IR 05000272/2015001

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000272/2015001 and 05000311/2015001 (January 1 - March 31, 2015)

ML15118A818
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/28/2015
From:	Glenn Dentel Reactor Projects Branch 3
To:	Braun R Public Service Enterprise Group
dentel, gt
References
IR 2015001
Download: ML15118A818 (33)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:T. Joyce UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 April 28, 2015 Mr. Robert Braun President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC - N09 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2015001 AND 05000311/2015001

Dear Mr. Braun:

On March 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 16, 2015, with Mr. John Perry, Salem Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).

Both of these findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the non-cited violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding, or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Salem Nuclear Generating Station.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70, DPR-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000272/2015001 and 05000311/2015001 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos. 50-272, 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70, DPR-75 Report Nos. 05000272/2015001 and 05000311/2015001 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 Dates: January 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015 Inspectors: P. Finney, Senior Resident Inspector A. Ziedonis, Resident Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. Barkley, Senior Project Engineer L. Dumont, Reactor Inspector T. Hedigan, Operations Engineer Approved By: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report (IR) 05000272/2015001, 05000311/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 03/31/2015;

Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Post-Maintenance Testing.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified two non-cited violations (NCVs) of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 19, 2013. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

Inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when PSEG did not implement adequate corrective actions from a previous Green NCV in a timeframe commensurate with its safety significance. Specifically, inadequate corrective actions resulted in high energy line break (HELB) and moderate energy line break (MELB) barriers being unsecured without implementing the associated station process. PSEG immediate corrective actions were to secure the affected barriers and enter these examples in their CAP as notifications 20677643, 20683127, 20680283, and 20680680.

The issue was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, and determined to be more than minor since it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, it screened to Green since it was not associated with a design or qualification deficiency or loss of system or function. The issue had a cross-cutting issue in Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, in that organizations thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, PSEG did not thoroughly investigate and evaluate the previous NCV issues in order to understand the bases for staff decisions and the underlying organizational and safety culture contributors.

   [P.2] (Section 1R19)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 3.9.12, Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System, when PSEG did not suspend Unit 1 fuel movement operations when the fuel handling area ventilation system was inoperable. Specifically, differential pressure exceeded its alarm setpoint, and at times, was positive during irradiated fuel movements.

Once aware of the issue, PSEG immediately suspended fuel movement, placed fuel assemblies in a safe condition, and entered the issue in their CAP as notifications 20677427 and 20678063.

The issue was determined to be more than minor since it affected the configuration control/barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was screened using IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and Appendix A, Exhibit 3.C for Barrier Integrity screening questions involving the spent fuel pool building. Since the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the spent fuel pool, the finding screened to

Green.

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance, Procedure Adherence, in that individuals follow processes, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, PSEG operators did not follow alarm response and general operating procedures, did not use human error reduction techniques with respect to receipt of multiple low FHB D/P alarms, and manipulated irradiated fuel when not appropriately authorized and directed by procedures. [H.8] (Section 1R15)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent. On March 7, the unit was reduced to 50 percent power in support of 12 steam generator feedpump (SGFP) corrective maintenance.

The unit returned to 100 percent power on March 10. On March 12, the unit was reduced to approximately 60 percent power in response to a control oil leak on the 12 SGFP. On March 15, the unit was shut down to comply with Technical Specifications (TSs) for the 14 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) that had exceeded its allowed outage time. A reactor startup was commenced on March 22. The unit reached 98 percent power at the end of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent. On February 4, Unit 2 was reduced to 60 percent power in response to a main condenser tube leak. The unit returned to 100 percent power on February 7. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PSEGs preparations during impending extended cold conditions the week of January 5 and an impending blizzard on January 26. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during these adverse weather conditions. The inspectors walked down the service water (SW) intake structure, circulating water intake structure, Unit 3 gas turbine engine and control house, SW accumulators, freshwater pumphouse, effluent radiation monitors, and Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary buildings. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in PSEGs adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel.

Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the .

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of February 3, the inspectors performed a review of PSEGs readiness for the onset of seasonal grassing. The review focused on the SW intake structure.

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TSs, control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure PSEG personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including PSEGs seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected system to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during grassing conditions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 2, auxiliary feedwater (AFW) during degraded conditions associated with 24 steam generator level control valve on January 26 Unit 2, steam dumps during megawatt recovery on February 9 Common, AFW backup supply water on February 24 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the Reactor Safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders, notifications, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether PSEG staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On March 18, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 1 CFCU system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct.

The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure PSEG appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection