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The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 1 … The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to take actions specified in the procedure for initiation of shutdown cooling. Specifically, prior to placing the A loop of the residual heat removal (RHR) system into shutdown cooling, an operator was not stationed to close the condensate transfer system cross-connect valve to the A RHR loop (10RHR-274), nor was the valve immediately closed after initiation of shutdown cooling, as specified by the operating procedure. This resulted in a significant loss of operational control, in that RPV level increased to the point of putting water down the main steam lines. As immediate corrective action, operators closed 10RHR-274, thus stopping the RPV inventory increase. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2016-00273. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the resultant loss of RPV level control represented a significant loss of operational control that could have affected the operability of the HPCI and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems, as well as the S/RVs, had their use again been required in the near term. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Challenge the Unknown, because operators did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Specifically, without otherwise having maintained status control on the condensate transfer system cross-connect valve to the A RHR loop, operators did not stop to positively establish the condition of the valve when it appeared in a conditional step in the procedure (that is, if 10RHR-274 is open, then station an operator at 10RHR-274) (H.11). station an operator at 10RHR-274) (H.11).

Discovered date

23:59:59, 31 March 2016 +

Docket

05000333 +

Event date

23:59:59, 31 March 2016 +

Finding integer

2 +

Finding type

Non-cited violation +

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INPO aspect

QA.2 +

Identified by

NRC identified +

Inspection Manual Chapter

NRC Inspection Manual 0609.04 + and NRC Inspection Manual 0609/Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power +

Inspection procedure

IP 71153, Event Followup +

Inspection report

IR 05000333/2016001 +

Inspector

Ed Knutson +, Arthur Burritt +, Joseph Schoppy +, Beth Sienel + and Jason Schussler +

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12:56:12, 25 September 2017 +

Person