ML20199K115
| ML20199K115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1997 |
| From: | Beach A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Myers L CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199K119 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-96-16, 50-440-96-17, 50-440-96-18, 50-440-97-08, 50-440-97-8, EA-96-482, EA-96-542, EA-97-047, EA-97-430, EA-97-47, NUDOCS 9712010016 | |
| Download: ML20199K115 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000440/1996016
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- - - e j ptd*A UNITED STATES f. . g?g NUCLEA1 RE ULATORY COMMISSION ' [ ,j BEGloN H1 g g 801 wAnntNVlu E ROAD g *****/ UsLE, ILUNotS 60W-051 November 18, 1997 EAs 96482,96 542,97-047, and 97430 Mr. Lew W. Myers Vice President . Nuclear Centerior Service Company P.O. Box 97, A200 Perry, OH 44081 SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSmON OF civil PENALTY - $100,000 (Reports 50-440/96016 (DRS), 50-440/96017 (DRP), 50-440/96018 (DRP), and 50-440/97008(DRS)) and EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION Dear M; Myers: This refers to three routine safety inspections conducted from December 28,1996 through February 3,1997, and a specialinspection conducted from July 21 through August 27,1997, at the Centerior Cervice Company's (Centerior) Perry 1 Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP). Among the more significant findings from the thre: routine safety inspections were failures to: (1) take effective corrective action following an earlier event to prevent repetition; (2) protect cablos and equipment in the same fire control zone outside of primary containment from hot shorts; and (3) restore operability of a motor control center (MCC) within the time specified in the Perry Plant Technical Specifications (TS). The reports documenting these inspections and transmitting the apparent violations were sent to Centerior by letters dated January 23,1997, February 4,1997, and March 19,1997. /; open predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) was held in the NRC Region Ill office on April 18,1997, at which time the violations, root causes and coctective actions were discussed. A follow-up conference was held on October 7, { 1997, to discuss the corrective actions. The purpose of the specialinspection (inspection Report No. 50440/9700b(DRS)) was to follow up on issues identified during the NRC Design Inspection conducted at PNPP from February 17 through March 27,1997 (Inspection Report No 50440/97201). An apparent f violation involving a change to the emergency closed cooling (ECC) system was identified i during this inspection. This issue also appeared to represent an unreviewed safety question (USQ). The exit meeting for the specialinspection was conducted on August 27,1997. The f inspection report for the special inspection was mailed to Centerior by lette, dated September 23,1997. On October 7,1997, an open PEC was held in thc 1RC Region lli office -{ , , to discuss the apparent violation, and the report of the PEC was sent to Ct,nterior by letter, s g dated Octobe 16,1997. , f Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information provided by representatives of Centerior at the conferences, the NRC has determined that several significant violatione of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed ., wmuv%u - - . L j
._ .. - - . . . L. Myers 2- Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection reports. Violation A (EA 97-047) of the enclosed Notice pertains to a November 9,1996 event. This violation is considered significant because it concems a failure to take lasting corrective actions following a similar event in 1994. The November 9,1996 event occurred as operators were retuming a hydraulic power unit (HPU) for the reactor recirculation system 'A' Flow Control Valve to service. The operators were required to confirm that output power was available from the HPU programmable logic controller prior to restarting the HPU. A technician reported that a fuse was blown, indicating an operate / isolate solenoid valve had no power. The shift supervisor consulted with one of the responsible system engineers and decided the HPU could be restarted with the blown fuse in place. The reactor operator then proceeded to restart the HPU. However, the operator wac notifying plant personnel of the HPU restart and he was not attentive to critical reactor parameters. Approximately 12 seconds after the HPI' was started, the shift supervisor recognized that the flow control valve was openir.g and reactor power was increasirg. He then took action to stop the reactivity addition. Nevertheless, reactor power increased from 08 percent to 100.2 percent during the transient. The signiiicance of this event is that, even though several people were involved in developing the plan tc return the flow control valve to service, the actions taken did not take into consideration lessons learned from a prior similar event. Operator training following the 1994 event apparently failed to adequately inform the operators of the potential consequences of an HPU subloop operato/ isolate solenoid failure and the impact on reactivity. Violation A represents a breakdown in the implementation of corrective actions following an incident on July 27,1994, as corrective actions from that event were insufficient to prevent recurrence of a similar event on November 9,1996. Tito violation also represents a potentially significant lack of attention toward reactivity control. Therefore, Violation A is categorized in accordance ,vith the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"(Enforcement Policy) NUREG 1600 as a Severity Level til violation. In addition to the violation, we are concemed that the shift supervisor became overly focused on restarting the flow control valve HPU instead of maintaining a broad perspective of operational conditions. In accordance with the Enforcement Polley, a basc, civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level 111 violation (Violation A) occurring prior to November 12,1996. Since the Perry Plant has been the subject of an escalated enforcement action within the last two years', the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Correct /ve Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for identification because the event was self- identifying and a similar evbish in 1994 provided prior opportunity to identify that starting the HPU with a blown fuse could result in reactivity excursions. Also, several workers from differing i A Notice of Violation without civil penalty was issued for EA 96-367. Tt.e issue was categorized as a Severity Levellli problem for the f ailure to consider ECC or ECC loops inoperable under conditions specified in PNPP Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. - _ __,
. . L. Myers 3- disciplines were involved in developing the plan to retum the flow control valve to service. This provided plant personnel with additional opportunities to identify anticipated problems prior to actually restarting the HPU. Credit for Corrective Action was warranted for Violation A. The NRC recognizes that high level management attention was given to the November 9,1996 ever,t and an investigation into the event was completed, it was also recognized that Centerior took conective actions to address operational performance weaknesses associated with the event. Other corrective actions include, but are not limited to: remedial action for the crew that caused the event; training on the event for the other crews; and modifications to improve HPU reliabliity. To emphasize the importance of reactivity controls and the need for effective corrective actions in response to events, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000. Violation B (EA 96-542) pertains to e miswired electrical breaker installed in an MCC which supplies safety rotated loads for various systerr.s, including the Control Room Emergency Reci*culation (CRER) system. Violation B represents a algnificant failure to comply with an Action Statement for a Technical Specification Limiting Condit!on for Operation (TS LCO) where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time on at least four occasions from March 10 to September 17,1996. Therefore, Violation B is categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level lli violation. Since the Perry Plant was the subject of the previously described escalated enforcement action, within the last two yeare, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action for violation B in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for identification because the event was self identifying, but without reasonable prior opportunities to discover the miswired breaker. Also, Centerior proactively identified other similar breakers purchased and installed at the same time and performed appropriate inspections. Credit was also warranted for Corrective Actions because, even though the vendor considered this event an isolated case, Centerior performed an additional comprehensive evaluation of the susceptibility of other breakers from this vendor to miswiring and developed a method to test the polarity of the signals to the solid state trip device. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty for Violation B. Violation C (EA 97-430) involves the failure to identify a USQ for the ECC surge tanks. The ECC surge tanks were designed to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) was provided to the ECC pumps. 7urther, the design of the surge tanks provided a 7-day supply of water with normal system leakage,0.5 gallons per hour (gph), before makeup water was necded. As part of the corrective actions for an earlier event involving ECC leakage, the PNPP staff established allowable system leakage limits of 3.0 gallons per minu'e (gpm) for ECC Loop A
. 4 t.. Myers 4 and 3.5 gpm for Loop B. The increased allowable leakage reduced the 7-day supply of water to a 30 minute supply and introduced the need for local operator action at the 30 minute point to ensure adequate NPSH to the ECC cooling pumps. The PNPP staff also changed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and applicable drawings and procedures to support the now allowable leakage. However, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed by the PNPP staff incorrectly concluded the changes did not constitute a USQ, and prior NRC approval was not required. The change to the USAR was later incorporated in a periodic update of the USAR and it was not submitted to the NRC for review. ,a the October 7,1997 PEC, the Centerior representatives agreed that this change constituted a USQ and a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, but disagreed with the NRC's basis for coming to that conclusion. The NRC determined that this was a USQ because the change in allowable system leakage increased the consequences of an accident, and it increased the probability of failure of safety related equipment due to the potential failure of time critical required actions by operators in a high radiation area. However, your staff concluded that this change was a USO because it reduced the margin to safety as described in the licensing basis for the PNPP. The change to increase allowable leakage rates was initiated because the ECC was leaking in excess of 0.5 gph. Therefore, the PNPP staff considered the ECC as degraded. However, this leakage was in tne reverse direction from accident conditions. Following the Design inspection Team's questioning of the test methodology used on the system, the PNPP staff disassembled portions of the system (l.e.. niping and valves) and tested the system in the proper direction. The resultant total system leakage was less than 0.5 gph, and that equated to a 10 day supply of water in the surge tank. Following that testing, the PNPP staff rescinded the proposed change to the USAR. However, while it is fortuitous that the potential safety consequences were low, the regulatory significance is high. The NRC depends on a licensee performing adequate safety analyses to determine whether or not a USQ exists. A licensee's safety analysis for the existence of a USQ is fundamental to ensuring the bases on which the plant was licensed are maintained. in this case, multiple levels of the PNPP staff and management reviewed the changes, but did not identify the safety implications. The violation described in the Notice concerns a significant failure to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, including a failure such that a required license amendment was not sought. Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600 at Severity Level 111. In accordance with the Enforcement Polby, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level lll violation occurring prior to November 12,1996. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy, identification credit was not warranted because the NRC identified the violation. The NRC evaluated whether credit for Corrective Action was also warranted. Your corrective .
- . - .. .- -- _ . - - - - . - - - _ - - - . . . i L Myers 5- actions were comprehensive, and included, but were not limited to: training, both current and future refresher, emphasizing the importance of effective safety reviews; reviewing a number of past sahty evaluations to determine if they failed to identify any USQs; and revising your proceduie for reviewing changes to consider any change that results in any reduction in the marglit to safety, as described in the licensing basis, as a USQ. Your definition of reduction in margin is more conservative than the NRC definition of reduction in margin as defined in the basis for a technical specification. While your corrective actions did not directly address past of the root cause of the violation (i.e., poor understanding of the 10 CFR 50.f 9 criteria regarding increased consequences and increased equipment failure probability) the
NRC concluded that your conservative definition of reduction in margin would likely prevent recurrence of this violation in the vast majority of cases. In addition, we are aware that the i nuclear industry's formal positiori on USQs is based on the same principles you applied in i reviewing the potential for increased consequences and probability of equipment failure. Therefore, we have determined that on balance, credit is warranted for corrective action. Nonetheless, in your response to this letter, you should describe additional corrective actions , that you have taken, or plan to take, to ensure that your review criteria appropriately identify changes that would result in incret M vsequences of an accident or increased probability of failure of safety related equipment, Therefore, to emphasize the importance of promptly identifying violations and to ensure that safety reviews related to 10 CFR 50.59 are bread and sufficiently detailed, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $50,000 for the Severity Level ill violation. EA 96-482 concerns a period of approximately two years (August 1994 to July 1906) when a means had not been established to protect cables and equipment of at least ene redundant train of safe shutdown equipment from hot shorts during a postulated fire in the control room. This design issue is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and represents a system designed to prevs,1t or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended safety function (i.e., ensuring that a redundant train remained free from fire damage and available to maintain hot shutdown of the unit). This issue was considered for escalated enforcement and possible civil penalty. However, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized to neither issue a Notice of Violation nor propose a civil penalty in this case, in accordance with Section Vll.B.3 of the Enforcement Policy. This decision was made after considering that the issue was discovered by the PNPP staff. In addition, the initial evaluation by plant staff of NRC information Notice (IN) No. 9218 " Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire," dated March 28,1992, was adequate based on the available information. While there was an opportunity to identify this issue during the 1994 refueling outage, the PNPP staff was focused at that time on providing sufficient margins to assure MOV actuation and not on hot short concerns. The hot short weakness in post safe shutdown capability was later identified through the engineering design change process. The NRC also considered that Centerior's corrective actions following identification of additionalinformation in 1996 were adequate Modifications have been made to all affected equipment, and Centerior improved the process for multi-disciplined design . - -. . - - . .- . - - . - - .- --- - - _
. . L Myers -6- 1 chan00 reviews. Further, the NRC considered that this issue is not reasonably linked to current performance. The exercise of discretion acknowledges your good efforts to identify and correct significant design problems. ) You are required to respond to this letter, with the exceptions noted in the following paragraph, and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response for the issues cited in Violations A and C. The NRC will use your responses,in part, to determine whether further enforcement adion is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. The NRC has concluded that the information regarding Violation B, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved are already adequately addressed on the docket in License Event Report (LER) No. 90-008, dated November 4,1996. Therefore, you are not required to respond to Violation B unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's
- Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the
NRC Public Document Room (PDR). Sincerely, wi J j A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-F8 Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Ploposed imposition of Civil Penalty cc w/enci: H. L. Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Affairs T. S. Rausch, Director, Quality and Personnel Development R. Schreader, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department W. R. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department H. W. Bergendahl, Director Nuclear Services Department Terry J, Lodge, Esq.
. . L. Myers 7 State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio Robert E. Owen Ohio
Department of Health C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio Public Utilities Commission
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-8- _ DISTRIBU , . PUBLIC IE i -SECY CA i LCallan, EDO - AThadani, DEDE ( , ' LChandler, OGC JGoldberg, OGC ) SCollins, NRR -} RZimmerman, NRR -j GMarcus, NRR DPickett, NRR Enforcement Coordinators- RI, Ril and RIV Resident Inspector, Perry _ -JGilliland, OPA HBell, OlG GCaputo 01 LTremper, OC TMartin, AEOD OE:ES OE:EA (2) RAO:Rlli SLO: Rill PAO: Rill OC/LFDCB DRP~ Docket File -
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