ML20215L377
| ML20215L377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1986 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215L349 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8610280594 | |
| Download: ML20215L377 (9) | |
Text
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A ATTACHMENT A
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2 Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:
Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-17 3/4 7-17 l
3/4 7-18 3/4 7-18 3/4 3-48 3/4 3-48 3/4 3-48a 3/4 3-48a f
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PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HABITABILITY SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.7.1 The following control room emergency habitability systems shall be OPERABLE:
a.
The amergency ventilation system, and b.
The bottled air pressurization system.
APPLICABLITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6.
ACTION:
MODES l',
2, 3, and 4 l
With one control room emergency habitability system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the l following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
ACTION:
MODES 5 and 6 With the Unit 1 control area ventilation system open to the outside atmosphere and the Unit 1 emergency ventilation system inoperable and Unit 2
in MODE 1,
2, 3,
or 4,
isolate the Unit 1 control area ventilation system from the outside atmosphere within 7 days or return the emergency ventilation system to OPERABLE status.
ACTION:
When moving irradiated fuel at either Unit 1 or Unit 2.
With the requirements of the above specification not satisified, place fuel assemblies in a safe condition and suspend all operations involving Core Alterations or movement of irradiated fuel.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.7.1 The emergency ventilation system shall be demonstrated l OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control room air temperature is < 104*F.
l b.
At least once per 31 days by:
1.
Initiating flow through the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that the train operates for 15 minutes.
I BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 PROPOSED WORDING
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREffENTS (Continued) n -
c.
At least once per 12 months or after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation and (1) after each complete or partial replacement of a
HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber bank, or (2) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (3) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
1.
Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 1 99% of a halogentated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 800 cfm i 10%.
l 2.
Verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove 1 99% of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 800 cfm i 10%.
l 3.
Subjecting the carbon contained in at least one test canister or at least two carbon samples removed from one of th charcoal adsorbers to a laboratory carbon sample analysis and verifying a removal efficiency of 1
90%
for radioactive methyl iodide at an air flow with an inigt methyl l velocity of 0.90 ft/sec 1
20%
0.15 mg/m,
1 95%
iodide concentration of 0.05 to relative
- humidity, and 86*F; other test conditions l shall be in accordance with USAEC RDT Standard M-16-lT, June 1972.
The carbon samples not obtained from test canisters shall be prepared by either:
a.
Emptying one entire bed from a removed adsorber
- tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining samples at least two inches in diameter and with a
length equal to the thickness of the bed, or i
b.
Emptying a
longitudinal sample from an adsorber l
- tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining samples at least two inches in diameter and with a
length equal to the thickness of the bed.
4.
Verifying a
system flow rate of 800 cfm i 10% during l system operation.
i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 PROPOSED WORDING
PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is < 6 inches Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a l Water flow rate of 800 cfm i 10%.
2.
Verifying that on a containment isolation signal, the system automatically starts within 60 minutes and diverts its inlet flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.
3.
Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a
positive pressure of 1 1/8 inch W. G. relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
4.7.7.2 The bottled air pressurization system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that the system contains a
minimum of 10 bottles of air each pressurized to at least 1825 psig and by verifying that the system solenoid operated valves are powered from an operable emergency bus, b.
At least once per 18 months by verifying that the system will supply at least 800 cfm of air to maintain the controll room at a positive pressure of 1 1/8 inch W. G.
relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.
4.7.7.3 When the control room emergency ventilation system is inoperable in Modes 5
or 6
(and is required to be operable),
isolation of the control area ventilation system shall be verified at least once per 31 days.
l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18 PROPOSED WORDING
TABLE 3.3-10 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Instrument Location Minimum Instruments Operable Smoke Heat 1.
Control Room.
4 N/A 2.
Cable Spreading Mezzanine 20 4
3.
West cable Vault 3
3 4.
East Cable Vault 3
3 5.
Computer Room 1
N/A 6.
Normal Switchgear Room 8
N/A 7.
A/E Emergency Switchgear Room 3
N/A 8.
D/F Emergency Gwitchgear Room 3
N/A 9.
Remote Shutdown Panel 1
N/A (Process Instrument Room)
- 10. Station Battery Rooms (each)
N/A 1
- 11. Relay Room 1
N/A
- 12. No. 1 Diesel Generator 2
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- 13. No. 2 Diesel Generator 2
1
- 14. Upper Charcoal Filters N/A 6
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- 15. Lower Charcoal Filter N/A 6
- 16. Control Room Air Conditioning 2
N/A Room i
- 17. Reactor Trip Breaker Room 3
N/A
- 18. Charging Pump Cubicle 1/ cubicle N/A
- 19. Cable Vault 3 4
N/A (Elev. 720' on side of I
Unit 2 Control Room)
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BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 1 3/4 3-48 f
PROPOSED WORDING
TABLE 3.3-10 (CONTINUED)
FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Instrument Location Minimum Instruments Operable Smoke Heat
- 20. Intake Structure 6/ cubicle N/A (A, B and C Cubicle)
NOTE:
D CUBICLE N/A 1
- 21. CCR Pump Area 4
N/A
- 22. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Area 4
N/A
- 23. Cable Penetration Area 2
N/A
- 24. RHR Pump Area 2
N/A 1
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-48A PROPOSED WORDING l
ATTACHMENT B
Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 126 No Significant Hazard Consideration Description of amendment request: The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS)
Unit 1, Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBApS) and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) have been modified to accomodate the BVPS Unit 2 control room area.
The Unit 2 control room is currently separated from the Unit 1 control room by a wall which serves as a wentilation barrier and provides fire protection for the Unit 1 portion of the control room. When this wall is removed the BVPS control room will be served by a Unit 1 CREVS, a Unit 2 CREVS and a common CREBAPS.
Existing CREBAPS compressed air storage capacity was increased by the addition of five new compressed air storage tanks which are equivalent in capacity and pressure to the existing tanks. The combined capacity of the compressed air storage tanks is sufficient to maintain pressurization of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room areas for one hour. A larger air compressor was i
installed in place of the existing air compressor to increase the charging capability of the system.
Control Room Emergency Supply Fans VS-F-41A and 418 will be replaced with larger fans capable of supplying the increased flow rate required by the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room areas.
In addition, larger supply and discharge ducting for the fans, and larger duct heater and dampers were installed.
To eliminate the possibility of excessive pressure in the control room areas, a redesigned control scheme was installed for the Unit 1 fans (VS-F-41A and 418). The new control scheme will startup only one fan (and open its' associated dampers) at a time; should the first fan fail to start, a second fan would then be started (and its' associated dampers opened).
A complex control scheme preventing the startup of Unit 1 and Unit 2 fans at the same time was not installed. Operating a Unit 1 fan and a Unit 2 fan at the same time will not result in excessive pressure levels in the control room although it may be difficult opening and closing control room doors. To prevent this from occurring, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 procedures will be revised to indicate that only one fan should be operated at any one time.
The applicability requirements of Specification 3.7.7.1 will be revised to include Modes 5 and 6, and the time period when moving irradiated fuel at either unit.
The ACTION statement when Unit 1 is in Modes 1, 2, 3 or 4 will only be changed to correct an editorial error. The words "...with the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />..."
will be revised to read
"...within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />...".
When Unit 1 is in Modes 5 or 6 and Unit 2'is in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 the proposed action statement will require that the Unit 1 CREVS be operable or the Unit 1 control area i
sentilation system be isolated from the outside atmosphere. A similar technical specification will be incorporated into Unit 2 Technical Specifications, thus ensuring the ability to isolate the control room area if either unit is operating. When moving irradiated fuel at either Unit 1 or Unit 2, the proposed action statement will require control room emergency habitability systems to be operable or the suspension of all operations involving movement of irradiated I
fuel.
h ATTACHMENT B (cont.)
Air flow rate and air flow velocity specified in the surveillance requirements for the control room emergency habitability systems, Sections 4.7.7.1 and 4.7.7.2, will be increased. These changes reflect the replacement of control room emergency ventilation system supply fans with larger fans and the addition of five compressed air storage tanks to the control room bottled air pressurization system.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.1 will be revised by changing " emergency habitability system" to " emergency ventilation system" This was done to provide clarification, since the emergency habitability systems include the emergency ventilation system and the bottled air pressurization system.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.1.
specifies testing for the emergency ventilation system and 4.7.7.2 specifies testing for the bottled air pressurization system.
The maximum control room air temperature prescribed in specification 4.7.7.1.a has been reduced from s113 F to s104 F.
The lower temperature limit will provide consistency with the requirements applicable to BVPS Unit 2.
Surveillance Reauirement 4.7.7.1.c.3 requires laboratory analysis of carbon samples from the control room emergency ventilation system filters.
The proposed change will reduce the test temperature from 2125 F to 86 F.
This lower temperature is more representative of tempertures expected during the course of an accident, and is a more conservative test condition since it will result in a lower measured removal efficiency (
Reference:
IE Information Notice No. 86-76, problems Noted In Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems).
Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.2 will be revised to include verification that CREBAPS solenoid operated valves are powered from. an operable emergency bus.
A new surveillance requirement, 4.7.7.3, is proposed to verify isolation of the BVPS Unit 1 control room area ventilation system when the Unit 1 CREVS is inoperable in Mode 5 or 6.
This will ensure that the Unit 1 control room area ventilation flow path is, or can be, isolated in the event a toxic substance is present in the intake air.
Table 3.3-10 has been revised by removal of the Unit 2 control room tire detection instruments since these instruments are included in the Unit 2 technical specifications.
The Unit 2 control room area is now continuously manned, thus reducing the possibility of an unnoticed and unreported fire.
Therefore, the Unit 2 control room fire detection instruments can be removed l
from the Unit 1 technical specifications.
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Basis for no significant hazards determination: The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because plant operation in accordance with these changes would not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a previously evaluated accident because:
The proposed changes are provided to ensure the control room area environmental l
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ATTACHMENT B (cont.)
conditions are maintained suitable for operator habitability under postulated accident conditions, thus ensuring no significant increase in the probability of occurrence or.the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Requirements on the Unit 2 control room area fire detection instrumentation are being removed from the Unit 1 technical specifications and included in the Unit 2 technical specifications. Therefore, these changes will not affect the probability or consequences of an accident.
2.
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed because: The proposed changes will ensure control room area environmental conditions are maintained suitable for operator habitability under accident conditions. Therefore, the possibility for a new or diferent kind of accident will not be created.
3.
Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because:
The margin of safety is maintained by ensuring the control room area environmental conditions are suitable for operator habitability under postulated accident conditions.
Conclusion The proposed changes provide for the additional capacity of the Control Room Emergency Habitability Systems, clarification of system operability and surveillance requirements, a lower maximum control room air temperature, and removal of the Unit 2 control room area fire detection instruments from the Unit 1 technical specifications.
These changes will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety related equipment, increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a malfunction different than previously evaluated. Therefore, based on the above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards.
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