ML20249C800

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Rev 1 to Calculation EC-M96-002, Carbon Dioxide Generator/ Oxygen Depletion in Cr
ML20249C800
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/1998
From: Ola P, Reese J
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20249C787 List:
References
EC-M96-002, EC-M96-002-R01, EC-M96-2, EC-M96-2-R1, NUDOCS 9807010214
Download: ML20249C800 (37)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:-__ I ENGINEERING CALCULATION COVER SHEET I B13.17 (Original R-Type or R-Type from Attachment 7.7) CALCULATION NO. EC-M96-002 REV. NO. 1 TITLE Carbon Dioxide Generation / Oxygen Depletion In Control Room 4 SUBJECT Time When CO, Levelin Control Room Reaches 1% & O Level Reaches 17% 2 AFFECTED SYSTEMS HVC THIS CALCULATION SUPERSEDES N/A COMPUTER SOFTWARE USED N/A CODE VERSION DISK CALCULATION CLASSIFICATION: U Non-Quality Related l X l Safety Related l l Quality Related: Important to Safety CALCULATION PERFORMED UNDER: l X l Waterford 3 Procedures o, l l Supplier Approved Quality Procedures ' -l -} CALCULATION STATUS: ( @ Final-List Pending Calculation (s) and/or Calculation Changes incorporated l void d perseded - New Calc. No. Pending (Not Currently Installed) [ Partially installed / Implemented initial Date Completely Installed / Implemented initial Date Canceled initial Nte Study - Does Not Represent, And Can Not Be Used For The Design Basis of The Plant Prepared By: J.S. Reese /vfd f /h Date:

7. N

[N INEER 8~~I~ M Verified / Reviewed By: P.P. la Date: Approved By: ,[, b$ Date: 96 SUPERVISOR / 9007010214 980629 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P PDR NOECP-011 Rev 5.2 M

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET w ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC-M96-002 REF TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 1.0 Purpose 2.0 Conclusion 2 3.0 References 4 4.0 input Criteria 5 5.0 Assumption 6 6.0 Method Of Analysis 7 7.0 Calculation Computation 8 8.0 Attachments 11 l NOECP-011 Rev.2 E---_- --__ Form 3, Rev. O

WATERFORD 3 ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET CALC. NO.: EC-M96-002 PAGE LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES DESCRIPTION OF AFFECTED REVISION PAGES REVISION NO. All 0 Originalissue This revision changes the Control Room net-free volume from 1 214,500 ft to 220,000 ft'. This was based on the creation of All calculation EC-M97-013 which was added as a reference. In addition this revision added a section to determine how many ) people can be in the Control Room during a Toxic Chemical Event assuming various concentrations at the initiation of the event for a duration of 48 hours. l l 4 l 1 f l l l l I !.3A NOECP-011, Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET = ENTERGY C ALC. NO. EC M96 002 PAGE 1 OF 11 REF 1.0 PURPOSE The first purpose of this calculation is to demonstrate the capacity of f 1.1 the Control Room in terms of the number of people it can l accommodate, when isolated for an extended period of time, and not exceed a CO concentration limit of 1% The extended period of time 2 Rt is assumed to be 6 days from statements in the Standard Review Plan; section 6.4, paragraph lil, item 2, Control Room Personnel Capacity. The second purpose of this calculation is to determine the time when 1.2 oxygen (O ) concentration level in the CR is depleted to 17% based on the number of personnel determined from above, and the CR is 2 l completely isolated. Purpose 1.1 & 1.2 of this calculation provides a basis for FSAR Section 6.4.4.2, paragraph e. The third purpose of this calculation is to establich a basis for allowing 1.3 the Control Room to be isolated during normal operations for an The indefinite period of time and not limit Control Room access. assumptions for this analysis are that at an alert limit the Control Room can be unisolated and ventilated with fresh air unless a toxic chem Rl c If a toxic chemical event has occurred, the event has occurred. I calculation assumes that the number of control room personnel will be limited to a value determined in this portion of the analysis. This value will prevent exceeding the maximum CO level in the control room of 2 15 This part of the calculation assumes the duration of the toxic r chemical event is only 48 hours, and the initial CO concentration is at 2 the alertlimit or less. l ,__.3A NOECP-011, Rev. 5

1 1 WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET e ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC-M96-CC2 PAGE 2 OF 11 REF

2.0 CONCLUSION

This calculation concludes that CO generation levels and O depletion levels l 2 2 are acceptable for 16 people in the Control Room For 6 days, assuming the initial CO concentration is that of fresh air. This assumes the Control Room is completely isolated with no outside or emergency air make-up. The 6 day 2 time frame meets guidance given in NUREG-0800 Standard Review Plan Section 6.4 " Control Room Habitability System". Carbon Dioxide Generation The results of this calculation demonstrate that 16 people can remain in the Control Room with no outside air makeup for 6 days and 3.85 hours (147.85 hours) and maintain CO concentration to a maximum of 1%. A graphical 2 breakdown showing Time vs. Control Room Personnel for 1% CO2 are attached (Attachment 1). In addition, this calculation concludes that the Control Room can be in isolation mode indefinitely until one of the CO concentrations (Alert Limits) 2 shown below is reached. At this point the Control Room should be ventilated with outside air unless a toxic gas event is in progress. If a toxic gas event is in progress, CO concentration will not rise above a 1% maximum in a period 2 This ass'umes Control Room staff is limited to the number of 48 hours. people associated with that alert limit. MAX. CR. STAFF FOR 48 HOURS %CO, ALERT LIMIT 44.0 ~.10 0 41.0 0.15 39.0 0.20 36.0 0.25 34.0 0.30 32.0 0.35 29.0 0.40 27.0 0.45 24.0 0.50 22.0 0.55 19.0 0.60 17.0 0.65 14.0 0.70 12.0 i 0.75 9.0 0.80 i.3A NoECP-011, key. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET w ENTERGY C ALC. NO. EC-M96-002 PAGE 3 OF 11 _ REF

2.0 CONCLUSION

(Continued) Oxygen Depletion The results of this calculation demonstrate that 16 people can remain in the l Control Room with no outside or emergency air makeup for 19 days and 21.5 ) g hours (477.5 hours) and maintain an 0 concentration of 17% or 2 graphical breakdown showing Time vs. Control Room Personnel for 17% l Oxygen is attached (Attachment 3). i i i i j l l i i ..3A NoECP-011, Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET l ~- ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC-M96 002 PAGE 4 OF 11 ~ REF f

3.0 REFERENCES

l Standard Review Plan; Section 6.4; Control Room Habitability Systems 3.1 i Regulatory Guide 1.78; June 1974; Assumptiol 3.2 Hazardous Chemical Release. l Regulatory Guide 1.95; January 1977; Protection Of Nuclear Powj Control Room Operators Against An Accidental Chlorine Release. 3.3 1 1991 ASHRAE Handbook; Applications; Chapter 11; Environmental l 3.4 For Survival. l LP&L Document Record # 3980; Carbon Dioxide Build-up Time in C 3.5 Room. Calculation EC-M97-013, Rev. O, Control Room Envelope Volume \\ 3.6 1972-1978, Summary Of FSAR Table 2.2A-3; On-Site Meteorological Data: g 3.7 Maximum Persistence Occurrences FSAR Sections 6.4.4.2, Toxic Gas Protection and 2.2A.1.3 Control Ro 3.8 Habitability, Long Term Effects l i 1 i \\ [ l 1 \\ = _.3A NoECP-011, Rev. 5

i 1 l WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET l l I w ENTERGY l CALC. NO. EC M96-002 PAGE 5 OF 11 REF l 4.0 INPUT CRITERIA 3 '1 3 4.1 The CO production rate is 0.93 ft /hr. 2 39 The O consumption rate is 1.1 ft'/hr. 4.2 2 3.g R1 l Control Room Net-Free Volume is 220,000 ft* 4.3 l I l l l l 1 i l l l l l l l l l _ _ _ _..3A NOECP-011, Rev. 5

r WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET ~'ENTERGY ~- CALC.NO. EC-M96 002 PAGE 6 OF 11 REF 5.0 ASSUMPTIONS A complete mixing of air in the Control Room Volume is assumed. Normal 5.1 Control Room ventilation is safety related and required to operate continuously to provide adequate cooling. This volume of airflow would provide a continuous mixing of air. This assumption is consistent with other habitability calculations. 1.0% is the assumed maximum CO concentration in the Control Ro 2 ASHRAE recommends a 0.5% CO concentration for normal ventilation, and M 5.2 2 states that "At 1.5%, basic performance and physiological functions are not 5 A. affected, but slow adaptive processes have been observed that might induce pathophysiological states on long exposure." However at concentrations 3.0% are when performance deteriorates and basic physiological functionsgg are affected, therefore a 1.0% assumption is conservative. In addition Reg. Guide 1.78, Table C.1 list a toxicity limit for CO at 1.0%. 2 sy Oxygen concentration in fresh air is 20.82%; 17% is the assumed limit for 5.3 shelters. The maximum number of hours recorded for any continuous wind direction is M

25. Aft'er 25 hours the wind direction would change and it would be posaible 5.4

'34 Therefore, during a toxic to ventilate the control room with outside air. 81 chemical event the duration the control room must remain in is conservatively assumed to be 48 hours. Prior to initiation of a toxic chemical event the control room CO 2 5.5 is assumed to be at or below the alert limit. L.3A [ NOECP-011, Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET e ENTERGY CALC.NO. EC-M96-002 PAGE 7 OF 11 REF 6.0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS Carbon Dioxide Generation The Control Room Net Free Volume is multiplied by the 1% maximum percentage of Carbon Dioxide by volume. This number is then divided by the y individual Carbon Dioxide generation rate and 144 hours (6 days) to determine the maximum number of people that can be accommodated. This methodology is outlined in the ASHRAE Handbook (Ref. 3.4 Attachment 2). The method above is used to determine various staffing limits in the control Bt room during a toxic chemical event at various initial CO concentrations. The 2 maximum duration of the toxic chemical event is assumed to be 48 h i Oxygen Depletion The Control Room Net Free Volume is divided by the number of occupants This number is then times their individual oxygen consumption rate. multiplied by the difference between oxygen concentration in fresh air and th 3,q 17% minimum. This was calculated for the maximum number of people l Si 2 generation section explained in Section 6.1 and determined in the CO calculated in Section 7.1 of this calculation. This methodology is outlined in the ASHRAE Handbook (Ref. 3.4, Attachment 2). l l .___.3A L-_ ___.___D%ECP - 011, Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET e ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC M96-002 l PAGE 8 OF 11 RhF 7.0 CALCULATION COMPUTATION 7.1 Carbon Dior.ide Concentration Calculation 7.1.1 Maximum Number Of People Assuming A 6 Day Duration bH N = KxV i Equation: GxT Where: Number Of Personnelin Control Room l N = Acceptable CO Concentration Level l K 2 = 1% K = Net Free Volume Of Control Room u V = gg 220,000 ft' V = CO Generation Constant Per Person G = 2 8 0.93 ft /hr G = Assumed Time Duration Until CO Concentration is 1% s.\\ 2 T = 144 houm T = N = 0.01 x 220,000 Therefore: 0.93 x 144 16.43 people gg N = This value is conservatively rounded down to the next whole integer value (Cannot have a fraction of a person). Thus, for 16 people the equation can be re-arranged to solve for the exact occupancy time: T = 0.0l x 220,000 147.85 hours Ol = 0.93 x 16

.3A u___________ R@@CP - 011, Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET e ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC M96-002 l PAGE 9 OF 11 REF l _7.1.1 Maximum Number Of People During A Toxic Chemical Event 39 (Kn, - K.,,,,) x V l Equation: N = GxT l Where: Number Of Personnelin Control Room 0.01 3.2. N g = = 1% = Maximum CO Limit 2 K,;,,,j, Various Assumed Alert Limits When CR. Is Ventilated = Ka,r = Net Free Volume Of Control Room

3. b V

= 220,000 ft' V = CO Generation Coir.stant Per Person j G- = 2 3 0.93 ft /hr Assumed Time Duration Until CO Concentration is 1% G = 2 T = RI = 48 hours 7 I I N = -(0.01 - 0.007) x 220,000-Example: 0.93 x 48 14.78 people N = Note: The above methodology was used for assumed alert limts from 0 to 0.8%. See attachment 4 for results. ___.3A radfCT@- 011 e Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET e ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC M96-002 f PAGE 10___ OF 11 l REP 7.2 Oxygen Depletion Calculation 39 V x (Ky - K,; ) Equation: T= NxR Where: Time Until 0 Concentration is 17% T = 2 Net Free Volume Of Control Room V = gi 3 220,000 ft V = Assumed Fresh Air O Concentration Level 2 K,,e = f 0.2082 K,,e = 20.82 % = Assumed Minimum O Concentration Level f 2 Kmm = 0.17 17 % = Kma = O Consumption Rate (Constant)

  • 9 R

= 2 1.1 ft'/hr R = Number Of Personnelin Control Room N = 16 N = 220,000 x (0.2082 - 0.17) B erefore-T= gg 16 x 1.1 477.5 hrs T = l l ._.3A NoECP-011, Rev. 5

WATERFORD 3 DESIGN ENGINEERING GENERAL COMPUTATION SHEET w ENTERGY CALC. NO. EC-M96-002 [ PAGE 11 OF 11 HEF 8.0 ATTACHMENTS _ Graph Of Time vs. People To Reach A CO Limit Of 1% 2 8.1 { Graph Of Time vs. People To Reach A O Limit Of 17% 2 8.2 \\ 8.3 Pages From ASHRAE Handbook Rt Table Of Maximum Control Room Staff For Various Alert Limits 8.4 8.5 Calculation Checklist ..3A NoECP-011, Rev. 5

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~_ ~ i 1.3 Ensironme 'l Page i Of 'S "" " E8ctor5 Attachment Carbon dioude concentranon should not esceed J r 6 e ETM%- oo S - o For a edentars range of enstr Calc. NO. - s n, sus and preferably should be maintained below 0.$ r person,3 efrn per person of fresh air ull maintain a CO: concen dse temperati temperatures o> men vi risuse.. s.vumuum iiiisi smits on the duration of o and abose. performan,e trationof 0.3r. Atconcemrationsof 3r comfort zone, do not impose any h. deteriorates and basic physiological functions are affected. At e 1.5%, basic performance and physiological functions are not occupancy. affected, but slow adaptne processes have been obsersed t ^ ' o "55" g's might induce pathophysiological states on long expos n.,, ' ' " " * " ]'

  • r to 0.8%, no significant physiologicalor ad p

} p' ..a soI p g levek in the absence pflife. support systems. Oxygen concentra N [g,,,) p .,8 hi tion in normal air is saout 21%; 17 % is frequently taken as a I ig,'a y f 4 so An approximate relationship between physical actis sty, ene n-for shelters. h3 j expenditure, oxygen consumption. carbon dioxide product .w s . / Mao [

p

{ n. and rate of breathing is shown in Table 3.The respiratory quo g*[g 4-g Q J ,o j g (RQ)is the volumetric ratio of carbon dioxide production to o 3 gen consumption. A value of 0.84 may be used for the c g 3,

e 4

. N, 8 I I ) in Table 3. This value is representative; the actual RQ d .m ,N A largely on diet and body chemistry. In the absence of 4/V" M j N p o disorders, values of RQ associated with the oxidation of ca hydrates, proteins, and fats are about 1.0. 0.8, and 0 y;gif 4- ,MMb[ (Allen 1972, Harrow and Mazur 1958). A//)( 71 / 7 S*' V Per Capita Rates of Energy Expenditure. Oxysca ) s = w a m so so = Consumption Carbon Dioxide Production, and Table 3 Pulmonary Vestlistlos for Man E l J s a w m a a m a

  • 'c wava mance.

~ g,,,,, o,, c,,g, Cos-fNozJde Rate of Still Air Effective Temperature 14 vel of Empteditore; Metaboue som ties Production, Breathies,- Fig. 2 2 ft /h Physicas 3 fs /h Near the outer bounds of ET ranges L1 and H1, susceptible Rate. Ste/h f /b Aettvity d s afflicted with individuals (includinginfants,'theaged,an person arthritis, heart disease, or metabolic disorders) may experiencedif h*[*"uo 8 2400 4.44 3.g 97 k 1600 2.96 2.5 64 At higher tem-a,, ports temperatures in range L1, chilblains may appear.peratures in range Hl. a h Moderate exercise 40 1000 1.g4 1.55 Mild exercise; 600 1.10 0.93 24 will probably occur during prolonged exposure. lishi work If exposure to the moderate cold stress in ET range L2 or heat Standing; desk work 400 0.74 0.62 16 stress in ET range H2 is likely to be extended beyond a few hours, 300 0.56 0.41 12 _ Sedentary, at ease i special care should be taken to maintain safe body temperatures. Reclining, at rest I An adequate diet and multilayered clothing adaptable to the The effects of carbon monoxide must be considered, e prevailing temperature level are essential during prolonged li ibly though the amount of this gas produced by the body is ne exposure co conditions in ET range L2. Reliance on the warming smail. in confined shelter spaces, the prime source l be tobacco smoke, with pipes producing five times an almost 20 times as much as cigarettes. Carbon mon Minimal clothing is appropriate in ET range H2, and, to avoid ble alternative. come from fuel burning devices in the shelter, from th dehydration, potable water should be avadable for replacing meta-gases o f internal combustion engines, or throug bolic losses. The ability to cope with heat stress varies among intake from smoldering fires outside the shelter, individuals; persons having subnormal sweat response are inhet. For industrial purposes, the allowable concentratio ently susceptible. A posture that affords maximum opportunity 50 ppm by volume.This limit is based on an 8 h w j for evaporation from skin surfaces is desirable in a hot environ-me per week. For exposure over longer sustained are used. For submarines, the limit is 50 ppm or 0 i space cabins the design levelis 10 ppm or 0.00 ration should be avoided. Epposure to the severe cold stress in ET range L3 and heat stress of carbon dioxide can increase the toxic in ET range H3 cannot be safely prolonged beyond limits deter-mi increased CO: results in deeper and more rapid bre i in turn, increases the absorption of CO into the bo d of tivities. With subfreezing temperatures, the fingers an toessedentary Odor arising from activities within the shelter, as w or explosive gases, should also be atures tective clothing. Exposure to relatively high dry-bulb tempercan be end l sufficient to dilute odors associated with human occup t re of water vapor in the air is low. An environmental tempera u Hydrocarbons from fuelleakage, hydrogen from 176*F is tolerable for about an hour if the air is virtually dry. discharged, and ingress of radioactive particulate, p However, breathing is slightly painfulin air having a dew point of 122'F, and such a condition is endurable for only a few minutes organisms, or chemical agents are all possible haz (Lind 1955),

>ok i 11.4 and 00 CLIMATE AND SOILS e o' Page 1 of 5 ' h"" Heatloss calculations for underground shelters require s alues of thermal conductivity and thermal diffusisity of earth. Infor, Calc No. EC,- fw-oo A - oN his l ters. mation on earth temperature is also required, w hich is related to used................................... the thermal and physical properties of soil, as well as to the eli-matic conditions. Table 4 illustrates thermal conductivity and CONTROL OF CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT Control of the phpical emironment may be regarded as two diffusivity of various types of Til with respect to moisture con. tent. Earth temperature may be estimated from the soil tempera. independent problems-controlof the chemicalen ironment and ture data at several selected stations throughout the United States, controlof thethermalenvironment. Closed (buttoned up) shelters publ4hed in Climatological Data of the U.S. Weather Record without any air replacement from outside sources remain habita. ble for only a few hours, unless a life support system is used. The Center, Asheville, NC. permissible stay time (period of occupancy)is determined by th Thermal Properties of Soils, Rocks, and Concrete - net volume of space per person, and is defined as the time required Table 4 Metertal Condec ter, D f y,

Densky, ex r til 3 Ste/lb.'F
  1. = 0.04 V, ft /h th/ft 3

54m/h. ft. 'F 3 Dense rock 2.00 0.050 200 0.20 Aserage rock i.40 0.040 175 0.20 where 1.00 0.033 150 0.20 fr3 = time to reach 3*e carbon dioxide, h j 8 Dense concrete 143 0.21 V, = unit volume of space, ft per person Thus, people can safely stay for 20 h in a closed shelter having Solid masonry 0.75 0.025 a net volume of 500 ft per person. The stay time can also be

  • d**P 8

m n the Ggure, the 3'd' O 50 0.020 naec relationship between the concentrations of carbon dioxide and 0.20 0.011 90 0.20 -- oxygen in occupied spaces, the rate of ventilation per person, t Light soil. dry not volume of space per penon, and the time after entry is shown. Earth temperature beyond a depth of 3 ft is seldom affected by The terminal values of carbon dioxide and oxygen concentration diurnal cycle of air, temperature, and solar r=Am%. However, the < are tabulated for various rates of ventilation. Figure 2 is based on annual fluctuation of earth temperature extends to a depth of 30 rates of oxygen :onsumption and carbon dioxide production to 40 ft. The integrated momhly average earth temperature from representative of people in confined quarters (Allen 1960). surface to a depth of 10 ft is insensitive to the thermal diffusivity The example shown by dotted lines indicates that a carbon dio of soil, as long as the diffusivity is larger than 0.02 ft3/h. lable 5 ide concenation of 3.5% by volume will develop in 10 h in an 8 presents annual maxtmum and minimum earth temperatures aver-unvemilates2 shelter having a net volume of 240 ft per person, aged over the surface to a depth of 10 ft for 47 stations through-and that the oxygen conteat of the air will then be 16.2r by e out the United States, which may be used for an approximate volume. Ventilation with pure outdoor air is the most economi calculation of underground heat transfer. cal method for maintaining the necessary chemical quality o in a sheher. The recommended minimum ventilating rate of AssualMaalmans and Mlaisons foe per person of fresh air will maintain a carbon dioxide concen Table 5 Integrated A-,w Earth Temperatures

  • tion of about 0.59e and an oxygen content of approximately e

Earth Teenseemasses. *F by volume, in a shelter occupied by sedentary people. How I Maa. Min. bathe Maa. Mia, th usultant Mw tmpmtum m W. der many con &- h ke 74 56 ma==aa MT 56 32 tions, unless the supply temperature is less than about 45 *F. A Auburn. AL Decatur, AL 71 og Huntley, MT 64 36 tdation capability for maintaining a low concentration oI carbol 31 59 Ltacola,NB 69 39 dioxide and a correspondingly safe concentration of oxygen Tempe, AR Tucson. AR 35 65 Norfolk, NB 66 40 shelter has several advantages, including one or more of t Brawley, CA 90 63 New Brunswick, NJ 65 42 76 56 Ithaca, NY 59 39 lowing: Ft. Collins, CO 64 36 Raingh, NC 73 52 Davis,CA 1, A longer :tay time is gained for continued occupancy a OM fa f shutdowtaf a ventilating system due to fire or for repair o Tifton, GA 30 62 Lale Hefner.OK 77 51 abled equipment.

2. Intermittent operation of a manual ventilating blower may Moscow,ID 57 37 Powhuska, OK 74 50 Lemont,IL 65 39 Ottawa,Om., Canada 59 36 become practicable.
3. Greater physical activity in the shelter becomes perm 63 42 Cervalks, OR 66 46
4. Environmental conditions, such as temperature, humidit l

West Lafayette, IN 66 33 Pendleton, OR 67 39 Urbana. IL Burlington lA 71 33 Cadhoun. SC 76 52 moisture cortdensation, air distribution, air motion, and o 69 41 Union, SC 70 43 as well as oxygen and carbon dioxide, may be improved w Maghattan, KS 70 46 Madason. SD . 61 33 Lexington, KY 42 Jackson, TN 71 49 Suppleentan apparatus. Upper Marlboro, MD 70 East Lansing, M1 63 37 Temple, TX 33 5, THERMAL ENVIRONMENT 62 34 Sah Lake City, UT 63 40 St. Paul, MN 79 55 Burlington, VT 63 35 65 43 Pullmaa. WA 60 36 Underground Shelters State Univ., MS As previously indicated, the thermal environment in Kansas City. MO 66 42 Seattle, WA 61 45 Faucett, MO depends on occupancy, construction features, clim 71 43 conditions, and conditions of use. The miernal environmen Sneston. MO Earth te nperniurus are intestaied a,erness trase surface io a depch of to tt dernedm each for s represents a balance between heat generated msid i I to namtam e6:ervec artathermaldiffusmiy,e = 0.02s r %.

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!g. / // \\ \\ !W NN\\1 i W r4 a.i P = \\ % Nb j.: # NrE 6i ,,e y g._ g .i ./ 00 e i g. l umt vot.unas OF SPAct, v Physical Dets(Per Capite Seele) i lierminalvalues of Gee Concentration 0.9 ft*Jh ~ Oxygen consumption 0.75 ft /h 8 Termmal Concentration Carton dioxide production per Capita 0.144 Itvh (percen' t y W9me) Moisture lose from body Ventdelion Carten Dumuoe Oxygen Ventnetion Air Properties Rose, cfm 14.13 20A2% 5.33 0.25 17.23 Oxygenin fresh air 0.075 1 2.67 I l' O.50 13.77 Deneer lbitt* 1.33 1,0 l 50 % 0.80 19.53 Relative humidity 77'F l 2.0 19.79 Dry. bulb temperature 14 7 psi 0.47 3.0 20.11 Atg,J.F.c pressure 0.29 50 Carben Diezide sad Oxyges la Occupied Spaces Fig. 3 83'F effective temperature, although higher or lower values may heat conduction into the materials surrounding the shelter, andbe used for different segments of the population. the neat exchange with the ventilating air. Because each of the heat Experimental measurements have been made in various shelters exchanges include latent and sensible components that vary with with real or simulated occupants to determine the temperature and time, computation of the temperature and humidity, for short humidity that would develop after one to two weeks in various climates, and with various ventilation rates and occupancies. periods of occupancy,is very complex. The problem of keeping warm in shelters during winter condi. Achenbach et al(1962) and Kusuda and Achenbach (1963) tions has not been considered acute since normal, healthy people pared computed and experimental results in a few shelters. can tolerate temperatures as low as 50*F for several days, if Figures 4 and 5 show the relative effects of ventilation rate. eart - properly clothed. However, since people of all ages and in vary. conductivity, and shelter size (Drucker and Cheng 1962, Drucker ing degrees of health wili sequire shelter, and because it cannot be and Haines 1964, Baschieve et af.1%5). The effect o f initial earth assumed that, on short warning, people will take adequate cloth-temperature is smallin magnitude, averaging about 0.2 *F stelter ing into a shelter, the heating requirements of shelters should not temperature per degree of earth temperature. The analog com. be ignored. Generally, the need for heating will be greater in puter studies disclosed that after the tenth day, the temperature family-size shelters than in group or community shelters becausein the shelter would approximate 95% of the ultimate tempera. of the greater surface area per occupant in the smaller shelters.ture rise. . Because the steady state rates of conducted heat are charac. teristically small for underground shelters, envuonmental temper.Simplified AnalyticalSolutions atures less than 50'F can usually be avoided by arranging the The thermal environment in a sheiter is determined by the fol. ventilating system to use metabolic heat generated by the occupants. During cold weather, a mixture of fresh and recircu* lowing energy balance relation: (2) lated air in varying proportions can be supplied to occupied spaces

q. + g, = q, + g,, + g, at a temperature of 50*F or more. This procedure is less effective

[ if the shelter is only partially occupied (Allen 1972).

  • h'"'

During the summer, the maintenance of suitab!c environmen.

e. = human metabolic h.et tal conditions in a shelter is, in most instances, a question of sur*

= hat senerat.d by lishts, cookins appliances, motor. driven vival rather than comfort. From considerations of survival, the equipment, and annitiary power appar.tus e, environmental criterien for 14 days' duration has been selected at a

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\\ 's 5 L\\si 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 4 2 0 8 6 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 85Ic._D5 lt l

l l ATTACHMENT 4 CALCULATION EC-M96002 Rev.1 l l 3 dO2 ALERT LIMIT MAX CR STAFF FOR 48 HOURS l 0.10 44.35 0.15 41.89 0.20 39.43 0.25 36.96 0.30 34.50 0.35 32.03 l 0.40 29.57 0.45 27.11 0.50 24.64 l 0.55 22.18 0.60 19.71 l 0.65 17.25 0.70 14.78 0.75 12.32 0.80 9.86 MAX CR STAFF FOR 48 HOURS 45.00 g ...4....+....+.. 40.00 .. +... 35.00 - --- +- - + - 1-30.00 ...i.. .... ;....!....;...... ;...i.... i.. l 2$ 00 ~4. ~ 4....q.. s.. ..4.. 3 +-. e 20.00 +.. +..- + 4 -.. v - +b-15.00 - f - f-- 10.00 - --f--i -{ i i j-s - i i-- d- - 5.00 - -t7 ~--t- -4 0.00 O.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.00 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 ALERT UMIT e F t b__.-...__.__ -_u

J l i i 1 .1 q 1 ( 1 NPF-38-205 REFERENCE 6 7 LETTER To J. G. DEWEASE (LP&L) FROM J. H. WILSON (U.S. NRC) ' DATED _ JULY 21; 1987-l .t. L L: i 1 l i a 1 1 l

l I' i l. 1 l '- i L l l -l. l NPF-38-205 l-REFERENCE 3 i 1991 ASHRAE HANDBOOK; APPLICATIONS; L CHAPTER 11; ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL FoR SURVIVAL; l PAGES 11.3,11.4, & 11.5 l i ~ I' L e2 -_

Environme l99/ ASHRGE HeoBmK i i.3 Attachment 'l Pago I of W Utlati n Facton range of envir Calc. No. EC-M% - on. live temperati Carbon dioxide concentration should not exceed 3r by solume o temperatures oy mwn vi riguic 4. sunumune m niuss n, sus and preferably should be matntained below 0.5 r. For a sedentary o comfort zone, do not impose any limits on the duration of person,3 cfm per person of fresh air will maintain a CO: concen. tration of 0.5r. At concentrations of 3re and abose, performance occupancy. e n,n,,, onso. n deteriorates and basic physiological functions are affected. At 'C 1.$r, basic performance and physiological functions are not e . no A - affected, but slow adaptive processes have been observed that ,o might induce pathophysiological states on long exposure. At 0.5 ^ '[,N[O -So I to 0.8%, no significant physiological or adaptive changes occur. y' ~,B Oxygen levelin a shelter is generally less critical than CO: l levels in the absence of life-support systems. Oxygen concentra-n- [ - so tion in normal air is about 21%; 17% is frequently taken as a limit 4 I/ 6 .,o f M'"7'~~ f for shelters. g,,. j .,((5 An approximate relationship between physical activity, energy 6 pgg / %;;; -80 g " expenditure, oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide production gg,,f" S fg4 f g a e -io 5 and rate of breathing is shown in Table 3. The respiratory quotient E AN N IV (RQ)is the volumetric ratio of carbon dioxide production to oxy- .m /I)( )( jC gen consumption. A value of 0.84 may be used for the conditions pfy j( Q N jo in Table 3. This value is representative; the actual RQ depends I largely on diet and body chemistry. In the absence of metabolic u--" gy y \\ # ,,.e disorders, values of RQ associated with the oxidation of carbo.

  • P W, /,

\\ / hydrates, proteins, and fats are about 1.0,0.8, and 0.7. respectively 87))( \\/ (Allen 1972, Harrow and Mazur 1958). ,,, bT **' f/ s-RELativt MutHoITY 7 [ Table 3 Per Capita Rates of Energy Expenditure. Oxygen s to is so as so as e as ac Consumption, Carbon Dioxide Production, and onwouta Tmanuasa Pulmonary Ventilation for Man Fig. 2 Still-Air Effective Temperature Emergy Oxyges Ca h Imeiof Expenditure; Coe-Dioxide Rate of Near the outer bounds of ET ranges L1 and HI, susceptible Physical Metabolic suas tion Production, Breathing, individuals (including infants, the aged, and persons afflicted with Actitity itste, Btu /h ft /b ft/h 3 3 ft /h arthritis, heart disease, or metabolic disorders) may experience Exhausting effort 36n0 6.66 5.7 146 difficulties (lee and Henschel 1%3, Henschel er al.1968). At low Strenuous work temperatures in range Li, chilblains may appear. At higher tem

  • or sports 2400 4.44 3.8 97 peratures in range H1, anxiety, sleeplessness, nausea, and heat rash Moderate exercise 1600 2.96 2.5 64 will probably occur during prolonged exposure.

Mild exercise; I If exposure to the moderate cold stress in ET range L2 or heat light work 1000 1.34 1.55 40 I stress in ET range H21s likely to be extended beyond a few hours, Standing; desk work 600 1.10 0.93 24 special care should be taken to maintain safe body temperatures. Sedentary, at case 400 0.14 0.62 16 An adequate diet and multilayered clothing adaptable to the Reclining at rest 300 0.56 0.47 12 prevailing temperature level are essential during prolonged I exposure to conditions in ET range L2. Reliance on the warming The effects of carbon monoxide must be considered, even effects of increased physical activity or shivering is not a desira-though the amount of this gas produced by the body is negligibly ble alternative. small. In confined shelter spaces, the prime source of CO would Minimal clothing is appropriate in ET range H2, and, to avoid be tobacco smoke, with pipes producing five times and cigars dehydration, potable water should be available for replacing meta-almost 20 times as much as cigarettes. Carbon monoxide can also bolic losses. The ability to cope with heat stress varies among come from fuel. burning devices in the shelter, from the exhaust l individuals; persons having subnormal sweat response are inher-gases ofinternal combustion engines, or through the ventilation ently susceptible. A posture that affords maximum opportunity intake from smoldering fires outside the shelter. I for evaporation from skin surfaces is desirable in a hot environ-For industrial purposes, the allowable concentration of CO is ment; impermeable clothing and furnishings that impede evapo-50 ppm by volume. This limit is based on an 8.h workday, five days ration should be avoided. per week. For exposure over longer sustained periods, lower limits Exposure to the severe cold stress in ET range L3 and heat stress are used. For submarines, the limit is 50 ppm or 0.005 We, and for in ET range H3 cannot be safely prolonged beyond limits deter-space cabins the design levelis 10 ppm or 0.001%. Increased levels mined by body temperatures, dehydration, and individual sensi-of carbon dioxide can increase the toxic effect of CO. The tivities. With subfreezing temperatures, the fingers and toes of increased CO results in deeper and more rapid breathing, which, sedentary persons are most susceptible to frostbite, even with pro-in turn, increases the absorption of CO into the body (OCD 1%9). l l tective clothing. Exposure to relatively high dry-bulb temperatures Odor arising from activities within the shelter, as well as toxic can be endured for significant periods if the panial pressure of or explosive gases, should also be considered. In connection with water vapor in the air is low. An environmental temperature of austere shelters, minimal rates of air replacement are generally 176'F is tolerable for about an hour if the air is virtually dry. sufficient to dilute odors associated with human occupancy. However, breathing is slightly painful in air having a dew point of Hydrocarbons from fuelleakage, hydrogen from batteries being 122'F, and such a condition is endurable for only a few minutes discharged, and ingress of radioactive particulate, pathogenic (Lind 1955). organisms, or chemical agents are all possible hazards. 1

\\ i o

  • ~

11.4 and Ot: CLIMATE AND SOILS 'Y of Page 1 of 3 thern Heat loss calculations for underground shelters require values hap-t sc Calc No. EC-M%- oo1 ey be of thermalconductivity and thermal diffushity of earth. Infor. te 2 t mation on earth temperature is also required, which is related to used............ ..ters. the thermal and physical properties of soil, as well as to the cli. magic conditions. Table 4 illustrates thermal conductivity and CONTROL OF CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT diffusivity of various types of soil with respect to moisture con. Control of the physical environ nent may be regarded as two tent. Earth temperature may be estimated from the soil tempera. independent problems-control of C. chemicalenvironment and ture data at several selected stations throughout the United States, control of the thermal environment. CL,ed (buttoned.up) shelters published in Climatological Data of the U.S. Westhet Recordwithout any air replacement from outside sources remain habita-Center Asheville, NC. ble for only a few hours, unless a life support systern is used. The permissible stay time (period of occupancy)is determined by the l Table 4 ThermalProperties of Soils Ilocks.and Concrete net volume of space per person, and is defined as the time required arbon dioxide concentration to 3 % by volume. This p[ Meterial C ky, f y,

Deusky, est,

.g, 3 3 Ben /lb a *F ft /h ib/ft 6 = 0.04 V, (1) Ben /h ft.*F 3 Dense rock 2.00 0.050 200 0.20 i Averase rock I.40 0.040 175 0.20 where l Dense concrete 1.00 0.033 150 0.20 ft3 = time to reach 3*e carbon dioxide, h s 143 0.21 V, = unit volume of space, ft per person Solid masonry 0.75 0.025 131 a23 Thus, people can safely stay for 20 h in a closed shelter having Heavy son, damp a net volume of 500 ft per person. The stay time can also be 3 125 1 20 Heavy soil, dry 0.50 0.020 100 0.25 determmed from Figure 3 for various conditions. In the figure, the Lisht soil, damp relationship between the concentrations of carbon dioxide and Light soil, dry 0.20 0.011 90 0.20 oxygen in occupied spaces, the rate of ventilation per person, the net volume of space per person, and the time after entry is shown. Earth temperature beyond a depth of 3 ft is seldom affected byThe terminal values of carbon dioxide and oxygen concentration diurnal cycle of air, temperature, and solar r-W However, the

  • are tabulated for various rates of ventilation. Figure 2 is based on I

annual fluctuation of earth temperature extends to a depth of 30 rates of oxygen consumption and carbon dioxide production to 40 ft. The integrated monthly average earth temperature from representative of people in confined quarters (Allen 1960). surface to a depth of 10 ft is insensitive to the thermal diffusivity The example shown by dotted lines indicates that a carbon diox-of soil, as long as the diffusivity is larger than 0.02 fts/h. "Ihble 5 ide concentration of 3.5% by volume will develop in 10 h in an presents annual maximum and mimmum earth temperatures awr-3 unventilated shelter having a net volume of 240 ft per person, aged over the surface to a depth of 10 ft for 47 stations through-and that the oxygen content of the air will then be 16.2% by out the United States, which may be used for an approximate volume, Ventilation with pure outdoor air is the most economi-calculation of underground heat transfer. cal method for maintaining the necessary chemical quality of air in a shelter. The recommended minimum ventilating rate of 3 cfm Table 5 Aeneal Maximmuns and Minimeans for per person of fresh air will maintain a carbon dioxide concentra- { latograted Average EarthTemperatures* tion of about 0.5% and an oxygen content of approximately 20%, Eank Temperosesu, *F by volume, in a shelter occupied by sedentary peopic. However, g,,, gg,,. g,,, gg, an air e=s==t rate of 3 cfm per person is not sufficient to limit the resuItant effective temperature to 85'F, under many condi-Auburn. AL 74 56 Bozeman, MT 56 32 ^L tions, unless the supply temperature is less than about 45 'F. A wn-tilation capability for maintaining a low concentration of carbon T R 8 i 69 dioxide and a correspondingly safe concentration oI oxygen in a Tucson, AR 85 65 Norfolk.NB 66 40 Brawley, CA 90 68 New Brunswick, NJ 65 42 shelter has several advantages, including one or more of the fol. Davis, CA 76 56 Ithaca, NY $9 39 Ft. Collins, CO 64 36 Raleish, NC 73 52 lowing:

1. A longer stay time is gained for continued occupancy after shutdown of a ventilating system due to fire or for repair of dis-os n OH 6

Tifton, OA 80 62 Lake Hefner.OK 77 51 abled equipment. Moscow,ID $7 37 Pawhuska.OK 74 50

1. Intermittent operation of a manual ventilating blower may Lemont. !L 65 39 Ottawa,Ont Canada 59 36 become practicable,

- Urbana.IL 68 42 Corvallis, OR 66 46

3. Greater physical activity in the shelter becomes permissible.

West Lafayette,IN 66 38 Pendleton.OR 67 39 Burlington. !A 71 38 Calhoun, SC 76 52

4. Environmental conditions, such as temperature, humidity, moisture condensation, air distribution, air motion, and odors, Manhattan, KS 69 41 Union, SC 70 48 taxington, KY 70 46 Madison, SD 61 33 as well as oxygen and carbon dionsde, may be improved without Upper Marlboro, MD 10 42 Jackson.TN 71 49 p,

g g East Lansins, MI 63 37 Temple, TX 83 59 St. Paul, MN 62 34 Salt Lake City, UT 63 40 THERMAL ENVIRONMENT State Univ., MS 79 55 Burlington, VT 63 35 Faucett, MO 65 43 Pullman, WA 60 36 Underground Shelters As previously indicated, the thermal environment in a shelter . Kansas City, MO 66 42 Seattle, WA 61 4S nk m,dMM d d i ' Sikaston,MO 71 43 MmWG,em a manh iemssverures one iniesrated evereses froen surface to e depth or 10 ft derived conditions, and conditions of use. The internal environment _ each for erese ennphiude and phase ene e with r? presents a balance between heat generated inside the shelter, t n to om.nem eeners.d[vny,u = 0 015 fl /h-a earth theriaaldiffue

ffi ,o f Environment Control for Survivr.1 11.5 ahd 1 @3 d 3 Calc. No. Ec wu,- on GAS CONCENTRATION IN e........s u , o u s s u e u , u.... i l \\ W \\ \\ \\ \\ 1

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- = 4 \\A\\ \\ \\ N w %= } 5. - --u i 2",., \\ )\\ .;;.;.,L.,, - u ~ ~" g!. : l A # \\ \\\\ \\ % 'A i\\ \\ "g! i$.: lM \\ \\ \\\\ !\\ \\ m!

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/ / E 4... K..h.....A \\ ; s 5 1/U \\ \\ l W NN \\, i k ~ > ome - Es De . se s e 12 is m),,, an oo p, 4. , j, y UNIT VOLUME OP $ PACE. V Terminal Values of Gee Concentration Phyelcel Dets (Por Capits Beels) Per Capita Termmal Concentratum Oxygen consumption 0.9 ft'/h Ventdation (Percent by Volume) Carbon dioxide production 0.75 ft*/h Rate. cfm Carbon Deoxide Oxy 9en Moisture loss from body 0.144 lb/h 0.25 5.35 14.13 Ventilation Air Properties 0.50 2.67 17.23 Oxygen in fresh air 2022% i 1.0 1.35 18.77 Density 0.075 lb/fts 2.0 0.69 19.53 Relative humidity 50 % 3.0 0.47 19.79 Dry bulb temperature 77'F 5.0 0.29 20.11 Armosphenc pressure 14.7 psi Fig. 3 Car":en Dioxide and Oxygen is Occupied Spaces heat conduction into the materials surrounding the saelter, and 83 'F effective temperature, although higher or lower values may heat exchange with the ventilating air. Because each t & he heat be used for different segments of the population, e;nanges include latent and sensible components t. tat va,y with Experimental measurements have been made in various shelters time, computation of the temperature and humidity, for short with rea! or simulated occupants to determme the temocrature and periods of occupancy,is very complex. humidity that would develop after one to two weeks in various The problem of keeping warm in shelters during winter condi-climates, and with various ventilation rates and occupancies. tions has not been considered acute since normal, healthy people Achenbach et al(1%2) and Kusuda and Achenbach (1%3) com-can tolerate temperatures as low as 50'F for several days, if pared computed and experimental results in a few shelters. properly clothed. However, since people of all ages and in vary. Figures 4 and 5 show the relative effects of wntilation rate, earth ing degrees of health will require shelter, and because it cannot be conductivity, and shelter size (Drucker and Cheng 1%2, Drucker assumed that, on short warning, people will take adequate cloth-and Haines 1964, Baschiere et al 1%5). The effect ofinitial earth ing into a shelter, the heating requirements of shelters should not temperature is smallin magnitude, averaging about 0.2 'F shelter be ignored. Generally, the need for heating will be greater its temperature per degree of earth temperature. The analog com-family size shelters than in group or community shelte:S because puter studies disclosed that after the tenth day, the temperature of the greater surface area per occupant in the smaller shelters. in the shelter would approximate 95% of the ultimate tempera. Because the steady state rates of conducted heat are charac. ture rise. teristically small for underground shelters, environmental temper-atures less than 50'F cem usually be avoided by arranging the Simplified AnalyticalSolutions ventilating system to use metrbolic heat generated by the The thermal environment in a shelter is determined by the fol. occupants. During cold weather, a mixture of fresh and recircu* lowing energy balance relation: lated air in varying proportions can be supplied to occupied spaces at a temperature of 50 'F or more. This procedure is less effective q,,, + q, = q, + q,, + q (1) if the shelter is only partially occupied (Allen 1972). where During the summer, the maintenance of suitable environmen. j I tal conditions in a shelter is, in most instances, a question of sur* q,,, = human metabolic heat vival rather than comfort. From considerations of survival, the q, - tant senerated by lights, cooking appliances, motor-driven environmental criterion for 14 days' duration itis been selected at equipment, and auxiliary power apparatus

l l l-l l i. L l l l l i NPF-38-205 REFERENCE 4 REGULATORY GUIDE 1.78 DATED JUNE 1974 ' l-ASSUMPTIONS FOR EVALUATING THE HABITABILITY OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONTROL ROOM DURING A POSTULATED ' HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL RELEASE l ?

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June 1974 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION d 4 REGULATORY GUIDE t o,, DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS REGULATORY GUIDE 1.78 ASSUMPTIONS FOR EVALUATING THE HABITABILITY OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONTROL ROOM DURING A POSTULATED l HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL RELEASE A. INTRODUCTION control rooms dunng the course of all postulated hazardous chemical releases. ' However, the "Acci. Criterico 4,," Environmental and missile design dental Episode Manual" 2 prepared for the Environ. l l bases," of Appendix A " General Design Criteria for mental Protection Agency (EPA)in Apnl 1972 presents Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing a method for the evaluation and estimation of the area of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires, in affected by the release of hazardous chemicals u a part, 0:st structures, systems, and components impor. function of source strength, type of chemical, distance tant to safety be designed to accommodate the effects of from source, and meteorology.The " Accidental. Episode and to be compatible with the environmental conditions Manual" rates accident potentials from both mobde and associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, stationary sources and identifies some hazardous chenu. and postulated accidents. Criterion 19," Control room," cals that may be released. Human tolerance for hazard. requires that a control room be provided from which ous chemicals should be considered in the design stage of, actione can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit nuclear facilities. safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a For hazardous chemicals shipped on routes near the safe condition under accident conditions. Release of nuclear power plant, the shipment frequencies specified hazardous chemicals can potentially result in the control for consideration in this guide (Regulatory Position 2) toom becoming uninhabitable. This guide describes reflect the relative accident probabilities for common assumptions acceptable to the Regulatory staff to be modes of transportation. A discussion of accident rates 3 used in assessing the habitability of the control room for various transportation modes can be found m during and after a postulated external release of hazard. Appendix A. " Analysis of Transportation Accidents," l ous chemicals and describes criteria that are generally of WASH 1238. 8 Consideration is also given to the i acceptable to the Regulatory staff for the protection of quantity of hazudous chemical shipped. ] the control room operators. This guide does not consider q the explosion or flammability hazard of these chemicals, The purpose of this guide is to identify those j which also must be addressed. The Advisory Committee chemicals which, if present in sufficient quantities, could on Reactor Safeguards has been consulted conceming result in the control room becoming uninhabitable. The this guide and has concurted in the regulatory position. general design considerations that are used in assessing S. DISCUS $10N ' A regulatory suide is beins developed to desents specific design provtsions and procedures that are acceptable to mitz6 ate hazards to control room operators from an onsite chlortne The control room of a nuclear power plant should

reisess, be appropriately protected from hazardous chemicals
  • office of Air Programs, Publication AFTD 1114. Copies that may be discharged as a result of equipment failures, ray tw obtamed from Nanonal Techrucal Informauon Service, 5285 Port Royai noad, sprinstneld. virgsrus 22151.

operator errors, or events and conditions outside the 8 WASH 1238, " Environmental Survey of Transportanon

  • control of the nuclear power plant.-

of Radioscuve Matenals to and from Nuclear Power Plants" December 1972. Copees may be obtained from Nauonal Tech-At present, there is no one standard design evalua-nical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Spnnsfield. tion method in use for evaluating the habitability of virsuna 22151. USAEC RE0ut

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aen 0.7n$ wiUn.Y k .Mos*,*.m mI.U Nm $ E I. Ya d"".Se".Tn."..N Y"E$ M"TO:"l,:.*, '.".:".; ' 00::" "::"O,..'" "l'J.'". ;; 'o:::f"c=",J., '":'.e'J:P"'""" "" t 1 i =*= :1:"=a.t""07.,1;'":'=.',=.=",* ". ::* ': n. e.. ';: *" ~." L""l . A";*,.'.'"::',',"P.,,,'":'l::"'"" " e. i," '*,'l,0.! ";;=. ! O=1*,..

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l the capabdity of the control room, as designed, to 1. If major depots or storage tanks of huardous i withstand hazardous chemical releases occurring either chemicals such as the chemicals listed in Table C.! of on the site or within the surrounding area are presented. this guide are known or projected to be present within a Some of the chemicals specifically identified, such as five trule radius of the reactor facility, these chemicals helium and nitropn, shFuld generally not present a should be considered in the evaluation of control room problem except when very lary quantities are stored on habitability.' Whether a major depot or storage area the site. Asphyxiating chemicals such as these need not constitutes a huard is determined on the basis of the be considered unless a significant fraction of the control quantity of stored chemicals, the distance from the room air could be displaced as a result of their release, nuclear plant, the inleakage charactensues of the control l room, and the applicable toxicity limits (see Regulatory l Fire. fighting equipment used for fighting chemical Position 4 for definition). Table C 2 gives the entena and electrical fires should be considered as a potential to be used in evaluating the hazards of chemicals to f source of hazardous chemicals. control rooms. A procedure for adjusting the quantities given in Table C.2 to appropnately account This guide ider,tifies chlorine as a potentially haz. for the tox.icity limit of a specific chemical, meteorology I ardous chemical. Chlvine is used in a majority of conditions of a particular site, and air exchany rate of a nuclear power plants far water treatment and is not. controt room is presented in Appendix A of this guide. tally stored onsite as is liquified gas. A separate guide l will be issued to descnoe the detailed design provisions Chemicals stored or situated at distances greater which are considered adequate to protect control room than five miles from the facility need not be considered operator: from an onsite chlorine release. because, if a release occurs at such a distance, atmo, spheric dispersion will dilute and disperse the incoming C. REGULATORY POSITION l

  • The hst of chemicals given in Table C.! u not all incluirve j

l In evaluating the habitability of a nuclear power but indicates the chemicats most commonly encountered. See plant control room during a postulated hazardous also " Guide for Emergency Services for Hazardous Matsnals i (1973)-spets. Fires. Evacuation Arees" copies of which may be I chemical release the following assumptions should be ogi 4 r, ine u s. o.,,tment of Transponstion. Office of l made: Hazardous Materials, Washington D.C. g l l TA8LE C.1 SOME HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS POTENTIALLY INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTAL RELEASES FROM STATIONARY AND MOBILE SOURCES

  • k remicies umin Tomocoty Lomit chemoces nom me/m'
  • cnemonet anm mesm' e

Acetaldehyde 200 360 Ethylene omide 200 180 Acetone 2000 4800 Fluorine 2 4 Acrylonitrile 40 70 Formaldehyde 10 12 l Anhydrous emmoma 100 70 Helium asphyxiant I 1. Aniline 10 38 Hydrogen cyanide 20 22 Benzene 50 100 Hydrogen sulfide 500 750 i Butodiene 0.1%' 2200 Methanol 400 520 Butenes asphyxiant Nitrogen (compressed Carbon dioeide 1.85e 1840 or liquified) asphyxisnt Carbon monoxide 0.1%' 1100 Sodium oxide 2 . qhlorine 15 46 Sulfur dioxide 5 26 1 2 l Ethyl chloride 10000 26000 Sulfuric acid Ethyl other 800 2400 Vinyl chloride 1000 2600 1 Ethylene dichloride 100 400 Xylene 400 1740 j i a This list is not all. inclusive but indicates the hazardous chemicals most commonly encountered. ) b Adapted from Sam's " Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials." c Parts of vapor or gas per million parts of air by volume at 26*C and 700 torr (standard temperature and pressure), j d Approximate milligrams of particulate per cubic meter of air, at standard temperature and pressure, based on l listed ppm values, j ' Percent by volume. 1.78-2 l

TABLE C 2 EXAMPLES OF WElGHTS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS THAT REQUIRj CONSIDERATION IN CONTROL ROOM EVALUATIONS (FOR A 50 mg/m TOXICITY LIMIT AND STABLE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS *) o,,,,,,,,,, W rIr000oba ",f*** T& A Tm s Tm c Conrros noom, contrat noom contros noom 0.3 to 0.5 9 2.3 0.1 0.5 to 0.7 35

8. 9 0.4 0.7 to 1.0 120 20 1.0 1 to 2 270 52 2.5 2 to 3 1300 280 13 3 to 4 3700 780 33 4 to 5 8800.

1400 60 a For different toxicity limits as given in Table C 1 and different meteorological conditions, the weights should be proportionately scaled as described in Appendix A. b All hazardous chemicals present in weights greater thui 100 lb within 0.3 mile of the control room should be considered in a control room evaluation. C Control room types (Appendix A illustrates the use of this table for other air exchange rates): Type A - A " tight" control room having low feakage construction features and,the capability of detecting at the fresh air intake those hazardous chemicals stored or transported near the site. Detection of the chemical and automat c isolation of the control room are assumed to have i occurred. An air exchange rate of 0.015 per hour is anaumed (0.015 of the control room air by volume is replaced with outside air in one hour). The control room volume is defined as the volume of the entire aone serviced by the control room ventilation system. The assumption that the air exchange rate is less than 0.06 per hout requires verification by field testing. Type 8 - Same as Type A, but with an air exchange rete of 0.00 per hour. This value is typical of a control room with normel leakage construction features. The assumption that the air exchange rate is less than 0.06 per hour, requires verification by field testing. Type C - A control room that has not been isolated, has no provir'on for detecting hazardous chemicals, and has en air exchanpo rate of 1.2 per hour. i plume to such a delree that there should be sufficient Shipments are defined as being frequent if there are 10 8 time for the control room operators to take appropnate per year for truck traffic,30 per year for rail traffic, or actic:.. In addition, the probability of a plume remaining 50 per year for barge rraffic. 8 If the quanbty, per within a given sector for a long period of time is quite shipment, of hazardous chemicals frequently shipped small. Ptst a site is less than the adjusted quanuty shown in 2. If hazardous chemicals such as those indicated in Table C 2 for the control room type being evaluated, the Table C 1 are known or projected to be frequently shipments need not be considered in the analysis. shipped by rail, water, or road routes within a five mde radius of a nuclear power plant, estimates of these 3. In the evaluation of control room habitabilky shipments should be considered in the evaluation of during normal operation, the release of any hazardous control room habitability. The weight limits of Table C.2 (adjusted for the appropriate tox.icity limit, meteo-e p.,,,pio,ive hazards. a lower number of sarpments rology, and control room air exchange rate) apply also would be conadered frequent ance the effects of an explosion to frequently shipped quantities of hazardous chemicals. would be independent of wind direction. l.78-3

l I chemical to be stored on the nuclear plant site in a Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of. quantity greater than 100 lb should be considered. Any Coolant Accident for Botling Water Reactors." and hazardous chemical stored onsite should be accompanied Regulatory Guide 1.4, "Auumptions Used for Evaluat. by instrumentation that~will detect its escape, set off an ing the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss. alarm, and provide a readout in the control room. of. Coolant Accident for Pressunzed Water Reactors." & The value of the atmosphenc dilution factor be. 4. The toxicity limits should be taken from appro. priate authoritative sources such as those listed in the tween the release pomt and the control room that is References section, For each chemical considered, used in the analysis should be that value that is exceeded j the values of importance are the human detection I threshold and the maximum concentration that can be tolerated for two mm, utes without physical incapacita. When boiloff or a slow leak is analyzed, the effects tion of an average human (i.e., severe coughing, eye of density on vertical diffusion may be considered if adequately substantiated by reference to data from bum, or severe skin irntation). The latter concentration experiments. Density effect of heavier than. air gases is considered the 'toxtetty limit. Table C.1 toxicity limits (in ppm by volume and mg/m,sives the should not be considered for releases of a violent nature ) for the or for released matenal that becomes entramed in the chemicals listed. Where these data are not available, a determination of the values to be used will be made on a turbulent air near buildings, case by. case basis. 7. For both types of accidents desenbed in Regulatory Position 5 above, the capability of closing the air ducts 5. Two types of industrial accidents should be con-of the control room with dampers and thus isolaung the sidered for each source of hazardous chemicals: maxi. control room should be considered in the evaluation of l mum concentration chemical accidents and maximum control room habitability. In particular, the time re. I concentration. duration chemical accidents. quired to shut off or redirect the intake flow should be justified. The detection mechanism for each hazardous a. For a maximum concentration accident, the chemical should be considered. Human detection may be l quantity of the hazardous chemical to be, considered is appropriate if the buildup of the hazardous chemical in l l the instantaneous release of the totalcontents of one of the control room is at a slow rate due to slow air the following: (1) the tarpst storage container falling turnover. The air flows for infiltration, makeup, and within the guidelines of Table C 2 and located at a recirculation should be considered for both normal and nearby stationary facility, (2) the largest shipping accident conditions. The volume of the control room container (or for multiple containers of equal size, the and all other rooms that share the same ventilating air, 2 failure of only one container un.less the fai!ure of that during both normal conditions and accident conditions, j l container could lead to successive failures) falling within should be considered. The time required for buddup of i the guidelines of Table C.2 and frequently transported a hazardous chemical frw the detection concentration near the site, or (3) the largest container stored onsite to the toxicity limit should be considered. ' Table C 3 (normally the total release from this container unless the of this guide contains a sample list of the chemical and containers are interconnected in such a manner that a control room data needed for the evaluation of control single failure could cause a release from several con-room habitability, i tainers.) 8. In the calculation of the rate of air infiltration (air l For chemicals that are not gases at 100*F and leaking into the control room from ducts, doors, or normal atmospheric pressure but are liquids with vapor other openings) with the control room isolated and not I pressures in excess of 10 torr, consideration should be pressunzed, use of the following assumptions is sug. given to the rate of flashing and boiloff to determine the gested: rate of release to the atmosphere and the appropriate time duration of the release. a. A pressure differential of 1/8 inch water gaup actoss ailleak paths. l 'the atmospheric diffusion model to be used in the evaluation should be the same as or similar to the model presented in Appendix 8 of this pide.

  • The time from detection to capacitation should be guester than two amutes. Two menetes is considered sufficient tune for a trained operator to put a self.contamed breathmg b.

For a maximum concentration. duration acci- ,,,,,,,s into o,e,etion,if these as to tw used. dent, the continuous release of hazardous chemicals from the tarpst safety relief valve on' a stationary, ' This pressun differentani accounts for wmd effects, mobile

  • or onsite source fallinI within the guideline: of

'h*'"at column effects, and barometne possure chaness It does Table C 2 should be considered. Guidance on the not secount for psessure diffenaces resulting from the operation of ventention systems supplyins sones adjaasnt to the control atmosphenc diffusion model is presented in Replatory room. It should be adivated appropriately when the venidat on Guide 1.3, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the system appiies tones adjacent to the control roont 1.78 4 C_________________

l' l TAtl.E C 3

11. If credit is taken m the evaluation for the removal t

of hazardous chemicals by filtration or other means the TYPESOF CHEMICAL AND exPenmental basis for the dynamic removal capability of CONTROL ROOM DATA fog the removal system for the particular chemical bems HA81TABILITY EVALUATION c nsidered should be established.

12. Concurrent chemical release of container contents CHEM / CAL dunng an earthquab, tomado, or flood should be considered for chemical container facilities that are not l

1, Name of hasardous chemical. designed to withstand these natural events. It may also

2. Type of source (stationary, mobile, or onsite),

be appropriate to consider release from a single onsite

3. Human detection threshold, ppm.

container or pipe coincident with the radiological

4. Maximum allowable two minute concentration (tox-consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident.

icity limit as defined in Regulatory Position 4, ppm if the contamer facilities are not designed to withstand and mg/m'), an earthquake.

5. Maximum quantity of hazardous chemicalinvolved
13. If consideration of possible acciderits for any I

in incident. hazardous chemicalindicates that the applicable toxicity

6. Maximum continuous release rate of hazardous limits may be exceeded,self<ontained breathing appara-chemical.

tus of at least one half hour capacity or a tank source of

7. Vapor pressure, torr, of hazardous ' chemical (at air with manifold outlets and protective clothing, if maumum ambient plant temperaturch required, should be provided for each operator in the
8. Fraction of chemical flashed anci rate of boiloff contrul room. Additional air capacity with appropriate when sphg occurs.

equipment should be provided if a chemical hazard can

9. Distance of source from control room. miles.

persist longer than one half hour. For accidents of long

10. Five percentile meteorological dilution factor be-duration. sufficient air for six hours (coupled with j

tween release point and control room for mstanta-provis ons for obtaining additional a;r within this time neous and continuous releem period) is adequate. Each operator should be raumht to CONTROLAOOy distinguish the smells of hazardous chemicals peculiar to the ares. Instruction should include a periodic refresher

1. Volume of control room, including the volume of course. Practice drills should be conducted to ensure all other areas supplied by the control room emer, that personnel can don breathing apparatus within two gency ventilation system, ft.

minutes. 8

2. Normal flow rates for volume defined above, cfm:a

- unfiltered inleekage or makeup air,

14. Detection instnamentation, isolation systems, fdtra.

- filtered makeup air, tion equipment, air supply equipment, and protective - filtered recirculated air, clothing should meet the single failure criterion. (In the

3. Emergency flow rates for volume defined above, case of self contained breathing apparatus and protective cfm" (as in item 2. above),

clothing, this may'be accomplished by supplying one

4. Time required to isolate the control room, sec, extra unit for every three units required.)
15. Emergency procedures to be initiated in the event a " Filtered air" refers to the ak filtered through filters whose removal capahdity for the particular chemscal being con-of a hazardous chemical release within or near the udered has been estabushed.

station should be written. These procedures should address both maxamum concentration accidents and maximum concentration. duration accidents and should

b. ' The maximum design pressure differential for identify the most probable chemical releases at the flesh air dampers on the suction side of recirculation station. Methods of detecting the event by station fans.

Personnel, both during normal workday operation and during minimum staffing periods (late night and week. 9. When the makeup aar flow rate required to pressur. end shift staffing), should be discussed. Special instru. ize the control room is calculated, a positive pressure mentation that has been provided for the detection of differential of 1/4 inch water gauge should be assumed hazardous chenucal releases should be desenbed includ-in the control room relative to the space surrounding the ing sensitivity, action initiated by detecting instrument control room. . and level at which this action is initiated, ar}d Technical Specification limitations on instrument availability. Cri-

10. To account for the possible increase in air exchange teria should be defined for the isolation of the control due. to ingress or egress, an additional 10 cfm of room, for the use of prctective breathing apparatus or unfiltered air should be assumed for those control roorra other protective measures, and for orderly shutdoui or without airlocks. This additional leakage should be scram. Criteria and procedures for evacuating nonessen-i assumed whether or not the control roorn is pressurized.

tial personnel from the station should also be defined. 1.78 5

e L Arranyment should be made with Federal, State, accidents involving hazardous chemicals have occurred and local synews or other cognizant organizations for withm five nules of the plant the prompt notification olthe nuclear power plant when REFERENCES 1. "Matheson Gas Data Book," Fourth Edition, The 4 " Toxic Substances List,1973 Edition," U.S. De. Matheson Company, Inc., East Rutherford, New partment of Health, Education, and Welfare. Jersey (1966). National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Rockville, Maryland 20852 (June,1973). 2. N. Irving Sax, " Dangerous Properties of Ir.dustrial Prepared for NIOSH under contract by Tracor Jitco, Materials " Third Edition, Reinhold Book Corp., Inc.,1300 East Gude Drive, Rockville, Maryland New York, New York (1968). 20852. 3. " Hygienic Guide Series," published by the Ameri-5. " Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances can Industrial Hygiene Association William E. and Physical Agents in the Workroom Environ-McCormick, Executive Director, 66 South Willer ment," American Conference of Governmental In. Road, Akron, Ohio 44313. dustrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, Ohio (1973). e i l 1,78-6

l l APPENDtX A PROCEDURE FOR CALCULATING WElGHTS OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS NECESSITATING THElR CONSIDERATION IN CONTROL ROOM EVALUATION The weights presented in Table C 2 are based on the room requires that the control room leakage rate be veri. i following assumptions: fled by periodic field testing. 8 1. A toxicity limit of 50 mg/m For control rooms without automatic isolation 2. Air exchange rates for the three control room capability, the weights given for Type C control rooms types of 0.015,0.06, and l.2 per hout should be used, appropnately adjusted for the actual 3. Pasqudi stabdity category F fresh air exchange rate. Weights for Type B control rooms should be used when the control room has auto. These conditions are generally applicable to most of matic isolation. Weights for Type A control rooms, ap-today's plants for a gas such a chlorine (toxicity limit of propriately adjusted for the design isolated air exchange 3 45 mg/m ). If the tcxicity limit, air exchange rate, or rate, should be used only when the control room has meteorological conditions are significantly different been designed specifically for low inleakage, from the assumptions used in Table C 2, simple correc-tions that result in only minor errors can be made. Pesquilt stability Category Tonielty t imit The weights given in Table C 2 are based on stable atmospheric dispersion coaditions equivalent to Pasqudl The weights presented in Table C.2 are directly Condition F. This represents the worst five percentile proportional to 'he toxicity limit. If a particular chemi. meteorology observed at the majority of nuclear piarit 8 cal has a toxic %y limit of 500 mg/m, the weights from sites and, for most casse, there will be no need to adjust 8 the table (bud on 50 mg/m )are increased by a factor the weights because of meteorology. Ifit is determined of ten. that the worst five percentile meteorology is better or worse than Condition F, the following adjustments Air Enchange Rate should be made: Table C 2 weights are inveaely proportional to the p/w ewsenew wee atuseipueeriu air exchange rate. If a type C control room has an ex-o,mereen omeory reewr chany rate of 2.4 per hour, the weights from the table (based on 1.2 per hour) are decreased by a factor of two. E 2.5 When adjustments of this type are made, the control room type (A, B, or C) that has an air exchange rate F t.0 closest to that of the control room in question should be selected. G 0.4 It should be noted that the use of an air exchange Appendix b provides additional discussion of atmos-rate of less than 0.06 per hour for an isolated control pheric dispersion. l l 1.78 7 i

i l I APPEN0lX B DIFFUSION CALCULATIONS FOR AN INSTANTANEOUS (PUFF) RELEASE 1. Diffus;on Eevation Windspeed does not enter into the determination of unit concentration per se, but does affect the time-groundlevel release with a finite initial volume is:' puff) The diffusion equation for an instantaneous ( integrated concentration since it determines cloud passage time. The variation of unit concentration at a specific stationary receptor location is determined by 0,+ofg' evaluating x in the exponential term in the above 8 8 7.87 0 +o equation as follows: = gy x = D - ut y s s s %lf x y g + +

  • exp

\\o,og ,s + oj o} + ol l where D is the source receptor distance, u is the i s g y windspeed, and t is the time after release. ~ where: 2. Determination of input Data 1 = unit concentration at coordinates x, y z Q1 from the center of the puff m s The following assumptions and methods should be applied when analyzing worst case instantaneous source releases: = standard deviations of the gas concen, o,0 o xyz i l tration in the horizontal alongwind,hort-s. Select the appropriate stabdity category based j zontalcrosswind,and vertical crosswind on h wet h FMe steordogy oWM at pe directions, respectively (assume o = a ), site according to the AT method. Regulatory Guide 1.23 x m (Safety Guide 23), "Onsite Meteorological Programs," presents a classification of various atmospheric stability 7.87 =2I/2 r /2 categories as a function of temperature change (AT) 3 f with twight. Normally, this category wdl be Pasqudl-3 Condition F, in some cases, the werst case stability og = initial standard deviation of the puff, m category may be either Pasquill Condition E or G. This 1/3 occurs at sites having distinctly better or worse diffusion ~ "g .3jXo. where Qg is the puff re* than is normally encountered. Figures I and 2 of this l = 7 lease quantity, g, and x,is appendix include conditions E, F, and G and encompass t the densit of the gas at standard condi- . the worst expected stability conditions at nearly all sites.- tions, g/m b. Determine the x, y, and z standard deviation x,y,z = distance from the puff center in the values based on the Pasqudi stability categories as horizontal alongwind, honzontal cross',presented in Figures I and 2. wind, and vertical crosswind directions l respectively, m. c. Additional credit due to building wake or other dispersive phenomena may be allowed, depending on the { properties of the relected gas, the method of release, and l ' G.R. Yanshey, E.H. Market. Jr., and A.P. Richter "Clima-the intervening topology or structures. f tography of the Nataonal Reactor Testing Station "1D012048. January 1966. Copees may be oMained from NationalTechnical d. Windspeed should be selected to maximtze the reformation Service, $285 Port Royal Road. Spansfield, y. l suun 22151. two minute concentration within the control room. I i s 1 i 1.78 8 L______.________._

3 10 ~ '3 ~ 3 Pasqui'l Type E e,! Pasquill Type F 3

s N

2 PasquHI Type G 10 w .o 5 n 5 c O ~ c a 558 10 a ~ <wao5moZ I I ! ! I!!! l l l l l lIl l l l l l lll 1 10 10 10' 10 3 3 5 OlSTANCE FROM RELEASE PolNT (meters) Figure 1. Horizontal Standard Deviation of Materialin a Plume 1.78 9 L.

1 l' \\ 3 10 1 3 1 ? I 8 Pasquill Type E l 3 1 l 3 10 Pasquill Type F a. m C Pasquill Type G 5 5 5 a l 2 = oE = 1 i ti lo a 3 A t i:: = y i i i

l l lll l

l l l 1111 I I I I I III, 1 1 2 3 4 1 10 10 10 10 OlSTANCE FROM RELEASE POINT (meters) Figure 2. Vertical Standud Deviation of Materialin a Plume i e 1.78 10

r_. "n. l 's v l i. t l ( u 1 i l l NPF-38-205 t l' l REFERENCES CALCULATION NO. EC-M96-002, REVISION 1 I CARBON DIOXIDE GENERATION / OXYGEN DEPLETION IN CONTROL ROOM l t l l' L n s 1}}