Text

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual, Volume 1, Revision 2016-001
	ML16125A098
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/28/2016
From:	Batson S; Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	ONS-2016-036 Vol. 1, Rev. 2016-001
	Download: ML16125A098 (50)
	v • d • e

e{-..DUKE

~;ENERGY ONS-2016-036 April 28, 2016 Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-27 46 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume 1, Revision 2016-001 Please find attached for your use and review a copy of the revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and does not reduce the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. If there are any questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Pat Street, Emergency Preparedness Manager, at 864-873-3124.

By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.

Sincerely, dc.tlft:s Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments:

Revision Instructions EPIP Volume 1 - Revision 2016-001 50.54(q) Evaluation

ONS-2016-036 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 28, 2016 Page2 xc:

w/2 copies of attachments Ms. Catherine Haney Administrator, Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta.GA 30303-1257 w/copy of attachments Mr.*James R. Hall, Senior Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11555 Rockville Pike Mailstop: 0-8G9A Rockville, MD 20852 2738 (send via E-'ri1ail)

Mr. Jeffrey A. Whited, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11555 Rockville Pike Mailstop: 0-881A Rockville, MD 20852 (send via E-mail)

W/o attachments Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station ELL EC2ZF

I

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Volume 1 Dean Hubbard Director, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness lf-2(-16 Date Approved Volume 1 REVISION 2016-001 Apr2016

April 4, 2016 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

SUBJECT:

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume 1, Revision 2016-001 Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume 1.

REMOVE INSERT Cover Sheet Rev. 2015-007 Cover Sheet Rev. 2016-001 RP/O/A/1000/001 Rev 004 RP/O/A/1000/001 Rev 005 Pat Street ONS Emergency Preparedness Mgr.

c:1v1c:l"'(~C:Nt...;Y !-'LAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev.1 1 O CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of I~,..,-

Screening and Evaluation Number Applicable Sites BNP D

EREG #: 02006495 CNS D

CR3 D

HNP D

MN$

D SAD #: 020064 77 ONS x

RNP D

GO D

Document and Revision RP/O/A/1000/001 Rev. 005 Emergency Classification Part I. Description of Activity Being Reviewed (event or action, or series of actions that may result in a change to the emergency plan or affect the implementation of the emergency plan):

, ~torial changes:

. ~.1 and the body, changed from revision 4 to revision 5.

2. Entire document, removed page numbers in the footer of the procedure due to forniat constraints.

4. p. 6, removed page numbers from the table of contents due to format constraints

5. Encl 4.6, p.2 capitalized 'FRESHLY OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE' to maintain consistency with other procedure formatting that capitalizes defined terms.

6. Encl 4.7 p.2 Replaced 'Condition 8' with 'Potential Failure (Condition 8)'. Replaced 'Condition A' with 'Imminent Failure (Condition A)' due to terminology changes in the Hydro Dam Emergency Plans that were driven by Revised FERC Guidelines for Dam Emergency Plans,

7. Encl 4.1 O p. 1 Amended definition of 'CONDITION A' to 'IMMINENT FAILURE (CONDITION A) and added the enhanced definition to be consistent with the Revised FERC Guideline definition. Placed in alphabetical order.

8. *Encl 4.10 p. 1 Amended definition of 'CONDITION 8' to 'POTENTIAL FAILURE (CONDITION 8 and added the enhanced definition to be consistent with the Revised FERC Guideline definition. Placed in alphabetical order

9. Encl 4.12 p.1 Corrected the misspelling in the NOTE from 'judgement' to 'judgment'

10. Encl 4.13 p.1 Added references used to support the clarification of change 3 and change 6.

Changes to Procedure Bod~;

3. Added new step 1.4.7 clarifying PLANNED vs UNPLANNED Events extracted from the guidance in NEI 99-01 on General Considerations for the Emergency Coordinafor to assess. Response to AR 01965160-01 Pa II. Activity Previously Reviewed?

I Yes ID I No I x

-~"'.'/

c:1v1t:l"'(~t:NvY 1-'LAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 1 O CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form ATIACHMENT 4 r-Page 2 of" Is this activity Fully bounded by an NRC approved 10 CFR 50.90 submittal or 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Continue to Alert and Notification System Design Report?

Effectiveness,

Evaluation is not 10CFR If yes, identify bounding source document number or approval ~eference and required. Enter 50.54(q) ensure the basis for concluding the source document fully bounds the proposed justification Screening change is documented below:

below and Evaluation complete Form, Part Ill Justification:,

Part V.

Bounding document attached (optional) 10 Part Ill. Editorial Change Yes lo No I x

t:Mt:t-<(.;it:.N(.;Y PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev.1 1 O CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form ATTACHMENT 4 /

Page 3 off \\11 r-"'

Is this activity an editorial or typographical change only, such as formatting, paragraph numbering, spelling, or punctuation that does not change intent?

Editorial changes:

1. p.1 and the body, changed from revision 4 to revision 5.

2. Entire document, removed page numbers in the footer of the procedure due to format constraints.

4. p. 6, removed page numbers from the table of contents due to format constraints

5. Encl 4.6, p.2 capitalized 'FRESHLY OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE' to maintain consistency with other procedure formatting that capitalizes defined terms.

6. Encl 4.7 p.2 Amended 'Condition B' to 'Potential Failure (Condition B}'.

A!11ended 'Condition A' to 'Imminent Failure (Condition A}' due to terminology changes in the Hydro Dam Emergency Plans that were driven by Revised FERC Guidelines for Dam Emergency Plans, (AR 01910389)

7. Encl 4.1 O p. 1 Amended definition of 'CONDITION A' to 'IMMINENT FAILURE (CONDITION A) and added the enhanced definition to be consistent with the Revised FERC Guideline definition. (AR 01910389)

8. Encl 4.10 p. 1 Amended definition of 'CONDITION B' to 'POTENTIAL ILURE (CONDITION B and added the enhanced definition to be consistent h the Revised FERC Guideline definition. (AR 01910389)

9. Encl 4.12 p.1 Corrected the misspelling in the NOTE from 'judgement' to

'judgment'

10. Encl 4.13 p.1 Added references used to support the clarification of change 3 and change 6.

J ustificatlon:

These changes correct the formatting, page numbering, capitalization, spelling and terminology. Due to FERC initiative, the Division of Dam Safety and Inspections, Office of Energy Projects, has finalized revisions to chapter 6 of the Engineering Guidelines for Emergency Action Plans. Terminology was modified to be consistent with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program(HSEEP) Imminent Failure was part of the definition of Condition A and Potential Failure was part of the definition of Condition B, the change was intended to more clearly state the conditions of the dams to Offsite Organizations in the communications and do.not change intent.

The changes to the Emergency Plan have been evaluated per 1 OCFR50.54(q) under the EREG assignment 01999776 in CAS.

10 CFR 50.54(q}

Effectiveness Evaluation is not required. Enter justification and complete,

Part V & VI.

Continue to,

Part IV and address non editorial changes

t:IVlt:K~t:.NL;Y PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTJVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q) 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 A TI ACHMENT 4'1 Page.4 ot1 ' \\"

Part IV. Emergency Planning Element and Function Screen (Reference Attachment 1, Considerations for Addressing Screening Criteria)

Does this activity involve any of the following, including program elements from NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1 Section II? If answer is yes, then check box.

1 1 O CFR 50.4 7(b)(1) *Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control) 1a Responsibility for emergency response is assigned.

D 1b The response organization has the staff to respond and to augment staff on a continuing basis D

(24-7 staffing) in accordance with the emergency plan.

2 1 O CFR 50A 7(b )(2) Onsite Emergency Organization-,

2a Process ensures that onshift emergency response responsibilities are staffed and assigned D

2b The process for timely augmentation of onshift staff is established and maintained.

D 3,

10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) Emergency Response. Support* and* Resources:

3a Arrangements for requesting and using off site assistance have been made.

o*

3b' State and local staff can be accommodated at the EOF in accordance with the emergency plan.

D (NA forCR3) 4 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Emergency Classiflcatlon System*

4a A standard scheme of emergency classification and action levels is in use.

x

'~ (Requires final approval of Screen and Evaluation by EP CFAM.)

' 10-CFR 50.4 7(b )(5) Notification Methods and: Procedure&.:

Sa Procedures for notification of State and local governmental agencies are capable of initiating notification D

of the declared emergency within 15 minutes (60 minutes for CR3) after declaration of an emergency and providing follow-up notification.

Sb Administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions D

to the public within the plume exposure pathway. (NA for CR3)

Sc The public ANS meets the design requirements of FEMA-REP-10, Guide for Evaluation of Alert and D

Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, or complies with the licensee's FEMA-approved ANS design report and supporting FEMA approval letter. (NA for CR3)

t::Mt:K(:;l=NCY PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0) 10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT 4.

Page Soft~

Part IV. Emergency Planning Element and Function Screen (cont.)

6.

10 CFR 50.47(b){6) Emergency Communications*

6a Systems are established for prompt communication among principal emergency response d

organizations.

6b Systems are established for prompt communication to emergency response personnel.

0 7

10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) Public Education and Information***

7a Emergency preparedness information is made available to the public on a periodic basis within the 0

plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ). (NA for CR3) 7b Coordinated dissemination of public information during emergencies is established.

0 a:*

10 CFR50.47(b)(8) Emergency. Facilities: and Equipment,'*:*

Ba Adequate facilities are maintained to support emergency response.

0 8b Adequate equipment is maintained to support emergency response.

0 9

1 O CFR 50.4 7{b )(9) Accident Assessment.

9a Methods, systems, and equipment for assessment of radioactive releases are in use.

0 17~' 10CFR50.47(b)(10) Protective Response:~*

.:!tfUa A range of public PARs is available for implementation during emergencies. (NA for CR3) 0 10b Evacuation time estimates for the population located in the plume exposure pathway EPZ are available 0

to support the formulation of PARs and have been provided to State and local governmental authorities. (NA for CR3) 10c. A range of protective actions is available for plant emergency workers during emergencies, including 0

those for hostile action events.

10d Kl is available for implementation as a protective action recommendation in those jurisdictions that 0

chose to provide Kl to the public.

11*

1 O CFR 50.4 7(b )( 11) Radiological Exposure. Control*

11a The resources for controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers are established; 0

12 10 CFR 50.4.7(b}(12) Medical and Public Health Support

12a Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated, injured individuals.

D 13**

10 CFR 50.4 7(b)(13) Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations

13a Plans for recovery and reentry are developed.

0 14 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) Drills and* Exercises*

14a A drill and exercise program (including radiological, medical, health physics and other program areas) 0 is established.

14b Drills, exercises, and training evolutions that provide performance opportunities to develop, maintain, 0

and demonstrate key skills are assessed via a formal critique process in order to identify weaknesses.

14c Identified weaknesses are corrected.

0

,~t.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) Emergency Response Training*

Training is provided to emergency responders.

0

EMERGENCY PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT 4 *t.... _

Page 6 off' If.A/-

10 CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form Part IV. Emergency Planning Element and Function Screen (cont.)

16 10 CFR 50.47(b}(16) Emergency Plan Maintenance 16a Responsibility for emergency plan development and review is established.

D 16b Planners responsible for emergency plan development and maintenance are properly trained.

D PART IV. Conclusion If no Part IV criteria are checked, a 1 O CFR 50.54(q} Effectiveness Evaluation is not required, then complete D, 10 CFR 50.54(q} Screening Evaluation Form, Part V. Go to Attachment 4, 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Screening Evaluation Form, Part VI for instructions describing the NRC required 30 day submittal.

If any Attachment 4, 10CFR50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form, Part IV criteria are checked, then complete x, 10 CFR 50.54(q} Screening Evaluation Form, Part V and perform a 10 CFR 50.54(q}

Effectiveness Evaluation. Shaded block requires final approval of Screen and Evaluation by EP CFAM.

PartV; Signatures:'

Date:

~*~eparer Name (Print):

Preparer Signature:

-**~~-:'/ er Kuhlman

r;....; ~

\\~";;;£'* -----------------1---___;_ _ __;;___;__..._ ______ -+--------1

... Reviewer Name (Print):

Reviewer Signature:

Date:

Don Crowl

~ O\\S Approver (EP Manager Name (Print):

Date:

Pat Street 4

Approver (CFAM, as required) Name (Print)

Date:

Part VI. NRC Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Submittal Actions Create two EREG General Assignments.

One for EP to provide the 10 CFR 50.54(q) summary of the analysis, or the completed 10 CFR 50.54(q), to Licensing.

One for Licensing to submit the 1 O CFR 50.54(q} information to the NRC within 30 days after the change is put in effect.

QA RECORD j

th D

-D

c:1v1c:t<l:it:.N(.;Y 1-'LAN CHANGE SCREENING ANIJ" EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form ATIACHMENT 5

/,

Page 1 of/h,

Screening and Evaluation Number Applicable Sites

BNP D

EREG #: 02006495 CNS D

CR3 D

HNP D

MNS D

SAD#: 02006477 ONS x

RNP D

GO D

Document and Revision RP/O/AJ1000/001 Rev. 005 Emergency Classification Part I. Description of Proposed Change:

Changes to Procedure Bod~;

'.;;~Added new st~p 1.4.,7 clarifying PLANNED vs UN'.LANNED Events extracted from the guidance in NEI 99-01

rH* General Cons1derat1ons for the Emergency Coordinator to assess. (Response to AR 01965160-01). 7

2. p.2 Replaced 'Condition B' with 'Potential Failure (Condition B)'. Replaced 'Condition A' with 'Imminent Failure (Condition A)' due to terminology changes in the Hydro Dam Emergency Plans that were driven by Revised FERC Guiqelines for Dam Emergency Plans, (AR 01910389)

This change is being performed in parallel and to support the change to the Emergency Plan, Rev 2015-007 which has been evaluated and documented in AR 01979258, 10 CFR 50.54(q) Initiating Condition (IC) and Emergency Action Level (EAL) and EAL Yes x Bases Validation and Verification (V&V) Form, is attached (required for IC or EAL change)

No

[J

c:1v1t:t'(\\.:.it:NliY 1-'LAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

. 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Part II. Description and Review of Licensing Basis Affected by the Proposed Change:

ONS Emergency Plan Revision 2015*007(November)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATTACHMENT~ /

Page 2 of p 10 r-D.2 Initiating Conditions : Initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D-4. Classification procedure (RP/O/A/1000/001) provides the guidance necessary to classify events and promptly declare the appropriate emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to cognizant facility staff that an emergency action level threshold has been exceeded.

Specific response procedures are in place for the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification.

D.. 7 Contain the IC/EAL for Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting Keowee or Jocassee Hydro POTENTIAL FAILURE [Condition BJ and Imminent/actual dam failure exists involving any of the following:

Keowee Hydro Dam, Little River Dam, Dikes A,B,C,D, Intake Canal Dike, or Jocassee Dam - IMMINENT FAILURE

[Condition A J

.:~

i:1v1c:l"\\\\:Jt:Nv Y l""LAN L;HANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form ATIACHMENT 5 h Page 3 of~ t-Part Ill. Description of How the Proposed Change Complies with Regulation and Commitments.

If the emergency plan, modified as proposed, no longer complies with planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E to 1 O CFR Part 50, then ensure the change is rejected, modified, or processed as an exemption request under 10 CFR 50.12, Specific Exemptions, rather than under 10 CFR 50.54(q):

Regulations 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determin.ations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

10 CFR App E.IV.C.2 states (in part) By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level NUREG-0654, Criterion 0.1 and 0.2

1. An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix 1 must be established by the licensee. The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each

/"

ergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures. The plan shall Identify the parameter val.ues and uipment status for each emergency class.

2. The initiating conditions shall include the example conditions found in Appendix 1 and all postulated accidents in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the nuclear facility.

Compliance Change 1 added the step to provide the EC/SM with clarifying information to consider when reviewing IC/EAL's for planned evolutions which would not warrant an emergency declaration.

Change 2 adds terminology to Condition 'A' and 'B' that will be changing in 2016. The terminology 'Imminent Failure' and 'Potential Failure' are currently in the definitions of Condition 'A' and 'B'. Changes to the terms are a result of a change driven by FERC Hydro to more descriptive terms used to describe the status a dams when communicating to Offsite Response Organizations.

The ONS Emergency Plan has been previously evaluated to comply with regulations and guidance for emergency classification. Due to FERC initiative; the Division of Dam Safety and Inspections, Office of Energy Projects, has finalized revisions to chapter 6 of the Engineering Guidelines for Emergency Action Plans. Terminology was modified to be consistent with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program(HSEEP). The IC/EAL scheme has not changed but* information has been added that will enhance the EC/SM's ability to classify in a timely manner when notified by Duke Hydro of events that could lead to event declaration using the new terms under the FERC guidelines for Hydro Emergency Action Plans. Additionally, information is being provided for consideration when evaluating planned events that meet IC/EAL criteria that would conservatively not warrant an event declaration. The procedure, as revised, continues to comply with regulations and commitments.

t=IVll:K{:jt:Nt;Y PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form ATTACHMENT~'

Page 4 of,P V Part IV. Description of Emergency Plan Planning Standards, Functions and Program Elements Affected by the Proposed Change (Address each function identified in Attachment 4, 1 O CFR 50.54(q) Screening Evaluation Form, Part IV of associated Screen):

1 O CFR 50.47(b)(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures A standard emergency classification and action level scheme is established and maintained.

Part V. Description of Impact of the Proposed Change on the Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Functions:

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans

-~ for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response

-i];.i asures

1. Added new step 1.4.7 clarifying PLANNED vs UNPLANNED Events extracted from the guidance in NEI 99-01 on General Considerations for the Emergency Coordinator to assess. Response to AR 01965160-01

2. p.2 Replaced 'Condition B' with 'Potential Failure (Condition B)'. Replaced 'Condition A' with 'Imminent Failure (Condition A)' due to terminology changes in the Hydro Dam Emergency Plans that were driven by Revised FERC Guidelines for Dam Emergency Plans, No changes or deletions of information has been performed on the procedure but clarifying information has been provided/added therefore, there is no reduction in effectiveness.

Part VI. Evaluation Conclusion.

Answer the following questions about the proposed change.

1 Does the proposed change comply with 1 O CFR 50.4 7(b) and 1 O CFR 50 Appendix E?

YesX NoD 2

Does the proposed change maintain the effectiveness of the emergency plan (i.e., no YesX NoD reduction in effectiveness)?

3 Does the proposed change maintain the current Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme?

YesX NoD 4

Choose one of the following conclusions:

a The activity does continue to comply with the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.47(b) and 1 O CFR 50, Appendix E, and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness or change in the current x

Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme. Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior NRC

_ approval.

. th* activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.47(b) or 1 O CFR 50

Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness or EAL scheme change.

0 Therefore, the activity cannot be implemented without prior NRC approval.

t:Mt:Kl:iENCY PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0) 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Part VII. Disposition of Proposed Change Requiring Prior NRC Approval Will the proposed change determined to require prior NRC approval be either revised or rejected?

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev.1 ATIACHMENT 5 1_

Page 5 of J.. t7

,y I Yes D I No D If No, then initiate a License Amendment Request in accordance 10 CFR 50.90 and AD-LS-ALL-0002, Regulatory Correspondence, and include the tracking number:

t:Mt:.Kt:;l:NCY PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0) 10 CFR 50.54(q) Effectiveness Evaluation Form AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT~b Page 6 ofp 1 rr-Part VIII. Signatures: EP CFAM Final Approval is required for changes affecting risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

Preparer Name (Print):

Peter Kuhlman Reviewer Name (Print)

Don Crowl Approver (EP Manager) Name (Print):

Pat Street Approver (CFAM, as required) Name (Print):

Date:

Reviewer Signature{'--'"

~

~'::>

Appro er Signature:

N I'\\

If the proposed activity is a change to the E-Plan or implementing procedures, then create two EREG General Assignments.

One for EP to provide the 10 CFR 50.54(q) summary of the analysis, or the completed 10 CFR 50.54(q), to 0

Licensing.

One for Licensing to submit the 1 O CFR 50.54(q) information to the NRC within 30 days after the change is put in effect, D

QA RECORD

i=Mt:K<.;;t:N<.;Y PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(Q)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT6 Page 1 of 4 1 O CFR 50.54(q) Initiating Condition (IC) and Emergency Action Level (EAL) and EAL Bases Validation and Verification (V&V) Form Screening or Evaluation Number:

Part I. Identification of ICs and EALS Affected by Proposed Change:.7 (p. D-83), 4.7.U.2 (p.D-86), 4.7.U.3 (p. D-87), 4.7.S.2 (p. D-98): Added terms in brackets; Imminent Failure prior to Condition A, Potential failure prior to Condition B. In response to FERC terminology pending change Change done in parallel with Emergency Plan Rev 2015-007 documented under AR 01979258-03 Part II. Determination of Validation Method by Site EP Manager:

In-Plant Walkdown D

Tabletop D

Training D

Other (Specify)

.~

Simulator D

NA; Completed under AR 01979258-03 x

EP Manager Name (Print):

1Et-' M~ger Signature: I Date:

Pat Street

\\~~

tr/f//(p

?~~rt Ill. Validation. (Answers marked No require resolution)~

~ )

Validation Question--

Yes,:** No*

NA Resolution and Com men.ts*,

Readouts, alarms, indications. etc., available in D

D 0

the Control.Room?

Monitor, gauge, etc., designations are correct?

D D

0 Are correct units of measure displayed on the D

D 0

monitor; aauae, etc.?

All values are within instrumentation display D

D D

ranae?

Is instrument display finite enough to D

D 0

distinauish between values?

No miscellaneous issues we~e identified during 0

D 0

walkdown correct?

Part IV. Verification (Answers marked No require resolution)

Validation Question Yes NO" NA Resolution and Comments Is the IC/EAL change easy to use and does it flow well? Is sequencing logical and correct?

D D

D Is it written to appropriate level of detail and uham_biguous?

Is the IC/EAL Matrix legible and easy to use?

0 D

D

-~~ ~orrect units of measure displayed on the D

D D

1J:> niter, oauae, etc.?

. ~*

c:1v1c.~\\.;IC.l\\lvY t-'LAN t;HANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT6 Page 2 of 4 1 O CFR 50.54(q) Initiating Condition (IC) and Emergency Action Level (EAL) and EAL Bases Validation and Verification (V&V) Form Part IV. Verification (cont.) (No answers require resolution))

Validation Question;.

Yes.

No NA Resolution and Comments Instrumentation; Plant Computer System (PCS); and/or Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) points specified?

Correct instrument?

Correct units Adequate instrument range?

0 D

D Display unit readable?

Proper significant digits?

Instrument number and noun name provided?

Consistent with operations procedures1 References specified in EAL Technical 0

D. D Basis current and updated and source documents for inputs have been identified and verified to be appropriate for use?

Does the change avoid human performance D

D D

~:~allenges, latent weaknesses, and human

.irormance traps?

~~~;, No vague or missing critical detail(s).

Decisions are not over-reliant on knowledge for successful performance Modifications, Emergency Plan, EAL Technical D

D D

Basis, reference manual and procedure revisions, setpoint changes, software changes, training, etc. are appropriately scheduled to correspond to the EAL revision?

Are alarm setpoints equal to or below EAL D

D D

thresholds?

Do radiC!tfon monitor setpoints account for D

D D

background?

Part V. Comments:

t:.Ml:Kljl:NCY PLAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT6

( t 10 CFR 50.54(q) Initiating Condition (IC) and Emergency Action Level (EAL) =~~

8 E~~f 4

Bases Validation and Verification (V&V) Form Part VI. Completion Review and Approval Signatures Validation and Verification (Print Names) [Note1]:

Validation and Verification Signatures:

Date:

N/A Site EP Manager Review (Print Name):

~zs~

Date:

Pat Street 4/~k~

Senior Operations License Holder (Print Name):

~

Date:

Senior Operations c*

ns Holder Signature N/A Qualified Emergency Coordinator (Print Name):

Qualified Emergency Coordinator Signature:

Date:

N/A Engineering Review (Print Name) [Note2]:

Engineering Signature:

Date:

N/A

~t};;,SA Review (Print Name) [Note3]:

PSA Signature:

Date:

.,,~<;s,~A

~,;*

EP CFAM Review (Print Name):

EP CFAM Signature:

Date:

N/A

[BNP, CR3, HNP, RNP] Final PNSC Approval (Print

[BNP, CR3, HNP, RNP] PNSC Signature Date:

Name)

N/A

c:1v11:r<.~t:NliY 1-'LAN CHANGE SCREENING AND EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50.54(0)

AD-EP-ALL-0602 Rev. 1 ATIACHMENT6 Page 4 of 4 10 CFR 50.54(q) Initiating Condition (IC) and Emergency Action Level (EAL) and EAL Bases Validation and Verification (V&V) Form Part VII. NRC Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedure Submittal Actions If the proposed activity is a change to the E-Plan or implementing procedures, then create two EREG General Assignments.

One for EP to provide the 1 O CFR 50.54(q) summary of the analysis, or the completed 10 CFR50.54(q), to D

Licensing.

One for Licensing to submit the 10 CFR 50.54(q) information to the NRC within 30 days after the change is put in effect.

D Notes:

1. Validation and Verification can be performed by same individual but must be:

Qualified in the subject matter Separate from the author of change A cross-discipline reviewer

2. [BNP, CR3, HNP, RNP] System specific Engineering Review is required for EAL changes related to process equipment such as radiological instruments and environmental monitoring.

3. [BNP, HNP, RNP] PSA review is required for EAL changes to ensure any potential or actual impact to PSA

~ calculations or assumptions are adequately addressed. (Not applicable to CR3)

'!jjf)

QA RECORD

Duke Energy Company Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Site RP/0/A/1000/001 Revision No.

Emergency Classification 005 Ref ere nee Use Electronic Reference No.

OP009A63

Emergency Classification RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of6 NOTE:

This procedure is an implementing procedure to the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency P Ian and must be:

Reviewed in accordance with 1 OCFR50.54( q) by Emergency Preparedness prior to approval.

Cross Disciplinary Reviewed by Operations Forwarded to Emergency Preparedness within seven (7) working days of approval.

1. Symptoms 1.1 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

1.2 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and their corresponding Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

1.3 This procedure provides reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events.

1.4 The following guidance is to be used _by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in assessing emergency conditions:

1.4.1 Definitions and Acronyms are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition. The definitions are in Enclosure 4.10 (Definitions/Acronyms).

1.4,.2 The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director shall review all applicable

initiating events to ensure proper classification.

1.4.3 The BASIS Document (Volume A, Section D of the Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

1.4.4 IF,

THEN An event occurs on mote than one unit concurrently, The event with the higher classification will be classified on the Emergency Notification Form.

A. Information relating to the problem(s) on the other unit(s) will be captured on the Emergency Notification Form as shown in RP/O/A/1000/015A, (Offsite Communications From The Control Room),

RP/O/A/1000/015B, (Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center) or SR/O/A/2000/004, (Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility):

1.5 1.4.5 THEN An event occurs, RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 3of6 A lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, The classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.

1.4.6 The Fission Product Barrier Matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) or higher.

A. An event that is recognized at Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or lower shall not be classified using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.

1.

Reference should be made to the additional enclosures that provide Emergency Action Levels for specific events (e.g., Severe Weather, Fire, Security).

1.4.7 Planned vs. UNPLANNED Events IF THEN 1.5.l 1.5.2 A planned work activity that results in an expected event or condition which meets or exceeds an EAL does NOT warrant an emergency declaration provided that: 1) the activity proceeds as planned, and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain or modify a system or component. In these cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure that compliance is maintained with all aspects of the operating license provided that the activity proceeds and concludes as expected. Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirement of 10 CFR 50. 72 (ref.17).

A transient event should occur, Review the following guidance:

THEN THEN An Emergency Action Level (EAL) identifies a specific duration The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded, (i.e.;

condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses),

Classify the event.

A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, The event is NOT classified by that EAL.

A. Review lower severity EALs for possible applicability in these cases.

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 4 of6 NOTE:

Reporting under 10CFR50.72 may be required for the following step. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

1.5.3 1.5.4 THEN A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g.; as a result of routine log or record review)

The condition no longer exists, An emergency shall NOT be declared.

Refer to AD-LS-ALL-0006 (Notification/Reportability Evaluation) for reportability An emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification THEN The Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g.; Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on shift personnel through activation of the Emergency Response Organization.

A. IF An Unusual Event condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required.

1.

B. IF The event may be terminated in the same notification or as a separate termination notification.

An Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required, AND Activate the Emergency Response Organization.

1.6 Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment determines that the Emergency Action Levels for the Initiating Condition have been exceeded.

2. Immediate Actions 2.1 Assessment, classification and declaration of any applicable emergency condition should be completed within 15 minutes after the availability of indications or information to cognizant facility staff that an EAL threshold has been exceeded.

RP/0/ All 000/001 Page 5of6 2.2 Determine the operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response to the event.

2.3 The unit is at Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) or higher AND The condition/event affects fission product barriers, THEN GO TO Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).

2.3.1 Review the criteria listed in Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and make the determination ifthe event should be classified).

2.4 Review the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.

2.5 2.4.l One or more categories are applicable to the event, THEN

. Refer to the associated enclosures.

2.4.2 Review the EALs and determine if the event should be classified.

THEN A. IF An EAL is applicable to the event, THEN Classify the event as required.

The condition requires an emergency classification, Initiate the following:

for Control Room - RP/01All000/002, (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure)

for TSC - RP/O/A/1000/019, (Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure)

for EOF - SR/O/A/2000/003, (Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility) 2.6 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.

3. Subsequent Actions 3.1 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.

4.

Enclosures Enclosures 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix 4.2 System Malfunctions 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluents

4.4 Loss Of Shutdown Functions 4.5 Loss of Power 4.6 Fires/Explosions And Security Actions RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 6of6 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 4.8 Radiation Monitor Readings For Emergency Classification 4.9 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings 4.10 Definitions 4.11 Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications 4.12 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 4.13 References

.1 RP/0/A/1000/001 Page I of 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW:

ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY.

SEE NOTE BELOW RCS BARRIERS (BD 5-7)

FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (BD 8-9)

CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD 10-13)

Potential Loss (4 Points)

Loss (5 Points)

Potential Loss (4 Points)

Loss (5 Points)

Potential Loss (1 Point)

Loss (3 Points)

RCS Leakrate ~ 160 gpm RCS Leak rate that results in a loss Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC ;;, 1200° F ;;, 15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of subcooling.

CETC;;,700°F

, 1200°F OR pressure decrease after increase CETC

2! 700° F;: ::: 15 minutes with a OR valid RVLS reading O" containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR ~ 160 gpm Valid RVLS reading of O" Coolant activity;;, 300 µCi/ml DEi RB pressure;:::: 59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG OR results in a direct opening to the RB pressure ;:::: I 0 psig and no RBCU environment with SG Tube Leak NOTE: RVLS is NOT or RBS

, 10 gpm in the SAME SG valid if either of the following exists

Entry into the PTS (Pressurized IRIA 57 or 58 reading~ 1.0 Rfhr

One or more RCPs are Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 SG Tube Leak 2:: 10 gpm exists in Thermal Shock) Operation running Since SD R/hr R/hr Since SD R/hr R/hr oneSG.

NOTE: PTS is entered under 2 RIA 57 reading;;, 1.6 Rlhr OR AND either of the following:

2 RIA 58 reading~ 1.0 Rfhr

If LPI pump(s) are 0-<0.5

~300

~ 150 0 *<0.5

~ 1800

~860 the other SG has secondary side running AND taking failure that results in a direct

. A cooldown below 400°F@

opening to the environment

> 100°F/hr. has occurred.

3RIA 57 or 58 reading<! 1.0 RJh, suction from the LPI 0.5 -< 2.0

80

~ 40 0.5-<2.0

~400

~ 195 AND is being fed from the drop line.

affected unit.

. HPI has operated in the 2.0-8.0

~ 32

~ 16 2.0-8.0

~280

~ 130 injection mode while NO RCPs were operating.

HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike";:: 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration-;:: 9%

Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EDF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 Total Points)

ALERT l4-6 Total Points)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-10 Total Points)

GENERAL EMERGENCY lll-13 Total Points)

OPERA TING MODE: I, 2, 3. 4 OPERATING l\\IODE: 1, 2, 3. 4 OPERATING MODE: 1.2, 3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1. 2, 3,4 4.1.U.l Any potential loss of Containment 4.1.A.l Any potential loss or loss of the RCS 4.1.S.l Loss of any two barriers 4.1.G.l Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrier 4.1.U.2 Any loss of containment 4.1.A.2 Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel 4.1.S.2 Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either Clad RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers 4.1.G.2 Loss of all three barriers 4.1.S.3 Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers NOTE:. An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

. Referencing this matrix frequently will aid in determining a fission barrier failure or other upgrade criteria.

UNUSUAL EVENT

1.

RCS LEAKAGE (BD 15)

OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 A.

Unidentified leakage~ 10 gpm B.

Pressure boundary leakage~ 10 gpm C.

Identified leakage~ 25 gpm

. Includes SG tube leakage

2.

UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/

INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM FOR> 15 MINUTES (BD 16)

OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3,4 A.

U11pla11nedloss of> 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for> 15 minutes:

Units 1 &J I SAi, 2. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 Unit2 2 SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, & 16 A.ND Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to safely operate the unit (CONTINUED).2 System Malfunctions ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1.

UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/

1.

INABILITY TO MONITOR A INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT IN (BD20)

PROGRESS (BD 22)

OPERA TING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3,4 A.

Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following A.

Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for> 15 minutes:

annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes:

Units 1 &3 Units I &3 I SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 I SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 Unit2 Unit2 2 SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, & 16 2 SAi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, & 16 A.ND

!Yfil.

Loss of annunciators or indicators requires A significant lransieut is in progress additional personnel (beyond nonnal shift complement) to safely operate the unit AND AND Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications Significant plant transient in progress AND OR lnabiliry to directly monitor any one of the following functions:

Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications I.

Subcriticality (END)

2.

Core Cooling

3.

Heat Sink

4.

RCS Integrity

5.

Containment Integrity

6.

RCS Inventory (END)

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page I of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY

UNUSUAL EVENT

3.

INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN LIMITS (BD 17)

OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 A.

Required operating mode not reached within TS LCO action statement time

4.

UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS (BD 18)

OPERATINGMODE: All A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Plant phone system, PA system, Pager system, Onsite Radio system) affecting ability to perform Routine operations B.

Loss of alt onsite communications capability (DEMNET, NRC ETS lines, Offsite Radio System, AT&T line) affecting ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

5.

FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION (BD 19)

=

OPERATING MODE: All:

A.

DEi - >5µCi/ml (END)

ALERT.2 System Malfunctions SITE AREA EMERGENCY RP/0/ A/1000/001 Page 2 of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY

UNUSUAL EVENT I

ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF I.

GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TOTHE ENVIRONMENTTHAT EXCEEDS lWO TIMES THE SLC LIMITS FOR 60 MINUTES OR LONGER OPERATING MODE: All A.

Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 of~ 4.06E+06 cpm for> 60 minutes A.

(See Note 1)

B.

Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA-45 of.2:. 9.35E+o5 cpm or RP sample reading of B

2:_6.62E-2uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for> 60 minutes (See Note 1)

C.

Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure D.

Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.2 for> 60 minutes as C.

determined by RP Procedure NOTE 1: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation Monitor reading.

(CONTINUED).3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF I.

BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY ACTUAL/IMMINENT RELEASE OF TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 35)

EXCEEDS 200 TIMES RADIOLOGICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 30)

OPERATING MODE: All A

Valid reading on RIA 46 of.:::.2.09E+05 cpm or OPERATING MODE: All RIA 56 reading of::: 17.5 R!hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+Ol uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for> 15 Valid indication of RIA-46 of<: 2.09 E+ 04 minutes (See Note 2) cpm or RP sample reading of2:::, 6.62 uCi/ml Xe 133 eqfor> 15 minutes. (See Note 1)

B.

Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on.8 (See Note 2)

RIA 33 HIGH Alarm C.

Dose calculations result in a dose projection at AND the sile boundary of:

Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200

,, 100 mRem TEDE times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for> 15 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure OR Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 500 mRem CDE adult thyroid times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >15 minutes as determined by RP Procedure D.

Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding ~100 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR (CONTINUED)

Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of ~ 500 mRem CDE (3.84 E"7 µCi/ml) for one hour of inhalation NOTE 2: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

(CONTINUED)

I.

A B.

C.

D.

RP/0/ A/1000/001 Pagel of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUAL/ IMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 39)

OPERATING MODE: All Valid reading on RIA 46 of::: 2.09E+-06 cpm or RIA 56 reading of:::, 175 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+o2uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for 2: 15 minutes (See Note 3)

Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on.8 (See Note 3)

Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of:

,, I 000 mRem TEDE OR

,, 5000 mRem CDE adult thyroid Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding ~I 000 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of: ::?: 5000 mRem CDE for one hour of inhalation NOTE 3: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

(END)

UNUSUAL EVENT 2

UNEXPECfEDINCREASEINPLANT RADIATION OR AffiBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 27)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

LT S reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B.

Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND Unplanned Valid RIA 3, 6 or Portable Area

~fonitor readings increase.

C.

1 R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI D.

Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9.

NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4.* (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

(END).3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2.

RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE

2.

LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE 11-IATERIAL OR INCREASES IN REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR RADIATION LEVELS THAT IMPEDES WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE OPERATION OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED REACTOR VESSEL (BD38)

TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN COLD OPERATING MODE: 5. 6 SHUTDOWN (BD 32)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by A.

Valid radiation reading :2: IS mRad/hr in CR, the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 200° F CAS, or Radwaste CR B.

Unplanned/unexpected valid area monitor AND readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 LT 5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS NOTE: These readings may also be indicative of I

makeup Fission Product Barrier concerns which makes a review of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by necessary.

B.

the inability to maintain RCS temperature

3.

MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED below200°F FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE AND UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL Either train ultrasonic level indication less than (BD33)

O inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS OPERATING MODE: All makeup A.

ValidRlA 3*, 6, 41, OR49* HIGH Alarm NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also

- Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

B.

HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge C.

Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered D.

Operators determine water level drop in either (END))

the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

(END)

RPJ0J A/1000/00 I Page 2 of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY

.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I.

FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR

1.

FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 44)

INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 50)

OPERATING MODE I. 2, 3 OPERATING MODE: 1,2 (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

A Valid reactor trip signal received or required A.

Valid reactor trip signal received or required

\\VITHOlff automatic scram

\\VITHOUT automatic scram AND AND DSS has inserted Control Rods OR DSS has NOT inserted Control Rods

~Ianual trip from the Control Room is successful and reactor power is less AND than 5% and decreasing Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing

2.

INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PLANT IN

2.

COMPLETE LOSS OF FUNCTION MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD46)

NEEDED TO AClllEVE OR MAINTAIN MODE 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN) (BD 51)

OPERATING !\\!ODE: 5, 6 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2. 3,4 A.

Loss of LP! and/or LPSW A.

Average of the 5 highest CETCs ~1200° F AND shown on ICCM Inability to maintain RCS temperature B.

Unable to maintain reactor subcritical below 200° Fas indicated by either of the following:

C.

Inability to feed SGs prior to RCS pressure RCS temperature at the LPI Pump Suction reaching 2300 psig AND OR HP! Forced Cooling degraded by any of the Average of the S highest CETCs as indicated following:

by ICCM display

. Unacceptable HPI flow/pressure in either header per EOP Rule 4 OR

. Only 1 HP! Pump available

. Either PORV ("RC-66) and/or PORV Visual obseIYation Block (*RC-4) closed (CONTINUED)

(CONTINUED)

I.

A.

AND AND RP/0/A/1000/001 Page I of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND MANUAL OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 Valid Rx trip signal received or required MTHOUT automatic scram Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT successful in reducing reactor power to < 5% and decreasing Average of the 5 highest CETCs ~1200° F on!CCM (END)

UNUSUAL EVENT I.

UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT RADIATION OR AffiBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 42)

OPERATINGMODE: All A.

LT S reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B.

Valid indication of 1mco111rolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND Unplanned Valid RIA 3, 6 or Portable Area f\\..Ionitor readings increase.

c.

1 Rfhr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI D.

Va/;d area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9.

NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3., (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation levels wilt also be seen with this condition.

(END).4 Loss of Shutdown Functions ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3.

MAJOR DAMAGE TO ffiRADIA TED

3.

LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT INTHE WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL REACTOR VESSEL (BD52)

OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD48)

OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OPERATING MODE: All A.

Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature A.

Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41, OR49* HIGH Alarm below200° F

Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only AND B.

HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS main bridge or SFP bridge Makeup B.

Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by c

Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel the inability to maintain RCS temperature uncovered below200° F D.

Operators determine water level drop in either

~

the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel wilt Either train ultrasonic level indication less than be uncovered 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located makeup in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation (END) levels will also be seen with this condition.

(END)

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY

UNUSUAL EVENT I.

LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER TO I.

ESSENTIAL RUSSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD55)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

Unit auxiliaries are being supplied from Keowee or CT5 A.

AND AND Inability to energize either MFB from an offsite source (either switchyard) within 15 minutes.

2.

UNPLANNED LOSS OF REQUIRED DC POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 56)

OPERATING MODE: 5. 6 A.

U11p/anned loss of vital DC power to required DC bosses as indicated by bus voltage less A.

than llOVDC AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss (END).5 Loss of Power

{4}

ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND I.

LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL RUSSES (BD 57)

ESSENTIAL RUSSES (BD59)

OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 Defueled A.

MFB 1 and 2 de-energized MFB 1 and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one MFB Failure to restore power to at least one fvlFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both both offsite and onsite AC power offsite and onsite AC power AC POWER CAPABILITY TO

2.

LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER ESSENTIAL RUSSES REDUCED TO A (BD 60)

SINGLE SOURCE FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 58)

OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 A.

Unplanned loss ofvi1al DC power to required DC bosses as indicated by bus voltage less than AC power capability has been degraded to a llOVDC single power source for > 15 minutes due to the loss of all but one of the following:

AND Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)

Failure to restore power to at least one required Unit SU Transformer DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss Another Unit SU Transformer (aligned)

CT4 (END)

CT5 (END)

I.

A.

AND AND RP/0/A/1000/001 Page I of I GENERAL EMERGENCY PROLONGED LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER AND ONSITE AC POWER (BD62)

OPERATING MODE: I, 2, 3, 4 MFB 1 and 2 de-energized SSF fails to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby)

{I}

At least one of the following conditions exist:

Restoration of power to at least one MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is NOT likely OR Indications of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring (END)

Loss of Power - Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. ex. - If both MFBs, are energized but all 4 l 60V switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.

{4}

UNUSUAL EVENT I.

FIRES/EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE PLANT (BD65)

OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: Within the plant means:

Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Reactor Building Keowee Hydro Transformer Yard BJT B4T Service Air Diesel Compressors Keowee Hydro & associated Transformers SSF A

Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification or verification of a Control Room alarm B.

Unanticipated explosion within the plant resulting in visible damage to permanent structures/equipment

. includes steam line break and FDW line break (Continued)

I.

I A.6 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions (2) (3)

ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY FIRE/EXPLOSION AFFECTING OPERABILITY OF PLANT SAFETY (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

SYSTEMS REQUffiED TO ESTABLISH/!llAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN (BD70)

OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: Only one train of a system needs to I

be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

Firdexplosions AND Affected safety~related system parameter indications show degraded performance OR Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown (Continued)

RP/0/ A/1000/001 Page 1 of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

UNUSUAL EVENT

2.

CONFIRMED SECURITY CONDITION 2

OR THREAT WHICH INDICATES A POTENTIAL DEGRADATION IN THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE PLANT (BD67)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

A Security condition that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.

B.

A credible site-specific security threat notification C.

A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat

3.

OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEl\\IENT OF TIIE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A NOUE. (BD69)

A.

OPERATINGl\\IODE: All A.

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

(END).6 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions

{2) {3)

ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I

HOSTILE ACTION WITHIN THE I.

HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED OWNER CONTROLLED AREA OR AREA (BD76)

AIRBORNE ATTACK THREAT. {BD72)

OPERATINGMODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has A.

A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as AREA as reported by the Security Shift reported by the Security Shift Supervision.

Supervision.

A validated notification from NRC of an

2.

OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY AIRLINER attack threat within 30 minutes of DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION the site.

OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY. (BD 78)

OPERATING MODE: All OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE A.

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT the Emergency Director indicate that events are in DECLARATION OF A.N ALERT (BD75) progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for OPERATING MODE: All protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious Other conditions exist which in the judgment of acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that the Emergency Director indicate that events are could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that in progress or have occurred which involve an prevent effective access to equipment needed for actual or potential substantial degradation of the protection of the public. Any releases are not the level of safety of the plant or a security expected to result in exposure levels which event that involves probable life threatening exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline risk to site personnel or damage to site exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION.

Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

(END)

I.

A.

B.

2.

A.

RP/0! All 000/001 Page 2 of2 GENERAL EMERGENCY A HOSTILE ACTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY (BD79)

OPERATINGMODE: All A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and l:M!vllNENT fuel damage is likely for a FRESHLY OFF-LOADED REACTOR CORE in pool.

OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A GENERAL El\\IERGENCY. {BD 81)

OPERATING MODE: All Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

{END)

UNUSUAL EVENT

1.

NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PROTECTED AREA (BD83)

OPERATING MODE: All A

Tremor felt and valid alarm on the strong motion accelerograph B

Tornado striking within Protected Area Boundary C.

Vehicle crash into plant structures/systems within the Protected Area Boundary D.

Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals (CONTINUED).7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I.

NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PLANT (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

"1TAL AREA (BD 89)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (0.05g)

NOTE: Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy these conditions.

B.

Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic event AND Visible damage to pennanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit OR Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance.

(CONTINUED)

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page I of3 GENERAL EMERGENCY (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

UNUSUAL EVENT

2.

NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING KEOWEE HYDRO POTENTIAL FAILURE (CONDITION B) (BD 85)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

Reservoir elevation~ 805.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise B.

Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particles c

New area of seepage or wetness, with large amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments D.

Slide or other movement of the dam or abutments which could develop into a failure E.

Developing failure involving the powerhouse or appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable

3.

NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING JOCASSEE HYDRO POTENTIAL FAILURE (CONDITION B) (BD86)

OPERATINGMODE: All A.

POTENTIAL FAILURE (Condition B) has been declared for the Jocassee Dam (CONTINUED).7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2.

RELEASE OF TOXIC/FLAl\\IMABLE I.

CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION AND GASES JEOPARDIZING SYSTEMS PLANT CONTROL CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE ESTABLISHED (BD 96)

OPERATION OR ESTABLISW MAINTAIN MODE 5 (COLD OPERATINGMODE: All SHUTDOWN) (BD91)

A.

OPERATING MODE: All Control Room evacuation has been initiated A.

Report/detection of toxic gases in AND concentrations that will be life-threatening to plant personnel Control of the plant cannot be established from B.

Report/detection of flammable gases in the Aux Shutdown Panel or the SSF within 15 minutes concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant:

. Reactor Building

2.

KEOWEE HYDRO DAM FAILURE

. Auxiliary Building (BD 97)

. Turbine Building

. Control Room OPERATING MODE: All A.

Imminent/actual dam failure exists involving

3.

TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD (BD 93) any of the following:

OPERATING MODE: All

. Keowee Hydro Dam

. Little River Dam A.

Turbine Building flood requiring use of

Dikes A, B, C, or D

Intake Canal Dike AP/1,2,3/Afl 700/10, (Turbine Building Flood)

Jocassee Dam -IMl\\fiNENT FAILURE (Condition A)

4.

CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS BEEN INITIATED (BD94)

(CONTINUED)

OPERATING MODE: All A.

Evacuation of Control Room AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Plant control IS established from the Aux shutdown Panel or the SSF OR Plant control IS BEING established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or SSF (CONTINUED)

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 2 of3 GENERAL EMERGENCY (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

UNUSUAL EVENT

4. RELEASE OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES DEEMED DETRIMENT AL TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE PLANT (BD 87)

OPERATINGMODE: All A.

Report/detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in B.

Report by local, county, state officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event

5.

OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT (BD 88)

OPERATING MODE:

All A.

Emergency Coordinator determines potential degradation of level of safety has occurred (END).7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

5.

OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT

3.

OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT CLASSIFICATION OF AN ALERT DECLARATION OF SITE AREA (BD95)

EMERGENCY (BD 98)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A.

Emergency Coordinator judgment indicates A.

Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director that:

judgment Plant safety may be degraded (END)

AND Increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted (END)

I.

A.

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 3 of3 GENERAL EMERGENCY OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT DECLARATION OF GENERAL EMERGENCY (BD 99)

OPERATING MODE: All Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment indicates:

Actual/imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment OR Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that would result in a dose projection at the site boundary greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid (END)

l~uOURS SINCE A ~A* A-

__ rJ<.D 0.0 -< 0.5 0.5 - < 1.0 1.0 - < 1.5 1.5 - < 2.0 2.0-< 2.5 2.5-<3.0 3.0-<3.5 3.5-<4.0 4.0 - < 8.0

RIA 58 is partially shielded.8 Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO RIA 57R/hr RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1of1 RIA58 R/hr*

Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 l.1E+003 l.1E+004 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 1.0E+003 1.0E+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 1.0E+003 1.0E+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003

.9 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1of1 NOTE:

This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.; incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).

UNITS 1, 2,3 MONITOR NUMBER UNUSUAL EVENT lOOOx ALERT NORMALLEVELSmRAD/HR mRAD/HR RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop Elevation 796 150

~ 5000 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab Elevation 796 4200

~ 5000 RIA 10, Primary Sample Hood Elevation 796 830

~ 5000 RIA 11, Change Room Elevation 796 210

~ 5000 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank Elevation 783 800

~ 5000 RIA 13, Waste Disposal Sink Elevation 771 650

~ 5000 RIA 15, HPI Room Elevation 758 NOTE*

~ 5000 NOTE:

RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis. Applying lOOOx normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an Unusual Event. For this reason, an Unusual Event will NOT be declared for a reading less than 5000 mRad/hr.

.10 Definitions/ Acronyms

1. List of Definitions and Acronyms NOTE:

Definitions are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition.

RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1of5 1.1 ALERT - Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that invo Ives probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

1.2 BOMB - Refers to an explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.

1.3 COGNIZANT FACILITY STAFF - any member of facility staff, who by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensee's emergency classification scheme. (Does not include staff whose positions require they report, rather than assess, abnormal conditions to the facility.)

1.4 CIVIL DISTURBANCE - A group of persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.

1.5 EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

1.6 EXTORTION - An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

1. 7 FIRE - Combustion characterized by heat and ~ight. Sources of smoke, such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment, do NOT constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

1.8 FRESHLY OFF-LOADED CORE -The complete removal and relocation of all fuel assemblies from the reactor core and placed in the spent fuel pool. (Typical of a "No Mode" operation during a refuel outage that allows safety system maintenance to occur and results in maximum decay heat load in the spent fuel pool system).

1.9 GENERAL EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate area.

1.10 HOSTAGE - A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.

.10 Definitions/ Acronyms RP /0 I All 000/001 Page 2of5 1.11 HOSTILE ACTION - An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes HOSTAGES, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES,.

vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.)

1.12 HOSTILE FORCE - One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault,.

overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

1.13 IMMINENT - Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. Where IMMINENT timeframes are specified, they shall apply.

1.14 IMMINENT FAILURE (CONDITION A)-The IMMINENT FAILURE emergency level indicates that time has run out, and the dam has failed, is failing or is about to fail.

IMMINENT FAIL URE typically involves a continuing and progressive loss of material from the dam. It is NOT usually possible to determine how long a complete breach of a dam will take. Therefore, once a decision is made that there is no time to prevent failure, the IMMINENT FAIL URE warning must be issued. For purposes of evacuation, emergency management authorities should assume the worst-case condition that failure has already occured. (Ref; Jocassee Hydro Station - Emergency Action Plan) 1.15 INTRUSION -A person(s) present in a specified area without authorization. Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication ofINTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.

1.16 INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR - Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are NOT readily available to the operator.

1.17 LOSS OF POWER - Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. Ex. -If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160v switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.

1.18 POTENTIAL FAILURE (CONDITION B)-The POTENTIAL FAILURE emergency level indicates that conditions are developing at the dam that could lead to a dam failure.

Some examples are (1) rising reservoir levels that are approaching the top of the non-overflow section of the dam, (2) transverse cracking of an embankment, and (3) a verified bomb threat.

POTENTIAL FAIL URE should convey that time is available for analyses, decisions and actions before the dam could fail. A failure may occur, but predetermined response actions may moderate or alleviate failure. (Ref; Jocassee Hydro Station - Emergency Action Plan) 1.19 PROJECTILE - An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

1.20 PROTECTED AREA - Typically the site specific area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence.

.10 Definitions/ Acronyms RP/0/Nl000/001 Page 3of5 1.21 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE - RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13:

RCS leakage includes leakage from connected systems up to and including the second normally closed valve for systems which do not penetrate containment and the outermost isolation valve for systems which penetrate containment.

A. Identified LEAKAGE LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).

LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals, gaskets, or valve packing (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank; LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE): Primary to secondary LEAKAGE must be included in the total calculated for identified LEAKAGE.

B. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE.

C. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.

1.22 RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator) - Existence of Primary to Secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

1.23 SABOTAGE - Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

1.24 SECURITY CONDITION - Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

1.25 SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AREA-Any area within the Protected area which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

1.26 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT (SLC) -Chapter 16 of the FSAR

.10 Definitions/ Acronyms RP/0/ All 000/001 Page 4 of5 1.27 SIGNIFICANT PLANT TRANSIENT-An unplanned event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback>25% thermal reactor power (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load (3) Reactor Trip

( 4) Safety Injection System Activation 1.28 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious act; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevents effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the Site Boundary.

1.29 SITE BOUNDARY - That area, including the Protected Area, in which DPC has the authority to control all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property (1 mile radius from the center of Unit 2).\\

1.3 0 TOXIC GAS - A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.; Chlorine).

1.31 UNCONTROLLED - Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.

1.32 UNPLANNED -

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

1.33 UNUSUAL EVENT - Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

1.34 VALID - An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1) an instrument channel check; or, (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation; or, (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit with this definition is the need for timely assessment.

1.35 VIOLENT - Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.

.10 Definitions/ Acronyms RP/0/ All 000/00 I Page 5of5 1.36 VISIBLE DAMAGE -Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture.

1.37 VITAL AREA - An area within the protected area where an individual is required to badge in to gain access to the area and that houses equipment important for nuclear safety. The failure or destruction of this equipment could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

MODE 1

2 3

4 5

6.11 Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications MODES REACTIVITY

%RATED CONDITION THERMAL TITLE POWER(a)

(Ke ff)

Power Operation 2:0.99

>5 Startup 2:0.99

5 Hot Standby

<0.99 NA Hot Shutdown (b)

< 0.99 NA Cold Shutdown (b)

<0.99 NA Refueling ( c)

NA NA (a) Excluding decay heat.

(b) All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

( c) One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned RP/0/A/1000/001 Page 1of1 AVERAGE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE (of)

NA NA 2:250 250 > T > 200

200 NA

.12 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 RP /0 I All 0001001 Page I of2

1. Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 - Fission Product Barrier Matrix I.1 If the unit was at Hot SID or above, (Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4) and one or more fission product barriers have been affected, refer to Enclosure 4. I, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and review the criteria listed to determine ifthe event should be classified.

I. I. I For each Fission Product Barrier, review the associated EALs to determine ifthere is a Loss or Potential Loss of that barrier.

NOTE:

An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss thresholds is imminent (i.e. within 1-3 hours). In this situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

I.2 Three possible outcomes exist for each barrier. No challenge, potential loss, or loss.

Use the worst case for each barrier and the classification table at the bottom of the page to determine appropriate classification.

I.3 The numbers in parentheses out beside the label for each column can be used to assist in determining the classification. If no EAL is met for a given barrier, that barrier will have 0 points. The points for the columns are as follows:

Barrier Failure Points RCS Potential Loss 4

Loss 5

Fuel Clad Potential Loss 4

Loss 5

Containment Potential Loss 1

Loss 3

I.3. I To determine the classification, add the highest point value for each barrier to determine a total for all barriers. Compare this total point value with the numbers in parentheses beside each classification to see which one applies.

.12 RP 10 I All 0001001 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 Page 2of2 1.3.2 Finally as a verification of your decision, look below the Emergency Classification you selected. The loss and/or potential loss EALs selected for each barrier should be described by one of the bullet statements.

EXAMPLE: Failure to properly isolate a 'B' MS Line Rupture outside containment, results in extremely severe overcooling.

Barrier RCS Fuel Clad Containment PTS entry conditions were satisfied.

Stresses on the 'B' S/G resulted in failure of multiple S/G tubes.

RCS leakage through the S/G exceeds available makeup capacity as indicated by loss of subcooling margin.

EAL Failure Points SGTR > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in Potential Loss 4

normal makeup mode with letdown isolated Entry into PTS operating range Potential Loss 4

RCS leak rate> available makeup capacity as Loss 5

indicated by a loss of subcooling No EALs met and no justification for No 0

classification on judgment Challenge Failure of secondary side of SG results in a Loss 3

direct opening to the environment RCS _2_ +Fuel _Q_ + Containment __J__ =Total ___B.

A. Even though two Potential Loss EALs and one Loss EAL are met for the RCS barrier, credit is only taken for the worst case (highest point value) EAL, so the points from this barrier equal 5.

B. No EAL is satisfied for the Fuel Clad Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 0.

C. One Loss EAL is met for the Containment Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 3.

D. When the total points are calculated the result is 8, therefore the classification would be a Site Area Emergency.

E. Look in the box below "Site Area Emergency". You have identified a loss of two barriers. This agrees with one of the bullet statements.

The classification is correct.

1.13 References

References:

1.

PIP 0-05-02980

2.

PIP 0-05-4697

3.

PIP 0-06-0404

4.

PIP 0-06-03347

5.

PIP 0-09-00234

6.

PIP 0-10-1055

7.

PIP 0-10-01750

8.

PIP 0-11-02811

9.

PIP 0-12-1590

10.

PIP 0-10-7809

11.

PIP 0-12-9201

12.

PIP 0-12-9198

13.

PIP 0-12-11227

14.

PIP 0-14-10064 and PIP 0-14-11470

15.

PIP 0-13-6662

16.

PIP 0-14-13933

17.

10 CFR 50.72

18.

Jocassee Hydro Station - Emergency Action Plan RP ;0IAl1000/001 Page 1of1