ML20206T627
| ML20206T627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1987 |
| From: | Christman J HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206T406 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8704230213 | |
| Download: ML20206T627 (3) | |
Text
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V LILCO, April 18, 1987 00LMETED USHRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
'87 APR 21 Pl2:08 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE cr n,i. ;;3,
DOCKETING i gimcr BRANCH Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
LILCO'S MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF PAPILE ET AL.
LILCO hereby moves to strike portions of the " Direct Testimony of James D.
Papile, James C. Baranski and Lawrence B. Czech on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's Reception Centers," dated April 13, 1987.
I. Papile p. 9 LILCO moves to strike the paragraph in the middle of page 9 beginning with "In addition" and ending with "from TMI."
This testimony repeats earlier evidence on
" shadow phenomenon" to the effect that (1) radiation is a unique hazard, (2) people are generally more fearful of radiation than other hazards, and (3) therefore people will be more likely to act contrary to emergency advisories. All these issues were litigated in 1983-84 under the shadow phenomenon and evacuation time estimates contentions; they should not be relitigated now. See the accompanying LILCO's Motion to Strike Testimo-ny of Stephen Cole et al.
II. Papile pp. 8,11,12-14 (Legal Conclusions)
LILCO moves to strike the first sentence on page 8 (but not footnote 3, which is admissible), the last paragraph on page 11, and the passage on pages 12-14 beginning with "Using data pertaining" on page 12 and ending with "Krimm Memorandum must be rejected" on page 14 (5th line).
8704230213 870418 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G
e T, These passages should be stricken as improper legal conclusions.. They are, in fact, legal briefs rather than factual testimony. The first two passages (on page 8 and
- 11) offer an interpretation of Section J.12. LILCO recognizes that the general practice in this proceeding has been to allow witnesses to draw legal conclusions. However, in the instant case the conclusions are based solely on the " plain meaning" rule. On page 8 '
the witnesses talk about a " common-sense reading" of Section J.12 and on page 11 they talk about the " plain language" of Section J.12. LILCO submits that interpreting the
" plain language" of a regulation or guideline is something within the Board's province and, more important, something that no amount of expert testimony can help with.
Where a fact witness's interpretation of a regulation or guideline is based on his experi-ence or some other matter of fact that may shed light on the meaning of the regula-tion, it is not improper. But where a witness simply draws a pure legal conclusion based on interpretation of text, it is inadmissible.
Likewise, the testimony on pages 12-14 is simply a short legal brief based on the Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-855 and this Board's decision LBP-85-31. In the past the Board has struck such citations to legal authority, and it should do so in this case.
III. Papile Section III.3 (Recordkeeping)
LILCO moves to strike the entire Section III.3 of the Papile testimony on pages 22-23. This testimony consists of a question and answer arguing that LERO should keep more elaborate records of people monitored. The reasons for striking this testimony are two. First, it does not appear that the issue of recordkeeping was admitted by the Board's December 11, 1986 Memorandum and Order. The amount of data recorded does not seem material to the adequacy of LILCO's monitoring procedures, staffing require-ments, or "whether the proposal to send evacuees to parking lots would ever be imple-mented in a way to protect the public health and safety."
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g Second, LILCO believes there is no basis in the regulations for a requirement that the identitles of all people going through reception centers be recorded "for pur-poses of reuniting families, providing data for medical follow-ups, and other such rea-sons," or to allow the emergency response organization to " respond appropriately to in-quiries from anxious relatives or others regarding the whereabouts of particular evacuees." This is not to say that such recordkeeping would not be desirable; but it does not appear to be required by NRC regulations.
IV. Papile D. 30 LILCO moves to strike the paragraph in the middle of page 30, which reads as follows:
Finally, in our opinion it is absolutely wrong for LILCO to expect a contaminated person who cannot be decontaminated at the reception centers to drive himself to a hospital. A person told that he has contamination which can-not be removed by normal means is likely to be distraught and scared. Evacuees in that condition should not be left alone and certainly should not be sent back onto the road to drive in what will already be a stressful and congested environment.
Papile at 30, lines 8-15. LILCO does not believe that this was among the issues admit-ted by the Board in its Memorandum and Order of December 11, 1986. Nor does there appear to be any regulatory basis for the witnesses' proposed requirement that trans-portation to the hospital be provided even for people with their own cars.
Respectfully submitted,
^ "b-Y
[/ James N. Chr'istman v Stephen W. Miller Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: April 18,1987