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ENS 43338 + (Notified New Jersey Department of Environm … Notified New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection of a release of sodium hypochlorite to the environment. The amount of sodium hypochlorite released was small (11.5 lbs) and well below the Federal (100 lbs) and state reportability limits for quantity.Leak was from a hose on the chlorination system that supports the Service Water system.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.ensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 53666 + (Notified New York State Department of Envi … Notified New York State Department of Environmental Conservation for draining of sodium hypochlorite (12-15% by weight) from the storage tank into it's engineered secondary containment of approximately 1300 gallons. Reportable per regulation 6 NYCRR Part 597.The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.Licensee investigation into the cause of the leak is ongoing.ion into the cause of the leak is ongoing.)
ENS 47815 + (Notified Van Buren County Sheriff of atmospheric steam dump valve usage for cooldown of Palisades Nuclear Plant for start of refueling outage. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 43409 + (Notified at 1220 by Emergency Plan personn … Notified at 1220 by Emergency Plan personnel that a tone test initiated by the National Weather Service from Albany, NY, failed to activate tone alert radios via the Ames Hill NOAA transmitter. Notified at 1317 that the WTSA Studio to transmitter link also failed to activate the tone alert radios. The tone alert radio system was working when a severe thunderstorm was issued at 1205 on 6-5-07.The licensee has sent a technician to repair the transmitter. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the states of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0931 ON 06/07/07 * * *Repairs were completed to the tone alert radio system last night and testing was completed this morning. At 0821 the tone alert radio system was declared to be operable.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the states of Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Notified R1DO (Barkley)nd New Hampshire. Notified R1DO (Barkley))
ENS 41260 + (Notified by (deleted) of the Oswego County … Notified by (deleted) of the Oswego County Warning Point that the tone alert system (prompt notification system) was out of service for more than one hour as of 18:43 on 12/14/04. This requires a notification to the NRC for a major loss of notification capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72. The notification (from the County Warning Point) occurred on 12/14/04 at 19:07 via the RECS line (Radiological Emergency Communications System). Route Alert has been verified available (as backup to the tone alert system) and actions to restore (the tone alert system) are in progress.The licensee states that the malfunction on the prompt notification system only rendered the tone alert radio system inoperable. The emergency sirens are not affected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Oswego County authorities. The licensee has also notified the Fitzpatrick nuclear power plant.* * * UPDATE FROM NINE MILE POINT (D. MOORE) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 23:06 EST ON 12/14/04 * * *The prompt notification tone alert system was restored to operable at 21:45 EST on 12/14/04. Fitzpatrick and Oswego county are informed.itzpatrick and Oswego county are informed.)
ENS 41403 + (Notified by Barnwell Waste Management Faci … Notified by Barnwell Waste Management Facility that the filter liner sent to the Facility had arrived and that they found 'waste outside the liner.' This is a violation of the Barnwell license.This notification is made in accordance with the New York State PSC (Public Service Commission) requirements per corporate procedure.Ref: CR-IP2-2005-00613The licensee will inform the State of New York and had informed the NRC Resident Inspector.d had informed the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 44984 + (Notified by Engineering that Technical Sup … Notified by Engineering that Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency charcoal sample failed acceptance criteria. Declared TSC ventilation unavailable at 12:10 PM EDT, 4/11/09. TSC ventilation supports RERP radiological habitability function and as such represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Notified all Shift Managers if an emergency event is declared (Alert or higher), Shift Managers will need to modify emergency call out service so that TSC staffing report to Emergency Operating Facility (EOF). The use of the EOF as a backup facility for the TSC is included in Fermi's RERP Plan. Fermi will notify the NRC upon completion of corrective maintenance.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT MATUSZAK TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 5/1/09 AT 1621 EDT * * *Regarding Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation unavailability: Corrective maintenance to restore HVAC system has been completed satisfactorily. TSC has been restored as an Emergency Response facility.The TSC was declared operable at 1457 EDT. Corrective maintenance included replacing the out-of-spec charcoal filters and satisfactory follow-up tests.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills).esident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills).)
ENS 42677 + (Notified by Security Shift Supervisor of a … Notified by Security Shift Supervisor of a report by the Ashtabula County Sheriff that a 92 year old individual has been checked into the Ashtabula Clinic at 14:57 EDT, claiming to have an explosive device at his Kingsville home and at the Perry Power Plant. This is being considered as a non-credible security threat, based on his never having access to the site, ONI-P56-2 is not applicable, based on this report and assessment. Law enforcement officers are obtaining a warrant to access his home to investigate. The FBI and Lake County Sheriff's offices have been notified by the Security Shift Supervisor. This is an off site report from the Perry Plant to a government agency about the status of the Perry Plant.The Lake County Sheriff's office completed their search of individual's residence and found no bombs or related material.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.ensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 44527 + (Notified by the Operations Incident Comman … Notified by the Operations Incident Commander at 1009 CDT that a sheen of oil is visible on the Kankakee River north of the Goose Lake pumping station. It is estimated that 1 gallon may have been discharged to the Kankakee River.The leak was from a temporary diesel driven pump that was in place due to the recent flooding in the area. The pump has been secured and has been moved from the area. Notified the Illinois Emergency (Management) Agency (IEMA) of the fuel oil spill to the Kankakee River. IEMA incident report number H20081478. Reported to Agent (DELETED) at 1023 CDT.Notified the National Emergency Response Center of the oil spill to the Kankakee River. Incident report #885611. Reported to (DELETED) at 1055 CDT.The licensee made the reports based on the requirements of the Federal Water Pollution Act, Section 311(b)(5), 40 CFR 110.5 and 40 CFR 112.4.The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.e has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 46499 + (Notified by the Security Shift Commander a … Notified by the Security Shift Commander at 2020 (PST) that access to the primary EOF is not possible due to flooding. San Onofre will activate the alternate EOF if an event is declared. There are no other affected systems or loss to emergency response capabilities due to this flooding.Access to the site has not been impacted due to the flooding. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.)
ENS 46503 + (Notified by the Security Shift Commander a … Notified by the Security Shift Commander at 1932 (PST) that access to the primary EOF is not possible due to flooding. San Onofre will activate the alternate EOF if an event is declared. There are no other affected systems or loss to emergency response capabilities due to this flooding.Access to the site has not been impacted due to the flooding. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.See similar report #46499. been notified. See similar report #46499.)
ENS 50232 + (Notified by the licensee that three tritiu … Notified by the licensee that three tritium exit signs were improperly disposed of as trash. The signs were manufactured by SRBT with an estimated source strength of 20 Ci for each sign. The licensee noticed the missing signs following an equipment inventory taken after a renovation. The licensee determined that the three signs were mixed with general construction debris and sent to a landfill. The licensee investigation is continuing.THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALSources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf)
ENS 46363 + (Notified by the licensee that two tritium … Notified by the licensee that two tritium exit signs were improperly disposed of as trash. The signs were manufactured on April/1999 and the tritium gas was in sealed tubes. The sign manufacturer was NRD-LLC\Penteco and the original source strength was 25 Ci for each sign.THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALSources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfThis source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 sourceg categorized as a less than Category 3 source)
ENS 43249 + (Notified the New Jersey State, Department … Notified the New Jersey State, Department of Environmental Protection that Oyster Creek generating station was not in compliance with the NJPDES permit due to equipment malfunction.The malfunction was an electrical bus fault which resulted in a trip of both operating dilution pumps.Alternate power is now being supplied to the dilution pumps. The pumps have been restarted.There has been no observed impact on the environment..NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.as notified of this event by the licensee.)
ENS 51847 + (Notified the Pennsylvania Department of En … Notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection that Limerick Cooling Tower water was released to a non-permitted outfall through the spray pond (Ultimate Heat Sink) due to system lineups associated with emergent maintenance activities. There was no radioactive material contained within the water released. Corrective actions are being taken to prevent further release via this outfall.The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.e NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.)
ENS 42213 + (Notified the Pennsylvania Department of En … Notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ( PA DEP) at 2115 of an onsite chemical leak, some of which ended up being discharged to the environment (Ohio River). A small hydrazine spill onsite was directed to the onsite chemical waste sump. The chemical waste sump was at that time being reprocessed to the water treating clarifier. The clarifier effluent is directed to filters and eventually to the onsite reverse osmosis unit and demineralizer train. The waste effluent of the reverse osmosis unit is directed to the clarifier settling basin, which in turn is routed directly to the Ohio river. The chemical analysis of the clarifier settling basin indicated 132 ppb hydrazine.The information reported to the PA DEP essentially stated that BVPS had a minor onsite chemical spill that is not EPA reportable. However, since hydrazine was detected in outfall 103 (The clarifier settling basin) under the requirements of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit we are required to report this to the PA DEP. We do not expect harm to the environment. No offsite emergency response is required.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.ensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 40264 + (Noveste Beta-Cath System (Model A1767 30mm … Noveste Beta-Cath System (Model A1767 30mm S/N 86853) was used in a procedure on September 18, 2003. It has not been seen since. This office was notified October 20. This model contains 12 Sr-90 seeds, total activity up to 60 mCi (milliCuries). Florida is investigating.Florida Incident # FL03-192investigating. Florida Incident # FL03-192)
ENS 40430 + (Novoste Strontium-90 Intravascular brachyt … Novoste Strontium-90 Intravascular brachytherapy (IVB) source (remote afterloader) was discovered missing on January 5, 2004. Source was last seen but not used on December 17, 2003. Reported by phone by RSO. Source is a small handlheld device - Manufacturer: Novoste, Model: BethCath, Serial No. 92607; Source train Serial No. ZB-520; Original Activity 55.62 millicuries; current activity (date of discovery) 54.64 millicuries; Calibration date: 04/11/2003; Last leak test 10/29/2003. Received at the hospital on November 4, 2003. Last used in a patient on December 5, 2003 (first and last use). Last seen on during a functional test on December 17, 2003 in the Fondren Building, Room F1099 (near cath lab) at the Licensee's main site 6565 Fannin Street, Houston, Texas. The source was not used that day. Two other sources of different activity and length remain in storage. The room and cath lab have been search 4 times by the Licensee's staff. Trash has been surveyed. Hospital staff has been notified of the missing equipment..Texas Incident No.: I-8089.ng equipment.. Texas Incident No.: I-8089.)
ENS 56326 + (Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) experienced a … Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) experienced a "condition upset" for which they issued a news release. Following are details from the news release provided by the licensee via email:NFS Experiences Condition UpsetOn January 30, 2023, at 1030 EST, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. experienced a condition upset during routine inventory activities. Local ambulance services were contacted as a precautionary measure to ensure proper response to employees affected by the upset.Two employees were transported for further evaluation, while three were evaluated onsite and released.No impact to the facilities, the public, or the environment occurred.This report is being made per the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (c).* * * UPDATE ON 1/30/2023 AT 1402 EST FROM NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC. TO KAREN COTTON * * *Following are details from an updated news release provided by the licensee via email:NFS Experiences Minor Chemical ReactionOn January 30, 2023, at 1030 EST, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. experienced a minor chemical reaction during routine inventory activities in a contained area of the plant.Five employees were exposed to fumes. Two employees were transported by ambulance to the Unicoi County Hospital for further evaluation, and have been released. Three were evaluated on site and released. They were wearing appropriate personal protective equipment.Out of an abundance of caution, NFS activated its emergency response organization (ERO) at the beginning of the event to ensure appropriate response was initiated as details were gathered. The ERO is comprised of representatives from across the site.NFS was not evacuated, and no impact to the facilities, the public, or the environment occurred.Notified Fuels Group, R2DO (Miller), and NMSS Events Notification via email.), and NMSS Events Notification via email.)
05000247/FIN-2010005-10 + (O CFR 50.47(b)(4), requires that a standar … O CFR 50.47(b)(4), requires that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the licensee. 10 CFR 50.54(q), states in part, that licensees shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 0.47(b). Contrary to the above, on October 2Q,2010, during an extent of condition review of industry operating experience, Entergy personnel identified that the R-54 radiation monitor\'s (monitor is for liquid effluent from the the value of 2.5e-1uCi/cc required to declare an Alert using emergency action level (EAL) Table 5.1. Entergy personnel documented this issue in the CAP as CR-IP2-20\'10-06417 and provided timely guidance to the control room operators to ensure proper classification of an event. In addition, Entergy personnel performed an apparent cause evaluation which included an extent of condition of the issue. The EAL chart and associated emergency plan procedures were revised to reflect the EAL changes. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance because it did not result in a significant degradation of the risk significant planning standard function.sk significant planning standard function.)
ENS 42214 + (ODH was notified on 12/19/05 by the licens … ODH was notified on 12/19/05 by the licensee that a Troxler moisture density gauge received extensive damage when it was run over by a construction vehicle at a job site. The gauge was a Troxler Model 3430, serial number 31068, containing 8 mCi (millicuries) of Cs-137 and 40 mCi (millicuries) of Am-241. Preliminary notification by the licensee is that the gauge was left unattended but is still in sight of the operator, who had gone back to their truck to verify information for the next analysis. While the operator was away from the gauge, the construction vehicle approached the location and ran over the gauge. The gauge user was unable to get back to the gauge and wave away the truck driver before the gauge was run over. The gauge casing was destroyed but initial surveys performed on site indicate that the sources remained intact. The gauge was packed into the transport case and transported to a gauge service provider for leak testing and packaging for return to the manufacturer. An investigation is being conducted by ODH.ITEM NUMBER: OH050010* * * UPDATE FROM S. JAMES TO W. GOTT AT 1633 ON 02/08/06 * * *The State provided the following information via email:Device was found to not be leaking and was returned to the manufacturer.Notified R3DO (Lanksbury) and NMSS (Camper).tified R3DO (Lanksbury) and NMSS (Camper).)
ENS 45593 + (OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR ELEVATED TRITIUM … OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR ELEVATED TRITIUM LEVELSOn 12/23/09, station management was notified that a sample taken from (James A. Fitzpatrick) JAFs west storm drain was positive for tritium. The sample results were confirmed at 984 pCi/L. The sensitivity of the analysis is 800 pCi/L. The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) lower limit of detection (LLD) requirement for tritium is 3,000 pCi/L with a reporting level of 30,000 pCi/L. Comparing the confirmed activity level in the sample with the reporting criteria, there is little environmental impact, as the sample is more than an order of magnitude below the reporting criteria. Although no regulatory limit was exceeded these results were evaluated against the NEI 07-07 guidance for voluntary informal communication of state/local authorities. Since the storm drains communicate with native soil and Lake Ontario, it has been determined that the voluntary informal communication criteria applies. That determination was made at 1515 (EST) on 12/28/09. Since the state and local agencies will be notified of the slightly positive indication in the storm drain sample, reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) was reviewed and based on the public sensitivity to tritium issues, it was determined that a notification to the NRC should be made.The site has developed an action plan to address locating the source of the tritium (including) potential remediation actions, inclusion in the annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) report, and evaluation for inclusion as an NRC IN 80-10 pathway. In the interim, both the reactor building perimeter sump and west storm drain have been placed on an increased sampling frequency. The storm drain will be sampled weekly and the reactor building perimeter sump will be sampled daily.Background: On 11/03/09 station management was notified that a sample from the reactor building perimeter sump was positive for tritium at 1474 pCi/L. The reactor building perimeter sump was placed on increased monitoring frequency due to the positive indication. Since the sump only communicates with the environment, through the west storm drain, and there was no positive indication of tritium in the west storm drain or in the ground water monitoring wells, it was determined that no 'voluntary informal communication' criteria applied, at that time.The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.The licensee will notify the state, local, and other government agencies.ate, local, and other government agencies.)
ENS 45590 + (OFFSITE NOTIFICATION RESULTING FROM AN INA … OFFSITE NOTIFICATION RESULTING FROM AN INADVERTANT ACTIVATION OF A SIRENPrairie Island Nuclear Plant was notified by Goodhue County Dispatch that a public alert notification siren inadvertently activated at 0430 hours. Local law enforcement officials deactivated the siren at 0500 hours. (Greater than) 70% of sirens remain functional in the 10 mile EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone). The communications company has been contacted to investigate the cause of the false activation.The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.)
05000348/FIN-2012008-01 + (OI Investigation - Missed Fire Watches)
05000348/FIN-2012008-02 + (OI Investigation - Missed Fire Watches)

05000289/FIN-2011010-01 + (OI Investigation/ unescorted access authorization/ 10 CFR 50.7)

ENS 43538 + (OIL SHEEN IN THE PLANT FOREBAY At 0930 pla … OIL SHEEN IN THE PLANT FOREBAYAt 0930 plant personnel reported an oil sheen in the plant Forebay at the Intake Structure. The source was hydraulic oil from a small boat used to harvest and remove Milfoil ( biological plant; marine life) from the Forebay. Actions were initiated in accordance with plant procedure RWI-007, Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan. The volume of the spill was approximately one (1) gallon. The spill was stopped, contained, and clean-up efforts are in progress.At 1100 the National Response Center was notified of the hydraulic oil spill along with other Alabama State and local agencies. This event is reportable as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or condition related to protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies was made.The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.Specifically, the licensee notified the Alabama Department of the Environmental Management, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, and Limestone County Emergency Management Agency.estone County Emergency Management Agency.)
ENS 44103 + (OSHA was notified at 2055 on 3/17/08, under 29 CFR 1904, of the fatality of an employee caused by an apparent heart attack while at work. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 44637 + (Observation of discharge of Terasolve 146 … Observation of discharge of Terasolve 146 biodegradable fish oil into the Delaware river at the 11B Circulating Water Pump intake bay. The discharge was from a dewatering pump leak that was stopped. The fish oil has dissipated. The amount was 2 - 3 oz.The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.The licensee will notify Lower Alloways Creek Township.R1DO (Hansell) notified.s Creek Township. R1DO (Hansell) notified.)
ENS 42828 + (Observed degrading condenser pressure. En … Observed degrading condenser pressure. Entered abnormal procedure DB-OP-02518, High Condenser Pressure and reduced reactor power. At <280 Mwe and > 5 inches Hg (mercury) A (absolute) , manually tripped the reactor at approximately 45% power in accordance with procedure. Normal post-trip response. Condenser pressure is slowly recovering. Still trying to determine the source of the condenser air in-leakage.Notified Ottawa County Sheriff of main steam safety / atmospheric vent valve operation at 0231 hours per procedure.All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves and the motor driven feed pump. There is no steam generator tube leakage. The atmospheric vent valves / main steam safety valves lifted for a few seconds following the trip and fully reseated after the initial lifting. Plant electrical power if from the grid backfeeding to the station. The electric grid is stable.The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.ctor was notified of this event by the licensee.)
ENS 43508 + (Oceaneering International received a repor … Oceaneering International received a report from Landauer that two of their radiographers had May badge exposures of 5467 millirem and 5549 millirem (deep dose) respectively. The radiographers had been working on a pipe laying barge about 40 miles off the coast of Louisiana during the month of May when these potential overexposures occurred. Oceaneering International immediately stopped work of one of the radiographers. The other radiographer had already stopped working due to a personal injury. Interviews with the radiographers indicated that both individuals had removed their shirts during work on a hot day with their exposure badges still attached to the shirts The shirts could have been placed in a location that was near the radiography work and picked up the exposure. Both radiographers had self-reading dosimetry that was read and logged daily. The total May exposures logged on the self-reading dosimeters were 126 millirem and 147 millirem respectively.Oceaneering International is licensed under an Agreement State license from the State of Louisiana. This event has already been reported to the State of Louisiana and is under investigation by the State (See Agreement State Report EN#43481). However, after the RSO for Oceaneering International had discussions with NRC Region IV (Leonardi) about this event, the RSO decided to report the event to the Operations Center since the event occurred offshore and is under NRC jurisdiction at the time it occurred. NRC jurisdiction at the time it occurred.)
05000269/FIN-2017001-03 + (Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifica … Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.0.4 requires that when a limiting condition of operation is not met, entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability shall not be made except when the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the mode or other specified condition in the applicability for an unlimited period of time. Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.3.7, Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) Automatic Actuation Output Logic Channels, requires eight ESPS automatic actuation output logic channels to be operable in Modes 1 and 2 and Modes 3 and 4 when associated ES equipment is required to the operable. Contrary to the above, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1 entered Mode 4 on November 24, 2016 with ES protective system voters 1 and 2 in an abnormal configuration (bypassed) for the plant mode of operation. Operations shift personnel discovered this abnormal configuration on November 25, 2016 and restored voters 1 and 2 to an operate condition which met Technical Specification 3.3.7. This failure to maintain ESPS channels in the correct mode of operation for the required mode of applicability was a performance deficiency and was determined to be more than minor. The issue is more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the issue challenged the configuration control attribute of ensuring operating equipment was available to respond to initiating events. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Att. 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued October 07, 2016, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as NCR 02081523.corrective action program as NCR 02081523.)
ENS 49527 + (Oconee Nuclear Station identified a small … Oconee Nuclear Station identified a small Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leak on ONS (Oconee Nuclear Station) Unit 1 and initiated a Unit 1 shutdown at 0520 hours (EST) on November 11, 2013 in accordance with procedures and Technical Specifications. Visual inspection confirmed the leak is located on the 1B2 loop High Pressure Injection Line. ONS Unit 1 was operating at full power when the leak was identified and a down power to 20% was commenced at 2141 hours (EST) on November 10, 2013 in order to characterize the leak and leak location. The measured RCS leak rate was 0.13 gpm (gallons per minute) at the time of commencing the down power.This issue is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event poses no threat to the public or station employees.Unit 1 entered TS 3.4.13 Condition B at 0520 EST on 11/11/13. This TS requires Unit 1 be in Mode 3 Hot Standby within 12 hours and Mode 5 Cold Shutdown within 36 hours. The generator is currently offline and the licensee anticipates entering Mode 3 at 1000 EST. Unit 1 entered their Abnormal Operating procedures for leak determination at 0442 EST on 11/09/13.eak determination at 0442 EST on 11/09/13.)
05000269/FIN-2004013-01 + (Oconee Unit 1 Operating License DPR-38, Oc … Oconee Unit 1 Operating License DPR-38, Oconee Unit 2 Operating License DPR-47, and Oconee Unit 3 Operating License DPR-55 Condition D provide, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and as approved in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated April 28, 1983 and subsequent supplements. The licensees UFSAR commits to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Sections 1II.G and 1II.L. Section lll.G.3 states that alternative shutdown capability should be provided where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown, does not satisfy the requirements of lll.G.2. Section 1II.L of Appendix R provides requirements to be met by alternative shutdown methods. Section lll.L.2.b states, in part, that The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level. . . within the level indication in the pressurizer in PWRs. Section llI.L.3 specifies that procedures shall be in effect to implement this capability. Contrary to the above, on February 8, 2004, the licensees procedures for a fire requiring SSF manning and activation would not assure that the reactor coolant makeup function would be capable of maintaining reactor coolant level within the indicated range of the pressurizer. Specifically, delaying the manning of the SSF until after the occurrence of a loss of function of the high pressure injection and component cooling or feedwater rather than manning the SSF immediately upon confirmation of a fire in the areas of concern may not preclude an extended loss of reactor coolant system inventory. This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding for Units 1,2 and 3.ation Process finding for Units 1,2 and 3.)
ENS 51585 + (Off-site Notification to South Carolina De … Off-site Notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). At approximately 1400 (EST) on 12/4/15, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the owner controlled area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is between 10-15 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1448, an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The overflow appears to be the result of securing electrical power to the general area, including the lift station, to support construction activities. Power has been restored and clean-up is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.)
ENS 42805 + (Offsite Notifications have been made to Bl … Offsite Notifications have been made to Blair Rescue Squad due to an OPPD electrician suffering second and third degree burns to arms, face and torso while working on switchgear. The employee has been transported via life flight helicopter to Creighton University Hospital. The flash actuated the Switchgear Room Halon system. Operations verified that there was no fire in the Switchgear Rooms. Recovery efforts are under way. A media release is expected." A continuous fire watch has been established in the Switchgear Room as a compensatory measure.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.ensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 42267 + (Offsite Public Prompt Notification System, … Offsite Public Prompt Notification System, Sirens and Tone Alert Radios were inoperable for greater than one hour. The Primary Console for siren operation at Houston County was found to be non functional at (approximately) 0820 CST during periodic siren tests. The backup console did successfully operate the sirens. However, at 1030 CST the transport system for actuating system failed at Webb, AL and the Backup Console for siren operation as well as Tone Alert Radios became inoperable. The inoperability of the system lasted for one hour and five minutes, being restored at 1134 CST. Initial troubleshooting indicates the problem was with the fiber coaxial cable to the demultiplexer in the transport. The problem could not be repeated, and investigation continues. Repairs for the Primary Console for siren actuation are being facilitated.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Houston County.NRC Resident Inspector and Houston County.)
ENS 50138 + (Offsite notification has been made to the … Offsite notification has been made to the Arkansas Department of Health due to Pope county EMS rescue personnel entering a radiological / contaminated area. An individual was working in a radiological / contaminated area only accessible by ladder. The individual was unable to use a ladder to egress the area and requested assistance in exiting. Pope county EMS rescue with the on-site rescue team provided the necessary assistance which required the team to enter a radiological / contaminated area.The team, including the individual in question, has exited the radiological / contaminated area. They were evaluated by Radiation Protection and were not contaminated. The individual was transported to a local medical facility for further evaluation.The individual was assisted in exiting the 'A' steam generator cavity.The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.e has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 49722 + (Offsite notification to South Carolina Dep … Offsite notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). At approximately 1330 EST on January 14, 2014, site personnel discovered a fork lift leaking hydraulic oil in the protected area. The estimated amount of hydraulic oil spilled is between 10-15 gallons. Approximately 3 gallons of hydraulic oil from the spill entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. At 1530 (EST) an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The spill has been contained and clean up efforts are underway.The NRC Residents have been notified.way. The NRC Residents have been notified.)
ENS 47689 + (Offsite notification to law enforcement ag … Offsite notification to law enforcement agencies was made by the licensee due to an individual making threats against personnel and security at the site. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.Operations Officer for additional details.)
ENS 48981 + (Offsite notification to the New York DEC ( … Offsite notification to the New York DEC (Department of Environmental Conservation) to report a Freon (R-22) release to the air of 8 lbs. 11 ozs. This release came from the cafeteria kitchen walk-in cooler.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.ensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 40233 + (Offsite notification was due to a failure … Offsite notification was due to a failure on a 100-ton mobile crane that resulted in a approximately 150 gallon hydraulic oil spill to the ground. The spill did not involve a pathway to surrounding bodies of water. Efforts are underway to remediate the affected area. The State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection as well as the National Response Center was notified.The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.l be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 45061 + (Ohio Department of Health (ODH) Bureau of … Ohio Department of Health (ODH) Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was notified of a medical event that occurred at The Urology Center, LLC located at 4700 Smith Road, Suite M, Cincinnati, OH. 45212, Ohio license # 02200310002 at 12:30 PM 05/12/2009. The patient received a permanent implant of 64 I-125 seeds on 5-11-09. The total activity implanted was 28.422 mCi. (.444mCi/seed). The prescribed dose to the prostate was 144.0 Gy. The post-plan CT was evaluated 5-12-09 and determined that the prostate volume receiving the prescribed dose was 47% (i.e. V100%=47%) resulting in a 53 percent under dose of the prescribed dose. The patient and physician have been notified. ODH BRP will continue to evaluate this event. The licensee has initiated an internal evaluation.A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.necessarily result in harm to the patient.)
ENS 43786 + (Ohmart-VEGA RSO was informed on 11/14/07 t … Ohmart-VEGA RSO was informed on 11/14/07 that a shipment of SR-1A source holders sent to Gibraltar Mines in McLeese Lake, BC, Canada has been lost in transit. The missing consignment consists of 5 devices, each containing 100 mCi of Cs-137. The shipment left the Ohmart facility on 10/25/07. The Ohmart representative in Canada (DELETED) is leading the effort to locate the missing shipment. (DELETED) of the CNSC was notified by Canadian Freightways personnel on 11/14/07. TST Overland confirms turning over (2) skids to Canadian Freightways on Oct 29, 2007 in Burnaby, BC for furtherance to McLeese Lake, BC. One skid containing detectors was delivered to the customer in McLeese Lake. (DELETED) was unaware of this missing item until he received a phone call from the customer. He is pressing the trucking company to locate the equipment. Timeline as currently known: TST-Overland picked up two skids at Ohmart-Vega in Cincinnati, OH on 10/25/07; TST signed for them on waybill 766-4148797. TST-Overland moved the shipment through Sarnia, ON for delivery to TST-Porter Burnaby, BC. TST-Porter in Burnaby verified receipt of two skids.CFL was called to pick up 2 skids from TST-Porter in Burnaby on waybill 354-982526 per the attached copy. CFL delivered the shipment of one pallet only to Williams Lake November 2.Trace started with CFL November 9.Devices are five Sealed Source Fixed Gauges activity of 100 mCi each Serial Numbers (5943CN, 5950CN, 6157CN, 6160CN, 6165CN).Ohio report number: OH070006 * * * UPDATE AT 0845 ON 11/23/07 FROM B. BEAUDIN TO P. SNYDER * * * Mr. Beaudin from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission called with information that the missing sources were found intact in Burnaby, B.C. The sources were never lost. They were misplaced and located in a warehouse at a different location than expected. Notified Ohio (S. James), R3DO (M. Ring) and FSME EO (A. Mohseni). Notified via email R4DO (J. Clark), FSME NMED PM (Burgess), R3 SLO (via M. Ring), R4 SLO (McLean, Erickson), OIP (Baker, Dembeck) and ILTAB.THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALSources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.re close to it for a period of many weeks.)
ENS 52073 + (Oil reported in the vicinity of the statio … Oil reported in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent after the start of 3rd circulating water pump. The source of the oil is believed to be from oil entrained in the discharge canal from oil leak previously reported in EN#52045. One circulating water pump was removed from service to mitigate the source. The United States Coast Guard Response Center, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. James A. Fitzpatrick Control Room was notified of the issue at 0645, off site agencies were first notified at 0743.The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.r. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.)
ENS 44314 + (Oil spill detected in outfall structure of … Oil spill detected in outfall structure of joint operating units IP2 and IP3. Oil pool contained by partial boom in place at outfall structure. Slight rainbow sheen detected after outfall structure in Hudson River.The source of the leak is unknown. The licensee has made arrangements for remediation and has informed the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center, State of New York and the NRC Resident Inspector.f New York and the NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 40808 + (Oil was spilled on the asphalt in the Prot … Oil was spilled on the asphalt in the Protected Area and was cleaned up. Recent rains pulled out the percolated oil laden water which entered the storm drain. Less than one gallon of oil entered the storm drain. The source of the oil spill (possibly from a vehicle) is under investigation.The licensee notified the NJ Department of Environmental Protection, National Response Center, Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. NRC Resident Inspector.gency and the U.S. NRC Resident Inspector.)
