IR 05000298/2018010: Difference between revisions
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, Project Engineer | , Project Engineer | ||
- Region III Approved By: | - Region III Approved By: | ||
Jason Kozal Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects 2 SUMMARY The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/191 , "Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/ Staffing/Multi | Jason Kozal Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects 2 | ||
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans | |||
" at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self | =SUMMARY= | ||
-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/191 , "Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/ Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans " at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. | ||
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green FIN 05000298/2018010 | List of Findings and Violations Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green FIN 05000298/2018010 | ||
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | -01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | ||
3 INSPECTION SCOPES Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | 3 | ||
=INSPECTION SCOPES= | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | |||
-rm/doc-collections/insp | -rm/doc-collections/insp | ||
-manual/inspection | -manual/inspection | ||
-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light | -procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light | ||
-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | -Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | ||
OTHER ACTIVITIES | ==OTHER ACTIVITIES== | ||
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL TI 2515/191 | - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL TI 2515/191 | ||
- Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi | - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi | ||
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans Inspectors verifie d plans for complying with NRC Orders EA | -Unit Dose Assessment Plans Inspectors verifie d plans for complying with NRC Orders EA 049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond | ||
-Design-Basis External Events (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY 0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned", dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No. ML12339A262). | |||
-Design-Basis External Events (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY | : (1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals | ||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA 049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond | |||
(1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals | |||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA | |||
-Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily | -Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily | ||
: a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; c) protected FLEX equipment from site | : a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; c) protected FLEX equipment from site | ||
-specific hazards; d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability; | -specific hazards; d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability; e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design basis events; and f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off | ||
-site FLEX equipment would be available from of f-site locations | -site FLEX equipment would be available from of f-site locations | ||
. (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals | . | ||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA | : (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals | ||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA 051 , Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily | |||
: a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluati on; b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals; c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation. | : a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluati on; b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals; c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation. | ||
: (3) The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi | |||
(3) The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi | |||
-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near | -unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near | ||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following: | -Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following: | ||
a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) | a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS)scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and c) the licensee implemented multi | ||
scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and c) the licensee implemented multi | |||
-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site | -unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site | ||
-specific dose assessment software and approach. | -specific dose assessment software and approach. | ||
| Line 119: | Line 115: | ||
-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate. | -compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate. | ||
==INSPECTION RESULTS== | |||
Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green FIN 05000298/2018010 | |||
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | -01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | ||
Description: The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, "Support Functions | =====Description:===== | ||
The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, "Support Functions | |||
- Communications," states, in part: "NEI 12 | - Communications," states, in part: "NEI 12 | ||
-01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)-Satellite phones are credited for off | -01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)-Satellite phones are credited for off | ||
| Line 132: | Line 130: | ||
Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12 | Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12 | ||
-01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings. These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack) | -01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings. These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack)and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, "Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near | ||
and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, "Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near | |||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3." | -Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3." | ||
| Line 139: | Line 136: | ||
, the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBEE. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading, and the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event. | , the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBEE. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading, and the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event. | ||
The team determined that, by implementing this enhancement to communications systems, the licensee placed the ir satellite phone equipment in locations that are vulnerable to BDBEE. This does not meet the requirements of NEI 12 | |||
-01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document. | -01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document. | ||
Corrective Action(s): In response to the team's questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program. | Corrective Action(s): In response to the team's questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program. | ||
Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to st age in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12 | Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to st age in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12 | ||
-01. Corrective Action Reference(s): CR | -01. Corrective Action Reference(s): CR | ||
-CNS-2018-0149 9 Performance Assessment: | -CNS-2018-0149 9 | ||
Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12 | |||
=====Performance Assessment:===== | |||
Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12 | |||
-01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. | -01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. | ||
Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds. | Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds. | ||
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to contact any offsite organizations. | Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to contact any offsite organizations. | ||
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, "Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA | Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, "Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA 049 and EA 051)," dated October 7, 2016. The team determined that the performance deficiency did not | ||
: (1) impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA 051); | |||
: (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX equipment for 72 hours or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; | |||
: (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; | |||
-6; and (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room | : (4) did not have a product of the exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E | ||
-6; and | |||
: (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room | |||
[H.3]. Enforcement | [H.3]. Enforcement | ||
: Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding. | : Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding. | ||
EXIT MEETIN GS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report | |||
. On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on | . On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on | ||
-site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr. J. Kalamaja , General Manager of Plant Operations | -site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr. J. Kalamaja , General Manager of Plant Operations | ||
| Line 170: | Line 171: | ||
, and other members of the site staff. | , and other members of the site staff. | ||
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | |||
- TI 2515/191 Procedures/Instructions Number Title Revision 0-CNS-OU-108 Shutdown Safety Management Program | |||
Other Activities | |||
-in 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.06 Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie | - TI 2515/191 | ||
-In 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.07 4160 "F" Bus Tie | Procedures/Instructions | ||
Number Title Revision 0-CNS-OU-108 Shutdown Safety Management Program | |||
0.50.5 Outage Shutdown Safety | |||
2.4FPC Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble | |||
5.1FLOOD Emergency Operations Procedure: Flood | |||
7.0.11 Maintenance Procedure: Flood Control Barriers | |||
14.41.1.1 FPC-LIT-1 Testing 4 EOF08 Position Instruction Manual: Logistics Coordinator | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX | |||
FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.01 | |||
25 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.02 | |||
25 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.03 | |||
250 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.04 | |||
250 VDC Div | |||
FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.05 | |||
Reliable Hardened Containment Vent Battery Charger Tie | |||
-in 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.06 | |||
Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie | |||
-In 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.07 | |||
4160 "F" Bus Tie | |||
-in with Off | -in with Off | ||
-Site Generator | -Site Generator | ||
-Site Generator | FSG 5.10FLEX.08 | ||
4160 "G" Bus Tie-in with Off | |||
-B B.5.B Connection | -Site Generator | ||
FSG 5.10FLEX.09 | |||
5/23/2017 5164463 Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6 month) 11/06/2017 5194852 Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS | Hotwell to ECST FLEX Operations | ||
FSG 5.10FLEX.10 | |||
-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP) Inspection Assessment MEC 500-01-01 MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview | ECST Makeup from North Well | ||
-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and MF0972) 9/20/2017 MP 800000050260 FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps | FSG 5.10FLEX.11 | ||
Spent Fuel Pool Supply FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.12 | |||
Reactor Building Reliable Air FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.13 | |||
REC SW FLEX Supply | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.14 | |||
RHR Div 1 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.15 | |||
RHR Div 2 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.16 | |||
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.17 | |||
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 2 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.18 | |||
Alternate Reactor Building Ventilation FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.19 | |||
Alternate Ventilation FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.20 | |||
Debris Removal in Support of | |||
FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.21 | |||
Shutdown Injection FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.22 | |||
Communications and Lighting Equipment FLEX Power 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.23 | |||
Reactor Equipment Cooling FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.24 | |||
Control Building Temporary Heating FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.25 | |||
Alternate RPV Injection thru RHR SW Riser or RHR | |||
-B B.5.B Connection | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.26 | |||
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.27 | |||
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div | |||
FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.28 | |||
Vital Instrumentation FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.29 | |||
Alternate Reactor Vessel Injection from Missouri River 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.30 | |||
Hardened Containment Vent System FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.31 | |||
FLEX Equipment Refueling Operations | |||
5.3SBO Station Blackout | |||
5.7.17 CNS Dose Assessment | |||
5.7.17.1 Dose Assessment (Manual) | |||
6.FPC.701 FPC Level Transmitter Functional Test | |||
OI 25 Operations Routine Duties | |||
Security Procedure 2.8 | |||
Access Control Devices | |||
Site Services Procedure 1.1 | |||
Station Security | |||
FLEX Final Integrated Plan | |||
FLEX Program Document | |||
Preventative Maintenance Activities | |||
Number Title Revision 5067082 SAMG Diesel Generator Testing | |||
9/27/2016 5155721 Perform Vendor FLEX Maintenance Activities (1 year Operational Inspections) | |||
5/23/2017 5164463 Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6 month) 11/06/2017 | |||
5194852 Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS | |||
2/29/2017 | |||
Drawings Number Title Revision 453010422 Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks | |||
AB/02 R110827 Cooper Nuclear Strategy Topography Survey | |||
8/23/2012 Other Documents/Reports | |||
Number Title Revision EC 6036621 | |||
Install Remote Satellite Units | |||
EE 01-057 Class I Restrained Seismic Design Basis of Class IIS Piping 0 EE 01-147 Summary of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Pathway to the Condenser Seismic Qualification | |||
ER 2016-002 FLEX Portable Equipment Deployment Path Liquefaction Evaluation | |||
Number Title Revision INT0350113 | |||
FLEX Modifications | |||
INT0350114 | |||
FLEX Strategy | |||
INT0350116 | |||
FLEX Strategy Walkdown | |||
Lesson Plan IAC202-00-00 Level Measurement & Devices | |||
LO#2018-0092 2018 CNS TI | |||
-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP) Inspection Assessment | |||
MEC 500-01-01 MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview | |||
ML17226A032 | |||
Cooper Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders | |||
EA-12-049 and EA | |||
-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and MF0972) 9/20/2017 MP 800000050260 | |||
FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps | |||
{Not Dated} | {Not Dated} | ||
NEDC 09-102 Internal Flooding | NEDC 09-102 Internal Flooding | ||
- HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line Break 2 NEDC 14-001 Storage Facility Structural Calculation | - HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line Break 2 NEDC 14-001 Storage Facility Structural Calculation | ||
-11622, "MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy" | NEDC 14-027 Review of ERIN Calculation C122140001 | ||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 2/21/13 NSRC-005 SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station 9/15/2015 PM Notification 11417703 Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision 10/25/2017 Purchase Order 4500200470 Preventive Maintenance Program 3/06/17 Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.12 Beyond Design Basis Components 11/06/16 Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12 | -11622, "MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy" | ||
-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment 4/21/2016 FLEX Validation Document NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT | NEI 12-01 Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities | ||
-56251/NAN-56252 NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT | NEI 12-06 Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guidelines | ||
-56253/NAN-56254 | NLS2013028 | ||
Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near | |||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 | |||
2/21/13 NSRC-005 SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station | |||
9/15/2015 PM Notification | |||
11417703 Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision | |||
10/25/2017 | |||
Purchase Order | |||
4500200470 | |||
Preventive Maintenance Program | |||
3/06/17 Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.12 Beyond Design Basis Components | |||
11/06/16 Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12 | |||
-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment | |||
4/21/2016 FLEX Validation Document | |||
NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT | |||
-56251/NAN-56252 NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT | |||
-56253/NAN-56254 | |||
Corrective Action Program | |||
Documents (CR-CNS-) 2016-02845 2016-02869 2017-01463 2017-02565 2017-02568 2017-02799 2017-02801 2017-03089 2017-03777 2017-05033 2017-05285 2017-06372 2018-01166 2018-01243 2018-01442* 2018-01443* 2018-01450* 2018-01451* 2018-01457* 2018-01458* 2018-01463* 2018-01469* 2018-01475* 2018-01494* 2018-01496* 2018-01499* 2018-01500* 2018-01509* 2018-01511* 2018-02294* * - Initiated as a result of this inspection | |||
ML18128A07 | |||
SUNSI Review | |||
By: MHS2/rdr Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available | |||
Non-Publicly Available | |||
Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE RI:DRP/C/CNS | |||
SPE:DRP/A SRI:DRS/EB2 | |||
RIII:DRP/PE | |||
BC:DRP/C NAME MStafford RAlexander | |||
JMateychick | |||
SSheldon JKozal SIGNATURE /RA-E/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA-E/ /RA/ DATE 4/19/18 4/19/18 4/20/18 4/19/18 5/8/18 | |||
May 8, 2018 Mr. John Dent, Jr. | |||
Vice President | Vice President | ||
-Nuclear and CNO Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station | -Nuclear and CNO | ||
Nebraska Public Power District | |||
SUBJECT: COOPER NUCLEAR STATION | Cooper Nuclear Station | ||
2676 648A Avenue | |||
: [[contact::P.O. Box 98 Brownville ]], NE 6 8321 SUBJECT: COOPER NUCLEAR STATION | |||
- INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/ | - INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/ | ||
STAFFING/MULTI | STAFFING/MULTI | ||
-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS | -UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS | ||
- INSPECTION REPORT 05000 298/20180 10 | - INSPECTION REPORT 05000 | ||
298/20180 10 Dear Mr. Dent: On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of this inspection at your Cooper Nuclear | |||
Station. On April 16, 2018 , the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. | |||
On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of this inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On April 16, 2018 , the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations | : [[contact::J. Kalamaja]], General Manager of Plant Operations | ||
, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | , and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | ||
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of m | |||
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of m itigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA | itigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA | ||
-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication , Staffing, and Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel. | -12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication , Staffing, and Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel. | ||
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. | NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements. | ||
If you disagree with a cross | If you disagree with a cross | ||
-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 | -cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 | ||
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear Station. Jr. | days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the | ||
: [[contact::U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission]], ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 | |||
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the | |||
-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | Cooper Nuclear Station. | ||
J. Dent Jr. | |||
" | This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection | ||
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | |||
Sincerely,/RA/ Jason W. Kozal , Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50 | -rm/adams.html | ||
-298 License: DPR-46 | and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 | ||
CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | |||
" Sincerely, /RA/ Jason | |||
Inspection Report 05000 298/2018 0 10 | : [[contact::W. Kozal ]], Chief Project Branch | ||
C Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket: 50 | |||
-298 License: DPR-46 Enclosure: | |||
Inspection Report | |||
05000 298/2018 0 10 w/Attachment: | |||
Documents Reviewed | Documents Reviewed | ||
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
05000 298 License Number: | Inspection Report | ||
DPR-46 Report Number: | Docket Number: | ||
05000 298/201 8010 Enterprise Identifier: | 05000 298 License Number: | ||
I-201 8-010-0017 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Location: Brownville , Nebraska Inspection Dates: | DPR-46 Report Number: | ||
March 12, 2018 to April 16, 2018 Inspectors: | 05000 298/201 8010 Enterprise Identifier: | ||
M. Stafford, Resident Inspector | I-201 8-010-0017 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District | ||
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station | |||
Location: Brownville , Nebraska Inspection Dates: | |||
March 12, 2018 | |||
to April 16, 2018 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
: [[contact::M. Stafford]], Resident Inspector | |||
- Cooper (Team Leader) | - Cooper (Team Leader) | ||
R. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer | : [[contact::R. Alexander]], Sr. Project Engineer | ||
- Region IV J. Mateychick , Sr. Reactor Inspector | - Region IV | ||
- Region IV S. Sheldon | : [[contact::J. Mateychick ]], Sr. Reactor Inspector | ||
- Region IV S. Sheldon | |||
, Project Engineer | , Project Engineer | ||
- Region III Approved By: | - Region III | ||
Jason Kozal Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects | Approved By: | ||
Jason Kozal | |||
Chief, Project Branch | |||
C Division of Reactor Projects | |||
SUMMARY The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction | |||
2515/191 , "Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/ Staffing/Multi | |||
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans | -Unit Dose Assessment Plans | ||
" at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self | " at Cooper Nuclear | ||
Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for | |||
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html | |||
for more information. NRC and self | |||
-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. | -revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. | ||
List of Findings and Violations | |||
Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events | |||
Cornerstone | |||
Significance | |||
Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness | |||
Green FIN 05000298/2018010 | |||
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management | |||
TI 2515/191 | |||
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | |||
INSPECTION SCOPES | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | |||
-rm/doc-collections/insp | -rm/doc-collections/insp | ||
-manual/inspection | -manual/inspection | ||
-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light | -procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light | ||
-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | -Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | ||
OTHER ACTIVITIES | OTHER ACTIVITIES | ||
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL TI 2515/191 | - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL | ||
TI 2515/191 | |||
- Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi | - Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi | ||
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans Inspectors verifie d plans for complying with NRC Orders EA | -Unit Dose Assessment Plans | ||
Inspectors verifie d plans for complying with NRC Orders EA | |||
-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond | -12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond | ||
-Design-Basis External Events (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY | -Design-Basis External Events | ||
(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System | |||
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY | |||
-13-0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned", dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No. ML12339A262). | -13-0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned", dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No. ML12339A262). | ||
(1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors | |||
(1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals | verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the | ||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA | Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies | ||
(FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals | |||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation | |||
(ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA | |||
-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond | -12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond | ||
-Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily | -Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily | ||
: a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; c) protected FLEX equipment from site | : a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines | ||
-specific hazards; d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability; | (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; | ||
b) integrated their | |||
FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; | |||
c) protected FLEX equipment from site | |||
-specific hazards; | |||
d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX | |||
equipment to ensure their availability and capability; | |||
(3) The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi | e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of | ||
beyond-design basis events; and | |||
f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off | |||
-site FLEX equipment would be available from of | |||
f-site locations | |||
. (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors | |||
verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific | |||
submittals | |||
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS | |||
Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order | |||
NRC Order EA | |||
-12-051 , Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel | |||
Pool Instrumentation. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily | |||
: a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluati | |||
on; b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals; | |||
c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and | |||
d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation. | |||
(3) The inspectors | |||
reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi | |||
-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near | -unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near | ||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following: | -Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following: | ||
a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) | a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required | ||
scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and c) the licensee implemented multi | staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) | ||
scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are | |||
sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and | |||
c) the licensee implemented multi | |||
-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site | -unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site | ||
-specific dose assessment software and approach. | -specific dose assessment software and approach. | ||
The inspectors verified that non | The inspectors verified that non | ||
-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate. | -compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate. | ||
INSPECTION RESULTS | |||
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events | ||
Cornerstone | |||
Description: The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, "Support Functions | Significance | ||
Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness | |||
Green FIN 05000298/2018010 | |||
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management | |||
TI 2515/191 | |||
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable | |||
assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events. | |||
Description: The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, "Support Functions | |||
- Communications," states, in part: "NEI 12 | - Communications," states, in part: "NEI 12 | ||
-01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)-Satellite phones are credited for off | -01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)-Satellite phones are credited for off | ||
-site communication-Docking stations and remote antennas have been installed to allow use of the satellite phones from inside buildings." | -site communication-Docking stations and remote antennas have been installed to allow use of the satellite phones from inside buildings." | ||
NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities," | NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities," | ||
Revision 0, Section 4.5, "Equipment Location Requirements," states: "to be assumed operable, a piece of on | Revision 0, Section 4.5, "Equipment Location Requirements," states: "to be assumed operable, a piece of on | ||
-site communications equipment should be in a location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design basis external event-Equipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that can be readily accessed when needed-The above guidance applies to equipment at the point of use as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas." | -site communications equipment should be in a location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design basis external event-Equipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that can be readily accessed when needed-The above guidance applies to equipment at the point of use as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas." | ||
Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve | |||
Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12 | issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12 | ||
-01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings. These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack) | -01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to | ||
and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, "Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near | be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings. These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack) | ||
and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, "Response to | |||
NRC Technical Issues for Resolution | |||
Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near | |||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3." | -Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3." | ||
In moving the physical location of the satellite phones from the control room and TSC | In moving the physical location of the satellite phones from the control room and TSC | ||
, the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all | , the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBE | ||
: [[contact::E. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading]], and the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event. | |||
The team determined that, by implementing this enhancement to communications systems, the licensee placed the | |||
ir satellite phone equipment in locations that are vulnerable to BDBEE. This does not meet the requirements of NEI 12 | |||
-01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document. | -01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document. | ||
Corrective Action(s): In response to the team's questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program. | |||
Corrective Action(s): In response to the team's questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program. | Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to st | ||
age in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12 | |||
Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to st age in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12 | -01. Corrective Action Reference(s): CR | ||
-01. Corrective Action Reference(s): CR | |||
-CNS-2018-0149 9 Performance Assessment: | -CNS-2018-0149 9 Performance Assessment: | ||
Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12 | Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12 | ||
-01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. | -01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. | ||
Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds. | Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds. | ||
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to | |||
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to contact any offsite organizations. | contact any offsite organizations. | ||
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, "Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA | |||
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, "Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA | |||
-12-049 and EA | -12-049 and EA | ||
-12-051)," dated October 7, 2016. The team determined that the performance deficiency did not (1) impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA | -12-051)," dated October 7, 2016. The | ||
team determined that the performance deficiency did not (1) impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA | |||
-12-051); (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX equipment for 72 hours or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (4) did not have a product of the exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E | -12-051); (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX equipment for 72 hours or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (4) did not have a product of the exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E | ||
-6; and (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room | -6; and (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room | ||
[H.3]. Enforcement | [H.3]. Enforcement | ||
: Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding. | : Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding. | ||
EXIT MEETIN | |||
GS AND DEBRIEFS | |||
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report | |||
. On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on | . On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on | ||
-site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr. J. Kalamaja , General Manager of Plant Operations | -site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr. | ||
: [[contact::J. Kalamaja ]], General Manager of Plant Operations | |||
, and other members of the site staff. | , and other members of the site staff. | ||
On April 16, 2018, the lead inspector presented the final inspection results in | |||
On April 16, 2018, the lead inspector presented the final inspection results in an exit meeting to Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations | an exit meeting to Mr. | ||
: [[contact::J. Kalamaja]], General Manager of Plant Operations | |||
, and other members of the site staff. | , and other members of the site staff. | ||
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | |||
Other Activities | |||
- TI 2515/191 Procedures/Instructions Number Title Revision 0-CNS-OU-108 Shutdown Safety Management Program | - TI 2515/191 | ||
Procedures/Instructions | |||
-in 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.06 Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie | Number Title Revision 0-CNS-OU-108 Shutdown Safety Management Program | ||
-In 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.07 4160 "F" Bus Tie | 0.50.5 Outage Shutdown Safety | ||
2.4FPC Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble | |||
5.1FLOOD Emergency Operations Procedure: Flood | |||
7.0.11 Maintenance Procedure: Flood Control Barriers | |||
14.41.1.1 FPC-LIT-1 Testing 4 EOF08 Position Instruction Manual: Logistics Coordinator | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX | |||
FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.01 | |||
25 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.02 | |||
25 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.03 | |||
250 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.04 | |||
250 VDC Div | |||
FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.05 | |||
Reliable Hardened Containment Vent Battery Charger Tie | |||
-in 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.06 | |||
Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie | |||
-In 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.07 | |||
4160 "F" Bus Tie | |||
-in with Off | -in with Off | ||
-Site Generator | -Site Generator | ||
-Site Generator | FSG 5.10FLEX.08 | ||
4160 "G" Bus Tie-in with Off | |||
-B B.5.B Connection | -Site Generator | ||
FSG 5.10FLEX.09 | |||
5/23/2017 5164463 Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6 month) 11/06/2017 5194852 Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS | Hotwell to ECST FLEX Operations | ||
FSG 5.10FLEX.10 | |||
-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP) Inspection Assessment MEC 500-01-01 MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview | ECST Makeup from North Well | ||
-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and MF0972) 9/20/2017 MP 800000050260 FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps | FSG 5.10FLEX.11 | ||
Spent Fuel Pool Supply FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.12 | |||
Reactor Building Reliable Air FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.13 | |||
REC SW FLEX Supply | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.14 | |||
RHR Div 1 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.15 | |||
RHR Div 2 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.16 | |||
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.17 | |||
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 2 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.18 | |||
Alternate Reactor Building Ventilation FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.19 | |||
Alternate Ventilation FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.20 | |||
Debris Removal in Support of | |||
FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.21 | |||
Shutdown Injection FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.22 | |||
Communications and Lighting Equipment FLEX Power 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.23 | |||
Reactor Equipment Cooling FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.24 | |||
Control Building Temporary Heating FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.25 | |||
Alternate RPV Injection thru RHR SW Riser or RHR | |||
-B B.5.B Connection | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.26 | |||
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 1 FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.27 | |||
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div | |||
FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.28 | |||
Vital Instrumentation FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.29 | |||
Alternate Reactor Vessel Injection from Missouri River 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.30 | |||
Hardened Containment Vent System FLEX Operations | |||
FSG 5.10FLEX.31 | |||
FLEX Equipment Refueling Operations | |||
5.3SBO Station Blackout | |||
5.7.17 CNS Dose Assessment | |||
5.7.17.1 Dose Assessment (Manual) | |||
6.FPC.701 FPC Level Transmitter Functional Test | |||
OI 25 Operations Routine Duties | |||
Security Procedure 2.8 | |||
Access Control Devices | |||
Site Services Procedure 1.1 | |||
Station Security | |||
FLEX Final Integrated Plan | |||
FLEX Program Document | |||
Preventative Maintenance Activities | |||
Number Title Revision 5067082 SAMG Diesel Generator Testing | |||
9/27/2016 5155721 Perform Vendor FLEX Maintenance Activities (1 year Operational Inspections) | |||
5/23/2017 5164463 Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6 month) 11/06/2017 | |||
5194852 Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS | |||
2/29/2017 | |||
Drawings Number Title Revision 453010422 Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks | |||
AB/02 R110827 Cooper Nuclear Strategy Topography Survey | |||
8/23/2012 Other Documents/Reports | |||
Number Title Revision EC 6036621 | |||
Install Remote Satellite Units | |||
EE 01-057 Class I Restrained Seismic Design Basis of Class IIS Piping 0 EE 01-147 Summary of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Pathway to the Condenser Seismic Qualification | |||
ER 2016-002 FLEX Portable Equipment Deployment Path Liquefaction Evaluation | |||
Number Title Revision INT0350113 | |||
FLEX Modifications | |||
INT0350114 | |||
FLEX Strategy | |||
INT0350116 | |||
FLEX Strategy Walkdown | |||
Lesson Plan IAC202-00-00 Level Measurement & Devices | |||
LO#2018-0092 2018 CNS TI | |||
-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP) Inspection Assessment | |||
MEC 500-01-01 MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview | |||
ML17226A032 | |||
Cooper Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders | |||
EA-12-049 and EA | |||
-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and MF0972) 9/20/2017 MP 800000050260 | |||
FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps | |||
{Not Dated} | {Not Dated} | ||
NEDC 09-102 Internal Flooding | NEDC 09-102 Internal Flooding | ||
- HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line Break 2 NEDC 14-001 Storage Facility Structural Calculation | - HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line Break 2 NEDC 14-001 Storage Facility Structural Calculation | ||
-11622, "MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy" | NEDC 14-027 Review of ERIN Calculation C122140001 | ||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 2/21/13 NSRC-005 SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station 9/15/2015 PM Notification 11417703 Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision 10/25/2017 Purchase Order 4500200470 Preventive Maintenance Program 3/06/17 Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.12 Beyond Design Basis Components 11/06/16 Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12 | -11622, "MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy" | ||
-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment 4/21/2016 FLEX Validation Document NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT | NEI 12-01 Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities | ||
-56251/NAN-56252 NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT | NEI 12-06 Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guidelines | ||
-56253/NAN-56254 | NLS2013028 | ||
Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near | |||
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 | |||
2/21/13 NSRC-005 SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station | |||
9/15/2015 PM Notification | |||
11417703 Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision | |||
10/25/2017 | |||
Purchase Order | |||
4500200470 | |||
Preventive Maintenance Program | |||
3/06/17 Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.12 Beyond Design Basis Components | |||
11/06/16 Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12 | |||
-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment | |||
4/21/2016 FLEX Validation Document | |||
NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT | |||
-56251/NAN-56252 NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT | |||
-56253/NAN-56254 | |||
Corrective Action Program | |||
Documents (CR-CNS-) 2016-02845 2016-02869 2017-01463 2017-02565 2017-02568 2017-02799 2017-02801 2017-03089 2017-03777 2017-05033 2017-05285 2017-06372 2018-01166 2018-01243 2018-01442* 2018-01443* 2018-01450* 2018-01451* 2018-01457* 2018-01458* 2018-01463* 2018-01469* 2018-01475* 2018-01494* 2018-01496* 2018-01499* 2018-01500* 2018-01509* 2018-01511* 2018-02294* * - Initiated as a result of this inspection | |||
ML18128A07 | ML18128A07 | ||
SUNSI Review | |||
By: MHS2/rdr Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available | |||
Non-Publicly Available | |||
Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE RI:DRP/C/CNS | |||
SPE:DRP/A SRI:DRS/EB2 | |||
RIII:DRP/PE | |||
BC:DRP/C NAME MStafford RAlexander | |||
JMateychick | |||
SSheldon JKozal SIGNATURE /RA-E/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA-E/ /RA/ DATE 4/19/18 4/19/18 4/20/18 4/19/18 5/8/18 | |||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 00:54, 9 September 2018
| ML18128A074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/2018 |
| From: | Kozal J W NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Dent J Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| Kozal J W | |
| References | |
| IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18128A074 (14) | |
Text
May 8, 2018
Mr. John Dent, Jr.
Vice President
-Nuclear and CNO Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station 72676 648A Avenue P.O. Box 98 Brownville , NE 6 8321
SUBJECT: COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
- INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/
STAFFING/MULTI
-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS
- INSPECTION REPORT 05000 298/20180 10
Dear Mr. Dent:
On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of this inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On April 16, 2018 , the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations
, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of m itigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA
-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication , Staffing, and Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross
-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear Station. Jr.
2 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
"
Sincerely,/RA/ Jason W. Kozal , Chief Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50
-298 License: DPR-46
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000 298/2018 0 10
w/Attachment:
Documents Reviewed
1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Number:
05000 298 License Number:
DPR-46 Report Number:
05000 298/201 8010 Enterprise Identifier:
I-201 8-010-0017 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Location: Brownville , Nebraska Inspection Dates:
March 12, 2018 to April 16, 2018 Inspectors:
M. Stafford, Resident Inspector
- Cooper (Team Leader)
R. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer
- Region IV J. Mateychick , Sr. Reactor Inspector
- Region IV S. Sheldon
, Project Engineer
- Region III Approved By:
Jason Kozal Chief, Project Branch C Division of Reactor Projects 2
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/191 , "Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/ Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans " at Cooper Nuclear Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green FIN 05000298/2018010
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
3
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/doc-collections/insp
-manual/inspection
-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light
-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL TI 2515/191
- Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans Inspectors verifie d plans for complying with NRC Orders EA 049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond
-Design-Basis External Events (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY 0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned", dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No. ML12339A262).
- (1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA 049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond
-Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily
- a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events; b) integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures; c) protected FLEX equipment from site
-specific hazards; d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability; e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design basis events; and f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off
-site FLEX equipment would be available from of f-site locations
.
- (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittals
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order NRC Order EA 051 , Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily
- a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluati on; b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals; c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
- (3) The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi
-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS)scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and c) the licensee implemented multi
-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site
-specific dose assessment software and approach.
The inspectors verified that non
-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness Green FIN 05000298/2018010
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management TI 2515/191 The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
Description:
The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, "Support Functions
- Communications," states, in part: "NEI 12
-01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)-Satellite phones are credited for off
-site communication-Docking stations and remote antennas have been installed to allow use of the satellite phones from inside buildings."
NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities,"
Revision 0, Section 4.5, "Equipment Location Requirements," states: "to be assumed operable, a piece of on
-site communications equipment should be in a location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design basis external event-Equipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that can be readily accessed when needed-The above guidance applies to equipment at the point of use as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas."
Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12
-01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings. These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack)and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, "Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3."
In moving the physical location of the satellite phones from the control room and TSC
, the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBEE. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading, and the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event.
The team determined that, by implementing this enhancement to communications systems, the licensee placed the ir satellite phone equipment in locations that are vulnerable to BDBEE. This does not meet the requirements of NEI 12
-01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document.
Corrective Action(s): In response to the team's questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program.
Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to st age in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12
-01. Corrective Action Reference(s): CR
-CNS-2018-0149 9
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12
-01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event.
Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to contact any offsite organizations.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, "Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA 049 and EA 051)," dated October 7, 2016. The team determined that the performance deficiency did not
- (1) impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA 051);
- (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX equipment for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions;
- (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions;
- (4) did not have a product of the exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E
-6; and
- (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room
[H.3]. Enforcement
- Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETIN GS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report
. On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on
-site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr. J. Kalamaja , General Manager of Plant Operations
, and other members of the site staff.
On April 16, 2018, the lead inspector presented the final inspection results in an exit meeting to Mr. J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations
, and other members of the site staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Other Activities
Procedures/Instructions
Number Title Revision 0-CNS-OU-108 Shutdown Safety Management Program
0.50.5 Outage Shutdown Safety
2.4FPC Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble
5.1FLOOD Emergency Operations Procedure: Flood
7.0.11 Maintenance Procedure: Flood Control Barriers
14.41.1.1 FPC-LIT-1 Testing 4 EOF08 Position Instruction Manual: Logistics Coordinator
FSG 5.10FLEX
FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs)
FSG 5.10FLEX.01
25 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.02
25 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.03
250 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.04
250 VDC Div
FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.05
Reliable Hardened Containment Vent Battery Charger Tie
-in 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.06
Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie
-In 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.07
4160 "F" Bus Tie
-in with Off
-Site Generator
FSG 5.10FLEX.08
4160 "G" Bus Tie-in with Off
-Site Generator
FSG 5.10FLEX.09
Hotwell to ECST FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.10
ECST Makeup from North Well
FSG 5.10FLEX.11
Spent Fuel Pool Supply FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.12
Reactor Building Reliable Air FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.13
FSG 5.10FLEX.14
RHR Div 1 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.15
RHR Div 2 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.16
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.17
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 2 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.18
Alternate Reactor Building Ventilation FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.19
Alternate Ventilation FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.20
Debris Removal in Support of
FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.21
Shutdown Injection FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.22
Communications and Lighting Equipment FLEX Power 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.23
Reactor Equipment Cooling FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.24
Control Building Temporary Heating FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.25
Alternate RPV Injection thru RHR SW Riser or RHR
-B B.5.B Connection
FSG 5.10FLEX.26
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.27
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div
FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.28
Vital Instrumentation FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.29
Alternate Reactor Vessel Injection from Missouri River 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.30
Hardened Containment Vent System FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.31
FLEX Equipment Refueling Operations
5.3SBO Station Blackout
5.7.17 CNS Dose Assessment
5.7.17.1 Dose Assessment (Manual)
6.FPC.701 FPC Level Transmitter Functional Test
OI 25 Operations Routine Duties
Security Procedure 2.8
Access Control Devices
Site Services Procedure 1.1
Station Security
FLEX Final Integrated Plan
FLEX Program Document
Preventative Maintenance Activities
Number Title Revision 5067082 SAMG Diesel Generator Testing
9/27/2016 5155721 Perform Vendor FLEX Maintenance Activities (1 year Operational Inspections)
5/23/2017 5164463 Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6 month) 11/06/2017
5194852 Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS
2/29/2017
Drawings Number Title Revision 453010422 Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks
AB/02 R110827 Cooper Nuclear Strategy Topography Survey
8/23/2012 Other Documents/Reports
Number Title Revision EC 6036621
Install Remote Satellite Units
EE 01-057 Class I Restrained Seismic Design Basis of Class IIS Piping 0 EE 01-147 Summary of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Pathway to the Condenser Seismic Qualification
ER 2016-002 FLEX Portable Equipment Deployment Path Liquefaction Evaluation
Number Title Revision INT0350113
FLEX Modifications
INT0350114
FLEX Strategy
INT0350116
FLEX Strategy Walkdown
Lesson Plan IAC202-00-00 Level Measurement & Devices
LO#2018-0092 2018 CNS TI
-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP) Inspection Assessment
MEC 500-01-01 MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview
Cooper Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and MF0972) 9/20/2017 MP 800000050260
FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps
{Not Dated}
NEDC 09-102 Internal Flooding
- HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line Break 2 NEDC 14-001 Storage Facility Structural Calculation
NEDC 14-027 Review of ERIN Calculation C122140001
-11622, "MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy"
NEI 12-01 Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities
NEI 12-06 Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guidelines
NLS2013028
Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3
2/21/13 NSRC-005 SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station
9/15/2015 PM Notification
11417703 Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision
10/25/2017
Purchase Order
4500200470
Preventive Maintenance Program
3/06/17 Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.12 Beyond Design Basis Components
11/06/16 Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12
-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment
4/21/2016 FLEX Validation Document
NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT
-56251/NAN-56252 NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT
-56253/NAN-56254
Corrective Action Program
Documents (CR-CNS-) 2016-02845 2016-02869 2017-01463 2017-02565 2017-02568 2017-02799 2017-02801 2017-03089 2017-03777 2017-05033 2017-05285 2017-06372 2018-01166 2018-01243 2018-01442* 2018-01443* 2018-01450* 2018-01451* 2018-01457* 2018-01458* 2018-01463* 2018-01469* 2018-01475* 2018-01494* 2018-01496* 2018-01499* 2018-01500* 2018-01509* 2018-01511* 2018-02294* * - Initiated as a result of this inspection
SUNSI Review
By: MHS2/rdr Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE RI:DRP/C/CNS
SPE:DRP/A SRI:DRS/EB2
RIII:DRP/PE
BC:DRP/C NAME MStafford RAlexander
JMateychick
SSheldon JKozal SIGNATURE /RA-E/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA-E/ /RA/ DATE 4/19/18 4/19/18 4/20/18 4/19/18 5/8/18
May 8, 2018 Mr. John Dent, Jr.
Vice President
-Nuclear and CNO
Nebraska Public Power District
Cooper Nuclear Station
2676 648A Avenue
- P.O. Box 98 Brownville, NE 6 8321 SUBJECT: COOPER NUCLEAR STATION
- INSPECTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND SPENT FUEL POOL INSTRUMENTATION ORDERS AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMUNICATION/
STAFFING/MULTI
-UNIT DOSE ASSESSMENT PLANS
- INSPECTION REPORT 05000
298/20180 10 Dear Mr. Dent: On March 15, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of this inspection at your Cooper Nuclear
Station. On April 16, 2018 , the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr.
- J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations
, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of m
itigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA
-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication , Staffing, and Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross
-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30
days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555
-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the
Cooper Nuclear Station.
J. Dent Jr.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html
and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
" Sincerely, /RA/ Jason
- W. Kozal, Chief Project Branch
C Division of Reactor Projects
Docket: 50
-298 License: DPR-46 Enclosure:
Inspection Report
05000 298/2018 0 10 w/Attachment:
Documents Reviewed
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000 298 License Number:
DPR-46 Report Number:
05000 298/201 8010 Enterprise Identifier:
I-201 8-010-0017 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District
Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station
Location: Brownville , Nebraska Inspection Dates:
March 12, 2018
to April 16, 2018
Inspectors:
- M. Stafford, Resident Inspector
- Cooper (Team Leader)
- R. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer
- Region IV
- J. Mateychick, Sr. Reactor Inspector
- Region IV S. Sheldon
, Project Engineer
- Region III
Approved By:
Chief, Project Branch
C Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction
2515/191 , "Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/ Staffing/Multi
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans
" at Cooper Nuclear
Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html
for more information. NRC and self
-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness
Green FIN 05000298/2018010
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/doc-collections/insp
-manual/inspection
-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light
-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
- Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi
-Unit Dose Assessment Plans
Inspectors verifie d plans for complying with NRC Orders EA
-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond
-Design-Basis External Events
(Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML12056A045) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS No. ML12054A679) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verified implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340) and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY
-13-0010, "Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned", dated March 27, 2013, (ADAMS No. ML12339A262).
(1) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors
verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies
(FLEX) as described in the plant specific submittals
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation
(ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order EA
-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond
-Design-Basis External Events. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily
- a) developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines
(FSGs) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events;
b) integrated their
FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs were clear when using existing plant procedures;
c) protected FLEX equipment from site
-specific hazards;
d) developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX
equipment to ensure their availability and capability;
e) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of
beyond-design basis events; and
f) developed the means to ensure the necessary off
-site FLEX equipment would be available from of
f-site locations
. (2) Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors
verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific
submittals
[including the Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS
Accession No. ML17017A166)] and the associated safety evaluation (ADAMS No. ML17226A032) and determined that the licensee is in compliance with NRC Order
NRC Order EA
-12-051 , Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel
Pool Instrumentation. The inspectors verified the licensee satisfactorily
- a) installed the spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittals and safety evaluati
on; b) installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittals;
c) trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation; and
d) developed and issued procedures for maintenance, testing and use of the reliable SFP instrumentation.
(3) The inspectors
reviewed information provided in the licensee's multi
-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRC's March 12, 2012, request for information letter (ADAMS No. ML12053A340), and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 in response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to all site units and impedes access to the site. The inspectors verified the following:
a) the licensee satisfactorily implemented required
staffing changes to support an extend loss of all AC power (ELAP)/loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS)
scenario; b) EP communications equipment and facilities are
sufficient for dealing with an ELAP/LUHS scenario; and
c) the licensee implemented multi
-unit/-source dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools) using the licensee's site
-specific dose assessment software and approach.
The inspectors verified that non
-compliances with requirements and standards identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program as appropriate.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Satellite Phones in Locations That Provide Reasonable Assurance They Will Remain Available Following All Beyond Design Basis External Events
Cornerstone
Significance
Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Emergency Preparedness
Green FIN 05000298/2018010
-01 Closed H.3 - Change Management
The NRC inspection team identified a Green finding related to the licensee's failure to maintain the station satellite phones in locations that would provide reasonable
assurance the phones would remain available following all beyond design basis external events.
Description: The Cooper Nuclear Station FLEX Program Document, Revision 1, Section 5.2.27, "Support Functions
- Communications," states, in part: "NEI 12
-01 provides required emergency communications capabilities during an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP)-Satellite phones are credited for off
-site communication-Docking stations and remote antennas have been installed to allow use of the satellite phones from inside buildings."
NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities,"
Revision 0, Section 4.5, "Equipment Location Requirements," states: "to be assumed operable, a piece of on
-site communications equipment should be in a location, and maintained in a manner, that maximizes survivability following a beyond design basis external event-Equipment should be stored, or otherwise available, in locations that can be readily accessed when needed-The above guidance applies to equipment at the point of use as well as any supporting infrastructure components. Such components may include portable power sources, and radio system repeaters and antennas."
Initially, when the licensee implemented their plans to resolve
issues associated with communications during a beyond design basis external event (BDBEE), they had handheld satellite phones located in the control room and the technical support center (TSC), which required the users to relocate outdoors to acquire a usable signal. These locations are rated to withstand all BDBEE, and would therefore meet the requirements of NEI 12
-01. However, in an effort to enhance the communications methods, the licensee pursued plans to provide a means for personnel to
be able to communicate with satellite phones from inside buildings. These enhancements involved providing external antennas, relocating the existing satellite phones to docking stations in a structure attached to the elevated release point (ERP shack)
and in a communications room (PBX room), and routing wires to control room and TSC desk phones. These enhancements are mentioned in general in a letter from the licensee to the NRC, NLS2013028, dated 2/21/13, "Response to
NRC Technical Issues for Resolution
Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3."
In moving the physical location of the satellite phones from the control room and TSC
, the licensee failed to ensure that the new locations were suitable to withstand all BDBE
- E. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading, and the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event. Additionally, the external antennas located on the elevated release point and the meteorological tower would not be able to withstand the elevated wind speeds during a tornado or other high wind event.
The team determined that, by implementing this enhancement to communications systems, the licensee placed the
ir satellite phone equipment in locations that are vulnerable to BDBEE. This does not meet the requirements of NEI 12
-01 and therefore does not meet the requirements of the FLEX Program Document.
Corrective Action(s): In response to the team's questions, the licensee documented the concerns in the corrective action program.
Additionally, the licensee is in the process of procuring three additional satellite phones to st
age in the control room, thereby restoring compliance with NEI 12
-01. Corrective Action Reference(s): CR
-CNS-2018-0149 9 Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: That the station failed to maintain the satellite phones in locations that provide reasonable assurance the phones will remain available following all beyond design basis external events is a performance deficiency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones from locations where the phones were protected from beyond design basis external events to locations where the phones were not protected was contrary to NEI 12
-01, Revision 0, Section 4.5. The ERP shack is not rated for tornado wind loading and therefore the phones relocated from the control room may not survive this external event.
Additionally, the antennas may not survive high wind speeds.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and its objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, by moving the satellite phones to locations that are not rated for all beyond design basis external events, the licensee would not be able to
contact any offsite organizations.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix O, "Significance Determination Process for Mitigating Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Orders EA
-12-049 and EA
-12-051)," dated October 7, 2016. The
team determined that the performance deficiency did not (1) impact the spent fuel pool instrumentation order (EA
-12-051); (2) did not involve a failure of FLEX equipment for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or more that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (3) did not involve deficient procedures or training that would result in a complete loss of one or more of the FLEX functions; (4) did not have a product of the exposure time and external even initiating event frequency greater than 1E
-6; and (5) did not involve significant programmatic issues which reduced the effectiveness of the Mitigating Strategies. Therefore, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with change management, in that the licensee failed to fully evaluate implementing the enhancement to move the satellite phones from the control room and TSC to the ERP shack an the PBX room
[H.3]. Enforcement
- Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETIN
GS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report
. On March 15, 2018, the inspection team presented the on
-site inspection results in a management debrief to Mr.
