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Generating Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Gordon K. Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-219 License Nos.: DPR-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000219/2012005 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket No.: 50-219 License No.: DPR-16 Report No.: 05000219/2012005 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: October 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012 Inspectors: J. Kulp, Senior Resident Inspector A. Patel, Resident Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Hedigan, Operations Engineer S. Hammann, Senior Health Physicist J. Rady, Reactor Inspector B. Dionne, Health Physicist C. Crisden, Reactor Inspector C. Newport, Operations Engineer P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector T. OHara, Reactor Inspector T. Fish, Senior Operations Engineer Approved By: Gordon Hunegs, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000219/2012005, 10/01/2012 - 12/31/2012; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek

Generating Station; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Other Activities.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. This report documents one inspector-identified and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green), both of which are non-cited violations (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Exelon did not properly implement procedural controls to ensure adequate thread engagement for standby liquid control (SLC) squib valve spool piece flanges. Specifically, SLC squib valve flanges were installed with inadequate thread engagement (stud was not flush with the nut), as required by Exelons maintenance procedures. Exelons corrective actions included declaring the system inoperable, entering the issue into the corrective action program (IR 1444861 and 1444862) and immediately replacing the existing bolts with bolts of an appropriate length such that projection through the nut was at least flush.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected the inadequate thread engagement would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, Exelons evaluation stated that the SLC squib valve spool piece flanges would not have been able to perform their design function under all seismic conditions when the system was required to be operable. In consultation with the Region I senior reactor analyst, the inspectors reviewed this condition using IMC 0609, Attachment G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. As the condition occurred during the refueling outage and was identified and corrected before Exelon started up the Oyster Creek reactor, and only existed during the outage when SLC was not required to be operable (November 16 - 27, 2012), the issue screened to very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity. Specifically, Exelon did not take appropriate corrective actions, such as replacing bolts during the refueling outage with longer bolts, after the NRC identified a similar concern on the same SLC squib valve spool piece flanges in September 2012 (IR 1417726). (P.1(d)) (Section 1R15)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green.

A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified because Exelon procedures and work orders were not effective in preventing refueling cavity leakage from overflowing onto the exterior surface of the drywell liner during the refueling outage (1R24) in November 2012. The performance deficiencies that contributed to the finding were inadequate oversight of the contractors applying a strippable coating to the reactor cavity liner and a valve configuration control error on a temporarily installed leakage collection system.

Upon discovery, Exelon took immediate corrective actions to open the leakage collection system filter inlet valve and restore reactor cavity liner leakage flow to the reactor building equipment drain tank.

This finding is associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone and is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, this condition would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the continued wetting of the metallic drywell liner surface could provide an environment conducive to corrosion. This finding is not more than very low safety significance because Exelon performs periodic inspections of drywell liner and exterior surface coating to ensure that liner corrosion is monitored and controlled. The inspectors completed the Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, of Attachment 0609.04 of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, and screened the finding to Green, very low safety significance. Exelon has entered this condition into the corrective action process under IR 1440116. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, for not ensuring supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and plant personnel, such that nuclear safety is supported regarding the application of the strippable coating on the reactor cavity liner. (H.4(c)) (Section 1R08)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at full power until October 22 when operators commenced a shutdown for a planned refueling and maintenance outage (1R24). Following the completion of refueling and maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor startup on November 29. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent power on December 4, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of Exelons readiness for the onset of seasonal cold temperatures. The review focused on the intake structure and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Exelons personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Exelons seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during cold weather conditions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed one impending adverse weather preparation sample. The inspectors reviewed Exelons preparations for the onset of Superstorm Sandy on October 28, 2012. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during adverse weather conditions.

The inspectors walked down the emergency diesel generators and the intake structure to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in Exelons adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems.

The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Standby gas treatment system (SBGTS) #2 while SBGTS #1 was inoperable for corrective maintenance on October 4, 2012 Emergency service water (ESW) pump 1-1 while ESW pump 1-3 was inoperable for planned maintenance on October 10, 2012 Service water (SW) and ESW systems during Superstorm Sandy on October 29, 2012 Emergency diesel generator (EDG) #1 and EDG #2 during Superstorm Sandy on October 29, 2012 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

From October 10-12, 2012, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the A control rod drive system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure Exelon appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection