IR 05000275/2016007

Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 - NRC Component Design Bases Inspection Report 05000275/2016007 and 05000323/2016007

ML16112A422
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	04/21/2016
From:	Thomas Farnholtz Region 4 Engineering Branch 1
To:	Halpin E D Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR 2016007
Download: ML16112A422 (71)

Text

April 21, 2016

Mr. Edward D. Halpin, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56, Mail Code 104/6 Avila Beach, CA 93424

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2016007 AND 05000323/2016007

Dear Mr. Halpin:

On March 10, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Welsch, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. On April 7, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with Mr. R. Waltos, Acting Director, Engineering, Mr. T. Baldwin, Director, Nuclear Site Services, and other members of your staff. The inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

The NRC inspectors documented six findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000275/2016007 and 05000323/2016007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Electronic Distribution Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Dockets: 05000275; 05000323 Licenses: DPR-80; DPR-82 Reports: 05000275/2016007; 05000323/2016007 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, CA Dates: February 8 through March 10, 2016 Team Leader: J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Inspectors: C. Steely, Operations Engineer, Operations Branch M. Hayes, Operations Engineer, Operations Branch N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 R. Kopriva, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 R. Latta, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 Senior Reactor Analyst: D. Loveless, Senior Reactor Analyst, Plant Support Branch 2 Accompanying Personnel: H. Leake, Contractor, Beckman and Associates J. Zudans, Contractor, Beckman and Associates Approved By: Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

IR 05000275; 05000323/2016007; 02/08/2016 - 03/10/2016; Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2: Baseline inspection, NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21, "Component Design Bases Inspection."

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between February 8, 2016, and March 10, 2010, by six inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office and two contractors. Six findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. All of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The significance of in spection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-cutting Areas." Violations of NRC requirements are dis positioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program."

Specifically, prior to September 10, 2013, the licensee failed to verify the design of 480 Vac combination motor starter instantaneous magnetic circuit breakers settings, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, for those breakers whose settings are higher than their manufacturers' specifications, as documented in calculation 195B-DC, "MCCB Settings for 460VAC Class 1E Motors," to provide the required level of protection and ensure that certain failures that could be caused by sustained fault currents below the circuit breaker trip setting would not occur. In response to this finding, the licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation of some of the affected equipment and concluded that sustained fault currents below the trip settings are unlikely. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 50838071.

The team determined the failure to evaluate 480 Vac combination motor starters with instantaneous magnetic circuit breaker trip current settings higher than their manufacturers'

specifications was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, improper motor starter breaker trip settings could result in a fire in the motor control center cubicle, damage to motor starter components, spurious tripping of the entire motor control center, or lack of protection for downstream components during fault conditions. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety signi ficance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.3.b.1)

Green.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," which states, in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected." Specifically, prior to March 16, 2016, the licensee failed to assure that the lack of design verification of 460 Vac motors, which could be overloaded at the maximum allowable diesel generator frequency, was promptly corrected after having been identified in a 2013 apparent cause evaluation and again in a 2015 self-assessment as documented in Notifications 50572850 and 50826105, respectively. In response to this finding, the licensee performed a preliminary evaluation of the affected 460 Vac motors and concluded that operation at maximum emergency diesel generator frequency would not cause them to overheat or trip on overcurrent. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notifications 50835699 and 50838988.

The team determined the failure to correct the lack of design verification of 460 Vac motors at maximum allowable frequency when powered from the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operation of 460 Vac motors above their rated or analyzed maximum allowable frequencies could result in motor overheating or a trip of the thermal overload relays. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with evaluation because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization thoroughly evaluated issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.2]. (Section 1R21.2.3.b.2)

Green.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program."

Specifically, prior to February 10, 2016, the licensee failed to verify the design of (1) equipment on the nominally 125 Vdc system at the maximum voltage specified in Procedure OP J-9:IV, "Performing a Battery Equalizing Charge," and (2) equipment on 480 Vac and 120 Vac vital buses at maximum voltages specified in Procedure OP J-2:VIII,

"Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP," by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, to ensure equipment functionality. In response to this finding, the licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation of the affected equipment and concluded that any past exposure to voltages above their maximum rating would not have caused a loss of functionality. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notifications 50834558, 50835906, 50835394, 50835945, 50835949, 50836376, 50836439, 50836638, 50836872, and 50836995.

The team determined the failure to evaluate operation of 125 Vdc and 480 and 120 Vac equipment at maximum allowable voltages was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operation of equipment outside of its rated or analyzed maximum allowable voltages adversely affects the reliability and capability of that equipment required to perform safety-related functions. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a des ign or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with design margins because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization operated and maintained equipment within design margins and that margins were carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process [H.6]. (Section 1R21.2.4.b)

Green.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which states, in part, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings." Specifically, in October of 2015, the licensee failed to evaluate the extent of condition of a cracked holding pawl on a nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker, which was procured as safety-related, in accordance with Procedure OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution," when the failure of the component could adversely impact safety-related breakers of the same make and model. In response to this finding, the licensee is performing a procedure review to include steps to perform an extent of condition analysis fo r unplanned nonsafety-related equipment issues that may also affect similar safety-related equipment. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notifications 50836859 and 50836689.

The team determined the failure to evaluate the impact of a cracked holding pawl identified on a nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker on additional safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breakers was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the 4160 Vac breaker with the cracked holding pawl was procured as safety-related; therefore, the condition extends to safety-related 4160 Vac breakers of the same make and model and potentially adversely affects the ability to perform their safety function.

In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with conservative bias because the licensee failed to ensure that individuals used decision-making practices that emphasized prudent choices [H.14]. (Section 1R21.2.5.b)

Green.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program." Specifically, prior to January 30, 2014, the licensee failed to verify the design of the 230 kV preferred offsite power source, such as by the performance of design reviews or use of alte rnate or simplified calculational methods, by assuming in calculation 359-DC, "Determination of 230 kV Grid Capability Limits as DCPP Offsite Power Source," that the reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals are coincident in time for all postulated design basis events. However, the plant is designed such that, during some events, the signals are separate in time and would result in a greater vital bus voltage depression than analyzed. In response to this finding, the licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation and concluded that the current transmission grid conditions were such that the calculation criteria would be met in the event of a design basis event involving non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 50839137.

The team determined the failure to evaluate the voltage effects of a limiting design basis event with non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals on the 230 kV offsite power circuit was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure adequate bus voltages as a result of a design basis event with non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals would result in a trip of the undervoltage relays and the loss of the preferred offsite power circuit. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety signi ficance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with design margins because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization operated and maintained equipment within design margins and that margins were carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process [H.6]. (Section 1R21.3.1.b.1)

Green.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which states, in part, "Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished." Specifically, prior to November 25, 2015, the licensee failed to include appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria in Procedure MP E-62.3, "Tap Changer Functional Test for Standby-Startup Transformer 11," to ensure that the load tap changer speed for standby-startup transformer 11 was adequate to restore vital bus voltages to the required level during design basis events. In response to this finding, the licensee performed a preliminary evaluation of the condition and concluded that the most recently measured speed of the load tap changer was adequate to ensure that it would restore vital bus voltage within the required time. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as

Notification 50839333.

The team determined the failure to translate appropriate load tap changer timing acceptance criteria into functional tests to ensure that design assumptions were being maintained was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the load tap changer could meet its functional test acceptance criterion, but not operate fast enough to restore vital bus voltages within the required time during design basis events, which would result in an undervoltage trip and loss of the preferred offsite power circuit. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a des ign or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with design margins because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization operated and maintained equipment within design margins and that margins were carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process [H.6]. (Section 1R21.3.1.b.2)

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity This inspection of component design bases verifies that plant components are maintained within their design basis. Additionally, this inspection provides monitoring of the capability of the selected components and operator actions to perform their design basis functions. As plants age, modifications may alter or disable important design features making the design bases difficult to determine or obsolete. The plant risk assessment model assumes the capability of safety systems and components to perform their intended safety function successfully. This inspectable area verifies aspects of the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity cornerstones for which there are no indicators to measure performance.

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection

.1 Overall Scope

To assess the ability of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, equipment and operators to perform their required safety functions, the team inspected risk-significant components and the licensee's responses to industry operating experience. The team

selected risk-significant components for review using information contained in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, probabilistic risk assessments and the NRC standardized plant analysis risk model. In general, the selection process focused on

components that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than 1.3 or a risk reduction worth factor greater than 1.005. The items selected included components in both safety-related and nonsafety-related systems, including pumps, circuit breakers, heat exchangers, transformers, and valves. The team selected the risk-significant operating experience to be inspected based on its collective past experience.

To verify that the selected components would function as required, the team reviewed design basis assumptions, calculations, and procedures. In some instances, the team performed calculations to independently verify the licensee's conclusions. The team also verified that the condition of the components was consistent with the design basis and that the tested capabilities met the required criteria.

The team reviewed maintenance work records, corrective action documents, and industry operating experience records to verify that licensee personnel considered degraded conditions and their impact on the components. For selected components, the team observed operators during simulator scenarios, as well as during simulated actions in the plant.

The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design basis have been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions because of modifications, and margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results; significant corrective actions; repeated

maintenance; 10 CFR 50.65(a)1 status; operable, but degraded, conditions; NRC resident inspector input of problem equipment; system health reports; industry operating experience; and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in-depth margins.

The inspection procedure requires a review of 15 to 25 total samples that include risk-significant and low design margin components, components that affect the large

early release frequency (LERF) and operating experience issues. The sample selection for this inspection was 15 components, 1 component that affects LERF, and 5 operating experience items. The selected inspection and associated operating experience items supported risk-significant functions including the following:

a. Electrical power to mitigation systems: The team selected several components in the electrical power distribution systems to verify operability to supply alternating current (ac)and direct current

(dc) power to risk-significant and safety-related loads in support of safety system operation in response to initiating events such as loss of offsite power, station blackout, and a loss-of-coolant accident with offsite power available. As such the team selected:

• Diesel Generator 1-3 Instrument and Control System

• 4160 Volt Switchgear Bus 2F

• 480 Volt Switchgear 2F

• 125 Volt Distribution Panel and Bus 2-2

• 4160 Volt Feeder Breaker 52HF10

• 4160 Volt / 480 Volt Transformer 2F b. Components that affect LERF: The team reviewed a component required to perform functions that mitigate or prevent an unmonitored release of radiation. The team selected the following component:

• Containment Fan Cooler Unit 2-5 c. Mitigating systems needed to attain safe shutdown: The team reviewed components required to perform the safe shutdown of the plant. As such the team selected:

• Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-1

• Auxiliary Saltwater Traveling Screen 1-7

• Charging Pump Suction Valves LCV-112B and LCV-112C

• Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2

• Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Inlet Valves FCV-602 and FCV-603

• Condensate Storage Tank

• Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves PCV-455, PCV-456, and PCV-474

• Residual Heat Removal System Valves RHR-8701 and RHR-8702

.2.1 Diesel Generator 1-3 Instrument and Control System

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with diesel generator 1-3 instrument and control system. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Engineering changes and resultant design revisions, including work orders and condition reports

• Single-line and wiring diagrams of the local control panel, including functional descriptions

• Vendor manual for emergency diesel generator 1-3 instrument and controls

• Surveillance and preventive maintenance procedures and performed preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing documents

• Diesel generator 1-3 output traces, including observation of a field flash

• Output breaker sizing and protection calculations

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.2 4160 Volt Switchgear 2F

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with 4160 Volt switchgear 2F to ensure design basis requirements and specifications were met. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Calculations for electrical distribution system loading, steady-state and transient voltages, and maximum short-circuit levels to evaluate the adequacy of the switchgear bus and breakers to carry anticipated loads under limiting conditions

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to confirm adequate selective protection and coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions and to withstand and interrupt maximum available faults

• Degraded voltage and loss of voltage relay protection schemes that initiate automatic transfers from the offsite power supply to the diesel generator to assess adequacy of voltage at the terminals of the safety-related loads, and ability to remain connected to offsite power under worst operating and accident

conditions

• Corrective action history to determine whether there had been any adverse operating trends

• Visual inspection to assess material condition, the presence of hazards, and consistency of installed equipment with design documentation and analyses

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.3 480 Volt Switchgear 2F

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with 480 Volt switchgear 2F to ensure design basis requirements and specifications were met. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Calculations for electrical distribution system loading, steady-state and transient voltages, and maximum short-circuit levels to evaluate the adequacy of the switchgear bus and breakers to carry anticipated loads under limiting conditions

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to confirm adequate selective protection and coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions and to withstand and interrupt maximum available faults

• Corrective action history to determine whether there had been any adverse operating trends

• Visual inspection to assess material condition, the presence of hazards, and consistency of installed equipment with design documentation and analyses

.1 Failure to Evaluate 480 Vac Motor Starters with Circuit Breaker Trip Settings Higher than Manufacturers' Specifications

Introduction.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," involving the failure to evaluate 480 Vac combination motor starters with instantaneous magnetic circuit breaker trip current settings higher than their manufacturers' specifications.

Description.

The 480 Vac combination motor starters, which are used in motor control centers, contain an instantaneous magnetic circuit breaker, contactor, and thermal overload relay. The thermal overload relay senses excessive current due to motor overloads and failures to start and responds by signaling the contactor to open in order to protect the motor, components of the combination motor starter, and downstream cables and containment penetrations against excessive heating due to overcurrent conditions. If properly coordinated with the thermal overload setting, the instantaneous magnetic circuit breaker protects the combination starter components and downstream cables, and penetrations from downstream faults. Calculation 366A-DC, "Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Thermal Overload Relays," Appendix 9, includes the following precaution from a Cutler Hammer vendor document: "WARNING - To maintain overcurrent, short circuit, and ground fault protection, the manufacturer's instructions for selection of the heater pack and setting of the instantaneous trip circuit breaker (current interrupter) must be followed." Other Cutler Hammer documents provide more specific setting instructions for the instantaneous magnetic circuit breakers to coordinate with the thermal overload relay setting, such as no higher than 13 times the motor full load amp

ratings. Trip settings of the vital instantaneous magnetic circuit breakers in combination starters are documented and analyzed in calculation 195B-DC, "Evaluation of Molded Case Circuit Breaker Settings for 460VAC Class 1E Motors." Many of those breakers were set higher than the limits specified by their manufacturers. This lack of compliance with manufacturers' setting instructions could result in downstream faults causing damage to the combination starter components, fire in the motor control center cubicle, spurious tripping of the entire motor control center, or thermal damage to cables and containment penetrations. The licensee had no analysis to demonstrate that these vulnerabilities do

not exist.

Analysis.

The team determined the failure to evaluate 480 Vac combination motor starters with instantaneous magnetic circuit breaker trip current settings higher than their manufacturers' specifications was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, improper motor starter breaker trip settings could result in a fire in the motor control center cubicle, damage to motor starter components, spurious tripping of the entire motor control center, or lack of protection for downstream components during fault conditions. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency did not reflect current licensee performance.

Enforcement.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program." Contrary to the above, prior to September 10, 2013, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design, such as by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.

Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the design of 480 Vac combination motor starter instantaneous magnetic circuit breakers settings, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, for those breakers whose settings are higher than their manufacturers' specifications, as documented in calculation 195B-DC, "MCCB Settings for 460VAC Class 1E Motors," to provide the required level of protection and ensure that certain failures that could be caused by sustained fault currents below the circuit breaker trip setting would not occur. In response to this finding, the licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation of some of the affected equipment and concluded that sustained fault currents below the trip settings are unlikely. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 50838071. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275/2016007-01 and 05000323/2016007-01, "Failure to Evaluate 480 Vac Motor Starters with Circuit Breaker Trip Settings Higher than Manufacturers' Specifications."

.2 Failure to Promptly Correct the Lack of Design Verification of 460 Vac Motors at Maximum Allowable Frequency

Introduction.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," involving the failure to correct the lack of design verification of 460 Vac motors at maximum allowable frequency when powered from the emergency diesel generators.

Description.

Technical specification surveillance requirements 3.8.1.2, 3.8.1.7, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.15, and 3.8.1.20 allow a maximum emergency diesel generator frequency of 60.8 Hz. Increased frequency of a motor power supply causes a faster motor speed and increases the brake horsepower of the driven equipment. Motors that operate at or near their thermal capability limit at 60 Hz could overheat or trip on overcurrent when operating at a higher frequency.

Procedure OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution," provides instructions on the timeliness of problem resolution in Section 5.3. The procedure specifies the timeframe in calendar days within which actions should be completed from the time the action is generated. The timeframe for corrective actions from apparent cause evaluations is 180 days, and the timeframe for a preliminary plan for resolution is 30 days.

On July 31, 2013, the licensee completed an apparent cause evaluation under Notification 50573621 to address Non-cited Violations05000275/2013007-02 and 05000373/2013007-02 documented in the 2013 component design bases inspection report regarding the effect of maximum allowable emergency diesel generator voltage on the auxiliary feedwater pump motors. The licensee's corrective actions in response to these non-cited violations identified the need to perform an extent of condition review for all vital alternating current motors in Task #5. The apparent cause evaluation stated, "As a result the scope of Notification 50572850 has increased to include an extent of condition which applies to all ESF motors that have a BHP loading greater than their name plate rating." However, the associated corrective action task did not include all engineered safety feature (ESF) motors as described in the apparent cause evaluation, but limited the review to 4 kV motors (i.e., not 460 Vac motors).

In addition, on December 17, 2015, the licensee issued the "DCPP 2016 Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) Self-Assessment" report, which identified that, for 460 Vac motors, "a documented Engineering evaluation of Class 1E motor heating when operating at 60.8 Hz via a DG powered vital bus should be prepared." Although Notification 50826105 was initiated on December 17, 2015, to address this issue, an action to perform the technical motor evaluation had not been initiated prior to the team's

inquiry.

Analysis.

The team determined the failure to correct the lack of design verification of 460 Vac motors at maximum allowable frequency when powered from the emergency diesel generators was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operat ion of 460 Vac motors above their rated or analyzed maximum allowable frequencies could result in motor overheating or a trip of the thermal overload relays. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power,"

dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with evaluation because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization thoroughly evaluated issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions [P.2].

Enforcement.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," which states, in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected." Contrary to the above, prior to March 16, 2016, the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances were promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to assure that the lack of design verification of 460 Vac motors, which could be overloaded at the maximum allowable diesel generator frequency, was promptly corrected after having been identified in a 2013 apparent cause evaluation and again in a 2015 self-assessment as documented in Notifications 50572850 and 50826105, respectively. In response to this finding, the licensee performed a preliminary evaluation of the affected 460 Vac motors and concluded that operation at maximum emergency diesel generator frequency would not cause them to overheat or trip on overcurrent. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notifications 50835699 and 50838988. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275/2016007-02 and 05000323/2016007-02, "Failure to Promptly Correct the Lack of Design Verification of 460 Vac Motors at Maximum Allowable Frequency."

.2.4 125 Volt Distribution Panel and Bus 2-2

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with 125 Volt Distribution Panel and Bus 2-2 to ensure

design basis requirements and specificati ons were met. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Calculations for electrical distribution system loading, voltages, and maximum short-circuit levels to evaluate the adequacy of the distribution panel bus and breakers to carry anticipated loads under limiting conditions

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to confirm adequate selective protection and coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions and to withstand and interrupt maximum available faults

• Corrective action history to determine whether there had been any adverse operating trends

• Visual inspection to assess material condition, the presence of hazards, and consistency of installed equipment with design documentation and analyses

b. Findings

Failure to Ensure Safety-Related Alternating Current and Direct Current Equipment Functionality at Maximum Allowable Voltages

Introduction.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," involving the failure to evaluate operation of 125 Volt direct current

(dc) and 480 and 120 Volt alternating current

(ac) equipment at maximum allowable voltages (two examples).

Description.

Example 1: Equipment is designed and rated by its manufacturers to withstand supply voltages within a limited range. Procedure OP J-9:IV, "Performing a Battery Equalizing Charge," specified an equalizing voltage of approximately 138 Vdc, and design criterion memorandum S-67, "125V/250V Volt Direct Current System,"

specified a maximum equalizing voltage of 139.8 Vdc, on nominally 125 Vdc systems, without an analysis to ensure that safety-related direct current equipment would not be adversely affected at the equalizing voltage level. However, the licensee had not performed a comprehensive review to verify or check that the maximum voltage to which

vital dc equipment would be exposed during battery equalizing, which could be as high as 139.8 Vdc, was within the equipment maximum voltage ratings or that the equipment had been analyzed to function above its rated voltage limits. In response to the team's inquiry, the licensee performed a preliminary evaluation of the condition and determined that some of the dc equipment had maximum voltage ratings that were less than 139.8 Vdc, but that it was unlikely that they had been damaged due to exposure to

voltages above their ratings.

Example 2: Equipment is designed and rated by its manufacturers to withstand supply voltages within a limited range. On June 30, 1997, the licensee issued design change package E-050321, which increased the voltage of the vital 480 Vac buses by 2.5 percent. The design change package stated, "The calculation performed by Duke Engineering and Services (358A-DC) detailed the acceptable voltages on all buses during normal operation, accident conditions, and plant shutdown."

Calculation 358A-DC, "DCPP Unit 2 Load Flow, Short Circuit, and Transient Stability Calculation," established a maximum voltage acceptance criterion of 105.4 percent (506 Volt) for the 480 Volt buses. Units 1 and 2 Procedures STP I-1C, "Routine Weekly Checks Required by Licenses," include voltage checks of vital 480 Vac buses to verify that the voltage does not exceed 126.33 Vac on the secondary of the potential transformers, which translates to a limit of about 506 Vac on the 480 Vac buses. Calculation 357G-DC, "Guidelines for Circuit Breaker Data Entered into ETAP Database," specified a maximum voltage of 508 Vac on the 480 Vac buses to maintain the credited circuit breaker interrupting ratings. Calculation 357A-DC, "Units 1&2 Load Flow, Short Circuit, and Motor Starting," identifies, in section 3.1.6, a voltage limit of 511 Vac to avoid overvoltages on the 120 Vac control circuits.

Contrary to these established voltage limits, implementation of design change package E-050321 resulted in measured bus voltages that were sometimes as high as 528 Vac. These overvoltage conditions were justified in Procedure OP J-2:VIII, "Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP," Section 5.4, which stated that they are acceptable based on several corrective action documents that it referenced. The team reviewed the referenced notifications and determined that they lacked the rigor of a formal calculation and failed to address a number of vulnerabilities. Specifically, the licensee lacked analysis of allowable overvoltage conditions on induction motor rotor overheating, comprehensive review of non-motor maximum voltage ratings, consideration of additional voltage boosting at the 120 Vac level, derating of circuit breaker interrupting capacities, motor operated valve torque considerations, and exceedance of maximum voltages for which equipment was qualified.

Analysis.

The team determined the failure to evaluate operation of 125 Vdc and 480 and 120 Vac equipment at maximum allowable voltages was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, operation of equipment outside of its rated or analyzed maximum allowable voltages adversely affects the reliability and capability of that equipment required to perform safety-related functions.

In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with design margins because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization operated and maintained equipment within design margins and that margins were carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process [H.6].

Enforcement.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program." Contrary to the above, prior to February 10, 2016, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design, such as by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the design of

(1) equipment on the nomi nally 125 Vdc system at the maximum voltage specified in Procedure OP J-9:IV, "Performing a Battery Equalizing Charge," and

(2) equipment on 480 Vac and 120 Vac vital buses at maximum voltages specified in Procedure OP J-2:VIII, "Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP," by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, to ensure equipment functionality. In response to this finding, the licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation of the affected equipment and concluded that any past exposure to voltages above their maximum rating would not have caused a loss of functionality. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notifications 50834558, 50835906, 50835394, 50835945, 50835949, 50836376, 50836439, 50836638, 50836872, and 50836995. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275/2016007-03 and 05000323/2016007-03, "Failure to Ensure Safety-Related Alternating Current and Direct Current Equipment Functionality at Maximum Allowable Voltages."

.2.5 4160 Volt Feeder Breaker 52HF10

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with 4160 Volt feeder breaker 52HF10. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component functional description, maintenance history, and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Component logic, schematic, and wiring diagrams

• Feeder breaker vendor manual and qualification document

• Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, cable sizing and routing, and electrical protection to verify that switchgear bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Results of completed preventative maintenance on breakers, including other breakers in the switchgear

b. Findings

Failure to Evaluate the Extent of Condition for a Degraded Condition on a Nonsafety-Related 4160 Vac Breaker

Introduction.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," involving the failure to evaluate the impact of a cracked holding pawl identified on a nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker on additional safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breakers.

Description.

Feeder circuit breaker 52HF10 is a 1200 A, 4160 Vac SF6 breaker. Although 1200 A and 2000 A 4160 Vac SF6 circuit breakers were procured safety-related, some of their applications are classified as nonsafety-related. These breakers are mostly used in Units 1 and 2 4160 Vac switchgear buses, D and E, and safety-related switchgear, buses F and G.

The team reviewed corrective actions associated with the 4160 Vac SF6 breakers and observed that, on October 8, 2015, Notification 50809805 documented corrective actions associated with a cracked holding pawl on nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker 52HD10. As a corrective action, the licensee promptly removed the part and replaced it with a spare, but failed to review the impact of the condition on safety-related breakers. Specifically, although breaker 52HD10 is used in a nonsafety-related application, it was procured as safety-related and is of the same make and model as the safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breakers.

The licensee failed to review Notification 50809805 and implement corrective actions in accordance with Procedure OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution."

Section 5.2.4.b.2, states that ---"ensure positive contact is made with WCSFM" to perform extent of condition "if problem could adversely impact safety ---- or the ability of equipment to perform its intended licensing and or design function." Contrary to that provision, the licensee failed to recognize that the problem associated with the 4160 Vac nonsafety-related SF6 breaker could impact the ability of other safety-related breakers to perform their intended safety function and, as such, perform an extent of condition on safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breakers due to the cracked holding pawl on the nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker, which was procured as quality equipment and, similar in make and model, to the safety related 4160 Vac SF6 breakers.

Analysis.

The team determined the failure to evaluate the impact of a cracked holding pawl identified on a nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker on additional safety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breakers was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the 4160 Vac breaker with the cracked holding pawl was procured as safety-related; therefore, the condition extends to safety-related 4160 Vac breakers of the same make and model and potentially adversely affects the ability to perform their safety function. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with conservative bias because the licensee failed to ensure that individuals used decision making-practices that emphasized prudent choices

[H.14].

Enforcement.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which states, in part, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings." Contrary to the above, in October of 2015, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstance in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.

Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the extent of condition of a cracked holding pawl on a nonsafety-related 4160 Vac SF6 breaker, which was procured as safety-related, in accordance with Procedure OM7.ID1, "Problem Identification and Resolution,"

when the failure of the component could adversely impact safety-related breakers of the same make and model. In response to this finding, the licensee is performing a procedure review to include steps to perform extent of condition analysis for unplanned nonsafety-related equipment issues that may also affect similar safety-related equipment. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notifications 50836859 and 50836689. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275/2016007-04 and 05000323/2016007-04, "Failure to Evaluate the Extent of Condition for a Degraded Condition on a Nonsafety-

Related 4160 Vac Breaker."

.2.6 4160 Volt / 480 Volt Transformer 2F

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the 4160 Volt / 480 Volt transformer 2F. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Load tap changer design and temperature sensor monitor

• Component functional description, protection, logic and schematic diagram and sizing calculation

• Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, cable de-rate for load center transformer 2F, and electrical protection to verify that 480 Vac bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable

limits

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker 52HF10 ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions

• Procedures for transformer maintenance, surveillances, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance; including the cable and insulation aging management program

• Results of completed preventative maintenance on transformer and supply breaker 52HF10, including breaker tracking

• Vendor manual and vendor recommended preventive maintenance requirements

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.7 Containment Fan Cooler Unit 2-5

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with containment fan cooler unit 2-5. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with

system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Surveillances of containment air flow

• Modifications to the containment fan cooler unit back-draft damper

• Technical specifications and bases documents

• Vendor documentation

• External cleaning processes of the fan cooler units

• Chemistry control surveillances and test results of component cooling water system water with respect to system corrosion and containment fan cooler fouling requirements

• Piping and instrumentation diagrams

• System operating instructions

• Component one-line and control wiring diagram, cable schedule and cable routing for the fan motor

• Component fan motor cable sizing and routing for the fan motor and brake horsepower calculation

• Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings for fan motor to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance; including the cable aging management program

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.8 Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-1

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, modifications, vendor technical manual and condition reports associated with auxiliary saltwater pump 1-1. The team also performed walk downs and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel and inservice testing program personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Net positive suction head calculations, including elevated ultimate heat sink temperatures and varying tidal conditions, hydraulic balancing calculations to verify that the pump will be able to perform its functions during normal and accident conditions

• Modification to upgrade the pump to a larger impeller and the hydraulic effects on the system and pump

• Test trends for the last three years to verify that the pump has been operating in the desired range and is operationally ready, as well actions taken to correct any deficient conditions identified during tests

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Schematic diagrams to confirm the mo tor operation conformed to the design requirements

• Voltage drop calculations to determine whether the motor had adequate voltage for starting and running under degraded voltage conditions

• Cable sizes to determine whether the motor circuit cabling had adequate ampacity

• Maximum power demand of the pump to verify it was properly reflected in alternating current distribution system and diesel generator loading analyses, that the electrical protective devices were set appropriately, and that the motor

thermal capability was not exceeded

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.9 Auxiliary Saltwater Traveling Screen 1-7

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, modifications, vendor technical manual and condition reports associated with auxiliary saltwater travelling screen 1-7 and associated components. The team also performed walk downs and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel and operations personnel to ensure the capability of the auxiliary saltwater strainer components (e.g., screens, pumps, differential pressure instruments) to perform their desired design basis function under varying intake conditions. Specifically, the team

reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Seismic calculation to verify the travelling screens are adequately supported during seismic and normal operating conditions, including considerations for maximum tidal conditions associated with tsunami conditions

• Intake management and alarm response procedures associated with the travelling screes to verify that changing conditions in the intake structure are managed adequately

• Modification to screen wash pumps and travelling screens to improve system performance

• Data collected from operator rounds to assure that the travelling screen system is operating acceptably and corrective actions are taken when system problems are encountered

• Material condition of this system to assure that the components get adequate consideration in the corrosive salt water environment

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Schematic diagrams to confirm that the screen and screen wash pump motor operation conformed to the design requirements

• Voltage drop calculations to determine whether the motor had adequate voltage for starting and running under degraded voltage conditions

• Cable sizes to determine whether the motor circuit cabling had adequate ampacity

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.10 Charging Pump Suction Valves LCV-112B and LCV-112C

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the charging pump suction valves. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of the related components to perform their desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Corrective action documents issued in the past five years to verify that repeat failures, and potential chronic issues, will not prevent the charging pump suction valves from performing their safety function

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.11 Condensate Storage Tank

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the condensate storage tank for Unit 2. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Corrective action documents issued in the past five years to verify that repeat failures, and potential chronic issues, will not prevent the condensate storage tank and associated components from performing their safety function

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.12 Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, modifications, vendor technical manual and condition reports associated with component cooling water pump 2-2. The team also performed walk downs and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel and inservice testing program personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Net positive suction head calculations including elevated ultimate heat sink, hydraulic balancing calculations to verify that the pump will be able to perform its functions during normal and accident conditions

• Test trends for the last three years to verify that the pump has been operating in the desired range and is operationally ready, as well actions taken to correct any deficient conditions identified during tests

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Schematic diagrams to confirm the mo tor operation conformed to the design requirements

• Voltage drop calculations to determine whether the motor had adequate voltage for starting and running under degraded voltage conditions

• Cable sizes to determine whether the motor circuit cabling had adequate ampacity

• Maximum power demand of the pump to verify it was properly reflected in alternating current distribution system and diesel generator loading analyses, that the electrical protective devices were set appropriately, and that the motor

thermal capability was not exceeded

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.13 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Inlet Valves FCV-602 and FCV-603

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with the component cooling water heat exchanger inlet valves FCV-602 and FCV-603. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function.

Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Calculations for air-operated valve design basis operating conditions, and weak-link analyses

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Air supply system and back up air accumulator system associated with valves FCV-602 and FVC-603

• System quarterly functional tests

• Technical specifications and bases documents

• Vendor manual for the valves

• Work orders and corrective action program documents

• Piping and instrumentation diagrams

• System operating instructions

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.14 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves PCV-445, PCV-456, and PCV-474

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with pressurizer power operated relief valves PCV-445, PCV-456, and PVC-474. The team also reviewed recent photographs of the valves and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of these components to perform their desired design basis function. Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Corrective action documents issued in the past five years to verify that repeat failures, and potential chronic issues, will not prevent the valves from performing their safety function

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.15 Residual Heat Removal System Valves RHR-8701 and RHR-8702

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the updated final safety analysis report, system description, design basis documents, the current system health report, selected drawings and calculations, maintenance and test procedures, and condition reports associated with residual heat removal system motor operated valves RHR-8701 and RHR-8702. The team also performed walkdowns and conducted interviews with system engineering personnel to ensure the capability of this component to perform its desired design basis function.

Specifically, the team reviewed:

• Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation

• Calculations for motor-operated valve design basis operating conditions, torque and thrust capabilities, and weak-link analyses

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance

• Surveillances pertaining to valve leakage requirements and test results

• System quarterly functional tests

• Technical specifications and bases documents

• Vendor documentation for installation, operation, and maintenance of the valves

• Work orders and corrective action program documents

• Piping and instrumentation diagrams

• System operating instructions

• Component one-line and control wiring diagram, cable schedule and cable routing for the valve motors

• Component motor cable sizing and routing for the valve motors and brake horsepower calculations

• Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits

• Protective device settings and circuit breaker ratings to ensure adequate selective protection coordination of connected equipment during worst-case short circuit conditions

• Procedures for preventive maintenance, corrective actions, inspection, and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance; including the cable aging management program

• Valve motor control power transformer and fuse sizing

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3.1 Inspection of NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk

and the Operability of Offsite Power"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee response to NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power." The licensee's interface and coordination with the transmission system operator for plant voltage requirements and notification of the need for compensatory measures were reviewed. The inspectors also reviewed the capacity and capability of the 230 kV offsite power circuit to perform its required functions during anticipated operational occurrences and postulated accidents. The review included the ability of the load tap changing standby-startup transformers to automatically correct low voltage conditions prior to actuation of the degraded voltage relays.

.1 Failure to Evaluate the Voltage Effects of Limiting Design Basis Events on the 230 kV Offsite Power Circuit

Introduction.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," involving the failure to evaluate the voltage effects of a limiting design basis event with non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals on the 230 kV offsite power circuit.

Description.

The licensee's updated final safety analysis report states in Section 8.2.1.2, "The preferred power supply has sufficient capacity and capability to assure that:

(1) specified fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and

(2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents." Calculation 359-DC, "Determination of 230 kV Grid Capability Limits as DCPP Offsite Power Source," models the transient voltage effects of various design basis events and verifies that the resulting voltage depression is not so severe that it would result in loss of the 230 kV offsite power circuit due to an undervoltage trip. The calculation assumes a coincident engineered safety features actuation system signal and reactor trip signal. The engineered safety features actuation system signal initiates immediate automatic transfer of the vital buses from the

auxiliary transformer to the standby startup transformer, but transfer of the non-vital buses to the standby startup transformer and tripping of the main generator is delayed for approximately 30 seconds after a reactor trip. However, the team reviewed the licensee's accident analyses and observed that the reactor trip signal could also occur before the engineered safety features actuation system signal for steam generator tube rupture, steam line break, and small break loss-of-coolant accidents. Therefore, the transfer of vital and non-vital loads to the standby startup transformer and tripping of the main generator could coincide and the voltage effect on the vital buses could be more severe than the scenarios modeled in the calculation.

Analysis.

The team determined the failure to evaluate the voltage effects of a limiting design basis event with non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals on the 230 kV offsite power circuit was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to ensure adequate bus voltages as a result of a design basis event with non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals would result in a trip of the undervoltage relays and the loss of the preferred offsite power circuit. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with design margins because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization operated and maintained equipment within design margins and that margins were carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process [H.6].

Enforcement.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program." Contrary to the above, prior to January 30, 2014, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the design of the 230 kV preferred offsite power source, such as by the performance of design reviews or use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, by assuming in calculation 359-DC, "Determination of 230 kV Grid Capability Limits as DCPP Offsite Power Source," that the reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals are coincident in time for all postulated design basis events. However, the plant is designed such that, during some events, the signals are separate in time and would result in a greater vital bus voltage depression than analyzed. In response to this finding, the licensee conducted a preliminary evaluation and concluded that the current transmission grid conditions were such that the calculation criteria would be met in the event of a design basis event involving non-coincident reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation system signals.

This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 50839137. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275/2016007-05 and 05000323/2016007-05, "Failure to Evaluate the Voltage Effects of Limiting Design Basis Events on the 230 kV Offsite Power Circuit."

.2 Failure to Translate Appropriate Load Tap Changer Timing Acceptance Criteria into

Periodic Tests

Introduction.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," involving the failure to translate appropriate load tap changer timing acceptance criteria into functional tests to ensure that design assumptions were being maintained.

Description.

The licensee's updated final safety analysis report states in Section 8.2.1.2: "The preferred power supply has sufficient capacity and capability to assure that:

(1) specified fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and

(2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents." Calculation 359-DC, "230 kV Grid Interface Requirements as a DCPP Offsite Power Source," includes simulations to verify that vital bus voltage transients during design basis events are automatically corrected by the standby startup transformer load tap changers to ensure that that the 230 kV offsite power circuit has the required capability (i.e., that it would not be lost due to an undervoltage trip). However, Unit 1 Procedure MP E-62.3, "Tap Changer Functional Test for Standby-Startup Transformer 11," allows up to 16 seconds for three load tap changer step changes, but calculations 357A-DC, "Unit 1 and 2 Load Flow, Short Circuit and Motor Starting Analysis," and 359-DC, "230 kV Grid Interface Requirements as a DCPP Offsite Power Source," credit a faster speed of 3.3 seconds per step. Most of the postulated cases require multiple load tap changer steps to achieve a voltage that exceeds the second level undervoltage relay voltage threshold. Margins between the calculated voltage recovery times and the second level undervoltage relay minimum time delay are discussed in calculation 359-DC, Section 9.1. For the bounding case, the calculated recovery time is 16.07 seconds versus a required recovery time of 16.09 seconds, so the design margin is only 0.02 seconds.

Analysis.

The team determined the failure to translate appropriate load tap changer timing acceptance criteria into functional tests to ensure that design assumptions were being maintained was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor, and therefore a finding, because it related to the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the load tap changer could meet its functional test acceptance criterion but not operate fast enough to restore vital bus voltages within the required time during design basis events, which would result in an undervoltage trip and loss of the preferred offsite power circuit. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power," dated July 19, 2012, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with design margins because the licensee failed to ensure that the organization operated and maintained equipment within design margins and that margins were carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic and rigorous process [H.6].

Enforcement.

The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," which states, in part, "Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished." Contrary to the above, prior to November 25, 2015, the licensee failed to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria in instructions, procedures, and drawings for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee failed to include appropriate quantitative acceptance criteria in Procedure MP E-62.3, "Tap Changer Functional Test for Standby-Startup Transformer 11," to ensure that the load tap changer speed for standby-startup transformer 11 was adequate to restore vital bus voltages to the required level during design basis events. In response to this finding, the licensee performed a preliminary evaluation of the condition and concluded that the most recently measured speed of the load tap changer was adequate to ensure that it would restore vital bus voltage within the required time. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 50839333. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275/2016007-06 and 05000323/2016007-06, "Failure to Translate Appropriate Load Tap Changer Timing Acceptance Criteria into Periodic Tests."

.3.2 Inspection of NRC Information Notice 2007-36, "Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage

Regulator Problems"

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice 2007-36, "Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator Problems," to verify the licensee performed an applicability review and took corrective actions, if appropriate, to address the concerns described in the information notice. This information notice discusses various failure associated with emergency diesel generator voltage regulators. The team verified that the licensee's review adequately addressed the issues in the information notice.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3.3 Inspection of NRC Information Notice 2012-06, "Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations"

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice 2012-06, "Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations," to verify the licensee performed an applicability review and took corrective actions, if appropriate, to address the concerns described in the information notice. This information notice discusses recent operating experience regarding ineffective use of vendor technical recommendations at U.S. nuclear power plants. The team verified that the licensee's review adequately addressed the issues in the information notice.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3.4 Inspection of NRC Information Notice 2012-14, "Motor-Operated Valve Inoperable due to

Stem-Disc Separation"

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice 2012-14, "Motor-Operated Valve Inoperable due to Stem-Disc Separation," to verify the licensee performed an applicability review and took corrective actions, if appropriate, to address the concerns described in the information notice. The team also reviewed enhancements to the licensee's processes for verifying valve position and the affected procedures to assure that this key aspect of the information notice was considered. The team verified that the licensee's review adequately addressed the issues in the information notice.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3.5 Inspection of NRC Information Notice 2014-03, "Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip Mechanism Issues"

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensee's evaluation of Information Notice 2014-03, "Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip Mechanism Issues," to verify the licensee performed an applicability review and took corrective actions, if appropriate, to address the concerns described in the information notice. This information notice discusses recent operating experience related to improper adjustments of control mechanisms that led to inoperability of turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The team reviewed several corrective action program documents and maintenance activities for physical inspection and measurement of the pump control mechanisms to address the concerns identified in the information notice. The team verified that the licensee's review adequately addressed the issues in the information notice.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Results of Reviews for Operator Actions

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected risk-significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. This included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1E-6.

For the review of operator actions, the team observed operators during simulator scenarios associated with the selected components as well as observing simulated actions in the plant.

The selected operator actions were:

• Scenario 1 was initiated by a spurious safety injection signal. The crews were required to stop centrifugal charging pump number 3, make a power operated relief valve available, restore instrument air to containment, and to establish

normal letdown.

• Scenario 2 was initiated by a leak in the component cooling water system. The crews were required to locate and isolate the leak, which includes field actions, after receiving component cooling water surge tank makeup alarm.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

The team reviewed actions requests and notifications associated with the selected components, operator actions and operating experience notificat ions. Any related findings are documented in prior sections of this report.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On March 10, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. James Welsch, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. On April 7, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the final results of this inspection with Mr. Robert Waltos, Acting Director, Engineering, and Mr. Thomas Baldwin, Director, Nuclear Site Services, and other members of the licensee's staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

A-1 Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

A. Heffner, NRC Interface, Regulatory Services

A. Peck, Director, Engineering Services

C. Basulto, Mechanical Engineer, Design Engineering

C. Ingram, Mechanical Engineer, Design Engineering

E. Tahlman, Electrical Engineer, Electrical Systems and Components

G. Reimers, Senior Consultant, Design Engineering

H. Garcia, Manager, CNO Support

H. Hamzehee, Manager, Regulatory Services

J. Loya, Manager, Quality Verification

J. Morris, Senior Advising Engineer

J. Nimick, Senior Station Director

J. Salazar, Engineer, Mechanical Systems

J. Welsch, Site Vice President

L. Orozco, Electrical Engineer, Design Engineering

L. Parker, STARS Regulatory Affairs Specialist

M. McCoy, NRC Interface, Regulatory Services

M. Sharp, Manager, Design Engineering

P. Gerfen, Director, Operation Services

R. Waltos, Acting Director, Engineering

T. Baldwin, Director, Nuclear Site Services

T. Stanton, Senior Engineer, Design Engineering

NRC Personnel

B. Tharakan, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Reynoso, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000275;

05000373/2016007-01 NCV Failure to Evaluate 480 Vac Motor Starters with Circuit Breaker Trip Settings Higher than Manufacturers' Specifications (Section 1R21.2.3.b.1)

05000275;

05000373/2016007-02 NCV Failure to Promptly Correct the Lack of Design Verification of 460 Vac Motors at Maximum Allowable

Frequency (Section 1R21.2.3.b.2)

05000275;

05000373/2016007-03 NCV Failure to Ensure Safety-Related Alternating Current

and Direct Current Equipment Functionality at Maximum Allowable Voltages (Section 1R21.2.4.b)

Opened and Closed

05000275;

05000373/2016007-04 NCV Failure to Evaluate the Extent of Condition for a Degraded Condition on a Nonsafety-Related

4160 Vac Breaker (Section 1R21.2.5.b)

05000275;

05000373/2016007-05 NCV Failure to Evaluate the Voltage Effects of Limiting Design Basis Events on the 230 kV Offsite Power

Circuit (Section 1R21.3.1.b.1)

05000275;

05000373/2016007-06 NCV Failure to Translate Appropriate Load Tap Changer Timing Acceptance Criteria into Periodic Tests

(Section 1R21.3.1.b.2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Calculations

Number Title Revision / Date 100A-DC 4kV ESF Motor Stator Temperature Rise for Operation Above Nameplate Horsepower

114-DC Protection Relay Setting for Bus and Feeders, Class

1E 4.16kV Switchgear

156-DC 4kV Motor Starting Times as a Function of Voltage 6 15-DC Diesel Generator Loading for Vital Bus Loads Units 1

and 2 25 170-DC Basler Class 1E 4kV Motor Overcurrent Relay Setpoints

192A-DC Determine the Maximum Allowable Length of 120 VAC Control Wire for Control Circuits of 480 MCCs

195A-DC 460V Motors Thermal Overload Setting for 460V Continuous Duty Motors

195B-DC 460V Motors Magnetic Trip Setting of Molded Case Circuit Breakers for Class 1E 460V Motors

195C-DC Evaluation of Thermal Overload Relay Settings for 460VAC Class 1E MOV/MOD Motors

195D-DC MCCB Settings for 480VAC Class 1E Non-Motor Loads 9 202-DC System Coordination Study for Class 1E 480V Buses 1 207B-DC MCCB Settings/460VAC Non-Class 1E Continuous Duty Motors

230-DC Under and Overvoltage Setting for Class 1E 125V DC

System 0 234E-DC 125 VDC Battery 22 Coordination Evaluation 4A 235A-DC Battery 11 Sizing, Load Flow, Voltage Drop, Short Circuit and Charger Sizing 11 235E-DC Battery 22 Sizing, Load Flow, Voltage Drop, Short Circuit and Charger Sizing 11 258-DC 32G Generator Reverse Power Relay 0 357A-DC 12kV / 4kV / 480V Electrical Distribution System 14

Calculations

Number Title Revision / Date 357F-DC Guidelines for Motor Data Entered into ETAP

Database 7 357G-DC Guidelines for Circuit Breaker Data Entered into ETAP

Database 2 357I-DC 230/12KV Startup Transformer LTC 2 357R-DC 4.16 kV Bus Under-Voltage Relay & Timer 2 358A-DC Load Flow, Short Circuit and Transient Stability Calculation

359-DC 230 kV & 500 kV Grid Interface Requirements 10 360-DC 125VDC System Analysis Methodology & Scenario Development

361-DC 125 VDC Ground Detection System Sensitivity 0 364-DC Electrical Penetration Protection for Unit 2 6

366A-DC Sizing and Setting of Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Thermal Overload Relays

9000033359 (357A-DC)

12kV / 4kV / 480V Electrical Distribution System 14A B-22-09-04-02 Seismic Interaction East of CCW Ht. Ex. 2-2 Above Mech. Panel 149 North of CL June 15, 1983

DC-135 Auxiliary Salt Water Pumps Increased Loading 0

HVAC-2005-03 Backflow through the Idle CFCUs without the Backdraft Dampers

M-0180 Calculation of the Brake Horse Power for Miscellaneous Pumps

M-1018 Evaluate CCW Split Train Operations with Vital Bus Failure and Temporary Loss of Cooling

M-1020 Evaluate CCW System with Elevated UHS

Temperature in Mode 4

M-1027 To determine the maximum allowable ASW temperature when two CCW HX are aligned

M-1141 Maximum Emergency Diesel Generator Mechanical Loading 2

Calculations

Number Title Revision / Date

M-1141, 90000040769 Emergency Diesel Generator, 4kv System, 480 V

System Part 2, Version 00 M-1185 SAP CALC NO. 90000041599 - CCW FATHOM Flow and Heat Transfer Analysis Model December 18, 2014 M-175 Check NPSHA for CCW for Temperatures of 100 to 250 deg.F and Flows from 5000 to 20000 gpm

M-305 CCW System Pressure and Temperature 14 M-854 Maximum Brake HP for CCW, ASW, AFW, and CCW

Auxiliary Lube Oil Pumps

M-877 Demonstrate the Acceptability of Throttling Cooling Water Flow to the CCW Pump Lube Oil coolers

M-885 Determine Change in ASW Flow When Switching Configuration and Tidal Conditions

M-888 Minimum Hold Time for

FCV-602 and

FCV-603 2 M-919 Single CCW Pump Operation During Station Blackout - Analysis of Ability to Support Cold Shutdown

M-951 Evaluation of CCW System Accident Mitigation Capabilities during Plant Cooldown and During ASME Section XI testing May 28, 2015 M-953 Determine if Adequate NPSH is Available for ASW

Pump Operations

M-988 ASW System Flows, Pressures and Temperatures

SAP Calculation No. 9000013922-

008-00 Environmental Qualification Requirements:

Bases for "Note 11: and "Note 16" Devices; Bases for the Required Post-DBA Operating Time" and "Minimum Required Qualification Time"; Review of Potential

10CFR50.49(b)(2) Devices; and Radiation EQ of Non-

Electronic Devices Subject to a TID of between 10

and 10 4 Rads.

Legacy No. EZ-002.

SAP Calculation No. 9000039862-

006-01 Component Cooling Water System Flow Balancing.

Legacy No. M-1017

SAP Calculation No. 9000039872-

2-00 Component Cooling Water System and Auxiliary Saltwater System - To determine the maximum allowable ASW temperature when two CCW HXs are aligned.

Legacy No. M-1027

Calculations

Number Title Revision / Date SAP Calculation No. 9000039872-

003-00 Component Cooling Water System and Auxiliary Saltwater System - To determine the maximum allowable ASW temperature when two CCW HXs are aligned.

Legacy No. M-1027

SAP Calculation No.

9000041599 Component Cooling Water (CCW) - Component Cooling Water Fathom Flow and Heat Transfer Analysis Model.

Legacy No. M-1185

SAP Calculation No.:

9000035423 Rising-Stem MOV Actuator Sizing and Setpoints. 7

SAP Calculation No.:

9000039834 Calculation M-988 Auxiliary Saltwater System (ASW).

To evaluate the effects of the new ASW bypass piping. 6

SQME-63 Evaluation of Seismic Lateral Restraint for Traveling Water Screens

STA-246 ASW Outlet Pressure of the CCCW H 0

STA-274 Establish a Bounding Time to Implement the 500 kV Backfeed and Restore Reactor Coolant System RCS Makeup Flow and Still Meet the

GDC 17 Requirements for a Delayed Offsite Power Source

WCAP-14282 Evaluation of Peak CCW Temperature Scenarios for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2

52.21.1 Seismic Verification of Outdoor Water Storage Tanks

4

EQP-52.21.9 Structural Integrity of Outdoor Water Storage Tanks

3 52.21.10 Structural Integrity of Outdoor Water Storage Tanks Relative to Effects of Tornado Loading and Normal Wind Loading Design Change Packages Number Title Revision / Date

C-49207 ASW Bypass Piping - Intake to Hillside Tie-in 7

DC2-EP-4328 Installation of Vacuum Relief System on Each Aux.

Saltwater Line

DCM S-10 Residual Heat Removal System 20 DCM S-7 Reactor Coolant System 28

Design Change Packages Number Title Revision / Date

DCM-S-14 Component Cooling Water System 28

DCM-S-17B Auxiliary Saltwater System 21A

DCM-S-23A Containment HVAC System 22

DCM-S-25B Backup Air / Nitrogen Supply System 16

DCN 2000000751 Unit 1 Traveling Screen Speed Control Upgrade August 2, 2011

DCN 2000000752

Replacement of Existing Travelling Screen and Screen Wash Controls Unit 1&2 August 2, 2011 DCN 2-SE-50649 125/250 Volt Direct Current System - 125V DC Vital Battery Charger BTC21(ED21)

DCN 2-SE-50650 125/250 Volt Direct Current System - 125V DC Vital Battery Charger BTC22(ED22)

DCN 2-SE-50651 125/250 Volt Direct Current System - 125V DC Vital Battery Charger BTC221(ED221)

DCN 2-SE-50652 125/250 Volt Direct Current System - 125 VDC Vital Battery Charger

BTC 231 (ED231)

DCN 2-SE-50653 125/250 Volt Direct Current System -125V DC Vital Battery Charger BTC232 (ED232)

DCP - 50649 Replace Vital Battery Chargers 0 DDN

2-1297 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Inlet Damper Modification 1

DDN 2-249 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Anti-Reverse Rotation Device 0 DDN 2-442 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Anti-Reverse Rotation Device 0 DDP 1-119 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Anti-Reverse Rotation Device 0 DDP

1-24907 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Inlet Damper Modification 1 DFC 3-1340 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Anti-Reverse Rotation Device

0 DFC 3-2239 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Inlet Damper Modification 0 DFC 3-2254 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Inlet Damper Modification 0

DFC 3-756 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Anti-Reverse Rotation Device 0

Design Change Packages Number Title Revision / Date DFC 3-964 Containment Fan Cooler Unit Anti-Reverse Rotation Device 0 E-41629 Change Overcurrent Relay Setpoint of Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps Motor

E-50321 Adjust Various Transformer Taps 0 E-50322 Replace Startup Transformer 21 1 E-50365 Replace Startup Transformer 21 0 E-50649 Replace Battery Chargers 0

LBIE Screen Applicability DCP

M-49948 Installations of Lube Oil Sample Ports on Safety Related and Non-Safety Related Pumps, Motors and Gearboxes January 23, 2008M000096 Lube oil Sample Points 12 M-09383 John Crane Mechanical Seal - Component Cooling Water Pump

M-39834 Change Impeller Size on ASW Pumps 0 MMD M00010-1 Damaged Bolt Hole Repair 3

Drawings

Number Title Revision / Date

067998 DCPP Unit 2 SRData Cable Report for cable G02P00 23

102008, Sheet 4B Chemical &Volume Control System (Unit 1) 114

2008, Sheet 4D Chemical & Volume Control System (Unit 1) 131

102017, Sheet 1 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 89

102017, Sheet 10 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 60

2017, Sheet 11 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 73

2017, Sheet 12 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 84

2017, Sheet 13 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 89

2017, Sheet 2 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 15

102017, Sheet 3 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 109

102017, Sheet 3A Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 99

Drawings

Number Title Revision / Date

102017, Sheet 3B Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 95

102017, Sheet 4 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 68

2017, Sheet 5 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 98

2017, Sheet 5A Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 3

2017, Sheet 6 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 102

2017, Sheet 6A Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 93

102017, Sheet 6B Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 1

102017, Sheet 7 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 15

2017, Sheet 8 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 15

2017, Sheet 9 Piping Schematic - Saltwater Systems 38

103011 Logic Diagram 12kV Bus Sections "D" & "E" Automatic Transfer

106717, Sheet 7 Saltwater OVID 198

107031, Sheet 1 Piping Schematic Long Term Cooling Water System 7

107031, Sheet 1A Piping Schematic Long Term Cooling Water System 6

107714, Sheet 2 Component Cooling Water System 65

107723, Sheet 4 Containment Fan Cooler Units - Containment Air Circulation

104

108007, Sheet 4 Reactor Coolant System (Unit 2)` 59

108009, Sheet 3 Safety Injection System 55

108010, Sheet 1 Piping Schematic - Residual Heat Removal System 18

108010, Sheet 2 Piping Schematic - Residual Heat Removal System 17

108010, Sheet 3 Piping Schematic - Residual Heat Removal System 30

108010, Sheet 4 Piping Schematic - Residual Heat Removal System 16

108010, Sheet 5 Piping Schematic - Residual Heat Removal System 18

108010, Sheet 6 Piping Schematic - Residual Heat Removal System 18

108014, Sheet 1 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 51

108014, Sheet 10 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 42

Drawings

Number Title Revision / Date

108014, Sheet 2 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 12

108014, Sheet 3 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 12

108014, Sheet 4 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 22

108014, Sheet 4A Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 45

108014, Sheet 5 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 49

108014, Sheet 5A Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 35

108014, Sheet 6 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 43

108014, Sheet 6A Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 30

108014, Sheet 7 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 36

108014, Sheet 8 Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 41

108014, Sheet 9

Piping Schematic - Component Cooling Water System 46

108016, Sheet 17 Make-up Water System (Unit 2) 50

108017, Sheet 1 Piping Schematic Salt Water Systems 72

108017, Sheet 3 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Salt Water System Unit 2 79

108017, Sheet 3 Saltwater System 79

108017, Sheet 3B Diablo Canyon Power Plant Salt Water System 82

108023, Sheet 3 Ventilation and Airconditioning system 82

333354 Schematic Diagram Ground Detector 125/250 Volt

DC Buses 9

437530 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 12kV Startup System 38

437533 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 V System 43

Drawings

Number Title Revision / Date

437533, Sheet 1 Electrical Single line, Single line Meter and Relay Diagram, 4160 Volt System

437541 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 480 Volt System Bus Sections 14D and 14E

437583, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Auxiliary Feedwater system

25

437594 Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Salt Water Pump 33

437595, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Charging Pumps 11 &

33

437629, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Motor Control Center transformer

437641 Schematic Diagram Screen Drive System 17

437666, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, 4KV Diesel Generator and Associated Breakers

441219 Single Line Diagram 12/4.16kV System 18

441220 Single Line Diagram for Station Auxiliaries 28

441228 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160 V System Bus section "D" & "E"

441229 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 4160 Volt System Bus Section "F" 20

441229, Sheet 1 Electrical Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram, 4160 V System Bus Section "F"

DG 23

441230 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 V System Bus Section "G" & "H" 31

441231 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 480 Volt System Bus Sections 21D & 21E

441237 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 480 Volt System Bus Section 2F

441237, Sheet 1 Electrical Single line Meter and Relay Diagram, 480 Volt System Bus Section 2F

441238, Sheet 1

Single line Meter & Relay Diagram, 480 Volt System Bus Section 2G

441239, Sheet 1

Single line Meter & Relay Diagram, 480 Volt System Bus Section 2H

Drawings

Number Title Revision / Date

441240 Single Line Meter and Relay Diagram 125V D.C.

System 43

441240, Sheet 1 Electrical Single line Meter and Relay Diagram, 125V D.C. System

441286 Logic Diagram 4160 Volt Bus Section "F" Automatic Transfer 11

441287 Schematic Diagram Auxiliary Salt Water Pumps 28

441310, Sheet 1

Electrical Schematic Diagram, Residual Heat Removal Motor Operated Valves

441311 Schematic Diagram Component Cooling Water Pumps 27

441313, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Containment Fan Coolers 35

441313, Sheet 2 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Containment Fan Coolers, No. 21, 23, 24 & 25

441339 Bus Potential and Synchronizing 4160 V System 11

441340 Schematic Diagram Potential & Synchronizing Diagram 4160V Bus Sections F, G, & H

441352 Schematic Diagram 4160 Volt Bus Section "F" Automatic Transfer

441352, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram' 4160V Bus Section "F" Automatic Transfer

441359 Schematic Diagram 4kV Diesel Generators Auxiliary Motors 22

441363 Schematic Diagram Motor Control Center Transformer

441364 Schematic Diagram Motor Control Center Transformer

441368 Schematic diagram 125 Volt DC System 22

441457 Diagram of Connections 125 Volt Battery No. 22 and

DC Distribution Panel No. 22

441462, Sheet 1 Electrical Diagram of Connections, Penetration No. 3E, 9E, 15E, 29E, 32E

Drawings

Number Title Revision / Date

441473, Sheet 1 Electrical Diagram of Connections, Penetration No. 16E 16

441493 Diagram & Panel Schedule Lighting Distribution 76

448570 Electrical Wiring Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear Bus

"F" Cell 8

448572 Electrical Wiring Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear Bus

"F" Cell 10

448573 Electrical Wiring Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear Bus "F" Cell 11

451805 Single Line Diagram Main Control Board 2VB1 &

2VB2 Fuse Panels

498123 Schematic Diagram Stand-By Start-Up Transformer No. 11 Cooling and Local Annunciator

498124 Schematic Diagram Stand-By Start-Up Transformer No. 11 Load Tap Changer

500788, Sheet 1 Electrical Schematic Diagram, Main Annunciator Windows

PK 1817 -

PK 1923

500800 Functional Diagram Reactor - Turbine - Generator Protection

502110 Single Line Diagram 500/230/25/12/4.16kV Systems 21

502669, Sheet 1 Electrical Diagram of Connections, Above elevation 140' - 0" Area G

663030-61 PG&E Diablo Canyon Unit 1&2 Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Curve May 24, 1989

663212, Sheet 67 CCW HX Tube Plugging Map Unit 1 10

663219 4 Inch - Limitorque 150 lb. Gate Valve

17

663219, Sheet

430 Piping - 14 inch Motor Operated Gate Valve Assembly 16

663393, Sheet 42 Electrical Wiring Diagram, ASL and

ASL-R Transformer

FIGURE 9.2-2 Arrangement of Intake Structure September 12, 1998 FIGURE 9.2-3 Arrangement of Auxiliary Saltwater System Piping September 12, 1998

Procedures

Number Title Revision / Date AD13.DC1 Control of the Surveillance Testing Program 43 AD13-ID4 Post Maintenance Testing 20

AD13-ID4 Post Maintenance Testing 23A

AD4.ID1 Housekeeping 14

AD9.DC2 Purchase Classification and Documentation Requirements

AR PK04-24 VCT PRESS LVL TEMP 18 AR PK05-21 PZR LEVEL

HI-LO 11

AR PK11-21 High Radiation 31

AR PK13-01 DCPP Annunciator Alarm Response - Bar Rack/Screens

AR PK15-01 CONTMT TURB BLDG SUMP

LVL 22 AR PK18-22

Annunciator Response 480 V Bus 2F 13

AR PK19-17 U1 12kV SU Transf 11

AR PK20-04 U1 SU Transf 11, 12, or 21 Local Annun 14

CF3.ID22 Minor Modification Process 1

CF3.ID4 Design Calculations 22

CF3.ID9 Design Change Development 50A

CF4.ID10 Non-Design Modifications (N-MOD) 25

CF5.ID2 Control of Material in Storage 13

DCM No. T-19 Electrical Separation and Isolation 12 DCM T-22 Electrical Cable, Termination and Raceway 11

EDDG-005 Fuse Control Program 0

EQ File

IH-07 System Component Evaluation Worksheet - Limitorque Valve Actuators

ER1.ID1 Equipment Reliability Process 4A

MA1.DC54 Conduct of Maintenence 10

MA1.ID27 Preventive Maintenance Program 1 ME E-50.30B Agastat Type ETR Timing Relay Maintenance 26

Procedures

Number Title Revision / Date ME E-50.61 Basler Type

BE1-27 Medium Inverse Undervoltage Relay Maintenance

MP E-35.2 Transformer Temperature Probe Calibration 11 MP E-50.1 Thermal Overload Relay and Cubicle Maintenance 48

MP E-52.1 480 Volt Switchgear Maintenance 30

MP E-53.10A Preventative Maintenance of Limitorque Motor Operators

MP E-53.10A1 Low Impact External Inspection of Limitorque Motor Operators

MP E-53.10N Limitorque SMB 0, 1, 2, and 3 Overhaul 25 MP E-53.10R Augmented Stem Lubrication for Limitorque Operated Valves 6 MP E-53.10S Limitorque Swap-Out and Switch Settings 12 MP E-57.11A Preparations for Working on Potentially Energized Load Centers and Transformers

MP E-63.1C Overhaul of 4KV and 12KV Magna-Blast Circuit Breaker 5 MP E-63.3C Maintenance of 4 and 12 KV Switchgear 30 MP E-63.6A Maintenance of SF6 4kV Circuit Breakers 24 MP E-64.6A Maintenance of ABB K-line Circuit Breaker 41

MP I-17-FCV602 Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger 2-1 Saltwater Flow FCV-

2 Calibration

MP I-17-FCV603 Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchanger 2-2 Saltwater Flow FCV-

603 Calibration

O-23 Operating Instructions for Reliable Transmission Service to DCPP

2.2

OM4.ID14 Notification Review Team (NRT) 26

OM4.ID15 Corrective Action Review Boards (CARB and D CARB) 22A

OM7 Corrective Action Program 6

OM7.ID1 Problem Identification and Resolution 47

OM7.ID1 Problem Identification and Resolution 48

OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 27

Procedures

Number Title Revision / Date

OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 29

OM7.ID12 Operability Determination 34

OP

AP-1 Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage 22

OP

AP-11 Malfunction of Component Cooling Water 32

OP E-5 Auxiliary Saltwater System 9

OP E-5:I Auxiliary Saltwater - Make Available 35 OP E-5:II Auxiliary Saltwater System Two CCW Heat Exchanger Operation

OP F-2:VII Alternate Makeup Water Sources to the CCW System 8A OP H-2:I Operating Procedure - Containment Fan Cooler Units - Make Available and System Operation

OP J-2:VIII

Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP 27 OP K01014 Sealed Component Checklist for Backup Regulating Transformer TRY -24 (NORMAL Supply)

OP K-10 Systems Requiring Sealed Component Checklists 39 OP K10B2 Sealed Component Checklist for Containment Manual Isolation Components Outside Containment

OP K10F Sealed Component Checklist for Auxiliary Saltwater System 10 OP K10G1 Sealed Component Checklist for ECCS Modes 1, 2 and

25 OP O-28 Intake Management 18

OP1.DC16 Control of Plant Equipment Not Required by the Technical Specification

2b

OP1.DC20 Sealed Components 20

OP1.ID2 Time Critical Operator Action 8A

STP 1-1C Routine Weekly Checks Required by licenses 89A STP I 1A Routine Shift Checks Required By Licenses 133 STP I-1B Routine Daily Checks Required By Licenses 124 STP I-1C Routine Weekly Checks Required by Licenses 89A STP M 31 Vital Switchgear Appendix R Circuit Isolation Test 1

Procedures

Number Title Revision / Date STP M-109 Test of Back-Up Air Accumulator System to

FCV-602, CCW Heat Exchanger No. 1 Saltwater Inlet Valve

STP M-110 Test of Back-Up Air Accumulator System to

FCV-603, CCW Heat Exchanger No. 2 Saltwater Inlet Valve

STP M-13F 4KV Bus Non-Si Auto Transfer Test 57 STP M-26 ASW System Flow Monitoring 31 STP M-31 Vital Switchgear Appendix R circuit isolation Test 1 STP M-31 Vital Switchgear Appendix R Circuit Isolation Test 3

STP M-51 Routine Surveillance Test of Containment Fan Cooler Units 24 STP M-8B Leak Rate Testing of Electrical Penetrations 6 STP M-93A Refueling Interval Surveillance - Containment Fan Cooler System

STP M-93A Refueling Interval Surveillance - Containment Fan Cooler System

STP M-9G Diesel Generator 24-Hour Load Test and Hot Restart Test 57 STP P-ASW-11 Routine Surveillance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump

1-1 33 STP P-ASW-A

Performance Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pumps 30 STP P-ASW-A11 Comprehensive Test of Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 1-1 10

STP P-CCW 22 Routine Surveillance Test for Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2

STP P-CCW-A Performance Test of Component Cooling Water Pumps 11 STP P-CCW-A22 Comprehensive Pump Test for Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2

STP R-10 Reactor Coolant System Leak Evaluation 12 STP R-10C Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance 46 STP V-13A CCW Flow Balancing 17 STP V-2 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation Diablo Canyon Power Plant Surveillance Test Procedure

Procedures

Number Title Revision / Date STP V-2D3 Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation Diablo Canyon Power Plant Surveillance Test Procedure

STP V-2D3 Excersizing and Position Verification of Vavles 8701 and

8702 7 STP V-2D3 Exercising and Position Verification of Valves 8701 and

8702 March 31, 2013 STP V-2D3 Exercising and Position Verification of Valves 8701 and

8702 May 18, 2011 STP V-2D3 Exercising and Position Verification of Valves 8701 and

8702 October 20, 2016STP V-3F4 Exercising Valve

FCV-602 CCW Hx No. 1 Saltwater Inlet 27 STP V-3F5 Exercising Valve

FCV-603 CCW Hx No. 2 Saltwater Inlet 22 STP V-3T6 Exercising Containment Ventilatlon Isolation Valves

FCV-662,

FCV-663 and

FCV-664

STP V-682B Penetrations 82B and 82C Containment Isolation Valve Leak Testing

13A STP V-7C Leak Test of RHR Suction Valves 8701 and 8702 (Surveillance Test November 3, 2014)

STP V-7C Leak Test of RHR Suction Valves 8701 and 8702 (Surveillance Test Mach 19, 2013)

STP V-7C Leak Test of RHR Suction Valves 8701 and 8702 13

TS3.ID2 Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations 40A

TS5.ID1 System Engineering Program 25

U1 OP J-9:IV Performing a Battery Equalizing Charge 9A

U1 OP L-4 Normal Operation at Power 89 U1&2 MP E-

50.33A Westinghouse Type

SSV-T One Unit Voltage Relay Maintenance

U1&2 MP E-

50.62 Basler

BE1-GPS100 Relay Maintenance 8 U1&2 MP E-

57.15 Maintenance & Calibration of Ammeters Voltmeters, Frequency Meters & Tachometers

Procedures

Number Title Revision / Date U1&2 MP E-

63.6A Maintenance of SF6 4kV Circuit Breakers 24 U1&2 MP E-

64.1B Molded Case Circuit Breaker Exercise and Maintenance 15A U1&2 STP M-

13F 4KV Bus F Non-SI Auto-Transfer Test 57 U1&2 STP M-

84F

CIAX-F and

CIAX2-F Operations Test 10 U2 EOP

ECA-0.0 Loss of all Vital AC Power 24 U2 MP E-62.3 Tap Changer Functional Test for Standby-Startup Transformer 21

U2 OP

AP-26 Loss of Offsite Power 18 U2 OP J-2:V Backfeeding the Unit from the 500 kV System 14

U2 STP M-75F 4kv Vital Bus F Undervoltage Relay Calibration 4

XI1.ID4 NRC Communications and Inspection Support 6

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date 64136746-0100 Performance Test of Component Cooling Water Pumps November 3, 2014

663022-76 Traveling Screen Vendor Technical Manual August 22, 1997

663213-55 Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Pumps Unit 2

Appendix B Systems Interaction Program Appendix B Source Acceptance Criteria

CCW PUMP TEST DATA IST data for 2-2 CCW pump - approximately last years Various Dates

CDBI Self-Assessment DCPP 2016 Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) Self-Assessment, Notification

50795610 December 17, 2015

DC 663030-17 Instruction Manual -

ASW 22

DC-2-14-M-PP-CCWP2 Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2 August 20, 1985

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date

DC2-EP-4328 Installation of Vacuum Relief System on Each Aux.

Saltwater Line

DCM NO. S-17B Design Criteria

Memorandum DCM S-17B Auxiliary Saltwater System

21A DCM S-14

Component Cooling Water System 28

DCN 2000000751 Unit 1 Traveling Screen Speed Control Upgrade August 2, 2011

DCN 2000000752

Replacement of Existing Travelling Screen and Screen Wash Controls Unit 1&2 August 2, 2011 DCP M-050284 CCW Surge Tank Pressurization 0 DCPP UFSARY DCPP UNITS 1&2 FSAR UPDATE 22

IST PROGRAM

PLAN Inservice Testing Program Plan - Fourth Ten Year Interval 0 IST PROGRAM

PLAN Inservice Testing Program Plan - Third Ten Year Interval 0 LBIE Screen Applicability DCP M-49948 Installations of Lube Oil Sample Ports on Safety Related and Non-Safety Related Pumps, Motors and Gearboxes January 23, 2008LER 1-88-032-00 Improper Design Change Package for Auxiliary Saltwater System Pump Impeller Replacement Due to

Personnel Error March 29, 1989 Log Entries Logs For high DP traveling screen start Various M000096 Lube oil Sample Points 12 M-09383 John Crane Mechanical Seal - Component Cooling Water Pump

MR-APP C Appendix C Mapping of Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria Functions From Scoping Functions

RPE 8000001132

DCI , Au x iliary Salt Water Pump (ASP) Parts , Sulzer Bingham , HydoAire Services , Inc., etc. 10 SAPN

50501007

IN 12-14: MOV Inop Stem-Disk Separation

SISI Manual Seismically Induced Systems Interaction Manual Unit 1 Screens dp Traveling Screen DP Plot and Operator logs for traveling screens Various Dates

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date A-005 Component Cooling Water Data Sheet January 25, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 1, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 8, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 16, 2016 A-005 Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 22, 2016 A-006

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet January 25, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 1, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 8, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 16, 2016 A-006

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 22, 2016 B-2 System Training Guide -Residual Heat Removal System 20

DCL-95-135 PG&E Letter

DCL 95-135: 10

CFR 50.59 Report of Facility Changes, Procedure Changes, Tests, and Experiments for the Report Period May 3, 1993 -

October 28, 1994 June 16, 1995 DCM S-10 Residual Heat Removal System 20

ECC-0001 Critical Component List - Limitorque Operator

SMB-1 7 H-2 System Training Guide - Containment Fan Coolers 18

Material D772854 Stockable Materials - Material D772854.

Limitorque Limit Switch Compartment Cover

NA8281O5 Unit 1R15 Motor Operated Valves Trending Study.

RHR Valve 8701 Last Three Diagnostic Test Reports with Trend Data

RHR Valve 8702 Last Three Diagnostic Test Reports with Trend Data

STI_Listu3r03 Surveillance Test Intervals List, Revision 3 November 19, 2015 STP V-13A Surveillance - CCW Flow Balancing March 2013

STP V-13A Surveillance - CCW Flow Balancing October 2014

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date

TES 420DC 96-

161 Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Molybdate Blend Monitoring, Evaluation of Corrosion Coupons Exposed in the Closed Cooling Water Systems (CCW) Unit 1 and Unit 2, and in the Intake Cooling Water System (ICW)

Unit 2 October 30, 1996

Unit 2 System

03B System Health Report - Auxiliary Feedwater, Fourth Quarter Report, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System 10 System Health Report - Residual Heat Removal System, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System 14 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System

17A System Health Report - Saltwater, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System

17B System Health Report - Auxiliary Saltwater, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System

23-3 System Health Report - Control Room and Containment Ventilation , Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 1-LCV-112B Valve Stroke Time Data February 21, 1999 - Feb. 25,

2014

1-LCV-112C Valve Stroke Time Data October 14, 2010

- October 16, 2015 60431-95N Dedication / Acceptance Basis for Class 1E Retrofit circuit breakers 4KV, 350MVA for Diablo Canyon Power Plant units 1 & 2 Pacific Gas and Electric Company

64136746-0100 Performance Test of Component Cooling Water Pumps November 3, 2014

663022-76 Traveling Screen Vendor Technical Manual August 22, 1997

663213-55 Installation, Operation and Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Pumps Unit 2

663219-539 Maintenance Manual for Masoneilan Control Valves 29 A-005 Component Cooling Water Data Sheet January 25, 2016A-005

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 1, 2016 A-005 Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 8, 2016

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date A-005

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 16, 2016 A-005 Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 22, 2016 A-006

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet January 25, 2016

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 1, 2016 A-006

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 8, 2016 A-006

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 16, 2016 A-006

Component Cooling Water Data Sheet February 22, 2016 A0712687 Evaluation of NRC

IN 2007-036, Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Regulator problem February 6, 2008

ANSI/IEEE

C37.09-1979 IEEE Standard Test Procedure for AC High Voltage Circuit Breakers rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis October 15, 1979Appendix B Systems Interaction Program Appendix B Source Acceptance Criteria

B-2 System Training Guide -Residual Heat Removal System 20 B-35 Notification Review March 23, 2015 CCW PUMP TEST DATA IST data for 2-2 CCW pump - approximately last years Various Dates CHRON

191107 Review of Westinghouse CFCU Backdraft Damper

Calculations

June 8, 1992 Chron

219049 Meeting minutes from DCPP Breaker Project Kick off meeting March 29, 1994

CVCS-1-LCV-112B Diagnostic Testing MP E-53.10V1 February 25, 2014

CVCS-1-LCV-112B External Inspection MP E-53.10A1 April 25, 2014

CVCS-1-LCV-112C Diagnostic Testing MP e-53.10V1 December 29, 2015

CVCS-1-LCV-112C External Inspection MP E-53.10A1 March 11, 2014

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date

DC 663030-17 Instruction Manual -

ASW 22

DC 663216-66-1 Vortex Suppression, Refueling, Condensate, and Fire Water Storage Tanks August 2, 2009

DC-2-14-M-PP-CCWP2 Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2 August 20, 1985

DC2-EP-4328 Installation of Vacuum Relief System on Each Aux.

