NUREG-0754, Requests Commission Approval of Issuance of Draft Fr Notice Requiring Documentation of Deviations from SRP & Draft NUREG-0754, Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors. Related Documentation Encl

Requests Commission Approval of Issuance of Draft Fr Notice Requiring Documentation of Deviations from SRP & Draft NUREG-0754, Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors. Related Documentation Encl

ML19284C794
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/08/1981
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML19284C795	List: ML20003A098 NUREG-0754, Requests Commission Approval of Issuance of Draft Fr Notice Requiring Documentation of Deviations from SRP & Draft NUREG-0754, Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors. Related Documentation Encl
References
REF-10CFR9.7, TASK-PICM, TASK-SE SECY-81-013, SECY-81-13, NUDOCS 8101210524
Download: ML19284C794 (18)

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SECY-81-13 January 8,1981 (i(&) w d g i

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POLICY ISSUE s

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(Commission Meeting) s For:

The Cotanissioners

,j From:

William J. Dircks

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Executive Director for Operations y

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Subject:

SYSTEriATIC SAFETY, EVALUATION OF ALL CURRENTLY OPERATIi4G fiUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

Purpose:

To request Cociaission approval of the issuance of tne following items:

(1) a draft Federal Register notice for a final rule requiring occumentation of deviations from tne Stancard Review Plan, HUREG-75/087; (2) a oetailed plan to implement the systematic safety evaluation of currently operating nuclear power reactors as a draft huREG Report for public cosaent; (3) a Federal Register notice announcin9 the availability of and requesting coi%ents on the draft liuREG report; (4) a public announcement on the issuance of the final rule and draft NuREG report; and (5) letters to Con-gress on the issuance of the final rule and draft NUREG report.

These items are part of the staff's program to aadress the require-ments of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, the NRC FY-80 Authori-zation Bill.

Background:

On September 9, 1960, the staff suomitteo an Action Paper (SECY 414) entitled "Systewatic Safety Evaluation of All currently Operating Nuclear Power Reactors" to tne Coninission.

In this paper the staff requested approval of the proposea conceptual elements of a plan designed to meet the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, the HRC FY-80 Authorization dill. The Couaission met on September lo, 19 and 22 to discuss that paper and another relatea program, which will require the documentation of deviations from tne Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-75/067, by all licensees and applicants. These aiscussions resulted in tne issuance of the 90-aay status report to Congress (Enclosure 1), as required by Section 110(c) of PuDlic Law 96-295, on September 30, 1980, and in tne pub-lication of a iiotice of Proposea Rulemaking in the Federal Register on October 9, 1980 (FR 67099, Enclosure 2).

decause of the nexus of tne subject of the Federal Register notice to the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 90-293, wnich includes tne ioentification of ano documentation of compliance to the rebulations of particular safety significance, tne language in tne notice of proposeo rulemaking was cnosen to track that of U 01210 %

. the 90-day status report and thus, to be fully compatible with the language in the Public Law. Also, as presented in both Enclo-sures 1 and 2, the " Revised SRP " scheauled to be issued in April 1981, was explicitly designed and defined to be equivalent to the

" Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff technical positions," which is the language that the Public Law used to indicate compliance with the regulations.

The actions outlined in the Federal _ReJ ster Hotice of proposed i

rulemaking are fully concordant with the requirements of Subsec-tions 110(b)(1) and (2) of the law for all reactors operating as of June 30, 1980. This notice further extended the same require-ments to apply to all reactors issuea operating licenses in the near future and would impose full documentation requirements on all other reactors in the licensing process. Also, as stated in the 90-day status report, the documentation program will be inte-grated with an existing safety issues study of the 11 oldest reac-tors, (Phase II of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP)), and with a reliability-risk assessment study, (the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP)), such that the resultant product will be a comprehensive and coordinated reactor safety review program.

~

On October 7,1980, the staff briefed the Reactor Opentions Sub-Connittee of the ACRS, and on October 10, 1980, the ful! ACRS on the staff's plan, as presented in SECY-80-414, and or i.ne initial effort to identify the regulations of particular safety significance.

By memorandum dated October 14, 1980 (Enclosure 3) the ACRS provided its connents on the staff plan. The staff acknowledged these connents in a nemorandum dated November 7,1980 (Enclosure 4).

In a memorandum for the record dated October 24, 1980 (Enclosure 5),

the Office of the Secretary closed SECY-80-414 as an active action item. This action was based upon the issuance of the October 9th Federal Register Notice and on the understanding that the staff would submit a new action paper subsequent to the expiration date of the Federal Register connent period (November 24,1980). This present action paper is submitted to the Consission to present the staff's analysis of the public couaents received on the October 9th Federal Register Hotice (see Enclosure 6); to present the staff's proposed final rule for documentation of aeviations from the SRP (Enclosure 7); to provide the staff's analysis of the regulations, including several choices for a list of regulations considered to be of particular safety significance (Enclosure 8); and to obtain Comaission guidance on those issues in SECY-80-414 which have not as yet been acted upon.

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Discussion: As stated previously, the SRP is in the process of being revised, with completion scheduled for April 1981.

This revision will incorporate (1) a more thorough reference to existing regulations, (2) the approved THI-related requirements, (3) other new require-ments as are clearly necessary and appropriate at this time, and (4) necessary editorial and aaministrative changes.

The revi' sed SRP will then be the base document against which the determination of compliance to the regulations, as required by Section 110 of

~

Public Law 96-295, will be perfortaed.

It is the intent of the staff not to publish the proposed SRP revisions for public coment because of the nature of the revisions and because it would delay the issuance of an effective SRP.

The implementation scheme for the proposed requirement for documen-tation of deviations from the SRP, as detailed in a Federal Register notice issued on October 9,1980 (Enclosure 2), was the subject of a great deal of public comment. Enclosure 6 provides the staff's evaluation of these coments and Enclosure 7, developed as a result of that evaluation and as a result of administrative directives, is a draft final rule on the documentation requirements. Changes made to the proposed rule based on public coment and further staff evaluation are: responses from operating reactor licensees will be spread out over a seven year period to alleviate near-term resource constraints for both the NRC and the inaustry; flexibility is provided to modify the program for operating reactors based on experience gained in implementing the program; and near-tena construction penait applicants will not be required to document confonaance with the SRP as a condition for licensing.

Some of the recomendations made by the staff in SECY-80-414 are still open items requiring Coranission guidance. These items are:

1.

The alternative methods for developing the list of particularly significant regulations (Alternatives A-1, A-2, and A-3 of SECY-80-414). These alternatives concern the degree of strin-gency of the screening criteria to be usea, and whether the final aetenaination of particular significance should be deferred until after review of licensees' responses in order to penait recognition that, for a given plant, a particular regulation might have more or less safety significance depending on the metnod and degree of compliance of the plant to it and to other relatea regulations.

In SECY-80-414 we recomended that the staff develop the list of particularly significant regulations generically using moderately stringent screening criteria, recognizing that such a list would prcbably include at least 75% of the safety-related regulation. A memorandum from the ACRS (Enclosure 3) provides the Comittee's coments

. on this matter. provides the initial results of f

screening perfonaed by the staff using the sets of screening criteria discussed in SECY-80-414. Inat Enclosure also provides i

a recoranended list of regulations of particular safety significance.

2.

The degree of justification to be required of the licensees regarding:

(a) the safety significance of deviations from the applicable sections of the SRP; and (b) assertions that com-pliance is achieved by equivalent means, rather than by the methods identified in the revised SRP.

In SECY-80-414 w,e recommended that licensees be required to provide only brief technical bases for their judgments of equivalence and brief technical discussions of the safety significance of any devia-tions (Alternative B-1), rather than full tecnnical analyses (Alternative B-2).

In making this recoumendation, we recognized that more detailed responses may be requested in selected areas after staff review of the initial submittal.

3.

The nature and extent of the staff's evaluations of the licensees' analyses. An alternative could be a full evalua-tion of all deviations from and/or assertions of equivalence to the applicable sections of the revised SRP. However, the s.taff reconnended that evaluations be performed on a selective (audit) basis, based on staff judgments as to the likely validity of assertions of equivalence and the relative poten-tial safety significance of deviations (Alternative C-1). is a Draft NUREG Report that provides the staff's recoranended detailed plan to implement Section 110 of Puolic Law 96-295 for operating reactors. This plan incorporates the recouaended alternatives presented above and provides more detail on the actual implementation of the plan. A feature of this plan that should be noted is that flexibility in the docunentation and review process has been provided. That is, as experience is gained from implementa-tion of the plan, tne requirements may be altered so that the plan will focus on those areas where experience has shown the greatest contributior, to the reduction of risk to public health and safety may be achieved.

In this regard, as noted above, the licensees' responses will be staggered over a period of about seven years.

The priority of response will be dictated by factors such as the age and type of the plant and the density of population surrounding the site. This type of schedule is necessary considering tne NRC and industry resources necessary to implenent the program, and it also will permit the flexibility described above.

The detailed plan presented in the Draft NUREG Report also shows the interrelationsnips of IREP/NREP, SEP, and the requirements of Section 110 for the documentation of compliance to the regulations, and presents the staff plan for the identification and resolution of generic issues.

The staggered scheaule for response to tne documen-tation requirements will be coordinated with the NkEP and SEP reviews so that all three are integrated into one coordinated program and implenented at the same time on each inoividual plant. The major I.

parts of the staff plan are snown schematically on Figure 1 of the Draft NUREG, and the proposed implementation scheoule for tne major

.,j parts of the staff plan are snown on Figure 2 of that report.

j

- i

, 0 of this paper is a proposed Federal Register Notice announcing the availability of the Draft NURtG Report and requesting connent on the detailed plan.

This notice also details the relation-ship of the requirements presented in the Proposed Final Rule (Enclo-sure 7) for documenting deviations from the SRP and the requirements for demonstrating compliance with the regulations presented in the Draft NUREG Report (Enclosure 9).

, 1 is a Proposed Public Annoncement which discusses the Federal Register Notices on the Final Rule for documentation of deviations from the SRP (Enclosure 7) ano on the availability of the Draft NUREG Report (Enclosure 9). Also in our effort to keep Congress informed of our progress in satisfying the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, we have drafted the information letters in Enclosure 12. Attached to the letters will be a copy of the Draft NUREG Report and the Final Rule on documentation of deviations from the SRP.

Reconnendations: We reconnend that the Conaission:

1.

Approve the general content of the draft Final Rule requiring documentation of deviations from the SRP (Enclosure 7).

After receipt of this approval, tne staff will prepare the final wording of the final rule and associated Federal Register Notice for Connission approval.

2.

Approve the content and the issuance as a NUREG report of the proposed detailed draft plan to implement Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 (Enclosure 9);

3.

Approve the issuance of the proposed Federal Register Nutice (Enclosure 10) announcing the availability of and requesting coaaents on the draft NUREG report.

4.

Aaprove the issuance of the Proposed Public Announcement (inclosure 11);

5.

Approve the issuance of the information letters to Congress (Enclosure 12).

6.

Note that tne staff will submit the Final Rule requiring cocumentation of deviations from the SRP for Couaission approval.

7.

Note that the staff will reconnend a final plan to implement Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 after receipt and analysis of public connent.

M Resources:

Estimates of resources to implement Section 110 can only be pro-Jected with assurance after the extent of ceviations identified by,

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licensees are better known.

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. i However, while more manpower would be required to review the older operating reactors than those of more recent vintage, we currently estimate that the resources required to conduct the review of equivalence assertions and areas of nonconformance and resolve any ensuing potential safety issues for each oper-ating reactor would average about 2.8 staff years per plant based upon a learning curve process.

This is in addition to the resources required to extend the safety issue review of the oldest operating reactors to all other currently operating reactors (SEP Phase III) and to perform the NREP evaluations.

This estimate of additional staff-years per plant could prove to be high if:

1.

The responses from the the licensees are sufficiently defin-itive to facilitate very effective prioritization of issues for subsequent safety evaluation by the HRC; and 2.

Most of the areas where equivalence is asserted or potential nonconformance is identified that are selected for further evaluation fall within the scope of what would have been evaluated anyway in the SEP Phase III and NREP programs.

If the staff's plan for selective prioritized evaluation turns out to be unworkable, or if a large fraction of the areas of equivalence and potential nonconformance do not fall within the scope of what would have been reviewed anyway in the SEP Phase III and NREP programs, then the additional resource needs identified above could prove to be underestimates.

Table 1, attached to this paper, presents the latest combined Section 110/SEP/NREP estimated NRG resource requirements for the anticipated duration of the program, (through FY 1990).

The resources estimated to be required to accomplish Phase II and Phase III of the SEP are listed separately, as are the estimated NREP resources. Also listed separately is a breakdown of the additional resources estimated to be needed to implement the requirements of Section 110(a) and (b)(1) and (2), including appropriate safety evaluations of licensee responses as to the safety significance of possible deviations from the SRP acceptance requi rements.

The total effort for the overall Section 110/SEP/NREP program for operating reactors was levelized at 51 staff-years per year from FY 1982 to FY 1990, inclusive.

This is equivalent to about 37 professional staff-years per year. Contractual resources of 41,000K for FY 83 and $600K for FY 84-90 are neeced to substitute x

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. for some of the NRC staff resource needs in the SEP and Sec-tion 110 reviews, so as to levelize the NRC staff resources to the above value. The FY 1982 President's Budget currently includes 38 staff-years for the SEP and IREP/NREP portions of the overall program. The details of the assumptions used to estimate the resources are presented on the second pag 6 of Table 1.

The resources to implement Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5) are not large, and the staff intended to carry out the intent of these Subsections in any event. Thus, no addi-tional resources are needed.to implement these portions of Public Law 96-295.

of,-s_

c William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1.

September 30, 1980 Status Report to Congress 2.

October 9, 1980 Federal Register Notice on Documentation of Deviations from the SRP 3.

October 14, 1980 ACRS Memorandum to W. J. Dircks on Section 110 Plan 4.

November 7,1980 W. J. Dircks Memorandum to ACRS on Section 110 Plan 5.

October 24, 1980 Memorandum for the Record from E. W. McGregor on SECY-80-414 6.

Staff Analysis of Comments on October. 9,1980 Federal Register Notice 7.

Proposed Final Rule on Documentation of Deviations from the SRP 8.

Staff Analysis of Regulations of Particular Significance 9.

Draft NUREG-0745

10. Proposed Federal Register Notice Announcing NUREG-U/46

11. Proposed Public Announcement

/,

12. Proposed Congressional Information Letters A briefing and possible vote on this paper is scheduled for consideration at an open meeting on Thursday, January 15, 1981.

TABLE 1 Resource Requirements -- SEP/IREP-NREP/Section 110 (Dollars in thousands)

FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983 FY.1984-199k SEP Phase II (11 plants)

Program Support

$1,485

$ 850 Staff-Years 32 24 Phase III (59 plants)

$1,650

$1,000 Program Support Staff-Years 15 25 IREP/NREP(93plantsk

$1,400

$2,200

$2,200 Program Support Staff-Years 6

6 6

Section 110(a), (b)(1) and (2)

Initial Prioritization of Issues

$ 200 Program Support Staff-Years 7

9 Review of SEP Phase II plants (11 plants)

$ 600 Program Suppori Staff-Years 12 18 Reviewofremainingoprating reactors (82 plants)-

$ 950

$1,600 Program Support 12 20 Staff-Years TOTAL 9/

5 Program Support 31,485-

$3,050 /

$4,800

$4,800 9

Staff-Years 39 51 )

51 51 1/ For each fiscal year.

2/ Does not include $535,000 request for use of prior year unobligated funds.

d,.

]/ Based on the current number of operating reactors less the 11 plants in SEP Phase II, and Humboldt Bay and Indian Point I which have operating licenses but are shut down ;

indefinitely.

4/ Includes SEP Phase III plants and 23 additional plants to have supplemental SERs issued on or before April 1982 (as identified in SECY-80-508 Enclosure 2, Attachment 4).

5/ FY 1982 President's Budget for SEP and IREP/NREP is 38 staff-years and $2,250,000.

l/82 plants (footnote 4)plus11SEPPhaseIIplants

-2 Resource and Planning Assumptions SEP Phase III:

to assess the adequacy of design and operation and provide an integrated safety assessment of the Phase III plant issues:

.06 professional staff-years / issue

- 40 issues / unit

- 59 units 1

- approximately $1.0 million in program support per fiscal year /

NREP: -2/

to monitor licensees' performance of analyses

- 0.1 professional staff-years / unit

- $100,000 program support / unit -

- 93 units to evaluate potential safety issues

- 0.3 professional staff year / unit

- 100,000 program support / unit

- 93 units Section 110(a), (b)(1) and (2); Public Law 96-295:

to identify and prioritize issues generically

- 11.5 professional staff-years

- $200,000 program support to review the documentation submitted by the licensee and prioritize issues

.5 professional staff-years / unit

- 93 units to conduct the review of equivalence assertions and areas of nonconformance and resolve any ensuing potential safety issues

- 1.a professional staff-years / unit

- 93 units

- approximately $50,000 in program support per in-house staff-year to provide contractual technical review assistancell i.

If Program support is also used to substitute partially for in-house staff at a rate of $90,000/ professional staff-year.

2/ These are the same planning assumptions used in the formulation of the FY 1982 budget.

However, there are now more plants included in the program, and it extends over a longer period of time.

ENCLOSURE 1 STATUS REPORT ON THE EFFORTS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

~

Subsection 110(a) of Public Law 96-295 (NRC FY 1980 authorization) requires the NRC to develop, submit to Congress, and implement as soon as practicable after notice and opportunity for public connent, a comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants. The Conference Report states that the above requirement was written so as to enable the NRC to build upon the systematic safety evaluation it is currently conducting for th.e cldest operating nuclear power plants.

The need to systematically assess the safety of operating reactors resulted in the establishment several years ago of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) by the NRC.

One of the objectives of the Program was to extend the experience gained in reviewing older plants to the safety evaluation of all operating reactors.

The TMI Action Plan (NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the THI-2 Accident") appropriately recognizes this need in Task IV.E-5, which requires the improved and expanded systematic assessment of the safety of all operating reactors.

Oile there are many other TMI Action Plan tasks that are aimed at operating reactors (such as more emphasis on the review of operating experience), there are two additional tasks that are directly related to the systematic assess-ment of the safety of operating reactors.

These are:

(1) Task II.C.1 - Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP), the development of an orderly clasrification of accident sequences suitable for qualitative analyses and for use in the probabilistic analyses of core melt accidents of a few representative operating plants; and (2) Task II.C.2 - continuation of IREP on all remaining operating plants by means of the National Rel' Aility Evaluation Program (NREP).

Subsection 110(b) identifies certain information that, as a minimum, must be included as part of the systematic safety evaluation plan.

Subsections 110(b)(1) and (2) require:

the identification of each current rule and regulation, compliance with which the Commission determines to be of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety; and the detennination of the extent to which each currently operating plant complies with these identified rules and regulations, including an indicaticn of where such compliance was achieved by use of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff positions and where compliance was achieved by equivalent means.

Subsections 110(b)(3), (4) and (5) require:

the identification of all of the

generic safety issues set forth in NUREG-0410. "NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nt. clear Power Plants," for which technical solutions have been developed; the determination of -

which of these solutions should be incorporated into the Commission's rules and regulations; and a schedule for developing a technical solution for the remaining generic safety issues.

The need to address generic safety issues in a disciplined manner led to the establishment several years ago by the NRC of the program described in NUREG-0410 and recently to the establishment of the Generic Issues Branch in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation which has the responsibility for management of the technical resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues and for tracking the status of activities on other designated generic issues.

The TMI Action Plan also addresses generic safety issues; e.g., Task IV.E.2 requires the early identifica-tion, assessment, and resolution of safety issues.

Integrating the objectives and results of the above programs with the plan to satisfy the requirements of Section 110 w111 lead to a mere efficient use of available resources and to a more comprehensive and unified ' product.

Subsection 110(c) requires the NRC to provide to Congress a report on the status of the NRC's efforts to satisfy the requirements stated above, not later than 90 days from the date of enactment.

Status As indicated above, the NRC intends that the plan for the systematic evaluation of all operating reactors efficiently utilize those aspects of the current SEP and IREP programs that are deunstrated to be effective in assuring public health and safety.

The plan will also in:lude the NRC's determination of the extent to which each plant complies with the regulations of particular significance and the means of such compliance.

As presently constructed, the current SEP review of the oldest reactors generally is focused on 137 specific safety issues or problems. These were culled, based on experience and engineering judgment, from a larger list of 1100 issues to focus on these issues of greatest potential safety significance.

On the other hand, the IREP program is geared toward a reliability assessment of a complete plant. These reviews involve developing plant-specific event and fault trees to identify those systems, subsystems, and components that are the-greatest contributors to accident sequences posing risk to public i

health and safety.

Both the SEP and IREP programs look at the safety of the plaats from different perspectives, but they are amenable to

. integration into a single, coordinated plan ~of review.

However,

~

neither of tne programs are based on an explicit comparison with the NRC's safety regulations.

The NRC is developing an overall plan that attempts to integrate the current SEP., IRES, and Generic Issues programs with the specific requirements of Section 110.

This plan would treat currently operating plants, operating license applications, and construction pemit applications. As currently seen, the principal features of such a Plan are described below.

1.

The Commission currently has under consideration how to develop the list of what is "of particular safet.y significance" to the

~ protection of tne public health and safety, as required by Section 110(b)(1).

2.

The NF.C staff will develop a revision of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) by April 1931. The revised Plan will consist of the existing SRP, modified to reference all applicable regulations and those Division I Regulatory Guides, staff positions, *and other docum:nts currently used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulations, including requirements from the TMI accident.

All. licensees /or plants issued operating licenses prior to 3.

f June 30, 19801 and those licensees issued operating licenses based on staff SER's or SER TMI supplements issued prior to.'anuary 1,1982 will be required to identify and justify deviationsfromrevisedSRPinaccg plan as approved by the Comission /rdance with the Section 110 after issuance of an operating license.

Al*f applicants for OL's for which staff SER's or SER TMI 4.

supplements are issued after January 1,1982 will be required to identify and justify deviations from revised SRP prior to issuance of an operating license.

5.

In areas where the plant deviates from the revised SRP, the licensee will be requested to provide a technical discussion as to the safety significance of such deviation, including a judgment as to whether the alternative provides an equivalent method of meeting the regulation.

The licensee should also request any needed exemptions.

(The licensees' responses may be staggered based on some priority system related to public safety, if the NRC concludes such is necessary for the most efficient use of industry and NRC staff resources.)

4 P Date rn which P.L.96-295 (S.262) was signed by the President.

/ Section 110 requires identification of the means 2

of compliance with regulations of "particular significance to the protection of public health and safety." Hence, licensees for plants in this category will be required to justify deviations for only those sections of the revised SRP h im 1 ment these articularl i nificant re ut in

6.

All applicants for CP's and ML's for which staff SER's cr SER THI supplements are issued before January 1,1982 wil{/ e b

required to identif SRP and NUREG 0718_4/y and justify deviations from existing (as modified after public comments) prior to issuance of a construction permit or manufacturing license.

7.

All applicants for CP's and ML's for which staff SER's or SER TMI supplements are issued after January 1,1982 will be required to identify and justify deviations from revised SRP prior to. issuance of a construction permit or manu-facturing license.

8.

In parallel with the above steps, the staff wil1 review and evaluate the generic issues identified in NUREG-0410; and generic issues identified in the TMI Action Plan, the ACRS Generic Issues List, and new issues identified from operating experience or the systematic evaluation program.

Plans and schedule will be developed for those issues determined to require resolution within the next several years. A response will be prepared to meet the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5).

The basic elements of this approach will be published shortly for public comment.

Based on these comments, the Commission will decide what approach to follow.

.3/ Standard Review Plan dated May 1980.

4/ Proposed Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing License dated August 1980.

l.

e

..,_,,,,m, ENCLOSURE 2 67099

?

e=Proposed Rules r a-i n *-

Vol. 45. No.198 Thursday. October 9,'1980 TNs section of the FEDERAL. REGISTER FmHA before the solicitation is Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor centsins notices b the putse of the announced at the time of publication of Regulation. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.Washin8 ton D.C.20555 propoeed issumme of rulee and the FinalRegulations..

regulanone. The purpose of theos nodoes In general, the PmHA has jurisdiction (301) 492-8016.

7'"I over projects below 15 million gallons of suPPtsa0ENTARY pePORMATloocThe.

,g annual capacity anna the Department of Standard Review Pian (SRP),'NUREG maMng prior to tne adopuan of itx enei Energy has judadiction overprojects - 75/087, first published in1975,was

' with annual cape $y d15 :nHHon prepared for the guidance of NRC stafi rules.

gallons and larger, except for projects reviewers in performing safety reviews r

2 DEPARTMENTOF AGRICULTURE

- using forestry feedstocks or projects of applications to construct or operate owned and operated by agricultural 3

pg FormersHomeAdministrat6on cooperative which can be considered by_ ""CI' Q "g h, g

• 7 CFR Part1990 '

el erFmHAorDOE t and uniformity of the staff -

reviews and to present a well defined >

- Dated: Octobee 6,19e0.

base from which pmposed chanaes in BlomassI:.nergy and Alcohol Fuels.

. James E.Tfwafna-the scope of these reviews may be 4

Loans and Loan Guarantees; Associare AdmImstmto4 EarmersNom evaluated.The SRP also serves to make Admmhboriam

~

Additionalinformation information about regulatory ma!!ers '-

i Farmers Home Adn Inistration' PR Da awa PGod s&&st nmn),

widely evaGable, and improves AGID8CY:

""'""' coca sc&er-e understanding of the staff review USDA y Pm AddMad Process by interested members of the NUCLEAR REGULATORY public and the nuclear powerindustry.

i.,rnemation.

COMMISSION

%e NRC's current techniques for t! a d

SumeAARY:At 45 FR 51818. August 5.

10 CFR Part 50 safety evaluation of nuclear power 2900, ths Farmers Home Admin!stration facilities as. set forth b the SRP, are the '

(FmHA) published a proposed rule PlanTo Require Licensees and result of years of experience A great regarding biomass energy and alcohol AppGcants to Document Deviations deal of progress has been made in the fuels.no purpose of this document is to From the Standard Review Pfara methods of review andin the provide additionalInformatim AGEMCV: Nuclear Regulatory development of regulatory guides and regarding this pmgram.

r'nmmianlon.

other staff positions referenced in the FOR PURTHeR INFOR94ATIOst CONTACT:

ACTlose Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SRP.

l Mr. Weldon Barton. Director. Office of As this experience acquiredover the e~

Renewable Resources. FmHA. Rm. 5175 - susanaARY:Re Nuclear Regulatory years is incorporated into the regulatory South Bldg.,USDA 14th and Commission is considering requiring an process, regulatory guides. includ'ng the -

Independence Ave.SW., Washington, nuclear power plant hcensees and an SRP are periodically reviewed and D.C.20250, phone:202447-7195.

applicants for construction permits and revised to reflect the current state-of.

SUPPLEMENTARY INPOmAATiott De manufacturing licenses to identify and the-art.Ris results in a varymg scope l

Biomass Energy and AlcoholFuels Act justify deviations from the acceptance of review over tima and tends to lead to of1980 (Title II of the Energy Security cdteriaof the applicable revision of the r lack of uniform documentation of each.

g Standard Review Plan NUREG-75/087.

Act. Public Law 96-294) provides for the This program will provide the NRC with -

P ant's confnrmance with cuarent staff F

l i

solicitation of applications for fi"~'at acceptance criteria. Some plants, for assistance under Subtitle A within120 uniform 4- - =tationof the extent to,

? i i

instance, have been reviewed against days after enactment (l.a October 28, which each plant deviates from current the SRP at the OL stage but not at the L

i 1980). Farmers Mcme A 'a htion

!!ce.nsing acceptance criteria. Comment CP stage. while stillothars.although

[FmHAL USDA.has published (45 FR is sought on the proposal and on the reviewed against the SRP at both the CP 51818. August 5,1980) proposed preferred method of implementing such and OL stage. lack uniformty because y

regulations to estab!Ish guidatinas for '

a proposal, of updating of the SRP after the CP

n solicitation of such applicannna and is

. DATche comment period expues on review was completed.%islack of c

j reviewing comments received pursuant November 24,1980.

uniform documentation makes it dimenf t j

1-to such pubHeation and related headngs. Aponasses:a==ents should be tar detennine thi extent to which plants y

1 FmHA expects to publishFinal submittedin wdhg to de Secuta4,,

reviewed some time ago deviate from aI.I j

RegniMinna and to initiate the the Commission. U.S. Nuclear current acceptance criteria.and if so.

ly I A

solicitationof a lications as part of such Final tions on or before

",8 y

the safety significance of such 3.

d

" ' ' ~

October 28,1980. AppDeants wishing to Service Branch. AH commments As a result of the accident atThree 1 -

. undertake preliminary preparatory work received win be available for public MHe Island.Inany regulaton.

on such applications may consult the inspection in the Commtanton's PubHe requ rements have been revised and i

- Proposed Regulations but are advised Document Room at1717 H Street.NW, new requirements have been l!

that some changes willbe made in them ~Washmgtour. D.C.

mulgated. Accordingly.the staff has when the Final Regulations are FOR FURMR MPomsAMON CONTACT to revise the SRP to reflect these published on or about October 28,19001

(

q

[

Applications will not be accepted by*

Malcolm I. Emst. Assistant Dnector for-new requirements.Thtenext revision of 2

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]

o m mqo

• qo % y j

eeM eM 1h

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1

~

y 67100 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No.198,3 Thursday. October 9.1980 / Proposed Rules

.j the Standard Review Plan, scheduled for Specifically, the NRC is considering revision scheduled to be issued in April y

completion in April 1981, will consist of ' imposing the following requirements: -

1981.

M the May 1900 version of the SRP.

1. All nuclear power plants issced The Commission published a Federal Y.

modified to reference all applicable operating licenses on or before June 30, - Register Notice on October 2.1980 (45 i

safety and safeguards regulations and 1980,8would be required to identify and FR 65247) Inviting comment on -

8 those Division 1 Regulatory Guides, staff justify au deviations from the' Requirements 4 and 5 of the current 7

positions, and other documents acceptance criteria of the SRP revision plan.The present notice reiterates thosa currently used by the staff to interpret scheduled to be issued in April 1981 that, requirements and integrates them with the intent of these regulations,includin8 relate to those regulations which tha tl.a requiren ents for operating plants -

requirements resultig from the Dil Commission determines to be of and applicants for operating licens. s.

accident particubr significance to the protection

%e Commission will consider publ;c Requiring license applicants to of the public health and safety.

comments received in response to this.

Identify and justify deviations from the

2. All applicants who are issued a notice in determining the appropriate acceptance criteria in the applicable nuclear power plant operating license action to be taken. including the

- ' ~ ~.

revision of the SRP would enhance the - after June 30,1980, and for which the possible issuance of final rules on some quality of the staffs review of -

NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report or all of these matters.

applications and assist the staffin willbe issued on or before January 1.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of

?

making the determinations required by 19828would be required to identify and 1954, as amended, the Energy-10 CFR Part 50.In addition, such justify. after issuance of an 01, all Reorganization Act ofl974, as amended, documentation would mors clearly deviations from the acceptance criieria and Section 553 of Tit!s 5 of the United i

identify the bases for the acceptability of the SRP revision scheduled to be Ststes Code, notice is hereby given that.

of plant designs and their relationship to issued in April 1981 tbst relate to those amendment of the Commission's current licensing criteria. A similar post. regulations the Commission determines regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 with - '

licensing requirement for currently to be of particular signifier.nce to the regard to some or all of the subjects and operating plants would improve the protection of thepublic health and issues described in this notica is staffs ability to evaluate the extent and safety

• contemplated.

safety significance of deviations from current sta!I acceptance criteria for

3. All applicants for a nudear power Dated at Washington. D.C. this'3d day of

' these plants.

plant operating license for which the October 1980.

In a related matter, the NRC is NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report is For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. _

required by Section 110 of Public I.aw issued after January 1.1982 would be Samuel J. Chilk.96-295 (NRC FY 80 Authorization Bill) to required to identify and justify prior to s,cretaryof the commission.

i

' develop a plan for the systematic safety issuance of the operating license, all tra ooe.aoatess rited tun mes aml review of all operating nuclear power deviations from all acceptance criteria Ba. LNG Coot r$90-01-48 of the SRP revision scheduled to be plants.nis plan must include among other things: the identification of each issued in April 1981.

current rule and regulation, compliance

. 4. All app!! cants for a nuclear power DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

~

with which the NRC determines to be of. plant construction permit or particular significance to the protection manufacturing license for which the Federal Aviation Administration of the public health and safety; and the NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report determination of the extent to which TM1 Supplement is ismed before 14 CFR Ch.1 each currently operatlag plant complies January 1.1982 would be required to

'with those regulations, f ac!uding an identify and justify. prior to issuance of (Docket No. 20487; Petition Notice No. PR indication of whether such compliance.

the construction pennit or 60-151 was achieved by use of Division 1

. manufacturing license, all deviations a

from all acceptance criteria of the May Petition for Rule Making of Rosenbalm -

Regulatory Guides and staff positions and where such compliance was 1980 version of the SRP and from the Aviation,Inc.

achieved by equivalent means.

" Proposed I.icensing Requirements ict AGENCY: Federal Aviation In order to carry ect the requirem-nts Pending Applications for Construction Administration (FAA). DOT.

of Pub. L 96-295. to document-

~ Permits and Manufacturing I.icenses."in deviations from the SRP and to improve NUREG-0718. (as modified after public hPu A

on p n

the staffs ability to evaluate the safety comment).

. significance of such deviations, the NRC

5. All applicants for a nuclear power

SUMMARY

By letter dated March 31

~

Is considering requiring all nuclear plant construction permit or 1980. Mr. Arthur J. Schmidt. Vice power plant licensees and license manufacturing license for which the President. Rosenbalm Aviatie.t. Inc.,

applicants to ideritify and provide the NRC staffs Safety Evaluation Report is petitioned the Federal AviaSon safety bases for deviations from issued after January 1.1982. would be AdministrationdFAA) to amend '

applicable revisions of the SRP.Several required to identify and justify. prior to li 25.832 and 121.220 of the Federal methods ofimplementing this issuance of the construction permit or Aviation Regulations (FAR) to exempt requirement are under consideration.

manufacturing license, all deviations large, cargo-only aircraft from installing These methods are issuance of a fron all occeptance criteria of the SRP ozone control equipment or using ozone Regulatory Guide, specification of a avoidance procedures.

construction permit or operating license

'The date on which Puh.1.96 29s becam DATES: Comments must be received on condition, a Policy Statement, or

• U,*yc '$ss : for the renuary 1.us2 date. le toor before December 10.1980.

qahng.-

permit adequate tirne afterissuance of the revised ADDRESS: Send comments on the SRP for a licensee to document and justJy petition in duplicate to: Federal Aviation

• The revised SRP (April 1981) has been designed deviations and for the NRC stan to incorporate and defined to be equivalent to Division 1 evaluatior.s of the more safety sig:nficant deviatione Administration. Office of the Chief Reg datory Cmdes and staff positions.

Into the sta5 Safety Evaluation Reports.

Counsel. Attn: Rules Docket (AGC-204).

- A a ML

f." %'o, UNITED STATES

/

!\\[,s..

'j k uCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSib...

ENCLOSURE 3 c

ADVISORY COMMITTEE.ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS o hl,

1. [

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

% rs J, October 14, 1980 E ORN;DUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Executive Di for Operations FROM:

Raymond F. Frale,

cutive Director, ACR

SUBJECT:

COMMENTS ON THE NRC STAFF'S PRELIMINARY PLANS FOR ADDRESSING THE REQUIREMENTS IN SECTION 110 0F THE FY-80 NRC nuidORIZA-TION BILL During its. 246th meeting, October 9-11, 1980, the ACRS discussed with t's NRC Staff their preliminary plans for addressing the requirements of Section 110 of the NRC FY-80 Authorization Bill.

The Staff also discussed this subject with the Reactor Operations Subcommittee on October 7,1980 and raquested ACRS comments.

The Committee had the benefit of written comments by the Atomic Industrial Forum.

It is the Committee's view that the lists derived from Criteria II and III as currently presented by the NRC Staff do not include all the items of particu-lar significance to safety.

For. example, General Design Criterion 29 is not included.

Additional screening should be done,to ensure that all items of particular significance are included.

The Committee also recommends that some other groups within the NRC Staff, such as PAS and AE00, carry out an inde-pendent review in order to increase the likelihood that the screening process nas not omitted items of particular significance.

This review could also be used to establish a priority, based on risk reduction potential, in which the review items should be addressed.

The Committee noted your. comment on SECY-80 d14 and endorses your intent to impl ement tight management controls to limit staff and industry effort to areas of potential safety payoff; guarding against the potential for a large drain on Staff and licensee resources that would not produce commensurate improvements in safety.

The Committee would appreciate being kept informed cf additional developments in this area, particularly on the nature of com-

. ants received as a result of the call for puolic comments scheduled to begin following issuance by the Staff of the final draf t plan for addressing Section 110.

cc: ACRS Members H. Centon,!iRR F. Schroeder, DST

.;. Ernst, DST G. Zech,:RR A

S. Chilk, SECY nr*~

7 AM N

f ENCLOSURE 4 NOV 7 1980 MS40RANDUM FOR:

Raymond F. Fraley, Executive Director, ACRS FROM:

William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

STAFF'S PRELIMINARY PLANS FOR ADDRESSING THE REQUIREMENTS IN SECTIOU 110 0F THE FY-80 NRC AUTHORIZATION BILL Your memorandum, dated October 14, 1980, provided ACRS coments on the staff's preliminary plans for addressing the requirements of Section 110 of the FY-80 NRC Authorization Bill. The Comittee expressed concern regarding the results of the staff's trial screening of the regulations using two sets of proposed possible criteria for selecting those regulations of particular safety signifi cance. The Comittee expressed the view that the resultant lists do not include -

all the itms of particular significance, and recommended that other groups, such as PAS and AEOD, carry out an independent review.

1;g- ~

. 3.. -3 m.-

As you know, the staffzhasi requested Commission rev.iew and approval of a pre-liminary conceptual plan in SECY-80-414. An import $nt element of that plan on which we seek a Comission decision is the manner in which the regulations of particular safety significance would be selected. We plan further discussions of this and other features of the proposed plan with th~e Comission in Decenber, following the receipt and analysis of public coments on the recent Federal Register Notice regarding our proposal to require all licensees and applicants to review their designs against the Standard Review Plan.

Prior to-this discussion with the Comission, the NRR staff intends to request other NRC offices to review the resul.ts of the preliminary screening of the reculations. The staff also intends to utilize risk analyses, to the extent practical, to establish the priority for subsequent reviews of deviations from the regulations of particular significan::e.

The Comittee noted that the staff's trial screenings resulted in the omission of General Design friterion 29, " Protection Against Anticipated Operational

~

Occurrences", from ene list of particularly significant regulations. This omis-sion illustrates the difficulties inherent in any such screening process. The staff team perfonning the trial screening judged that, although GDC-29 appears

'to be quite important when viewed separately, the significant aspects of GDC-29 are addressed more explicitly in GDC's 20 through 28, and that GDC-29 could be screened out. On reflection, however, it appears that no useful purposes would be served by omitting GDC-29 from the list, since it clearly is complementary d."

to GDC-20 through 28.

D UPA : 714L #54 66 7 9

/

'~

a Raymond F. Fraley.

I appreciate the endorsement of the Committee on the need to implement tight management controls over this program. Such controls will be particularly important to exercise reasonable and safety-related constraints on the ident-ification of those regulations having particular safety significance, and in the development of priorities and schedules for the follow-on reviews of'all operating reactors.

We will keep the Connittee informed of future developments regarding the plan for addressing Section 110, and will arrange another meeting with the Canuittee after receipt of public comments on the final draf t plan.

(Signed) William J. Dirclq William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations hZ L Distribution: --

.b

~ Central Files

.,.,. G. Ertter-(ED0-9730)

W. Dircks

- S. Cavanaugh

~

~

K. ' Cornell

~~ C "T. Schul tze ~

~~

T. Rehm

~ E. 'Tel fprd R. Minogue SEQY~ ~

fr. Murley C. Michelson

'E.

Case H. Denton PPAS D. Eisenhut B. Grimes S, Hanauer D. Ross B. Snyder R. Vollmer F. -Schrueder G. Zech S. Chilk M. Ernst R. Baer M. Boyle W. Milstead I

ENCLOSURE 5 UNITED STATES IN RESPONSE 8

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~

3 E

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 e

\\'**O%*o 8

October 24, 1980 ACTION:

Dt.nton Cys: Dircks OFFICE OF THE Cornell SECRETARY pg

'MBoyle;~

MinDgue Par MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD E. W. McGregor, SECY b N -

FROM:

SUBJECT:

SECY-80-414 - SYSTEMATIC SAFETY EVALUATION OF ALL CURRENTLY OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS 1

(COMMISSIONER ACTION ITEM) t.a The subject paper is closed as an active Commissioner Action item based both on action taken by the Commission on September 19, '

1980 (SECY SRM of September 24, 1980 is attached for ready reference) and on anticipated future events.

It is SECY's understanding that the staff will submit a new '

pape'r on the subject matter for the Commission'ss consideration some time subsequent to expiration of the commeht period on the Federal Register Notice approved on September 19, 1980.

The new paper will address the public comments received on the Federal Register Notice as well ar any' remaining issues in-SECY-80-414 which were not acted upon at the September 19 meeting.

Attachment:

As Stated cc:

V. Harding, OCM J. Austin, OCM H.

Fontecilla, OCM T. Gibbon, OCM T.

Rehm, EDO OGC OPE E.

Case, NRR t-i e

D uPE ; 9$1 RR 9 93

QL*%q'o,j j

UNITED STATES

/..8}

['

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHIN GTL A. D.C. 20555

, g, 4,/

j. p s.j September 24, 1980 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

. !iEMORANDUM FOR:

William J. Dircks, Executive DirectorforOperations'),

F Samuel J. Chilk, Secretar h FR0!!:

./

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - CON INUATION OF DISCUSSION OF COMMISS PROGRAM TO REVIEW OPERATING LICENSE APPLICATIONS 2:00 P.M.,

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19,1980, C0ttiISSIONERS' CONFERENCE ROOM, D. C. OFFICE (OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTENDANCE) j, The Comission continued its discussion of proposed revisions to the Standard Review Plan.

0]

The Comission unanimously:

1.

approved publishing for coment a Federal Register Notice based on the attached."NRR Plan to Require Licensee and Applicants to Document Deviations from Current Staff Positions Related to Applic'51e Safety and Safeguards Regulations", including the systematic e. valuation of all currently) operating nuclear power reactors required by Subsect 110(a) and (b of the NRC FY-80 Authorization.

The Federal Register Notice should also raise the issue of how this plan should be implemented.

In particular, it should raise the issue of whether the licensee / applicant obligations should be imposed through technical specifications, order, rulemaking, or some other method.

The notice should be drafted so that the Comission may, at the end of the coment period, adopt a rule incorporating the NRR plan for construction permit applicants without the necessity of further public coment.

(NRR) (SECY Suspense: 9/26/80) 2..

directed the EDO to complete the revised Standard Review Plan in six months.

(EDO)(SECYSuspense:_ 4/1/81) 3.

requested that the policy statement on construction permits (SECY-80-348) approved August 1,1980 (requirements memorandum attached) be modified to conform to the above changes and published for coment; (NRR) (SECY Suspense: 9/24/80) 4.

noted that Comissioner coments on the proposed 90-day report to Congress (staff revision attached, dated 9/19/80) will be submitted to the Chairman early in the week of September 22, 1980, after which the report will be submitted to Congress by the Chairman, (OCM)

Attachments:

As noted cc:

Chairman Ahearne Commissioner Gi.linsky Comissioner Hendrie

~

Comissioner Bradford Comission Staff Offices, pg gp7 j

NUCLEAR REGUbTORY COMMISSION-og f-g wAsamcTou.o.c.2esss

%-/

OmCE OF THE August 4, 1g80

,$ECRETARY W'illiara J. Dircks, Actin MEMORANDUM.FOR:

Samuel J. Chilk, Secret FROM:

[

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - BRI F', ON HEAR TERii REQUIREMEhTS FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS F0F, Pd'.!ER REACTORS, 2:05 P.M., FRIDAY,

~

AUGUST 1,1980, COMMISSIUMERS' CONFERENCE ROOM, D. C. OFFICEd (SEESECY-80-348)

(OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTENDANCE)

The Comission discussed the staff's proposed policy for proceeding with pending construction permit and manufacturing license applications.

The Comission,'by a vote of 4-0:

1.

approved'the publication in the Federal Register of the proposed licensing requirements for a 45 day public commentsperiod.

The Notice should be modified by adding " Comments are also requested regarding the extent to which the judgments reached by the Cocmission

,,,,,,,,,,,,M-

-" **~

on these matters should form the basis for instructions to licensing.

and appeal boards in construction permit and manufacturing license

,,, g g

proceedings., as the next to last sentence on page o.

(NRR) (SECY Suspense:

8/18/80)

. The Comission requested:

2.

that the draft NUREG identifying Action Plan items applicable to pending CP and ML applications address the importance of close utility-vendor-architect engineer integration.

(NRR) (SECY Suspense: S/18/80)

~

cc:

Chairman Ahearne Commissioner Gilinsky _

Comissioner Hendried '

52~4 Commissioner Bradford Comission Staff Offices

~

D UPG: W.n p 79 m$

6

~

~

NRRPLANTOREQUIRELICENSEEANDAPPLICANTSTdDOCUMENT_

DEVIATIONS FROM CURRENT STAFF POSITIONS RELATED TO APPLICABLE SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS REGULATIONS 9

Operating Licenses 1.

All licensees for plants issued operating licenses prior to 6/30/80N and those licensees issued operating licenses based on staff SER's or SER TMI supplements issued prior to 1/1/82 will E

be required to identify and justify deviations from revised SRP in accordance with Singham amendment plan as approved by CommissionE after issuance of an operating license.

P 2.

All applicants for OL's for which staff SER's.or SER TMI s'upplements are issued after 1/1/82 will be require,d to identify and justify deviations from revised SRP prior to issuance of an operating license.

If Date on which Bingham amendment was signed by the President.

y Revised SRP is defined to be the existing SRP, modified to reference all applicable regulations and those Division I Regulatory Guides, staff positions and other documents currently used by the staff to interpret intent of these regulations, including requirements resulting from the TMI accident.

3/ The Bingham amendment requires identification of the means of compliance with regulations of "particular significance to the protection of public health and

~

sa fety. "

Hence, licensees for plants in this category will be required to justify deviations for only those sections of the revised SRP that implement these particularly significant regulations.

. ~.

s 2-9 Construction Permits and Manufacturing Licenses All applicants for CP's and ML's f ar which Staff SER's or SER TNI -

1.

supplements are issued before 1/1/82 will be required to 1/and identify and justify deviations from existing SRP NUREG 07182/ (as modified after public comments) prior _ to issuance of a Construction Permit or Manufacturing License.

All applicants for CP's and ML's for which Staff SER's or SER 2.

TMI supplements are issued after 1/1/82 will be required to identify and justify deviatio.ns from revised SRP prior _ to issuance of a Construction Permit or Manufacturing License.

N 1/

Standard Review Plan, dated May,1980.

Proposed Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction 2/

Permits and Manufacturing ' License dated August,1980.

g n

Revised

[

9/19/80 STATUS REPORT ON THE EFFORTS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A COM?REHENSIVE PLAN FOR THE SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

~

Subsection 110(a) of the FY 80 Authorization Billrequires the NRC staff to develop, submit to Congress, and implement as soon as practicable after not opportunity for public comment, a comprehensive plan for the systematic saf.ety The Conference Report evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants.

states that the above requirement was written so as to enable the NRC to build upon the systematic safety evaluation it is. currently conducting for the oldest operating nuclear power plants.

The need to systematically assess the safety of operating reactors resulted in the establishment several years ago of the Systematic Evaluation Program One of the objectives of the Program was to extend the (SEP) by the NRC. gained in reviewing older plants to the safety evaluation of all operating reactors. The TMI Action Plan (NUREG-0660,"NRC Action Plan Dev experience as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident") appropriately recognizes, this need in Task IV.E-5, which requires the improved and expanded systenatic assess of the safety of all operating reactors.

Plan tasks that are aimed at operating reactors (.such as more emphasis on the review of operating experience), there are two additional tasks that are directly related to the. systematic assessment of the safety of operating reactors.

(1) Task II.C.1 - Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP),

the development of an orderly classification of accident sequences suitable These are:

for qualitative analyses and for use in the probabilistic analyses of core melt accidents of a few representative operating plants; and (2) Task II.C.2

- continuation of IREP on all remaining operating plants by means of NREP (the National Reliability Evaluation Program).

Subsection 110(b) identifies. certain information that, as the identification of each current rule and regulation, compli -

and (2) require:ance with which the Commission determines to be of particular sign protection of the public health and safety; and the determinacion of the extent to which each currently operating plant complies with these identified rules and regulations, including an indication of where such compliance was achieved by of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff positions and where compliance was~

Subsections 110(b)(3), (4) and (5) require:

the achieved by equivalent means.

k 6

Revised s,

9/19/80

~2 identification of all of the generic safety issues set forth in NUREG-0410, "NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants,"

for which technical solutions have been developed; the determination of which of these solutions should be incorporated into the Commission's rules and regula-tions; and a schedule for developing a technical solution for the remaining generic safety issues.

The need to address generic safety. issues in a disciplined manner led to the establishment several years ago by the NRC of the program described in NUREG-0410 and recently to the establishment of the Generic ' Issues Branch in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation which has the responsibility for management of the technical resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues and for tracking the status of activities on other designated generic issues.

The TMI Action Plan also addresses generic safety issues; e.g... Task IV.E.2 requires the early identification, assessment, and resolution of safety issues.

Maximizing the integration of the objectives and results of all of the above ongoing programs into the plan to satisfy the requirements of Section 110 will-lead to a more efficient use of available resources and to a more comprehen-sive and unified product than might othentise be possible.

The proposed plan, which is conceptually described below, accomplishes this integration.

Subsection 110(c) requires the NRC to provide to Congress a' report on the status of tne NRC's efforts to satisfy the requirements stated above, not later than 90 days from the date of enactment.

This is that required status report.

Status As indicated above, the NRC intends that the plan for the systematic evaluation of all operating reactors efficiently utilize those aspects of the current SEP and IREP programs that are demonstrated to be effective in assuring public health and safety.

The plan will also include the NRC's determination of the extent to w'hich each plant complies with the regulations of particular significance and the means of such compliance.

As presently constructed, the current SEP review of the oldest reactors generally -

is focused on 137 specific safety issues or problems.

These were culled, based on experience and engineering judgment, from a larger list of 1100 issues to focus on those issues of greatest potential safety significance.

On the other hand, the IREP program is geared toward a reliability assessment of a complete plant.

These reviews involve developing plant-specific event and fault trees to identify those systems, subsystems, and components that are the greatest contributors to accident sequences posing risk to public health and safety.

Both the SEP and IREP programs look at the safety of the plants from different perspectives, but they are amenable to integration into a single, coordinated plan of review.

However, neither of the programs are based on the NRC's safety regulations, per se.

Revised

~.

9/19/8Q Since enactment of the FY 80 Authorization Bill, the 'NRC has initiated develop-ment of an overall plan that will integrate the current SEP, IREP, and Generic Issues programs with the specific requirements of Section 110.

Although a detailed draft plan has not yet been developed, the principal features.of a plan have been outlined and are described below.

Our current schedule calls for publication of a draft plan for public comment in late calendar year 1980, and submittal of the final plan, with schedules for its implementation, to the Congress in March 1981.

~

The draft plan wi}l include the following elements:

1.

The NRC staff will develop a list of particularly significant applicable safety and safeguard regulations based on a screening process which would permit inclusion of regulations or combinations of regulations that could reasonably be construed to have the potential for providing substantial protection to public health and safety.

2.

Each licensee will. be required to evaluate its operating plant (s) against these regulations and to determine the extent of the plant's compliance, including an indication of where such compliance was achieved by use of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff positions, and where compliance was achieved by other equivalent means.

To provide uniformity of response and to avoid unnecessary delays in this effort, the staff will also develop a revision of the Standard Review Plar (SRP) by March 1981.

The revised Plan will consist of the existing SRP. modif.ied to reference all applicable regulations and those Division I Regulatory Guides, staff positions, and other documents currently used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulations', including requirements resul. ting from the THI accident.

Where the licensee asserts that compliance with an identified regulation was achieved by equivalent means to that specified in the Revised SRP, the licensee will be asked to provide the technical bases for such assertions.

In areas where the plant does not comply with a regulation or deviates from the intent of the SRP, the licensee will be requested to provide a judgment and a brief technical discussion as to the safety significance of such noncompliance or deviation, together with a request for any needed exemption.

The licensees' responses might be staggered over perhaps a two year period, based on some priority system reisted to public safety, if public comment reveals that a shorter time for t esponse would substantially impact available industry resources.

3.

The NRC staff will review the submitted material ant' will take prompt initial action in areas where there is possible noncompliance with the regulations, including initiating action on any requests or need for exemptions.

The staff also will make informed judgments as to areas where (if any) non-6 f

Revised 4_

9/19/80 compliance with the regulations, the licensees' assertions of equivalence with the SRP, or deviations from the SRP represent a potential safety prob--

lem.

For any problems that appear to have substantial safety significance, further imediate actions will be taken on an ad hoc basis.

Decisions in these areas will be made by use of judgment Tsupported to a large extent

~

by experience gained from the current SEP program, a risk perspect,1ve supplied by the IREP program, and the results of any appropriate ongoing research, ruiemaking, and gener.ic issues activities.

4.

After completion of the initial review of ail responses in step 3 above, the staff will initiate plant-by-plant evaluations according to priorities established for the systematic evaluation program.

During these evaluations, the safety significance of all identified potential safety issues will be established.

It is expected that m'st such areas will inherently o

already be scheduled for a routine safety review as part of the NREP program or as a result of the experience gained from the current SEP program.

These evaluations will be completed for all operating plants in about five to eight years.

5.

After the above full safety assessment is completed for a plant, appropriate backfit determinations will be made to resolve the remaining significant safety issues, including any issues associated with any, areas cf noncompliance with the regulations.

6.

In paraller with the above steps, the staff will review and evaluate the generic issues identified in NUREG-0410; and generic issues identified in the TMI Action Plan, the ACRS Generic Issues List, and new issues identified from operating experience or the systematic evaluation program.

Plans and schedules will be developed for those issues determined to require resolution within the next several years.

A response will be prepared to meet the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5).

As a matter of information to the Congress, the Commission has agreed, subjact to public comments, on a program similiar to Section 110(b)(1) and (2) of the FY 80 Authorization Bill for all plants in the construction permit (CP) or operating license (OL) review process.

The elements of this program are:

. For plants receiving an operating license after June 30, 1980, where NRC's safety evaluation report is issued before January 1,1982, documentation and evaluation against the regulations of particular significance (referencing pertinent sections of the revised Standard Review Plan as described above).

will be required after issuance of an operating license.

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Revised 9/19/80 For plants in the OL review process where the NRC's safety evaluation

. report is issued after January 1,1982, documentation and evaluation against all regulations and all sections of the revised Standard Review Plan will be required prior to. issuance of. an operating license.

For plants in the CP or Manufacturing License review process where the NRC's safety evaluation report is issued before January 1,1982, documentation and evaluation of deviations from th.e May 1980 Standard Review Plan and NUREG-0718.

" Proposed Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for cps and MLs" (as modified after public comment) will be required before issuance of the Construction Permit or Manufacturing License.

For plants in the CP or Manufacturing License review process where the NRC's safety evaluation report is issued after January 1,1982, documentation and evaluations of deviations from the revised Standard Review Plan will be required before issuance of the Construction Permit or Manufacturing License.-

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ENCLOSURE 6

SUMMARY

AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC COMMENTS On October 9,1980, the NRC published a notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register L45 FR 67099]. The proposed rule would require all comercial nuclear power plant licensees and applicants to document deviations from the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087 (SRP).

Interested persons were invite'd to submit written coments to the Secretary of the Comission by November 24, 1980.

A total of 34 organizations or individuals provided coments in response to the Federal Register notice. Also, auring the same period there were two letters to Chairman Ahearne and one to President Carter that dealt, in part, with the same matter covered in the Federal Register notice.

The comments in all of the above letters can be grouped reasonably well in the following five major categories:

(1) The use of the SRP is not appropriate to evaluate whether older plants comply with the current NRC regulations; (2) More meaningful comments could be provided if the Comission identified the regulations of particular interest; (3) The plan goes beyond the intent of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295; (4)

T;.e dates that establish different documentation requirements for various c asses of plants are abritrary; (5) Tht safety benefits of the proposed method of complying with Section 110 of Pualic Law 96-295 are not comensurate with the large amount of resources tha*. will be required.

A listing of the organizations and individuals that provided coments is pre-sented in Table 1, along with an indication of which of the above five categories their coments could be reasonably placed.

The five major categories of comments, with appropriate sub-categories, are discussed below in a format that first paraphrases the comments and then presents the staff evaluation of these coments.

1.

Use of SRP is not Appropriate a.

Comment:

SRP should be consistent with the regulations.

Staff Evaluation: Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, in part, requires that each current rule and regulation which the Comission determines to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safety be identified, and that a determination be made of the extent to which each operating facility complies with these rules and regula-tions.

Subsection 110(b) specifically states that "...an indication of where such compliance was achieved by use of Division 1 regulatory J

guides and staff technical positions and where compliance was achieved

. by equivalent means..." should be provided.

The use of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) appears to be the most efficient means of satisfying the intent of this legal requirement.

To aid in the documentation process, the SRP will be revised to reference the applicable regulations. Therefore, the revised SRP will clearly show the current staff interpretation of the licensing review process acceptance crReria used to judge the conformance of the plant design to the regulations. In providing docutaentation regarding how a parti-cular plant conforms to a particular regulation, the licensee or appli-cant has the option of showing that the plant meets the SRP acceptance criteria relevant to tnat regulation, or showing that the intent of the acceptance criteria is satisfied by an equivalent method, or stating that tne plant deviates from the acceptance criteria.

b.

Comment: The SRP that is used to respond to Section 110 of Public Law 90-295 snould be the SRP used in licensing the individual plants.

Staff Evaluation: The staff generally agrees with this comment for plants to be licensed in the future. Those plants will be fully evalu-ated against the SRP during the licensing process. However, many plants currently operating were licensed prior to development of the SRP. Fur-ther, the SRP has been revised previously and will be revised again in April 1981. In order to document and later evaluate the extent to which an individual plant complies with the regulations, it is necessary to have a base document that sets forth the Commission's current guidance on how the regulations are interpreted. The staff believes that the April 1981 revision to the SRP should be that base document. However, as discussed in NUREG-0745, " Plan for the Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors," plants for which the staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is issued after April 1982 will be evaluated against the SRP revision used in the licensing process for that plant.

c.

Comment: The SRP is not a regulation, only guidance to the staff.

Staff Evaluation: The comment is correct.

There is no intent to require previously licensed plants to meet all of the SRP acceptance criteria.

In fact, as stated in NUREG-0745:

It is expected tnat most deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria will innerently already be scheduled for a routine safety review as part of the National Reliability Evaluation Program (NREP) or will either be resolved or scheduled for review as a result of the experience gained from the current Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP).

Only in those cases where a potentially significant safety issue is t

identified will the staff propose a backfitting of the SRP acceptance criteria.

- d.

Comment: The standard fonnat should be revised.

Staff Evaluation:

The SRP revision scheduled for the Spring of 1981 is expected to require little or no additional information in the PSAR and/or FSAR submitted by the licensee. Where changes to the Standard Format are found to be needed, however, necessary revisions will be made.

e.

Comment: The SRP should be reviewed by the Regulatory Requirements Review Committee and then issued for public comment.

Staff Evaluation: The SRP to be issued in the Spring of 1981 is expected to contain only those revisions that: (1) reflect new requirements already imposed by NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the THI-2 Accident," (2) reference appropriate regulations, (3) reflect changed organizational responsibilities within NRR, (4) reflect the staff's currcrit licensing practice, and (5) make minor editorial changes.

The new requirements imposed by NUREG-0660 have already received public comment and have been approved by the Comaission. Any other new require-ment will be subject to public comment before inclusion in the SRP, unless the Director of NRR makes a specific decision to the contrary on each such requirement.

2.

The Commission Should Identify the Regulations of Particular Significance a.

Comment: Many organizations stated that they could provide more meaning-ful comments if they had a list of the regulations that the Commission had detenained to be of particular significance to public health and safety.

Staff Evaluation: The proposed list of regulations of particular signifi-cance is included in Table 1 to NUREG-0745, " Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors," which is being published "for comment."

3.

The Plan Goes Beyond the Intent of Section 110 a.

Comment: The plan to require documentation to the SRP should apply only to operating plants.

Staff Evaluation:

Basically, this is the net effect of NUREG-0745.

NRR Office Letter 9 (issued in final form in January 1977) requires that deviations from the SRP requirements be identified and justified for cps docketed after September 1,1976 and for OL applications docketed after January 1,1977.

Therefore, many plants now in the licensing pro-cess would have to provide essentially the same documentation as part of the licensing process. (See also Comment 4b, below, and the staff evaluation of that comment).

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4-b.

Coment: The proposed program applies further burden on the engineering resources of an industry already straining to satisfy the requirements stemming from the accident at Three Mile Island.

Staff Evaluation: We generally agree with these coments and have modf-fied the schedule to spread the required industry resources over a seven year period and therefore ease the resource requirements during the next several years.

c.

Coment: Plants being reviewed under the Systematic Evaluation Program T5EP) and the plants scheduled to be issued an operating licensee in the near term (NT0Ls) should be exempted since documentation already exists.

Staff Evaluation: Complete documentation does not exist for the SEP plants or for the NT0Ls. Where appropriate documentation has been pre-viously submitted to the NRC, these can be referenced in responding to the requirements of NUREG-0745.

d.

Comment: The FSAR update rule will provide sufficient documentatfor,.

Staff Evaluation: The FSAR update rule requires the licensee to update the FSAR to reflect a variety of plant changes and analyses performed by or for the licansee. However, the FSAR update rule does not explictly require the licensee to provide documentation regarding meeting of regulations. The FSAR update rule requires documentation only in speci-fic cases of plant or procedure modifications, license amendments, cr analyses performed at the request of the Comission.

e.

Comment: The NRC's General Counsel has stated that, "the review process does... establish a legally adequate basis for a Comission finding for compliance with the regulations."

Staff Evaluation: As noted by some of the organizations making this com-ment, the NRC General Counsel also recomended that the staff more clearly document the relationship between the review process and compliance with the regulations.

Also, Section 110 requires a finding relative to current regulations, not the regulations in effect at the time of licensing. Certainly the intent of Section 110 would not be satis-fied by a mere statement of the legal adequacy of the relationship of the review process and the regulations.

f.

Coment: The requirement to document and justify deviations from the SRP amounts to a re-licensing of operating reactors.

Staff Evaluation: It is not the intent of the plan presented in NUREG-0745 to require conformance with all aspects of the SRP. See response to Item lc, above.

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Coment: The burden of documenting compliance with the regulations should be placed on the staff, not the licensees and applicants.

It is the staff's, not the licensee's responsibility.

Staff Evaluation: The plants currently operating have been licensed over approximately a 20-year period. The regulations have changed significantly during that period.

Further, the staff's interpretation of the intent of the regulations has become more specific based on the knowledge gained during the review process and on experience gained during the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documentation submitted to the staff during the licensing review varied greatly from plant to plant, depending on the period when uhe plant was being licensed because of changes in the regulations and in the depth of the staff's review over the twenty year period.

Further, the staff performs basically an audit review. Neither the NRC staff nor the Commission claims that the review process attempts to independently ascertain that each regulation is correctly applied to each applicable plant component, system, or structure.

Because of the lack of uniform documentation and the audit nature of the staff's review, the licensees and applicants, not the staff, must initially be responsible for documenting compliance with the regulations.

As stated previously in the response to 3c, previously submitted appli-cable documentation may be referenced by the licensees and applicants in responding to the requirements of the plan presented in NUREG-0745.

4.

The Requirement Dates are Arbitrary a.

Comment: The staff slips SER dates and if this occurs on a specific operating license (0L) or construction permit (CP) application review, the affected plant applicant may have to submit the documentation requirements prior to licensing instead of after licensing. Therefore, a slight slippage in SER date could have a major adverse impact on the licensing schedule.

Staff Evaluation: The Commission has previously stated that if a partic-ular licensing review slips such that the SER was issued after April 1, 1982, instead of prior to that date, that the specific situation will be reviewed on a " case-by-case" basis and that the more stringent documentation requirements would not be automatically applied.

b.

Coment: (1) Construction Permit (CP) applications should not have documentation requirements that are different than OLs; (2) SRP documen-tation should not be a precondition of licensing for currently docketed CP applications; (3) the January 1, 1982 date does not provide sufficient a

\\

- time to document against the SRP; and (4) the Shoreham nuclear power plant should be required to identify all deviations from the SRP prior to granting of an operating license.

Staff Evaluation: The different documentation requirements for cps than OLs, proposed in [45 FR 67099] were intended to reflect the re* quire-ments of Section 110 and an updating of existing NRR policy as documented

~

in Office Letter 9.

Section 110 specifies that the Commission determine which regulations are of particular significance and the extent to which operating plants meet these regulations. On the other hand, Office Letter 9 requires that all deviations from SRP be identified and justified for cps docketed after September 1,1976 and OLs docketed after January 1, 1977.

Office Letter No. 9 was issued in final form on January 3,1977 and included a listing of plants already in the licensing process that were exempt from the documentation requirements. However, the anti-cipated licensing dates for some plants in the licensing process in January 1977 have changed significantly during the past four years.

Construction was deferred by applicants because of financial reasons and decreases in projected needed generating capability, and licensing progress was slowed considerably by the diversion of staff resources needed to resolve safety issues arising from the accident of Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant. As a result, the 1977 list of plants exempt from the documentation requirements of Office Letter No. 9 is no longer rational in all cases. Therefore, at this time, it appears much more reasonable to satisfy the intent of both Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 and of Office Letter 9 by considering the current status of plants in the licensing process, not their status some four years ago.

The proposed rule has been modified significantly to reflect the coments received in response to 45 FR 67099. The major changes are:

1.

The SER date which determines whether pre or post licensing documentation of deviations from the revised SRP is required was changed from January 1, 1982 to April 1,1982 for both construction permit and operating license applicants. This is to allow at least one year from publication of the revised SRP in April 1981 to publication of the SER. This is sufficient time for the applicant's analysis and the NRC staff's evaluation.

3.

Pre-licensing requirements for documenting deviations from the May 1980 version of the SRP were eliminated at the construction permit stage for those plants where the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supplement is issued before April 1, 1982, since these applicants will later be required to provide complete documentation of deviations from the revised SRP before issuance of an operating license.

U

- In regard to the comment regarding the Shoreham nuclear power plant, there appears to be no basis for treating Shoreham d'fferer.tly than any other plant.

The Shoreham plant was exempt from the requirements of Office Letter 9; therefore, the proposed rule does not represent any relaxation of documentation requirements.

Currently, the staff SER is scheduled to be issued in the Spring of 1981; therefore, post rather than pre-licensing documentation will be required by the final rule.

5.

The Safety Benefits of the Overall Plan are Questionable and not Commensurate with the Kesources Required a.

Comment: A large number of individuals and organizations made the above comment in various forms, including references to ongoing programs like SEP and Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) and the National Reliability Evaluation Program (NREP).

Staff Evaluation: The staff has attempted to propose a plan that minimizes the resources necessary to comply with Section 110 waile maxi-mizing the anticipated safety benefits.

A najor aspect of the proposed plan is its integration with ongoing programs such as SEP, IREP/NRCP, and the resolution of generic issues.

The plan anticipates that most of the significant safety issues that will be identified by determining deviations from the regulations will inherently already be scheduled for a routine safety review as part of the NREP or will either be resolved or scheduled for review as a result of the experience sained from the current SEP program. The staff intends to propose ad hoc backfit requirements only in those cases where the identified deviation involves a significant safety issue.

Assuming that WRC staff resourcas allocated to this program are maintained at reasonaole levels, the program will not be completed until about 1990.

Therefore, to alleviate the immediate impact of the plan on industry resources, the plan has been revised to require evaluations from the operating plants in discrete groups over a seven year period (an average of about 13 plants a year). Also, as experience is gained in the imple-mentation of this program, the results will be reviewed from the standpoint of their contribution to reduction of risk to public health and safety.

Judgments could be maue that further documentation against certain SRP acceptance criteria or staff review of certain of the responses likely would not lead to the identification of any new safety issues, either generically o.' plant-specific; and the program could be suitaoly modified.

The evaluation required of applicants whose plants are relatively early in the licensing process will be accomplished as part of tne licensing process and should have little or no impact on either resources or licensing senedule, since a similar documentation program was already planned in accordance with Office Letter No. 9.

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St#9tARY OF PUBLIC COP 94ENTS

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< 22, Organtration and/or Individual Responses to F.R. Notice Alabama Power I

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X

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Atomic Industrial Forum X

I X

84bcock & W11cos X

8echtel Power Corp.

X X

8WR Review Group X

X X

X Carolina Power & Light X

I X

X X

Cincinnati Gas & Electric X

X X

X Combustion Engineering Power Systems I

X X

Cormionwealth Edison I

Consumers Power X

X X

X Debevoise & Lieberman X

I I

I Duke Power X

X X

Edison Electric Institute X

X Envirosphere Company I

X X

Florida Power & Light X

X Fluor Power Systems X

X General Electric Co.

X Georgia Power X

X Grandin Lawrence P.E.

I Igham, Lincoln & Beale X

X LeBoeuf. Lamb. Leiby & MacRae X

X X

Lowenstein. Neman. Reis. Axelrod & Toll I

X X

flortheast Utilities I

X X

X Omaha Public Power District X

X X

Pacific Gas & Electric Co.

X X

X X

X Portland General Electric X

X X

Power Authority of State of New York I

X X

X X

Rochester Gas A Electric I

I X

$NUPPS X

X 5 tone & Webster Engineering I

X X

X Twomey. Latham & Schmitt X

virginta Electrir & Power Co.

X X

X WJshington Public Power Supply System X

X X

Westit4 house Electric X

X X

g, Wisconsin Electric X

X X

Yankee Atomic Electric X

X X

X Other Applicable letters Atomic Industrial Forwn X

X X

Five Congressmen I

X muclear Oversight Committee I

ENCLOSURE 7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 50 RULE TO RE0VIRE LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS TO DOCUMENT DEVIATIONS FROM THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Coninission AC7 ION: Final Rule

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a rule that will require all nuclear power plant licensees and all applicants for construction permits and manufacturing licenses to identify and justify deviations from the acceptance criteria of the applicable revision of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087 as part of a comprehensive systematic safety evaluation.

EFFECTIVE DATE:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Malcolm L. Ernst, Assistant Director for Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.

20555,(301)492-8016 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 9,1980, the NRC published in the Federal

. Register [45 FR 670R] a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which would require all commercial nuclear power plant licensees and applicants to document deviations fromtheStandardReviewPlan(SRP).

Interested persons were invited to submit written comments to the Secretary of the Commission by November 24, 1980.

Numerous comments were 4eceived. After consideration of the coments and other factors involved, the Commission has amended the requirement as published for public comment and added explanatory statements to further define the applf-cability and implementation schedule for the requirement.

Many of the coments pointed out that the proposed plan would have a major impact on engineering resources during the next several years. To alleviate this y

short-term impact, and recognizing that the staff could not review all of the responses within the next several years, the plan to implement the proposed rule'

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y j I has been revised to schedule the responses in groups over a period of seven years. This revised schedule applies to both licensees of plants that had an operating license as of June 30, 1980 and applicants for an operating license for which the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report is issued before April 1982.

A large group of conuenters questioned the time penuitted for response and why applicants for construction permits were subject to significantly different documentation requirements than applicants for operating licenses for the situa-tion where an NRC staff safety evaluation report was scheduled to be issued within about the next 18 months. To correct this apparent inequity, the following signif-icant changes were made in the proposed rule.

(1) The SER date, which cetennines wnether pre or post licensing documentation is required, was changed from January 1,1982'to April 1,1982 for both construction permit and operating license applicants. This is to allow at least one year from publication of the revised SRP in April 1981 publication of the SER.

(2) Pre-licensing requirements for documenting deviations from the May 1980 version of the SRP were eliminated at the construction permit stage for those plants where the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supple-ment is issued before April 1,1982, since these applicants will later be required to provide complete documentation of deviations from the revised SRP before issuance of an operating license.

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' Copies of the comments, a summary of the comments, and the staff responses are alailable for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.

E., Washington, D. C.

Single copies may be obtained on' request from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washin9 ton, D. C. 20555, Attention:

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Document Control.

The requirements presented in this Final Rule are part of a comprehensive system-atic safety evaluation of operating nuclear power reactors which is required by Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, the NRC FY-80 Authorization Bill. The elements of t

the plan required by Section 110 of the Public Law were specified as the minimum acceptable in order to develop a significant safety evaluation.

The plan developed by the Commission adds to the minimum requirements of the Public Law and integrates it witt' already existing or planned safety programs.

This will lead to a more compre-hensiv and unified safety evaluation. The systematic safety evaluation plan, developed in response to the requirements of Section 110 of the Public Law, has the following as its principal conceptual elements.

(1) The identification of the regulations of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety by the NRC staff.

(2) The revision of the SRP by the NRC staff.

The revised SRP will consist of the existing SRP modified to reference all applicable regulations and those Division 1 Regulatory Guides, staff positions and other documents, including the TMI-related requirements, used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulations.

The revised SRP is scheduled to be issued by April 1981.

It is anticipated that the SRP will be periodically Ii '.

revised in the future.

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' 'j' (3) Licensee and applicant analysis and documentation of compliance with the

~J regulations of particular significance. The analysis will be made by demonstration of conformance with or equivalence to the acceptance criteria of identified SRP sections.

Conformance with or equivalence to the acceptance criteria of the revised SRP will be a satisfactorily aemonstration of compliance-with the regulations.

(4) iiRC Staff evaluation of licensee responses.

(5)

Integration of evaluations with the results of other Commission safety programs (the Systematic Evaluation Program, an engineering issue oriented safety program; and the National Reliability Evaluation Program, a reliability-risk assessment oriented safety program) to identify and resolve any possible significant safety issues. The entire program would be completed by 1990 for all currently operating reactors and reactors expected to receive operating licenses in the near term.

The details of the systematic safety evaluation plan are presented in a draft report, NUREG-0745, " Plan for the Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactors." This report has been issued for public comment, with the comment period ending on After Commission consioeration of the comments on the plan, a final plan will be issued which will identify the. rules of particular significance to which the requirements of this rule refer. The issuance of the final plan is tentatively scheduled for late spring 1981.

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amendea, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Sections 552 and 553, Title 5 of the United States y

Code the following rule is published subject to cocification.

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. I.A. ' Documentation Requirements All nuclear power plants required to be licensed under Section 103 or I

Section 104(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, will be required to document deviations from the acceptance criteria of the SRP.

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, The specific requirements for each plant have been categorized as follows:

e Category 1 All licensees for nuclear power plants issued operating licenses on or before June 30,1980,l/ and all applicants for a nuclear power plant operating license issued after June 30, 1980, but for which an NRC staff Safety Evaluation Report will be issued on or before April 1, E

1982, will be required to evaluate the plant against the SRP revision in effect one year prior to the date on which the NRC requires documenta-tion. The licensee or applicant is to:

(1) document conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria and pro-vide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documen-tation is required only for those SRP acceptance criteria that the Commis-sion has identified as implementing the regulations that the Coninission has determined to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safety.

Category 2 All applicants for a nuclear power plant operating license, construction pennit, or manufacturing license for which a NRC staff Safety Evaluation

'64 1/ The date on which Public Law 96-295 became effective.

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2 is issued after April 1,1982 / will be required to evaluate the 3

plant against the SRP revision used during the staff review, but in no case an SRP revision issued before April 1981. The applicant is to:

(1) docu-ment conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP accep-tance criteria and provide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documentation is required for all of the SRP acceptance criteria that the Comission has identified as pertinent to the specific type of license or permit.

B.

Response Schedule The documentation required under Part A of this rule shall be provided according to the following schedule:

1.

Those plants included in Category 1 shall submit the required documentation on a staggered schedule. The first group of plants required to respond will be the eleven plants identified in Phase II of the Commission's Systematic Evaluation Program. These plants will be required to submit the required documentation within one year after publication of the next revision to the SRP, currently scheduled for April 1981, or publication of the final version of NUREG-0745, whichever comes later. The remaining plants in this grouping will be scheduled to respond before 1990, at an average of about 13 plants per year. These plants will be notified by NRC of their response date at least fifteen months prior to that date.

2.

Those plants included in Category 2 will submit the required documenta-tion before the issuance of the license or permit.

2_/ For the case of construction permit or manufactucing license, the applicable

[i; document is NRC's Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supplement.

3f Or one year after publication of the next revision to uhe SRP, currently

/j expected in April 1981, whichever is later.

C.

Compliance with Regulations In situations where there are deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria (i.e., there is neither confonaance nor equivalence), a licensee shottld request any needed exemptions to the regulations.

D.

Clarifications

[

1.

As used in this rule, a deviation is defined as a lack of conformance of a plant feature to a provision of the acceptance criteria of the SRP. An alternate and acceptable (equivalent) approach to satisfying b

the SRP acceptance criteria is not considered to be a deviation, but a justification of equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria must be documented in the response.

2.

As used in this rule, tne regulations of particular significance are those identified in the final version of NUREG-0745, as perhaps iaodified in the subsequent NRC letters requesting documentation.

3.

The rule contemplates that the licensee of each plant in category 1 above, would assess the plant design against the regulations that would apply to a new applicant. Further, licensees or applicants for an OL, (as defined. in category 1 or 2 above), will be required to address not only those SRP acceptance criteria nonaally applicable to an OL, but also those SRP acceptance criteria normally applicable only to cps, unless the plant was previously evaluated during the CP or ML review as required under category 2 aoove. However, applicants for a CP or ML, in category 2, will only have to address those SetP acceptance criteria normally appli-cable to tneir stage of licensing, since the plants will be evaluated p

against the OL acceptance criteria" during the OL licensing review, as

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specified for category 2 plants.

