ML25111A084

National Institute of Standards and Technology - Us Nuclear Supplemental Inspection Reports 3 and 4 Quarter 2024202

ML25111A084
Person / Time
Site:	National Bureau of Standards Reactor
Issue date:	05/08/2025
From:	Jeremy Bowen Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Adams J US Dept of Commerce, National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)
References
IR 2024202
Download: ML25111A084 (1)

Text

Dr. James Adams, Director National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Center for Neutron Research U.S. Department of Commerce 100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8461 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8461

SUBJECT:

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY - U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3rd and 4th QUARTER 2024 SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000184/2024202

Dear Dr. Adams:

From July 1, 2024 - December 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff conducted an inspection at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research facility in accordance with the NIST Supplemental Inspection Plan dated August 1, 2022 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML22206A008). The NRC is implementing the supplemental inspection plan based on the violations identified in the NRC special inspection report dated March 16, 2022 (ML22066B312), and the confirmatory order (CO) dated August 1, 2022 (ML22202A423). The supplemental inspections covered in the enclosed report reviewed and assessed the licensees implementation of corrective actions. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection, which were discussed on February 20, 2025, with you and members of your staff.

The supplemental inspection plan consists of activities specified in the Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2545, Research and Test Reactor Inspection Program, additional inspection activities necessary to determine that the licensee has implemented adequate corrective actions, and inspection activities to support confirmation that the licensee has met the requirements of the CO. The NRC conducted supplemental inspections identified in this report using the following procedures:

• Inspection Procedure (IP) 69006, Class 1 Research and Test Reactors Organization and Operations and Maintenance Activities

• IP 69007, Class I Research and Test Reactor Review and Audit and Design Change Functions

• IP 69008, Class I Research and Test Reactor Procedures

• IP 69009, Class I Research and Test Reactor Fuel Movement

• IP 69012, Class I Research and Test Reactors Radiation Protection

• IP 93100, Safety-Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Followup

• IP 92702, Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviation, Confirmatory Action Letters, and Orders May 2, 2025

J. Adams 2

The NRC staff will continue to conduct supplemental inspections, in accordance with the supplemental inspection plan, to provide increased post-restart oversight until the NRC staff determines that reasonable assurance for the safety of the NIST test reactor operations can be achieved through routine inspections, in accordance with IMC 2545.

The supplemental inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. No response to this letter is required.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 2.390, Public inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs document system ADAMS. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, Jeremy S. Bowen, Director Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-184 License No. TR-5

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure: GovDelivery Subscribers Signed by Bowen, Jeremy on 05/02/25

ML25111A084 NRC-002 OFFICE NRR/DANU/UNPO NRR/DANU/UNPO/LA NRR/DANU/UNPO/BC NRR/DANU/D NAME BLin NParker TBrown JBowen DATE 4/21/2025 4/24/2025 4/25/2025 5/2/2025

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Docket No.:

50-184 License No.:

TR-5 Report Nos:

05000184/2023202 and 05000184/2024201 Licensee:

National Institute of Standards and Technology Facility:

National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor Location:

Gaithersburg, Maryland Dates:

July 1, 2024 - December 31, 2024 Inspector:

Brian Lin, Reactor Inspector Approved by:

Jeremy S. Bowen, Director Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-Power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

National Institute of Standards and Technology National Bureau of Standards Test Reactor Supplemental Inspection Report Nos. 05000184/2023201 and 05000184/2024201 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) program for overseeing the safe operation of research and test reactors is described in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2545, Research and Test Reactor Inspection Program. A supplemental inspection was established in accordance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Supplemental Inspection Plan issued on August 1, 2022 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML22206A008). The inspector conducted the supplemental inspection in accordance with the objectives described in the plan:

assure corrective actions to address the seven special inspection violations are timely, effective, and sustained assure restart readiness activities are comprehensive and necessary activities to restart and safely operate are completed assure corrective and planned actions to effectively address issues are completed This supplemental inspection report documents the NRC staffs inspection activities in accordance with the supplemental inspection plan objective areas outlined above. No violations were identified in this report.

For a summary of the status supplemental inspection objectives see table 1 in appendix A of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

1. Introduction NIST operates the National Bureau of Standards test reactor (hereinafter the NIST test reactor) at the NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) located on the NIST campus in Gaithersburg, Maryland. The NIST test reactor is a heavy-water (D2O)- moderated-and-cooled, enriched-fuel, tank-type reactor designed to operate at 20 megawatts thermal power. The facility normally operates continuously during a seven-week operational cycle that consists of approximately 38 days of operation, followed by 10-day refueling and maintenance outages. The facility remained shut down following the February 3, 2021, event and restarted on March 16, 2023, intermittently at lower reactor power levels. On July 18, 2024, the facility shutdown and entered an outage period to prepare for reactor vessel cleaning and other scheduled maintenance items.

This supplemental inspection report describes the inspections conducted from July 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024. The NRC staff will update the supplemental inspection plan, continue supplemental inspections, and issue subsequent supplemental inspection reports. The supplemental inspection plan lists the objectives that will be conducted at the NCNR test reactor until the NRC staff determines routine inspections in accordance with the NRC IMC 2545 are adequate to ensure safety.

2. Emergency Plan and Event Response

a. Observations and Findings The inspector did not review this area during this period and will continue to review the emergency plan and event response as part of the continued supplemental inspections.

An emergency preparedness exercise is scheduled in February 2025 with onsite firefighting and law enforcement personnel.

b. Conclusion

The previously reviewed supplemental inspection objectives documented in the 4th quarter 2022 report remain closed as noted in table 1 of appendix A. One objective remains open and will be inspected at a later date.

3. Fuel Handling

a. Observations and Findings The inspector observed fuel operations after operator requalification training was completed. Specifically, the inspectors observed several shifts completed training sessions focusing on element latch verification, fuel handling, and fuel element transfer.

The reactor vessel was fully defueled on August 2, 2025. The inspector noted that the licensee staff followed Administrative Rule 5.0, Procedure Use and Adherence, guidance on continuous use of procedures during the defueling evolution and that all operators were trained in safe fuel movement operations. The inspector will continue to review the licensees training and implementation of the use and adherence to procedures to ensure the licensees corrective actions are sustained to inform the NRC staffs decision to restore the routine inspection program.

b. Conclusion

The inspector concluded that the refueling/fuel handling supplemental inspection objectives in table 1 of appendix A remain closed. The inspector will continue to monitor the licensees performance in this area. One objective remains open and will be inspected at a later date.

4. Reactor Startup

a. Observations and Findings NIST continued to operate the reactor to complete operator requalification training and to train non-licensed operators. The reactor was operated at a maximum of 200 kilowatts and the reactor operations concluded on July 18, 2024, to prepare for additional reactor vessel cleaning to remove remaining unclad material. During reactor operation, the inspector observed licensee briefing and performance of pre-critical reactor protection systems checks in accordance with technical specification 4.1.1, Reactor Power. All surveillance paperwork was consistent with the procedures and documented the satisfactory completion of the surveillances.

The inspector observed the licensees pre-evolution briefs and noted that the briefs were thorough and included adequate time for questions to be addressed by the operator staff. In addition, the inspector noted that the operators consistently referenced procedures and tracked the completion of all steps. Operators-in-training were coached by the senior reactor operators who challenged the trainees knowledge.

b. Conclusion

The inspector observed that the precritical and reactor startup checklists continue to be adequate to ensure safe operation of the facility as observed during the reactor startup.

The conservative limits implemented during the reactor operations limited effluent radiation levels were below the lowered effluent monitoring setpoints and were well within regulatory limits. The inspector concluded previously reviewed supplemental inspection objectives documented in the 4th quarter 2022 report remain closed as documented in table 1 in appendix A. Due to the higher than pre-accident radiation effluent levels and scheduled reactor vessel cleaning, the inspector will continue to monitor the licensees performance of this area in future supplemental inspections.

5. Operator Licensing

a. Observations and Findings The inspector did not review this area during this period and will continue to review operator licensing as part of the continued supplemental inspection.

b. Conclusion

The inspector concluded previously reviewed supplemental inspection objectives remain closed as noted in table 1 of appendix A. Two objectives remain open and will be inspected at a later date.

6. Management Oversight

a. Observations and Findings The inspector observed portions of the licensees training on reactor operations and fuel handling. Licensee management oversight was appropriate to ensure policies and procedures were discussed and questions and concerns were addressed. The inspector additionally observed licensee management engage personnel with entering technical issues in their corrective action program (CAP). During fuel handling training, the inspector noted that operators shared its desire to receive more training in order to maintain proficiency in ensuring the fuel elements were properly latched. The inspector shared the feedback with management and additional training with latch verification will be scheduled prior to reactor startup. Additionally, management oversight of procedure adherence continues to trend positively with appropriate observations completed during routine and infrequent activities.

b. Conclusion

The inspector concluded previously reviewed supplemental inspection objectives documented remain closed as noted in table 1 in appendix A. The inspector will continue to monitor the licensees performance in this area in future supplemental inspections.

7. Corrective Actions

a. Observations and Findings During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed several submissions into the CAP and focused on the following: weld failures on the refueling plug, snap ring failures, helium leak repairs, and reactor vessel cleaning. The inspector observed progress with locating a majority of the helium leakage from equipment in the refueling plug and will aid in with lowering radiation levels at the C-200 level. The NCNR staff recognized the need to address the several cracks in the structural welds in the lower section of the refueling plug. Continued efforts are focused on restoring the structural integrity of the refueling plug and adding a redundant load path and monitoring system to identify additional weld failures. NCNR contracted a vendor to analyze the condition of the welds and submit a repair proposal. A redundant engineering safety feature is also being considered for the refueling plug to mitigate any future failure.

b. Conclusion

The inspector concluded previously reviewed supplemental inspection objectives remain closed as noted in table 1 in appendix A. Two objectives remain open, and the inspector will continue to evaluate the licensees CAP in future inspections.

8. Safety Committee Oversight

a. Observations and Findings The inspector observed the Safety Assessment Committee (SAC) meeting on November 20, 2024, and shared similar conclusions of NCNRs progress in many areas. The SAC discussed significant improvements in the management of engineering and operations.

Improvement in the safety culture was evident and reinforced by management and leadership. The SAC agreed with NCNRs approach to continue performing safety culture assessments every few years to monitor the health of their safety culture program to ensure sustainability.

b. Conclusion

During this inspection period, the inspector did not inspect the open objective of reviewing the SAC recommendations disposition. An inspection is planned in April 2025 to evaluate NCNRs response to the results of its independent safety culture assessment and implementation of actions in response to the assessment. One objective remain open and will be inspected at a later date.

9. Procedures

a. Observations and Findings The inspector did not review this area and will continue to review procedures as part of the continued supplemental inspection. The completion of procedure revision and updates will be completed as required by the confirmatory order.

b. Conclusion

The inspector will continue to evaluate the licensee program to write, approve, and use procedures. The inspector concluded the previously reviewed supplemental inspection objective remains closed as noted in table 1 of appendix A. One inspection objective in this area remains open and will be inspected at a later date.

10. Design Change Process

a. Observations and Findings The inspector did not review this area and will continue to review the design change process as part of the continued supplemental inspections.

b. Conclusion

The inspector concluded the previously reviewed supplemental inspection objective remains closed as noted in table 1 of appendix A. Two objectives remain open and will be inspected at a later date.

11. Safety Culture

a. Observations and Findings The inspector did not inspect this area at this time. The inspector noted that the third licensees independent safety culture assessment will be completed in 2025 and will be inspected during subsequent supplemental inspections.

b. Conclusion

The inspector concluded the previously reviewed supplemental inspection objectives remain closed as noted in table 1 in appendix A. Inspection of the second independent safety culture assessment will be scheduled at a later date. Two objectives remain open.

12. Material Control and Accounting

a. Observations and Findings The inspector did not review this area but will continue to review material control and accounting as part of the continued supplemental inspections.

b. Conclusion

The previously reviewed supplemental inspection objective remains closed as noted in table 1 of appendix A. The inspector will continue to monitor the licensees performance in this area.

13. Exit Meeting The inspector discussed the inspection with the licensee at the conclusion of this portion of the special inspection on February 20, 2025.

Attachment REFERENCES Administrative Rule (AR) 4.0, Fuel Manipulation Proficiency Requirements, Revision 1 AR 1.0, Conduct of Operations, Revision 2 AR 5.0, Procedure Use and Adherence, Revision 2 AR 5.4, Observation Program and Checklist, August 21, 2022 AR 7.1, Conduct of System Review Teams, dated August 24, 2022 AR 7.1.2, System Walkdown Guidelines, August 24, 2022 Operating Instruction (OI) 1.1.0, Reactor Startup Checklist, Revision 6 OI 1.1.1, Reactor Startup Up to 20 MW, Revision 3 OI 1.1.2, Low Power Reactor Startup, Revision 1 OI 1.1.5, Reactor Normal Operation, Revision 1 OI 4.2.9, CO2 Gas Valve Lineup Checklist, Revision 1 OI 6.1.3, Spent Fuel Transfer to the Storage Pool, Revision 3 OI 6.1.7, Rotational Latch Check, Revision 3 OI 6.1.8, Transfer of Elements from the Vessel, Revision 3 OI 6.3.1, 1/M Core Loading and Approach to Critical, Revision 2 Technical Specification Procedure (TSP) 4.1.2, Core Excess Reactivity/Shutdown Margin Reactivity Worth of each Shim Arm and Reg Rod, Revision 2 Design Request Note for Diverse and Redundant Engineering Safety Features for Refueling Plug -

NCNR-RE-TM-000670 Technical Memorandum-Refurbishment of Refueling Plug - NCNR-RE-TM-000673 System Requirement Document for the Refueling Plug Redundant Load Path - NCNR-RE-TM-000674 Refueling Plug Failure Modes and Effects Analysis - NCNR-RE-TM-000684 Refueling Plug Redundant Load Path Test and Validation Plan - NCNR-RE-TM-000685 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Adams Director T. Newton Deputy Director R. Strader Chief, Reactor Operations D. Sahin Chief, Reactor Engineering S. Dewey Chief, Health Physics D. Griffin Senior Reactor Operator J. Seiter Senior Reactor Operator, Training Coordinator A. Gahan Chief, Aging Reactor Management S. MacDavid Supervisory Electronics Technician D. Mattis Engineer INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 69006 Class I Research and Test Reactors Organization and Operations and Maintenance Activities IP 69007 Class I Research and Test Reactor Review and Audit and Design Change Functions IP 69008 Class I Research and Test Reactor Procedures IP 69009 Class I Research and Test Reactor Fuel Movement IP 92702 Follow-up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviation, Confirmatory Action Letters, and Orders ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened:

None Closed:

None Appendix A: Table 1 STATUS ACTIVITY PRE-STARTUP PROCEDURE CLOSURE REPORT Emergency Plan / Event Response Closed Evaluate adequacy of emergency response equipment identified in the Emergency Plan Yes IP 69011 4Q2022 Closed Evaluate adequacy of emergency plan implementation procedures Yes IP 69011 4Q2022 Open Observe implementation of emergency plan procedures No IP 69011 TBD Closed Review availability of items or systems for operators to check prior to control room evacuation No IP69011 4Q2022 Closed Review availability of post-evacuation checklist No IP69011 4Q2022 Closed Evaluate adequacy of guidance in Emergency Instructions for confinement re-occupation Yes IP69011 4Q2022 Refueling / Fuel Handling Closed Evaluate adequacy of fueling and defueling procedures Yes IP69009 4Q2022 Closed Observe implementation of fueling procedures Yes IP69009 4Q2022 Closed Observe implementation of defueling procedures No IP69009 4Q2022 Closed Evaluate adequacy of procedures used for latch checking Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Closed Observe implementation of procedures for latch checking Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Open Evaluate adequacy of loaded restart core for consistency with technical specifications and analysis Yes IP92702 TBD Reactor Startup Closed Evaluate adequacy of reactor startup procedures determined necessary for restart Yes IP69008 4Q2022 Closed Observe implementation of reactor startup procedures Yes IP69008 4Q2022 Closed Review pre-critical start-up procedures Yes IP69008 4Q2022 Operator Licensing Closed Evaluate adequacy of proficiency training of reactor operations personnel identified to be completed prior to startup (including fuel handling, refueling and latch checking proficiency of operators)

Yes IP69008 4Q2022 Open Evaluate adequacy of licensed operator proficiency training No IP69003 TBD Open Observe implementation of licensed operator proficiency training No IP69003 TBD Closed Evaluate adequacy of operator training on off-normal conditions during startup and operations conditions Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Management Oversight Closed Evaluate adequacy of qualification training for supervisors overseeing refueling operations Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Closed Evaluate adequacy of policies and procedures in place to ensure training of Reactor Operations and Engineering personnel on procedure adherence Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Corrective Actions Open Evaluate program to ensure expectations, processes, and procedures are in place to identify and implement safety improvements No IP92702 TBD Open Evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions for re-evaluated root cause analysis performed with emphasis on nuclear safety culture No IP92702 TBD Closed Confirm primary system characterization/readiness following fuel debris cleanup Yes IP92701 4Q2022 Closed Confirm that the appropriate shielding is in place to ensure safe access for maintenance Yes IP92701 4Q2022 Closed Confirm consideration of carbon dioxide build up potential in safety documentation and emergency plan No IP92701 TBD Closed Review root cause of #2 shutdown pump failure and corrective actions, including evaluation of the extent of condition No IP92701 4Q2022 Safety Committee Oversight Open Review disposition of safety assessment committee recommendations No IP69007 TBD Procedures Open Evaluate program and processes in place to ensure quality of written procedures, to ensure procedures can be effectively executed, and to ensure procedures are periodically evaluated to implement improvements No IP69009 TBD Closed Evaluate startup procedures for consistency with INPO-1103, Guideline for Excellence in Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Closed Evaluate reactor startup procedures to instruct operators to identify abnormal fluctuations in nuclear instrumentation Yes IP92702 4Q2022 Design Change Process Closed Review refueling tool wear and replacement program No IP69008 4Q2022 Open Review change process program and procedures for compliance Title 10 of the Code of Federal (10 CFR) Section 50.59 No IP69008 TBD Open Evaluate effectiveness of Engineering Change Management Program for ensuring changes are made consistent with 10 CFR 50.59 No IP92701 TBD Safety Culture Closed Conduct safety-conscious work environment follow-up inspection prior to startup Yes IP93100 4Q2022 Closed Conduct safety culture inspection following 3rd party 1st assessment No IP93100 4Q2022 Open Conduct safety culture inspection following 3rd party 2nd assessment No IP93100 TBD Open Conduct safety culture inspection following 3rd part 3rd assessment No IP93100 TBD Material Control and Accounting IP85102 Closed Evaluate adequate implementation of nuclear material accounting for damaged fuel element No IP92701 4Q2022