ML20199B796

Forwards Rev 3 of RG 5.44, Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Sys. Regulatory Guide Has Been Revised to Provide Guidance on Selecting Perimeter intrusion-detection Alarm Sys & Applications at Nuclear Power Reactors

ML20199B796
Person / Time
Issue date:	10/21/1997
From:	Rathbun D NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
To:	Gore A PRESIDENT OF U.S. & EXECUTIVE OFFICES
References
RTR-REGGD-05.044, RTR-REGGD-5.044, TASK-*****, TASK-RE CCS, NUDOCS 9711190099
Download: ML20199B796 (40)

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UNITED STATES ij NUCLEAR REGU1.ATORY COMM68810N wasmwovoN, D.C. M

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October 21, 1997 The Honorable Al Gore President of the United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to Subtitle E of the Small Bu*.iness Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. 801, the Nuclear R3gulatory Commission (NRC)is submitting Revision 3 of Reguistory Guide 5.44, " Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems."

Regulatory Guide 5.44 has been revised to provide guidance on sele.; ting perirneter intrusion detection alarm systems and their epplications at nuclear power reactors, independent spent fuel storage instL ations, and certain special nuclear material processing 4

facilities.

We have determined that this regulatory guide is not a " major rule" as defined in 5 U.S.C.

804(2). We have confirmed this determinatioa with the Office of Management and Budact.

Enclosed is a copy of Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 5.44, which will be distributed to affected licensees and other interested parties, Sincerely,

~

Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs

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Enclosures:

Regulatory Guide 5.44 Regulatory Analysis i

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411ypRspuu XX,XXX C PDG; i

.y. ~esk UNtYED STATES

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1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

WASHINGTON D.C. 3000HSD1 Octcber 21, 1997 The Honorable Newt Gingrich Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulator

• nforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. 801, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (N.C)is submitting Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 5.44, " Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems."

Regulatory Guide 5.44 has been revised to provide guidance on selecting perimeter intrusion-detection alarm systems and their applications at nuclear power reactors, independent spent fuel storage installations, and certain special nuclear material processing iacilities.

We have determined that this regulatory guide is not a " major rule" as defined in 5 U.S.C.

804(2). We have confirmed this determinatinn with the Office of Management and Budget.

Enclosed is a copy of Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 5.44, which wi:1 be distributed to affected licensees and other laterested parties.

Sincerely.

4,J/

Dennis K. Rathbun. Director Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures:

Regulatory Guide 5.44 Regulatory Analysis

p me c'

a UNITED STATES

']

NUCLEAR REGULATONY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. asetHeM October 21, 1997 9

Mr. Mobert P. Murphy General Counsel General Accounting Office Room 7175 441 G Steset, NW.

Wushington, DC 20b48

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Pursuant to Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. 801, the Nuclear Requistory Commission (NRC) is submitting Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 5.44, "Perirneter Intrusion Alarm Systems."

Regulatory Guide 5.44 has been revised to provide guidance on selecting perimeter intrusion detection alarm systems and their applications at nuclear power reactors, indepanoent spent fuel storage installations, and certain special nuclear materi'il processing facilities.

We have determined that this regulatory guide is not a " major rule" as defined in 5 U.S.C.

804(2.l. W3 have confirmed this determinatior, with the Office of Management and Budget.

Enclosed is a copy of Revision 3 of Regulatory Guide 5.44, which will be distributed to affected licensees and other interested partiet.

l Sincerely, M

l Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs

Enclosures:

Regulatory Guide 5.44 l

Regulatory Analysis I

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Fr er.

.se ey 71 -/95 ENCt.0SURE "C" VAlbE/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1.

The Proposed Action A.

Description Proposed amendmens to 10 CFR Part 73, 42 FR 34310. July 5, 1977, comenly referre( to as the upgrade rule, require that fual cycle licensees, and licensees involved in the trans-portetton of certain quantities of special nuclear material upgrade their physical security requirements to prevent tiieft with high assurance and to protect against radiological sabotage by the defined threat.

These amendments included requirements.for general performanc.e to protect against adversaries as defined in the regulation.

They also included a generic safeguards reference system for fixed site and transportation physical protection which provides the cc.pabilities to meet the general reqvirements.

B.

Need for the Proposed Action A joint ERDA-NRC task force was fonned on March 17, 1976, to propose a plan of action for improving the control and protection 1

Enclosure "C"

(

of nuclear materials at NRC licensed fuel cycle facilities. The task force addressed the current status and future direction of physical security protection at NRC licensed fuel cycle facilities in possession of certain quantities of special nuclear material.

The task force report was issued in July 1976.I The requirement to provide improved u ;31 cal security systems to mest an increased f.hreat level is discussed in this report.

C.

Value/ impact of the Proposed Action 1.

NRC Operating Upgraded licensee physical security measures will provide assurance to the NRC and the public, that the security afforded fs adequate to protect this material against threats having characteristics greater than currently considered.

The direct impact on NRC will be the costs associat(d with the effort expended to perform reviews and inspections of revisions to the existing physical security programs.

Currently there are 12 plans which will have to be revised and are as follows:

11 for fixed site fuel cycle facilities and one for the protection of special nuclear material in 2

Enclosure "C"

transit.

It is estimated that an average of approximately 6 man-months will be expended by NRC to review each revised plan. Assuming an NRC cost per man-month of $2,800, the total cost for review of t..se revisions is estimated at about $201,600.

It is further estimated that 2 man-months per year per licensee or 24 man-months per year will be expended by the NRC to review subsequent revisions to the plans to make them acceptable. The costs for this review is estimated at 567,200.

2.

Other Government Agencies The increased level of physical protection that will exist at fuel cycle facilities and during transportation will enable licensees to deter, detect, delay and contain a more significant spectrum of adversary capabilities.

This will provide the licensee with a security system and response forces which could more fully cope with threats below the level specified in the regulation.

However, it is expected that the security posture that will be developed to cope with the threat levels specified in the regulation will continue to rely on local law enforcement and other Federal 3

Enclosure "C" i

agencies and that the present involvement of such agencies in providing irntectaon will continue at the current icvel or increase.

-Since muse of the facilities being affected are processing government owned material under the cognizance of DOE and 000, a major portion of cost will revert to these Departments.

3.

Industry The major impact on the licensees will be the espital and annual costs associated with the additional security personnel and hardware requirements and the preparation of revised security plans.

Estimates of the range of costs which may be incurred are shown in Annex 1 to this enclosure.

The total additional cost associated with upgrading physical security at fixed sites has been computed to be $6,712,000 capital investment cost and $6,001,000 in recurring annual cost.

Theseaverage$610,000(capital)and!546,000 (annual)perfacility.

It is estimated that this represents increases over present expenditures of 154% capital and 81% annual costs.

4 Enclosure "C"

_ _m _ _

4 The total additional cost associated with upgrading trans-portation physical security for 20 shipments per year is estimatedat$48,000(capital)and$68,000(annual).

It is estimated that this represents an increase over present estimated expenditures of 39% capital cost and 83% annual cost.

Tables V and VIII of Annex 1 describe the value of each requirement being added to the physical security systems.

The costs associated with the additional physical protec-tion requirements, when judged in relation to the increased protection provided, appear acceptable.

4.

Public The public will benefit from the fact that the nuclear industry will be protected with higher assurance against malevolent acts.

There is no direct cost impact to the public since, with the negligible exception of activities cupporting the Ft. St. Vrain reactor, material being protected is not being used in the production of com-?rcial electricity in 5

Enclosure "C"

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a the United States.

Some research and test reactors use high enriched uranium and plutonium but again this cost is not directly translatable to increased per capita cost for electricity.

D.

Decision on the Action A decision to require upgraded physical security measures through rulemaking is consistent with the previous Commission decision that emergency action to increase protection was not required.

It is aire consistent with the stated intention of the Commission to initiate a program of upgrading the protection of special nuclear material against thsit and nuclear plants against sabotage.

It responds to the recommendation by the Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safeguards to provide certain quantities of special nuclear material with a higher level of protection. The rulemaking action to upgrade safeguards physical protection systems snould proceed as planned.

6 Enclosure "C"

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I Te,chnical Aporoach i

I A.

Technical Alternatives 1

l An evaluation of the cost impact-to '.T0mda.the physical security

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system at 11 fuel cycle facilities and special., nuclear material in transit was prepared by the NRC staff (see annex to this enclosure).

Because of their diverse nature, each of these fuel l

cycle facilities and the one transportation company were evaluated as to additional performance capabilities required and a judgment f

l made as to the personnel (guerds) and hardware systems needed to bring the physical security posture up to the required level.

This method of evaluation is based on one of several technical approaches which would meet the regulation. Other technical approaches may be proposed and found to be acceptable. The structure of the regulation, i.e., per.formance capabilities, permits this latitude to the licensee so long as the overall capability is in accordance with the required level of perfonnance.

Systems which may be proposed by licensees which are acceptable may result in the same or greater value, i.e., the system would provide the level of protection and may cost less than the system considered by the NRC. staff. The value/ impact of alterna-tive systems could therefore be greater and accordingly would continue to be acceptable.

7 Enclosure "C"

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111. Procedural Approach 4

A.

The procedural approach to upgrade the physical protection of plants and materials can be accomplished by any of the following

- -

• methods:

1.

Perforvence oriented regulation only.

2.

A regulation which includes general performance requirements for the capabilities necessary to protect against adversaries

'plus a generic safeguards system that normally would protide those capabilities.

3.

Specific system type regulation only.

4.

License conditions.

B.

Value/ Impact of Procedural Alternatives 1.

Performance oriented regulations could take the form of statements such as:

The licensee will provide a physical protection a.

capability te neutralize a specified threat or 8

Enclosure 'C"

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l b.

To prevent with high assurance, theft of strategic l

special nu, clear material and to protect against l

radiological sabotage, for fixed sites and special i

nuclear material in transit safeguards must assure i

the license 9's capabilities to:

l 1.

Prevent unauthorized access of personnel.. material and vehicles into Material Access Areas and Vital i

Areas l

11. Permit only authorized activities and conditions within Protected Areas, Vital Areas and Material Accass Areas 111..... Three more capabilities -- see proposed iv.

.... section 73.45, 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977 v.

These capabilities must meet the general performa.se requirements of section 73.20 (42 FR 34313, July 5, 1977).

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l The first statement (a) gives the licensee the widest latitude as to the type of physical security system 1

'o propose and therefore provides the licensee with the option of designing an optimum system for a partic-i ular site.

It lacks definition, however, as to the specific performance capabilities that should be considered by the licensee in order to assure meetings and the general performaace capabilities that are i

required, and this could lead to disputes between the l

11cen-*e and the NRC as to the regulation.

1 1

The second statement (b) also gives the licensee a I

wide latitude as to the type of physical security system to propose, but in addition, channels the system.esign into the fulfillment of certain specific l

performance capabilities. While this provides more criteria for system design, there could still be mis-l i

understandings with regard to performance capability l

l requirements of specific systems.

2.

A regulation requiring a general performance capability as well as some specific systems whereby this general performance capability is met, provides the optimum means of upgrading

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licensee protection of plants and material. Licensee i

options in the design of systems are allowed. At the same j

10 Enclosure "C" l

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I time, the inclusion of the specific systems in the regula-tions assures the public that l'censee systems meet a set i

of individual performance criteria. Review of proposals is also simplified since acceptance of licensee options is made only it tneYap' abilities provided are equally effective.

3.

System requirements alone, while being explicit in the detail design, does not provide the desirable degree of flexibility and would not allow other equally or more cost effective systems or subsystems.

4 The changes to the licensee physical protection programs to upgrade them at fuel cycle facilities and in transit represents such a magnitude that to implement them by license conditions would be subject to legal dispute'by licensees. Moreover, this method of implementation would not be in accordance with the process of public rule making.

C.

Decision on Procedural Approach Issuance of both performance oriented and reference system requirements (alternative 2) is the preferred approach and should be implemented for the upgrade rule. This will provide the licensee latitude to submit a cost effective site oriented physical security plan while providing a basis for comparison of 11 Enclosure "C"

a performance oriented physical security plan to specific require-ments for capabilities.

IV.

Statutory Consideration A.

NRC Authority At the Federal level the Energy. Reorganization Act of 1974, section 204(b)(1) allots to the NRC the Atomic Energy Act authority for the " provision and maintenance of safeguards against threats, thefts, and sabotage of... licensed facilities, and materials."

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides ample authority for the Commission to require licensees to upgrade the existing physical security requirements.

B.

Need for NEpA Assessrent An Environmental Impact Appraisal, supporting a Negative Declara-tion, was prepare.d for the proposed rule published in the Federal Register en July 5, 1977, 42 FR 34310, was placed in the Public Document Room and is still applicable.

12 Enclosure "C"

Relationship to Other Existing or Proposed Regulations or Policies V.

There are no apparent potential conflicts or overlaps with other agencies. The Department of Energy is implementing a similar upgrading of physical security at their contractor facilities and in transporta-tion. Completion of this upgrading program is schedu, led for the end of FY 78.

Issues dealing with Federal, State and local laws, and the interface of international laws or. export / import shipments are dis-cussed in the statement of consideration (Enclosure A). The interface of the proposed regulation with respect to other safeguards activities within NRC is discussed in the staff paper fomarding this action to the Comission.

VI.

Sumary and Conclusions

' Amendments to the regulations (10 CFR part 73) 'should be provided to upgrade the physical security afforded to certain quantities of a class of special nuclear material at fixed sites and while in transit and of plants in which these quantities are used. The incremental value obtained from these improvements, i.e., protection against an increased threat level, outweighs the resulting incremental impact.

In order to provide the option to be flexible in the design of the physical security system as well as provide an enforceable regulatory framework, the amendments should encompass both general and specific requirements.

13 Enclosure "C" 4',N 46f/J$smib?

References 1.

Joint ERDA-NRC Task Force on Safeguards (U), Final Report, July 1976 NUREG 0095, ERDA 77-34.

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1 Enclosure "C" 4

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c ENCLOSURE "C" ANNEX I CAPITAL AND ANNUAL COST COMPARISONS OF PRESENT AND UPGRADED PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS

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The following procedure was used to establish a cost comparison between what a typical physical security system in operation under present regula-tions would' cost and what the additional cost would be for a physical security system under the upgrade rule.

Fixed Site The staff computed the costs for security personnel and systems that would be required at each of 11 facilities to meet the new upgrade reference system requirements (Refteences (1) and (2) were used for many of the cost factors). The total additional costs to upgrade 11 facilities are summarized in Table I.

An average cost per facility can be assumed from the totals to be about 5610,000 Capital and 5546,000 Annual Costs.

Inasmuch as accurate costs for the present physical security system at each facility are not available to the staff, estimates of the present day costs of the existing security requirements at 'a typical fuel cycle facility were made. Table II presents this sumnary.

Tables III and IV prcvide a more detailed basis for Tables I and II.

1 Enclosure "C" Annex I

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1 I

Table V relates the value of each of the additional security requirements i

resulting from the upgrade rule, It is seen that appronimately a 154". increase in capital costs i

(from $4,345,000 to $11.057,000) and an 81% increase in annual costs (from57,414,000to$13.415,000) result from the upgrade rule requirements.

Transportation The staff computed the total costs resulting from 20 shipments / year having I

an avtrage road distance of 800 km/ shipment 'ac a physical security system under the present regulation and license conditions, and for a physical security system under the upgrade rule.

Table VI presents the estimated additional costs to upgrade transportation.

It is seen that the total impact for 20 shipments / year is $48,000 Capital and $68,000 Annual Costs.

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Table VII presents the estimated costs to presently ship 20 shipment / year 1

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under the present regulations and license conditions.

It is seen that Capital Costs are $124,000 and Annual costs 582,000, i

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Table Vill relates the value of each of the additional security require-1 ments resulting from the upgrade rule.

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2 Enclosure "C" Annex !

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12 is seen that approximately a 38% increase in capital costs j

(from $124,000 to $171,000) and an 82% increase in annual costs l

(from 583,000 to 5151,000) result from the upgrade rule requirement, f

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l The air cargo costs were, for the purpose of this analysis, considered l

j negligible since they would not appreciably affect the percentage increase resulting from the upgrade rule.

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3 Enclosure "C" Annex I

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t TABLE I EST1 HATED ADDITION /'. COSTS TO UPGRADE PHYSICAL l

SECURITY AT EXISTMG (11) FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES (In '.,ousands of Dollars)_

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i Requirements Total Total i

Capital Annual

_C,os ts Costs 1.

Fences 2.

L'ighting & Emergency Power

$410 582 1

3.

Perimeter Alarms 76 15 i

4.

Interior Alarms 5.

Locks 6.

Alarms Stations 2,200 440 7.

Perimeter Access Control Station 96 5

8.

Bullet Resistant Features 218 11 9.

Remote Assessment (CCTV) 1,285 255 l

10.

Badging

11. Vaults 1,810 90 4,790

12. Additional Guards l

13. Guard Training 84 180 14.

Security Equipment 60 12 15.

Security Plan Preparation

473, 121 j

Total (11 Facilities) 56.712

$6,001 Average Cost Per Facility

$610 5546 2

4 Enclosure "C" Annex I 4

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TABLE II ESTIMATED PRESENT COSTS FOR AN AVERAGE FUEL CYCLE FACILITY _

(In Thousands of Dollars)

Requirements Capital Annual Cost Cost

~ ~1.

Fences

$25 51 2.

Lighting & Emergency Power 28 6

3.

Perimeter Alarm 23 5

4 Interior Alarm 7

I 5.

Locks 4

I 6.

Alarm Stations 200 40 7.

Perimeter Access Control Stations 25 1

8.

Bullet Resistant Features 9.

Remote Assessment 2

10.

Badging

11. Vaults 583

12. Guards

13. Guard Training 28 22 14.

Security Equipment 10 3

11 15.

Security Plan Preparation 43 -

Total

$395

$674 Total Average Present Cost (11 Facilities) 54,345__

$7.414 5

Enclosure "C" Annex !

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TABLE III

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SUMMARY

OF SECURITY CHARACTER 15 TICS CONSIDERED (CAPITAL COSTS)_

COST (in thousands of dollars)

Present Upgrade Per Facility Total Cost Requirement (Con't) 1.

Fences Length of Perimeter Fence 2500 feet 9 $10/ft.

$25 2.

Lighting & Emergency Power 9 $11/ft.

28

$410 3.

Perimeter Alarms 9 $ 9/ft.

23 76 4.

Interior Alarms 50 Building doors - interior and ext.erior -

magnetic switch 9 $140/ door 7

a 5.

Locks 30 Bu11 ding doors; 10 perimeter gates 9 $100/dior 4

.e e.

M t. 6.

Alarm Stations Cost of Present Alam Stations 200 C,..:

. =n 9th Cost of Independent Secondary Alam Station for 2,200 i

hjp Upgrade rule t

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Perimter Access Control Presently a. guard shack 25

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96 j

IC Station Upgrade to include guard ready roo'm 8.

Bullet Resistant Features Incl. hardening of access control point - $120,000 j

.pmg

" primary central alarm 218 l

l30g station - $98,000 l

wE 1,285 2 9.

Renote Assessment (CCTV) iG. Badging 200 color coded photo badge capacity 2

1,810

11. Vaults Vault upgrading to higher perfomance criteria i

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S't! MARY OF SCCURITY CitRRACTERISTICS CONSIDERED (CAPITAL COSTS)

COST i

(In thousands of dollars)

Present..

Upgrade Requirement (Crn't)

Per Facility Total Cost 1

12. Guards

13. Guard Training CURRENT COST:

Current training is assumed to have been conducted under Regulatory Guide 5.20.

Therefore, a train-ing period cf two weeks or the training cost for one guard is 2/52 (two wks.) of a guard's annual salary ($18,500) plus overhead and estimated train-ing expenses. Thus tht: present estimited training w

cost is:

a.

Cost - one guard:

l Salary ($18,500 x 2/52) e

$712 i

Overhead (40% of $18,500 x 2/52) =

285 Training expense (estimated) =

250

$1 747 Training cost for one guard

$1,250 b.

Guards / facility:

pp 5 guard posts with 4.5 guards / post or g n, 22.5 guards / facility MO I

E c.

Present cost / facility-2 22.5 x $1.250 = $28,125 or 28 (The total present estimateo cost for 11 facilities is:

$28,125 x 11 = $309,375.)

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SUPMARY OF SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS CONSIDERE3 (CAPITAI. COST 5l COST I

(In thousands of dollars)

'j Prt :ent Upgrade Per Facility Total Cost Requirement (Con't)

UPGRADE COST:

The upgrade rule requires 4 wks. training for each guard, 3 additional guard posts and 2 individuals providing arned response.

Thus the estimated increase training cost for the apgrade rule is:

Additional training of current guard force:

a.

2 additional wks. which is equivalent to the total current cost of $28,125.

b.

Additional guards / facility:

co 3 guard posts with 4.5 guards / post or 13.5 guards /facliity.

c.

Training cost - guard force increase:

13.5 guards / facility x $1.250 (cost for 2 wks. training) x 2 (increase training to 4 wks.) = $33,750.

d.

Training cost - armed response:

2 individuals required on 24 hrs. availability -

or -

2 responders x 4.5 x $1,250 (cost for 2 wks. train-ggi Ing x 2 (increase training tn 4 wks.) = $22,500. '

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Cost sunmary - one facility:

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~G Additional training of current guard force

$28,125 (2 wks.)

A Training of new guard Torcr- (4 wks.)

33,750 83 p

Training of arned response individuals 27,600_

=

Total (one facility)

$84,375 (The total upgrade estimated cost for 11 facilities

)

is:

$28,125 x 11 + 084,375 x 11 = S1,237,509.)

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l SlHiARY OF SECURITY CitARACTERISTICS CONSIDERED (CAPITAL COSYS1 COST (in thousands of dollars)

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Present Upgrade Per Facility-Total Cost Requirement (Con't)

14. Security Equipment One vehicle with four wheel drive. Other equip-ment for vehicle - bull horn, fire extinguisher, 10 spotlights - one portable first aid kit; guard uniform, and weapon. Security equipment increase due to the increase in guards and the addition of response forces.

Increased guard equipment - $23,000 i

25:000 60 rifles 12,000 conmunication 43

15. Security Plan Preparattor.

Present Plan requires 6 man months (asn); procc-dures F1 9.5 non Total 15.5 man month'a $2800/mn Cost to prepare upgrade plan is considered about Ti the same 473 Li 50 43,000 x 11 = $473,000 is Total pi 5395

,56,7iz p

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TABLE IV SUtHARY OF SECURITY CilARACTERISTICS CONSIDERED (AMNUAL COSTS)_

COST l

(In thousands of dollars)

Present Upgrade Per Facility _

Total Cost _

Requirement (r.on't)

Maintenar.ce Deprecia tion

.9pprox.

Percent Percent

$1.3 1.

Fences 2

3 5.5

$82 f

2.

Lighting & Emergency Power 10 10 4.5 15 3.

Perimeter Alarms 10 10 1.4 g 4.

Interior Alarms 10 10

.8

.; 3 5.

Locks 10 10 40 440 6.

Alarm Stations 10 10 hb#

W.O 1.3 5

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Perimeter Access Control Station 2

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8.

Bullet Resistant Features 2

255 9.

Remote Assessment (CCTV) 10 10 0.4 10 10

10. Badging m

90

!*Sgil. Vaul ts 2

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l. -. E Current - 22.5 guards 9 $18,500/ guard + 4GI overhead 583 l

g 12. Guards Increase - 13.5 guards x 11 facilities t 36 for four l

non-continuous operating facilities 4,790 i

9 9 $18,500/ guard + 40% overhead.

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SutHARY OF SECURITY CllARACTERISTICS CONSIDERED (ANNUAL CO COST (In thousands of dollars)

Prnsent Upgrade Per Facility Total Cost _

Requirement (Con' t) l I week annual retraining 9 1500/wk + $250

13. Guard Training incidental = $750/ guard plus 10% attrf tton

.10 (2250) = $225 750 + 225 = 975 21.9 Training for an additional 149 guards + 36 180 response force trainees.

10% Maintenance + 10% Deoreciation 3.0 12

14. Security Equipment 9 60,000 cost 11.0 121

15. Security Plan Revision 25% of Initial Cost

$674.1__

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TABLE Y VALUE OF INCREASED PHYSICAL SECURITY

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AT FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES Addition to Current Value of the impact Security System 1.

Lighting & Emergency Power Provides adequate lighting ( 2 ft candles) for assessment purposes within the protected area.

Emergency power provides backup lighting for security.

Provides an increase in the probability 2.

Perimeter Alarms of detection at the perimeter for those facilities requiring it.

Provides more affective control 3.

Locks of access to facility protected areas.

4 Alarm Stations A completely independent secondcry alarm station :.dth a redundart alarm capability provides more effective back up to primary station and additional means of identifying possible collusion of an alarm station operator.

5.

Perimeter Access Control St& tion Provides more effective perimeter access control by reducing the vulnerability to coercion of the entry point guard, These features enhance the service-6.

Bullet Resistant Features ability of guards and guard posts to violent assault and increase the assurance of prompt effective guard force containment measures.

12 Enclosure "C" Annex I

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i TABLE V (Cont'd)

VALUE OF INCREASED PHYSICAL SiCURITY AT FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES f

Addition to Current Value of th' Impact Security System l

7.

Remote Assessment (CCTV)

Provide higher assurance of detection of an attack by an adversary by per-i mitting assessment of all perimeter alarm annunciation at the time that they occur.

s Enhances guard response effective-ness by allowing identification of 4

nuisance alarms as such.

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Improves the timeliness of assessing security contingencies as such and increases the assurance of an adequate i

response force action.

In order to mett the increased threat 8.

Guards levels of the upgrade rule it is esti-mated that an average of 3 additional guard posts and a total responce force of 8 armed individuals would be required at the 11 facilities currently processing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. This translates into 3 guards posts x 4.5 guards / guard post = 13.5 guards per licensee.

This number extended to 11 facilities requires 149 guards. The additional force of two armed responders at four facilities will have to be provided by guards because operations there are not continuous. This requires a total of 36 guards. The total of additional guards is 149 + 36 or 185.

9.

Security Equipment Provides equipment for the additional guards and response force.

I 10.

Security Plan Preparation Provides the necessary organization and documentation to meet the new requirements.

13 Enclosure "C" Annex I

. sJ4. d$4454 4..

,.a.

\\.

l 1*

1 TABLE VI ESTIMATED AD0!TIONAL COST _

TO UPGRADE TRANSP_0RTAT10N i

(In thousands of dollars)_

Capital Annual Cost Cost Requirements _

2 Armored escort vehicles _

$33.0 l

Maintenance and operating costs on 2 escort vehicles - 5.11/km (Ref. 3 pg.121) 57.0

.11 x 800 km x 20 trips x 2(return) x 2 vehicles Manpower Additional escorts 9 513.80 per hr.

35.0 513.8012 x 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> (includes return) x 20 trips x 2 5 additional guards at transfer points 11.0 13.80 x 5 x 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> x 20 trips-1 additional a!rcraf t escort 4.5 13.80 x 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> (includes return) x 20 trips Per Diem for guards / escorts _

t 2.4 530 per day x 4 guards x 20 trips Training l

Initial -

l 4 weeks 0 5500/wk + 250 incidental costs 11.3 S guards / escorts x 52,250 Annual -

l_

1 week 9 5500/wk + 5250 inci:lental costs + 105 l

l attrition 500 + 250 +.10(2250) = 5975 6.0 i

5 guards / escorts x 975 Comunications Cost and mainterance of comunication equipment (Ref. 3 pg. 121) 14 Enclosure "C" e

j_

Annex I

m..,.,.,.cedM6M +,

m

TABLE VI (Cont'd)

ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL COST TO UPGRADE TRANSPORTATION _

(in thousands of-dollars)

Capital Annual Cost Cost _

squirements wenunications_ (Cont'd) additional communication system -

cost and maintenance 50.8

$1.8 irearms AR 15 semiautomatic rifles ($250 each) 2.0

.38 caliber revolvers (595 each) 0.4 Total SA7.5 _

567.7 15 Enclosure "C" Annex I N

,,.a...ei,.r_ K MS2d $ b MIOO;Midn, h-.

TABt.E VII ESTIMATED PRESENT TRANSPORTATION COSTS (In thousands of dollars)

Capi,tal Annual

-Cost Cost Requirement 1 escort vehicle,(Ref. 3, pg. 121)

$8.0 Maintenance and operating costs on I escort venicle - 5.ll/km (Ref. 3 pg. 121)

$3.5

.11 x 800 km x 20 trips x 2(return) 1 cargo vehicle (Armored) (Ref. 3.

105.0 p0. ' 116 )_

Maintenance and operating costs on one_

~ cargo vehicle - 5.28/km (Ref. 3 pg. 116).

9.0

.28 x 800 km x 20 trips x 2(return)

Manpower 5 escorts at $13.80 per hour 44.1 13.80 x 5 x 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br /> (includes return) x 20 trips 4 guards at transfer points 8.8 13.80 x 4 x 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> x 20 trips 1 aircraft escort 4i 13.80 x 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> (includes return) x 20 trips Per Diem for guards / escorts 3.0 5 guards at $30 per day x 20 trips Training Initial -

2 weeks 9 5500/wk + 250 transportation 7.5 6 guards / escorts x 1,250 Annual I week 9 $500/wk + 250 transportation + 10" attrition - 500 + 250 +.10(1250) = IS75 5.3

'6 guards / escorts x 875 Enclosure "C" 16 Annex I l

1 rdE/.O M.?.

6

TABLE V11 (Cont'd)

ESTIKATED PRESENT TRANSPORTATION COSTS (In thousands of collars)

Capttal Annuil Cost Cost Requirement _

Comunications Cost and msintenance of Comunication Equipment (Ref.3pg.121)

$0.9 51.8 Transport 0.8 "

1.B Escort Weapons 1.0 5shotgur.s(5200each)

0. 5__

5.38caliberrevolvers($90)

Total 5113.7 581.7 17 Enclosure Annex 1 e

'S

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'f 4.

't

,s p

t

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...< s.. ls,'sl. k'.

_ :h h k...

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TABLE VI!!

VALUE OF INCREASED PHYSLCAL 3ECURITY DURING TRANSPORTW.T6N Addition to Current Transportation Value of the impact Security System _

1.

2 additional escort vr.hicles Provide.s dispers.ed. targets, 3dded 1 amored maneuverability, and improved tactical response.

2.

Semiautomatic rifles Provides firepower for guards to counter postulated threat 3.

Additional Manpower Heeded to counter postulated threat.

i l

18 Enclosure "C" Annex !

<:9 &,~...

a I

i l

REFERENCES 1

I1 i

\\

)

An Evaluation of Cost Estimates of Physical Security Systems for l

Recycled Nuclear Fuel, Draf t MITRE REPORT - MTR 3541 - January 1978 i

Cost Effectiveness Evaluation of Amendments to 10 CFR rart 73 (Addition l

2, of i 73.55). Enclosure "C" of SECY-76-242A

" Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Reactors Against Industri.A Sabotage" j

i l

Physical Protection of Special Nucl ar Material in the Commercial 2

j 3.

l Fuel Cycle (U) Volume IV - Transportation Mode Analysis (U)

Sandia Report SAND 75-0457-(Confidential) l i

i i

l 1

I i

?

\\

l 1

l l

1' i

j l

19 Enclosure "C" Annex !

j j

1 e..

j I

- - ' ~ ~

-=%*-

s s

4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revision 3

/p aeg'o September 1997 g

(%*****OFFICE OF NUCLEAR R M

fM HH2 REGULATORY GUIDE 5.44 (Draft was DG-$007)

PERIMETER INTRUSION ALARM SYSTEMS possessing Category 112 uantities and types of materi-q A. INTRODUCTION al,10 CFR 73.67(d)(3) requires that the controlled ac-Part 73," Physical Protection of Plants and Mate-cess area be monitored with an intrusion alarm or other rials," of Ele 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations device or procedure to detect unauthorhed penetration specifies performance requirements for the physical or activities.

protection of nuclear power fecilities, independent His guide describes the functions of perimeter spent fuel storage facilities, fuel facilities and special intrusion detection sensors and detection methods that nuclear materials. Some examples of Part 73 objectives are acceptable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and requirements follow. For power reactors,10 CFR (NRC) staff for meeting the portions of the NRC's regu-73.55(c)(4) requires detection of penetration or lations specified above. it provides guidance on sensors attempted penetration of the protected area or the isola, and methods that can be integrated to form an effective tion zone adjacent to the protected area barrier toensure perimeter intrusion detection system. This guide pro-that adequate response by the security organization can vides guidance on selecting perimeter intrusion detec-be initiated. Adversaries are presumed to be determined ti n systems and on applications for nuclear power and knowledgeable. For independent spent fuel storage reactors, independent spent fuel storage installations, installations,10 CFR 73.50(b)(4), in part, requires and certain special nuclear matenal processm, g monitoring of isolation zones to detect the presence of facilities.

individuals or vehicles within the zone. For Category Il fuel fabrication facilities, the use of an intrusion in using this guide. 'i is not the intent of NRC to detection subsystem with the capability to detect pe-compel a licensee te revise commitments in previously netration through the isolation zones is specifically set approved security plans without tv nefit of site specific forth in 10 CFR 73.46(e)(1). (The special case of non-backfit and justification of a siglficant increase in power reactors with Category I types and quantities of protection of public health and safety. In advising materials is addressed in 73.60.) Finally, for facilities affected licensees of the appropriate use of the guide, NRC recommends that licensees, in replacing or redesigning a perimeter intrusion alarm system, con-1 Category I rncans stratesic specal nuclear material as dermed in 10 2 Category ti rneans special nuclear enaterial of rnoderate strategic sig-ntficance as defined in 10 CFR 73.2.

CFR 73.2 UsNac nroutAmay outots ne pdes are neued e v. % inn erond m e as m. moon la re stas lor paris to Cm 1 Power fi.sttors a Producss

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sider the information in the guide as one factor, among best, an intruder can only estimate points where detec-others, in the overall planning of the system. A licensee tion will occur. In contrast, the detection zone of a taut may choose to voluntarily commit to this revision of wise system can easily and accurately be determined.

the guide, in total or in part..

De wires constitute the detection zone.

De information collections contained in this regu.

In selecting a sensor capable of detecting an latory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR intruder,it is crucial to select and integrate sensors that Parts 50,72, and 73, which were approved by the Office will minimize false and nuisance alarm rates. (See of Management and Budget, approval numbers Appendix A, Glossary, for definitions.) Selecting the 3150-0011, 3150-0132, and 3150-0002. De NRC best sensor for a perimeter section will minimize the may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not re-false and nuisance alarm rates. In selecting the best sen.

quired to respond to, a collection of information unless sor for a penmeTer socation, the following factors are' '

it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

considered.

Fence, tdrrier, and isolation zone conditions B. DISCUSSION Soil types and conditions, including blowing sand Drainage GENERAL Suitability of the perimeter for segmenting into De effective use of a perimeter intrusion detection detection zones system is influenced by a number of factora. nese fac-Nearby roads, airports, waterways, railroads, and tors include the environment (such as snow, rain, tem.

perature, lightning); the selection, application, and the type of traffic they carry Perimeter penetrations (above and below grour:d) installation (including proper electrical grounding) of equipment; testing and maintenance of the particular such as culverts, pipes, buried wires, and utilities sensor types used; the ability of the security organiza-Temperature euemes tion to assess incoming alarm data in a timely manner; and the overall integration of the system. A perimeter precipitation (e.g., rain or snow) amounts and intrusion detection system generally consists of one or rates, including ice accumulation and blowmg snow more sensors, electronic processing equipment, a Lightning frequency and severity power supply, signal transmission media, an alarm monitor with display, and a means for maintaining and Natural foliage providing an alarm history.

Wildlife types, population densities, and activity at Sensor systems can be classified, from an applica-or near the perimeter tions viewpoint, as either line of sight or terrain-following, and from a functional viewpoint, as either Electromagnetic interference potential, including volumetric or planar. For line of sight systems to be radio frequency interference potential.

effective, the terrain surface must be relatively flat with Some typical commercially available sensor sys-no significant contour depressions or elevations, in tems are described below, 4

terrain.fc? lowing systems, the sensor's detection pat-tern can adapt to some changes in the terrain's contour.

SENSOR SYSTEMS The terms volumetric and planar refer to the general shape of the sensor's detection zone; the primary differ.

Microwave Systems ence between these terms concerns their depth dimen-Microwave systems are line-of sight and volumet.

sion, or the distance an intruder must travel to pass ric, and they are found in two basic configurations:

through the sensor's detection zone, ne depth dimen-(1)bistatic, consisting of a transmitter and receiver sion for a planar sensor is minimal to near zero (much remote from each other at either end of a microwave like a plate of glass). A taut wire system is an example; link, and (2) monostatic, with receiver and transmitter the intruder must contact the wire to cause an alarm. In located in the same unit, contrast, a microwave sensor creates a volumetric beam Each link of a bistatic microwave perimeter detec-pattem having a depth of up to several feet.

tion system is composed of a transmitter, receiver, An intruder's ability to determine a sensor's detec-power supply, signal processing unit, signal tiansmis-tion zone boundary can compromise the sensor. Micro-sion system, and an output for connection to an wave detectors have invisible detection patterns. At annunciation device. The transmitter radiates a low-SA4-2

power, three-dimensional, typically modulated micro-objects comparable to an individual's movement, a wave signal toward the receiver. De receiver detects, detection signal is generated. Some systems have addi-amplifies, and processes the signal. A referena rate of tional signal processing to discriminate between people microwave energy transfer is establithed while the and what would otherwise be nuisance alarms.

transmitter is unobstructed. When an intruder enters the Ported Coaxial Cable Systems space defined by a conical beam, the total amount of microwave signal energy entering the receiver is A ported coaxial cable system, considered to be increased or reduced from the established reference terrain.following and volumetric, consists of two bur-level.His causes the receiver to generate an alarm.De led shielded coaxial cables, transmitters, detectors, microwave beam is typically modulated to reduce pow r supply, processing unit, and an output for con-interference from spurious sourcet of n;"e fregency nection to an annunciation device. Radio frequency energy, to increase sensitivity, and to decteue the vul.

(RF) energy is transmitted along the transmission line nerability to defeat by the receiver capturing a false and is radiated thrmgh ports in the shield strands. Ris microwave source.

RF energy can be either pulsed or continuous wave.%e pulsed system operates in principle as a guided radar, A monostatic microwave unit consists of a trans-and thus an intruder is both detected and located. %e mitter and receiver in the same unit a'ong with a power continuous wave system detects the intruder but does supply, signal processing unit, signal transmission sys-not localize the intruder's presence along the cable N e 4 3 >n output for connection to an annunciation length.ne transmit receive antenna pattern that is set d@ h are two different kinds of monostatic up between the two cables produces a zone of detection mim m emplitude modulated (AM)and frequency around and between the transmitting and receiving moduisted (FM). AM monostatic microwave systems lines. Changes in this electromagnetic field that exceed detect changes in the net vector summation (direct and threshold levels cause an alarm. He system detects reflected components) of the received signal, similar to moving targets in the zone of detection, and the signalis a bistatic system. FM monostatic systems operate on a digitally processed to provide enhanced signal charac.

pulsed doppler principle and thus can provide range in-teristic identification. De received signal is generally formation in addition to detection. In general, the useful processed to reduce interference from nearby RF range of L monostatic microwave is considerably less emitters.

than that of a bistatic system. For this reason, its exte.

Active Infrared Multibeam Systems rior use is generally limited to short links or volumes covering portals or gaps in coverage between bistatic Active infrared multibeam systems are considered microwave transmitters and receivers, line of sight and planar. Each link of an infrared system is composed of a transmitter, receiver, power supply, Electric Field Systems signal processor, signal lines, and an output for connec-tion to an annunciation device. He transmitter directs a An electric field perimeter intrusion detection sys*

narrow infrared beam to a receiver, if the infrared beam tem is considered terrain.following if the grade is uni-between the transmitter and receiver is interrupted, an form between mounting supports. First generation sys-alarm is generated. Re infrared beam is usually modu-tems are considered planar, while second generation lated. Since the infrared beam does not diverge signifi-systems are more volumetric in nature. A typical sys-cantly, multiple infrared beams between transmitters tem consists of field wires, a field generator, sensing and receivers can be used to define a " wall." If this wires, a sensing filter, an amplifier, a discrimination

" wall" is then penetrated, an alarm will result. (Note:

unit, and an output for connection to an annunciation The term " active infrared" is used to distinguish these device. De field generator excites the field wires, systems from " passive infrared" systems. Passive creating an omnidhectional electrical field primarily infrared systems do not emit infrared energy, but between the field wires and the sensing wires (a field is instead, simply "look" at their field of view and detect J

also created between the field wires and the earth changes in the ambient infrared patterns or intensity j

ground). Electric field systems range from 4 to 7 wire levels.)

systems, i.e., from 2 sensing and 2 field wires up to 3 sensing and 4 field wires. A person approaching the Taut Wirr Systems system changes the pattern of the electric field. Sensing A taut wire system is a terrain-following (with wires installed at different locations within the trans-ground leveling) planar system. He system consists of mitted pattem detect changes occurring in th: pattern.

a series of steel wires, typically barbed, securely if the changes are withia the frequency bandpass of anchored on posts and stretched parallel to the ground.

5.44-3

^^

He wires are closely spaced to prohibit climbids terrain following and either volumetric or planar, between the wires without causing an alarm and are depending on the specific ins:allation and use.

typically tensioned to 36 kg (80 lb). Deflection of or Vibration or Strain Detection Systems cutting one or more of the tensioned wires activates a sensing device connecting each wire to either a sensing A variety of devices that detect strain or vibration i

post or anchor post.%e sensing device may be a simple are available for use as fence mounted intrusion detec.

switch, strain gauge device, or other passive transducer, tion systems. T)TN1y, such systems are cons!dered i

Slider posts are generally used to further support the terrain.following and planar. Although the devices wires, typically at 3 meter (10 foot) intervals.

vary greatly in design, each basically detects strain or vibration of the fence on which it is mounted, such as Fiber Optic Systems that produced by an intruder climbing or cutting the i

fence. In the simplest devices, the vibration or strain Fiber optics refers to light transmission through makes or breaks electrical continuity and thereby gen-specially constructed optical fibers for communica, crates an alarm. In more complex systems, vibration or tions, sensing, or imaging. Optical fiber consists of a strain changes light transmission characteristics light guiding core and a surrounding optical " insula, tor" called the cladding. The core has a higher index of through fiber optics.

refraction than the cladding, which permits total inter-C. REGULATORY POSITION nal reflectioa lf the angle ofincidence ls greater than the critical angle. Light can thus be confined in the core and transmitted along the length of the fiber.

1.

DESIGN OBJECI'IVES AND INTEGRATION A number of different techniques are being used in the developing technology of fiber optic intrusion 1.1 Layout detection. Speckle pattern and interferometry are two in designing an effective perimeter intrusion detec-common techniques. In the speckle pattern technique.

tion system, dividing the site perimeter into segments when light is sent through the optical sensing cable of that are independently alarmed and uniquely monitored the system, it appears at the end of the cable as a assists the security organization in assessing and speckled pattern of light and dark spots. he patterns of responding to an alarm by localizing the area in which light and dark are caused by the many different modes the alarm is initiated. The perimeter segment lengths or paths through which light can travel in a multi mode should be selected with consideration of such factors as fiber optic cable. When the cable is stationary, the pat

• range; limitations of the sensor system; and the loca-tern is stationary, flowever, when pressure is applied to tion, alignment, and viewing areas for closed circuit the cable, the light distribution through the cable is television (CCTV) cameras, when CCTV is used for changed.This change redistributes the speckle pattern alarm assessment. Segmenting the perimeter alarm sys-l oflight and dark.These speckle patterns are converted tem also allows testing and maintenance of a portion of to usable electrical signals through the use of a photo-the system without affecting the remainder of the diode. An alarm processing unit uses this information perimeter.The individual segments should generally be to determine whether an alarm has occurred.

limited to a length that allows observation of the entire segment by an individual standing at one end of the seg-Interferometry can also be used to determine ment. His typically means that segments should not changes in the optical sensing cable. This technique exceed 100 meters (328 feet), but shorter segments may uses wavelength-division multiplexing, which is a be needed to achieve the desired performance.

method capable of sending multiple signals at different wavelengths through the same fiber. He detection The ground surface of the detection zone should be l

l method involves monitoring made interference prepared by stabilizing the soil to prevent the growth of

)

changes of the light that are caused by pressure, vibra-vegetation along the length of the zone. Depending on tion, or motion. To optimize detection capability and the system type, this may help to minimize nuisance minimize nuisance alarms for a particular installation, alarms caused by the movement of high grasses, etc.

the rystem allows the user to select appropriate process-Measures for accomplishing stabilization include sur-l ing t arameters to qualify n disturbance as an alarm. He facing or soil sterilization. Isolation zones on either l

parameters include the frequency band, energy level side of the detection zone also help to provide a clear and duration of the disturbance, and the number of dis-zone for assessment. For all systems, the distance turbances within a specified time. Fiber optic systems between the bottom of the detection zone and the using these techniques for detection are considered ground plane should not be large enough for an 5.44 -4

indNidual to pass undetected under the detection zone A single system that by itself does not meet detec-and thereby circumvent the system.

tion performance requirements may, in conjunction with another system with a different sensing method, Perimeter intrusion detectica systems should be pr vide adequate detection performance. Such com.

placed to maximize detection and assessment capabili-bination systems should employ dissimilar detection ties and minimize nu,isance and false alarm rates. De techniques. This combination of different sensing tech.

following factors should be considered in locating the niques requires an intruder to defeat two (or more) detection system.

types of different sensing methods at the same time, 1.1.1 De iystem should be located so that items which would significantly increase the difficulty of such as existing (or planned) barriers, sensor mounts,3 defeating the system.

light poles, or natural terrain objects (e.g., trees) cannot be used as aids for bridging the sensor's detection pat.

He design goal of a perimeter intrusion detection tern, blocking assessment, or providing cover and system is to detect an individual weighing a minimum concealment.

of 35 kg (77 pounds), whether the individualis running, walking, crawling, jumping, or rolling through the 1.1.2 In determining the distance between the perimeter of a protected area. Further, the design goalof zone of detection and any area in which an adversary a perimeter intrusion detection system should be to may be concealed, the licensee should consider the time limit false alarms and nuisance alarms to a total of not needed to circumvent the barriers, the time to reach a more than one false alarm per zone per day and one nul-concealed location, and the specific intruder-sance alarm per zone per day, assessment capabilities at that location. Digital video frame storage systems are one means of addressing site.

Because nuisance alarm rate data are extremely unique assessment problems by capturing video frames specific to location and detection technique, data before, during, and after an actual intrusion, should be gathered for the first year after a new system 1.1.3 Pedestrian andvehicular trafficshouldbe10-is installed to gain system experience and to allow for cated away from the zone of detection to reduce nui, system alterations. After that period, the data should be examined to establish site-specific rates for both nul-sance alarms, sance and false alarms. De findings should be reflected 1.1.4 Sources of strong, fluctuating electromag-in adjustments to security plan commitments based on netic fields (such as large transfo;mers and electrical site specific operational and environmental circum-power distribution subsystems) should be considered stances and actual performance at the site. Such revi-when selecting sensors susceptible to such distur-sions to security plans may be submitted under the pro-bances (e.g., the electric field sensor and the ported visions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) if the changes do not coaxial cable system).

represent a decrease m. effectiveness of the security 1.1.5 Site specific environmental conditions plan. Settings of adjustable parameters should be should be considered in selecting the system. For recorded and future changes should be recorded with example, sites where fog sometimes obscures visibility justifications.

i may not be suitable for beam breaker type systems, such as the active infrared multibeam system, which IJcensees should be able to observe, in a timely may have its detection capability degraded by the fog's manner, the bridging of a detection zone or tojustify to beam scattering effect.

NRC that successful completion of a bridging attempt is not feasible.

1.2 Detection and Alarm Capabilities De system should be designed to annunciate, Optimum detection capabilities for any panicular audibly and visibly, under the following additional sensor system are achieved when the sensor selected conditions:

has a detection volume suited to specific segment con-Placement of any portion of a perimeter intrusion i

figuration and terrain. In general, volumetric systems detection system m the access mode,d are preferred because they are generally more difficult A unique indication, other than a normal alarm, of a to defeat. Ilowever, for certain limited site configura-tions, planar systems may provide coverage with fewer switch over to emergency or secondary sources of falsc or nuisance alarms compared to avolumetric type

power, sensor.

8 Access inode means the condition that maintains secunty over the sig.

nal knes between the detector and the annunesator and over the tam-3 rter adjustments in sensos position are complete, it might be neces.

per switch in the detector but allows access into the protected area A

sary to remove excessive lengths or mounting poles, th,ough the sone ordetection without indicatmg an alarm condition.

5.44 - 5

Any interruption or reduction of system power to supervision on these communication paths should pro-tia degree that any part of the system is not func-tect against simple elt.;trical bridging of the system or tioning properly, compromise of the system by any of the following Any indication of tampering (e.g., opening, short

• • "8' Substitution of resistance, voltage, or current, ing, or grounding of the sensor circuitry) ths.t ren.

dets the device incapable of normal operations; Substitution of equipment of the same design and Any ludication of tampering by activation of a tam-manufacturer, per switch or other triggering mechanism.

Reintroduction by pinback of signals peeviously rec rded onto the communication path, 1.3 System Electrical Specifications Introduction of signals eto the path that were syn-

~~

• if primary power is interrupted, the security systcm thesized erternally, should contain provisions for automatic switch over to emergency power (battery and/or generator) without The taniper switch and transmission medium causing false alarms and without causing a loss of sys-should be supervised to the same extent in the secure tem function or data. Emergency power should be capa-mode as when the sensor is conditioned for authorized ble of sustaining operation without external support for access.

a minimum of four hours for Category I fuel cycle facil-1.6 System Vulnerabilities ities, or for a site specific period of time determined according to station blackout criteria for power reactor 1.icensees are cautioned that any sensor system facilities. If emergency power is furnished by battery, may have one or more design vulnerabilities that may all batteries (including stored batteries) should be enable the system to be compromised by a knowledge-maintair,ed at full charge by automatic battery charging able intruder. For this reason, it is important that all circuitry designed according to IEEE Standard 450, equipment be installed per manufacturers' specifica-

" Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and tions, meet the performance criteria required by Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Gen-10 CFR Part 73 as clarified in this regulatory guide, and crating Stations and Substations"(1987).5 be thoroughly tested. In some instances, the combina-tion of different sensor types can yield improved per-1.4 hmper Pmtection formance with a reduction in vr'nerabilities. (See Reg-All enclosures containing controls that affect the ulatory Position 1.2,

" Detection and Alarm operation and sensitivity of the detection system and all Capabilities," on combining sensors.) Licensees access point controls should be located within an enclo-should consider requesting that a system manufacturer, sure protected by a tamper switch. De electronics a qualified engineer, or both be present during final should be designed so that tamper switches remain in acceptance testing of a perimeter intrusion detection operation even though the system may be placed in the system to be sure that the system has been properly access mode. At power reactor sites only, cable pull installed.

boxes and termination points need not be tamper-1.7 Amssunt protected if line supervision is used, unless there are splices at the location.

A perimeter intrusion detection system is incom-plete without some means to assess and resolve alarms.

1.5 System Line Supervision It is imperative that the assessment techniques identify All signal lines connecting detection devices to the stimulus in a timely manner before the stimulus of alarm stations should be supervised.6 If the processing the alarm disappears from view. The time an intruder electronics are separated from the sensor elements and takes to run through the isolation zones and disappear are not located within the detection area of the sensor from the field of view of the assessment mechanism elements, the signal lines linking the sensors to the should be greater than the time required to visually processing electronics should also be supervised. Line assess the alarm zone. lf the required protected area bar-en Me MdnMec-tion system do not provide suffic{ent delay to en 3 Cop,es may be obtained from the IEEE service Center. 445 Hoes i

1.ane. Piscataway, NJ 06855.

6SignalIme supernsion is discussed in the NRC's NUREG/CR-5723, delay or improve assessment (e.g., an additional fence, ember 1991) copies mg

• secunty system sisnal supervision

[ P"'p g yj g tt;t g r g theggmginig concertina rolls, razor tape, higher fence, video-cap-oo e

ture monitoring techniques). Care should be taken that (202)st2-1800); or from the National Technical Information Ser-vice by wrning NTis at 5285 Port Royal Ro.d. springGeld. VA 22161.

the means used to provide additional delay do not inter-S.44 - 6

fere with assessment capabilities. De following are ac-De amount of time that equipment is out of service ceptable methods of assessment, should be minimized to preclude the overuse of com.

P'"S*!wy measmes. %e majntenance grap should be 1.7.1 CCTV systems that are fixed and properly effective and respond in a timely manner. De use of aimed parallel to the barrier or perpendicular to the in-dedicated on site maintenance technicians has proven truder's path may be used to provide assessment in-formation to the alarm station operators. it is important effective to ensure perimeter mtrusion detectio'l system

• to select and orient equipment to maximize fields of operability and proper performance, view and, thus, maximize assessment time l'or evalua-2.

PERIh1ETER INTRUSION DETECTION ting intruders passing through detection zones. Dese SYSTEhtS-h11NIh1Uh1 SPECIFICATIONS systems should be designed to display immediately, using the s.a.;p! ti..t activates the annunciation-2.1 bilcrownie Systems Video-image capture devices with the capability 1 2.1.1 Installation Criteria secord an adversary within the zone of assessment and immediately prior to detection are an acceptable alter.

Bistatic transmitters and receivers should be native to alarm activated display monitors. At Cate-installed on even terrain clear of trees, tall grass, stand-gory I fuel cycle facilities, alarm activated display ing or running water, and bushes. Typically, a bistatic monitors should continuously display and not "go microwave perimeter detection system should be blank" during quiet periods (periods of no alarm). Con-Installed to operate effectively in a range not more than sideration should be given to the use of pan / tilt / zoom 100 meters (approximately 328 feet) long. Some mod-(PTZ) cameras to augment fixed camera installations, els are designed to operate over short ranges, e.g.,

as an adjunct to the fixed camera systems.7 across perimeter portals. Successive microwave links 1.7.2 Fixed guard posts can be effective if the and corners should overlap to climinate dead spots posts are positioned so that there is a clear field of view (areas where the microwave beam cannot detect)below of the assigned segment. Rese posts generally should and immediately in front of transmitters and receivers.

be positioned at the end of the assessment area with the ne required amount of overlap of successive links is guard observing in one direction only. De intrusion contingent on the antenna pattern and unit height. In detection system should annunciate in the local guard zone overlap areas, the equipment for the overlapped post as well as in both alarm stations. Consideration zones should either both be transmitters or both be should be given to compensation for loss of guard receivers; this is to minimize interference between the observation capability during periods of reduced visi-successl<e links that could otherwise result in bility such as darkness, rain, fog, and snow, decreased sensitivity and greater false alarm rates with-in zees. Each unh should be mounted rigidly on 1.8 hiaintenance secure posts at a sufficient distance above the ground The regulations in 10 CFR Part 73 require that the that incident and reflected signals combine positively, l

perimeter intrusion detection system be maintained in typically 60 cm (24 inches) for 100 meters (328 feet), or j

an operable condition, thus a preventive maintenance according to the manufacturer's installation criteria.

program is necessary. Maintenance of the detection, Because of variances in the antenna patterns of different alarm communication, annunciation, and assessment microwave systen.s, the h:ight may have to be varied system is critical to successful operation. Licensees slightly to obtain coverage adequate to detect crawling should establish an ongoing program for maintenance.

intruders. Accordingly, the mounting mechanisms for a In addition, maintenance may be initiated by the testin8 system should permit adjustment of antenna height and program, operational requirements, the routine peri-position to correct poor performance or alignment.

odic maintenance program, or a trending program or Receiver units for a microwave link may also need analysis.

to be specially protected because of their susceptibility to tampering by a knowledgeable intruder or to ece et capture" WMgh electmnic meaMMedm l

? Video systems are discussed in NUREG/CR-$721,"Vueo Systems

(

for Alarm Assessment" (D. A. Greenwoll and J. C Matter capture" occurs when a receiver recognizes a false Nd$iYe"nfrSt$frhm$hetIIcNrknIn$ int 7s Ir$.

transmission signal as its own. hicans available to o

P O.

Dos 37082. Washingtoni DC 20402-932s (telephone minimize vulnerabilities include the use of monostatic aW to pWet M aMa Men hcekcr kah l

hr tfngNatY8 rtNyYR ad Spr n m

A 61.

copies are maat 1e for insp.ction or copying for a fee"from the NRC located or the use of additional perimeter intrus. ion DYs Eto detection equipment, such as an electric field system, 1 s s d e s is a h n ton 20355-0001; telephone (202)634-327f; f as (202)634-3343.

Configured to require penetration of a detection zone in 5.44 - 7 l

I order to access a receiver head. Aswith bistatic receiver transmitter nor a receiver should be mounted on a fence heads, monostatic transceiver heads may be vulnerable unless prior approval is received from the NRC. Over.

to certain tampering methods and must also be pro-lapping transmitter / receiver paths should also be tected, possibly by placement inside another sensor's designed to prevent bridging from transmitter or detection zone as described above, receiver posts and to prevent an intruder from moving undetected behind units. Similarly, care should be Stacking of microwave sensors is one means of taken to be sure that mounting posts cannot be used as increasing the elevation detection zone height of the stepon pomts fodumping over N zone of d&ction.

system to enhance its detection capabilities. The stack-2.1.2 Performance Crittria ing technique, in effect, fills in the dead zones that can be inherent in simple bistatic systems. Additionally, the A microwave perimeter detection system should use of stacked units can help detect the bridging or be capable of detecting an intruder weighing a mini-jumping of a detection zone. Multichannel microwave mum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing through the units should be used in an alternating pattern around the zone of detection between the transmitter and receiver, perimeter.

including the area in front of both the transmitter and receiver, whcther the individual is walking, running, Since the bistatic transmitter / receiver link is a line-jumping, crawling, or rolling. Provisi n should be of sight system, variations in ground level (e g.,

made ta ensure detection in spite of the dead spots in ditches and valleys) may allow some intruders to crawl fr at of tranuniness and seceivers. The beam should be under the beam, and variable obstructions (e.g., snow m dulated and the receiver should be limited to drifts on accumulations) may interrupt the beam. To respond to selected frequencies to decrease susceptibil-prevent passage under the microwave beam, variations in the ground should be leveled, ditches should be ity to " receiver capture.

filled, and obstructions should be removed so that the 2.2 Electile Field Systems area between the transmitter and receiver is clear of ob-2.2.1 Installation Critesia structions and free of rises or depressions. The distance between the bottom of the detection rone and the I'lectric field systems should be installed with ground plane should be such that a prson cannot crawI zona, that me limiied io 100 meters (328 fee 1) or less in under the zone undetected. Typically, the distance order to have effective detection sensitiWty for assess-between the bottom of the detection rone and the ment and response. He system can be mounted on ground should be 15.24 centimeters (6 inches) or less metal, pintic, or wneden posts using specially de-Si,ned etcctrical iod.aors that allow for small move-The clear area should be sufficiently wide to preclude t

the generation of alarms by legitimate movements nea, ments of the iets without disturhing the wires. The the microwave link (e.g., personnel walking or vehicu.

wiscs need to be under a high degree of spring tension to lar traffic) and to preclude system degradation caused produce high-frequency vibrations when they are by reflections from any structure, such as the perimeter stnrk by small foreign objects or blown by the wind, fence. Approximate dimensions of the microwave pat.

botn of whkh are out of the bandpass of the receiving tern should be provided by the monufacturer, circuitry ne electric fiebt sens t's wires should be spaced Motion or disturbance of objects such as tumble-s that an individual moving between the wires can be weed, paper, and bushes moving in the path of the beam detected. It is important that the lowest wire of any elec-can cause nuisance alarms. Since the beam is relatively tric field system be consistently close enough to the wide, care should be taken to ensure that reflections gr und t detect crawling under the wire. Accordingly, from authorized activities do not create nuisance the bouom wire should be located 15.24 centimeters (6 alarms. With the microwave link installed inside a inches) or less above ground level. The field wires and perimeter baa rier or between a double perimeter barrier, sensing wires should be located and spaced per the the transmitter and receiver should be positioned to manufacturer 's specifications. The electric field detec-detect anyone jumping over the microwave beam into tot is not a line-of sight system and therefore can be the protected arca from atop the perimeter fence or wall.

installed on uneven terrain and in an irregular line.

Typically, the distance between a chain link security 11 wever, the terrain between posts must be of uniform fence with an overall height of 2.4 meters (8 feet) and grade so that the field and sensing wires can be installed the center of the microwave beam should be a minimum of 2.4 meters (8 feet). In addition, the microwave link parallel to the ground.

should be positioned within the isolation zone to Because of the characteristics of an electric field enhance assessment once detection is made. Neither a detection pr rn, the system should not be mounted on 5.44 - 8

of net.r a fence that an intruder could use to jump over crawling or rolling under the lowest wire, stepping or the field. Consideration may also need to be given to the jumping between the wires, or jumping over the wires, ability of intruders to set up, without observation, such

%e field and sensing wires should be supcivised to pre-hand carried equipment as small ladders for jumping vent undetected cutting or bypassing of the system by ever the electric field without detection. In general, electronic or clandestine means.

cvasion of detection by jumping over a planar system need not be considered if the overall height of the sys.

2 3 Ported Coaxial Cable Systems tem is about 3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater, because of 2 3.1 Installation Criteria the impact of jumping from those heights. For electric field systems, wires that are not connected to either Ported coaxial cable systems should be installed field generators or fwld change sensors may prove use.

per the manufacturer's specifications. He maxim"m ful for altering the field contours to fill in gaps on to and minimum separation of the transmitter and receiver extend the effective height of the field. In addition,if can vary. Generally, this type of system can operate in the electric field system is mounted on the side of a longer segments than other detection systems. Ilow-wall, the stand-off from the supporting barrier should ever, it is recommended that detection zones be not permit passage between the barrier and the system, restricted to segments ol 100 ueters (328 feet) or less to ne surrounding terrain within 3 meters (10 feet) of facilitate assessment. He system is tertain following field wires should be free of all shrubs, trees, and under-and can be curved around comers. %e lines are gener-growth.

ally buried approximately 18 centimeters (7 inches) deep and I to 3 meters (3 to 10 fer.t) apart. The installa-

'Ilie system should be well grounded per the tion of ported coaxial cabic perpendicular to buried manufacturer's recommendations cloag its entire metal conduit for electrical cables or metal pipes used length with special care given to the sections that go for water or storm drains may degrade detection or over walls or buildings. He control unit should be well cauta nuisance alarms. Soil conductivity should be grounded using a 1 meter (39 inch) or bnger ground-considered when installing this type of sensor. Soil ing rod or equivalent electrical ground. Grounding may found to have relatively high conductivity may cause be difficult under dry carth conditions. The resistance the detection field to be reauced, liighly conductive between ground rods and canth should also meet soilincludes soil that contains concentrations ofiron or manufacturer's recommendations.

salt. Moving objects in the zone of detection such as lilectric fieht systems should be tuned or over-f liage, rippling weer, and grasses may create aisance lapped if necessary to overcome any lack of sensitivity alarms. Rodents can chew through ported coaxial in the areas around tension springs and end insulators.

cable. Sensor locations should be selected carefully to Monastatic microwave could also be used to protect prevent nuisance alarms from such sources as person-these areas. Another alternative is to install barriers in nel and vehicular traffic. Similarly, the cleared area these areas to either channel an intruder into the higher above the sensor should be controlled to prevent the sensitivity envelope or require increased activity 'o placement of objects within the area, even temporarily, penetrate the barrier sufficient tobe detected even in the which would degrade the detection zone. The transmit-ter and receiver transducer lines should be installed on reduced sensitivity region. Each wire should be kept free of nicks, cuts, etc., and be properly tensioned per well dreined terrain cleared of trees, tall grass, and manufacturer's recommendations along its entire bushes. System sensitivity may be affected by freezing length. Systems mounted on chain link fence are sus-or : hawing of the surrounding terrain. Ilecause local ecptible to wind caused alarms and should be avoided, anomatics can cause variances in the antenna pattern, There may be some loss of sensitivity in the vicinity of the separation between the lines may vary slightly in ruetal posts used to support electric field fences. If site order to obtain proper ground coverage. Neither the transmitter nor the receiver lines should be mounted conditions necessitate bstallations over buildings, nonmetallic posts (e.g., wood or fiberglass reinforced above ground. Approximate dimensions of the detec-plastic) should be used to prevent gaps in the detection tion pattern should be provided by the manufacturer.

The system should be installed reiative to perime-zone.

l 2.2.2 Performance Criteria

I'.rwing, s that the transmitter and receiver lines are positioned to prevent someone from avoiding detection An electric field perimeter detection system should by jumping over the electromagnetic field. Typically, be able to detect an individual weighing a minimum of the distance between chain link security fencing with 35 kilograms (77 pounds) whether the individual is an overall height of 2.4 meters (8 feet) and the center of 5.44 - 9

the detection zone should be a minimum of 2.4 meters angles,with sufficient overlap to preclude the use of the (8 feet).

mounting posts for jumping over the plane of detection; this installation precludes the use of common posts.

Manufacturer's instructions should be tollowed when installing cable seross concrete or asphalt areas.

Fog, rain, and spaw can attenuate and disperse the Particular attention should be paid to the binding agent infrared beam and can cause nuisance alarms. Ilow-and app!ying epoxy over the cable groove after the ever, the system can be designed to compensate for j

cable is installed in the concrete or asphalt, severe atmospheric attenuation. Dust on the face plates w

a s attenuate se infrared kam, as wG an ao mulatl ion of condensation, frost, or ice.

2.3.2 Performance Criteria A ported coaxial cable perimeter detection system Condensation, frost, or ice may be eliminated by should be capable of dueuiuph huividual weighing a using heated face plates. Sunshine on the receiver may minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing over the cause nuisance alarms. A misalignmen; of transmitter transmitter and receiver wires, whether the individual and receive: caused by frost heaves may also cause nui.

is walking, running, jumping, erawling, or rolling. De sance alarms. Like the microwave system, vegetation electromagnetic field should be modulated, and the such as bushes, trees, or grass and accumulated snow receiver should be frequency selective to decrease sus-v illinterfere with the infrared beam. ne passage of an ceptibility to " receiver capture.

Intruder may go undetected on irregular ground sur-faces, ditches, or hills.

2.4 Active Infrared Multibeam System 2.4.1 Installation Criteria ne transmitter and receiver units should be posi-tioned a minimum of 3 meters (10 feet) from perimeter When installing an active infrared multibeam sys*

fencing. The infrared detection system should not be tem, the maximum distance between transmitter and installed directly adjacent to a barrier, since the barrier receiver should permit proper operation during condi-may provide a solid base from which an intruder could tions of severe atmospheric attenuation that are typical jump over the beams into the protected area.

for the site. De maximum distance betwe:n transmit-2.4.2 Performance Criteria ter and receiver is generally 80 meters (260 feet). Th:

infrared perimeter system should be installed so that, at An infrared periraeter detectioh system should be a any point, the lowest beam is 15.24 centimeters (6 multibeam modulated type, consisting of a minimum inches) or less above grade and the highest beam is at of six beams per segment, ne system should be capa-least 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) above grade to prevent ble of detecting an individual weighing a minimum of bridging.

35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing between the trans.

mitters and receivers whether the individualis walking, Consideration should be givca to the ability of intruders to set up, without observation, such hand-mnning, jumping, crawling, or rolling. This means that the mirared beams should be placed and interlaced to I

carried equipment as small ladders forjumping over the f rm an infrared " wall." Furthermore, the systems infrared beams without detection. In general, evain should be able to operate as above with a factor of 20 of detection by jumping over a planar system need not (13dB) insertion loss from atmospheric attenuation be considered if the overall height of the system is about (e.g., f g) at a mdmum range of 80 meters (2Wed).

3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater, because of the impact of l

jumping from those heights. The beams should be suf-2.5 hut Wire Systems ficiently interlaced that an individual could not pene-2.5.1 Installation Criteria trate between the beams and remain undetected. He transmitters and receivers should be rigidly mounted Manufacturer's specifications should be followed (e.g., installed on a rigid post in a concrete pad extend-in the installation of the system. liowever, because of ing below the frost line) to prevent nuisance alarms the basic operating principle of the system (i.e., ten-from vibrations or ground shifting. Systems with sioned wires), the length of the segments should be lim-heights greater than 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) should be spe-ited to 60 meters (200 feet) or less. The overall height of cially stabilized to prevent v;bration caused alarms, for the system should be 3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater.

example, by mounting on a building wall. Each post on Wires should be spaced so no intruder can pass between which a transmitter and receiver is mounted should be the wires without detection, normally a distance af l

provided with a pressurecnsitive cap to detect 15.24 centimeters (6 inches) or less between wir:s. A l

attempts at scaling or jumping over the post. As an sensing post should be placed approximately halfway l

alternative, successive infrared links should overlap at between anchor posts. (Anchor posts may function as 1

5.44 - 10

sensor posts in certain models.) To provide additional alarms caused by the wind can be seduced by rigidly system support, slider posts should be spaced approxi-mounting the fence and thereby lessening the propen.

mately every 3 meters (10 feet) between the anchor post sity of the fence to vibrate in the wind. Electronic and sensor post or between anchor posts. H: system signal processing equipment used in conjunction with may be installed on chain link fencing or an existing signal generating strain transducers can effectively wall with a standoff equal to or less than 15.24 centime-reduce nuisance alarm rates witbout sacrificing sensi-ters (6 laches). When installed on chain link fencing, tivity to climbing or cutting the fence. Increasing the the taut wire system should be installed on the interior fence height also appears to enhance sensor perfor-or protected area side of the fence. De ground within 1 mance. Consideration should be given to the ability of meter (39 inches) on either side of the taut wire system intruders to sei up, without observation, such hand-Wuld be stabilized to prevent erosion and to maintain carried equipment as smallladders forjumpingover the the bottom wire at 15.24 centimeters (6 inches) or less infrared beams without detection. In general, evasion above the ground.

of detection by jumping over a planar system need not be considered if the ovet all height of the system is about 25.2 Performanee Criteria 3.7 meters (12 feet) or greater, because of the impact of ne system should be installed so that an alarm is jumping from those heights. However, most fence received on deflection of any wire that causes a vertical detection systems can be bypassed easily by a variety of opening greater than 15.24 centimeters (6 inchts).

methods.

2.7.2 Performance Criteria 2.6 Fiber Optle Systems Vibration or strain-detection systems used for 2.6.1 Installation Criteria fence protection should detect an int:oder weighing a Since the use of fiber optics in intrusion detection minimum of 35 kilo; rams (77 pounds) attempting to is a fairly new technology, licensees are encouraged to climb the fence. De system should also detect any consult with the NRC on site specific usage. Manufac-attempt to cut the fence or lift the fence fabric 15.24 turer's guidelines for installation should be followed.

centimeters (6 inches) or more above grade. ne system Segments should be limited in length to 100 meters should not generate excessive nuisance alarms. In addi-(328 feet). Since such systems detect pressure, motion, tion to the testing described in Regulatory Position 3 of or vibration, they are sensitive to many of the vulnera-this guide, the vibration or strain detection systems bilities found under vibration or strala sensitive sys-should be tested for their ability to detect fence cutting tems or buried line technologies.

attacks or other means of defeating detection unique to 2.6.2 Performance Criteria these systerns.

A fiber optic detection system should be capable of 2.8 Other Intrusion Detection Systems detecting an individual weighing a minimum of 35 Some systems currently under development may l

kilograms (77 pounds) passing over the cable, whether be acceptable, when fully developed, for use at NRC.

the individual is walking, running, jumping, crawling, licensed facilities. Other systems that currently do not or rolling.

have an acceptable detection performance capability may at some future time be refined and be found suit.

2.7 Vibration or Strain Detection Systems able, in either case, these systems would have to be per-If used, a vibration or strain-detection system formance tested by the licensee and a qualified inde-l should be installed in accordance with the following pendent agent (such as a national laboratory) prior to criteria and used only as a secondary intrusion detection consideration by the NRC.

system to augment the detection capabilities of a pri-3.

RECOMMENDED TESTING mary system.

PROCEDURES 2.7.1 Installation Criteria in conducting any testing procedures, care should Depending on the variety of sensor, cach sensor can be taken to ensure ttle safety of the individuals perform-monitor a lengtt of fence ranging from about 1 meter ing the testing. He standard Occupational Safety and (39 inches) to several hundred meters. Vibration or 11ealth Administration procedures and practices should be followed, l

strain-detection devices for fence protection generally are susceptible to nuisance alarms caused by wind Specification testing should take place at the initial vibrating the fence, hait stones, or large pieces of trash installation of the equipment. If available, test procc-blowing against the fence. The frequency of nuisance dures recommended by the manufacturer should be fol.

5.44 - 11 I

iowed. As in all test situations, the area under test will. in most cases, be sensor and location-dependent.

should be maintained under visual observation by a Note that vulnerability to penetration also varies with member of the security organization while the test is environmental conditions. Inclement weather may be a being conducted. For each perimeter segment, the test particularly good time for a realistic evaluation of pe-should (1) ensure that the system meets manufacturer 's rimeter vulacrvbilities.

specifications and NRC recommended detection prob.

Test each segment using a combination of all tLe ability, f 2) verify that no dead spots exist in the zone of applicable penetration approaches at the most vulner.

protection, and (3) verify that line supervision and able area a total of 30 times. All 30 tests should result in tamper protection in both the access and secure modes successful detections.

are functional. Records of initial testing capabilities, if the minimum number of suxessful detections is equipment sensitivity settings, or voltage outputs should be maintained by the licensee so that deteriora-not achieved, the system should be checked. lf no prob-tion in equipment capability can be monitored.

lems with the system are discovered,10 more tests should be made if the miniraum number of successful Two acceptable options for testing are described detections is achieved, in this case 39 out of 40 (see the below. Other testing methods may be used if the meth*

following table), the testing for this segment can be en-(xis are fully documented and are approved by the jed. lf no problems with the system ean be discovered NRC.

and less than 9 out of 10 additional intrusions are detected, the system must be upgraded to increase the 3.1 hating Option I detection probability to the required level. lf problems Af ter the equipment has been installed and specifi-with the system are discovered, the system should be cation tested, the perimeter intrusion detection and repaired and 30 new tests performed. lf therc are 30 sue-alarm systems should be operationally tested in all seg-cessful detections, testing can be ended.

ments at least once each seven days in the following manner. Testing may be conducted during routine Minimum No.

Maximum No.

patrals by members of the licensee's security force.ne Total No. of of Successful of Failures testing should be conducted by crossing the zone of Tests Detections Detected detection or by disturbing the fence on which the sys' 30 30 0

tem is attached to cause the system to alarm. Defore the 40 39 1

test, the individual making the test should notify the alarm stations that a test is about to be conducted, ne 50 48 2

detection system in all segments should be walk tested in a different, preferably random, order every seven ne penetration approach that is most difficult to days, and the testing should be conducted throughout detect should be attempted more frequently if an equal the week rather than conducting all tests on the same number of tests for each npproach is not possible, day. The testing should result in 100% detection on all segments every seven days. If the perimeter alarm sys-ne segments should be tested in random order, tem falls to detect an intrusion on one or more seg-His will protect against the possibility that environ-ments, corrective actions should be taken and docu.

mental effects and other unknown factors that may af-mented. Records should be maintained to document fcct the test results (detection or nondetection) always that all required testing has been accomplished.

favor or handicap the same segment or method of ap-proach. For example, if Segment 1 is always tested in in addition to operational testing, at least semi-the morning and Segment 2 is always tested in the after-annually, as well as after each inoperative state and after noon and if the detection equipment is slightly more any iepahs, the system should be performance tested. A sensitive to intrusions in the morning, the conclusion 90% probability of detection with 95% confidence might be drawn from the test results that Segment 2 is should be the design goal of the system. An acceptable less protected than Segment 1. However, the difference performance testing method follows.

noted between the two segments might only be due to the morning versus aftemoon differen'ce. Similarly, us.

Model Performance Wsting Program ing random methods, no approach will be continually Determine the most vulnerable area of each seg.

favored if the time sequence (ordering) affects the test ment and determine the method of approach most likely results. This will protect against disturbances that may so penetrate that segment, e.g., walking, running, jump-or may not occur and that may or may not be serious if ing, crawling, ro: ling, or climbing. This determination they do occur. A random numbers table can be used to 5 44 -12

I.

determine the order in which the segments will be favored if the time sequence (ordering) affects the test tested.

results. His will protect against disturbances that may or may not occur and that may or may not be serious if Maintain records of the results of all tests per-they do occur. A random numbers table can be used to formed. These recorcis should include the segment determine the order in which the segments will be number, date, time, and relevant environmental condi-tested.

tions when tests were performed. Records should be maintained consistent with 10 CFR 73.70.

Because this option for testing is conducted on a j

weekly basis, the performance of the system need only be determined annually, as opposed to semi annually as 3.2 Testing Option 11 with Test Option 1. At t.he conclusion of a 12 month Under this option, one pass (i.e., one attempt to cir.

period, data accumulated from the weekly testing can cumvent the zone of detection) of a performance test is be applied to totals used in determining performance conducted in place of an operational test and the burden levels.

for semi annual performance testingis greatly reduced.

In essence, improved weekly testing is conducted With proper system performance, semi annual perfor-throughout the year, as opposed to Test Option I in mance testing need not be conducted. Instead of a sim.

which rudimentary weekly testing is conducted over 1

ple "go, no-Bo" operational test conducted by a member 6-month periods along with extensive performance of the security force passing through the zone of a testing at the end of the period. He Boal is improved detector on a weekly basis as with operational testing, testing over a year period with reduced overall burden this performance type of test that is conducted weekly on the licensee.

represents a challenge to the system.The weekly per-formance test is conducted by determining the most Under Test Option ll,1f a sensor achieves 50 detec-vulnerable area of each segment and determining the tions over a 52 week (annual) period through weekly method of approach most likely to penetrate that seg-testing of the segment, additional performance testing ment, e.g., walking, running, jumping, crawling, roll-need not be conducted at the end of the year. (Tradi-ing, or climbing. This determination will, in most tional performance testing would still be required after cases, be sensor and location dependent. Note that each inoperative state or repair.) Testing must never vulnerability to penetration also vades with emiron*

conclude on a nondetection. If three or more nondetec-mental conditions. Inclement weather may be a particu-tions occur, accumulated data for the period may not be larly good time for a realistic evaluation of perimeter counted toward totals for performance testing and the vulnerabilities, accumulation of data must be restarted.

Over time, each segment should be tested by using As described in the model performance testing pro-a combination of all the applicable penetration gram in Section 3.1, records of all tests performed approaches at the most vulnerable area.The penetration should be maintained.

approach that is rnost difficult to detect should be D. IMPLEMENTATION attempted more frequently if an equal number of tests for each approach is not possible.

The purpose of this section is to provide informa.

The segments should be tested in random order, tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC This will protect against the possibility that environ-staff's plans for using this regulatory guide, mental effects and other unknown factors that may affeet the test results (detection or nondetection) always Except in those cases in which an applicant or favor or handicap the same segment or method of licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for appraach. For example, if Segment 1 is always tested in complying with the specified portions of the NRC's the t iorning and Segment 2 is always tested in the after-regulations, the m thods described in this guide will be noon snd if the detection equipment is slightly more used in the evaluation of submittals in connection with sensitive to intrusions in the morning, it might be con-applications for construction permits and operating claded from the test results that Segme.nt 2 is less pro-licenses. This guide will also be used to evaluate sub-tected than Segment 1. Ilowever, the difference noted mittals from licensees who propose system modifica-between the two segments might only be due to the tions that are voluntarily initiated by the licensee if morning versus afternoon difference. Similarly, using there is a clear tiexus between the proposed modifica-random methods, no approach will be continually tions and this guidance.

5.44 - 13

4 APPENDIX A GLOSSARY Access mode ne mndition that maintains searity over the signallines between the detector and the annun.

clator and over the tamper switch in the detector but allows access into the' protected area through the zone of detection without indicating an alarm condition.

4 Active system A type ofintrusion detection sensor that emita a signal from a transmitter and detects changes in the reception of that signal.

~

Bist tlc system As used with a microwave sensor, a sensor consisting of a transmitter and receiver remote from each other at either end of a microwave link.

Bridging Circumvention of a perimeter detection system by traversing above the zone of detection using hand carried aids or nearby objects.

Cladding De reflective outer layer of an optical fiber that surrounds the light carrying core.De cladding contains the light in the core and allows the fiber to guide light from one end to the other. ne cladding has a lower index of refraction than the core.

Crawling Crossing the detection zone lying prone on the ground with a low profile at an approximate velocity of 0.03 meter (1 inch) per second, body aligned perpendicular to the zone of detection.

Dead spot An area in an intrusion detection zone where there is no detection capability.

