ML20236M164
| ML20236M164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1987 |
| From: | Stetka T, Tedrow J, Wilson B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236L939 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-87-17, IEIN-82-19, NUDOCS 8708100492 | |
| Download: ML20236M164 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1987017
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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REGloN 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATI ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report No:
50-302/87-17
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Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733
Docket No:
50-302
Licensee No.:
FachlityName:
Crystal River 3
Inspection Dates: June 12 - July 9, 1987
Inspectors: hO
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T. F.
tetka, Se ior Resident Inspector
' Date Signed
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esident Inspector
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Approved by:
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JB'. A. Wilson, Section Chief
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Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection was conducted by two resident inspectors in the
areas of plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event
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Reports and Nonconforming Operations Reports, non-routine operating events,
review of IE information notices, review of 10 CFR Part 21 reports, review of
surveillance procedures and records, and licensee action on previous inspection
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items.
Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility onerations
observed.
Some of these tours and observations were conducted or, backshifts.
Results:
Five Violations were identified:
Failure to adhere to plant
procedures, paragraphs 5.b.(2), 5.b.(9)(a) and 5.b.(9)(b); Failure to perform a
surveillance test, paragraph 7.a.(1); Failure to conduct inservice testing of
pumps and valves, paragraph 10.b; Failure to properly review and approve the
inservice inspection program procedures and procedure changes, paragraph
10.c.(1); Failure to properly retain inservice inspection records, paragraph
10.c.(2).
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8708100492 870805
ADOCK 05000302
Q
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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- J. Alberdi, Assistant to the Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
- W. Bandhauer, Assistant Nuclear Plant Operations Manager
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- P. Breedlove, Nuclear Records Management Supervisor
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- J. Colby, Manager, Nuclear Mechanical / Structural Engineering Services
- J. Cooper, Superintendent Technical Support
D. Gulling, Nuclear Inservice Inspection Specialist
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- V. Hernandez, Senior Nuclear Quality Assurance Specialist
B. Hickle, Manager,' Nuclear Plant Operations
- M.'Jacobs, FPC Area Public Information Coordinator
- H. Koon, Assistant Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
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- K
Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance
- J. Lander, Manager, Nuclear Operations Maintenance and Outage
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- M. Mann, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations
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R. Murgatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
- W. Neuman, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection (ISI)
G. Oberndorfer, Manager, Procurement and Material Quality Assurance
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- B. Partain, Nuclear Compliance Specialist
- W. Rossfeld, Nuclear Compliance Manager
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- E. Welch, Manager, Nuclear Electrical /I&C Engineering Services
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D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager
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- W. Wilgus, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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- K. Wilson, Manager, Site Nuclear Licensing
- R. Wittman, Nuclear Operations Superintendent
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Other personnel contacted included office, operations, engineering,
maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporcte personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2. . Exit Interview.
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph
1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 9,1987.
During this
meeting, the inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
as they are detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the
-Violations and Inspector Followup Items (IFI).
The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did
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not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
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by the-inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 302/87-10-07:
The licensee has
revised chemistry calibration procedures CH-232 (revision 15 dated May 18,
1987) and CH-233 (revision 9 dated May 18,1987) to require the utiliza-
tion of equipment clearances to remove and restore radiation monitors to
service following calibration. The verifications required with the use of
an equipment clearance should ensure that radiation monitors are returned
to service with the proper flow lineup.
(Closed) IFI 302/86-35-04:
The licensee has revised the FinL Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) (revision 8 dated July 1, 1987) to correct inaccur-
ate st3tements regarding the necessary volume of water required to achieve
the cold shutdown condition.
Section 10.2.1.6 cf the FSAR has been
clarified to include the sources of water and amount needed for cooldown.
(0 pen) IF. 302/85-19-04:
The licensee was informed by the SBM switch
manufacturer, General Electric, that replacement parts are not available
and that a total switch replacement would have to be performed.
The
licensee has obtained all of the 314 switches to be replaced and has
replaced 22 switches to date. The switch replacement program is presently
underway, however the majority of the switches can on1v be replaced after
plant shutdown.
The switch replacement will be completed following the
refueling outage scheduled to begin in September 1987.
(Closed) IFI 302/87-10-08:
Procedure SP-216 was revised as revision 6 to
enhance the performance of the procedure.
The revised procedure was
successfully completed on June 10, 1987.
(Closed) IFI 302/87-01-05:
The licensee has evaluated the use of the
non-quality parts and has determined that these parts are adequate for use
in the safety-related system.
To assure the parts in stock are properly
classified, the licensee qualified the existing parts as safety-related
and re-assigned them to their safety-related (quality) parts inventory.
(Closed) IFI 302/84-22-04:
The applicable instrumentation, AH-205-A,B,C-
DPI , AH-206- A,B ,C-DP I , AH-601- A,B ,C-DPI , AH-602- A ,B ,C-DPI , AH-603- A,B ,C-
DPI, and AH-604-A,B,C-DPI was added to the licensee's instrument calibra-
tion program (PM-200).
This instrumentation was calibrated and is now on
a scheduled calibration interval.
(0 pen)UNR 302/87-04-03: The licensee revised procedures as follows:
SP-130, Engineered Safeguards Monthly Functional Test, Revision 23
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dated 2/17/87;
SP-358A, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation Logic Functional
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Test #1, Revision 5 dated 4/15/87;
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SP-358B, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation Logic Functional
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Test #2, Revision 4 dated 4/20/87; and,
SP-358C, Operations ES Monthly Automatic Actuation Logic Functional
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Test #3, Revision 4 dated 3/24/87.
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The inspector reviewed these procedure revisions and determined that these
revisions appear to correct the procedures' deficiencies.
To assure that the procedure revisions completely resolve the deficiency
issue, the licensee plans to issue a Technical Specification Interpreta-
tion (TSI) on TS 3.3.2.1, Table 3.3-3, items 1.a.5,1.b.4, 2.c, 3.b,
4.c.6, and 5.f to address the testing limits for the automatic actuation
logic. This item remains open pending the licensee issuance and inspector
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review of the TSI.
(0 pen) IFI 30P/87-16-02: The licensee is still conducting their review of
This review is expected to be complete by July 15,
1987. This item remains open pending completion of the licensee's review.
(Closed) Violation 302/86-39-01: Failure to perform an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 review and failure to perform post-modification testing.
The
licensee's response dated March 12, 1987, was considered acceptable by
Region II.
The licensee's response stated that the violation actually
resulted from a failure to docunent in the Modification Approval Records
(MAR) package all references used in the development of the modification.
The inspector reviewed the following documentation-
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Memorandum from K. Baker and R. Widell to All Nuclear Operations
Engineering and Site Nuclear Services Personnel, dated March 11,
1987, (WPN 87-0112).
This memorandum basically reminds all enginee-
ring personnel of the need to include as a " reference" all appropri-
ate documents that were used in the development of Modification
Approval Record / Field Change Notice (MAR /FCN) design package and not
attached to the package.
Memorandum from R. Mungatroyd, Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent to
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all Maintenance Planners and Supervisors dated December 2,1986 (MA
86-158). This memorandum's purpose was to bring to the planner's and
supervisor's attention the need for adequately identified post
maintenance testing following performance of work activities.
The inspector was informed by licensee personnel that temporary modifica-
tion (T-MAR) T86-06-20-01 was removed from where it had been installed and
the modification package was awaiting final review prior to closure.
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The inspector reviewed minutes from a Post Maintenance Test Meeting dated
May 6, 1987. This is the first of a series of meetings being conducted to
expand post maintenance testing (PMT) requirements beyond what is required
by procedure CP-113, Handling and Controlling Work Requests and Work
Packages, by the shop planners.
This meeting established a steering
committee and task force to expand post maintenance testing activities.
The meeting minutes state that the task force leader is to establish and
identify milestones, define the scope of the task, and identify any major
obstacles.
Additionally the leader is to contact the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations for references for companies with the best PMT programs.
A second meeting was proposed for May 21, 1987. The long term goal is to
establish an improved PMT program in late 1988.
This date, however, is
not consistent with the licensee's response which requires improve PMT
implementation by October 1987.
This inconsistency was brought to the
dttention of the Supervisor, Site Nuclear Engineering Services.
The
development of the PMT program and implementation will be reviewed during
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subsequent inspections.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee had
corrected the previous problem and was in process for developing correc-
tive action to preclude recurrence of similar problems.
Corrective
actions stated in the licensee's response either have been implemented or
were under development.
(Closed) Deviation 302/86-39-02:
FSAR requirements are not being met in
that RM-L4 has been inoperable since September 1979.
The licensee's
response dated March 12, 1987, was considered acceptable to Region II.
The inspector received a proposed change to the FSAR which is to be
submitted to the NRC on or before July 1987.
This FSAR change deletes
RM-L4 and its associated circuitry from the FSAR. The inspector was also
informed that T-MAR 79-08-78, which removed RM-L4 from service, was now a
permanent modification.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had
corrected the previous problem and developed corrective action to preclude
recurrence of similar problems.
Corrective action stated in the
licensee's rerponse will be implemented on or before July 1987.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection period.
5.
Review of Plant Operations
The plant started this inspection period in power operation (Mode 1). On
July 2 ,1987, a reactor trip occurred due to a failure of the "A" Inverter
(VBli-1A) (see paragraph 7.a of this report for details of the reactor
trip).
Following repairs to VBIT-1A, a reactor startup was performed. The
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reactor achieved criticality at approximately 8:12 PM followed by the
resumption of power operation at 9:25 PM on July 3.
The plant remained in
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power operation for the rest of the inspection period,
a.
Shift Logs and Facility Records
The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with
operations p)ersonnel to verify compliance with the Technical Specifi-
cations (TS and the licensee's administrative procedures.
The following records were reviewed:
Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Equipment
Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief Checklist; Auxiliary Building.
Surveil-
Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; Daily Operating (STI); and
lance Log; Work Request Leg; Short Term Instructions
Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.
In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently
verified clearance order tagouts.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Facility Tours and Observations
Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted.to
observe operations and mainterience activities in progress.
Some-
operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted
during backshifts.
Also, during this inspection period, licensee
meetings were attended by the inspector to observe planning and
management activities.
The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:
security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator
room; auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and,
electrical switchgear rooms.
During these tours, the following observations were made:
(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation
and/or indications were observed to verify that indicated
parameters were in accordance with the TS for the current
operational mode:
Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid
radiation monitors; electrical system lineup; reactor
operating parameters; and auxiliary equipment operating
parameters.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(2) . Safety Systems Walkdown - The inspector conducted a walkdown of
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the Nuclear Service; Closed Cycle Cooling (SW) system to verify
that the lineup was in accordance with license requirements for
system operability and that the system drawing and procedure
correctly reflect "as-built" plant conditions.
The licensee operates this system in accordance with operating
procedure OP-408, Nuclear Services Cooling system. Valve Check
List I of this procedure specifies the valve positions required
for normal system operation.
During this walkdown on June 25,
.1987, the inspector observed that valve SWV-14, an inlet valve
to the "B" Nuclear Services Heat Exchanger (SWHE-1B), was in the
closed position vice the open position required by Valve Check
List I.
When informed 'of this finding, the nuclear shift
supervisor concurred that the valve was not in the correct
position and directed that the valve be opened.
This matter was discussed with the licensee's operations
personnel who stated that the valve had recently been positioned
in accordance with an equipment clearance (clearance number 6-54
dated June 19, 1987) after maintenance was performed on SWHE-18.
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A review of this clearance revealed that valve SWV-14 was
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directed to be restored to the closed position following tag
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removal.
Compliance procedure CP-115, In-Plant Equipment Clearance and
Switching Orders, step 5.3.6.h requires that following removal
of a tag, the restoration position of a valve shall be obtained.
from the applicable operating procedure.
In this case the
clearance incorrectly direchd valve SWV-14 to be closed
contrary to procedure 0?-408,
Failure to adhere to the require-
ments of procedure CP-115 to obtain the cortect restoration
position of a valve is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1
and is considered to be a violation.
Vi6Ltion (302/87-17-01):
Failure to adhere to the requirements
of plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.
This violation is similar to one cited in NRC Inspection Report
50-30?/86-35 (item a) in which a valve was restored to the
incorrect position following the removal of an equipment
clearance.
The licensee's corrective action associated with
this violation does not appear to have been sufficient to
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prevent recurrence.
(3) Shift Staffing - The inspector verified that operating shift
staffing was in accordance with TS requirements and that control
room operations were being conducted in an orderly and profes-
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sional manner.
In addition, the inspector observed shif t turn-
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overs on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant
status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant informa-
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tion during these turnovers.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(4) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and compon-
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ents and cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the
facility were observed to determine whether . safety and/or fire
hazards existed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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(5) Radiological Protection Program - Radiation protection control
activities were observed to verify that theso activities were in
conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in
compliance with regulatory requirements.
These observations
included:
Selected licensee conducted surveys;
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Entry and exit from contamir.ated. areas including step-off
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pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;
Area postings and controls;
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Work activity within radiation, hinh radiation, and
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contaminated areas;
Radiation Control Area (RCA) existing practices; and,
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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protec-
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tive clothing, and respiratory equipment,
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Area postings were independently verified for accuracy by the
inspectors.
The inspectors also reviewed. selected Radiation
Work Permits (RWPs) to verify that the RWP was current and that
the controls were adequate.
The implementation of the licensee's As low As Rear.nably
Achievable (ALARA) program was revicwed to determine personnel
involvement in the objectives and goals of the program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
.(6) Security Control - In the course of the monthly activities, the
Resident Inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical
security program.
The composition of the security organization
was checked to insure that the minimum number of guards were
available and that security activities were conducted with
proper supervision.
The performance of various shifts of the
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security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities
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to include; protected and vital area access controls, searching
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of personnel, packages, and vehicles, badge issuance and
retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols, and compensatory
posts.
In addition, the Resident Inspectors observed the
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operational status of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) monitors,
the Irtrusion Detection system in the central and secondary
alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and vital
area barrier integrity, and the security organization interface
with operations and maintenance.
No violations or deviations were ioentified.
(7)
Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and
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equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was
appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,
actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equip-
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ment, and fire barriers were operable.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(8)
Surveillance - Surveillance tests were ob;erved to verify that
approved procedures were being used; qualified personnel were
conducting the tests; tests were adequate to verify equipment
operability; calibrated equipment was utilized; and TS require-
ments were followed.
The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:
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Operability and Functional Check of Valve
Monitoring System;
Containment Air Lock Test (Semiannual);
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Sample Line Leak Rate Test;
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RC System Water Inventory Balance;
SP-349A, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-1) Monthly
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Operability Demonstration, (Procedure review
only);
SP.349B, Emergency Feedwater Pump (EFP-2) Monthly
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Operability Demonstration, (Procedure review
only);
Nuclear Services Flow Path Operability,
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(Procedure review only);
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Locked Valve List (Position Verification of
Locked Valves), (Procedure review and walk
through);
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RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance;
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Containment Air Locks;
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SP-513B, Battery Service Test (Unit 2);
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Containment Building Spray Semiannual
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Surveillance Program; anc',
PT-2'E,
"B" 0TSG Level Instrumentation Verification.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(9) Mainte' ance Activities - The inspector observed maintenance
activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in
effect; work requests and fire prevention work permits, as
required, were issued and being followed; quality control
personnel were available for inspection activities, as required;
and, TS requirements were being followed.
Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the
following maintenance activities:
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Calibration of various instruments and miscellaneous work
associated with the
"B"
accordance with procedure SP-169D, Diesel Generator Instru-
mentation, and work requests;
Calibration of protective relays associated with the
"B"
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Decay Heat Removal Pump in accordance with procedure
PM-102, Protective Electrical Relays;
Reinsta11ation of the motor operator for valve DHV-111 in
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accordance with procedure MP-402, Maintenance of Limitorque
Valve Controls;
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Resetting of an Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control
Valve, EFV-55, in accordance with procedure SP-146, EFIC
Monthly Functional Test;
repair of the Absolute Position
Troubleshooting ) and
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Indication (API
associated with control rod number 1 in
control rod group number 2 in accordance with procedure
SP-333, Control Rod Exercises;
Troubleshooting and repair of the "A" Inverter, VBIT-1A, in
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accordance with procedure PM-130, Static Inverters; and,
Testing of main steam safety. valves MSV-35 and MSV-41 in
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accordance with procedure SP-650, ASME Code Safety Valve
Test.
As a result of these reviews, the following items were identi-
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(a) During observation of the test performed on valve MSV-35 (a
main steam safety valve) to determine the pressure relief
setpoint, the inspector noticed that the steam system
pressure was approximately 920 psig.
Review of the
completed work package revealed that procedure SP-650, ASME
Code Safety Valves Test, step 8.2.4 required that the steam
system be operating normally at a pressure between
885-910 psig.
The actual steam pressure which existed
during this test was recorded on Data Sheet 1 of the
procedure. This data sheet depicted steam system pressures
of 917 psig and 920 psig during the tests.
The inspector
discussed this apparent discrepancy with the maintenance
supervisor who concurred that the test was performed at the
incorrect steam system pressure.
Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure SP-650
is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1 and is
considered to be another example of the violation discussed
in paragraph 5.b.(2) of this report.
(b) During a review of the post-maintenance testing performed
on July 3 in accordance with procedure SP-333, Control Rod
Exercises, following repair of the API, the inspector noted
that procedural steps 9.1.57 through 9.1.60 had not been
completed.
Procedure steps 9.1.57 through 9.1.60 provide
the switch lineups needed to recover from the safety
control rod (Rod #1 in Group #2) exercising mode.
The
inspector also noted that the " Procedure Approval and
Transmittal Sheet", which is used to document a supervisory
review of the completed data, did not document completion
of these steps.
The inspector also reviewed the data from the performance
of another procedure SP-333 that was performed to verify
operation of all the control rods' position indication
channels prior to the reactor startup. This SP-333, which
was completed on the same day and subsequent to the post-
maintenance test, was properly performed and provided
assurance that the cxtrol rod drive (CRD) system switch
lineup we.s correct.
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Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure SP-333
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is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1 and is
considered to be a violation. This violation is considered
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to be another example of the violation discussed in para-
graph 5.b.(2) of this report.
(10) Radioactive Waste Controls - Solid waste compacting and selected
liquid releases were observed to verify that approved procedures
were utilized, that appropriate release approvals were obtained,
and that required surveys were taken.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
(11) Pipe Hangers ar..i Seismic Restraints - Several pipe hangers and
seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were
observed to insure that fluid levels were adequate and no
leakage was evident, that restraint settings were appropriate,
and that anchoring points were not binding.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee Event Reports and Nonconforming Operatichs Reports
a.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potentini generic
impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions
appeared appropriate.
Events, which were reported immediately, were
reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied.
LERs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement
policy. LERs 86-23, 86-25 and 87-08 are closed.
(Closed) LER 86-25:
This LER reported the lack of independent DC
power sources for the 230 KV switchyard protective relays.
The
licensee has revised section 8.2.3.3 of the Final Safety Analysis
Report (FSAR) (revision 8 dated July 1,
1987) to clarify the
electrical system design reliability considerations.
These minor
changes modified the descriptions of the DC power sources.
(Closed) LER 86-23:
This LER reported operation outside the design
basis of the plant due to the addition of unanalyzed D.C. loads.
As
reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/87-10, the new battery has
been installed and tested.
On June 29, 1987, an Interoffice Corre-
spondence was issued by the Vice President Nuclear Operations to
establish a " Department Interface Summary" listing that identifies
the systems and the personnel in charge of these systems that need to
interface with Crystal River Unit 3 prior to conducting any activi-
ties on these systems.
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b.
The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) to
verify the following:
compliance with the TS, corrective actions as
identified in the reports or during subsequent reviews have been
accomplished or are being pursued for completion, generic items are
identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are
reported as required by TS,
All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforce-
ment Policy.
I
No violations or deviations were identified.
i
.
,
.
12
7.
Non-routine Operating Events
a.
At 10:42 AM on July 2, a reactor trlp cecurred from approximately 88%
power.
Prior to the reactor trip, technicians were performing
procedure SP-110, Reactor Protection System Functional Testing, and
were in the process of testing the
"B" AC reactor trip breaker (one
i
of two breakers which supply AC power to the control tod drive
mechanisms).
This breaker had been tripped opened per the procedure
but could not be re-closed.
Troubleshooting efforts to re-close the
breaker were in progress.
4
Not associated with this troubleshooting effort, the
"A" Inverter
(VBIT-1A), which is the normal power supply to the "A" 120 volt Vital
Bus (VBDP-3), failed due to a faulty capacitor.
This caused a
voltage drop in the power supplied to the vital bus and initiated an
automatic transfer to a backup transformer which is the alternate
source of power to the vital bus.
The voltage drop on VBDP-3 also
caused undervoltage sensing circuits associated with the "A"
reactor trip breaker to actuate and trip the breaker open.
This
removed the remaining source of AC power from the control rod drive
mechanisms allowing them to deenergize and release the control rods
which fell into the reactor core.
The inspector arrived in the control room moments after the reactor
trip and verified proper plant response and performance of operator
actions.
The inverter was removed from service at 10:43 AM on July 2 and the
plant remained in the hotstandby (Mode 3) condition during trouble-
shooting and repair efforts.
On July 3, during the cooldown
conducted following the reactor trip, the thrust bearing on the motor
for the
"C" Reactor Coc'ent Pump (RCP-1C) overheated which caused a
failure of the pump's 3rd stage mechanical seal (this type of pump
has a three stage mechanical seal with each stage designed to
withstand full reactor coolant system pressure).
The pump was
secured and the 1st and 2nd pump seal stages verified to be function-
ing properly.
VBIT-1A was repaired at 5:15 PM on July 3 and was placed back in
service supplying power to VBDP-3.
A reactor startup was commenced
utilizing three reactor coolant pumps and the reactor was taken
critical at 8:12 PM.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's post trip review and restart
justification and maintenance activities which were conducted
following the reactor trip.
In addition the Nuclear Shift Supervisor
(NSS) log was reviewed to determine compliance with the TS.
From
these reviews the following items were identified:
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
..
,
.
13
(1) TS 4.8.2.1.2 requires that whenever a transformer is supplying
power to a vital bus instead of the normal source of power, it
shall be demonstrated operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Procedure
SP-321. Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and Power Avail-
ability Verification, was written by the licensee to implement
this surveillance requirement.
From the review of the NSS log
and discussions with operations personnel, it appears that
procedure SP-321 was not performed as required and that the
,
I
transformer supplying VBDP-3 was not demonstrated to be operable
and functioning properly within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of its use as a power
source. The transformer was in use from 10:43 AM on July 2_until
5:15 PM on July 3 for a time period of approximately 30.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
',
Failure to demonstrate the operability of the transformer
supplying power to VBDP-3 is contrary to the requirements of TS 4.8.2.1.2 and is considered to be a violation.
Violation (302/87-17-02):
Failure to demonstrate _ the oper-
- ability of the transformer supplying power to VBDP-3 within 24
hours as required by TS 4.8.2.1.2.
(2) The licensee is presently inspecting and testing .the "B"
reactor trip breaker to determine why the breaker failed to-
re-close.
Initial troubleshooting activities have failed to
'
reproduce the failure mechanism.
This breaker has been removed
and subsequently replaced with a spare breaker to allow a
reactor startup to be performed.
IFI (302/87-17-03):
Review the licensee's troubleshooting
activities regarding the failure of the AC reactor trip breaker
to close.
,
b.
At 9:40 AM on July 3 the plant entered an unusual event due to the
sighting of a tornado nearby.
The tornado did not cause any damage
to the nuclear plant and the unusual event was terminated at 11:15 AM
on July 3.
8.
Review of IE Information Notice (IEN)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities with respect to IEN
82-19, Loss of High Head Safety Injection Emergency Boration and Reactor
Coolant Makeup Capability, to determine what action, if any, the licensee
was taking to address this issue.
As a result of the li:ensee's review,
which included a review of all safety-related systems with a common
suction header, the licensea has determined that their plant was not
susceptible to such occurrences and that no further action is required.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's assessment and has no further
questions on this item at this time.
c
_ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ .
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14
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9.
Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Report
On June 5,1987, the licensee issued a 10 CFR Part 21 report describing
the improper setting of the middle blowdown ring on Pressurizer Safety
Valve RCV-8, serial number (S/N) BU3148.
The inspector reviewed this report and all applicable documentation
associated with the disassembly, reassembly, and testing of RCV-8.
In
addition the inspector reviewed all applicable documentation associated
with the disassembly, reassembly, and testing of the presently installed
Pressurizer Safety Valves RCV-8 (S/N BL8900) and RCV-9 (S/N BL3149). This
review was conducted to verify that the presently installed valves have
the correct blowdown ring settings.
As a result of this review and discussions with licensee representatives
it appears that the two presently installed valves have the proper blow-
down ring settings.
No violations or deviations were identified and the inspector has no
further questions on this issue.
10. Review of Surveillance Procedures and Records
The inspector reviewed surveillance procedures and records to verify that
the surveillance of systems and components required by the Technical
Specifications (TS), Inservice Inspection (ISI), and Inservice Testing
(IST) programs are being properly conducted.
To accomplish this inspection, procedures were reviewed to verify that:
Selected systems or components were covered by properly approved
-
procedures;
Procedures were adequate with respect to prerequisites, accept-
-
ance criteria, and restoration to service;
Technical content cf sampled procedures were adequate to 'sure
-
TS, ISI, and IST program compliance; and,
Completed tests were properly reviewed and conducted within tne
-
time intervals specified in the TS, ISI, and IST program.
a.
The following direct TS related surveillance procedures and completed
data were reviewed:
SP-333, Revision 15, Control Rod Exercises, and data completed
-
on 7/3/87 and 7/6/87;
-
SP-224, Revision 3, RC Flow Measurement Determination, and data
completed on 6/15/86;
e
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_-
_____ _ _ _ .
_
'
.
,
.
15
SP-317, Revision 35, RC System Water Inventory Balance, and data
-
completed for the period 6/12/87 through 7/9/87;
SP-709, Revision 8 Reactor Coolant and Decay Heat Non-Scheduled
-
Surveillance Program, and data completed on 4/22/87, 4/25/87,
4/29/87, 7/2/07, and 7/3/87;
I
SP-403, Revision 6, Decay Heat Removal System Valves Automatic
-
Closure and Interlock Verification, and data completed 8/4/85
and 6/8/86;
i
SP-347, Revision 32, ECCS and Boration Systems Flow Path, and
-
data completed 6/3/87, 6/17/87, and 7/1/87;
SP-341, Revision 18, Monthly Containment Integrity Check, and
-
data completed 4/5/87, 5/3/87, 5/31/87, and 7/5/87;
SP-344 A (B), Revision 3 (3), Nuclear Services Cooling System A
-
(B) Train Operability, and data completed 2/9/87, 3/24/87,
5/11/87, and 6/22/87;
SP-364, Revision 23, Hose Station Inventory and Hydrant Oper-
-
ability Test, and data completed 3/27/87, 4/24/87, 5/22/87, anJ
6/27/87;
-
SP-367, Revision 1, Fire Service Valve Alignment and Operability
Check, and data completed 4/23/87, 4/24/87, 6/1/87, and 6/24/87;
and,
SP-381, Revision 39, Locked Valve List (Position Verification of
-
Locked Valves), and data completed 2/5/87, 3/23/87, 5/1/87, and
5/20/87.
While reviewing the completed data for procedure SP-403, tM
inspector noted apparent confusion with the data recording.
While
the recorded data indicated satisfactory completion of the test,
there was incons4stency as to how the data was to be recorded.
This observation was discussed with licensee representatives and the
inspector's comments were acknowledged.
The licensee will review
SP-403 and the completed data to determine if a procedure revision
may be necessary to remove any ambiguity.
Inspector Followup Item (302/87-17-04):
Review the licensee's
activities to reduce the ambiguity in procedure SP-403.
b.
The IST program is conducted to meet the requirements of TS 4.0.5.b.
The inspector reviewed this program and examined selected referenced
procedures to verify the criteria listed above.
_
-
-
- - _ _ - _ _ _ _- _ _ _ _ --
--
.
.
16
On June 4, 1982, the licensee submitted a proposed IST program to the
NRC for review and approval .
Through this and subsequent corre-
spondence dated June 14, 1983, July 1, 1985, and October 22, 1985,
the licensee was required to implement the proposed program and
comply with the TS.
The IST program provides a listing of pumps and valves that are
required to be tested by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code and provides a listing of the procedures used to
accomplish this testing.
During a review of the components and their testing procedures, the
inspector identified that the following two pumps and thirty valves
were not being tested as delineated in the program:
Chilled Water Pumps CHP-1A and CHP-1B;
-
Valves BSV-42, BSV-43, CDV-103, CDV-104, CFV-17, CFV-20, DCV-17,
-
DCV-18, DCV-177, DCV-178, DFV-45, DFV-46, FWV-161, FWV-162,
LRV-35, LRV-38, LRV-47, LRV-49, LRV-51, LRV-52, MUV-40, MUV-41,
MUV-158, SWV-47 through SWV-50, SWV-278, SWV-370, and SWV-382.
Failure to perform the testing described in the IST program is
contrary to the requirements of TS 4.0.5.b and is considered to be a
violation.
Violation (302/87-17-05):
Failure to conduct the IST of pumps and
valves as required by TS 4.0.5.b.
c.
The ISI program, which is also conducted in accordance with the
requirements of TS 4.0.5.b, includes inspection of components and
systems over a ten year time interval.
The ten year time interval
for Crystal River 3, began in March 13, 1977, and ended on March 13,
1987.
During this ten year interval the licensee has been performing
partial system inspections.
The intent of this partial inspection
program is to spread out the required inspections over the interval
with all systems being completed at the end of the interval. These
inspections include both Non-Destructive Examinations (NDE) of welds
using visual (VIS), ultrasonic testing (UT), magnetic particle
testing (MT), radiographic testing (RT), and hydrostatic testing
(Hydro) of systems.
Since Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code allows
extension of this interval of up to one year so that the interval can
be made to correspond to a plant's outage schedule, the licensee is
planning to complete the first ten year interval during their
refueling outage scheduled to begin in September 1987.
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. _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
17
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The licensee's program is conducted in accordance with " Technical
Maruals" that were developed by a contractor.
These Technical
Manuals delineate the prcgram and provides a proposed schedule that
specifies when during the ten year interval systems or portions of
systems will be tested.
The results or extent of the testing
completed after each outage are reported in an ISI Report.
By
utilizing the Technical Manuals and the ISI Reports the licensee
performs and tracks the status of their program.
To verify compliance with the TS the inspector reviewed the following
documentation:
Technical Manual for Crystal River Unit 3 Refueling Outage #5
-
1983;
Inservice Inspection Report for Crystal River Unit 3 Refueling
-
Outage #5 1983;
Technical Manual for Crystal River Unit 3 Outage #61985; and,
-
-
Inservice Inspection Report for Crystal River Unit 3 Outage #6
1985.
To determine the completion of the program as delineated in these
Technical Manuals and Reports, the inspector reviewed the following
procedures and completed data:
-
UT-120, Ultrasonic Examination of Piping end Vessel Welds
Joining Similar and Dissimilar Materials;
-
UT-131, Remote Ultrasonic Examination Using the Automated
Reactor Inspection System (ARIS) Device;
MT-270, Wet or Dry Methods of Magnetic Particle Examinations of
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-
Welds, Studs, Bolts, and Pump Motor Flywheels;
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VIS-353, Visual Examinations of Pipe Hangers, Supports, and
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Restraints;
I
i
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SP-204, Class 1 Systems Leakage Test for Inservice In:pection;
SP-210, ASME Class 3 Hydrostatic Testing; and,
-
J
MP-137, System Hydrostatic Pressure Testing.
-
The following lists the procedures that were related to selected
components and systems:
Component
Procedur:; Used
Completion Date
Pressurizer Surge Nozzle
UT-120
4/18/85
_ d
<
-
-
-
- - - _ - - - - .
. _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - _
_
.
l-
.
1
18
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Pipe to Core Flood
UT-131
6/3/85
Nozzle Safe End
Main Steam, Once Through
MT-270
4/4/85
Steam Generator (OTSG) B
!
to MSV-413, Pipe to Cap
Feedwater, FWV-31 and
VIS-353
3/21/85
l
FWV-30 to 0TSG A Spring
Hanger
Emergency Feedwater,
MT-270
3/20/85
FWV-161 and FWV-34 to
OTSG B, Pipe to EL
Building Spray (BS),
SP-210, Rev. 0
5/18/85
Partial System Hydro
Diesel Fuel Oil, Partial
SP-210, Rev. O and 5/20/85
System Hydro
SP-210, Rev. 1
5/17/85
SP-204, Rev 9
8/11/85
inch Decay Heat Line -
Drain Connection to
DVH-116
Makeup and Purification
SP-204, Rev 9
8/11/85
Pump (MVP), A Side Let
Down Cooler Line -
Pressure Connection to
MUV-166
B2 High Pressure
SP-204, Rev. 9
8/11/85
Injection Line - Drain
-
Connection to MUV-393
To determine continuity within the program, the inspector reviewed
hydros of the BS system that were performed in Outage #5 (1983) and
Outage #3 (1980).
When the inspector's review of these records
identified apparent discrepancies with the BS system hydro performed
in Outage #3, the record review was expanded to include all of the
,
twenty-three hydros performed in Outage #3. All of these hydros were
i
performed in accordance with procedure MP-137.
As the result of these reviews the following items were identified:
w
--- - - - - - - _ - - - - - - _
i
.
.
19
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(1) While reviewing the Technical Manual and ISI Report for-
0utage #6 the inspector noted that the Technical Manual
specified that the hydros were to be performed in accordance
with procedure MP-137 but that the subsequent ISI Report showed
that the hydros were actually performed in accordance with
procedure SP-210.
In addition the inspector noted numerous
changes made to the Technical Manual-by the contractor in the
form of " Change Authorizations".
Since the ISI Program is a surveillance activity, procedures for-
this program come under the preview of TS 6.8.2.b.
Review of the Change Authorizations made to the program
indicated that Change : Authorization CR-85-026 did not receive
the review and approval required by TS 6.8.2.b.
In addition,
during subsequent discussions with licensee personnel it was
determined that the hydro procedure change from MP-137 to SP-210
in Outage #6 and the Technical Manuals for the ISI Program
conducted in Outages 3 and 5 also did not receive the review and
approval required by TS 6.8.2.b.
Failure to provide interdepartmental reviews and interdisci-
plinary reviews by qualified reviewers and failure to have the
Plant Review Committee (PRC) review the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations
is contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.2.b and is considered
to be a violation.
Violation (302/87-17-06):
Failure to review and approve the ISI
program and changes to this program as required by TS 6.8.2.b.
(2) Procedure MP-137 requires the boundary for each hydro to be
defined with a highlighted schematic that is attached to the
procedure.
Review of the data for the hydros performed in
Outages 3 and 5 indicate that highlighted drawings and valve
lists were attached to the procedure, however the licensee is
unable to locate the drawings or valve lists.
As a result of
this record deficiency the inspector was unable to determine the
adequacy of the following hydrostatic tests that were conducted
during the 1980 Outage #3:
-
BS system, BS Pump 1B Discharge Piping;
Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling) (SW) System, SW lines
-
to Air Handling ) Heat Exchanger (AHHE 31 and 32B (penetra-
tion 370 and 371 ;
i
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SW System, SW to Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) IC Bearing and
Seal Cooler (penetration 325 and 326); and,
-
SW System, SW to RCP-1B Bearing and Seal Cooler (penetra-
tion 364 and 365).
e
__
__
- _ - .
.
.
20
While these highlighted drawings and valve lists were also
missing for the BS system hydro conducted in the 1983 Outage #5,
the records that were available enabled the inspector to
determine that an adequate test was performed.
However, based
upon these findings, it appears that records for other hydros
performed during Outage #5 may also be suffering from a lack of
records.
During discussions with licensee representatives regarding these
findings, the inspector stated that a review of all of the
hydros conducted during the first ten year interval should be
conducted to verify that these hydros were adequate.
TS 6.10.2.h requires records of ISI activities to be retained
for the duration of the Facility Operating License.
Failure to
retain the hydrostatic test records for procedure MP-137 is
considered to be contrary to the requirements of TS 6.10.2.h and
is a violation.
Violation (302/87-17-07):
Failure to retain ISI records as
required by TS 6.10.2.h.
)
L
_
_