ML20209C064
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Ahearne Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
ALLEGATIONS REGARDING DIABLO CANYON (BOARD NOTIFICATION 83-48)
In accordance with the procedures for Board Notification, the enclosed infor-mation is beino transmitted directly to the Comission.
In a telephone call on March 28, 1983, from D. Fleischaker, representing the Joint Intervenors in the Diablo Canyon proceeding, the NRC was alerted to the attached incoming letter. That letter was received in qy office on Friday, April 1,1983, despite several attempts to receive it earlier. A copy was eventually' received from Congressman Udall's office.
The staff will be reviewing this information promptly.
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G. E se t
ec' tor Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As Stated cc:
J. F. Wolf, ASLB G. O. Bright, ASLB J. Kline, ASLB T. S. Moore, ASLAB W. R. Johnson, ASLAB J. H. Buck, ASLAB SECY OGC OPE a
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Parties to the Proceeding 7
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Contact:
D N. G. Eisenhut, ONRR 3
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4 March 28,~1983 Daryl Eisenhut Director of Licensing Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
Ret Diablo Canyon
Dear Daryl,
As we discussed earlier
- today, I
have enclosed a summary of the allegations received over the course of the last seven (7) to ten (10) days.
The caller apparently works for the Diablo Canyon Project but wants to remain anonymous.
The allegations, if true, are especially troublesome.
They suggest not only that significant safety problems remain unresolved, but more important, that the PG&E/ Bee *.tel group continue to play hide and seek with the Copumission.
On behalf of the Joint Intervenors, I request that you.
give this matter your prompt attention.
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David S.'Fle schaker DSF:jm cc Congressman Morris Udall Congressman Leon Panotta l
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SUMMARY
OF ALLEGATIO1S RECEIVED BY ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALL 1
1)
Containments structure tilting:
Pralindnary calcula-tions on the. stability of the containment structure t
utilizing the latest response spectra-developed
.by PG4E/Bechtel disclosed, some cases where the containment would topple.
Since the masses of the structure ar's not synunetrically distributed, seismic motions in certain da.rections can result in overturning the containment.
The preliminary calculations were conducted with a' simplified j
methology but because of the potentially negative results, i.
PG&E/Bechtel has decided not to conduct a more detailed i
analysis.
Rather PG&E/Bechtel have assumed without a
detailed analysis that there is not in reality a problem for i
two reasons.
Cohesiveness between the foundation map of the structure and the underlying rock material and low bility of the event occurring with seismic excitation,proba-4 in the most critical direction.
Finally, PG&E/Bechtel assume that the NRC will not conduct a detailed review of the. underlying i
data concerning this matter.
Hence the cursory description provided to the NRC did not highlight the potential tilting j
problem.
2)
Classification of Platformt The platform between the i
crane wall and the shield wall is a Class II, (non-safety l
related) structure but the platform holds class, I (safety related) equipnent.snd serves as a connection for Class I pipe support.
This: is improper since. there are different l
design criteria for Class II as compared to Class I plat-i.
forms.
Further, the design and construction control program i
did not contain measures to insure that in the future that class I equipment would not be supported by Class II plat-forms.
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3)
High Energy Line Break (BELB)
Assessment:
The BELB analysis was not conducted in accordance with the procedures described in Section 3.6 of the FFAR and Regulatory Guide 1.46.
For example, the Reg Guide required an assessment if a temperature of greater than 200*F or a pressure of greater than 275 psia are exceeded in a line.
But both conditions are required to be satisfied for PG&E/Bechtel to conduct an j
analysis.
Further, potential breaks are not postulated at i-every sitting nor is a fatigue analysis conducted.
- Thus, 1
there is a lack of assurance that-PG&E/Bechtel has sede correct estimate of break locations.
4)
Systems Interaction:
The Systems Interaction measures I
are not being implemented in accordance with PC&E/Bechtel i
commitments.
PGGE committed that any Class II s'uipment q
which might fail during a seismic event and result in damage i
to Class I equipment will be modified to meet Class I requirements.
Current olant modifications are not being i
designed and constructed in accordance with the preceding i
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In addition, the Design criteria Memormadua, which.the working level engineers utilised, fail to document-the preceding PGaB commitment.
t 5)
Analus Structural stieel The loading analysis for the containment analus structural steaA has not included all the potential loads.
For
- exangile, pipe attachments to the analus' steel radial beam will re.sult in torsional loads due to thermal expansion and seismic excitation, such torsional loads have not been, analysed to data.
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6)
Tornado Design Criteriat Masonry walls in the turbine building are not analyzed for the suction loads which might result from a tornado.
Thus the tornado design criteria is incomplete.
7)
High Energy Rupture Restraint Pads:
The ' crush pads provided for high energy pipe rupture restraints have insufficient margins in some cases resulting from restric-tions due to a lack of available clearances.
In those cases design loads could require more than 100t of the pad crush-ing capacity.
8)
Seismic criteria for Westinghouse Items:
The Nuclear l
Senm Supply System (N555) squipment and piping supplied by i
Westinghouse is de' signed for a Safe Shut-down Earthquake (SSE) as originally defined by PG6E for the Double Design p
Earthquake (DDE).
Thus, the Westinghouse SSE analyses were not systematically updated based on the new Rosgri SSE load.
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U DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Diablo Canyon' Units 182 Docket Nos. 50-275/323 OL ACRS Members Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg Dr. Robert C. Axtmann Mr. Richard E. Blankenburg Mr. Myer Bender Mr. Glenn 0. Bright Dr. Max W. Carbon Mr. Herbert H. Brown Mr. Jesse C. Ebersole Dr. John H. Buck Mr. Harold Etherington i
Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
Dr. William Kerr Mr. Frederick Eissler Dr. Harold W. Lewis l
David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
Dr. J. Carson Mark i
Mrs. Raye Fleming Mr. William M. Mathis Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Dr. Dade W. Moeller Mr. Mark Gottlieb Dr. David Okrent Mr. Thomas H. Harris Dr. Milton S. Plesset Mr. Richard B. Hubbard Mr. Jeremiah J. Ray Dr. W. Reed Johnson Dr. Paul C. Shewmon Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Dr. Chester P. Siess Dr. Jerry Kline Mr. David A. Ward Mr. John Marrs Thomas S. Moore Esq.
Bruce Norton, Eso.
Joel R. Reynolds. Esq.
l Mr. James 0. Schuyler
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Mr. Gordon Silver Michael J. Strumwasser, Esq.
Paul C. Valentine, Esq.
Harry M. Willis John F. Wolf. Esq Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pane' Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Docketing and Service Section Document Management Branch O
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