ENS 43140 + (On 2/3/2007 at approximately 12:32 MST, P … On 2/3/2007 at approximately 12:32 MST, Palo Verde Control Room operators were performing a routine surveillance test. The purpose of this test is to demonstrate the operability of each full strength CEA not fully inserted in the core by verifying freedom of movement (trippability) by moving each individual full strength CEA that is not fully inserted in the core at least 5 inches (SR 3.1.5.3).While performing this test on Shutdown Group 'B', Subgroup 6, the 4 CEA's in the sub-group failed to withdraw after successfully inserting the CEA's the requisite 5 inches. The CEA's were inserted beyond the limit of 144.75" withdrawn as required per PVNGS TS LCO 3.1.6 to a position of 144" withdrawn. It was determined that this was not an analyzed condition.On 2/3/2007 at 13:15 MST, the Control Room staff identified the unanalyzed condition and PVNGS Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3. It was determined that the unanalyzed condition had existed since 12:32 MST.On 2/3/2007 at 16:16 MST, following corrective maintenance to replace a phase sequence card, the 4 CEA's were recovered above the TS 3.1.6 insertion limit of 144.75", and Unit 2 exited LCO 3.0.3.The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. The required offsite power sources are operable and the electrical grid is stable.The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.inspector has been notified of this event.)
ENS 43309 + (On February 26, 2007 a 5 millicurie Polon … On February 26, 2007 a 5 millicurie Polonium 210 source static eliminator button was identified as lost or stolen from a silicone extruder frame. The device was last used on February 23, 2007. The lost button was 1 of 3 buttons on the extruder. The device model number is P2042, serial number A2FD631. The static eliminator is leased from Amstat Industries, 3012 North Lake Terrace, Glenview, IL 60026. A department-wide search and an interview with all employees was conducted without success. It is believed that the button may have been swept up during floor cleaning and ultimately disposed of in a land fill. The search for the missing button will continue and corrective actions have been put in place to prevent reoccurrence.Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.re close to it for a period of many weeks.)
ENS 40991 + (On July 1, 2004 while Bayou Testers was p … On July 1, 2004 while Bayou Testers was performing quarterly inspections, they noticed that the case on a INC-100 industrial radiography camera was split open. The exposure devise was taken out of operation and sent to Source Production and Equipment (SPEC). The devise contained approximately 10 Ci of Ir-192. SPEC informed the licensee that the cause of the case splitting was corrosion of the depleted uranium shield, which caused it to swell and tear the weld. SPEC informed the licensee that this occurrence was not unusual.nsee that this occurrence was not unusual.)
05000454/FIN-2017001-01 + (On March 11, 2017 , with Unit 1 shutdown … On March 11, 2017 , with Unit 1 shutdown and in a refueling outage, pipefitters as signed to cut out and replace service water valve 1WS413 discovered that piping was blocked upstream of the valve and the work scope was appropriately changed to remove the blocked piping. Taking action they believed was allowed by the work instructions, the pipefitters opened a pipe union and removed the pipe. They then set the removed section containing valve 1WS023C on a nearby tripod to continue work. A system engineer performing a walkdown in the area identified that the removed valve had a clearance (danger) tag on it and immediately stopped work and contacted the operations department. Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires , in part , that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. One administrative procedure recommended in Appendix A is , Equipment Control ( e.g. locking and tagging). OP AA 109 101, Clearance and Tagging, accomplished the locking and tagging requirement for Byron Station. Section 5.2, Danger Tags, established standards for implementation of the tagging process. Step 5.2.2 stated , A component with a Danger Tag attached to it shall not be physically removed from the system. Contrary to the requirements stated above, a component with a danger tag attached was physically removed from the system on March 11, 2017. Specifically, pipefitters disconnected a pipe union and removed associated service water piping from the system that contained valve 1WS023C which had a clearance (danger) tag attached. The licensee immediately verified that the cooler the piping served was out -of-service on both the supply and return sides with a clearance boundary in place and drained so that the workers were not exposed to a pressurized sourc e. The workers immediately acknowledged their error stating they did not see the tag because they were focused on the demolition activities. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 03984215 , and the maintenance organization conducted a stand down to reinforce the station standards for compliance with the clearance procedure. The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because the performance deficiency adversely impacted the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge safety functions during shutdown operations. The inspectors determined the issue was of very low safety significance , or Green by answering No to all screening questions in IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significant Determination Process, Exhibit 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions. 2, Initiating Events Screening Questions.)

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