' 1 4.

As used in this rule, justification of equivalence to or deviation from the acceptance criteria of the SRP shall be a summary statement identifying the area of eqv;v tience or deviation, a description df actual or designed area in question, and the basis for equivalence or

~

the basis for continued safe operation in light of the deviation.

5.

If a slippage in the SER issuance date occurs such that significant changed or increased documentation will be required before license or permit issuance, the Commission may grant relief from the change in docunentation requirements and response schedule upon request.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this day of

, 1981.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ii i

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w ENCLOSURE 8 N

STAFF ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATIONS OF "PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE" Section 110 of the FY 80 Authorization Bill requires that the NRC develop and implement a comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of

~

all currently operating utilization facilities required to be licensed under Section 103 or 104(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Subsection 110(b)(1).

requires' that the Comission, as a part of this plan, identify each current rule and regulation, compliance with which the Comission determines to be of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety.

Subsection 110(b)(2) requires that the Comission determine the extent to which each operating plant complies with the particularly significant rules and regulations, including an identification of where compliancu was achieved by use of Division 1 Regulatory Guides and staff technical positions and where compliance was achieved by equivalent means.

This enclosure describes the complexities involved in determining which regu-lations are "particularly significant" in terms of public health and safety.

A general discussion is provided in Section A below, and the results of an NRR staff review using different criteria are described in Section B, including the NRR staffs recommendations of the listing of rules of "particular signi-ficance" to be addressed by the operating plants.

A.

General Discussion The conference report (Congressional Report No. 96-1070) accompanying the Authori-zation Bill notes that the scope of the legislation was limited to those regula-tions having particular significance in order to reduce the burden on the NRC in preparing the plan, and to ensure that the information gathered will be useful in assessing the overall safety of the operating plants.

It was assumed that by thus limiting the scope of this study, it could be accomplished in a timely manner.

The NRC staff has initiated efforts to identify those nf the Comission's rules and regulations that are particularly significant to the protection of the public health and safety. The efforts performed show that the criteria used to determine "particular significance" and the degree of conservatism used in judgments as to which regulations meet the criteria both strongly impact the number of regula-tions that are so identified. Thus, the staff has found the task of determining those of the Comission's rules which are of particular significance. is a diffi cult and subjective process.

T1.ere are two basic problems associated with the identification of regulations of particular significance. The first invovles the matter of judgment as to the degree of increase in risk to the public that would warrant such a categori-zation. This manifests itself in two ways:

1.

Words such as " substantial" increase in consequences or frequency of an accident, or " major" degradation of a boundary, are subject to wide varia-f tions in interpretation.

The lack of explicit, quantifiable safety goals or X

criteria and the uncertainties surrounding the quantification or risk add to Di this problem.

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2.

Application of the criteria to test a particular regulation may be done with varying degrees of conservatism and whether a regulation passes the test depends, in large part, on the "what if" scenario developed by the person doing the categorization. This is further complicated because some regula-tions themselves interpret or define certain aspects of broader regulations.

The following example dealing with containment systems is provided to illustrate the difficulties and subjective judgments that are involved. The first judg-ment is whether or not the containment system, as a whole, qualified as a major protection to public health and safety. Valid arguments can be advanced from either point of view. One point of view is that containment is only required if two relatively low probability events both occur. First, there has to be a significant loss of reactor coolant inventory, either through an accident like a LOCA, stuck open PORV, or failed pump seal, or through a slow boil-off of reactor coolant becaun a decay heat removal path is not maintained.

In addition, the redundant mitigating systems that are provided to maintain reactor coolant inventory and provide a decay heat removal path must fail or be erron-eously shut off, resulting in severe damage. Only if these events occur does the containment provide a significant protection to public health and safety.

The opposite point of view is that the events described have occurred and, in the case of the TMI accident, the containment was the safety system that did not provide substantial protection to the public.

If one reaches the judgment that the containment system is very important to public health and safety, then GDC-16, which establishes the requirement to have a containment and GDC-50 which defines the design basis for the containment, would be identified as regulations of particular significance.

GDC-51 through 57 also establish important requirements pertaining to parti-cular aspects of containment design. These regulations are clearly important.

However, it is a high judgmental decision whether or not all or some of these other GDCs are of "particular significance."

A second difficulty in identifying which regulations are deemed to be of particular significance is that such a designation does not mean, or even imply, that all deviations from these important requirements are of safety significance. Such a determination of safety significance can only be made by considering the specific deviation in the context of the overall plant design. Considered by itself, a specific requirement may be judged to have particular significance.

Later, when plant specific designs or operating requirements are reviewed, it may be found that the impact of noncompliance upon public health and safety is very small. This may be the result of a number of factors. Overall plant design may have incorporated other features, the presence of which serves to reduce the importance of features called for by the specific requirement which was judged to be particularly significant. Good engineering practices utilized in the plant design may have been the predecessor of a later requirement which has been categorized as "particularly significant," but the particular plant y

feature may not fully meet all of the detailed requirements of the formal staff Y.

position. However, the design of the part clarplant feature may have gone far g

enough to reduce risk to the public to a negligible level.

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i A general illustrative example might be the problem of pipe breaks inside of containment. GDC 4 requires, in part, " Structures, systems and components important to safety shall1 be designed to accomodate the effects of... pipe whipping and discharging fluids..." To, assure compliance with the intent of this regulation, the staff has generally taken the position that all c

pipes containing high energy fluids inside of containment must be structurally supported to a sufficient extent that a postulated break in one pipe would not cause failure of other piping systems because of pipe whip or.. jet impinge-ment forces. However, some plants were designed and constructed prior to promulugation of the staff position.

In such cases, there were not sufficient structural anchor points to protect against every conceivable location where s

a pipe might break. However, additional preventive features may be deemed to provide adequate compensatory safety features for a limited number of possible pipe break locations that could not be protected against by adequate structural support of the piping system. Such features might include more frequent inser-vice inspection of welds at the unprotected locations, better weld preparation to obtain mcre sensitive ultrasonic measurements during inservice inspection, and a more sophisticated leak detection system.

To add to the complexity of the overall problem, not only can some deviations

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from requirements of "particular significance" be of little safety consequence, but also there may be situations where a given regulation might not be judged to be of particular significance if taken alone. However, a substantial deviation from this requirement in combination with deviations from closely related requirements could result in a significant reduction in public health and safety. One example might be the requirement that the condensate storage tank (the primary source of water for the auxiliary feedwater system) be designed to Category I seis.nic standards. This might not be deemed " parti-cularly significant" because there is also a requirement for a seismically designed connection to the safety ' grade component cooling water system.

However, if the latter requirement were also determined to be not of parti-cular significance, the review of the plant against the particularly signi-ficance regulations would not address assurance of a supply of water to the auxiliary feedwater system following a severe seismic event.

The net result of the difficulties discussed above has been much subjectivity in the determination of regulations of particular significance, with a strong tendency toward a lenient interpretation. While a probabilistic risk-based assessment of the regulations might help part of this problem, the staff has not had time to consider such an analysis. Also, any risk-based analysis would suffer from the same inability to address initially the effect of a range of deviations from these regulations.

B.

Preliminary Results of Staff Evaluations of Regulations The staff initiated a program to identify those of _the Commission's rules and regulations which are particularly significant to the protection of the public health and safety. A small task force of NRC technical specialists was formed

_g to perform this effort. The first step in this program was to identify all of W

the Commission's rules and regulations which are: (a) safety-related and

- i (b) applicable to plants having received a license under Section 103 Or 104(b)

,j of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The results of this screening are shown in

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. Table 1 under the column identified as Applicable Rules. This list was then further screened by the task force, using two sets of screening criteria--

one of which might be construed as a somewhat lenient interpretation of "particular significance," and the other a more restrictive interpretation.

The more lenient set of screening criteria (Criteria Set A) used by the task force was defined as follows: A rule was to be identified as "particularly significant" if it advances technical or administrative requirements, the absence of which might result in a significant increase in the likelihood of:

1.

Offsite consequences 10 CFR 100 for the design basis event and most limiting single fail.ure, or; 2.

Loss of Safety Function by assuming single equipment failure, or; 3.

Major Degradation of fuel integrity, primary coolant boundary or primary containment boundary, or; 4.

Large onsite releases or staff personnel exposures A.

Restricted areas 25R whole body 150R whole body skill 375 extremities B.

Unrestricted areas 0.5 R/yr. whole body 500 x 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II release These criteria were based on the criteria for the reporting to Congress of abnormal events which has been adopted by the Commission (ref. NUREG-0090).

The more stringent set of screening criteria (Criteria Set B) used by the task force was as follows: A rule was to be identified as "particularly significant" if it advances technical or administrative requirements, the absence of which might result in a significant increase in the likelihood of major degradation of two or more of the three barriers in the defense-in depth concept (i.e., fuel integrity, reactor coolant system pressure boundary).

As is evident, this screening criteria set was based upon assumptions of severe challenge to the Commission's defense-in-depth concept.

In both cases, the task force used the screening criteria conservatively to test the applicable safety-related regulations; i.e., if there was a reason-able question as to the importance of a regulation, it was judged to pass the test of' "particular significance." The results of the task force screening activities is shown in Table 1.

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, After completion of the task force review of the Commission's Rule and Regu-lations the listings were subjected to an NRR staff peer review and a review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The listing shown in Table 1 refler

'le results of these reviews. Where the task force listing has been expanded by the comments received from the NRR staff and the ACRS the change is indicated by an asterisk in the appropriate colman.

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After review of the comments received from the ACRS and the NRR staff regarding the criteria used to screen for Rules of Particular Significance the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation recommends that the listing of the staffs regulations obtained using Criteria A be adopted as the Commissions interpre-tation of the intent of Subsection 110(b)(1). However, it should be noted that one division of NRR, although not voicing strong objections to this recom-mendation, preferred the use of all of the Applicable Rules listed in the first column of Table 1.

Before issuance of NUREG-0745, " Plan for Systematic Safety Evaluation of Nuclear Power Plants," the list of regulations contained in that report will be reviewed by the other NRC offices.

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TABLE 1 TECHNICAL RULES Applicable Rule Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 20.101-20.108 X

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10 CFR 20.201 -20.207 X

10 CFR 20.301 - 20.305 X

10 CFR 50.34a 10 CFR 50.36 X

X 10 CFR 50.36a 10 CFR 50.44 10 CFR 50.46 X

X 10 CFR 50.55a X

X 10 CFR, Appendix A GDC 1 X

X GDC 2 X

X GDC 3 X

X GDC 4 X

X GDC 5 X

X GDC 10 X

GDC 11 X

X*

GDC 12 X

GDC 13 X

X GDC 14 X

X GDC 15 X

X GDC 16 X

X

• Added per NRR staff and ACRS comments

' Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B GDC 17 X

X GDC 18 X

X GDC 19 X

X

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@C 20 X

X GDC 21 X

X

@C 22 X

X GDC 23 X

X GDC 24 X

X GDC 25 X

GDC 26 X

GDC 27 X

X

@C 28 X

X GDC 29 X*

X*

GDC 30 X

X GDC 31 X

X

@C 32 X

X GDC 33 X

GDC 34 X

GDC 35 X

X

@C 36 X

X GDC 37 X

X GDC 38 X

X GDC 39 X

X GDC 40 X

X

. Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B GDC 41 X

X GDC 42 X

X GDC 43 X

X GDC 44 X

X GDC 45 X

X GDC 46 X

X GDC 50 X

X*

GDC 51 X

X GDC 52 X

GDC 53 X

GDC 54 X

X GDC 55 X

X GDC 56 X

GDC 57 X

GDC 60 X

GDC 61 X

GDC 62 X

GDC 63 X

GDC 64 X

10 CFR 50, Appendix G X

X 10 CFR 50, Appendix H X

X 10 CFR 50, Appendix I 10 CFR 50, Appendix J X

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Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 50, Appendix K X

X 10 CFR 70.24 10 CFR 71.31 - 71.42 X

10 CFR 71, Appendix A 10 CFR 71, Appendix B 10 CFR 71, Appendix D 10 CFR 73.40 - 73.60 10 CFR 73.67 10 CFR 100 X

10 CFR 100, Appendix A X

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ADMINISTRATIVE RULES Applicable Rules Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 19 X

10 CFR 20.401-20.409 X

10 CFR 21 X

X 10 CFR 30 10 CFR 50.10 10 CFR 50.34 10 CFR 50.37 10 CFR 50.40 10 CFR 50.54 X

X 10 CFR 50.59 10 CFR 50.70 X

X 10 CFR 50.71 X

X 10 CFR 50.80 X

X 10 CFR 50.81 X

X 10 CFR 50.82 X

X 10 CFR 50.109 X

X 10 CFR 50, Appendix B X

X 10 CFR, Appendix E X

10 CFR 51 10 CFR 55 X

X 10 CFR 55, Appendix A X

X 10 CFR 70.52 10 CFR 71.51-71.64 t.

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Applicable Rules.

Criteria A Criteria B 10 CFR 71, Appendix E 10 CFR 73.70 - 73.72 10 CFR 73. Appendix B

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10 CFR 73, Appendix C O

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CONTENTS Page Abstract......................

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't Abbreviations.......................................................

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1.

General.........................................................

1 2.

Background......................................................

1 3.

Discussion of the Proposed Plan.................................

3 3.1 P a rt I......................................................

3 3.1.1 Rules and Regulations of Particular Significance.....

3 3.1.2 Revision to Standard Review Plan.....................

3 3.1.3 Licensee / Applicant Determination of Compliance.......

4 3.1.4 NRC Evaluation of Licensee / Applicant Determination o f Comp l i a nce......................................

7 3.2 Part II.....................................................

8 3. 3 P a rt I I I....................................................

9 3. 4 P a rt I V.....................................................

10 4.

Sc dules.......................................................

11 References..........................................................

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ABSTRACT MM

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The plan presented in this report is part of a comprehensive systematic safety r

evaluation of nuclear power reactors, which is required by Section 110 of Public j

Law 96-295, the NRC FY-80 Authorization Bill. Section 110 of the Public Law specified the minimum acceptable elements of a meaningful safety evaluation.

This plan, developed by the Commission, adds to the minimum requirements and i

integrates it with already existing or planned safety programs, which wilJ lead 3ij to a more comprehensive and unified safety evaluation.

2 The Systematic Safety Evaluation Plan, developed in response to the requirements of Section 110 of the Public Law, has the following principal conceptual elements.

A.

Compliance with the Regulations of Particular Significance 1.

The identification of the regulations of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety by the NRC staff.

2.

The revision of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) by the NRC staff. The J

revised SRP wisi consist of the existing SRP modified to reference all w/

applicable regulations and those Division 1 Regulatory Guides, staff positions and other documents, including the TMI-related requirements, used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulations. The revised SRP is scheduled to be issued by April 1981.

3.

Licensee and applicant analysis and accumentation of compliance with, or deviation from, the identified regulations. The determinations will be made by demonstration of conformance with, equivalence to, or deviations from the acceptance criteria of the SRP sections associated with each of the identified regulations.

4.

Staff evaluation of licensee responses.

5.

Integration of evaluations with the results of other Comaission safety programs to resolve any potential significant safety issues.

B.

Generic Issues 1.

The identification of all of the generic safety issues for which techni-cal solutions have been developed.

2.

Periodic identification of new generic issues.

3.

Periodic prioritization of new and existing, generic issues.

4.

Resolution of issues and the determination of which of these should be incorporated into the Conaission's regulations.

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ABBREVIATIONS

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CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CP -

Construction Permit

-3 IREP - Interim Reliability Evaluation Program ML -

Manufactuiring License NRC -

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NREP - National Reliability Evaluation Program NRR - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC OL -

Operating License SEP - Systematic Evaluation Program SRP - Standard Review Plan USI - Unresolved Safety Issue vi

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M PLAN FOR THE SYSTEMATIC SAFETY EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1.

General The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is proposing a plan for the systematic safety evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants, as well as all nuclear power plants that are in the operating license (0L), constrac-tion permit (CP), or manufacturing license (ML) review process. The plan also details the procedures for resolving identified generic safety issues. Parts rehensive plan to of this plan reflect the Corcission's effort to develop a comp (NRC FY 80 Author-satisf; the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 ization Bill). Coment is sought on the proposed plan and on the method of implementing such a plan. The coment period expires within 45 days from the date of the Notice of Availability of NUREG-0745 in the Federal Register.

===2.

Background===

Subsection 110(a) of Public Law 96-295 (NRC FY 1980 Authorization Bill) requires the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) to develop, submit to Congress, and implement as soon as practicable after notice and opportunity, for public coment, a comprehensive plan for the systematic safety evaluation of all currently operating nuclear power plants. The Congressional Conference Report, Report No. 96-1070, (Reference 1), states that the above requiremert was written so as to enable the NRC to build upon the systematic safety evaluation it is currently conducting for the oldest operating nuclear power plants.

The need to systematically assess the safety of operating nuclear power plants resulted in the establishment several years ago of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) by the NRC'.

One of the objectives of that program is the exten-sfon of the zxperience gained in reviewing the oldest plants to the safety evalu-atbr of all operating nuclear power plants. The TMI Action Plan (Reference 2) appropriate *y recognizes this need in Task IV.E.5, which requires the improved and expanded systematic ass. mment of the safety of all operating plants. Although there are many other TM..sction Plan tasks that are aimed at operating plants (such as more emphasis on the review of operating experience), there are two additional tasks that are directly related to the systematic assessment of the safety of operating plants. These are:

(1) Task II.C.1--Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP), the development of an orderly classification of accident sequences suitable for qualitative analyses and for use in the pro-babilistic analyses of core melt accidents of a few representative operating nuclear power plants and (2) Task II.C.2--continuation of IREP on all remaining operating plants by means of the National Reliability Evaluation Program (NREP).

Subsection 110(b) of Public Law 96-295 identifies certain information that, as a minimum, must be included as part of the systematic safety evaluation plan. Subsections 110(b)(1) and (2) require: the identification of each current rule and regulation, compliance with which the Comission determines to be of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety; and the detennination of the extent to which each currently operating g

plant complies with these identified rules and regulation, including an t

indication of where such compliance was achieved by use of Divisan 1 regu-7j

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latory guides and staff positions and where compliance was achieved by equiva-t lent means. Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5) require: -the identification of all of the generic safety issues set forth in NUREG-0410 (ReferHce 3) for which technical solutions have been developed; the determination of which of these solutions should be incorporated into the Comission's rules and regu-l 1ations; and a schedule for developing a technical solution for the remaining f

generic safety issues.

h Several years ago, the need to address generic safety issues in a disciplined manner led the NRC to establish the program described in NUREG-0419; recently the Generic Issues Branch was established in the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). This branch is responsible for managing the technical reso-lution of Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs) and for tracking the status of activities on other designated generic issues. The TMI Action Plan also addresses generic safety issues resulting from the lessons learned from the TMI accident; for example, Task IV.E.2 requires the early identification, i

assessment, and resolution of safety issues.

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Subsection 110(c) of Public Law 96-295 requires that, within 90 days of enact-ment of this legislation, the Comission report to Congress on the efforts to carry out Subsection 110(a). By letters of September 30,1980, from the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission to the President of the Senate (Reference 4) and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Reference 5),

the Commission has fulfilled this requirement.

As stated previously, the infonnation specifically called for in Section 110(b) of Public Law 96-295 is the minimum information that Congress required to be included in the expanded systematic safety evaluation program. The Commission's plan to satisfy Section 110 will not only explicitly fulfill the requirements, but, in an effort to minimize resources and to maximize plant safety, the Comission will also integrate this plan with certain aspects of other existing or planned safety programs. The proposed Comission plan, as well as its inter-relationship with other programs, is discussed below.

This proposed plan for the systematic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants has the following as its objectives:

(1) conforming to SeCion 110 of Public Law 96-295; (2) integrating the results of pertinent existin; or planned pro-grams into this plan to form a more comprehensive and uniffeo product; (3) maxi-mizi:.g the enhancement of plant safety; (4) minimizing the NRC and industry resources necessary to implement this plan; and (5) minimizing the time needed to implement this plan.

The proposed plan described below was developed by NRC staff with the intent of satisfying these objectives to the maximum extent practicable, realizing that some objectiver are in partial conflict with each other. For example, accomplishing the entire plan with several years would have a major unaccept-able short-term impact on both NRC and industry resources.

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3.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED PLAN The plan, as currently formulated, has been divided into four distinct parts:

(I)identificationandevaluationofcompliancewiththeregu-lations of particular significance; (II) assessment of safety issues or problems at operating plants in the SEP and IREP programs; (III) the Generic Issues Program and (IV) the integration of the results of Parts

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I-III to enable comprehensive decision making.

Figure 1 depicts the major tasks for each part of the overall plan.

These parts are discussed indivi-ducily below.

3.1 Part I Depicted on the flowchart in Figure 1 is Part I cf the plan, which covers the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(1) and (2) of Public Law 96-295.

These requirements specifically call for the identification of the regu-lations of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety, and for the de'r nination of the extent to which each operating plant complies with these regulations.

The major aspects of this plan are:

(1) identification of the rules and regulations of particular significance; (2) revision to the Standard Review Plan; (3) licensee / applicant determination of compliance; and (4) NRC evaluation of licensee / applicant determination of compliance.

3.1.1 Rules and Ragulations of Particular Significance The implementation of Part I of the plan, as presented in Figure 1, has already been initiated; the NRC staff has prepared a list of those regulations that are particularly significant to the protection of the public health and safety. This was accomplished by evaluating Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). A list of all administrative and technical regulations which the staff deemed to be of particular safety significance is presented in Table 1.

3.1.2 Revision to Standard Review Plan In a related effort, the staff is presently in the process of updating the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-75/087 (Reference 6). The SRP, first published in 1975, was prepared to guide NRC staff reviewers in performing safety reviews of applications to construct or operate nuclear power plants.

The principal purpose of the SRP is to ensure the quality and uniformity of the staff reviews and to present a well-defined base from which pro-posed changes in the scope of these reviews may be evaluated.

The SRP also serves to make information about regulatory matters widely available, and to improve understanding of the staff review process by interested N

members of the public and nuclear power industry.

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'i Currerit techniques for the safety evaluation of nuclear power plants as set forth in the SRP are the result of years of experience. As this experience is incorporated into the regulatory process, regulatory guides and the SRP are periodical!y reviewed and revised to reflect the current state of the art. This results in a varying basis for staff acceptance over time. Also, there has been a lack of uniform documentation of each plant's conformance with SRP acceptance criteria in effect at the time of review. This lack of a comon basis and of uniform documentation makes it difficult to determine the extent to which plants reviewed some time ago deviate from current SRP acceptance criteria, and the safety significance of any such deviations.

As a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, many regulatory reqairements have been revised and new requirements have been promul-gated.

Accordingly, the staff has begun to revise the SRP to reflect these new requirements. This next revisie of the SRP, scheduled for completion in April 1981, will consist of to May 1980 versicn of the SRP, modified to reference all applicable safet < and safeguards regulations and those Division 1 regulatory guides, staff positions, and other documents currently used by the staff to interpret the intent of these regulations, including requirements resulting from the TMI accident.

3.1.3 Licensee / Applicant Determination of Compliance In a matter related to the requirements of Section 110(b)(1), the Com-mission recantly published a notice of proposed rulemaking (Reference 7) which would require documentation of deviations from the Standard Review Plan acceptance criteria. This proposed rulemaking, as subse-quently modified by the Comission after considering public coments, requires all operating plants, and plants for which an OL, CP, or ML is pending, to be evaluated by the licensees / applicants in the following manner:

Category 1 All licensees for nuclear go,wer plants issued operating licenses on or before June 30, 1980-and all applicants for a nuclear power plant operating licensee issued after the June 30, 1980, but for which April 1,1982,pty Evaluation Report will be issued on or before an NRC St:ff S will be required to evaluate the plant against the SRP revision in effect one year prior to the date on which the NRC requires documentation. The licensee or applicant is to:

(1) document confor-mance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria and provide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documentation is required only for those SRP acceptance 1/ The date on which Public Law 96-295 became effective ai

~2/ The basis for the April 1,1982 date is to permit adequate time after v.

issuance of the revised SRP for a licensee / applicant to document and

-4 justify deviations and for the NRC staff to incorporate evaluations of

'j the more safety significant deviations into the staff Safety Evaluation

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Reports.

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criteria that the Commission has identified as implementing the regulations that the Comission has detennined to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safet.

Category 2 All applicants for a nuclear power plant operating license construction Report"isissuedafterApril1,1982gchaNRCstaffSafetyEvaluatIon permitgr manufacturing license for w will be required to evaluate

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the plant against the acceptance criteria of the SRP revision used during the staff review, but in no case an SRP revisico issued before April 1981.

The applicant is to:

(1) document conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria, (2) justify equivalence to the SRP acceptance criteria, or (3) identify deviations from the SRP acceptant e criteria and provide an analysis of the safety significance of these deviations. The documentation is required for all of the SRP acceptance criteria that the Commission has identified as pertinent to the specific type of license or permit.

The revised SRP will reference all pertinent safety regulations and Divi-sion 1 regulatory guides, staff positions, and all other documents used by the staff to interpret the intent if these regulations; and thus, demonstra-tion of conformance or equivalence to every SRP section that references a specific regulation will constitute a satisfactory means of demonstrating full compliance with the regulation.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations is in the process of being revisad by the NRC sk that the regulations will appear in a more logical order and --

in compliance with Executive Order 12044, " Improving Government Regulations" --

so that the regulations will be as simple and clear as possible. This program to revise the regulations is scheduled to be completed in about five years and, therefore, for consistency of review, the SRP references to the regulations will be interpreted to be these regulations in effect on June 30, 1980. To facilitate future determinations of compliance to the revised regulations, a list cross-referencing the existing regulations to their revised counterparts will be prepared by the staff. These revisions to the regulations will not nec-essitate future duplicative demonstrations of plant compliance by the licensee /

applicant.

Each licensee / applicant would be required to review its plant (s) against the acceptance criteria of the SRP, and indicate (1) where there is conformance with the SRP acceptance criteria; (2) where conformance is achieved by equiva-lent means, including a sumary justification as to why the current plant design or operating procedures provide an equivalent means of meeting the

-V For the case of construction permit or manufacturing license, the applicable document is NRC's Safety Evaluation Report TMI Supplement 4j Or one year after publication of the next revision to the SRP, currently expected in A;,ril 1981, whichever is later.

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s SRP acceptance criteria; and (3) where there is a deviation from (neither conformance or equivalence) the acceptance criteria of the SRP. In the latter case, the licensee / applicant will be required to provide a technical discussion as to.the safety significance of the deviation. The licensee / applicant should also request any needed exemptions to the regulations.

It should be noted that when certain regulations were promulgated they did not require plants that had already passed a specified point in thb licensing process to comply.

However, because Section 110 of Public Law 96-295 requires identification of each current (eic,.nasis added)

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regulation that the Comission determines to be of particular signi-ficance, the plan contemplates that the licensee of each plant in category 1 above, would assess the plant design against the regula-tions that would apply to a new applicant. Further, licensees or applicants for an OL, (as defined in category 1 or 2 above), will be required to address not only those SRP acceptance criteria nomally applicable to an OL, but also those SRP acceptance criteria normally applicable only to cps, unless the plant was previously evaluated during the CP or ML review as required under category 2 above. How-ever, applicants for a CP, or ML, in category 2, will only have to address those SRP acceptance criteria normally applicable to their '

stage of licensing, since the plants will be evaluated against the OL acceptance criteria during the OL licensing review, as specified for category 2 plants.

For each regulation that is determined by the Commission to be of particular significance to the protection of public health and safety, the NRC staff will prepare a list of the associated SRP acceptance criteria in the April 1981 revision to the SRP. As stated above, conformance with the identified acceptance criteria is an acceptable means of demonstrating compliance with the regulation.

The schedule for responses by the licensee / applicant is shown on Figure 2.

The NRC will request in the spring of FY 81 that all opera-ting reactor and near-term OL licensees document conformance with, equivalence to, or justify deviations from, the SRP acceptance criteria related to the regulations of particular significance. This response will be staggered to be compatible with the to-be-established schedule for the systematic safety review of all operating reactors. The 11 SEP Phase II plants will be scheduled to respond first, by the spring of FY 82. The remaining plants will be scheduled to respond before 1990, at an average of about 13 plants per year. The priority of response will be determined by factors such as the age of the plant, design differences from plants already reviewed, and popu-lation density.

It is expected that further revisions to the SRP will be made periodi-cally.

Those licensees whose plants are in category 1, above, will. be required to provide documentation based on the SRP revision in effect one year prior to the date that the Comission requires the documentation 4'

to be submitted.

.-. \\n f

W For any new licensing requirement established after the April 1981 revision to the SRP, the staff will make a definitive decision as to the applicability of the. requirement to CP applications to be submitted in the future, CP applications under review, OL applications to be submitted in the future, OL applications under review, and plants alreauy issued an OL. Revisions of the SRP after the April 1981 SRP revision will reflect these decisions.

For each future SRP revision, the NRC staff will prepare, for each regulation that has been detenained to be of particular significance, a list of SRP acceptance criteria similar to that prepared for the April 1981 revision to the SRP. These future lists will reflect the decisions made on the applicability of new requirements to plants that already had been issued an OL and, in general, licensees will not have to address SRP licensing requirements tnat were not backfit to this class of plants.

As discussed in Section 3.1.4 below, the NRC review of the licensee's evaluations might result in some reduction of the number of SRP

~

acceptance criteria required to be addressed by those licensees that are scheduled to submit evaluations toward the end of the SEP.

3.1.4 NRC Evaluation of Licensee / Applicant Determination of Compliance After each group of licensecs' evaluation have been received, the NRC staff will review the documentation submitted and will detennine those areas (if any) where assertions of equivalence should be evaluated further bor possible safety significance and those areas where deviations from the SRP present a potential safety program. As shown on Figure 1, if the deviation involves a potentiall.v significant safety issue, the staff will promptly resolve the issue and implement, on an ad hoc basis, any necessary backfit.

As experience is gained in the implementation of this program, the results will be reviewed from the standpoint of their contribution to the reduction of risk to public health and safety. Judgments may be made that documentation against certain of the SRP acceptance criteria has not led, or is not likely to lead, to the identification of any new potential safety issues, either generically or plant-specific.

Therefore, flexibility will be provided regarding NRC staff evaluation of licensee's responses in these areas, which probably will reduce the number of follow-on detailed questions sent to licensees.

Also, since the initial licensees responses will be staggered, this could result in a reduction of the number of SRP acceptance criteria required to be addressed in the initial licensee responses, at least for the plants in the latter half of the SEP.

In effect, this would represent a modification to the list of regulations of "particular significance" (or at least some parts of tnose regulations) based on experience sained in implementing the program.

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After completing the initial review of each group of responses, the staff will initiate plant-by-plant evaluations according to priorities established for the resolution of issues in the plan for the systematic safety evaluation of operating reactors.

It is expected that most deviations from the SRP acceptance criteria will inherently already_ be scoeduled for a routine safety review as part of the NREP or will either be resolved or scheduled for review as a result of the experience gained from the current SEP. These plant-by-plant evaluations will be completed for all operating plants by about 1990.

c Aften the full safety assessment is completed for a plant, appro-priate integrated backfit determinations will be made fur any significant safety issues, including any issues associated with any areas of deviation from the SRP acceptance criteria.

As shown on Figures 1 and 2, after the comprehensive plan is published and the revision of the SRP is complete, the NRC staff will hold workshops for the licensees / applicants for the purpose of clari-fying the specific provisions of the plan and to indicate the form and minimum content of their submittals. These workshops will bene-fit the licensees / applicants and NRC staff, in that a uniform response containing the required infonaation should reduce the conformance deter-mination and evaluation time to a minimum.

3.2 Part II Part II of the staff plan as shown on Figure 1 depicts the nature and interplay of the otner two major programs to evaluate plant safety, which have already been briefly identified.

These approaches are an engineering issues approach (SEP) and a plant reliability-risk assess-ment approach (the IREP/NREP). As presently constructed, the SEP review of nuclear power plants generally is focused on 137 specific safety issues or problems. These were culled from a larger list of 1100 issues to focus on those issues of greatest potential safety significane, based on experience and engineering judgement.

On the otner hand, IREP/14 REP is geared toward the reliability-risk assessment of a complete plant.

These reviews involve developing plant-specific event and fault trees to identify those systems, suosystems, and components that are the greatest contributors to acciaent sequences posing significant risk to public health ano safety. Both SEP and IREP/NREP look at the safety of the plants froo different perspectives; however, they are auienable to integration with the plan to satisfy the requirements of Section 110 into a single, cuordinated plan of review. The results of SEP and IREP/NREP will be used to prioritize the review of SRP deviations found as a result of Part I of the plan; and they also will be used in an integrated manner, as depicted on Figure 1, to develop a coherent backfit program and to detenaine whether cnanges or additions are necessary to the regulations or the SRP requir, ments.

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4 3.3 Part III Part III of the staff plan as shown on Figure 1 depicts the nature and covers the implementation of Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5) of Public Law 96-295. As stated in Section 2, Background, Subsections 110(b)(3), (4), and (5) require:

(1) the identification of all of the generic safety issues set forth in NUREG-0410 (Reference 3) for which technical solutions have been developed; (2) the determiriation of which of these solutions should be incorporated into the Commission's rules and regulations; and (3) a schedule for developing a technical solu-

~

tion for the remaining generic safety issues. The staff plan is designed to satisfy the requirements of these three subsections and to prioritize any new safety issues with due consideration of those previous issues identified in NUREG-0410, the TMI Action Plan (Reference 3), the ACRS Generic Issues, as well as any new issues resulting from IREP, NREP or SEP, Part I of the staff plan, research results, ur operating experience. After all the issues have been ranked as to importance on the basis of relative risk reduction and estimated benefit-cost (value-impact) ratios, detailed plans will be developed and completion schedules projected for those issues that require resolution within the next several years.

As shown on Figure 1, it is our intention to remove from the generic safety issues list those issues that are determined to have relatively low safety significance. The ongoing development of an NRC safety goal will aid in distinguishing the important from the unimportant generic issues. The active list of generic safety issues will, therefore, be reduced in number, enabling a realistic projection of resource alloca-tions and completion schedules to be developed. For each issue that was not included on the active generic safety issues list, a justifi-cation for its inactive status will be made together with a recomended priority for any future consideration.

As shown on Figure 1, Part III of the staff plan will be a continuing effort. That is, as new icsues are identified and existing generic safety issues are resolved, priorities will have to be changed periodf-cally and new schedules will be developed.

Since this is an ongoing program, a yearly report will be prepared that will identify (1) the current generic safety issues, (2) the action plans and schedules for resolution of each issue under active review, and (3) those generic safety issues whose technical resolution will likely require either a change to the Comission's rules and regulations or new rules and regulations.

It should be noted that some generic safety issues have been designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs) because of their poten-tially significant impact on safety and the need for enhanced manage-ment controls. Task Action Plans and schedules for developing techni-cal resolutions to the USIs have already been established, and progress has been reported to Congress in the NRCs Annual Report (Reference 9).

W Accordingly, we believe that the requirements of Subsections 110(b)(3)

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and (5) have been satisfied for those generic safety issues that are

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currently designated as USIs.

U With respect to Subsection 110(b)(4), rule changes are being proposed for certain of the USIs. As technical resolutions are developed for the remaining USIs and for other generic issues, the criteria describec below will be used to reconinend to the Contaission whether any,0f these should be incorporated into the NRC rules and regulations.

In Decemoer 1978 the staff issued NUREG-0449, "Prelfiainary Statement on General Policy for Ruleraaking to Improve Nuclear Power Plant

• Licensing" (Reference 10), to provide preliminary guidance required that an issue satisfy the followin9 criteria before goins to rule-

~

iaaking:

(1) the issue saust be generic; (2) there suust be a reason-able likelihood of a useful, definitive rule (for example, provices a specific seneric acceptance criteria, or provides a final specific requirement so that the issue would not be accresseu at all or only in a suinor way in plant-specific licensing actions); (3) there iaust be a reasonable likelihoco of a staule rule (that is, not likely to require change for some reasonable time period); (4) the ruleinaking woulo achieve saure effective public input; (b) the ruletaakin9 should be cost-effective re9arding use of NRC resources; (b) the rulesaaking should be cost effective frota an overall stanopoint.

These criteria are being iraproved and issued in final fona under Teil Action Plan Task IV.E.4; final criteria are expected to be issueo early in calen-dar year 1981. These final criteria will be issued in detennining when tecnnical resolutions to generic safety issues should.be incor-porated into NRCs rules and regulations.

3.4 Part IV As shown in Figure 1 Part IV of this plan, the inte9 ration of the reconiaendations of Parts I, II and III, deals with the issuance of backfit orcers or rules.

The Comiission has already decided in the course of its deliberations on SECY-8-2308 (Reference 11) that the development of safety goals will include a generally applicable cri-teria for backfit orders or rules. The reconiaendations stewiing from tne evaluations perfonned in Parts I, II, ana III of the plan will be assessed regarding their safety significance and for applicability to tne Coianission's stateiaent of backfit policy, or a9ainst the criteria set forth in 50.109. backfit decisions will be saaae accoraingly.

Also, as inoicateu on Figure 1, the staff may be proposing new re9u-lations as a result of coiupleting Parts I, II, and III of tniS plan.

Other new regulations, not associateu witu this plan, will also be promul ated as a result of cnanges in technology or frota the staff's 9

increasing understanuin3 of plant operations by means of evaluation of operating experience ano systeia interactions. Eacn new proposed regulation will incluce specific implementation requireinents for operating plants and for CP, OL and hL applications currently under p.

10

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staff review, and for sucn applications that may be submitted in the future. This implementation program will ensure that every plant will accress new regulations and requirements as they are issued.

Thus, each plant, whether in the operating, construction, or design stave, will be continually upgraced (as appropriate) to the current rsvelations, as interpreted by the SRP acceptance criteria.

There-fere, this implementation program will likely eliminate the need for any periodic, comprehensive, plant-specific safety reviews in the future.

4.

SCHEUulES F13ure 2 is the statt's proposed seneaule for accomplisnin9 eacn of the plan's naaor tasks. As stated previously, portions of tne staff plan will be accomplished by makin3 use of already existing or planned programs. Specifically, these programs are IREP, NREP, SEP, and the Generic Issues Pru3 rom.

Work on SEP, the Generic Issues Program, and IREP is alreauy in progress. Also, work on the list of particularly significant re9ulations has been partially completed; that is, the draft list is providea in Table 1 for public comaent.

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REFERENCES 1.

Congressional Conference Report, Report No. 96-1070.

2.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," USNRC NUREG-0660, May 1980.

3.

U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission, "NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants," USNRC Report NUREG-0410, 4.

Letter from J. F. Ahearne, Chairman of NRC, to Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate, dated September 30, 1980.

5.

Letter from J. F. Ahearne, NRC, to Thomas P. O'Niell, Jr., Speaker of U. S.

House of Representatives, dated September 30, 1980.

6.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants -- LWR Edition," USNRC Report NUREG-75/087.

7.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Plan to Require Licensees and Appli-cants to Document Deviations from the Standard Review Plan," Federal Register, Volume 45, No.198, October 9,1980.

8.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Proposed Licensing Requirements for Pending Applications for Construction Permits and Manufacturing Licenses,"

USNRC Report, NUREG-0718, August 1980.

9.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "1979 Annual Report."

10.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatcry Commission, " Preliminary Statement on General Policy for Rulemaking to Improve Nuclear Power Plant Licensing," USNRC Report NUREG-0449, December 1978, 11.

SECY-80-2308.

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4 TABLE 1 RULES OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 10 CFR 20.101 - 20.108 GDC 21 GDC 44 10 CFR 20.201 - 2012.07 GDC 22 GDC 45 10 CFR 20.301 - 20.305 GDC 23 GDC 46

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10 CFR 50.36 GDC 24 GDC 50 10 CFR 50.46 GDC 25 GDC 51 10 CFR 50.55a GDC 26 GDC 52 10 CFR 50, Appendix A GDC 27 GDC 53 GDC 1 GDC 28 GDC 54 GDC 2 GDC 29 GDC 55 GDC 3 GDC 30 GDC 56 GDC 4 GDC 31 GDC 57 GDC 5 GDC 32 GDC 60 GDC 10 GDC 33 GDC 61 GDC 11 GDC 34 GDC 62 GDC 12 GDC 35 GDC 63 GDC 13 GDC 36 GDC 64 GDC 14 GDC 37 10 CFR 50, Appendix G GDC 15 GDC 38 10 CFR 50, Appendix H GDC 16 GDC 39 10 CFR 50, Appendix J GDC 17 GDC 40 10 CFR 50, Appendix K GDC 18 GDC 41 10 CFR 71.31 - 71.42 GDC 19 GDC 42 10 CFR 100 GDC 20 GDC 13 10 CFR 100, Appendix A

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TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

ADMINISTRATIVE 10 CFR 19 10 CFR 50.71 10 CFR 50, Appendip B 10 CFR 20.401 - 20.409 10 CFR 50.80 10 CFR 50, Appendix E 10 CFR 21 10 CFR 50.81 10 CFR 55 10 CFR 50.54 10 CFR 50.82 10 CFR 55, Appendix A 10 CFR 50.70 10 CFR 50.109

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a PARTI PART11 PARTlli Pulalication of l

l E ting Comptsmuive Pim Revise SEP IREP Psv=M h ad Replatsons of NUREG 76/087 Project Project l

Safety issues g

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Particular Significance SRP l

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u Prioritiration of issues Deler or Elimate Develop Based on Risk Reasction issues of Low Risk NREP

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ad Benefit / Cost h or liC""*/

• th0do308V flatios Benefit / Cost Ratio l

l Applicuit WoAshops s

i r 3 r Licorues/ Applicant NREP Mop Missal Implementation Detennination of Project Plans and p,g,,,

Plant Compliance Schedsles Plant Noncompliance NRC Evaluation of Hi@ Safety l

Eneaste of Plant Compliance @

E pincance

' Plans l

Requiring Backfit e

Orders, ad Hoc Basis l

3 7 l

Evaluation SEP IREP/NREP I

issue Resolution /

Recommendations Reconunendations,

Recommesdations I

Recommendations f

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- -.L - - __ _

1 P 1

Backfit Orders Proposes Changes /

PARTIV gg p,,

ggg Integrated Regulations. Guides.

Recommendations Etc.

Development of implementation of Changes / Additions Criteria to implement New Regulations or

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Requirements e

FIGURE 1. INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF PLAN PARTS

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FYl 81' l

82 83 l

84 l

85 l

86 l

87 l

88 l

l 89 90 LICENSEE WORKSHOP COMPLETION OF COMPLETION Of 11 SEP PLANTS OTHER PLANTS IN GROUPS OF ABOUT 14 PER YEAR ALL LICENSEE A

A

^

^

EVAL A ONS REVIEW OF 8

OF LICENSEE

>l NRC REVIEW 11 SEP PLANTS 1 NRC REVIEW OF OTHER GROUPS OF PLANTS g

RESPONSES SEP A

1 REP NREP A

A NREP METHODOLOGY GENERIC ISSUES PROGRAM FIGURE 2. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE y,ao

EiiCLOSuRt 10 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PLAN FOR THE SYSTENaTIC EVALUATION OF ALL NUCLEAR POWER REACTURS The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (tne Cuumission) has prepared a report entitled "The Plan for the Systematic Evaluation of all Nuclear Power Reactors" (NUREG-u745), dated January 1961.

This report provides the Commission's pro-posed detailed plan to satisfy the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 90-295 (the itKC FY-bu Authorization Bill).

The first part of the pruposed plan concerns docunientation of compliance with tne re9ulations for all currently operatiris nuclear power plants, as well as all nuclear power plants that are in the process of an operating license, construction penait or manufacturinu license review. This part of the plan requires all licensees and applicants to docunient deviations 'froia tne Standard Review Plan, NUREG-70/Ud7, as detailed in a final rule puDlished in tne Federal Re9ister (F.R.

, aated

).

This ole was issued witn oue consideration 91ven to consaents received by the Coimaission as requesteu by a notice for r, *o-posed ruleniaking on the same subject (F.R. 67099, dated October 9,1980).

Table 1 of NUREG-074b presents a list of those Commission's regulations which have been detenained to be of particular si nificance to the protection of 9

public health ano safety, and a9ainst which all operatiri9 nuclear power plants will be evaluated, as well as some reactors in the final stages of review for an operatin9 license.

The second part of tne proposed plari details tne interrelationsnips that exist between the first part of the plan and otiier existin3 or planned HRC pro-9 rams, i.e., tne Interim Reliability Evaluation Pru3raia, the Natiunal Reliability Evaluation Pro 9raia, ana the Systematic Evaluation Pro 9rala.

The third part of the proposed plan details the procedures for the identi-fication of generic issues, the resolution of the issues, and the incorporation, as appre,iate, of the resolutions into the Cosmiission's rules and regulations.

The fourth part of the proposed plan details how the recongnendations of the first three parts of the plan will be assessed and integrated for the purpose of issuing any necessary backfit orders or rules.

NUREG-0745 is being issued in its present draft fona to involve the public in the development of the final plan. Public comments are being solicited.

All couments should be sent to the Secretary of the Conraission, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, by

, 1981.

Copies of the report will be available after January 1981.

Copies will be sent directly to utilities, industry groups and associations, and identified intervenor groups. Utner copies will be available for review at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N. W. Wasnington, D. C.; and the Comission's Local Public Document Rooms located in tne vicinity of existing nuclear power plants. Addresses of these Local Public Document Roonis can be cotained by contacting the Chief, Local Public Document Rooms Branch, Mail Stop 309, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C. 20655. Telephone (301) 492-7536.

Other copies may be purchased directly from the NRC, by contacting the Director, Division of Technical Infonaation and Document Control, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, Washington, D.

C., 20555.

DATED AT BETHESDA, nARYLAND, THE DAY OF 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Thomas E. Murley, Director Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

A ENCLOSURE 11 PUBLIC ANN 0UNCEMENT To be prepared by Public Affairs when F.R. Notice and Final Rule is approved.

ENCLOSURE 12 The Honorable (EitherMondaleorBushdependingon President of the Senate the date of issuance)

Washington, D.C.

20510

Dear Mr. President:

As part of our effort to keep the Congress informed of the Commission's progress in meeting the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, I am pleased to submit a draft report, NUREG-0745, detailing the proposed comprehensive plan for th! systematic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants and a copy of a Feleral Register Notice describing the final plan requiring nuclur power plant licensees to document deviations from the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087.

The Commission will continue to keep the Congress informed of its progress in these matters.

Sincerely, John F. Ahearne

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.

20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

As part of our effort to keep the Congress informed of the Commission's progress in meeting the requirements of Section 110 of Public Law 96-295, I am pleased to submit a draft report, NUREG-0745, detailing the proposed comprehensive plan for the systenatic safety evaluation of nuclear power plants and a copy of a Federal Register Notice describing the final plan requiring nuclear power plant licensees to document deviations from the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-75/087.

The Commission will continue to keep the Congress informed of its progress in these matters.

Sincerely, John F. Ahearne