IR 05000247/2013002

IR 05000247/2013002, 05000286/2013002; 01/01/2013 - 03/31/2013; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3; Maintenance Effectiveness

ML13123A280
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	05/03/2013
From:	Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 2
To:	Ventosa J Entergy Nuclear Operations
Burritt A
References
FOIA/PA-2016-0148 IR-13-002
Download: ML13123A280 (51)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION May 3, 2013

SUBJECT:

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS 2 AND 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2013002 AND 05000286/2013002

Dear Mr. Ventosa:

On March 31, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 12, 2013, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green).

Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Indian Point Energy Center. In addition, if you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Indian Point.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs document system Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-247, 50-286 License No. DPR-26, DPR-64

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000247/2013002 and 05000286/2013002 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-247, 50-286 License Nos.: DPR-26, DPR-64 Report Nos.: 05000247/2013002 and 05000286/2013002 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) Facility: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 Location: 450 Broadway, GSB Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Dates: January 1, 2013, through March 31, 2013 Inspectors: J. Stewart, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point 2 K. Dunham, Resident Inspector, Indian Point 2 P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector, Indian Point 3 A. Patel, Resident Inspector, Indian Point 3 N. Laferty, Resident Inspector, Indian Point 3 E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist E. H. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000247/2013002; 05000286/2013002; 01/01/2013 - 03/31/2013; Indian Point Nuclear

Generating Units 2 and 3; Maintenance Effectiveness.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance was identified when Entergy personnel did not use a procedure appropriate to the task for testing of a secondary plant valve, resulting in a transient that led to a manual reactor trip. On February 13, 2013, with Unit 2 at full power, Entergy personnel started testing of a heater drain tank dump valve without electrical isolation and other risk management precautions. When energized control power leads were lifted as specified in the work instruction, two electrically inter-connected valves opened causing loss of heater drain flow to the main feedwater pumps. The transient affected steam generator level and operators initiated a rapid down power followed by a manual reactor trip when steam generator level control limits were challenged. The transient was documented in their corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP2-2013-721.

The finding was more than minor because the testing activity resulted in a reactor trip. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 screening in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because all mitigating equipment remained available. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because the licensee did not assure that procedures and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety, including accurate design documentation and procedures to support the work activity. Specifically, the work instruction used for the testing had not been appropriately planned or implemented when the electrical control power ties to valves outside the work scope was neither planned into the work nor recognized by the workers. [H.2(c)] (Section 1R12)

Other Findings

A violation of very low safety significance identified by Entergy personnel was reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Entergy have been entered into Entergys CAP. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On February 13, operators manually tripped the unit and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 as result of a secondary plant transient. Unit 2 was restarted on February 15 and restored to full power on February 16. The unit remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at full power until March 03, 2013, when operators commenced a down power for a planned refueling and maintenance outage (3R17). The unit was shutdown on March 04, 2013. Following the completion of refueling and maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor startup on March 30, 2013. Reactor power was increased to 35 percent power when the inspection period ended.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed preparations for the onset of cold weather on January 25, 2013. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during this adverse weather condition.

The inspectors walked down various plant areas to ensure system availability, and verified that operator actions defined in Entergys adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel, including the assessment of a fire system header rupture that occurred as a result of the cold weather and Entergys protection of several exposed piping sections throughout the site. The inspectors verified that the ruptured piping was appropriately isolated and repaired. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 2 22 Auxiliary feedwater pump and associated injection flow path valves on January 9, 2013 when 138 KV feeder 33332L/M was removed from service for repairs. The walkdown was done using licensee procedure 2-COL-21.3, Steam Generator Water Level. Condition report, CR-IP2-2012-7140, was reviewed to verify that the licensee was documenting alignment issues at the proper threshold on January 9, 2013 21 emergency diesel generator (EDG) post run on March 28, 2013 Unit 3 31 and 33 auxiliary boiler feed pump (ABFP) during 32 ABFP maintenance on January 1, 2013 32 and 33 EDG during 31 EDG maintenance on January 8, 2013 33 and 35 service water (SW) pumps during 34 SW pump outage on January 25, 3013 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into their CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On March 26, 2013, the inspectors performed a complete system walk down of accessible portions of the Unit 3 high head safety injection system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walk downs of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure Entergy personnel appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection