IR 05000293/2013004

IR 05000293-13-004; 07/01/2013 - 09/30/2013; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Problem Identification and Resolution

ML13318A304
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	11/14/2013
From:	Raymond Mckinley NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Dent J Entergy Nuclear Operations
McKinley R
References
IR 13-004
Download: ML13318A304 (45)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ber 14, 2013

SUBJECT:

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2013004

Dear Mr. Dent:

On September 30, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 23, 2013, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green).

This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at PNPS. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at PNPS. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Raymond R. McKinley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No: 50-293 License No: DPR-35

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000293/2013004 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket No: 50-293 License No: DPR-35 Report No: 05000293/2013004 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Location: Plymouth, MA 02360 Dates: July 1, 2013 through September 30, 2013 Inspectors: M. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) B. Smith, Resident Inspector, DRP B. Scrabeck, Resident Inspector, DRP T. Moslak, Health Physicist, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) H. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS T. Burns, Reactor Inspector, DRS N. Floyd, Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Rady, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Lally, Operations Engineer, DRS C. Newport, Operations Engineer, DRS Approved By: Raymond R. McKinley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000293/2013004; 07/01/2013 09/30/2013; Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; Problem

Identification and Resolution.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated October 28, 2011. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, because Entergy did not complete a design control review for the station blackout (SBO) fuel oil transfer system in a timely manner. Entergy extended the corrective action due date out to greater than a year from the discovery of the original condition. Entergy has increased the priority of this design review and captured this issue in condition report CR-PNP-2013-6906.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to complete a timely design review of a credited support system for the onsite power safety function further extends the vulnerability of the safety function if the design review determines the system is inadequate. The inspectors used IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design deficiency that did not result in the loss of system safety function or a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Entergy did not take appropriate corrective actions to address a safety issue in a timely manner, commensurate with its safety significance. [P.1(d)]. (Section 4OA2)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station began the inspection period operating at 100 percent reactor power. On July 17, Pilgrim reduced power to 85 percent due to the high temperature of the ultimate heat sink (UHS), and returned to 100 percent reactor power later the same day. On July 18, Pilgrim reduced power to 90 percent due to the high temperature of the UHS, and returned to 100 percent reactor power later the same day. On July 25, Pilgrim reduced power to 90 percent due to the high temperature of the UHS, and returned to 100 percent reactor power on July 26. On August 20, Pilgrim reduced power to 50 percent to perform a condenser thermal backwash, and returned to 98 percent reactor power on August 21. On August 22, Pilgrim initiated a manual scram due to a loss of feedwater and entered forced outage 20-1 to perform repairs to the feedwater system. On August 25, Pilgrim performed a startup and reached 23 percent power on August 26, where the unit remained due to a loss feedwater heating. On August 28, operators increased power to 75 percent power, where the unit remained for troubleshooting of the A reactor feed pump (RFP). On September 8, Pilgrim shut down and entered Forced Outage 20-2 to perform repairs to the A RFP, and to repair steam leaks in the feedwater heating system. On September 15, Pilgrim performed a startup and reached 75 percent reactor power on September 16, where power remained for completion of repairs to the A RFP. Pilgrim returned to 98 percent power on September 17. On September 18, Pilgrim reduced power to 77 percent to perform a control rod pattern adjustment, and returned to 98 percent reactor power later that same day, and power remained at 98 percent due to troubleshooting on the ultrasonic feedwater flow instrumentation. Pilgrim returned to 100 percent power on September 20 and continued to operate at 100 percent power for the remainder of the quarter.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of August 5, 2013, the inspectors performed an inspection of the external flood protection measures for Entergy. The inspectors reviewed technical specifications (TS), procedures, design documents, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 2.4.2.4, which depicted the design flood levels and protection areas containing safety-related equipment to identify areas that may be affected by external flooding. The inspectors conducted a general site walkdown of external areas of the plant to ensure that Entergy had maintained flood protection barriers in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors also reviewed operating procedures for mitigating external flooding during severe weather to determine if Entergy planned or established adequate measures to protect against external flooding events. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the .

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: A residual heat removal (RHR) system alignment during heavy load lift over B safety-related train components on July 26 Electric fire pump alignment during diesel fire pump maintenance on July 31 Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system during a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system quarterly surveillance on August 14 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TS, work orders (WO),condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of August 5, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the A train of the RHR system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, system health reports, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection