ML20202D562
| ML20202D562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1998 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202D532 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9802170116 | |
| Download: ML20202D562 (66) | |
Text
. -.
Attachmont I to JPN 98-005 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION (JPTS 95-004).
New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket 50-333 DPR-59 9802170116 980206 PDR ADOCK 05000333 r p
JAFNPP TECHNICAL hPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS EAER 1.0 Definitions 1
LIMITING SAFETY SAFET1LtMITS SYSTEM. SETTINGS l
1.1 Fuel Cladding integrity 2.1 7
1.2 Reactor Coolant System 2.2 27 SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.0 General 4.0 30 3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.1 30hl 3.2 Instrumentation 4.2 4S A.
Primary Containment isolation Functions A.
49 B.
Core and Containment Cooling Systems -
B.
50 initiation and Control l
C.
Control Rod Block Actuation C.
50 D.
Radiation Monitoring Systems Isolation D.
50 and initiation Functions l
E.
Drywell Leak Detection E.
53 F.
Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip F.
53 G.
Recirculation Pump Trip G.
53 H.
Accident Monitoring Instrumentation H.
53 1.
4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip 1.
53 J.
Remote Shutdown Capability J.
54 3.3 Reactivity Control 4.3 88 A.
Reactivity Limitatioas A.
88 B.
Control Rods B.
91 C.
Scram Insortion Times C.
95 D.
Reactivity Anomalies D.
96 3.4 Standby Liquid Control System 4.4 105 A.
Normal Operation A.
105 B.
Operation With inoperable Componer.ts B.
106 C.
Sodium Pentaborate Solution C.
107 3.5 Core and Containment Cooling Systems 4.5 112 A.
Core Spray and LPCI Systems A.
112 B.
Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR B.
115 System C.
HPCI System C.
117 D.
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
D.
119 E.
Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC)
E.
121 System Amendment No. 22,130,13',100,100,210,225,227 i
JAFNPP Mpj,E OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS Ea2R F.
ECCS-Cold Condition F.
122 G.
Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe
_ G.
122a H.
Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (API 4GR)
H.
123 1.
Linear Heat Generation Rate 1.
124 J.
Thermal Hydraulic Stability DELETED 124a k.
Single-Loop Operation NONE 124a 3.6 Reactor Coolant System 4.6 136 A.
Pressurization and Thermal Limits A.
136 B.
DELETED C.
Coolant Chemistry C.
139 D.
Cot l ant Leakage D.
141 E.
Safety and Safety / Relief Valves E.
142a F.
St.uctural Integrity F.
144 G.
_ Jet Pumps G.
144 H.
DELETED 1.
Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 1.
145b 3.7 Containment Systems 4.7 165 A.
165 B.
Standby Gas Treatment System B.
181 C.
'184 D.
Primary Containment isolation Valves D,
185 3.8 Miscellaneous Radioactive Material Sources 4.8 214 3.9 Auxiliary Electrical Systems 4.9 -
215 A.
Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems A.
215 B.
Emergency AC Power System B.
216 C.
Diesel Fuel C.
218 D.
Diese!-Generator Operability D.
220 E.
Station Batteries E.
221 F.
LPCI MOV Independent Power Supplies F.
222a
'G.
Reactor Protection System Electrical Protection Assemblies G.
222c 3.10 Core Alterations 4.10 227 A.
Refueling Interlocks A.
227 B.
Core Monitoring B.
230-C.
Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C.
-231 D.
Control Rod and Control Rod Drive Maintenance D.
231 3.11 Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities 4.11 237 A.
Main Control Room Ventilation A.
237 B.
DELETED C.
Battery Room Ventilation C.
239 i
D.
Emergency Service Water System D.
240 E.
Intake Deicing Heaters E.
242 Amendment No. 20, SS, 98,113,1SS, 231,236, ii
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JAFNPP TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS Eggg 3.12 Special Operations 4.12 244a A.
Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation A.
244a j
5.0 Design Features 245 5.1 Site 245 5.3 Reactor Pressure Vessel 245 5.4 Containment 245 5.5 Fuel Storage 245 5.6 Seismic Design 246 6.0 Administrative Controls 247 6.1 Responsibility 247 6.2 Organization.
247 6.2.1 Facility Management and Technical Support 247 6.2.2 Plant Staff 247a 6.3 Plant Staff Qualifications 248 6.4 Retraining and Replacement Training 248 6.5 Review and Audit 248 6.5.1 Plant Operating Review Committse (PORC)
'248a 6,5.2 Safety Review Committee (SRC) 250 6.6 Reportable Event Action 253 6.7 Safety Limit Violation 253 253 6.8 Procedures 254a 6.9 Reporting Requirements 6.10 - Record Retention 254g 6.11 Radiation Protection Program-255 258 6.12 Industrial Security Program 258 6.13 ' Emergency Plan 258 6.14 Fire Protection Program 6.15 Environmental Qualification 258a Amendment No. ?, 22, 22, Oi, ??, 93, ' 10,120,137, 219, iii
JAFNPP 4.0 Continued 3.0 Continued G.
Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requwements to be changed to permit performance of W toets and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remam unchanged. Compliance with the Specul Operations LCOs is i
optional. When a Special Operations LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Specsal Operations LCO shall be met. When a Spacesi Operations LCO is not desired to be met, entry is 'o an OPERATIONAL CONDITION (model or other specified mdition s'.all only be made in accordance with the other applicable specifications.
Amendment No.
30b
JAFNPP 3.0 BASES A.
This specification states the opphcatukty of each specification D.
Continued in terms of defined OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) and is provided to dehnoste _;:
I'-- "; when each spacefication is the status of the plant before or after an OPERATIONAL CONDITION imode) change. Thorofore in this case, entry into j
applicable.
en OPERATIONAL CONDITION (model or other specified j
condition may be made in accordance with the prowissons of 8.
This specification defines those condetsons necessary to conststute comphence with the terms of an indevidual Limiting the ACTION requwements. The prowessons of this specification Condeteen for Operation and associated ACTION requwement.
should not, howower, be interpreted as endorsing the failure to i
. exercise g0ad practice in restonne systems or components to C.
This specification dehnootes the ACTION to be taken for OPERABLE status before startup.
circumstances not directly provided for in the ACTION '
statements and whoes occurrence would violate the intent of Exceptions to this prowesson may be made for a limited number the specification. Under the terms of Specification 3.0, the '
of specifications when startup with inoperable equipment facility is to be pieced in COLD SHUTDOWN withen the would not affect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. It is assumed that the unit is brought to the ACTION statements of the appropnote specifications.
the required OPERATIONAL CONDITION (model withm the E.
This specification dehnostes what addmonal conditions must required times by promptly inetseteng and cwrying out the be satisfied to pennst operation to continue, consistent with appropnete ACTION statement.
the ACTION statements for power sources, when a normal or D.
This specification provides that entry into an OPERABLE emergency power source is not OPERABLE. It specifically CONDITION (mode) must be made with (a) the full prohetwts operation when one dovesson is inoperable because its normal or emergency power source is inoperable and a complement of required systems, equepment or components OPERABLE and (b) all other peree^eters as specified in the system, subsystem, train, component or device in another Limiting Conditions for Operation w ng met without regard for division is inoperable for another reeson.
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allowable deviations and out of service prowessons contained in The prowessons of this specification permet the ACTION the ACTION statements.
statements assocested with indeveduel systems, subsystems.
The intent of this prownsion is to insure that facility operation is trains, components or devices to be consestent with the ACTION statement of the assocseted electrical power source.
not initiated with eether required equipment or systems -
moperable or other limits being exceeded. Comphance with it allows operation to be govemed by the time '
ACTION requirements that permit continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time provides an acceptable
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level of safety for continued operation withaut the regard to Amendment No. 33, ?31,1Si, l
3&
~.
JAFNPP 3.0 BASES - Continued E.
Continued E.
Continued Ac a further example, Specification 3.9.A. requires in part that limits of the ACTION es tement assocsated with the Limiting two 115KV lines and reserve station transformers be aveelable.
Condition for Operation for the normal or emergency power The ACTION statement provides a 7 day out-of-service time source, and not by the indeweduel ACTION statements for sech when both esquired offsite circuits are not OPERABLE. If the system, subsystem, train, component or device thet is -
definition of OPERABLE were appleed without consederation of determened to be inoperable solely hm'=mm of the inoperabdety Specdecation 3.0.E., all systems, sulmystems, trains, of its normel or emergency power source.
components and devices supplied by the inoperable normel For example, Specification 3.g.A. requires in part that both power sources, both of the offsite circuits, would also be snoperable. This would dictate involung the applocable ACTION emergency dessel generator systems be OPERABLE. The statements for each of the appbcable LCOs. However, the ACTION statement provides for a 7 day out-of-service time i
when emergency diesel generator system A or 8 is not prowessons of Spacefication 3.0.E. permet the time limits for continued operation to be consistent with the ACTION OPERABLE. If the defineteen of OPERABLE were apphed statement for the inoperable normel power sources insteed, without consideration of Specification 3.0.E., all systems, provided the other spacefrid condetsons are satisfied. In this subeystems, trains, components and devices supphed by the case, this would mean that for one devoeien the emergency enoperable emergsncy power source, dessel generator system power source must be OPERABLE las must be the components A or 8, would also be inoperable. This would dictate involung the apphcable ACTION statements for each of :he applicable suppisod by the emergwcy power source) and ar redundant j
Limiting Condeteens for Operation. Howcer, the provisions of systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in the other division must be OPERA 8LE, or likewise satisfy Specification 3.0.E. permet the time hmets for continued Specificatiert 3.0.E. (i.e., be cpoble of performing their design operation to be consistent with the ACTION statement for the functions and have an emergency power source OPERABLE).
enoperable err:ergency dessel generator system instood, in other words, both emergency power sources A and 8 must provided the other specified condetsons are satisfied. If they be OPERABLE and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this components and devices in both devessons must also be.
specification.
OPERA 8LE. If these conditions are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this specification.
In Cold Shutdown and Refuel Modes, Specification 3.0.E. is not appbcable, and thus the individual ACTION statement for each applecable Limiting Condition for Operation in these OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS Imodes) must be adhered to.
Amendment No.
"O, t 9",
j 3Od
JAFNPP 3.0 Bases - Continued F.
LCO 3.0.F establishes the aNowance for restoring G.
Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified equipment to service under edmmistrative controls when it TS requirements to be changed to permet performance of has been removed from service or declared inoperstdo to special tests and operations.. Unless otherwise specified, comply with required actions. The solo purpose of this all the other TS requirements remsen unchanged. This will Specification is to provide an saception to LCO 3.0.B to ensure all appropnote requirements of the OPERATIONAL
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agow testing to demonstrate: (a) the operatukty of the CONDITION (model or other specified condition not equipment being retumed to service; or (b) the operability of directly associatea sith or required to be changed to other equipment.
perform the eracial test or operation will remsen in effect.
The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment The appiscability of a Pacid Operations LCO represents a e
is returned to service in confhet with the requerements of condition not r+::- -. p in cci"- u with the normal the required actions is limited to the time absolutely -
requirements of TS. Cw;"1s with Special Operations necessary to perform the allowed testing. This LCOs is optional. A epaceaf operation may be performed Specification does not provide time to perform any other eether under the prowessons of the appropriate Special preventive or corrective meentenance.
Operations LCO or under the other.. ":M'-3 TS requirements. If it is dessted to pas form the special An example of demonstrating the operability of the opeedion under the prowesions of the *+=en=8 Operations equipment boeng retumed to service is reopenmg a LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shell conteenment isolation valve that hes been closed to comply be followed. When a Spnceal Operations LCO requires with the required actions and must be ; :M to perform another LCO to be mot, only the requwoments of the LCO statement are requwed to be met fi.e., should the the testing.
requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of An example of demonstrating the operability of other the other LCO). HGwever, there are instances where the equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other occurring during tie performance of testeg on another LCOs* ACTIONS be met.
channel in the other trip system. A semder example of demonstrating the operability of other equepment is taking Survedlances of the other LCO are not required to be met, an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the -
. conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other appropriate response during the performance of testing on LCO is met, all the other LCOs* requirements (ACTIONS another channel in the same trip system.
and Sft) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO.
Amendment No. 22h 30e
JAFNPP 4.0 BASES A.
This specification provides th'd su.veillance activities
=quirement wiH be identified as an exception. An example necessary to insure the Lirniing Conditions for Operation are of an exception when the test interval is not specified in the met and wiH be performed during the OPERATIONAL regulations is the Note in Specification 6.20, ~Pnmary CONDITIONS (modes) for which the Limiting Conditions is Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program," which states Operation are applicable. Provbions for additional "The provisions of Specification 4.0.B do not apply to the surveillance activities to be performed without rega-d to the test frequencies specified in the Pnmary Containment applicable OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS (modes) are provided Leakage Re1 Testing Program." This exception is provided in the individual SurveBlance Requirements.
because the program already includes provisions for extension of intervals.
B.
Specification 4.0.8 establishes the limit for whic, the specified time interval for Surveillance Requiremmts may be C.
This specification establishes the failure to perform a extended. It permits aa allowable extension o' the normal Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveiitance surveillance interval to facistate sixveillaacr scheduling and interval, defined by the provisions of 3pecification 4.0.8, as consideration of plant operating conditions that may not be a condition that constitutes a failure to meet Me suitab!e for conducting the surveillance (e.g., transient OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for conditions or other ongoing surveillance or maintenance Operation. Under the provisions of this specification, activities). It also provides flexib;'ity to accommodate the systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE length of a fuel cycle for surveillances that are performed at when Surveillance Requirements have been sa*isfactorily each refueling outage and are specified with a 24 month performed within the specified time interval. However, surveillance interval. It is not intended that this provision be nothing in this provision is to be construed as implying that used repeatedly as a convenience to extend surveillance systems or components are OPERABLE when they are found intervals beyond that specified for surveillances that are rmt or known to be inoperable although stiH meeting the performed during refueling outages. The limitation of this Surveillance Requirements. This specification also clarifes srx.fication is based on engineering judgement and the that the ACTION requirements are applicable when recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance Requirements have not been completed within surve;!!ance being performed is the verification of the allowed surveillance interval and that the time limits of conformance with the Surveillanca Requirements. The limit the ACTION requirements apply from the point in time it is on extension af the normal surveillance interval ensures that identified that a surveillance has not been performed and not the reliability confirmed by worveillance activitin is not at the time that the allowed surveiHance was exceeded.
significantly reduced below that obtained from the specified Completion of the Surveillance Requirement within the surveillance interval. The exceptions to Spec;fication 4.0.8 allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are those surveillances for which the 25% extension of the restores compliance with the requirements of Specification interval specified does not apply. These exceptions are 4.C.C. However, this does not negate the fact that the stated in the individual Technical Specifications. The failure to have performed the surveillanco within the aHowed requirements of regulations take precedence over the surveillance interval, defined by the provisions of Technical Specifications. Therefore, when a test interval is Specification 4.0.S. was a violation of the OPERABILITY specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be requirements of a 1:dting Condition for Operation that is extended under the provisions of 4.0.8, and the surveinance subject to enforcerrert action. Further, the failure to Amendment No. 33,188,198,227,234, 30f I
JAFNPP 4.0 BASES - Continued C.
Continued C.
Continued perform a surveillance within the provisions of Specification
@.irveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on 4.O.8 is a violation of a Technical Specification requirement inoperable equipment because the ACTION requirements and is, therefore, a reportable event under the requirements define the remedial measures that apply. However, the of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2){i)(B) because it is a condition Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.
that inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.
If the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements are less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION requirements, a 24-hour D.
This specification estabGshes the require nent that all allowance is provided to permit a delay in implementing the applicable surveillances must be met before entry into an ACTION requirements. This provides an adequate time limit OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other condition of operation to complete Survei!!ance Requirements that have not been specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this performed. The purpose of this allowance is to permit the specification is to ensure that system and component completion of a survei!!ance before a shutdown is required to OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met comply with ACTION requirements or before other remedial before entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other measures would be required that may preclude completion of specified condition associated with plant shutdown as well a surveillance. The basis for this allowance includes as startup.
consideration for plant conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Under the provisions of this specification, the applicable surveillance and the safety significance of the delay in Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the completing the required survei!!ance. Tl"s orovision also specified survei!!ance interval to ensure that the Limiting provides a time limit for the completior o. Surveillarice Canditions for Operation are met dunng initial plant startup Requirements that become applicable as a consequence of or following a plant outage.
OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) changes imposed by ACTION requirements and for completing Surveillance When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION Requirements that are applicable when an exception to the requirements, the provisions of this specification do not requirements of Specification 4.0.C is a!! owed. If a apply because this would delay placing the facility in a lower surveillance is not completed within the 24-hour allowance, CONDITION of operation.
the time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at that time. When a surveillance is performed within the 24-hour allowance and the Surveillance Requirements are not met, the time limits of the ACTION requirements are applicable at the time the surveillance is terminated.
Amendment No. 49 E4, SS,109,1 S2,183, 227, 234, 3Og I
JAFNPP 3.1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM Aooficability-Anoticability-Applies to the instrumentation and associated devices which Applies to the survei!!ance of the instrumentation and associated initiate the reactor scram.
devices which initiate reactor scram.
Obiective:
Obiective:
To assure the operability of the Reactor Protection System.
To specify the type of frequency of surveinance to be applied to the protection instrumentation.
Soecification:
Soecification:
A. The setpoints and minimum number of instrument A.
Instrumentation systems shall be functiona!Iy tested and calibrated channels per trip system that must be operable for each as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 respectrvely.
it of the reactor mode switch, shall be as shown in g g,,
listed below shall be demonstrated to be within its limit once per 24 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel in each trip system. AII channe :; in both trip systems shall be tested within s
two test intervals.
- 1. Reactor High Pressure (02-3PT-55A, B, C, D)
- 2. Dryweil High Pressure (05PT-12A, B, C, D)
- 3. Reactor Water Level-Low (L3) (02-3LT-101 A, B, C, D)
- 4. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure (29PNS40A2, B2, C2, D2)
(29PNS-86A2, B2, C2, D2)
- 5. Turbine Stop Valve Closure (94PNS-101,102,103,104)
- 6. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (94PS-2OOA, B, C, D)
- 7. APRM Fixed High Neutron Flux
- 8. APRM Flow Referenced Neutron Flux
- Sensor is eliminated from response time testing for the RPS actuation logic circuits. Response time testing and conformance to the test acceptance criteria for the remaining channel components includes trip unit and relay logic.
Amendment No. 227.233,235, 3Oh I
JAFNPP 3.5 (cont'd) 4.5 (cont'd) a.
From and after the date that the HPCI System is a.
When it is determined that the HPCI System is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, incp=r isie the RCIC System, both LPCI subsystems.
continued reactor operation is permissible only dunng both core spray subsystems, and the ADS System the succeeding 7 days unless such system is sooner actuation logic shall be venfied to be Operatie made operable, provided that dunng such 7 days a!!
immediately. The RCIC System and ADS System logic active components of the Automatic Depressunzation shall be venfied to be operable daily thereafter.
System, the Core Spray System, LPCI System, and Reactor Core isolation Cooling System are operable.
b.
If the requirements of 3.5.C.1 canrot be met, the reactor shall be placed in the cold condition and pressure less than 150 psig within 24 hrs.
2.
Low power physics testing and reactor operator training sha!! be permitted with reactor coolant temperature s212*F with an inoperable component (s) as spec. ied in 3.5.C.1 f
above.
Amendment No.
A, 107,134,*49,179, 118
i JAFNPP 4.5 (cont'd) 3.5 (cont'd) i I
2.
If ttu requirements of 3.5.D.1 cannot be met, the 2.
A logic system functonel test.
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reactor shell be pieced in the cold condetson and pressure less then 100 paig weihin 24 hr.
a.
When it is determened that two valwes of the ADS are inoperable, the ADS System actuotion logic for I
the operable ADS volves and the HPCI System shall be venfied to be up.rable immedetely and at leest l
weeldy thoroofter.
l l
b.
When it is determened that more than two relief /sofety velves of the ADS are inoperable. the l
HPCI System shell be venfied to be operable l
immodetely.
l 3.
Low power physics testing and reactor operator traerung shell be pomwtted with inoperable ADS components, l
provided that reactor coolent temperature is.1212T and the reactor vessel is vented or reactor vessel heed is i
I removed.
t i
i i
l f
E
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Amendment No. 33, 'iS.
- 79, 2^^
2 ? 7 120
JAFNPP 3.5 (Cant'd) 4.5 (Cont'd)
E.
Reactor Core Isolation Coolino (RCIC) System E.
Reactor Core isolation Coolino (RCIC) System 1.
The RCIC System shall be operable whenever there 1.
RCIC System testing shall be performed as follows is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and the reactor provided a reactor steam supply is available. If pressure is greater than 150 psig and reactor coolant steam is not available at the time the survesilance temperature is greater than 212*F except from the test is scheduled to be performed, the test shaII be time that the RCIC System is made or found to be performed within ten dayuf continuous operation inoperable for any reason, continued reactor power from the time steam becon.cs available.
operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 days unless the system is made operable earlier Itgrn Freauency provided that during these 7 days the HPCI System is operable.
a.
Simulated Automatic Once per 24 Months Actuation (and Restart')
2.
If the requirements of 3.5.E cannot be met, the Test reactor sha!! be placed in the cold condition and pressure less than 150 psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
Pump Operability Once/ month 3.
Low power physics testing and reactor operator c.
Motor Operated Once/ month training shall be permitted with inoxrable Valve Operability components as specified in 3.5.E.2 above, provided that reactor coolant temperature is $212'F.
d.
Flow Rate Once/3 months
- e. Testable Check Tested for operabTity Valves any time the reactor is in the cold condition exce+'kg 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability tests have
.mt been performed dunng the preceding 31 days.
f.
Logic System Once per 24 Months Functional Test Automatic restart on a low water level signal which is subsequent to a high water level trip.
Amendment No. 40,107,??^,'?9,???,
121 i
~.. _ -
t i
i JAFNPP
^
r-4.6 (cont'd) 3.6 (cont'd)
[
s20*F when to the left of curve C.
a.
b.
5100*F when on or to the right of curve C.
t I
I 3.
Non#elaar Hestup and Cooldown
- 3. Non#elmar Hestup and f'aaadawn t
Dunng heetup by non-rmelaar meene (mechorucal),
Dunne heetup by Non-Nucieer means, cooldown foNowmp cooldown following r=h shutdown and low power nuclear shutdown and low power physses tests, the reactor phymes tests the Reactor Cooient System preneure and cocient system preneure and temperature shen be recorded i
temperature shall be on or to the right of the curve 8 overy 30 manutes untM two corie=c% temperettwo needings shown in Figure 3.5-1 Port 1,2, or 3 and the mammum are wethen 5'F of each other.
temperature change dunne any one hour shall be j
s100'.5
)
l 4.
Core Critical Operation
- 4. Core Cntcal Operation r
During au modes of operation with a entcal core (except Dunng all modes of operation with a critical core (except for low for low g ower physics tests) the reactor Cocient System power phymes tests) the reector Coolant System pressure and
[
pressure and temperature shall be at or to the right of temperature shen be recorded withen 30 erwnutes prior to i
the curve C shown in Figure 3.6-1 Part 1,2, or 3 and withdrawal of control rods to bnng the reactor entical and every the maximum temperature change dunng any one hour 30 rmnutes dunne hoatup untd two consecutive temperature shen be 5100*F.
readegs are within 5'F of each other.
i l
t i
Amendment No. 29, iS, ' 13,15S. ' ?9, t
l 137
m JAFMPP 3.67(conrd) :
4.6 (conrd) ~
- 2. ' If.Speedicahon 3.6.E.1 is not met, the reactor shall be placed in.
- 2. At least one safety / relief valve shaN be dissesembled and 1
- a coid condition vnthen 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
inspected every 24 months.
7
- 3. l Low power physics tesbng and reactor operator tnaneg shsE
. 3. ' The integnty of the rutrogen system and corrponents which be permetted with inoperable components as speedied in provide manual ard ADS actuabon of the safety / relief waives SpecA Gen 3.6.E.1 abowe provided that reactor coolant shaE be demonstrated at least once every 3 months.
e temperature is 5212 *F and the reactor vessel is vented or the reactor vessel head is removed.
- 4. The provisions of Spec 44 3.0.D are not applicable.
- 4. IWanuaNy open each s '_:yliif vahre while ly -;
_.9 stea m y
j-to the condenser and observe a >10% closure of the turtme bypass valves, to venfy that the safety / relief valve has opened.
This test shan be performed at seast every 24 months while in r-the RUN mode and withm the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after steam pressure and flour are adequate to perform the test.
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i 3AFNPP I
3.6 and 4.6 BASES (cont'd) i j
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t Fig. 3.6-1, curve B, provides luuwtotions for plant hootup and cocidown when the reactor is not cnncal or dunng low power phyescs tests. The thermal lesutesson is beood on mammum 2
hootup and cocidown reens of 100*F/hr in any one-hour penod.
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Fig. 3.6-1, curve C, establishes opereeng limsts when core is j
cntecol. These lurets include a mergin of 40*F as regured by 10 I
CFR 50 ?u P G.
l i
The regurements for cold boltup of the reactor vessel closure are l
booed on NDT temperature plus a 60'F factor of eefety. This factor is bened on the reguwements of the ASSE Code to whsch
}
the vessel was built. For Fig. 3.5-1, curves A, B and C, martyns are only added to the low temperature portion of the curve where nonaluctile failure is a concom. The closure flenges have en NOT temperature not greater then 30'F and are not subject to any., : -
"_ neutron radionen exposure. Thorofore, the menenum temperature of the fienges when the studs are in l
tension is 30*F plus 60*F, or 90*F.
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Amendtnent No. 93. * ? 2. ' 79, i
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JAFNPP 3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 4.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS ApolecatnistY:
AcoliCabilitY:
f Applies to the status of systems dunng special operations.
Applies to periodoc testmg of systems during special operations.
i Objective:
Obiective:
To allow performance of special operations.
To verify operability of required systems during specisi operations.
[
l Soecification:
Specifica00n:
t A.
Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testmo Operation A.
Inservice Leak and Hvdrostatic Testma Operation The reactor may be considered to be in COLD SHUTDOWN Perform the applicable survoiNance requirements for the with reactor coolant temperature between 212*F and 3OO*F required LCOs.
and the reactor vessel not vented, to allow performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic testmg provided the following LCOs are met:
l 1.
LCO 3.5.F, *ECCS-Cold Condition," a menimum of two low pressure subsystems shall be operable; 2.
LCO 3.7.8, " Standby Gas Treatment System *:
i 3.
Secondary Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation instrumentation a.
LCO 3.2.A, *Pnmary Contamment Isolation l
Functions", Table 3.2-1, Trip Function
" Reactor Low Water Level (Notes 4 and 7)*;
f i
I Amendment No. 34,00,134,135,21S, f
244a f
f
'3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS (cont.).
b.
Radeologecal Effluent TS LCO 3.8, "Standty
- Gas Treatment Systern", Radiological Effluent TS Table 3.10-1, Trip Functions " Refuel Aree Exhaust Mordor" and " Reactor Building Aree Exhoust Morwtors".
4.
LCO 3.7.C, " Secondary Contaenment*: (including the maintenance of Secondary Containment integnty as defined by Definition 1.0.S) and -
5.
LCO 3.9, " Auxiliary Electrical Systems," the necessary systems shall be operable to support equipment required to be operable.
6.
Wsth the above requirements not rnet,immediately suspend activetses that could increase reactor coolant
. temperature or pressure and redu:e reactor coolant temperature to less then 212*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
a Amendment No.
244b'
JAFNPP 3.12 and 4.12 BASES A..
Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testino Operation The purpose of this Special Opeiot. ors LCO is to allow certain in the event of a large pnmary system leak, the reactor vessel would j
reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in COLD rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems SHUTDOWN when the metallurgical characteristics of the to operate. The capability of these systems, as required by this
, reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at Special Operations LCO, would be adequate to keep the core flooded l
temperatures greater than 212*F (normally corresponding to under this low decay heat load cord,Lun. Small system leaks would
, HOT SHUTDOWN).
be detected by leakage inspections before sgnificant inventory loss l
occurred
- A!!owing the reactor to be considered in COLD SHUTDOWN during hydrostatic or leak testing, when reactor coolant For the purposes of this test, the protecbon provided by normally temperature is >212*F, effectively provides an exception to required COLD SHUTDOWN applic bie LCOs, in addition to the HOT SHUTDOWN requirements, including operability of requireirents of this Special Opm.Gors LCO, will ensure acceptable
' primary containment and the full complement of redundant consequences dunng normal hydrostatic test cordinens and dunng Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or postulated accident conditions.
leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core wi!! be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. In addition, Special Operations LCO 3.12.A requires supporting LCOs for ECCS-Cold Condition, Standby Gas Treatment, Secondary Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatrnent initiation instrumentation, and Auxiliary Electrical Systems to be met to ensure secondary containment integrity is maintained and capable of handling any airbome radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. A listing of secondary containment isolation valves required to maintain Secondary Containment integrity is included in plant controlled procedures. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment.
Amendment No.
244c
l Att:chment ll to JPN 98 005 1
SAFETY EVALUATION 1
INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION (JPTS 95-004)
I f
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New York Power Authority
' JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
. Docket No. 50 333 DPR 59 4 s -. =..
Attachment ll to JPN 98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 1 of 21 1.
DISCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSEQ_C&WQER Section 1 describes technical changes to the James A. FitrPatrick Technical Specifications that affect system operability requirements during hydrostatic and system leakage (pressuro) testing of the reactor coolar,t system. These changes, with minor exceptions, adopt the Special Operations section from Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG 1433).
In addition to the technical changes, Section 2 describes editorial changes to improve the table of contents, telocate text, use consistent terminology, and reflect the addition i
of new pages to the Technical Specifications, l
1.
Technical Changes Paae 30b l
~
Add Specification 3.0.G as follows:
"G.
Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements romain unchanged. Compliance with the Special Operations LCOs is optional. When a Special Operations LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO shall be met. When a Special Operations LCO is not desired to be met, entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified conditlNi /tNI only be made in accordance with the other applicable specifications."
r
Attachm:nt ll13 JPN,98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION c
1 Page 2 of 21 i
Page 30.g i
. Add Specification 3.0.G Basos as follows:
"G.
Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performance of special te6ts and-operations. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the -
special test or operation will remain in effect.
The applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compilance with the normal requirements of TS, Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special
'l operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other appl! cable TS '
requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the i
provisions of the Special Operations I.CO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a 5,acial Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the' ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO), However, there are instances wheie the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the.
other LCOs' ACTIONS be met.
Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCOs' 4
requirements (ACTIONS and SR) are required to be met concurrent with '
.the requirements of the Special Operations LCO."
P_ age 118 Delete Specification 3.5.C.3, which states:
"3.
The HPCI system is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures between 212*F and 300*F and irradiated fuelin the reactor vessel provided all control rods are inserted."
I
~
Attachment ll t) JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 3 of 21 Page 120 Delete Specification 3.5.D.4, which states:
- 4.
The ADS is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures below 300'F and r
irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel provided all control rods are l
Inserted."
l P_ age.121 Delete Specification 3.5.E.4, which states:
"4.
The RCIC system is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures between 212*F and 300'F and irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel provided all control rods are inserted."
Pape137 Delete the following from Specification 3.6.A.2:
" Specifications 3.5.C,3.5,P 1.5 E and 3.6.E which would become effective because of an increase in re or coolant temperature above 212'F or pressures above 100 and 15u psig are not required while conducting the RCS hydrostatic pressure and leakage tests between 212'F and 300*F provided all control rods are fully inserted."
Page 143-Delete Specification 3.6.E.5, which states:
"5.
The safety and safety / relief valves are not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with rea> or coolant temperetures between 212'F and 300*F and irradiated fuelin the reactor vessel provided all control rods are inserted."
= - _ _
Att: chm:nt 11 to JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 4 of 21 P_aae 148 Delete the following from Specification 3.6 and 4.6 Bases:
" Specification 3.6.A.2 identifies four LCOs that become effective with increased reactor coolant temperature or pressure but are not in effect during the hydrostatic and leakage tests. This is necessary because, as reactor fluence increases, the minimum test temperature and pressure rises into ranges normally associated with startup or hot shutdown. RCS pressure and temperature are used throughout the Technical Specifications as a basis for establishing plant mode and system operability requirements. Some LCOs and restrictions cannot be satisfied during the test at elevated temperatures. For example, Specifications 3.5 C.1 and 3.5.E.1 require that HPCI and RCIC bt operable when reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig and 212F. HPCI and RCIC cannot be made operable during the test because piping normally filled with steam is filled with water during the test.
Hydrostatic and leakbge tests shall be terminated before the reactor coolant temperature exceeds 300"F. This temperature limit is based on providing a 50*F band for operating flexibility between the 300"F limit and the highest estimated minimum testing temperature at 32 EFPY (approximately 250 F).
The protection provided by LCOs applicable during cold shutdown plus the requirement that all control rods be fully inserted are adequate to ensure protection of public health and safety. Tha hydrostatic test is performed once overy 10 years while the leakage test is performed af ter each refueling when conditions are similar to cold shutdown (l.o., after the reactor has been shutdown and decay heat and the energy stored in the core is very low). The consequences of accidents (small and large break LOCAs, MSLB, etc.) are bounded by analyses that assume full power operation. Specification 3.5.A requires the low pressure ECCS systems to be operable. Specifications 3.7.A, 3.7.B and 3.7.C require the containment, SGTS and Secondary Containment to be operable. Specifications 3.2.A,3.2.B and Appendix B, Specification 3.8 require instrumentation that initiate containment, low pressure ECCS, SGTS and Secondary Containment be operable. Emergency power is required by Specification 3.9.B."
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Attachment il13 JPN 98 005 -
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 5 of 21 L' age 244a and 244h Add Specification 3.12 as follows:
"3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS Anoticability:
I Applies to the status of systems during special operations.
l Objective:
{
To allow performance of special operations.
Snecification:
A. Innervice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina Oneration The reactor may be considered to be in COLD SHUTDOWN with reactor coolant temperature between 212*F and 300'F and the reactor vessel not vented, to allow performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic testing provided the following LCOs are met:
- 3. Secondary Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation instrumentation:
- a. LCO 3.2.A,' " Primary Containment isolation Functions", Table 3.21, Trip Function " Reactor Low Water Level (Notes 4 and 7);"
- b. Radiological Effluent TS LCO 3.8, " Standby Gas Treatment System", Radiological Effluent TS Table 3.101, Trip Functions
- Refuel Area Exhaust Monitor" and " Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors."
- 4. LCO 3.7.C, " Secondary Containment" (including' maintenance of Secondary Containment integrity as defined by Definition 1.0.S); and
~
Att0chmOnt ll to JPN 98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 6 of 21
- 5. LCO 3.9, " Auxiliary Electrical Systems," t 1e necessary systems shall be I
operable to support equipment required to be operable.
- 6. With the above requirements not met, immediately suspend activities I
that could increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure and reduce reactor coolant temperature to less than 212*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."
Eage 244n Add Specification 4.12 as follows:
"4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS Acolicability:
Applies to periodic testing of systems during special operations.
OldattlYn:
To verify operability of required systems during special operations.
Specification:
A. Inservice Leak and Hvdrostatic Testina Ooeration Perform the applicable surveillance requirements for the required LCOs."
Attachm:nt ll13 JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 7 of 21 Eage_2d_4s inev$ page) l Add Section 3/4.12 Bases as follows::
"3.12 and 4.12 /MSES A. Insnvice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina coeratino The purpose of this Moecial Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at temperatures greater than 212*F (normally corresponding to HOT SHUTDOWN).
Allowing the reactor to be considered in COLD SHUTDOWN during hydrostatic or leak testing, when reactor coolant temperature is > 212'F, effectively provides an exception to HOT SHUTDOWN requirements, including operability of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low, Under these conditions, the potential for f ailed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized, in addition, Special Operations LCO 3.12.A requires supporting LCOs for ECCS Cold Condition, Standby Gas Treatment, Secondary Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation instrumentation, and Auxiliary Electrical Systems to be met to ensure secondary containment integrity is maintained and capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. A listing of secondary containment isolation valves required to maintain Secondary Containment Integrity is included in plant controlled procedures. The required pressure testing conditions provido adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postuleSd main steam line break outside of primary containment, in the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core caoling systems to operate. The capability of these systems, as required by this Special Operations LCO, would be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition.
Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.
For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required COLD SHUTDOWN applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions."
.. _ 1 to JPNo98-005 8AFETY EVALUATION I
Page 8 of 21 2.
Editorial Changes P_ Age]
Change page number for LCO/SR 3.1/4.1 from "30g" to "30h."
P_Agt.ll Move the section headings " LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" and "SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMEMIS" to the top of the page.
Delete blank line between "3.9 Auxiliary Electrical Systems" and "A.
Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems."
Relocate LCO/SR 3.11/4.11.D and E from page 111.
P_agalil Add the section headings " LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" and
- S1JRVEILLANCE RECJIREMENIS" to the top of the page.
Delete " DELETED" for page 244a and replace with LCO/SR "3.12/4.12 Special l
Operations" and LCO/SR "A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation."
page 30b
. Palocate Bases for LCO 3.0.A, 3.0.B, 3.0.C, 3.0.D, and 3.0.E from page 30b to page 30c.
Pme_3Ds Relocate tne remainder of the Bases for LCO 3.0 E from page 30c to page 30d.
Page 30d i
Relocate Basis for LCO 3.0.F from page 30d to page 30s, Pege 30e Relocate Bases for SR 4.0.A,4.0.B, and 4.0.C from page 30e to page 30f.
Pace 30f Relocate the remainder of the Bases for SR 4.0.C and the Bases for SR 4.0.D from page 30f to page 300 P.nen.209
- Relocate LCO/SR 3.1/4.1 from page 30g to new page 30h.
l' Attachment ll to JPN 98-005 5AFETY EVALUATION Page 9 of 21 Page 118 Revise SR 4.5.C.1.a as follows:
Change "HPCI subsystem" to *HPCI System," *the LPCI subsystem" to "both l
LPCi subsystems," "RCIC system" to "RCIC System," and " ADS subsystem" to
" ADS System."
Revised Specification to read:
"When it is determined that the HPCI System is inoperable the RCIC, both LPCI subsystems, both core spray subsystems, and the ADS System actuation logic shall be verified to be operable immediately. The RCIC System and ADS System logic shall be verifled to be operable daily thereaf ter."
Eage 120 i
Revise SR 4.5.D.2.a as follows:
Change " ADS subsystem" to " ADS System" and "HPCI Subsystem" to "HPCI System."
Revised Specification to read:
"When it is determined that two valves of the ADS are Inoperable, the ADS System actuation logic for the operable ADS valves and the HPCI System shall be verified to be operable immediately and at least weekly thereafter."
Paos 244a Delete "Pages 244a 244w DELETED."
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Attachment ll 13 JPN 98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 10 of 21
- 11. EljBEOSE OF__THEfaQEQSED CHANGES 1.
Technical Changes The Authority uses the guidance in NRC Generic Letter 8811, "NRC Position on
{
Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and its impact on Plant l
Operations," for calculation of the reactor vessel pressure and temperature (P T) limits for hydrostatic and system leakage (pressure) testing of the reactor coolant system. The P T curves defining these limits are periodically recalculated to consider the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens to account for i
accumulated reactor fluence. At the current point in FitzPatrick reactor vessellife, P-T curve limitations are such that reactor coolant temperatures above 212'F ore l
expected during pressure tests.
The purpose of the proposed technical changes is to allow reactor coolant system pressure tests to be performed while remaining in the Cold Shutdown Mode.
Primary containment integrity is not required in the Cold Shutdown Mode thus allowing unrestricted access to the primary containment for the performance of inspections. The changes will also allow outage activities on other systems to f
continue at the same time as duting pib66ure testhy. The changos, with minor I
I exceptions, adopt Special Operations Section 3.10.1, *lnservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation," from Standard Technical Specifications (STS),
NUREG 1433, Revision 1. Minor exceptions are required to ensure consistency within FitzPatrick TS, reflect differences between FitzPatrick TS and t TS, and ensure the same level of ECCS redundancy afforded by STS during pressure testing. These exceptions will be eliminated when the FitzPatrick TS are converted to STS.
Technical Specification Amendment 179 was issued on March 9,1992 to allow the High Pressure Coolant injection, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Safety Relief Valves, and Automatic Depressurization Systems to be inoperable during the performance of reactor coolant system pressure tests at temperatures up to 300*F. These exceptions to the normal system operability requirements are permissible because pressure tests are performed with the reactor shutdown, in nearly water solid conditions, with low decay heat (i.e., heat flux is approximately 1 percent of the full power value within a few hours of shutdown). The proposed changes will retain the exceptions for these systems because operability of these systems is not required with the reactor in the Cold Shutdown Mode. The effect of the proposed changes is to expand the list of exceptions to the normal operability requirements to be consistent with STS (NUREG 1433. Revision 1).
2.
Editorial Changes Editorial changes improve the table of contents, relocate text, ensure consistent use of terminology, or reflect tho addition of new TS pages.
Att:chment ll to JPN 98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 11 of 21 111. SAFETY IMPLICAllONS OF THE PROEDSED_CHAN.QES 1.
Technical Changes Allowing the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during reactor coolant system pressure tests, with reactor coolant temperature between 212'F and 300*F, effectively provides an exception to Hot Shutdown requirements, including maintaining primary containment integrity and operability of the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since pressure tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low Under these conditions, the potential for f ailed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized.
An analysis of a High Energy Line Break (HELB) was performed (Reference 1) to determine the response of the secondary containment to a HELB during a reactor coolant system hydrostatic test. Reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were conservatively assumed to be 350'F and 1250 psia, respectively, for this analysis. In addition, the primary containment, including the drywell head, was assumed to be open during the test in order to maximize the energy telease to the secondaty containment. The analysis demunsttates that iii the event of a HELB during a hydrostatic test, the secondary containment will remain intact and environmental qualification of equipment within the secondary containment will not be Jeopardized. Since secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with the Special Operations LCO, the secondary containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing.
The requirements of the Special Operations LCO provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements willlimit potential radiation releases to the environment, in the event of a large reactor coolant system pressure boundary leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize illowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of these systems, as required by the Special Operations LCO would be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small reactor coolant system pressure boundary leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.
During reactor coolant system pressure tests, the protection provided by normally required Cold Shutdown applicable LCOs,in addition to the requirements of the Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal testing conditions and during postulated accident conditions,
. 1 to JPN 98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 12 of 21 i
Technical Specification Effects l
The proposed changes allow reactor coolant systern pressure testing to he performed in Cold Shutdown when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing be performed at temperatures greater than 212*F (normally corresponding to Hot Shutdown). TS requirements i
for the following systems or components are affected by the proposed changes:
l i
Primary Containment isolation System Accident Monitoring instrumentation Core Spray System Low Pressure Coolant Injecilon System
- * - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Cross Tie Valve Position RHR Spent Fuel Pool Cuoling e - RHR Containment Cooling Reactor Coolant System Chemistry Reactor Coolant System Leakage ShMk Suppressors (Snubbers)
F
- ' Auxiliary Electrical Systems
- Control Room Ventilation
-* Crescent Area Ventilation 1
The specific requirements that will no longer be in effect during reactor coolant t
system pressure testing and their potential safety significance are discussed
- below, s
- Specification 3.2.A: Requires that instrumentation which initiates primary '
containment isolation be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. Primary containment integrity will not be required per Specification 3.7 A.2; therefore, the safety functions provided by Specification 3.2.A is not
. required except for the reactor low water trip function which actuates Secondary
' Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatment.
A
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Attachm:nt il to JPN 98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 13 of 21 Specification 3.2.H: Requires the stack, turbine building ventilation, radwaste building ventilation, and containment high range radiation monitors be operable whenever the reactor is in the Run, Sturtup/ Hot Standby, and Hot Shutdown Modes, Proposed Specification 3.12.A will allow the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown during hydrostatic and system leakage tests; therefore these radiation monitors will not be required to be operable during testing. These radiation monitors provide information to the operator for use in assessing plant conditions following an accident. Since the potential for f ailed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.2.H is not required. The containment high range radiation monitors also provide primary containment isolation signals; however, since primary containment integrity is not required during hydrostatic and system leakage tests, the isolation function provided by these radiation monitors is not required.
Specification 3.5.A.1: Requires both Core Spray Subsystems be operable whenever irradiated fuelis in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition. Since the core will remain in a subcritical condition during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.1 is not required. Proposed Specification 3.12.A will require a min! mum of two low pressure emergency core cooling subsystems be operable por Specification 3.5 F.1 during hydrostatic and bytt6m leakage testing of the reactor coolant system.
Specification 3.5 A.3: Requires both LPCI subsystems be operable whenever irradiated fuelis in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition. Since the core will remain in a suberitical condition during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.3 is not required. Proposed Specification 3.12.A will require a minimum of two low pressure emergency core cooling subsystems be operable per Spec fication 3.5.F.1 during hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant system.
Specification 3.5 A.3.b: Requires the motor cperated and manually-operated RHR cross tie valves be locked closed whenever reactor water temperature is greater than 212'F. The intent of this specification is to prevent a loss of both LPCI subsystems during a DBA LOCA due to a diversion of all LPCI flow to the severed recirculation loop. ' roposed Specification 3.12.A will allow the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown during hydrostatic and system leakage tests;
' therefore these valves will not be required to be locked closed during testing. Due to the low reactor coolant temperature and decay heat loads during hydrostatic testing, sufficient time would be available to close the subject valves, if required to ensure core cooling. Therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.3.b is not required.
AttCchment ll to JPNe98 005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 14 of 21 i
Specification 3.5.A.4 b: Requires that the RHR System shall not supply cooling to i
the spent fuel pool when the reactor coolant temperature is above 212T. The f
intent of this specification is to ensure availability of both LPCI sobsystems in the event of a LOCA. Due to the low reactor coolant temperature and decay heat loads during hydrostatic testing, sufficient time would be available to realign LPCI, if required to ensure core cooling. Therefore, the safety function provided by i
Specification 3.5.A 4 b is not required.
Specification 3.5.81 Requires both subsystems of the containment cooling mode (of the RHR System) be operable whenever there is irradlated fuelin tha reactor vessel, prior to startup from a cold condition, and reactor coolant temperature in greater than or equal to 2127. The function of the containment cooling mode is to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a LOCA. This function ensures primary containment integrity is maintained following a LOCA by maintaining containment pressure and temperature within design limits. Since primary containment integrity will not be requireu during hydrostatic and system leakage tests por Specificathn 3.7.A.2, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.B is not required.
Specification 3.6.C.1: Establishes limits for reactor coolant system specific activity limits. Specification 3.6.C 5 requires the reactor be plcced in the cold condition if limits are exceeded. - Allowing the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown with reactor coolant system temperature above 212T effectively provides an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.6.C.1. The intent of Specification 3.6.C.1 is to limit the exposure at tho site boundary in the event of a
-ma n steam ne break outside the primary containment. During hydrostatic and i
li system leakage tests of the reactor coolant system, the main steam line isolation valves remain closed in order to pressurize the reactor coolant system. Therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.6.C.1 is not required.
Specification 3.6.C.4: Establishes limits for reactor coolant water conductivity and chloride concentration. Specification 3.6.C.5 requires the reactor be placed in the cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if limits are exceeded. Allowing the reactor to be consider.ed in Cold Shutdown with reactor coolant system temperature above 2127 effectively provides an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.6.C.4. The intent of Specification 3.6.C.4 is to minimize corrosion of the reactor coolant system. The major benefit of cold shutdown is to reduce the temperature dependent corrosion rates and provide time for the Reactor Water Cleanup System to reestablish purity of the reactor coolant. Fince hydrostatic and
- leakage tests of the reactor coolant system are infrequently performed tests
. (normally once per operating cycle) of relatively short durat!on (normally less than 3 days) an exception to the requirements of this specification will have minimal impact on corrosion of the reactor coolant system.
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Attachment ll to JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 15 of 21 SpecificatA J.6.D.1: Requires that reactor coolant systerr leakage rates be within specified limits whenever irradiated tuel is in the reacwr vessel and reactor coolant temperature is above 212*F. Laakage limits are based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The intent of this specification is to provide early indication of potential flaws in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Since the reactor coolant pressure boundary is visually inspected to detect leaks during hydrostatic and system Icakage testing, the safety fur.ction provided by Specification 3.6.D.1 is not required.
Specification 3.6.D 4: Requires the Primary Containment Sump Monitoring System and the Continuous Atmosphere Monitoring System be operable when the reactor coolant leakage limits are in effect. Since reactor coolant leakage limits will not be In effect during hydrostatic and system leakage tests, leakage detection systems will also not be required to be operable. Visualinspection of the reactor coolant system during hydrostatic and system leakage tests satisfies the safety function provided by leakage detection systems.
Specification 3.6.l: Requires all snubbers to be operable except during cold shutdown and refueling. During cold shutdown and refueling, only those snubbers shall be operable wh:ch are on systems required to be opecable. Since proposed Specification 3.12.A allows the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during hydrostatic and system leakage testing with reactor coolant temperature above 212'F, an exception is provided to the snubber operability requirements. Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or scvere transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. During normal operation, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed for repair or replacement of an inoperable snubber prior to taking any other action. Since inoperable snubbers are permitted for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during normal operation, providing an exception to snubber operability requirements for the short duration of hydrostatic and system leakage testing is not safety significant.
- Specification 3.7.A.1: Requires that torus water level and torus water temperature be maintained within specified limits whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 212'F and irradiated fuelis in the reactor vessel. Since proposed Specification 3.12.A allows the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during hydrostatic and system leakage testing with reactor coolant temperature above 212*F, an exception is provided to the torus water level and water temperature limits. The purpose of these torus water level and water temperature limits is to ensure that peak primary containment pressures and temperatures do not exceed maximum allowable values during a postulated DBA or any transient resulting in heatup of the torus. Since primary containment integrity will not be required during hydrostatic and system leakage tests per Specification 3.7.A.2, the safety function provided by Specification 3.7.A.1 is not -
required. SR 4.5 F.3 requires that torus water level be maintained greater than or equal to 10.33 feet whenever a low pressure emergency core cooling system is aligned to the torus. This SR ensures sufficient water is available for core cooling.
Attachm:nt ll to JPN-98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 16 of 21 Specification 3.7.' 7,: Re':uires that primary containment integrity be maintained at all timas when e reactor is critical or reactor water temperature is above 212T and fuelis in the reactor vessel. Since proposed Specification 3.12.A -
allows the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during hydrostatic and system leakage testing with reactor coolant temperature above 2127, an exception is provided to the isquirement to establish primary containment integrity. S:nce the hydrostetic or leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel i
and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the limits specified in LCO 3.6.C, " Coolant Chemistry " are minimized, i.. eddition, secondary containment-integrity will be maintained, in accordance with this Spec.at Operations LCO, and Ethe secondary containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could or cur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing (Reference 1). The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2.- Therefore, these requirements wit!
conservatively limit potential radiation releases to the environment.-
4 Specification 3.7 A.4: Requires the pressure suppression chamber - reactor building vacuum breakers to be operable whenever primary containment irtega$
i
-is required. Since primary containment integrity is not required to be m et%%
during hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant syvec,15e safety function provided by the vacuum breakers is not required.'
Specification 3.7 A,5: Requires the pressure _ suppression chamber - drywell:
vacuum breakers to be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. Since primary containment integrity is not required to be maintained during hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant system, the safety function provided by the vacuum breakers is not required.
Specification 3.7.D.1 Requires that primary containment isolation valves and all instrument excess flow check valves be. operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. Primary containment integrity will not be required per
=c Specification 3.7.A.2; therefore, the safety function govided by Specification
- 3,7.D 1 is not required.
1
Attachment il to JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 17 of 21 Specifict.t.<n. 3.9: Includes operability requirements for the Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems, Emergency AC Power System, Station Batteries, and LPCI MOV Indapendent Power Supplies. This specification does not specifically address operabil:ty requirements for power systems other than Emergency Diesel Generators during Cold Shutdown, in order to assure adequate power sources are available during reactor coolant system pressure testing, proposed Specification 3.12.A requirer that necessary powei supply systems be operable to support equipment required to be operable. This proposed change is consistent with the requirements of Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 3) for shu;down power sources, Since Specification 3.12.A will ensure adequate power acurce availability, the safety function provided by Specification 3.9 is not required.
Specification 3.11.A: Requires the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and fresh air filter trains be operable whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 212'F. The purpose of the control room emergency ventilation system is to supply clean air for breathing and to maintain a positive pressure in the contre' room in the event of a LOCA or other design basis accidents. During reactor coolant system pressure testing, the reactor will be maintained subcritical, there is minimal potential for fuel failure, and secondary containment integrity will be maintained. Therefore, the safety function provided by specification 3.11.A is not required.
Comparison With Standard Technical Specifications These proposed changes, with minor exceptions, adopt Special Operations Section 3.10.1, " Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation," from Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 3). The differences between proposed Specification 3.12.A and Standard Technical Specification (STS) Section 3.10.1 and the basis for the differences ara discussed below.
STS provide an exception to normalllot Soutdown requirements by modifying the definition ci Mode. Proposed Specification 3.12.A provides an exception in terms of reactor coolant temperature. This difference is required because FitzPatrick TS typ.cally define system operability requirements in terms of reactor coolant temperature.
J
...-. - -- =- -. - - -. -. - -- - - -
-.~ -
4 Attuhm:nt ll to JPN-98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 18 of 21
- - STS provide an exception to the requir.3ments of LCO 3.4.9, " Residual Heat Remo' al (RHR) Shutdown Cooling 8,+. tem - Cold Shutdown." This exception is not included in proposed Specih;ation 3.12.A because FitzPatrick Technical Specifications do not address sh adown cooling system operability requirements, STS do not place an upper limit on reactor coolant temperature during reactor coolant system pressure testing. Proposed Specification 3.12.A limits reactor coolant temperature to 300*F. This is more conservative than STS and provides an additional margin of safety by limiting the stored energy in the
- reactor coolant system. The 300*F limit is consistent with current FitzPatrick Technical Specification requirements for reactor coolant system pressure testing.
STS LCO 3.3.6.2 requires Functions 1,3,4, and 5 of Table 3.3.6.21,
" Secondary Containment isolation instrumentation," be operable during reactor coolant system pressure testing. Proposed Specification 3.12.A requires the same trip functions where provided by design. Proposed LCO 3.12.A 3.a is comparable to STS Table 3.3.6.21, Function 1; proposed LCO 3.12.A.3 b is comparable to STS Table 3.3.6.2-1, Functions 3 and 4. The FitzPatrick Plant design does not include a " manual initiation" trip function for initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Secondary Containment Isolation which is similar to STS Table 3.3.6.21, Function 5.
STS requires that LCO 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation Valves," be met during reactor coolant system pressure testing, Proposed Specification 3.12.A also requires Secondary Containment Isolation valves to be operable (or secured in the isolated position). Proposed LCO 3.12.A.4 requires LCO 3.7.C,
" Secondary Containment" to be met and includes a requirement that secondary containment integrity, as defined by Definition 1.0.S, be maintained.
FitzPatrick Plant TS do not include a listing of secondary containment isolation valves; however, a list of the valves is contained in plant controlled
- procedures.
- - Proposed Specification 3.12.A includes the requirement to have a minimum of two low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) operable during I
reactor coolant system pressure testing. STS Section 3.5.2 requires two low pressure ECCS be operable at all times during Cold Shutdown. Therefore, proposed Specification 3.12.A ensures the same ECCS redundancy afforded by STS during pressure testing.
I 4
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m
]
{
Att:chmInt ll to JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 19 of 21 Proposed Specification 3.12.A includes the requirement to have the necessary power supply systems operable to support equipment required to be operable during reactor coolant system pressure testing, FitzPatrick TS Section 3,9 addresses only emergency diesel generator operability during Cold Shutdown, STS Section 3,8 addresses operability of all power supply systems during Cold Shutdown. Therefore, proposed Specification 3.12 A ensures the same power supply system redundancy afforded by STS during pressure testing, 2.
Editorial Changes Editorial changes do not alter the intent of any operability Jr surveillance -
requirements contained in the TS. Therefore, these changes have no effect on
- safety, IV. EALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed Amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50,92, since it would not:
- 1. -Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, The probability of a leak in the reactor coolant pressure boundary during reactor coolant system pressure testing is not increased by considering the reactor to be
. In Cold Shutdown, Since the pressure tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized, in addition, Special Operations LCO 3.12.A requires supporting LCOs for ECCS-Cold Condition, Standby Gas Treatment, Secondary Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation instrumentation, and Auxiliary Electrical Systems to be met to ensure secondary containment integrity is maintained and capable of handling any airbome radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. A liwng of secondary containment isolation valves required to maintain Secondary Containment Integrity is included in plant controlled procedures. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment, in the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel
, would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of these systems would be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.
Therefore, the consequencu of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased,
Attachment ll to JPN 98-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 20 of 21 2.
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident initiators or f ailure mechanisms since the changes do not involve any changes to structures, systems, or components, do not involve any change to the operation of systems, and alter procedures only to the extent that the 212 F limit may be exceeded during reactor coolant system pressure testing with certain syster s inoperable. There are no alterations to plant systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
The only difference is that a different subset of plant systems would be utilized for accident mitigation than those utilized during the Hot Shutdown Mode Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
3.
Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
Since pressure tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low, Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. Since secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with the Special Operations LCO, the secondary containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing, Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of I
- safety, V.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES Implementation of the proposed changes will not adversely affect the ALARA or Fire Protection Programs at the FitzPatrick plant, nor wil: the changes impact the environment.
VI. CONCLUSION Based on the discussion above, the reactor may be safely considered to be in the Cold Shutdown Mode during reactor coolant system pressure tests, with reactor coolant temperature between 212 F and 300 F.
The Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and Safety Review Committee (SRC) have reviewed this proposed change to the Technical Specific 0tions and have concluded that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question or a significant hazards consideration and will not endanger the health and safety of the public, a
.. ~.
Attachmont ll t3 JPN 98-005 l
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 21 of 21 Vll. REFERENCES
- 1. ' JAF CALO MULT-02238, Revision 0, JAF-HELB Analysis Durin9 Hydrostatic Test 2.
James A. FitzPatrick Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 14
)
- 3... NUREG 1433, " Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling
-Water Reactors (BWR/4)," Revision 1, dated April 1995
- 4.. James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications, Sections 3.2. A, 3.2,H, 3.5,A,
- 3.5.B, 3.0,C, 3.6.D,- 3.6.1, 3,7. A, 3.7.D, 3.9, and 3.11 5.
AEC Safety Evaluation of the James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Docket No. 50 333,- Dated November 20,1972, and Supplements 6.
NRC letter,8 C McCabe to R. E Beedle, dated March 9,1992, issuing
' Amendment 179 to the Technical Specifications 7.
NYPA letter (JPN 92 002) R. E. Beedle to NRC, dated January 9,1992, regarding
" Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications Reactor Vessel Hydrostatic Testing (JPTS-91014)"
6 4
- - -.. -. -.... -.. = _. - _ - - -. -.
Attachment lll to JPN 98-005 MARKED UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES INSERVICE LEAK AND HYOROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION
. (JPTS 95-004)-
1-4 i
4
.I 4
1 4
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
JAFNPP TECHNICAL SPECIPICATIONS IARLI QP CONTENTS EAnn i
1.0 Cefinitione LIMITING SAFFTY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 Fuel Clodding Integrity 2.1 7
1.2 Reactor Coolern System 2.2 27
$URVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUlMEMENTS 4.0 q,
3.0 Generel 4.1 30 l
3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.2 49 ~
3.2 Instrumentation A.
PeWwy Ccntainment lealetion Puretione A.
49 5.
Coes and Conteenment Cooling Systems -
5.
50 Init'etion end Control C.
Control Red Block Actuation C.
'50 D.
Redetion Mennoring Systeme leciation D.
50 and innistion Punctions E.
53 E.
Drywell Leek Deteadon P.
Feeds,eter Pump Turbine end Main Turbine Trio F.
53 G.
S3 G.
Recirculogien Pump Trio H.
53 H.
Accuisnt Monitoring instrumentation l.
53 1.
4kV Emergency Sue undervoltage Trip J.
54 J.
Remets Shutdown Capetitty 4.3 88 3.3 ReactMty Coured A.
88 A.
ReestMta umitadene B.
91 8.
Control Rode C.
95 C.
Scram innertien Times D.
98 D.
ReactMty Anemstes 4.4 105 3.4 Stendhy Wedd Caneet System A.
105 A.
Nennel 0gatellen s.
10s
- 5.. Opereden W18e Inoperelde Componerne C.
107 C.
Sedian Penttherste Solueen 4.5 112 3.5 Core end Containnent Cootne Systeme A.
112 A.
Core Sprey ord LPCI Systems 5.
115 s.
Contemment cooiine Mode of the RHR System C.
117 C.
HPCI System D.
119 D.
Automatic C:n-imetion System (ADS)
E.
121 E.
Reactor Core tooledon Coodng (RCIC)
System
,_,,.,........-......<g i
JAFNPP TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
F.
ECCS Cold Condition F.
122 G.
Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe G.
122a i
H.
Aver e Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate H.
123 i
(APLH R) l.
Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) 1.
124 J.
Thermal Hydraulic Stability J.
124a
-m _ -
SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.6 Reactor Coolant System 46 136 A.
Pressurization and Thermal Limits A.
136 B.
DELETED C.
Coolant Chemistry C.
139 D.
Coolant Leakage D.
141 E.
Safety and Safety / Relief Valves E.
142a F.
Structural integrity F.
144 G. Jet Pumps G.
144 H.
DELETED 1.
Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 1.
145b 3.7 Containment Systems 4.7 165 A.
165 B.
Standby Gas Treatment System B.
181 C.
184 D.
Primary Containment isolation Valves D.
185 3.8 Miscellaneous Radioactive Material Sources 4.8 214 3.9 Auxil_iary Electrical Systems
[
_4. 9 215 C
3 A.
Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems A.
215 B. - Emergency AC Power System B.
216 C.
Diesel Fuel C.
218 D.
Diesel Generator Operability D.
220 E.
Station Batteries E.
221 F.
LPCI MOV Independent Power Supplies F.
222a G. Reactor Protection System Electrical Protection G.
222c Assemblies 3.10 Core Alterations 4.10 227 A.
Refueling Interlocks A.
227 B.
Core Monitoring B.
230 C.
Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C.
231 D.
Control Rod and Control Rod Drive Maintenance D.
231 g
3.11 Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities 4.11 237 A.
Main Control Room Ventilation A.
237 B.
DELETED l
C.
Battery Room Ventilation C.
239 d,en u ou y W ei t 4 m Vy srion
~b.
m b
^
hnne bdoem hsmo 6.
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Amendment No. 20,12,98,113,1S,
1 ii
wArmee TABLE OF CONTENTS ICant'd)
D.
Emergency Se ce Water System 240D E.
Intake Dectng Heaters 242 ; p Q e.
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[
24d
~
5.0 Design Features 245 5.1 Site 245 5.2 Reactor 245 5.3 Reactor Pressure Vessel 245 5.4 Contenment 245 5.5 Fuel Storage 245 5.6 Sesmic Desgn 246-6.0 Admnstravve Controis 247 6.1 Responsabletty 247 6.2 Orgaruzaoon 247 6.2.1 Facility Management and Techrucal Support 247 6.2.2 Plant Staft 247a 6.3 Plant StaN Qualifica6ons 248 6.4 Retraning and Reptar,ement Tranng 248 6.5 Rewsw and AucSt 248 6.5.1 Piant Operanng Rev6ew Comtrwttee (POMC) 248a 6.5.2 Safety Rewow Committee (SRC) 250 6.6 Reportable Event Acoon 253 f
6.7 Safety Urrut Violat6cn 253-6.6 Procedures 253-254a 6.9 Reporting Requirements
}
6.10 Record Retention 254g 6.11 Radiaton Protocoon Program 255 6.12 Industnal Securtly Program 258 258 6.13 Emergency Plan 2f8 6.14 Fire Protecnon Program 6.15 Enwronmental Qualificadon 258a AM 60fuElt1 M C6 LimrflNG 06Nhrfl&NS fM. OM6N __
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Continued limits of the ACTION statement a==ae==*ed witti the Limiting As a further example, Speceheatoon 3.9.A. requwes en pas"t tiet Condetsors for Operation for the norsnel er emergincy power two 115KV lines and reserve station transioemers be awastable source, and not by the hulmduel ACTION stateerents for each The ACTION statemerW prowedes a 7 day out-of-service tune system, wheystem, train, cosnponent er device ihet is when both seguired offsies circuits are not OPERABLE. If the determened to be inoperable solely a.=== et th inoperaluli;y deferuteen of OPERABLE were appbed without cocsederat on of of its normel or emergency poseer sauce.
r;- -Mien 3.0.E., a8 syneesns, subsystems, trasns, components and deweces supphed by tow enoperatise normal For example, S; 9_ :- 3.g.A. requires in port thet beh power newcoe, both of the oHsite circuits, would also tm emergency dessel generator systems be OPERA 8LE. 'The sneperable. This would dictate inweking the appbcalde ACTION ACTION statesnent provides for a 7 day out-of-serwesw time
. statements for each of the appa e=M= LCOs. However, the when emergency diesel generseer system A er S is not prewiesens et Specsfecesion 3.0.E. permet the tone hmits for OPERABLE. If the elecinselon of OPERASLE were append continued operosien to be consessent with the ACTION without considerselen et W 3.0.E., e8 oyeessne, stecoment for the inopereMe nemesi power sources instead, subsystems, traine, componente and devices supplied by the provided the scher specsfeed condseiens are satisted. In stus anoperable asnergency power eeWee, U generseW eyseten Case, dtis Wendd sneen that for one efewessort the emergeracy A ot 8, would mise tse ka _ " This wondd dictato inwekong power eeurce snust be OPERA 8LE les must be the components the appaie=Ma ACTION etetements der each of the appaie=Ma supphed by the emergency power sourcel and all sedundant Limiting Condseiens for Operosion. However, the provielens of systema, subsyseesne, trains, components and devices in the Specification 3.0.E. pennit the tiene limits for continued scher dMesen must be OPERA 8LE, or hkewese satisf y operation to be consiesent with the ACTION etesement for the cp.e.a.c.a.a=t 3.0.E. 6 4., he cepehto of performing theer dessen
[7) inoperable emergency q$esel generoser system inoseed, simctions and howe en emesgency power source OPERA 8tE).
prownied the other specified condialene are sealeleed. N they in other words, beeh emergency power sources A and a snust are not satisfied, shuedown is required in accordance with this be OPERA 8LE and as redundant systems, subsystems, stains.
componenes and dowocos in beeh dnreasons must also tse specification.
OPERABLE. If these condemens are not seeisfied, shutdown is regused in acceedence with this specifecation.
tri Cold Shutdown and Refuel Modes, Specification 3.0 E. is root apasic M., are thus the indswedual ACTION statement for each apedic=M= Limiting Condsteen for Operation en these i
OPERATIONAL CONDITDONS Imedest snust be adhered to.
Amendment No. pd
- j 4
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JAFNPP 4.0 BASES d,tdM A.
This specification provedes that survositance activities 3
necessary to insure the Lerwteg Comhtions for Operation are requwement will be identified as an exception. An example 1 3
met and will be perfonneef dunne the O*ERATIONAL of an exception when the test intwwel is not specdeed in the !
CONDITIONS imodes) for which the Limen 0 Conddions for regulations is the Note in Spaceficaten 6.20, " Primary (l
Operation are apphcable. PFowiesons for addmonal Contenment Leekage Rete Testmg Progran," whsch mmes surweellence actewstsee to be performed wethout regard to the
- The prowmons of f;:i-P:i. 4.0.8 do not apply to the f asspeicable OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS imodes) are provided test frequencies specdied in the Primary Containment t
in the indewidual Survetence fleguirements.
Leekage Rete Testing Preyam." This exception is provided b
because the program already includes prowissons for B.
Specification 4.0.8 estabbehen the limit for which the extension of intwwgis. -
i (j)!
specified time interval for Surweigence Regurements may be C.
This specificatson omdW es the failure to perform a I
i extended. It permets an allowable extension of the normal Sur;:'
survedience interval to facditete survmuence schedulme and s ?:M -.a4 withm the snowed survenence concederasson of plant operates condmons that may not be interval, defined by the prowiesons of Specification 4.0.8, as suitable for conductme the summinence le.g., transient a condition that conststutes a fasture to most the i
conditions or other ongome sumusence or mentemmics OPERASILITY requirements for a R ' '^'
Condition for activities). It ateo provides meisey to accommedste the OpwMion. Under the provemons of this specdecaton.
i a
length of a fuel cycle for surh that are perfonned at systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE each refueling outage and are specified with a 24 enenth when Sur. ~_
7:1 i a howe been setwiectority survesNonce aterwel. It is not intended that this p* women be performed wnhan the specified done irnerwal h.
used repostesNy as e convenience to extend survedience nothme in this prevision is to be construed as implying that intwwols beyond that specafied for surwaBences that we not systems or componente are OPERA 8LE when dwy we found perfornwd dunne refuobng outosos. The lentation of this or known to be inoperable eithough stM eneming de speedw.etion is bened on engineering judgement and the Survedlance ?n t-n This specoficmion also cientes recognaion that the mot't probable result of any particider that the ACTION requiremente are appEcobie whwi Sur. ?
survedlanc. bemg performed is the wenfication of
- a Requimments howe not been completesi wnhan conformance with the Sumeibence Regurements. De M the allowed surweWence interwel and that the time limits s
on extensson of the *wnnel aumeiRence inteme! ensures Wut
- w AM requirements apply from the poent in time it is Hw rebetubty confinned by survoinence activities w not idennhed det a aumemence has not been performed and not significantly restuced below that obtemed from the speedied at the time that the eBowed surwomence was encomimf.I survedience ineervel. The exceptions to Spec 6feestion 4.0.5 Comptonen of the surwomenos 7:g 22; new, We we thoes surweigences for sufdch the 25% extensson of the alloweble outage time Emsts of the ACTION reguarements interval speedied does not apply. These emceptions are restores comphence with the requireenwWs of WficWien maalin Wie individual Technical *;: M we. The' 4.0.C. However, this dess not negate We fact thm Ww requwerments of regadesons take precedence oww Wu fadure to hows performed the surwmEence wnhen Ww agowed
{
Technecal C;::i"-:f e. Thorofore, when s test intervel e,s summuence intemel, stehnod by the prownesons of specified in the reguistoons, the test interval cannot be Specification 4.0.8, was a violatoon of the OPERASILITY extwidal under the prowiesons of 4.0.8, and the surweellence requwements of a Lwnsting Condmon for Operation thet is subsect to enforcement action. Further, the failure to N
Am.nomeni uo. ca. ?es. t esp. -2*~
4
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JAFNPP 4.0 BASES - Continued C.
Coe.tinued C.
Continued j
k perform a survenence vntfun the provissons of Specification Survedence Requirements do not have to be performed on 4.0.8 is a veciation of a Technical Specification regurement noperable equipment because the ACTION requiresperus and is, therefore, a reportable event under the requirements define the remodel measures that apply. However, the i
i) of 10 CFR 50.73(aH2HiH88 hae-it is a condition Survedance Reguwements have to be met.Jo demonstrate i
I prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.
that inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERAllLE
{
)
status.
l l
3 If the aNowable outage time limits of the ACTION i
requirements are less then 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a shutdown is M
gt required to comply with ACTION requirements, a 24-hour D.
This spoofocatson==*=hbabes the requirement that aN I
aNowance is provided to permit a deley in W;":
asng the applicable surveiNonces must be met before entry into an ACTION requirunents. This provides an adequete time limit OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other condition of operation l
l to complete Survedlance Requirements that have not been specified in the ?;;"M T" J statement. The purpose of this perforened. The purpose of this eBowance is to permet the specification is to onoure that system and component completion of a survoinence before a shuklown is required to OPERAM regarements or parameter limits are met comply with ACTION requirements or before other remedial before entry into an OPERATIONAL CONOfTION or other
'(
measures would be reguwed that rney preclude completion of a
a surveWance. The bases for this agowence includes specified condition===aci=*ad with plant shutdown as wen l
as startup.
consideration for plant senditions, adeguate pionning, i
availability of personnel, the time requwod tu pseform the Under the provisene of this specsfication, the appiscable survomence and the safety esOnefeconce of the deley in Survedence Requirements must be performed withen the
{
completmg the required survuNonce. This provision also specified survedence interval to ensure that the twmting
[
provides a time limit for the complemon cf Survedence Conditions for Operation are met dunne initiet plant startup Requwements that become applicable as a conesquence of or fotowing a plant outage.
OPERATIONAL CONDITION imodel changes imposed trf ACTION requirements and for compleang Survedence When a shutdown is required to cxngly with ACTION Roguerements that are appbcable when an exception to the rogurements, the prowessons of this specification do not reguwements of Specification 4.0.C is allowed. If a apply because this would deley placing the faciisty in a lower survedance is not completed wethen the 24-hour allowance, CONDITION of operation.
i the time limits of the ACTION requerements are appleesbie at that time. Whers a survemence is perfonned vndun the 24-hour allowance and the SurveiNonce Reguerenums are not
{
met, the time lienits of the ACTION re:gue,rements are i
appucaede et the time de survadence m termmeted.
J i
4 L : H, :'; L 11?, 2 *4 Wft i
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JAFNPP 3.1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
' 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 REAGTCfiPROTECTION SYSTEM Aoolicability:
ApolicaM#n Applies to the instrumentation and associated devices which Applies a the surveillance of the instrumentation and associated initiate the reactor scram.
devices which initiate reactor scram.
Obiective:
Obiective:
To assure the operability of the Reactor Protection System.
To specify the type of frequency of surveillance to be applied to the protection instrumentation.
Soecification:
Specification:
A. The setpoints and minimum number of instrument A.
Instrumentation systems shall be functionally tested and calibrated channels per trip system that must be operable for each as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 respectively.
ition of the reactor mode switch, shall be as shown in
- , 9, g 7,
~
. listed below shall be demonstrated to be within its limit once per 24 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel in each trip system. All channels in both trip systems shall be tested within two test intervals.
- 1. Reactor High Pressure (02-3PT-55A, B, C, D) l
- 2. Drywell High Pressure (05PT-12A, B, C, D)
- 3. Reactor Water Level-Low (L3) (02-3LT-101 A, B, C, D) l
- 4. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure (29PNS-80A2, B2, C2, D2)
(29PNS-86A2, B2, C2, D2)
- 5. Turbine Stop Valve Closure (94PNS-101,102,103,104)
- 6. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (94PS-2OOA, B, C, D)
- 7. APRM Fixed High Neutron Flux
(
- 8. APRM Flow Referenced Neutron Flux
(
l
- Sensor is eliminated from response time testing for the RPS actuatiort l
fogic circuits. Response time testing and conformance to the test i
acceptance criteria for the remaining channel components includes tn t
unit and relay logic.
t T
Amendment
. 227,233,230
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- 2.
If the requirements of 35D.1 cannot be met, the reactor 2.
A logic system funchonal test _
h shed be placed in the cold conditon and possure less tien 100 peig wWen 24 hr.
a_
When it is delenmned that two valves of tie ADS ar l ;
moperable, the ADS emb$$rstem actuahon logc for 18 operdile ADS valves and tie HPCI sMstem shat be vented to be operable inanedately and at least i
weekly thereelter.
gi; w
b.
When it is detenmned that more than two rehel/ safety /
valves of the ADS are inoperable, the itPCI System ( ]I (g,
shed be verified to be opesdAe imneddely.
3.
Low power physics testing and remetar operator traming shall be permined with inoperable ADS components.
I prended that reactor coolant temperature is 5212 Y and
[
the raartar vessel is vented or reactor vessel head is
'" f,(nEL 4.
~ ADS is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leeluipo lesen0 wi#l reactor coolant temperahres below 300Y and irradated fuel in the reactor vessel provided a5 control rods are inserted.
Amendment No. M 146',M2085 ffh 120
JAFNPp 3.5 'ICont'd) 4.5 tCont'd)
E.
Reactor Core " " ^*m C " e IRCICI S ^
E.
fleectcr rare Isaistion Combne IRClCl System 1.
The RCIC System shen be operet:*3 whenever there 1.
RCIC System testing shes be performed as fogows is irradisted fuelin the reactor vessel and the reactor provided a reactor steem supply is eveileblo. If steem is not aweilobio at the time the surveNience pressure is greater then 150 pois and reactor coolent test is scheduled to be perforneed, the test shsE be ternperature le grooter then 212*F except from the performed within ten days of continuous operation time that the RCDC System le made or found to be froen the time steem becomes eveilable.
inoperable for any reeson, continued reactor power operation is m.i "" during the =% 7 c
deys unless the system is made operable oorlier jgget Freauency provided that during those 7 days the HPCI System l
s.
Sunuieted Automatic Once per 24 Months Is operable.
A*ctuation (and Restart *)
Test 2.
If the requirements of 3.5.E cannot be snet, the J
reactor shen be placed in the cold condtion and
- b. Pump Opersbuity OrcL4h gg pressure lose then 150 pois within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c.
Motor Operated Once/ month 3.
Low power physics testing and reactor operator Velve Opersbuity training shen be permitted with inoperable components os specified in 3.5.E.2 above, provided
- d. Flow Rote Oncc/3 months that reactor coalent temperature le 5212*F.
4 4.
The RCIC system is not to be operable e.
Testable Check Tested for operability any time the reactor is Velves in the cold condnion during hydrostatic preneure and loolunge testing with reactor coolant temperatures between 212*F and exceeding 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />,if 300*F and irremoted fuelin the reactor vessel operebNity tests hows provided as control rode are inserted.
not been performed dunne the procedmg
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Logic System Once per 24 Months j
Functional Test Automatic restart on a low water level sognef which is subsequent to a high water level trip.
/
M Amendment No. ?? ???. T. *??
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- 2. At least one oefetyhetsof volve shd be desessembled and t
- 2. If Specification 3.8.E.1 is not met, the reactor shes be inspected owwy 24 months.
placed in a cold condition wethen 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- 3. The integrity of the rutrogen system and components wtuch
- 3. Low power physecs techng and reactor operam troeneng shall provide menuel and ADS actuation of the sofptyholeef vefwes he perfrutted with inoperable components as spacefeed in shall be demonstrated at least once every 3 months.
Specification 3.8.E.1 above, provided that reactor cocient l
temperature is s 212 F and the reactor veessi is vented or the reactor veessi heed is resnowed.
- 4. Manuelhr open each safetyheloof velve wtule bypessing j
- 4. The proweseens of Specification 3.0.D are not g C"-
steem to the condenser end observe a 110% closure of the M j
turbane hypeos valves, to verify that the safety #elief volve j
has opened. This test shall be performed at Ioest every 24 monens whde in the fWJN modo and within the fws: 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />;
)
g after steem pressure and flow are adequete to perform the l
/
test.
U
- 5. The safety and safetyhelief volves are not required to be
.f opersiAs dunne hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolent temperatures between 212 F and 300 F and l
i i.
irradiote.d fuelin the reactor vessel prownled all control rods are inserted.
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Amen.noni no. 45. w. ix. uw. us. 2es. 2eoer.ms [-a'n f3
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Att:chment 111 to JPN 98 005 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES l
InitLt A
"G.
Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with the Special Operations LCOs is optional. 'Nhen a Special Operations LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO shall be met.
When a Special Operations LCO is not desired to be met, entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition shall only be made in accordance with the other applicable specifications."
B "G.
Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 aliow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations.
Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mc.de) or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be chan0ed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.
The applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of TS.
Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the eppropriate Speciai Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements, if it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS cf the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met.
Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCOs' requirements (ACTIONS and SR) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO."
4 Page 1 of 4
AttachmInt lli to JPN 98-005 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECisiOATION PAGES Insert C
"3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS Anoticability:
Applies to the status of systems during special operations.
Objective:-
To allow performance of special operations.
Soecification:
A.
. Intervice Leak and Hvdrostatic Testino Ooeration The reactor may be considered to be in COLD SHUTDOWN with reactnr coolant temperature between 212*F and 300*F and the reactor vessel not vented, to allow performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic testing provided the following LCOs are met:
1.
LCO 3.5.F, "ECCS-Cold Condition," a minimum of two low pressure
. subsystems shall be operable; 2.
LCO 3.7.8, " Standby Gas Treatment System;"
. 3.
Secondary Containtnent isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation instrumentation:
a.
LCO 3.2.4, " Primary Containment Isolation Functions", Table
- 3 l-1, Trip Function " Reactor Low Water Level (Notes 4 and 7;;"
b.
Radiological Effluent TS LCO 3.8, " Standby Gas Treatment System", Radiological Effluent TS Table 3.10-1, Trip Functions
" Refuel Area Exhaust Monitor" and "Heactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors;"
Page 2 of 4 m
Attechment lli to JPN 98 005 MAPvtD UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 4.
LCO 3.7.C, " Secondary Containment" (incluu.ng the maintenance of Secondary Containment Integrity as defined by Definition 1.0.S);
and 5.
LCO 3,9, " Auxiliary Dectilc61 Systems," the necessary systems shall be operable to support equipment required to be operable.
6.
With the above requirements not met, immediately suspend activities that could increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure and reduce reactor coolant temperature to less than 212'F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."
Ananil D
"4.12 SURVEILLARCE REQUIREMENTS 4.12 SPECIAL OPERAI1QRS Acollcabilitv:
Applies to periodic testing of systems uring special operations.
Oblective:
To verify operability of required systems during special operations.
Soecification:
A.
Inservice Leak snd Hvdrostatic Testina Ooeration Perform the applicable surveillance requirements for the required LCOs."
E "A,
inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testino Goeration The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor -
coolant pressure tests to be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPVr require the pressure testing at temperatures greater than 212*F (normally corresponding to HOT SHUTDOWN).-
_=
=
Page 3 of 4
Att:: chm:nt lli to JPN 98 005 MARKED UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PACES Inu11 E (cont'd)
Allowing the reactor to be considered in COLD SHUTDOWN during hydrostatic or leak testing, when reactor coolant temperature is > 212*F, eftectively provides an exception tc HOT SHUTDOWN requirements, including operability of primary containment and the full complement of reind"it Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or lack te cs are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near cot.3 SHUTDOWN cond;tions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for f ailed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized, in addition, Special Operations LCO 3.12.A requires supporting LCOs for ECCS Cold Condition, Standby Gas Treatment, Secondary Containment isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation instrumentation, and Auxiliary Electrical l
Systems to be met to ensure secondary containment integrity is maintained and capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. A listing of secondary containment isolation valves required to maintain Secondary Containment Integrity is included in plant controlled l
procedwes. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatinly bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment.
l In the event of a large primary tystem leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of these systems, as required by this Special Operations LCO, would be adequate to keep the core floodad under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.
For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally requirod COLD SHLITDOWN applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions."
Page 4 of 4
_ _ _ _ _