Text

Amend 183 to License DPR-72,approving Use of Revised Pressure/Temp Limits Rept & Low Temp over-pressure Protection Limits
	ML20210S670
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/12/1999
From:	Peterson S; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20210S676	List: ML20210S670; ML20210S679;
References
	NUDOCS 9908180167
	Download: ML20210S670 (22)
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p* at49'o UNITED STATES 8

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION n

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- WASWNCTON, D, C. 205U l

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- - e FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CITY OF ALACHUA CITY OF BUSHNELL CITY OF GAINESVILLE CITY OF KISSIMMEE CIT ( OF LEESBURG CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND UTILITIES COMMISSION.

CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH CITY OF OCALA ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO SEMINOLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE. INC.

CITY OF TALLAHASSEE DOCKET NO 50-302 i

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.183 i

License No. DPR-72 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al. (the licensees), dated October 30,1998, as supplemented on December 31,1998 and May 12,1999, complies with the standards and requ *ements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and 9908180167 990812

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PDR ADOCK 05000302 l

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. E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as l

indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.183, are hereby incorporated in the license. Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

l 3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to commencing cycle 12 operation.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

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).sheri R. Peterson, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate 11 Division of Project Licensing Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of issuance: August 12, 1999 l

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l-ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.183 l

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 l

DOCKET NO. 50-302 i

i Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Paae Insert Paae 3.4-21 3.4-21 3.4-21 A 3.4-21 A 3.4-21 B 3.4-21 B 3.4-21 C 3.4-21 C 3.4-21 D 3.4-21 D 3.4-21 E 5.0-23 5.0-23 5.0-23A 5.0-23A B 3.4-11 B 3.4-11 B 3.4-16 B 3.4-16 B 3.4-52B B 3.4-52B B 3.4-52C B 3.4-52C B 3.4-52D B 3.4-52D B 3.4-52E '

B 3.4 52E B 3.4-52F B 3.4-52F B 3.4-52G B 3.4-52G B 3.4-52H B 3.4-52H B 3.4-521 B 3.4-521 B 3.4-52J B 3.4-52J B 3.4-52K B 3.4-52K B 3.4-52L B 3.4-52L i

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L_

f' LTOP System l

3.4.11 1

l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. More than one makeup A.1

NOTE-----------

pump capable of Two makeup pumps may be injecting into the capable of injecting RCS.

into_the RCS during pump swap operation for s 15 minutes.

Initiate action to Immediately verify only one makeup pump is capable of injecting into the RCS.

B. HPI capable of B.1 Initiate action to Immediately actuation, verify HPI deactivated.

C. A CFT not isolated C.1 Isolate affected CFT.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months when CFT pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing temperature allowed in the PTLR.

D. Required Action C.1 D.1 Increase RCS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months not met within the temperature to > 208 F.

l required Completion Time.

OR D.2 Depressurize affected 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months CFT to < 454 psig.

l E. Pressurizer level E.1 Restore pressurizer 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

> 155 inches.

level to s 155 inches.

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21A Amendment No. 183

LTOP System 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action E.1 F.1 Close and maintain 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months not met within the closed the makeup required Completion control valve and its Time.

associated isolation valve.

ANQ F.2 Stop RCS heatup.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months G. PORV inoperable.

G.1 Restore PORV to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OPERABLE status.

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H. Required Action G.1 H.1 Reduce makeup tank 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months not met within the level to s 88 inches.

required Completion Time.

AND H.2 Deactivate low low 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months makeup tank level interlock to the borated water storage tank suction valves.

I. Pressurizer level I.1 Restore LTOP System to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

> 155 inches.

OPERABLE status.

l AND QB l

PORV inoperable.

I.2 Depressurize RCS and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months establish RCS vent of

_QB 2 0.75 square inch.

LTOP System inoperable for any reason other than Condition A through Condition H.

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Crystal River. Unit 3 3.4-21B Amendment No. 183 J

L LTOP System 3.4.11 1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE

' FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11.1 Verify a maximum of one makeup pump is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months capable of injecting into the RCS.

SR 3.4.11.2 Verify HPI is deactivated.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.11.3

NOTE--------------

Only required to be performed when CFT isolation is required Verify each CFT isolation 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months valve is closed and deactivated.

SR 3.4.11.4

NOTE--------------

30 minutes Not required to be performed during RCS when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b heatup and cooldown-Verify pressurizer level is AND s 155 inches.

l 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.11.5

NOTE--------------

Not required to be performed when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b l

Verify PORV block valve is open.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.11.6

NOTE--------------

Only required when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b.

Verify RCS vent 2 0.75 square inch 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for is open.

unlocked vent opening (s)

AND i

31 days for I

L locked vent I

f-opening (s) l (continued) 1

. Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21C Amendment No. 183 I

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LTOP System 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR C00LANT' SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Low Temperature' Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System LC0

-3.4.11 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with a maximum of one makeup pump ' capable of injecting into the RCS, high pressure injection (HPI) deactivated, the core flood tanks (CFTs) isolated and:

a.

Pressurizer. level s 155 inches and an OPERABLE power l

operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setpoint of 5 454 psig; or l

b.

The RCS depressurized and an RCS vent of 2 0.75 square inch.

' APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4 when RCS temperature is s 264 F, l

MOLE 5, MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is not completely detensioned.

NOTE---------------------------------

CFT isolation is only required when CFT pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature allowed by the pressure and temperature limit curves provided in the PTLR.

f Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21 Amendment No. 183

LTOP System 3.4.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY v.

SR 3.4.11.7-Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for Within 12 PORV.

hours before or after decreasing RCS temperature to s 264 F l

A._ND 31 days thereafter SR 3.4.11.8 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for PORV.

24 months SR 3.4.11.9

NOTE----------------

Not required to be performed when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b Verify PORV is selected to the low range 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months setpoint.

Crystal River Unit 3 3.4-21D Amendment No.183 i

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F Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6 l'

5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals l

5.G.2.18 COLR (continued)

LC0 3.2.3 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Operating Limits LC0 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT LC0 3.2.5 Power Peaking Factors LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LC0 3.9.1 Boron Concentration b.

The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and appro' ed by v

the NRC:

BAW-10179P-A, " Safety Criteria and Methodology for Acceptable Cycle Reload Analyses" (the approved revision at the time the reload analyses are performed) and License Amendment 144, SER dated June 25, 1992.

The approved revision number for BAW-10179P-A shall be identified in the COLR.

The core operating (e.mits shall be determined such that all li c.

applicable limits g.

fuel thermal mechanical limits, core thermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as SDM, transient anal s)is limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety anal sis are met.

d.

The COLR, including any midcycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.

5.6.2.19 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS 1

REPORT (PTLR) a.

Other Applicable ITS:

3.4.3 RCS P/T Limits 3.4.11 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection b.

RCS pressure and temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown rates, criticality, and hydrostatic and leak test limits, shall be established and documented in the PTLR.

The analytical methods used to determine the pressure and temperature limits including the heatup and cooldown rates shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in BAW-10046A, Rev. 2, " Methods of Compliance With Fracture Toughness and Operational Requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix G," June 1986. The analytical method used to i

determine vessel fluence shall be those reviewed by the NRC and documented in BAW-2241P, May 1997.

the analytical method used to determine LTOP limits shall be those previously reviewed by the NRC based on ASME Code Case N-514.

The Materials Program is in accordance with BAW-1543A,

" Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program."

(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-23 Amendment No. 183

-Procedures, Programs. and Manuals 5.6

~ 5.6 Procedures, Programs and Manuals 5.6.2.19 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS i

REPORT-(PTLR)

(continued) c.

.The reactor vessel pressure and temperature' limits including those for heatup and cooldown rates, shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g.li hydrostatic heatup limits,.ccaldown limits, and inservice leak an testing limits) of the analysis are met.-

d.

The PTLR, including revisions or supplements thereto, shall l

be provided upon issuance for each reactor vessel fluency period.

5.6.2.20-Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54 o and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved e(xe)mptions.

This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained i

in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, Pa, is 54.2 psig. The containment design pressure is 55 psig.

I The maximum allowable primary containment leakake rateper day,, at L

shall be 0.25% of primary containment air weigh Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:

1.

Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is s 1.0 L,.

During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are 1 0.60 L for the Type B and Type C Tests and 5 0.75. L, for Type A Tests.

2.

Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

Overall air lock leakage range is s 0.05 L, when tested a.

at 1 P,.

b.

For each door, leakage rate is < 0.01 L* when tested at 1 8.0 psig.

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The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Containment Leakage Rate i

Testing Program.

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

Crystal River Unit 3 5.0-23A Amendment No. 183

RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 BASES APPLICABLE The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident SAFETY ANALYSES (DBA) analyses.

They are prescribed during normal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB.

Reference 8 establishes the methodology for determining the P/T limits.

Since the P/T limits are not derived from any DBA analysis, there are no accident analysis acceptance limits related to the P/T limits.

Rather, the P/T limits are acceptance limits themselves since they preclude operation in an unanalyzed condition.

RCS P/T limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The two elements of this LCO are:

The limit curves for heatup, cooldown, ISLH testing, a.

and LTOP, and l

b.

Limits on the rate of change of temperature.

The LCO limits apply to all components of the RCS, except the pressurizer.

The limits define allowable P/T operating regions and per. nit a large number of operating cycles while providing a wide margin to nonductile failure.

The limits for the rate of change of temperature control the thermal gradient through the vessel wall and are used as inputs for calculating the heatup, cooldown, and ISLH P/T limit curves.

Thus, the LCO for the rate of change of temperature restricts stresses caused by thermal gradients l

and also ensures the validity of the P/T limit curves.

l Violating the LCO limits places the reactor vessel outside of the bounds of the stress analyses and can incr<.ase l

stresses in other RCPB components.

The consequences depend on several factors, as follows:

a.

The severity of the departure from the allowable operating P/T regime or the severity of the rate of change of temperature; (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-11 Amendment No.183 l --

. RCS P/T Limits

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B 3.4.3 t

1 BASES l

REFERENCES 6.

10 CFR 50, Appendix H.

(continued) 7.

ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Appendix E.

8.

BAW-10046A, Rev. 2, April 1986.

9.

ASME Code Case N-514

" Low Temperature Overpressure Protection,Section XI, Division 1."

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Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-16 Amendment No.183

LTOP System l

B 3.4.11 BASES BACKGROUND RCS Vent' Reauirements (continued)

Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the containment atmosphere will maintain the RCS at ambient containment pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the maximum credible LTOP l

transient do not exceed the capabilities of the vent. Thus, the' vent path must be capable of relieving the flow of the limiting LTOP transient and maintaining pressure Selow LTOP limits.

The required vent capacity may be piovided by one or more vent paths.

For an RCS vent to meet the flow capacity, it requires removing a pressurizer safety valve, or similarly establishing a vent by removing an OTSG primary side manway cover or primary side handhole cover, or other vents as determined to be sufficient. The vent path (s) must be above the level of reactor coolant, so as not to drain the RCS when open.

APPLICABLE Analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vessel j

SAFETY ANALYSES can be adequately protected against overpressurization transients during shutdown.

At 264*F and below, l

overpressure prevention is provided by an OPERABLE PORV and i

a restricted coolant level in the pressurizer or by a depressurized RCS and a sufficient size RCS vent.

The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve can fall below the PORV setpoint increases as vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement.

Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure that its functional requirements can still be met with the PORV and pressurizer level method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition.

Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS have been identified and evaluated (Ref. 4).

These transients relate to either mass input or heat input:

actuating the HPI System, discharging the CFTs, energizing the pressurizer heaters, failing the makeup control valve open, losing decay heat removal, starting a reactor coolant pump (RCP) with a (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52B Amendment No.183 l

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LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES APPLICABLE large temperature mismatch between the primary and secondary SAFETY ANALYSES coolant systems, and adding nitrogen to the pressuriner.

(co.itinued)

HPI actuation and CFT discharge are the transients that result in exceeding P/T limits within < 10 minutes, in which time no operator action is assumed to take place.

In the rest, operator action after that time precludes overpressurization.

The analyses demonstrate that the time allowed for operator action is adequate, or the events are self limiting and do not exceed LTOP limits.

The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure that transients do not occur, which either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot handle:

a.

Deactivating all but one makeup pump; l

b.

Deactivating HPI; and c.

Immobilizing CFT discharge isolation valves in their closed positions, when CFT pressure is greater than the PTLR limit.

1 The Reference 3 analyses demonstrate the PORV can maintain RCS pressure below limits when only one makeup pump is actuated.

Consequently, the LCO allows only one makeup pump to be OPERABLE in the LTOP MODES.

1 Inadvertent actuation of HPI can cause the RCS pressure to

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exceed the LTOP limits determined by Reference 3 sooner than j

the 10 minutes allowed.

Consequently, HPI must be j

deactivated by assuring that an inadvertent HPI actuation i

can not inject water into the RCS through the HPI valves.

The isolated CFTs must have their discharge valves closed and the valve power breakers in their open positions.

The analyses show the effect of CFT discharge is over a narrower i

RCS temperature range (208 F and below) than that of the LCO (264 F and below).

Analyses performed per Reference 1 established the temperature of LTOP Applicability at 263 F at the vessel quarter-t location. The LTOP enable temperature of 264 F includes correction for instrument uncertainty.

The vessel materials were assumed to have a neutron irradiation accumulation equal to 32 effective full power years (EFPYs) l of operation and plant operation is assumed to'be in compliance with the RCS heatup and cooldown limitations of (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52C Amendment No.183

LTOP System l*

B 3.4.11

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BASES APPLICABLE LCO 3.4.3.

In addition, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)

SAFETY ANALYSES operation is assumed to be restricted to greater than 85'F (continued) for the first two pumps, and greater than 220 F for pump l

three.

Pump four operation is not considered for LTOP.

l During plant heatup, the vessel metal temperature lags the reactor coolant temperature.

Stopping the Reactor Coolant l

System heatup and holding for a period of 90 minutes allows the vessel metal temperature at the quarter-t location to stabilize to the reactor coolant temperature.

This LCO will deactivate the HPI actuation when the RCS temperature is s 264 F.

The consequences of a small break l

LOCA in LTOP MODE 4 are consistent with those discussed in the bases for LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS-Shutdown," by having a maximum of one makeup pump OPERABLE for the required one

)

OPERABLE ECCS train.

i Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the LTOP requirements.

These limits, in combination with the limitations of LCO 3.4.3, and administrative restrictions on RCP operation, provide the assurance that the reactor vessel is protected from exceeding the requirements of ASME Code Case N-514.

Any change to the RCS operation or design must be evaluated against these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the LTOP acceptance limits.

PORV Performance Analyses (Ref. 3) show that the vessel is protected when the PORV is set to open at s 458 psig.

The PORV setpoint at or j below the derived limit ensures the requirements of ASME Code Case N-514 (Reference 1) will be met.

The PORV lift setpoint limit of s 454 psig includes correction for l

instrument uncertainty.

The PORV setpoint will be re-evaluated for compliance when the revised P/T limits conflict with the LTOP analysis limits.

The P/T ~ limit, are periodically modified as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to embrittlement induced by neutron irradiation.

Revised P/T limits are determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens.

The Bases for LCO 3.4.3 discuss these examinations.

The PORV is considered an active component.

Therefore, its failure represents the worst case LTOP single active failure.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-52D Amendment No.183

l LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES APPLICABLE Pressurizer Level Perfc. mange j

j.

SAFETY ANALYSES j

(continued)

Analyses of operator response time show that the pressurizer level must be maintained s 160 inches to provide the 10 minute action time for correcting transients. (Ref. 3)

The pressurizer level limit of s 155 inches includes l

correction for instrument uncertainties.

The pressurizer level limit will also be re-evaluated for compliance each time P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance.

RCS Vent Performance With the RCS depressurized, analyses show a vent of 0.75 square inches is capable of mitigating the transient resulting from full opening of the makeup control valve while the makeup pump is providing RCS makeup. The capacity of a vent this size is greater than the flow resulting from this credible transient.

The RCS vent size will also be re-evaluated for compliance each time P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance.

The vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.

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(continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52E Amendment No. 183 l

LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES l

LCO The LCO requires an LTOP System OPERABLE with a limited coolant input capability and a pressure relief capability.

To limit coolant input, the LCO requires only one makeup pump OPERABLE, the HPI deactivated, and the CFT discharge isolation valves closed and immobilized.

For pressure relief, it requires either the pressurizer coolant.at or below a maximum level and the PORV OPERABLE with a lift setting at or below the LTOP limit or the RCS depressurized and a vent established.

NOTE:

The limits and values presented in this LCO for the PORV lift setpoint, enable temperature, and pressurizer level are corrected for instrument uncertainty.

The instrumentation to be used by plant operators to assure compliance with these limits and values are specified in approved plant operating procedures.

The pressurizer is available with a coolant level s 155 inches.

l The PORV is OPERABLE when its block valve is open, its lift setpoint is set at s 454 psig and testing has proven its l

ability to open at that setpoint, and motive power is available to the PORV and the PORV control circuits.

For the depressurized RCS, an RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an area of at least 0.75 square inches.

APPLICABILITY This LCO is applicable in MODE 4 when RCS temperature is s 264 F, in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel l

head is not completely detensioned.

The Applica,bility temperature of 264*F 1s established by ana yses in l

accordance with Reference 1.

With the vessel head completely detensioned, overpressurization is not possible.

The vessel head is completely detensioned when the pre-stress has been relieved from all of the studs, and the nuts are free spinning.

The Applicability is modified by a Note stating that CFT isolation is only required when the CFT pressure is more than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS temperature, as allowed in LCO 3.4.3.

This Note permits the CFT discharge valve surveillance performed only under these pressure and temperature conditions.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52F Amendment No.183

\\

LTOP System l

B 3.4 11 I

\\.

BASES l

ACTIONS Allowable times are specified in the LCO to implement the actions and controls described below.

These times range I

from immediately to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The times are based on I

operational and industry experience and regulatory recommendations.

The times are intended to balance the time necessary to accomplish the actions and the likelihood of experiencing a limiting transient during the action.

A.1 and B.1 With two or more makeup pumps capable of injecting into the RCS or if the HPI is activated, immediate actions are required to render the other pump (s) inoperable or to deactivate HPI.

Emphasis is on immediate deactivation because inadvertent injection with one or more HPI pump OPERABLE is the event of greatest significance, since it causes the greatest pressure increase in the shortest time.

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that permits two pumps capable of RCS injection for s 15 minutes to allow for pump swaps.

The deactivation of HPI is accomplished by assuring that an inadvertent HPI actuation can not inject water into the RCS through the HPI valves.

This may be accomplished by i

combinations of equipment as determined appropriate for the existing plant conditions such as, disabling all HPI va'Ives or disabling all Makeup pumps.

If powered components are used to accomplish deactivation, power should be removed to assure positive lockout.

J C.1. D.1. and D.2 An unisolated CFT requires isolation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months only when the CFT pressure is at or greater than the maximum RCS pressure for the existing temperature allowed in LCO 3.4.3.

If isolation is needed and cannot be accomplished in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action D.1 and Required Action D.2 provide two options, either of which must be performed in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

By increasing the RCS temperature to > 208 F, the CFT pressure l

of 600 psig cannot exceed the LTOP limits if both tanks are fully injected.

Depressurizing the CFTs below the LTOP limit of 454 psig also prevents exceeding the LTOP limits in l

the same event.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 8 3.4-5'2C Amendment No.183 I

f LTOP System B 3.4.11 l~.

l BASES-1 ACTIONS E.1. F.1 and F.2 (continued)

With the pressurizer level more than 155 inches, the time l

l L

for operator action in a pressure increasing event is reduced.

The postulated event most affected in the LTOP MODES is failure of the makeup control valve, which fills the pressurizer relatively rapidly.

Restoration is required within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

If restoration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months cannot be accomplished, Required Actions F.1 and F.2 must be performed within 12 i

l hours.

Actions F.1 and F.2 limit the makeup capability by closing the makeup control valve and its isolation valve, l

which is not required with a high pressurizer level, and permit cooldown and depressurization to continue.

When the makeup is isolated, RCS heatup must be stopped because heat

)

addition decreases the reactor coolant density and increases the pressurizer level.

Operations such as starting RC pumps and reducing decay heat removal should not be performed when l

in this condition.

G.I. H.1. and H.2 With the PORV inoperable, overpressure relieving capability is lost, and restoration of the PORV within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is requi red.

If that cannot be accomplished, the ability of the Makeup System to add water must be limited within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

If restoration cannot be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action H.1 and Required Action H.2 must be performed to limit RCS water addition capability.

Makeup is not required to be deactivated since it may be needed to maintain the RCS coolant level.

Required Action H.1 and Required Action H.2 require reducing the makeup tank level to 88 inches and deactivating the low low makeup tank level interlock to the borated water storage tank. This makes the available makeup water volume insufficient to exceed the LTOP limit by a makeup control valve full opening.

l l

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52H Amendment No.183 l

t

LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES l

ACTIONS I.1 and I.2 (continued)

With the pressurizer level above 155 inches and the PORV l

inoperable or the LTOP System inoperable for any reason other than cited in Condition A through H, the system must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

When this is not possible, Required Action I.2 requires the RCS depressurized and vented within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from the time either Condition started.

One or more RCS vents may be used.

A vent size of 2 0.75 square inches is specified.

Such a vent keeps the pressure from full flow of one Makeup pump with a wide open makeup control valve within the LCO limit.

This size RCS vent cannot maintain RCS pressure below LTOP limits if the HPI or CFT systems are inadvertently actuated.

Therefore, verification of the deactivation of two Makeup pumps, HPI injection, and the CFTs must accompany the depressurizing and venting.

Since th,_ese systems are required deactivated by the LCO, SR 3.4'.11.1, SR 3.4.11.2, and SR 3.4.11.3 require verification of their deactivated status every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE The following surveillance requirement frequencies are shown REQUIREMENTS by operating experience and industry accepted practice to be sufficient to regularly assess conditions for potential degradation and to verify operation within the requirements.

4 SR 3.4.11.1. SR 3.4.11.2. and SR 3.4.11.3 Verifications must be performed that only one makeup pump is capable of injecting into the RCS, the HPI is deactivated, and the CFT discharge isolation valves are closed and immobilized.

These Surveillances ensure the minimum coolant input capability will not create an RCS overpressure condition to challenge the LTOP System.

The Surveillances are required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months intervals.

A Note modifies SR 3.4.11.3 by only requiring this Surveillance when CFT isolation is required.

(continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52I Amendment No.183 I

l

e LTOP System B 3.4.11 1

I BASES l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.4 l

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

Verification of the pressurizer level at s 155 inches by l

observing control room or other indications ensures a i

cushion of sufficient size is available to reduce the rate of pressure increase from potential transients.

i The 30 minute Surveillance Frequency during heatup and cooldown must be performed for the LCO Applicability period when temperature changes can cause pressurizer level variations.

This Frequency may be discontinued when the ends of these conditions are satisfied, as defined in plant procedures.

Thereafter, the Surveillance is required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months intervals.

A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b.

SR 3.4.11.5 Verification that the PORV block valve is open ensures a flow path to the PORV.

This is required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months intervals.

A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b.

SR 3.4.11.6 When stipulated by LCO 3.4.11.b, the RCS vent of at least i

0.75 square inch must be verified open for relief protection.

For an unlocked vent opening, the Frequency is every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

For a locked vent opening in the RCS, the required Frequency is every 31 days.

A Note modifies the SR by requiring the Surveillance when i

complying with LCO 3.4.11.b.

l l

i (continued) l Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52J Amendment No.183 l

l

r LTOP System B 3.4.11 1

BASES' SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months before or after decreasing RCS temperature to s 264 F and every l

l 31 days thereafter to ensure the setpoint is proper for l

using the PORV for LTOP.

PORV actuation is not needed, as it could depressurize the RCS.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months frequency considers the unlikelihood of a low temperature overpressure event during the time.

SR 3.4.11.8 The performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION is required every 24 months.

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for the LTOP setpoint ensures that the PORV will be actuated at the appropriate RCS pressure by verifying the accuracy of the instrument string.

The calibration can only be performed in shutdown.

l The frequency considers the refueling cycle.

SR 3.4.11.9 Verification that the PORV is selected to the low range setpoint ensures the overpressure protection flow path through the PORV.

This is required at 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months intervals.

A Note modifies the SR by not requiring the Surveillance when complying with LCO 3.4.11.b.

i l

1 I

l (continued)

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52K Amendment No.183 L-

F~

LTOP System B 3.4.11 BASES l

REFERENCES' 1.

ASME Code Case N-514, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Section XI, Division 1".

2.

Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant Operations".

3.

FPC Calculation F98-0013. "CR-3 32 EFPY P/T Limits".

l 4.

B&W Nuclear Services (FTI) Document 51-1176431-0,1,

" Crystal River 3 Reactor Vessel Low Temperature l

Overpressure Protection (LTOP)".

i l

Crystal River Unit 3 B 3.4-52L Amendment No.183

ML20210S670

Text

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