Design stimulus An individual weighing a minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds), running, walking, crawling, jumping, or rolling through the perimeter of a protected area.

False alarm An alarm generated without an apparent cause.

False alarm rate ne frequency at which a particular alarm zone indicates a false alarm, the design goal for which is no more than one per zone per day, index of refraction A measure of a transparent material's ability to bend light, usually abbreviated as "n." De index of refraction is the ratio of the sgwed of light in a vacuum to the speed of light in the material.

Interferometry Using the interference of light waves to precisely determine the wavelength of the light.

7 solation zone An area adjacent to a physical barrier, clear of all objects that could conceal or shield an individ-ual. For facilities required to have double protected area barriers, this zone should extend 6.1 meters (20 feet) on either side of the protected area barriers and include the area bounded by the barriers Fr. facilities required to have a single protected area barrier, the isolation zone should c:. tend 6.1 meters (20 feet) on either side of the protected area barrier.

Jun.,nng leaping over the zone of detection, including standing on a fence and attempting to leap across the zone of detection.

Line-of sight As used with intrusion detection systems, a sensor that requires a terrain surface that is relatively system flat, with no significant contour depressions or elevations.

Monostatic As used with a microwave sensor, a sensor that has the receiver and transmitter located in the system same head or unit.

'Multimode liber Optical fiber that permits more than one light mode to be propagated.

5.44 -14

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Nuisance alarm An alarm ;enerated by an identified input to a sensdr or monitoring device that does not repre.

sent a safeguards threat.

Nuisance alarm The frequency at which a particular alarm zone indicates a nuisance alarm, the design goal for rate which is no more than one per zone per day.

Operational Testing performed at the beginning and end of ar y period in which a sy stem is used. lf the period testing of continuous use is longer than seven days, under operational testing the system must be tested at least once every seven days.

Passive system A type of intrusion detection r,casor that produces rio signal from a transmitter but simply detects energy emitted in its vicinity.

Performance Testing conducted at least semi annually, after each inoperative state, or after any repairs to ensure testing the design stimulus will be detected properly. An inoperative state for an alarm system or com-ponent exists, for example, when the power is disconnected to perform maintenance or when, for any other reason, both primary and backup power sources fall to provide power Placing a properly operating alarm system in access would not constitute an inoperative state unless accompanied or followed by any of the conditions above.

Planar system A system in which the distance an intruder must travel to pass through the detection zone is considered more two-dimensional, as a flat plane, than three dimensional or volumetric.

Receiver capture As used with a sensor system, the condition that occurs when a receiver recognizes a false trans-mission signal as its own.

Rolling Crossing the detection zone on the ground with a low proille, body parallel to the zone of detec-tion, and moving at an approximate velocity of 0.03 meter (1 inch) per second.

Running Entering and leaving the zone of detection at an approximate velocity of 5 meters (16 feet) per second.

Secure mode ne condition that maintains security over the signallines between the detector and the annun-clator and over the tamper switch in the detector; the secure mode does not allow access into the protected area through the zone of detection withoat indicating an alarm condition.

Segment One of several sections into which a perimeter intrusion zone might be subdivided to optimize sensor performance, compensate for unique terrain features or vulnerabilities, improve alarm assessment capabilities, or facilitate response force deployment.

Specification Testing done after completion of the system's initialinstallation or replacement of any major testing component to verify that the system complies with (1) the manufacturer's specifications for design, installation, and adjustment, (2) performance criteria set by the NRC and the site, and (3) any other criteria on which the system's acceptability is based. Specification testing is more comprehensive than performance testing.

Speckle pattern A light interference pattern produced at the end of a multimode fiber that is being illuminated by a laser source.

Terrain following As used with intrusion detection systemt, a sensor with a detection pattern that can adapt to system some changes in the terrain's contour.

Wlumetric system A system in which the distance an intruder must travel to pass through the detection zone is considered more three-dimensional than two-dimensional or planar.

Walking Entering and leaving the zone of detection with a normal stride (2 30-inch steps per second).

5.44 - 15

4 APPENDIX H CllECKLIST i

This appendix contains checklists for each type of or structures are not amenable to standar'd instal-detection system described in this guide. ney may be lation.

used as reminders when planning, installing, or using Be aware that microwave sensor detection zones the systems.

that parallel a road with veh}cular traffic or long MICROWAVE fence lines may produce nuisance alarms unless sufficient offset is established betwer.o lhe. sensor Ensure that microwave sensors are set up so that axis and the interference source, e.g., traffic on the they have a clear line of sight between transmitters roads or swaying fence lines, and receivers.

Note that standing water, e.g., from heavy rain, E,nsure that nicrowave sensor systems are under the microwave sensor detection zone can installed ovei it ground or ground with a constant produce an increased nuisance alarm rate when the slope to prevent shadowing (inadequate detection water is rippled by winds. Crowned surface grades in depressions),

and gravel beds can reduce or eliminate standing For corner overlap applications, keep intersection angles of microwave beams as close as possible to Note that, after a heavy rain, moving water under 90 degrees, i.e., orthogonal, the microwave detection zone may produce nui-sance alanns, Never mount on the same post two microwave re-ceivers for different segments or zones (or on the Note that significam snow depths and drifts can same channel),

produce velds in the detection zone.

Remember that dynamic multipath signals frota Consider that the dead spot in detection immedi-microwave sensors can be subject to constructive stely below and in front of microwave units and destructive interference-increases with mounting elevation.

Consider that the detection pattern is relative to the Consider that heavy rain exceeding 5.6 cm (2.2 mounting position, and it is sometimes possible for nches) per hour is likely to cause microwave sen-an adversary to crawl under the detection beam sors to produce nuisance alarms, when microwave sensor antennas, i.e., receivers Consider that electro-magnetic interference (EMI),

and transmitters, are relatively high.

either reflected or direct, can strike the microwave Consider that it is sometimes possible toj amp over receiver and cause nuisance alarms. Shichied the zone of detection when microwave sensor radomes or enclosures with shielded wiring and

antennas, i.e., receivers and transmitters, are proper grounding can reduce or eliminate the mounted low so the detection zone is close to the effects of EMI.

ground.

Note that scoustic noises and vibrations, e.g., seis-When a boundary system is to be established using mic activities or mechanical disturbances, can microwave sensors and multiple zones or sectors, adversely affect some microwave sensors and not the detection zones should overlap to achieve a affect others, depending on their design, signal continuous detection pattern with no areas of processing, and installation parameters.

seduced detection capability at the ends of each Remove food and water sources from the vicinity sector.

of the sensor system to prevent foraging animals De aware that reflections of microwave signals from causirg nuisance alarms.

from nearby structures, traffic, or surface disconti-Limit grass heights to l0 cm (3.91nches) to prevent nulties may cause nuisance alarms. Ilowever, reflection of microwave signals may sometimes be nuisance alarms caused by the wind moving the used effectively to extend coverage where terrain grass.

SA4-16

Be aware that the detection capability of active ELECTRIC FIELD SYSTEMS infrared multibeam systems can degrade in adverse Avoid installation in areas that are sut> ject to drastic environments snh as heavy rain, dense fog, sels-environmental changes, such as temperature mic r.ctivity, and vibration as from vehicle traffic.

extremes, Install systems so that intruders can not crawl Easure that angles of corners are kept as close to 90 under or jump over the detection zone.

degrees as possible.

Install systems so that the ends of rhacent zones Note that electric storms can cause electric field overlap.

I systems to malfunction and can cause false alarms.

Note that wildlife activity can cause nuisance

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When electric field systems are installed on perim-alarms in active infrared multibeam systems.

eter fencing, the perimeter fencing must be kept in good condition at all times.

TAttr WIRE Make sure that a constant tension is maintained on For electric field sensor zones located parallel to roads, provide sufficient offsei from the road to the wires through periodic checking and adjust-ments.

prevent nuisance alarms.

Be tware that certain environmental conditions, Note that significant snow drifts and depths can such as icing or frozen ground heaves, can cause degrade detection capabilities.

nuisance alarms.

P.nsure that wires are retensioned after extreme sea-Ensure that, prior to installation, terrain under the sonal temperature changes.

system is leveled to a constant grade.

Ensure that the path alongthe alignment of the sen.

PORTED COAXIAL CABLE SYSTEMS s r fence is cleared of all vegetation, tree branches, Ensure that the ground in which a ported coaxial and otkr debns.

cable system is buried is firm and is not subject to Consider the installation of curbing under the fence movement.

system to prevent tunneling or trenching.

Note that ground water can cause ported coaxiel Ensure that fence posts are securely anchored.

cable systems to generate false alarms.

Note that rodents can chew through ported coaxial FIBER OPTICS SYSTEMS cable.

Install according to manufacturer's recommenda.

Avoid intersecting irrigation pipes and power lines tions, since many new and different technologies with the coaxial cable, are being used in fiber optic detection.

For buried lines, be advised that nuisance alarms Note that the detection zone may be elongated at may P caused by tree root movement in high

curves, winds.nd by nearby vehicular traffic.

Note that the sensor may react to strong sources of pg 9

;g g radio frequency energy.

g,

_ Perform soil conductivity tests to ensure that high detection systems, conductivity, such as is caused by high concentra-VIBRATION. OR STRAIN DETECTION tions of iron or salt in the soil, does not "short out" SYS'ITJfS the radio frequency field.

Foliage and debris touching or being blown against ACTIVE INFRARED MULTI BEAM SYSTEMS a fence can create nuisance alarms.

Note that active infrared multibeam systems Fence fabric must be securely fastened down.

require a clear line of sight.

All gates in the fencing system on which the sen.

Be aware that active infrared.nultibeam systems sors are mo mted should be prevented from vibrat.

require flat ground to prevent shadowing.

ing to prevent nuisance alarms.

5.44 -17

s-If not encapsulded in conduit, system wiring Enswe vibrations from nearby vehicles do not cause nuisance alarms.

-should be interwoven in the fence fabric, rather than simply clipped to it, to prevent removal as a t

Wildlife activity can cause nuisance alarms, awans of defeating tthe system.

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l 5.44 - 18

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l VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT l

- A separate value/ impact statement has not been prepared for this Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 5.44. A value/impad statement was prepared for tbc upgraded l

physical protection amendments to the regulations that were published in the Fed.

ers/Regisser on November 28,1979. nis analysis is also appropriate for this res-ulatory guide. A copy of the value/ imped statement is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC; the PDR's mailing address is Mail Stop LIA, Washing.

l too, DC 20555-0001; telephone (202)634-3273; fax (202)634-3343.

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'5.44 - 19 5

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2......

a CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENG SYSTEM DOCUMENT PREPARATION CFIECD2ST nds check list is to be submitted with each document (or group of Qs/As) sentforprocessing into the CCS.

1. BRIEF DESOllPTION OF DOCUMENT (S)

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L tQ

2. TYPE OFDOCUMENT X CORRESPONDENG _

HE4 RINGS (Qs/As)

3. DOCUMENT CONTROL,__ SENSITIVE (NRC ONLY) X NON-SENSITIVE

4. CONGitESS10NAL COMMITIEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE ((f applicable)

Congressional Committee Subcommittee 5, SUBJECT CODES (A)

(B)

(C) _

6. SOURG OFDOCUMENTS (A) 5520 (DOCUMENT NAME

)

(B)

SC4N (C),_

ATTAWMENTS (D)

OTHER

7. SYSTpf fg0GDATES (A) IIII}47 DATA OC4 SENTDOCUMENT TO CCS (B)

DAT' CCS REGIVED DOCUMENT (C)

DATE RETURNED TO OC4 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (D)

DATE RESUBMITTED BY OC4 TO CCS (E)

DATE ENTDtED INTO CCS BY (F)

DATE OC4 NOTIFIED 7HATDOCUMENT15IN CCS COMMENTS:

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RELEASE TO POR 100000

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