Saltwater Line

DCL-95-135 PG&E Letter

DCL 95-135: 10

CFR 50.59 Report of Facility Changes, Procedure Changes, Tests, and Experiments for the Report Period May 3, 1993 -

October 28, 1994 June 16, 1995 DCM NO. S-17B Design Criteria

Memorandum DCM S-17B Auxiliary Saltwater System

21A DCM S-10 Residual Heat Removal System 20 DCM S-14

Component Cooling Water System 28

DCN 2000000751 Unit 1 Traveling Screen Speed Control Upgrade August 2, 2011

DCN 2000000752

Replacement of Existing Travelling Screen and Screen Wash Controls Unit 1&2 August 2, 2011 DCP M-050284 CCW Surge Tank Pressurization 0 DCPP UFSARY DCPP UNITS 1&2 FSAR UPDATE 22

EA-15-040 Diablo Canyon Power Plant - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2015002 and

05000323/2015002 August 7, 2015

ECC-0001 Critical Component List - Limitorque Operator

SMB-1 7 FCT 7*1944 Revise Drawing

441237 to correct the discrepancy between Electrical Calcs and Electrical design dwgs December 20, 2012 H-2 System Training Guide - Containment Fan Coolers 18

IST PROGRAM

PLAN Inservice Testing Program Plan - Fourth Ten Year Interval 0 IST PROGRAM

PLAN Inservice Testing Program Plan - Third Ten Year Interval 0

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date

LBIE Screen Applicability DCP

M-49948 Installations of Lube Oil Sample Ports on Safety Related and Non-Safety Related Pumps, Motors and Gearboxes January 23, 2008LER 1-88-032-00 Improper Design Change Package for Auxiliary Saltwater System Pump Impeller Replacement Due to

Personnel Error March 29, 1989 Log Entries Logs For high DP traveling screen start Various M000096 Lube oil Sample Points 12

M-09383 John Crane Mechanical Seal - Component Cooling Water Pump Material D772854 Stockable Materials - Material D772854.

Limitorque Limit Switch Compartment Cover

MP E-53.10A PM of Limitorque Motor Operators

37 MP E-53.10A Preventive Maintenance of Limitorque Motor Operators 37

MP E-53.10R Augmented Stem Lubrication - Limitorque 6

MP E-53.10V1 MOV Diagnostic Testing 14

MP M-5128 Actuator Maintenance for Masoneilan Actuator Sizes 9, 11, 13, 15 and 18

MR-APP C Appendix C Mapping of Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria Functions From Scoping Functions

NA8281O5 Unit 1R15 Motor Operated Valves Trending Study.

NRC Letter to DCPP Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units Nos.1&2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3,8,1, "AC Sources - Operating"

(TAC Nos. MF3826 AND MF3827)

July 1,2015

OE 36324 Essential Power Breaker Lost Control Power Unexpectedly Due To A Failed Breaker Subcomponent

(Charging Spring Motor)

March 6, 2012 PG&E Letter

DCL-14-018 License Amendment Request 14-01 Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating" March 27, 2014 RHR Valve 8701 Last Three Diagnostic Test Reports with Trend Data

RHR Valve 8702 Last Three Diagnostic Test Reports with Trend Data

RPE 8000001132

DCI , Au x iliary Salt Water Pump (ASP) Parts , Sulzer Bingham , HydoAire Services , Inc. etc. 10

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date SAPN

50501007

IN 12-14: MOV Inop Stem-Disk Separation

SISI Manual Seismically Induced Systems Interaction Manual

STI_Listu3r03 Surveillance Test Intervals List, Revision 3 November 19, 2015 STP I-1D Surveillance Test January 2016

STP M-105 Test of Backup Nitrogen Accumulator System to Pressurize

PCV-455C

STP M-106 Test of Backup Nitrogen Accumulator System to Pressurize

PCV-456

STP V-13A Surveillance - CCW Flow Balancing March 2013 STP V-13A Surveillance - CCW Flow Balancing October 2014 STP V-21 Charging and Letdown Valves 10 STP V-2I1 Surveillance Test October 2015

STP V-2T1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves

9

STP V-3J2 Exercising Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves

PVC-455C, 456 and 474.

STP V-3K12 Surveillance Test February 2013 STP V-3K12 Exercising VCT Outlet Isolation Valves

LCV 112B and

LCV-112C 2 STP V-I1 Charging and Letdown Valves 9A

STP-1-1D Routine Monthly Checks Required by Licensees 88

TES 420DC 96-

161 Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Molybdate Blend Monitoring, Evaluation of Corrosion Coupons Exposed in the Closed Cooling Water Systems (CCW) Unit 1 and Unit 2, and in the Intake Cooling Water System (ICW)

Unit 2 October 30, 1996

Unit 1 Screens dp Traveling Screen DP Plot and Operator logs for traveling screens Various Dates Unit 2 System

03B System Health Report - Auxiliary Feedwater, Fourth Quarter Report, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System 10 System Health Report - Residual Heat Removal System, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision / Date Unit 2 System 14 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System

17A System Health Report - Saltwater, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System

17B System Health Report - Auxiliary Saltwater, Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015 Unit 2 System

23-3 System Health Report - Control Room and Containment Ventilation , Fourth Quarter, 2015 December 31, 2015

Vendor Documents Number Title Revision / Date 6009838-207-1 Maintenance Manual of Yaskawa Circuit Breakers for PG&E April 16, 1997

660030, Sheet 61 Aux. Saltwater Pumps June 2 , 1998

663022, Sheet 95 Envirex Products Operation & Maintenance Manual 1

663030, Sheet 17 Bingham-Willamette Co. Aux. Saltwater Pumps 22

663030, Sheet 83 Motor Outline Drawing 6 663079-110 Performance curves for motor Shop orders 17565 LN with Air gaos September 15, 1998

663079-51 Reactor Containment fan cooler - Westinghouse Technical Manual

663102, Sheet 24 Electrical Relay Boards 18

663213, Sheet 22 Comp Cooling Water Pump Motor Outline 10

663213, Sheet 55 Installation, Operation, & Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Pumps

663332, Sheet 220 Instruction Manual for Generator Protection System

BE1-GPS100

663332, Sheet 80 4kV and 12kV Switchgear 27

663332, Sheet 221 Instruction Manual for Undervoltage, Overvoltage, and Under/Overvoltage Relays

BE1-27,

BE1-59, and BE1-

27/59 1

663336, Sheet 20 Instructions for Type W Control Centers 5

Vendor Documents Number Title Revision / Date

663345, Sheet

141 125VDC Vital Panels 1

663345, Sheet. 6 125VDC Distribution Panel No. 22 8

663347, Sheet 33 Delta-Star Metal Enclosed Bus Motor Operated Disconnect Switch

663393, Sheet 80 NLI Safety Related Type W Motor Control Center Cubicles 6

DC 663079-51 Reactor Containment Fan Cooler 31

DC 663219-619 Instruction Manual for Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of 14" Motor Operated Gate Valve

DC 663219-629 Limitorque Type SMB - Instruction and Maintenance Manual - Installation Book

DC 663336-6-2 Instruction for Temperature Indicator Hottest Spot Dial Type, Three Switch, Electrically Isolated Bulb for Type

ASL Transformer October 1971

DC 663344-86 400 AMP Battery Charger - Ametek Solid State Controls Instruction Manual

DC-663173 Fisher Controls Company - Type 7600 Butterfly Control Valve Body.

DC-663303 6-1 Instruction Book for Westinghouse Type ASL Core Form Power center Transformer Class AA/FA 1000/1333

KVA 4160 V Delta-480 Y Volt Three Phase, 60 Hz

150 degree C Rise August 8, 1972

Design Basis Documents Number Title Revision DCM S-14 Component Cooling Water System 28 DCM S-17B Auxiliary Saltwater System -

DBD 21A DCM S-17B Auxiliary Saltwater System 21A DCM S-21 Diesel Engine System 24

DCM S-61B 500-kV and 230-kV Systems 16

DCM S-62 12-kV System 16

DCM S-63 4160 Systems 17

Design Basis Documents Number Title Revision DCM S-64 480V System 12 DCM S-67 125/250 Volt Direct Current System 15

DCM T-18 Electrical System Protection 13A

DCM T-22 Electrical Cable, Termination and Raceway 11

DCM T-23 Miscellaneous Electrical Devices 5A

T-19 Electrical Separation and Isolation 12

System Health Reports Number Title Date System Health Report Diablo Canyon System Health Report (10/1/2015 to 12/31/2015) System 17b Auxiliary Saltwater Unit 2

January 11, 2016System Health Report Diablo Canyon System Health Report (10/1/2015 to 12/31/2015) System 17b Auxiliary Saltwater Unit 1

January 11, 2016System Health Report Diablo Canyon System Health Report (10/1/2015 to 12/31/2015) System 14 Component Cooling Water

Unit 2 January 11, 2016System Health Report Unit 2, System 62, 12kV January 11, 2016System Health Report Unit 2, System 69, 230kV January 11, 2016System Health Report Unit 2, Systems 64A/B, 480V Vital & Non-Vital January 11, 2016System Health Report Unit 2, Systems 673A/B, 4kV Vital & Non-Vital January 11, 2016System Health Report Unit 2, Systems 67A/B, 125VDC Vital & Non-Vital January 11, 2016

System Training Guides Number Title Date E-5 Salt Water Systems Training Guide May 7, 2012 F-2 CCW System Training Guide April 29, 2013

Notifications

50300606

50491644

50620750

50587273

50373271

0549975

50830482

50534891

50629148

50656852

50291751

50828426

50595631

50681168

50381215

50358136 50231071-214

50608110 A0659098

50321527

50431909

50632130

50568523

50330692

50676139

50455238

50662593

50570469

50501007

50681486

50517064

50503166

50811791

50814814

50540447

50532192

50576508

50627543

50807847

50702101

50545886

50546077

50286329

50538388

50663465

50554741

50604297

50658301

50627627

50386803

50568258

50560220

50269363

50540604

50706699

50595604

50809805

50811253

50635014

50635017

50596378

50455238

50662593

50570469

50501007

50596454

50495384

50486697

50595863

50276427

50607511

50662776

50595473

50635018

50276427

50613228

50664721

50671890

50406133

50661719

50631370

50626989

50534892

50698514

50604534

50664410

50570744

50807849

50621835

50306109

50664723

50760568

50447137

50662235

50665755

50670046

50710844

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ML16112A422

SUNSI Review By:

TFarnholtz

ADAMS

Yes

No

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive Keyword:

NRC-002 OFFICE RI:DRS/EB1 SRI:DRS/EB1 SRI:DRS/EB1 RI:DRS/EB2 RI:DRS/OB RI:DRS/OB C:DRS/EB1

NAME JBraisted RKopriva RLatta NOkonkwo MHayes CSteely TFarnholtz SIGNATURE E-mail E-mail E-mail /RA/ E-mail E-mail /RA/ DATE 4/19/16 4/19/16 4/14/16 4/19/16 4/11/16 4/15/16 4/21/16 OFFICE C:DRP/PBA

NAME JGroom

SIGNATURE /RA/

DATE 4/21/16

Letter to Edward D. Halpin from Thomas R. Farnholtz, dated April 21, 2016

SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC COMPONENT

DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2016007 AND

05000323/2016007