IR 05000219/2015001

IR 05000219/2015001, January 1, 2015 March 31, 2015, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - NRC Integrated Report

ML15133A235
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	05/14/2015
From:	Silas Kennedy NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Nuclear
KENNEDY, SR
References
IR 2015001
Download: ML15133A235 (46)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 May 14, 2015 Mr. Bryan Hanson Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2015001

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On March 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 17, 2015, with Garey Stathes, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents three violations of NRC requirements, all of which were of very low safety significance (Green and/or Severity Level IV). Additionally, two licensee-identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in this report.

However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the non-cited violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-219 License Nos. DPR-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000219/2015001 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-219 License Nos.: DPR-16 Report No.: 05000219/2015001 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: January 1, 2015 - March 31, 2015 Inspectors: A. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector J. Kulp, Senior Resident Inspector E. Andrews, Resident Inspector B. Bollinger, Project Engineer E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector N. Floyd, Reactor Inspector P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector T. OHara, Reactor Inspector M. Orr, Reactor Inspector J. Patel, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000219/2015001; 01/01/2015 - 03/31/2015; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek

Generating Station; Post Maintenance Testing, Problem Identification and Resolution, Follow-Up of Events This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) and two findings of very low safety significance (Green), which were NCVs. The significance of most findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP) dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014.

All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, when Exelon did not document and adequately evaluate test results to assure that test requirements had been satisfied. Specifically, Exelon did not perform the proper post maintenance test procedure to assure that the requirements of Technical Specification 4.5.G.3 were satisfied following installation of a temporary modification to secondary containment. Exelon entered this issue into the corrective action program for resolution as issue report (IR) 2440643. Corrective actions include revising the process to perform the correct post maintenance test to ensure Technical Specification 4.5.G.3 is met.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control (Standby Gas Trains) attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process: Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, issued May 9, 2014. Because the finding degraded the ability to close or isolate secondary containment, the inspectors were required to further assess the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, issued May 6, 2004. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the decay heat values were low, given that the unit had been shut down for approximately three days, and reactor water level was greater than that required for movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence, because Exelon personnel did not perform the post maintenance test specified by the work order.

    [H.8] (Section 1R19)

Severitv Level lV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.9(a) in that Exelon did not provide complete information in reports submitted per 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. Specifically, a licensee event report (LER) submitted on November 18, 2014, did not discuss a separate, partially opened secondary containment door that was discovered during the same time frame, which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment, and therefore was required to be discussed in the original LER. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 2440641.

Planned corrective actions include revising the original LER to add a discussion of the partially opened secondary containment door.

The inspectors determined that not providing a complete report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(a) is a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelons ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Because the issue had the potential to affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory oversight function, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. In accordance with Section 2.2.2.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency identified with the reporting aspect of the event is a Severity Level IV violation because it is of more than minor concern with relatively inappreciable potential safety significance and is related to findings that were determined to be more than minor issues. In accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, this issue was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect. (Section 4OA3)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings for Exelons failure to develop an adequate post maintenance test to determine operability of the A emergency service water pump breaker.

Specifically, the corrective maintenance work performed on April 16, 2013, did not correct the cause of the failure and Exelon did not perform an adequate post maintenance test to verify conditions had been corrected. As a result, the emergency service water system was returned to service even though it did not meet all the requirements for operability. The issue was not identified and resolved until a subsequent surveillance test on April 17, 2013, which identified a failed breaker. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program (IR 2471069). Planned corrective actions include revising work order activities to specify the correct post maintenance test.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely affected its objective to ensure the availability and reliability of the systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the inadequate post maintenance test for A emergency service water pump breaker on April 16, 2013, led to the A emergency service water pump failing to perform its function during the subsequent surveillance testing on April 17, 2013.

The inspectors assessed this finding in accordance with the IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors concluded that this finding did not represent an actual loss of function of the emergency service water system for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time (15 days). Therefore, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Management, in that Exelons work planning and executing of work activities did not include documented instructions for performing an adequate post maintenance test. [H.5] (Section 4OA2)

Other Findings

Two violations of very low safety significance that were identified by Exelon were reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by Exelon have been entered into Exelons corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On March 22, 2015, an automatic reactor scram occurred due to high average power range monitor flux caused by an electronic pressure regulator failure. After repairs to the electronic pressure regulator, operators commenced plant startup on March 25, 2015, and returned to full power operation on March 28,

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Exelons response to a blizzard warning issued by the National Weather Service for the period of January 26 - 27, 2015, and to the declaration of a cold weather alert by the grid operator on February 15 - 16, 2015. The inspectors verified that Exelon implemented its adverse weather procedures and that operators reviewed applicable emergency procedures and performed procedural briefs for the expected adverse weather conditions. The inspectors performed independent walkdowns of the site to verify the site was ready for the onset of adverse weather. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: B isolation condenser while A isolation condenser was out of service on January 5, 2015 Containment spray system II while containment spray system I was out of service on January 20, 2015 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 while emergency diesel generator No. 1 was out of service on March 2, 2015 Reactor building closed cooling water system II while reactor building closed cooling water heat exchanger 1-1 was out of service on March 18, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On February 9, 2015, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the reactor building to torus vacuum breaker system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability; component lubrication and equipment cooling; hangar and support functionality; and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure Exelon appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection