ML20205B912
| ML20205B912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1988 |
| From: | Paulson W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205B918 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8810260344 | |
| Download: ML20205B912 (13) | |
Text
+# p n as: o UNITED STATES g
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
.l WASHING TON, D. C. 20665
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ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT BY THE OFFICE 0F_ NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO THE EXPANSION OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL FACILITY OPERATING, LICENSE NO. NPF-76 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT UNIL1 y
LOCKET NO._50-498
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 rescription of ProppgMetjgn By letter cated March 0,1988 as supplemented on March 26, 1988 Hcuston lighting
& Power Company (HLtP or the licensee) requested an anendment to Facility Operating License No NFF-76 for South Texas Project, Unit 1 (STP-1) to allow the expansion of the capacity of the spent fuel pool.
Further infomattor, was provided in the form of answers to staff questions by letters dated August 9 August 10 August 19. August 30. Septenber Pl. September FP, and September F9, 1988.
The amendrent would specifically authorire the licensee to increase the capacity of the spent fuel vool from the currently approved capacity of 169 fuel assenblies to the pionosed capacity of 1969 fuel assenblies. The proposed expansien would be acnieved by removing (the current spent fuel rocks from the l
pool and replacing them with new racks i.e., reracking), in which the cells for the spent fuel assemblies arS more closely spaced. Both the current fuel storage arrangement and the proposed arrangement would make use of free standing racks.
The proposed arrangement would consist of a total of 1969 cells arranged in 20 distinct ncdules. The new racks would not be double-tiered and all racks would sit on the spent fuel pool floor. The fuel storage will be divided into two regions within the pool.
Region 1 (?fe storage locations) will consist of high density fuel storage with cell center-to-ce.7ter spacing of 10.95 inches, separated by narrow rectangular water boxes. Strips of Boraflex neutron absorber are affixed on the outside face of the long sides.
Region 2 (1681 locations) will also consist of high density fuel storage cells with center-to-center spacing of 9.15 inches whh Poraflex strips located between adjacent walls. The Region 1 storage cells are designed for storage of new fuel assem-l blies with enrichments of up to a nceinal 4.5 weight percent U-E35 and spent fuel that has not achieved adequate burnup for Rtglen 2.
The Regien 7 cells are capable of accomodating fuel assemblies with initial enrichments of less than or equai to a nominal 4.5 weight percent U-P35 that have attained a minimum burnup given as a function of initial enrich: rent.
8810260344 881018 PDP ADOCK 05000498 P
-p-1.2 Need for Increased Stor, age Capacity In March 1988. HL&P received itt operating license for STP-1. The staff Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG-0781 and its 5 supplements approved storage for 196 fuel asserrblies. This is approximately one full core load. After the first refueling outage, insufficient capacity would exist for a full core off-load. Therefore, HL&P has proposed to expand its spent fuel storage capacity to 1969 fuel assemblies which is projected to provide storage capacity until the year 2019, while maintaining full core offload capacity, t
Changecut of the racks before the first refueling outage will result in essen-i tially no exposure to workers, thus treeting ALARA considerations.
In addition, sirce the racks are not contair.inated, they will not require any special handling 3
and can be disposed of as non-radioactive waste material.
If the Unit I core were to be offloaded before the reracking is begun, it wculd increase the radic-l I
logical contanination of the existing racks and spent fuel pool.
Further, the i
l contuchation would be great'y increased in the event of a fuel handling acci-j.
dent during the offload.
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l The Nuclear Uatte Policy Act of 1982 provided for limited away-from-reactor storage, and stipulated that a spent fuel repository would be available by 1998. Since the Act does not require a repository before this date, it is not 4
clear whether there will be any place to ship spent fuel in the 1980's or ca r ly-tc-mid-1990 's. Therefore, in the interim HL&P needs to provide more i
storage carecity.
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1.3 Alt erna t,ive,s 3
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Commercial reprocessing of spent fuel has net developed as originally antici-
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- pated, in 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Corcission directed its staff to pre-l l
pare a Generic Environrental Impact Statement (GEIS) on spent fuel storage.
j The Corcission directed the staff to aralyze alternatives for the handling and storage of spent light water power reactor fuel with particuler erphasis on i
developing long-range policy. The GEIS was to consider alternative ciethods of I
spent fuel storage, as well as the possible restriction or termination of the generation of spent fuel thrcugh nuclear power plant shutdown, i
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A "Final Generic Envircorrental Impact Staternent on Handling and Storage of i
Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel" (HUREG-0575), Volures 1-3 (the FGEIS) was i
is. sued by the NRC in August 1979. The finding of the FGEIS is that the l
j environtrental impact costs of interin storage are essentially negligible, regardless of where such spent fuel is stored. A comparison of the irupact costs of various alternatives reflects the advantage of continued generation of t
i nuclear power versus its replacement by coal-fired power generation. Continued j
j nuclear generation of power versus its replacement by oil-fired generation provides an even greater economic advantage.
In the bm nding case considered I
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in the F0EIS, that of shutting dcwn the reactor when the existing spent fuel storage capacity is filled, the cost of replacing nuclear stations before the end of their normal lifetime makes this alternative uneconomical. The storage of spent fuel as evaluated in NUREG-0575 is considered to be an interim action, not a final solution to permanent disposal, i
One spent fuel storage alternative considered in detail in the FGEIS is the expansion of the onsite fuel storege capacity by nodification of the existing l
spent fuel pools. Applications for more than 100 spent fuel pool expansions have been received and have been approved or are under review by the NRC. The finding in each case has been that the environmental inpact of such increased storage capacity is negligible. However, since there are variattens in storage design and litnitations caused by the spent fuel already stored in some of the pools, the FCE!S recormends that licensing reviews be done en a case-by-case basis to resolve plant-specific concerns.
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i The continuing validity and site specific applicability of the conclusicos in the NUREG-0575 have been confirmed in the Environt,, ental Assessirents for the I
i Surry and H.B. Robinsen Plants independent spent fuel storage installations, i
The licensee has considered several alternatives to the proposed action of the L
spent fuel pool expansion. The staff has evaluated these and certain other alternatives with respect to the need for the proposed action as discussed in l
Section 1.2 of this assessment.
The following alternatives were considered.
i (1) Shiptrent of spent fuel to a perrnanent federal fuel storage / disposal L
f a cili ty.
t (2) Shipment of fuel to a reprocessirig facility.
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i (3) Shipment of fuel to another utility or site for storage.
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(4) Reduction of spent fuel generation, f
- j (5) Constructionofanewindependentspentfuelstorageinstallation(ISFSI).
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(6) No action taken.
Each of these alternatives is discussed below.
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i Shiptre'nt to a perrtanent federal fuel storage disposal facility is a preferred I
j alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity. The licensee has made contractual arrangements whereby spent nuclear fuel and/or high level nuclear waste will be accepted and disposed of by the U.S. Departe,ent of Energy (00E). 00E is developing a repository under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (hNPA). However, the facility is not likely to be ready to receive spent fuel until the year 2003, at the earliest.
In addition, based on existing acceptance criteria. DOE does not plan to take the first South Texas Project spent fuel asserbly prior to 2007.
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) As an interirt neasure, shipment to a l'unitored Retrievable Storage (PPS) facility is another preferred alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel i
storage capacity. DOE, under the fNPA, has recently submitted its MRS propcsal to Congress. Because Congress has not authorized an f1RS and because one is not projected to be available until 1998, this alternative does not rceet the near-term storage needs of STP-1.
Under the INFA, the federal government has the responsibility to provide not raore than 1900 rnetric tons capacity for the interin storage of spent fuel.
The impacts of storing fuel at a Federal Interim Storage (FIS) facility fall within those already assessed by the 11RC in liUREG-0575.
In passing fNPA, Congress found that the owners and operators of nuclear power stations have the priraary responsibility for providing interin storage of spent nuclear fuel.
In accordance with the tNPA and 10 CFR Part 53, shipping of spent fuel to a FIS facility is considered a last resort alternative. At this time, the licensee cannot take advantage of FIS because existing storage capacity is ret inax irriz cd. Ther' fore, HL&P has been diligently pursuing this application for the spent fuel F 1 expansion at this tirne.
The alternative of shiptent of spent fuel to a FIS is not available.
2.
S h i prre n t_ o f, [p e,1,,t o, p,,R ep,r o c e s,s,ips, f,a e i,l_i,ty Reprocessing of spent fuel from STP-1 is not viable because presently there is no operating ccnnercial r(processing facility in the United States, nor is there the prospect for one in the foreseceble future.
3.
S h i En e n t_ p,f, fy,c,1, tp, A,n o t h,e,r,,U,t,1,1,1,ty,,c r,,s,i t e, f o,r, S,t,o, rag e The shipn.ent of spent fuel from STP-1 to the storage facility of another utility conpany could provide short-terni relief for the storage capacity prcblen. However, thc PYPA and 10 CFR Part E3 clearly place the responsi-bility fcr the interie:. storage of spent nuclear fuel with each owner or operator cf nuclear power plant. Itereover, transshipnent of spent fuel to and its storage at another site would entail pctential er.vironcental ir. pacts greater than those associated with the propostd increased storage at STP-1 site. Therefore, this is not considered a practical or reasonable alternative.
j HL&P also owns South Texas Project, Unit 2 (STP-2), which is located adjacent to STP-1. STP-2 is still under construction and is not expected to receive a fuel load license before December 1988.
By the serre letter dated flarch 8,1988 requesting the fuel storage expansion for STP-1, the licensee requested approval for installation in the STP-2 spent fuel pool racks of identical design to those being considered for STP-1. The staff approved the request on October 5, 1908. The STP-2 has a large unused capacity at this titre. The licensee could store fuel from STP-1 in the STP-2 fuel pool. There may be a near term benefit, but it does not represent the interrtediate-term solution as far as the South Texas Project site is concerned.
If spent fuel frera STP 1 were stored in the STP-2 fuci pool along with the spent fuel from STP-2, then the STP-2 pool would be quickly filled. Further, the fuel transfer process would involve more handling of the spent fuel and would therefore increase the probability of an accident.
4 Red,uctjon,p,f, Spent Fuel Generation Improved usage of fuel in the reactor and/or operation at a reduced power level would exterd the life of the fuel in the reactor.
In the case of extended burnup of fuel asserblies, the fuel cycle would be extended and fewer offloads would take place. However, the current storage capacity would still be quickly exhausted as discussed in Section 1.2.
Operation at reduced power would not n.ake effective use of availabic resources and would thus result in econoraic penalties.
5.
Cone true_ tion _,c,f, Miew 1,nd,ep,end,en,t,, Spent Fuel Storage, In,s,tal,la,t,ip,n Additicnal storage capacity could be developed by building a new, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), similar either to the existing pool or a dry cesk storage installation. The t;RC staff has generically assessed the it? pacts of the pool alternative and found, as reported in i;l' REG-0575, that "the storage of LWR spent fuels in water pools has an insignificant impact on the enviretrent." A generic assessrent for the dry cask alternative has not been made by the staff. Hcwever, assesstents for the dry cask ISFSI at the Surry Power Statier er,d the dry riodular concrete ISFSI at the H.B. Robinsen Stearn Electric Plant Unit ? resulted in Findings of tie Significant Irlpact. While these alternatives are enviror.tentally ccceptable, such a new storage facility, either at the STP-1 or at a location offatte, would require new site-specific design and construction, including equipr'ent for the transfer of spent fuel.
NP.C review, evaluation ard licensing of such a facility woulc' also be required.
It is not likely that this entire effort would be corpleted in tire to neet the need for additional capacity as discussed in Section 1.2.
Furtherrore, such construction would not utilize the existing expansion capabilities of the existing pool and thus wculd waste resources.
6.
fio Action _,Ta,Len If no action were takco, i.e., the spent fuel pool storage capacity rer ains at l
169 locaticos, the storage capacity would becore exhausted in the very near j
future and STP-1 would have to be shut down.
Such terraination of operations i
would result in no further generation of spent fuel, thereby elirninating the need for increased spent fuel storage capacity.
The impacts of terniinating the generation of spent fuel by ceasing the operation of existing nuclear power plants (i.e., ceasing generation of electric power) when their spent fuel pools becone filled was evaluated in NUREG-0575 and found to be undesirable. This alternative would be a waste of an available resource, the South Texas Project, Unit 1 itself, and is not considered viable.
In summry, the only leng-tere alternative that could provide an alternative solution to the HL&P spent fuel storage capacity problera is the construction of a new independent spent fuel storage installation at the South Texas Project site or at a location away from the site.
Construction of such an additional spent fuel stcrage facility cculd provide long-term increased stcrage capacity for STP-1. However, this alternative could not be irplemented in a timely ran-ner to r.eet the need for additional capacity for the South Texas Project Unit 1.
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6-1.4 Fuel Rep,ro, cessing History l
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Currently, spent fuel is not being reprocessed on a comercial basis in the l
United States. The !!uclear Fuel Services (f4FS) plant at West Valley, flew York, was shut down in 1972 for alterations and expansion.
In September 1976, tiFS informed the Comission that it was withdrawing from the nuclear fuel reprocessing business. The Allied General fluclear Services (AGfiS) proposed i
plant in Barnwell South Carolina, is not licensed to operate. The General Electric Company ('GE) Morris Operation ( formerly Midwest Recovery Plant) in i
Morris, Illinois, is in a decomissioned condition.
l On April 17, 1977, President Carter issued a policy statement on comercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, which effectively eliminated reprocessirs as j
part of the relatively near-term nuclear fuel cycle.
Although oc plants are licensed for reprocessing fuel, the storage pools at i
Morris and at West Valley are licensed to store spent fuel. The storage pool i
at West Valley is not full, but the licensee (the current licensee is i;ew York Energy Re cerch and Development Authority) is presently not accepting any additier.al spent fuel for storage, even from those power generating facilities o
that had contractual arrager.ents with West Valley.
In fact, spent fuel is I
being rer+oved from fiFS and returned to its owners.) (On May 4,1982, the license held by GE for spent fuel storage activitics at its Morris operatier.
l was renewed for another 20 ycors; however, GE is concitted to accept only limited quantities of additional spent fuel for storage at this facility from j
Cooper and San Onnfre Unit 1.
l e.0 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTES c
South Texas Project, Unit I contains radioactive waste treatrient systems
@ signed to cc.llect and process the gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that raight con uin rt.dioactive material. The radioactive weste treatment systems are cvaluated in the Final Environnental Statement (FES) dated August 1986 (US f;RC i
i 1986). There will bc no change in the waste treatracnt systeras describec' in the
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j FES because of the proposed spent fuel pool (SFP) rerack.
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2.1 Radicactive Material Released to the Atmosphere i
f With respect to releases of gaseous materials to the atmosphere, the only radio-i active gas of significance that could be attributable to storing additional i
i spent fuel assemblies for a longer period of time is the noble gas radicouclide i
Krypton-85 (Kr-85).
Experience has demonstrated that after spent fuel has decayed 4 to 6 months, there is r.o longer a significant release of fission pro-4 j
ducts, including Kr-85, from stored spent fuel containing cladding defects. To determine the average annual release of Kr-85, we assumed that all of the Kr-8K released from any defective fuel discharged to the SFP would be released prior l
.l to the next refueling. Enlarging the storage caphity of the SFP has no effect i
on the calculated average annual quantities of Kr-85 released to the atmosphere each year. There may be some small change in the calculated quantitics due to i
a change in the fuel burnup; this is expected 'o be a srall fraction of the cal-l j
culated annual quantities. However, for the purpose of estitiating potential t
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radiation doses to the metbers of the public due to the proposed increased storage of spent fuel assemblies, the NRC staff has conservatively assumed an additional release of 125 Ci/ year of Kr-85 (US NRC 1985).
Iodine-131 releases from spent fuel assemblies to the SFP water will not be significantly increased because of the expansion of the fuel storage capacity since the Iodine-131 inventory in the fuel will decay to negligible levels i
between refuelings, i
Most of the tritium in the SFP water results from activation of boron and lithium in the primary coolant and this will not be affected by the proposed changes. A relatively small amount of tritium is contributed during reactor
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operation by fissioning of reactor fuel and subsequent diffusion of tritium through the fuel and fuel. cladding. Tritium release from the fuel essentially i
occurs while the fuel is hot, that is, during operations, and to a limited l
extent, shortly after shutdown. Thus, expanding the SFP capacity will not
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significantly increase the tritium activity in the SFP.
I Storing additional spent fuel assemblies is not expected to increase the bulk water temperature during normal refueling above the value used in the design analysis. Therefore, it is not expected that there will be any significant change in the ar.r.ual release of tritium or iodine as a result of the proposed todific6tions fron that previously evaluated in the FES. Most airborne releases of tritiun, and iodine result from evaporation of reactor coolant, which centains tritium and iodine in higher concentrations than the SFP.
Therefcre, tven if there were a higher evaporatiun rate fron the SFP, the 1
increase in tritirn and iodine releases from the plant, as a result of the j
increase in stored spent fuel, would be small compared to the amount normally I
released from the plant and that which was previously evaluated in the FES.
4 The fuel handling building (FHB) Exhaust Air System must be operable whenever i
spent fuel is stored in the SFP and when fuci is either being moved or other l
loadsarebeingmovedovertheSFP(TS3.9.12).
In addition, the station l
1 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications, which are not being changed by this acticn, limit the total releases of gaseous activity.
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2.2 Solid Radioactive Wastes The concentration of radionuclides in the pool water is controlled by the SFP
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cleanup system and by decay of short-lived isotopes. The activity is highest during refueling operations when reactor coolant water is introduced into the 4
pool, and decreases as the pool water is processed through the SFP cleanup j
system. The increase, if any, of radioactivity due to the proposed modification should be minor because of the capability of the cleanup system to continously remove radioactivity in the SFP water to acceptable levels.
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We do not expect any significant increase in the amount of solid waste generated frem the SFP cleanup due to the proposed modification. The expected increase in total waste volume shipped from the South Texas Project site is j
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ninimal and would not have any significant additional environmental impact.
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The licensee plans to store the existing racks on site. The racks will be decontaninated (if necessary) to the maximun extent possible. Averaged over the lifetime of the station, the racks would increase the total waste volume shipped from the station by an insignificant amount. This will not have any i
significant additional environmental impact.
2.3 Radioactive Material Released to Receiving,,W,a,ter,s l
The staff does not expect that there will be a significant increase in the liquid release of radionuclides from the plant as a result of the proposed l
nodifications. Since the SFP cooling and cleanup systems operate as a closed system, only water originating from cleanup of SFP floors and resin sluice water need be considered as potential sources of radioactivity.
It is typected that neither the flow rate nor the radionuclide concentration cf the floor cleanup water will char.ge as a result of these modifications. The SFP demineralir(r resin reraoves soluble radioactive materials frcm the SFP water. These resins are periodically sluiced with water to the resin stcrage tank. The arrount of radicactivity on the SFP demineralizer resin raay increase slightly due to the additional spent fuel in the pool, but the soluble radiocctive material shculd be retained on the resins.
Radioactive material that might be transferred fron the spent resin to the sluice water will be effectively recoved by the liquid rodwate systen. After processing in the liquid radwate systen, the an:ount of radioactivity released to the environraent as a result of the proposed n,cdification would be negligibic, i
3.0 RADI0l0GICAL lf: PACT ASSESSftEliT This section contains the staff's estimates of the inpacts or the public from the proposed SFP redification. l'a3r scurces of radicactivity and principal envirertenta' pathways were considered in preparing this section.
The section also contains the staff's evaluation of the estir.ates of the additional radiological impacts on the plant workers fron the proposed E
operation of the r. edified SFP.
3.1 Public Radiation Expos,ure The principal source of radiation doses to individual rembers of the general public from releases from the SFP is exposure to Kr-85 releases from the t
SFP during subsequent fuel storage, i
The staff has estimated the doses to individual members of the public as well as the population as a whole in the area surrounding the South Texas Unit 1 Project by conservatively assuming a release of 125 Ci of Kr-85 due to the I
proposed increased storage of spent fuel assemblies and using the calculational l
methcds presented in Regulatory Guide 1.109. The staff estimated the total body and organ doses for the direct radiation exposure pathway from the Kr-85 plune shine for individual rembers of the general public of all ages at the worst site boundary location 1.6 Km NIN of the plant resulting from the assuned additional release of airborne Kr-85. The individual rerber of the public i
l was conservatively assumed to occupy the site boundary with the worst atmospheric dispersion characteristics continuous
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An atraospheric dispersion factor, X/Q, of 3.7x10~jy for g whole year.
sec/m was used in these estimates.
The additional total body dose that might be received from the assured release.
of Kr-85 by an individual at the worst site boundary location and the estimated dose to the total body of the population within the 80 kilometer redius of the plant is less than 0.1 mren/yr and 0.1 person-ren/yr, respectively. These doses are small compared to the flLetuations in the annual dose this population receives from exposure to background radiation. The population dose due to the SFP modification represents an increase of less than 0.1 percent of the pcpulation dose evaluated in the FES for the release of noble gases from the norual operation of STP-1.
Ey comparison, every year the sarrple population of about 3,300,000 persons will receive a cumulative total body dose of more than 370,000 person-rens from natural background radiation of about 0.11 rem per year per person (US EPA 1972).
Thus, the additienal total body dose to the pcpulation from the SFP modification is estimated to be less than 0.0001% of the annual dose due to natural background.
J On this basis, the staff concludes that the doses to individuals in unrestricted J
areas and to the population within 80 kilometers due to the assue:ed additional l
i airborne Kr-85 releases arruelly from the SFP mcdification would not be environtentally significant.
l In sum ary, the estimated doses due to exposure of individuals and the pcpulation to radioactive r.attrials associated with the spent fuel pool
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nodification are not significant.
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1 Since the reracking is scheduled to occur prior to the first refueling at STP-1, the rack modules removed from the SFP will not be radioactively contaminated.
i Therefore, the rack r:odules reroved from the SFP will net require any special q
handling and can be disposed of as nonradioactive waste material.
j 3.2 Occupation,a,1 Eypo,s,u,re 1
The occupational exposure for the proposed modification of the SFP is estinated l
i by the licensee to be less than 15 person-rers, based on the licensee's l
detailed creakdown of occupational dose for each phase of the operation. This dose is less than 3% of the average annual occupational dose of 600 person-rems l
1 per unit per year for operating pressurized water reactors in the United States. The small increase in radiation dose should not affect the licensee's l
i ability to maintain individuel occupational doses within the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, and is as low as is reasonably achievable. Normal radiation control procedures (NUREG-0800, US NRC 1981) and Regulatory Guide 8.8 (US NRC 1978) i l
will preclude any significant occupational radiation exposures.
Eased on present and projected operations in the SFP area, we estirate that the proposed operation of the ecdified SFP should add only a small fraction to the l
total tonual occupational radiation dose at STP-1.
Thus, we conclude that the prcposed storage of spent fuel in the codifled SFP j
will not result in any significant incre se in doses received by workers.
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3.3 C_onclusions Based on its review cf the proposed expansion of the SFP at STP-1, the staff concludes that:
1.
The estimated additional radiation doses to the general public are:
a.
much less than those incurred during nonnal operation of the South Texas Project, Unit 1.
b.
Very small in corparison to the dose members of the public receive each year from exposure to natural background radiation.
7.
The licensee has taken appropriate steps to ensure that occupational dcse will be n.aintained as Icw as is reasonably achievable and within the l
limits of 10 CFR Part 20.
On the basis of the foregoing evaluatica, it is concluded that there oculd be
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no significant additional environmental radiological inpact attributeole to the proposed reracking and rodification to increase the spent fuel storat,e capacity at the South Texas Project. Unit 1.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, tha ; there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will tot be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, with regard to radiation deses to the public and plant workers.
4.0 NCN-RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT As noted in Section 1.F. the existing racks are not contaminated ard will bt retained on site. Consequently, they w ll not require any unusual processing i
i and handling ard thus will not involve any significant environr. ental impact.
The new spent fuel racks will be fabricated by U.S. Tool and Die Conpeny in Alison Park, Pennsylvania.
They will be shipped by truck to the South Texas 4
Project site for installation in the pool. This is not expected to irpact terrestrial resources not previously disturbed during the original i
construction.
I The only non-radiological effluent affected by the spent fuel pool expansion is the additional waste heat rejected from the plant. The total increase in heat load rejected to the environnent through the cooling systems due to the c
increased spent fuel storage over the current rejected heat load is 1.8x10' BTU / hour. This represents an increase of approximately 0.01 percent of the total heat rejected to the environment. Thus, the increase in rejected heat will have negligible irpact on the environment. No impact on aquatic biota is
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anticipated.
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i The licensee has not proposed any change in the use or discharge of chemicals in conjunction with the expansion of the fuel pool. The proposed fuel pool expansion will not require any change to the NPDES permit.
Therefore, the staff concludes that the non-radiological environmental impacts of expanding the spent fuel pool will be insignificant.
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5.0 SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS 4
The staff, in its related Safety Evaluation to be published at a later date, has addressed both the safety and environmental aspects of a fuel handling accident, an event that bounds the potential adverse consequences of accident attributable to operation of a spent fuel pool with high density racks. A fuel l
handling accident rnay be viewed as a "reasonably foreseeable" design basis event which the pool and its associated structures, systens, and corponents (including the racks) are designed and constructed to prevent.
The environ-r: ental it: pacts of the accident were found not to be significant, i
The staff has considered accidents whose consequences night exceed a fuel handling accident, that is, beyond design basis events. The most widely considered accident, which was investigated by an NRC contractor, involves a structural failure of a spent fuel pool resulting in a rapid loss of all contained cooling water, followed by fuel heatup and a zirconiur, cladding fire.
The details of this severe accident are contained in HUREG/CR-4982 entitled "Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Fools in Support of Gereric Safety issue Pf."
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The staff belims that the prcbability of this type of accident occurrire is j
extrerely Icw. This belief is based upon the Comission's requirer:ents for the designandconstructionofspentfuelpoolsandtheircontents(e.g., racks),
and adherence to approved industry codes and standards.
For e::arnple, in the Scuth Texas case, the pool itself is an integral part of the fuel handling j
buildirig, which is designed to Seistaic Category I standards. The foundation t
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nat ard walls are rnassive, corsprised cf reinforced concrete. The spent fuel i
storage racks are Seistic Category I equiprent required to reraain functional i
during and after a safe shutdown earthquake.
In addition, the racks are i
i extreracly strong in the structural sense in maintaining proper spacing of the fuel assenblies. The water cooling systern is extremely reliabic; in the highly i
unlikely event of a total cooling system failure, makeup water sources are l
available. These are but a few of the considerations used by the staff in l
assessing the adequacy of the rerack.
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1 The staff acknowledges that if the severe accident occurred as described above, i
the environn. ental irnpacts could be significant; however, this event is highly l
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unlikely and is not reasonably foreseeable, in light of the dw ign of the spent fuel pool systen and racks. Therefore, further discussion of severe accidents i
is not warranted, and the staff concludes that an environmental impact statement t
need not be prepared.
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6.0 SUWARY The Final Generic Environnental Impact Statement (FGEIS) on Handling and i
Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel concluded that the cost of the various alternatives reflects the advantage of continued generation of nuclear power with the accompanying spent fuel storage.
Because of the differences in SFP designs, the FGEIS recow+nded environmental evaluation of SFP expansions on a case-by-case basis.
For the South Texas Project. Unit 1. the expansion of the storage capacity of j
the spent fuel pool will not create any significant additional radiological effects or neasurable non-radiological environmental impacts. The additional whole body dose that might be received by an individual at the site boundary is less than 0.1 mrem / year; the estimated dose to the population within an EO kiloneter radius is estimateo to be less than 0.1 persen-rem / year.
These doses are small compared to the fluctuations in the annual dose this population receives from exposure to background radiation. The occupaticnal radiation dose for the proposed operation of the expanded spent fuel pool is estimated by the staff to be less than three percent of the total annual occupational radiation expost.re for a facility of this type. The small l
increase in radiation dose should not affect th licensee's ability to maintain individual occupational dcse at the South Texas Project. Unit I within the limits of 10 CFR Part 70, and as 1cw as is reasonably achievable.
The only non-radiological effluent affected by the SFP expansion is the aediticnal waste heat rejected. The increase in total plant waste heat is insignificant. Thus, there is ne significant environnental impact attributable to tht waste heat fron the plant due to the SFP expansion, i
6.1 Alternative Use of Resources This action does not involve the use of resources not previously considered in j
connection with the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's Final Environmental 1
Statenent, dated August 1986. related to the operation of the South Texas Project. Units 1 and E.
6.2 Agencies and Persons Consulted The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request.
No other agencies or persons i
were consulted.
7.0 BASIS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR NOT PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT The staff has reviewed the proposed spent fuel pool mcdification to the South Texas Project. Unit I relative to the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 51.
Based upon the environmental assessment, the staff has concluded that there are no significant radiological or non-radiological ireccts associated with the j
proposed action and that the proposed license ams.nJtent will not have significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Therefore, the Comission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.31, not to prepare an environnental impact staten<nt for the proposed amendment.
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8.0 REFERENCES
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 197?, ORP-S10-72-1, "Natural Radiation Exposure in the United States," June 1972.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission,1986, NUREG-1171, "Final Environmental Statement related to the Operation of South Texas Project Units 1 and ?",
August 1986.
--- 1977. Regulatory Guide 1.109 Revision 1. "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Ccepliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I," October 1977.
--, 1978. Regulatory Guide 8.8, Revision 3. "Information Relevant to Ensurirg 3
That Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be as los as Is Reasonably Achieveable " June 1978.
--, 1981, NUREG-0800, "Radiation Protection," in:
"Standard Revio: Plan,"
Chapter I?. July 1981 (forrrerly issued as NUREG-75/087).
--,1985, NUREG-0713. Volurre 5, "Occupationel Radiation Exposure at Concercial 4
kuclear Power Reactors 1983", March 1985.
--,1985. Environmental Assessnent Pelated to the Construction and Operation of the Surry Dry Cask Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
--,10P6 Environntental Assessirent Relatt.d to the Construction and Operation of the M.
P., Pobinsen Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
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Dated: October 18, 1938 Frincipal Contributors:
E. Tourigny I
J. Partin G. Dick l
J. Minns L
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