ML20206H263

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License DPR-70

ML20206H263
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/04/1999
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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ML20206H259	List: ML20206H256 ML20206H263
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NUDOCS 9905110121
Download: ML20206H263 (10)

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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. SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.m TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO. 50-272

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 15,1999, as supplemented on March 31,1999, Public Service Electric

& Gas Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No.1, Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would allow a one-time extension of the TS surveillance interval to the end of fuel Cycle 13 for certain TS surveillance requirements (SRs). Specifically, the amendment extends the surveillance interval in (a) SR 4.3.2.1.3 for the instrumentation response time and sequence testing of each engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) function; (b) SRs 4.8.2.3.2.f and 4.8.2.5.2.d for service testing of the 125-volt and the 28-volt DC distribution system batteries, respectively; (c) SR 4.8.2.5.2.c.2 for verification of the condition of the 125-volt DC battery connections; (d) SR 4.8.3.1.a.1.a and 4.8.3.1.a.1.b for channel calibration and integrated system functional test for containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection; (e) SR 4.1.2.2.c for verification that each automatic valve in the reactivity control system flow path actuate on a safety injection (SI) test signal; (f) SRs 4.3.1.1.1, Table 4.3-1,4.3.2.1.1, Table 4.3-2,4.3.3.5, Table 4.3-6, and 4.3.3.7, Table 4.3-11 for the channel calibration of the containment water level-wide range, the manual solid-state protection system (SSPS) functional input check, and the ESFAS manual initiation channel functional test; (g) SR 4.5.1.d for verification that each accumulator isolation valve opens automatically on an Si test signal; (h) SR 4.5.2.e.1 for verification that each automatic valve in the ECCS flow path actuates on an Si test signal; (i) SR 4.7.6.1.d.2 for verification that the control room emergency air conditioning system automatically actuates in the pressurization mode on an Si test signal or control room intake high radiation test signal; (i) SR 4.7.10.b for verification that each automatic valve in the chilled water loop actuates on an SI signal; and (k) SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.7 which requires a test to verify that each emergency diesel generator operates for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Because of the length of the last outage and delays in restart, the SRs will be overdue prior to reaching the next refueling outage (1R13). The SRs are to be completed during the 1R13 outage, prior to retuming the unit to Mode 4 (hot shutdown) upon outage completion. The amendment also makes some 9905110121 990504 PDR ADOCK 05000272 P

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O - administrative and editorial changes on some of the pages that will be affected by the above

. SR interval extensions. The March 31,1999, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION On May 16,1995, the licensee voluntarily shut down Salem Unit i to resolve concems with the switchgear room supply fans and initiated a high-level review of the problems which led to the Unit 1 shutdown. Because of this issue and the problems resulting from the Salem Unit 2 reactor trip on June 7,1995, that highlighted some long-standing equipment performance issues along with deficiencies in the licensee's performance relative to timely recognition and resolution of specific safety and technical concems, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was j

issued on June 9,1995, to confirm the licensee's commitment to maintain both Salem units in i

a shutdown condition pending completion of a number of actions. The resolution of these actions and other emergent issues were covered under the Salem Restart Plan. On April 1, 1998, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff modified its CAL to allow the licensee to restart Salem Unit 1, and on April 7,1998, the unit was made critical.

Although the required surveillance tests were performed during the extended shutdown, the licensee indicated that the length of the outage and delays in the unit restart will cause some of the surveillances to become due prior to reaching the next refueling outage that is currently scheduled to begin on September 18,1999.

In its January 15,1999, letter, the licensee requested a one-time extension of a number of TS surveillance intervals during fuel Cycle 13 to allow Salem Unit 1 to operate to the thirteenth refueling outage (1R13). The licensee stated that these surveillance requirements would be completed during the 1R13 outage, prior to retuming the unit to Mode 4 upon outage completion.

ESFAS Time Resoonse Testina The ESFAS instrumentation is comprised of redundant sensors and logic and coincidence networks that actuate associated ESF equipment, motor starters, and valve operators. The ESF systems are tested periodically to provide assurance that the systems will function as designed and will be available in the event of an accident and/or loss of offsite power.

The safeguards equipment control (SEC) system is included in the logic networks. The SEC system includes a control electronic unit (cou) that responds to a safety injection, blackout and voltage degradation or a combination of these signals. The SEC system accepts and combines accident and undervoltage input signals to select the proper mode of operation of the ESFAS. On the basis of the inputs, the SEC system provides the appropriate outputs for equipment loading.

In its January 15,1999, letter, the licensee proposed to extend on a one-time basis the relay time response and sequence testing of the SEC system. The licensee has proposed extending the interval for completion of the 18-month surveillance requirement per TS i

4.3.2.1.3 until the 1R13 refueling outage. Although TS 4.0.3 allows a 25 percent interval j

extension for scheduling, the licensee stated that service tests will become overdue for (a) the 1

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3-1 A SEC on September 19,1999, (b) the 18 SEC on September 6,1999, and (c) the 1C SEC on September 23,1999. The licensee has stated that the response time testing of other

' portions of the ESFAS will not be overdue until after the start of 1R13.

The SEC system has the following test capability during power operation:

1. Check the operational capability of each bus undervoltage sensor and its input to the logic.

2. Check the operational capability of the Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal from the solid state protection system.

3. Check that the logic combinations of input signals result in proper operation of the various functions without actuation of any motors, and a verification of the timed loading sequence.

4. Check the output relay capability to actuate the driven equipment.

The SEC system has a self-test process which continually tests each sequencing circuit and the continuity of the output relay coils. If a problem is de'ected, the self-test will energize the local and control room alarms. The self-test feature alerts the operators to failures that could affect the operability of the SEC.

Response time testing of the ESFAS is required every 18 months in accordance with TS - 4.3.2.1.3. The evaluation of the overall response time of each actuation function train is conducted per Salem Procedure S1.lC - TR.ZZ - 0002(O), Revision 13, " Unit 1 Master Time Response." The response time testing of the specific portions of the ESFAS function train are performed under various implementing procedures. The test results are evaluated under these implementing procedure' and then transcribed into the Master Time Response procedure to s

verify that the overall time response for the functional train from sensor to actuated device is within the acceptance criterion. In this regard, the response time for the SEC is tested under Maintenance Procedure S1.MD - ST.SEC-0001, "SEC - 18 Month Relay Time Response and

' Sequence Test."

In addition to the intamal self-test feature for the SEC, the licensee has stated that a functional test is performed monthly on each SEC as added assurance of operability. During these tests, dummy test signals are injected and the timing and operability of all. relays intemal to the SEC are monitored.

The NRC staff found that the previous response time testing of the SECS has met the applicable acceptance criteria. Additionally, the other portions of each ESFAS function train have likewise met the acceptance criteria. Because of the continuous self-test feature for the SEC, the successful completion of the response time testing of the other portions of the ESFAS, and the prior test history of the SEC, the NRC staff finds that the proposed extension of TS 4.3.2.1.3 to the 1R13 refueling outage is acceptable. Further, the completion of this test during an appropriate outage period would prevent the possibility of causing an inadvertent actuation should the test be attempted during power operation.

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. 125-Volt DC Distribution System Batteries The 125-volt DC (VDC) distribution system includes three 125-volt batteries that are individually connected to the three 125-VDC buses. The 125-VDC buses supply power for operation of 13 KV,4160 volt, and 460-volt switchgear, annunciators, station essential control

' inverters, emergency lighting, communications, turbine generator emergency auxiliaries, and tho' vital instrument bus inverters. During normal operation, these loads are fed by battery chargers powered from the 250-VDC subsystem with the 125-VDC batteries on a float charge.

The 125-VDC batteries provide power to the loads if power from the chargers is lost. If a loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurs, the battery chargers are energized from the emergency diesel generators (EDGs).

With regard to the batteries, the TSs detail a series of measurements, inspections, and tests that verify the operability of the batteries. The 18-month battery service test is conducted during shutdown to verify its capability to supply and maintain emergency loads operable for the design duty cycle. This is a test of the as-found battery's ability to satisfy the duty cycle.

Since the service test is conducted on a regular basis, it also reflects the maintenance practices that the battery has received. The licensee stated that in order to conduct the 18-month surveillance test, the entire 125-VDC train will be tagged out resulting in the associated EDG being unable to start in the event of a LOOP event.

The licensee proposed extending the interval for completion of the 18-month service tests for 125-volt batteries until the 1R13 refueling outage. Although TS 4.0.3 allows a 25 percent interval extension for scheduling, the licensee stated that service tests will become overdue for (a) the 1 A battery on June 4,1999, (b) the 1B battery on September 4,1999, and (c) the 1C battery on August 21,1999.

The licensee stated that the service test for each battery was conducted twice during the extended shutdown and that the results from these tests indicate that the batteries were capable of meeting the design requirements of the systems to which they are connected. In addition, a review of the actual tett results showed that the batteries showed no signs of degradation, nor had trends developed that indicated the batteries would not remain above the j

required limit until the next test is performed. The IEEE Standard 450, "lEEE Recommended j

Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vanted Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Application," defines degradation as being indicated when the battery capacity l

drops more than 10 percent from its capacity on the previous performance test, or is below 90 percent of the manufacturers rating.

The Salem Unit 1 125-VDC batteries were placed in service in November 1987, January 1988, and October 1997, for batteries 1 A,1B, and 1C, respectively. The capacity factors found during previous testing were between 109.5 and 115.7 percent of the manufacturer's specified j

rating. The NRC staff reviewed the results of the last service tests conducted during the i

extended outage and found that (a) the results of the service test on each battery was acceptable, and (b) the minimum observed battery terminal voltages at each point in the load profile when compared to the initial performance test indicated that the batteries were above the manufacturers rating.

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%* Since the battery shows no signs of degradation and the trend information shows that the battery should deliver a capacity above that necessary for its duty cycle, the licensee's weekly and quarterly testing and performance monitoring will provide assurance that the battery condition and performance will not deteriorate during the deferral period. Industry experience for similar batteries on 24-month cycles also supports this determination. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed one-time extension of the 18-month service test surveillance interval to be acceptable.

28-Volt DC Distribution System Batteries The 28-VDC distribution system supplies power to the auxiliary control system relay cabinets for manual control of ESF equipment and non-safety related equipment and to the status recorder panel RP4 in the main control room. During normal operation, DC power is supplied by the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. If power from the chargers is interrupted, power to the loads is drawn from the batteries. If a LOOP event occur: the battery chargers are energized from the EDGs.

As with the 125-VDC batteries, the licensee has stated that the service test for each battery was conducted twice during the extended shutdown and that the results from these tests were satisfactory. Including the 25 percent allowance for scheduling, the 28-VDC battery tests would become overdue on July 22 and November 4,1999, for the 1 A and 1B batteries, respectively. A review of the actual test results showed that the batteries showed no signs of degradation and trends indicated that the batteries would remain above the required limit until the next test is performed.

The Salem Unit 128-VDC batteries were piaced in service in March 1989. The capacity factor for each battery as found during the prior performance testing was 115 percent of the manufacturer's specified rating. The NRC staff reviewed the results of the last service tests conducted during the extended outage and found that (a) the results of the service test on each battery was acceptable, and (b) the minimum observed battery terminal voltages at each point in the load profile when compared to the initial performance test indicated that the i

batteries were above the manufacturer's rating.

j Since the battery shows no signs of degradation and the trend information shows that the battery should deliver a capacity above that necessary for its duty cycle, the licensee's weekly 1

and quarterly testing and performance monitoring will provide assurance that the battery condition and performance will not deteriorate during the deferral period. Industry experience for similar batteries on 24-month cycles also supports this determination. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed one-time extension of the 18-month service test surveillance interval to be acceptable.

The licensee has also proposed to similarly extend the surveillance period for TS 4.8.2.5.2.c.2 which requires the verification that the cell-to-cell and terminal connections on the 28-VDC batteries are clean, tight, and coated with anti-corrosion material. The NRC staff finds that the quarterly inspection of these batteries per Salem Maintenance Procedure SC.MD-ST.28D-003Q, Revision 9, dated November 14,1997, " Quarterly inspection and Preventive Maintenance of 28-Volt Batteries," verifies the condition of the terminals and the anti-corrosive coatings. If major corrosion and lack of anti-corrosion coating are found, the terminal posts are k

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1 required to be cleaned and regreased. Also, other attributes are observed to verify the physical condition of the batteries. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the one-time extension of the 18-month surveillance requirement is acceptable.

Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Pietedc-a The containment electrical penetrations / conductors are protected by deenergizing circuits which are not required for reactor operation and by ensuring the operability of primary and backup overcurrent protective devices through periodic testing. In this regard, SR 4.8.3.1 requires every 18 months that containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices be demonstrated operable by performance of channel calibration of associated protective relays and an integrated system functional test. However, for the 4.16 kV reactor coolant pumo (RCP) circuit, at least one 4.16 kV RCP circuit needs a channel calibration and functional test once per 18 months (such that all RCP circuits are demonstrated operable at least once per 72 months). Thus, the licensee has indicated that the 1F 4 kV Bus Overload Relays will become overdue on September 1,1999.

The licensee has also stated that the 460 VAC transformer overioad relays and current transformers (cts) that are part of the 1A,18, and 1C 4.16 kV vital bus breaker cubicles and associated with the power supplies to the containment fan cooler units (and are also used for overcurrent protective devices for electrical penetrations) will likewise become overdue on Mrs 26, August 4, and July 8,1999, for transformers 1 A,1B, and 1C, respectively.

The licenses stated that the surveillance inspection work orders covering the cnannel calibration and functional testing of these protective devices were reviewed and the as-found test data were within the acceptance criteria. Furthermore, during discussions with the licensee's electrical engineering organization, the licensee indicated that no corrective action requests were identified through the material history review of this equipment. The licensee also reviewed the relay manufacturer's service information bulletins and found no problems with the relays used at Salem Units 1 and 2.

On the basis of the observed reliability and stability of the circuit protective relays and the good maintenance history of the relays and cts, the one-time extension of the channel calibration is acceptable. Also, because of this and the short duration of the proposed extension, the one-time extension of the functional test is acceptable and will not impose a risk to safe plant operation.

. Containment Water Level Instrument Two channels of containment liquid level (water level-wide range or sump level) are available as indications for the plant operators during post accident conditions. The containment water level instruments prcvide indication and alarm functions but no automatic control functions.

These instruments are GEMS TransAmerica Delaval Model XM-54855 float-type level devices.

SR 4.3.3.7 requires that each accident monitoring instrumentation channel be demonstrated operable by performance of, in part, channel calibration operations. For the two channels of containment water level - wide range, channel calibration is required at least once per 18 months as stated in Table 4.3-11, item 17. The licensee indicated that these instrument u

a e (1LT938 and 1LT939) channels were calibrated during the second half of 1997 and therefore, would be overdue on August 18 and 28,1999, for 1LT938 and 1LT939, respectively.

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The licensee stated that a review of the containment sump level data from the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) showed a maximum deviation from the mean of less than 0.2 percent compared to an allowed value of 1.44 percent. The NRC staff reviewed a sample of the data and found that the data supported the licensee's stated instrument deviation.

Because of the limited period of the surveillance interval extension and the observed stability of these instruments, the NRC staff finds the one-time extension of the surveillance interval for the channel calibration of the containment water levelinstruments to be acceptable.

In its March 31,1999, letter, the licensee withdrew the request for the one-time extension of the surveillance interval for the channel calibration of the pressurizer water level instrument per TS Table 4.3-1 item 11. The licensee performed this calibration on March 2,1999, during a short outage of Salem Unit 1 Functional Testina Associated with Safety Inlection Sianal Test The licensee has proposed a one-time extension of several SRs that are satisfied by the performance of the manual safety injection (SI) channel functional test required by TS 4.3.2.1.1, Table 4.3-2, item no.1.a. The licensee stated that the manual Si test was last performed during the second half of 1997 and would become overdue September 16,1999.

This test can only be performed during shutdown in modes 5,6, or defueled.

The manual solid-state protection system (SSPS) functional input check per SR 4.3.1.1.1, Table 4.3-1, Note (4), is required to be completeo every 18 months. However, portions of this system are checked during other surveillance tests conducted every two months. The licensee stated that the automatic logic portion of the system verifies functionality and continuity to the output slave relays. Further, the ESF SSPS slave relays are also tested every two months to verify their operation and to check continuity to the final control element on the safety equipment. In this regard, there is an overlap between these tests in that continuity of the safeguards output relay coils is checked by the logic testing, and these coi!s are energized during the ESF SSPS test. The manual Si test only provides the additional actual verification of operation of the final control element and actuated safety equipment.

SR 4.1.2.2.c verifies that each automatic valve in the reactivity control system flow path actuates on an Si test signal. SR 4.5.2.e.1 verifies that each automatic valve in the ECCS flow path actuates on an Si test signal. SR 4.7.6.1.d.2 verifies that the control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS) automatically actuates in the pressurization mode on an Sl test signal or control room intake high radiation test signal. SR 4.7.10.b verifies that each automatic valve in the chilled water loop actuates on an SI signal.

The licensee has reviewed the results of the last three performances of the manual Si test used to satisfy the above surveillance requirements. The licensee has stated that no failure of a final control element or actuated component occurred during the tests. With regard to SR 4.7.6.1.d.2 for the CREACS test, the system was tested on July 11,1998, in response to the

control room high radiation test signal that further verifies the ability of this system to align properly if required.

Because of the successful performance during previous testing, the limited length of time that

, the SR intervals will be extended, and the bimonthly testing of the logic and actuation circuitry, the NRC staff finds that the one-time extension of these SRs to the 1R13 refueling outage is acceptable.

ECCS Accumulator Isolation Valves As part of the ECCS, there are four ECCS accumulator tanks, one connected to each RCS cold leg, that are available to passively inject borated water into the RCS during a large break i

loss of coolant accident. During normal operation, the accumulator tanks are pressurized to about 600 psig with nitrogen gas. Although a remotely operated valve can isolate the accumulator during plant cooldowns, it is open (with its actuator in power lockout) during normal plant operations, in particular, TS 3.5.1 requires the isolation valves to remain open during modes 1,2, and 3.

SR 4.5.1.d requires that at least once every 18 months each accumulator isolation valve be verified to open automatically on an Si test signal. The accumulator isolation valves were last tested during the manual Si test conducted in the second half of 1997 and would become overdue on September 18,1999.

t Because the accumulator isolation valves are in the required safety position (open), the period j

of the surveillance interval extension is short, and the test would require a plant shutdown and cooloown, the NRC staff finds the one-time extension of SR 4.5.1.d to be acceptable.

Emeroency Diesel Generator 24-hour Endurance Test i

The 4160-volt subsystem of the on-site AC electrical power system consists of three vital sections, two circulating water sections, and four non-vital group sections. The vital and circulating water section buses are normally powered from the nos.13 and 14 station power transformers. In the event of a LOOP, three emergency diesel generators will automatically start and repower the vital buses. The EDGs have a continuous rating of 2600 kilowatts. The short-telm ratings are: 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> of 2750 kW,2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of 2860 kW, and % hour of 3100 kW.

The EDGs are capable of supplying power for the safe shutdown of the unit. Any two of the three EDGs can supply sufficient power for operation of the safety equipment during a design basis ever>t coincident with a loss of offsite power.

In order to demonstrate that each EDG remains operable, the TSs require the completion of surveillance test requirements. In addition to monthly and semiannual operational tests in I

accordance with TS 4.8.1.1.2, TS 4.8.1.1.2.d.7 requires that the EDG be operated for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at least ortce per 18 months during shutdown. During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of this test, it is loaded to 2760-2860 kW. During the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />, it is loaded to 2500-2600 kW.

i The licenses stated that the 24-hour endurance runs of the Salem Unit 1 EDGs were performed during the second half of 1997. Specifically, the tests will become overdue on July i

19, August 13, and July 20,1999, for EDG Nos.1 A,1B, and 1C, respectively. The licensee l

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also stated that the results of the last 21 endurance runs were reviewed. Although some problems were noted during three of these tests, the problems were of a nature that they did not affect the completion of the load run. In February 1998, a Salem Unit 2 EDG experienced catastrophic failure of its turbocharger. Subsequent failure analysis showed that this was an isolated occurrence, and the root cause was not attributed to a potential common mode failure of the turbochargers.

The licensee has shown that the overa!I reliability of the EDGs has satisfied the requirements of the Maintenance Rule. The reliability has remained above 97.5 percent. The licensee has also reviewed the results of the other surveillance requirements, such as the monthly 1-hour load tests, and found them to be satisfactory.

On the basis of the overall reliability of the EDGs and the satisfactory results of the periodic operational testing, the NRC finds the one-time extension of SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.7 to be acceptable.

Summary The NRC staff finds that the proposed one-time extension of the surveillance intervals in SRs 4.1.2.2.c, Table 4.3-1 Note (4),4.3.2.1.3, Table 4.3-2 item 1a, Table 4.3-6 item 2, Table 4.3-11 items 4 and 17, 4.5.1.d, 4.5.2.e.1, 4.7.6.1.d.2, 4.7.10.b, 4.8.1.1.2.d.7, 4.8.2.3.2.f, 4.8.2.5.2.c.2, 4.8.2.5.2.d, and 4.8.3.1.a.1 until completed during the 1R13 refueling outage is acceptable.

Administrative and Editorial Chanoes The licensee has proposed to make several administrative and editorial changes. Specifically, the licensee proposed to capitalize the defined terms used in TS 3/4.7.10 to be consistent with TS Section 1.0. In TS Table 4.3-11, the licensee proposed to change the abbreviations for "not applicable" from "N/A or NA" to "N.A." and the abbreviation for "startup" from "SU#" to "S/U#." Additionally, the surveillance interval specified in TS Table 4.3-11 item 15, for the channel calibration of Containment Pressure - Narrow Range was proposed to be changed from "not applicable" (N.A.) to "every 18 months" (R) to coincide with the licensee's current instrument calibration practice. The licensee believed that this was a typographical error created in Salem Unit 1 Amendment No. 79. Lastly, the licensee proposed to change the column heading in TS Table 4.3-1 from " CALIBRATION" to " CHANNEL CAllBRATION" to be consistent with the terminology used in TS 4.3.1.1.1.

j The NRC staff finds that these changes are minor in nature and improve the consistency within the TS sections. Thus, the NRC staff finds these changes to be acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes

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s. surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (64 FR 6709). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) and (c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there Is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: P. Milano Date: May 4,1999