- J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations
, and other members of the site staff.
On April 16, 2018, the lead inspector presented the final inspection results in
an exit meeting to Mr.
- J. Kalamaja, General Manager of Plant Operations
, and other members of the site staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Other Activities
Procedures/Instructions
Number Title Revision 0-CNS-OU-108 Shutdown Safety Management Program
0.50.5 Outage Shutdown Safety
2.4FPC Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble
5.1FLOOD Emergency Operations Procedure: Flood
7.0.11 Maintenance Procedure: Flood Control Barriers
14.41.1.1 FPC-LIT-1 Testing 4 EOF08 Position Instruction Manual: Logistics Coordinator
FSG 5.10FLEX
FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs)
FSG 5.10FLEX.01
25 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.02
25 VDC Div 2 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.03
250 VDC Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.04
250 VDC Div
FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.05
Reliable Hardened Containment Vent Battery Charger Tie
-in 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.06
Fuel Pool Level Instrument Electrical Tie
-In 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.07
4160 "F" Bus Tie
-in with Off
-Site Generator
FSG 5.10FLEX.08
4160 "G" Bus Tie-in with Off
-Site Generator
FSG 5.10FLEX.09
Hotwell to ECST FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.10
ECST Makeup from North Well
FSG 5.10FLEX.11
Spent Fuel Pool Supply FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.12
Reactor Building Reliable Air FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.13
FSG 5.10FLEX.14
RHR Div 1 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.15
RHR Div 2 Shutdown Cooling FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.16
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.17
Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Div 2 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.18
Alternate Reactor Building Ventilation FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.19
Alternate Ventilation FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.20
Debris Removal in Support of
FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.21
Shutdown Injection FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.22
Communications and Lighting Equipment FLEX Power 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.23
Reactor Equipment Cooling FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.24
Control Building Temporary Heating FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.25
Alternate RPV Injection thru RHR SW Riser or RHR
-B B.5.B Connection
FSG 5.10FLEX.26
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div 1 FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.27
RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Div
FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.28
Vital Instrumentation FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.29
Alternate Reactor Vessel Injection from Missouri River 1 FSG 5.10FLEX.30
Hardened Containment Vent System FLEX Operations
FSG 5.10FLEX.31
FLEX Equipment Refueling Operations
5.3SBO Station Blackout
5.7.17 CNS Dose Assessment
5.7.17.1 Dose Assessment (Manual)
6.FPC.701 FPC Level Transmitter Functional Test
OI 25 Operations Routine Duties
Security Procedure 2.8
Access Control Devices
Site Services Procedure 1.1
Station Security
FLEX Final Integrated Plan
FLEX Program Document
Preventative Maintenance Activities
Number Title Revision 5067082 SAMG Diesel Generator Testing
9/27/2016 5155721 Perform Vendor FLEX Maintenance Activities (1 year Operational Inspections)
5/23/2017 5164463 Perform Vendor FLEX Equipment Maintenance (6 month) 11/06/2017
5194852 Spent Fuel Pool Primary LI Signal PCRS
2/29/2017
Drawings Number Title Revision 453010422 Emergency Condensate Storage Tanks
AB/02 R110827 Cooper Nuclear Strategy Topography Survey
8/23/2012 Other Documents/Reports
Number Title Revision EC 6036621
Install Remote Satellite Units
EE 01-057 Class I Restrained Seismic Design Basis of Class IIS Piping 0 EE 01-147 Summary of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Pathway to the Condenser Seismic Qualification
ER 2016-002 FLEX Portable Equipment Deployment Path Liquefaction Evaluation
Number Title Revision INT0350113
FLEX Modifications
INT0350114
FLEX Strategy
INT0350116
FLEX Strategy Walkdown
Lesson Plan IAC202-00-00 Level Measurement & Devices
LO#2018-0092 2018 CNS TI
-2515/191 Mitigating Strategies (SFP/EP) Inspection Assessment
MEC 500-01-01 MEC OSC Emergency Response Overview
Cooper Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders
-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0971 and MF0972) 9/20/2017 MP 800000050260
FLEX Equipment Maintenance Plans for FLEX Air Compressors; 175 kW, 60 kW, and 6 kW Diesel Generators; and FLEX Godwin Pumps
{Not Dated}
NEDC 09-102 Internal Flooding
- HELB, MELB, and Feedwater Line Break 2 NEDC 14-001 Storage Facility Structural Calculation
NEDC 14-027 Review of ERIN Calculation C122140001
-11622, "MAAP Analysis to Support Cooper FLEX Strategy"
NEI 12-01 Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities
NEI 12-06 Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guidelines
NLS2013028
Response to NRC Technical Issues for Resolution Regarding Licensee Communication Submittals Associated with Near
-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3
2/21/13 NSRC-005 SAFER Response Plan for Cooper Nuclear Station
9/15/2015 PM Notification
11417703 Maintenance Plan 800000050260 Revision
10/25/2017
Purchase Order
4500200470
Preventive Maintenance Program
3/06/17 Technical Requirements Manual Section 3.12 Beyond Design Basis Components
11/06/16 Cooper Nuclear Station NEI 12
-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment
4/21/2016 FLEX Validation Document
NANTeL Generic Basic FLEX, ERO0010102/ILT
-56251/NAN-56252 NANTeL Generic Advanced FLEX, ERO0010103/ILT
-56253/NAN-56254
Corrective Action Program
Documents (CR-CNS-) 2016-02845 2016-02869 2017-01463 2017-02565 2017-02568 2017-02799 2017-02801 2017-03089 2017-03777 2017-05033 2017-05285 2017-06372 2018-01166 2018-01243 2018-01442* 2018-01443* 2018-01450* 2018-01451* 2018-01457* 2018-01458* 2018-01463* 2018-01469* 2018-01475* 2018-01494* 2018-01496* 2018-01499* 2018-01500* 2018-01509* 2018-01511* 2018-02294* * - Initiated as a result of this inspection
SUNSI Review
By: MHS2/rdr Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE RI:DRP/C/CNS
SPE:DRP/A SRI:DRS/EB2
RIII:DRP/PE
BC:DRP/C NAME MStafford RAlexander
JMateychick
SSheldon JKozal SIGNATURE /RA-E/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA-E/ /RA/ DATE 4/19/18 4/19/18 4/20/18 4/19/18 5/8/18