IR 05000277/2015001

IR 05000277/2015001 and 05000278/2015001, January 1, 2015 Through March 31, 2015, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 & 3 - NRC Integrated Report

ML15133A246
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	05/13/2015
From:	Fred Bower Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Nuclear
BOWER, FL
References
IR 2015001
Download: ML15133A246 (32)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 May 13, 2015 Mr. Bryan Hanson Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2015001 AND 05000278/2015001

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On March 31 2015, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 24, 2015, with Mr. Michael Massaro, Peach Bottom Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one violation of NRC requirements, which was of very low safety significance (Green). However, because of its very low safety significance, and because it has been entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating the finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the PBAPS. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PBAPS.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's

"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Fred L. Bower III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-277, 50-278 License Nos. DPR-44, DPR-56

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000277/2015001 and 05000278/2015001 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket Nos.: 50-277, 50-278 License Nos.: DPR-44, DPR-56 Report No.: 05000277/2015001 and 05000278/2015001 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: Delta, Pennsylvania Dates: January 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015 Inspectors: S. Hansell, Senior Resident Inspector B. Smith, Resident Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector T. Fish, Senior Operations Engineer J. Petch, Project Engineer (Acting Resident Inspector) D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer Approved by: Fred L. Bower III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000277/2015001, 05000278/2015001, 01/01/2015 - 03/31/2015; Peach Bottom Atomic

Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 3; Maintenance Effectiveness.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. One NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011.

Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within The Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green) of 10 CFR Part 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," because Exelon did not include certain flood indication functions into the scope of the maintenance rule (MR). Specifically, level switches used to indicate flood levels in the Unit 2 and Unit 3 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) rooms were not included in the scope of the MR as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (b)(2)(i) as non-safety related components that are used in plant emergency operating procedures (EOPs). PBAPS entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as issue reports (IRs) 02433897 and 02437502 and scoped the level switches into the MR.

The finding is determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In the case of this finding, monitoring of components that provide alarm indication to operators during a flood hazard were not incorporated into the MR. The inspectors also reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, and determined the issue was similar to example 7.d; in that, flood detection was not within the scope of the MR and that one of the flood detectors had experienced performance problems during preventive maintenance (PM)testing . The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 screening in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent an actual loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time, and did not screen as risk significant due to external initiating events. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Change Management because PBAPS did not use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing a change. Specifically, during PBAPSs MR database update and monitoring criteria development for new functions, PBAPS did not ensure that certain level switches that provide alarms for flooding used in plant EOPs were scoped into the MR despite identifying that it was required. [H.3] (Section 1R12)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 89 percent rated thermal power (RTP) (the pre-extended power uprate 100 percent power limit). On February 7, 2015, Unit 2 down powered from 89 percent to 82 percent to perform scram time testing on control rod 42-43. The unit returned to 89 percent RTP on February 8, 2015. On February 25, 2015, the B reactor feed pump (RFP)tripped on a low main condenser vacuum signal, due to a failure of the low vacuum trip pressure switch. The Unit 2 B RFP trip resulted in a reactor recirculation runback to 59 percent RTP.

The pressure switch was replaced and the unit returned to 89 percent RTP on February 26, 2015. On March 20, 2015, Unit 2 down powered from 89 percent to 52 percent to perform a control rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to 89 percent RTP on March 21, 2015.

On March 27, 2015, Unit 2 raised power to 92 percent RTP after NRC approval to continue power ascension to the next extended power uprate hold point. The unit remained at 92 percent RTP until the end of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent RTP. On January 10, 2015, Unit 3 down powered from 100 percent to 83 percent to perform main steam isolation valve (MSIV) and main turbine testing. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on January 11, 2015. On January 16, 2015, Unit 3 down powered from 100 percent to 55 percent to perform waterbox cleaning and a control rod sequence exchange. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on January 17, 2015.

On February 19, 2015, the B reactor recirculation pump (RRP) tripped due a faulty capacitor associated with the voltage regulator that resulted in a power reduction to 45 percent RTP. The voltage regulator was repaired and the unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on February 21, 2015. On March 14, 2015, Unit 3 down powered from 100 percent to 33 percent to perform main condenser work and a control rod sequence exchange. The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on March 16, 2015, and remained at 100 percent RTP until the end of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Emergency Preparedness, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of PBAPSs Units 2 and 3 preparations for the onset of adverse weather and extreme cold temperatures from January 7 through January 9, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset and during extreme cold weather conditions. The inspectors walked down the inner and outer cooling water intake structures and emergency diesel generator (EDG) rooms to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in PBAPSs adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 4 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

== The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following four systems: Unit 3 A, B, C, and D core spray (CS) during A residual heat removal (RHR)maintenance outage on January 13, 2015 E-1, E-2, and E-4 EDGs during E-3 maintenance outage on January 28, 2015 Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) with high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) out-of-service (OOS) on February 4, 2015 E-2, E-3, and E-4 EDG during E-1 24-hour endurance run on February 5, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the Reactor Safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), TS, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether PBAPS staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection